INDONESIA MENGHADAPI PERKEMBANGAN EKONOMI DUNIA YANG SARAT RESIKO DAN KETIDAKPASTIAN PROF. J. SOEDRADJAD DJIWANDONO

Forum Kepemimpinan Ekonomi Bangsa

INDONESIA MENGHADAPI PERKEMBANGAN EKONOMI DUNIA YANG SARAT RESIKO DAN KETIDAKPASTIAN

PROF. J. SOEDRADJAD DJIWANDONO Jakarta, 9 Mei 2016

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Butir-butir presentasi pada Forum Kepemimpinan Ekonomi Bangsa, Bank Indonesia, 9 Mei 2016



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3(1*$17$5 Saya akan membahas perkembangan ekonomi regional dan global sebagai tantangan dan sekaligus peluang yang dihadapi Indonesia, termasuk kebanksentralan. Butir-butir pembahasan ƒ Perkembangan Ekonomi Dunia ƒ Indonesia dalam Peta Resiko Global ƒ Perkembangan Moneter dan Finansial ƒ Menghadapi kondisi yang penuh resiko dan ketidak pastian; berbagai cacatan

Caveats ƒ

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Saya tidak membuat studi sendiri mengenai apa yang saya kemukakan di sini. Presentasi ini menggunakan sejumlah sumber termasuk dari Bank Dunia (World Economic Prospects ), IMF, (W orld Economic Outlook), World Economic Forum, JP Morgan Global, Financial Times dan berbagai sumber lain. Karena alasan yang mudah-mudahan dimaklumi saya lebih fokus kepada membahasan tantangan daripada bagaimana menghadapinya. 

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LAMPIRAN

37

LAMPIRAN 1 C H I NA DA I LY

C H I N A D A I L Y. C O M . C N / O P I N I O N

M O N D A Y, O C T O B E R 2 9 , 2 0 1 2

9

views • letters

A N D R E Y V I N O G R A D O VA

W H AT ’ S T H E B U Z Z

China’s democracy suits the nation

This year, four mainland universities made the global top 100 and the reputations of many Chinese universities are growing. Do you have any plans for advanced education in the near future? If so, will you choose to study in China or abroad? Could you explain why? China Daily’s mobile phone news readers share their views:

F

or several decades, Western politicians considered lack of democracy to be the main problem with China. However, when the global economic crisis struck they realized that the rest of the world is more dependent on the China’s economy than its democracy. This was highly symbolic for the era of globalization and an extremely timely shift of priorities. Nevertheless, the rest of the world is still discussing the Chinese political system, especially with the 18th National Congress of Communist Party of China round the corner. For many Western specialists, the level of a country’s development is directly connected to its state of democracy. But China’s success and the economic crisis in Europe and the United States shook the faith in this belief. But the question remains: Will China be able to endure the difficulties and prove the advantages of its development model in new conditions? A radical change of the current political system is impossible without the maturation of the corresponding political culture. People, for whom the basic requirements of food, clothing and housing are still the first priority, need the political power that would be able to satisfy their requirements. This power has the highest degree of legitimacy. Despite the appearance of new social groups that require extension of their political involvement, the majority of the population in China is still interested mainly in stable welfare growth, not in changing a political system. Even in the West, the legitimacy of the political power is not secured only

by elections. Only a relative minority of the electorate votes leaders to power in Western countries. For example, in 2008 less than 30 percent of the US electorate voted for Barack Obama, with more than 40 percent not participating in the election either because they believed elections could be manipulated or for other reasons. There is no one-party rule in the US, but there is a duopoly of power, which prevents real political competition. Elections in the US, as well as in a majority of other “mature democracies”, are narrowed down to readymade options and give freedom of very limited choice. The system reminds us of “fast food” philosophy — easy and fast, but one never gets what one really wants. This is not to challenge the fact that democracy is possibly the best form of governance, but it should be emphasized that it is far from perfect even in Western countries. Western democracy, as well as any other public institution, must not be idealized. After all, despite its development, ancient democracy was not able to avoid collapse. Unable to sustain the historical competition, ancient democracy was rejected by the European civilization. That, however, couldn’t stop democracy’s development. The empires and monarchies that replaced ancient democracy met the requirements of European society in the Middle Ages and were thus recognized as legitimate authority by the people. Modern human values cannot explain these changes, but laws of history can. This means a political authority’s success and legitimacy reflects its capability to

respond to the challenges of the time. Today, as in 1978, China is passing through a crucial time and it is probably worth raising the same question that helped it choose the correct solution 30 years ago. As well as a truth, democracy has a strict criterion, which in this case is efficiency of public administration for the majority of the people. If we neglect efficiency, then our values will turn into a religious myth and will forever be blind to reality. In addition to being efficient, a political regime needs to be stable, and for this reason it has to correspond not only to the aims and challenges of the time, but also comply with national traditions. Since stable political systems develop gradually, according to historical conditions, there is no common model of democracy even in Europe today. Constitutional monarchies, and parliamentary and presidential republics differ from each other — and radically so from classical democracy. What’s more, models of democracy not only vary from country to country, but also change gradually with time. If democracy can continue developing, why can’t other political systems do the same? Simply put, democracy means that people, of their own free will, allocate the authorities with rights and responsibilities, which turn out to be the basis of political stability. The easiest and most convincing way to fulfill that requirement is to hold national elections. It could also be done without carrying out the election procedure in its totality.

The tradition of direct participation dates back to Greek democracy and involves ethics as part of the modern political mechanism. It implies that politically active members of society, like members of a ruling party, are obliged to be engaged in almost every aspect of daily political and social life. The execution of these functions, however, imposes on them increased requirements. Unlike Western democracy where voting in elections is voluntary and people vote once in several years, members of this party couldn’t avoid participating in public life, not even for a day. All that required special inter-party mechanisms, which are still unknown to Western democracies. So if a ruling party readily responds to all the changes in society, there appears to be no need for a two- or multi-party system, as the mechanism under oneparty leadership can be non the worse democratic. It is not easy to perfect this mechanism, and the best example was the Soviet Union. But it is still possible to move in this direction and the CPC stands a good chance of doing so. In no country do people directly govern the state. Hence, modern democracy can be defined as a form of government, which reflects the interests of a nation. It is not the election itself, but political stability, which proves this. A nation can choose its leadership in ways different from elections, but the feature people consider the most important is its efficiency. The author is director of the Center of Political Research, the Russian Academy of Sciences.

J. S O E D R A D J A D D J I WA N D O N O

New monetary easings raise concern

R

ecently, the central banks of three of the world’s largest economies attempted to stimulate their economies by adding new liquidities. The US Federal Reserve under chairman Ben Bernanke, acting on its promise to address the worst US unemployment since the Great Depression, decided to purchase mortgage-backed securities worth up to $40 billion every month. The program will be executed indefinitely until the unemployment falls to a more acceptable level. This is known as QE3, following two similar monetary stimulus initiatives since the global financial crisis struck. This decision was made only a few days after European Central Bank President Mario Draghi announced his version of monetary easing, or what he called outright monetary transactions (OMT). It took the form of a program to purchase sovereign bonds of eurozone countries in the secondary market with fewer conditions. There is now no requirement for triple A-rated bank collateral, and the bonds are not treated as senior loan, meaning in the event of bankruptcy, the ECB loan does not get priority for repayment. However, countries have to subscribe to a bailout program with tough fiscal and structural reform conditions — as in the case of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. After this, the Bank of Japan too implemented its brand of quantitative easing by buying assets held by banks and giving them loans of about $4,127 billion. On Oct 26, Japan’s Cabinet approved a 423 billion yen ($5.3 billion) economic stimulus package, a move to combat recession as its economic recovery falters. In all these policies, the central banks seem to show the public that they are proactively pursuing a policy to salvage their economies. In a way, these independent central banks have made a unilateral decision to make the policies, without being pressured by their governments. There is no clear answer as to whether these policies work. Most economists who support QE3 could only claim that it is because of these actions that the countries’ financial sectors, as well as the global financial system have not worsened. Indeed, every time such

In retrospect, I regret not having studied abroad. Since my university professors only repeat what I had already learnt, I have barely learnt anything new. Also, I have found that my vision is less broad than those who have studied overseas. I think people should study abroad to experience the outside world while they are still young.

JASON, Foshan, Guangdong province

I have no plan to go abroad in the near future, but hope to do so after graduation. It is less about better education than about experiencing different cultures, customs and people.

ZHOUMO, Wenzhou, Zhejiang province

I am a junior student majoring in English. I don’t want to study abroad because I do not want to burden my parents with the high tuition fees of an overseas postgraduate program. Also, overseas returnees do not enjoy the former preference with employers any more, so studying abroad is less attractive. Besides my major is English, which means I would need to change my major if I went abroad. So all things considered, I will do my advanced studies in China.

A READER, Jinan, Shandong province

If I can afford it, I will continue my studies abroad. I am very happy that four mainland universities made the global top 100. But while undergraduate courses in Chinese universities are good, there is a long way to go for postgraduate programs to reach the standard of overseas universities.

A READER, Mianyang, Sichuan province

I am a junior student majoring in traditional Chinese medicine and I want to do my postgraduate studies at a domestic university. Beijing University of Chinese Medicine is a very good platform for TCM majors while China has a competitive edge in TCM resources. Also overseas programs have higher tuition fees and a higher requirement for English proficiency.

XIAOFEI, Jinzhong, Shanxi province

I think we should never travel too far away from our parents, so I am now preparing to take the entrance exam for a domestic postgraduate school. Though some may regard it as an obstacle to their ambition, as far as I am concerned, relatives, parents in particular are very much in need of our company. Besides, it is not necessarily the case that one will be better off studying abroad that at home. Career prospects are decided by one’s efforts instead of where one studies.

XIAONIU, Hangzhou, Zhejiang province

LET TERS

A just and constitutional man Comment on “Ex-Security officials to try easing tensions” and “Former Senator McGovern dies” (China Daily Oct 22, 2012)

PANG LI / CHINA DAILY

a policy has been announced, the market has responded positively, though only for a short time before doubts returned. Only market players seem to welcome the moves of these monetary authorities and even then such positive response has lasted only briefly. After the initial euphoria, the market players resume worrying about the longer-term problems, like whether the sovereigns could repay their debts, when growth would resume and when the unemployment problem would dissipate. In other words, there is skepticism over the long-term impact of these monetary policies and whether they are effective to address the problem of unemployment. Draghi has stated very clearly that OMT cannot be effective without cooperation from the real sector. Monetary policy alone is not enough to have an impact on the real sector. Basically, monetary policy is no substitute for fiscal policy. The problem lies in weak demand coupled with a fragile financial system. There is also the issue of whether a monetary authority has a clear mandate to address the problem of unemployment that a quantitative easing is clearly meant to tackle. In a way a quantitative easing seems to be a quasi-fiscal policy, which may not be within the mandate of a central bank. For sure the Federal Reserve’s mandate does include the objective

of achieving full employment in the US. However, this is not clearly the case with the ECB, whose main function is to maintain stability against inflation and deflation. Most central banks in Asia after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 have also become independent with a narrower mandate of merely guarding financial and/or economic stability. Another issue involves the ballooning of the balance sheet of these central banks and its implication. In the last four years of QE1 and QE2, the balance sheet of the Fed increased by more than $2 trillion. Now there is a serious possibility of a sovereign default by Greece because of euro crisis. And if ECB loans to banks are not treated as senior loans, there is a grave possibility of a central bank default. A more serious impact many economists are worried about is on price stability or inflation. It does not take a hardcore monetarist to believe that too much liquidity would ultimately result in inflationary pressure. The Japanese economy in the 1980s and the US economy in the 1990s showed that too much liquidity and very low interest rates for too long could create bubbles — properties or stocks which ultimately developed into financial crises. The worry over the impact of this strategy on inflationary pressure is as valid as concerns over the quantitative

38

easing executed by the Fed, the ECB and the BOJ. For emerging Asian economies, there is yet another concern that cannot be ignored. Money is “fungible”, as students of monetary economics would say. Additional liquidities arising from the QE3 initiatives of these central banks will not necessarily be spent in their own economies. Any extra liquidity that households, enterprises or banks have will be used first to clear their outstanding obligations and to improve their balance sheets (deleveraging) before any though about spending, which would then create additional demand, boosting growth and ultimately employment. But where will these additional funds go? They will flow to where there is more room for profit. In this regard, the emerging economies are the most likely destination. In a globalized financial system, it is the emerging economies that will have to deal with these additional liquidities looking for room to unload. This means additional challenge for the monetary authorities of the emerging Asian economies, which are already facing increasing risks in general. The author is a professor in the international political economy programme, Nanyang Technological University. He is former governor of Bank Indonesia, the Indonesian central bank.

I was on former US senator George McGovern’s staff from 1970 to 1972 and drafted key passages of his testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the “Okinawa Reversion Treaty” of 1972. Most of the news of McGovern’s passing away on Oct 21 deals with his failed bid for the presidency and his opposition to the Vietnam War. Also worth mentioning in the context of the current SinoJapanese tensions over Diaoyu Island is McGovern’s opposition to the “Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 1972” in which the US gave the Okinawa archipelago and Diaoyu Islands to Japan. McGovern testified against the treaty and voted against it because he believed the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China. He gave geographical and historical reasons in support of his argument against the treaty. Unfortunately, his principled and wellreasoned position on the issue as well as many others was crushed by former US president Richard Nixon. Most Chinese fondly remember Nixon for his breakthrough visit to China and his meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. In fact, McGovern was equally eager to normalize relations with China and during his election campaign was actively working behind the scenes to communicate with Beijing. Had McGovern been elected in 1972, he too would have reached out to Mao and Zhou. McGovern also wanted the US having normal diplomatic relations with Cuba. History will show that on a broad range of issues, from the Vietnam War and relations with China to the Diaoyu Island and Cuba, McGovern’s positions were not only politically wise, but also just and constitutional. JAY HENDERSON, via e-mail

The opinions expressed on this page do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

LAMPIRAN 2

RSIS COMMENTARIES RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from RSIS. Due recognition must be given to the author or authors and RSIS. Please email: [email protected] or call (+65) 6790 6982 to speak to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, Yang Razali Kassim.

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

No. 159/2013 dated 27 August 2013

‘Greed is Good’: A Hard Lesson to Unlearn By J. Soedradjad Djiwandono Synopsis A recent survey about greed culture in Wall Street showed an alarming tendency: despite much effort by governments to strengthen regulation and supervision of finance, greed and corrupt practices might not be declining. Commentary THE CULTURE of greed in finance was popularly depicted in a 1987 movie “Wall Street” by the behaviour of a Wall Street trader Gordon Gekko, who believed in greed as the guiding principle for the conduct of business. Played by Michael Douglas, Gekko argued for upholding the greed principle in business during a shareholders meeting by declaring: “Greed, for lack of a better word, is good.” Since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, preceded by the US subprime mortgage loans meltdown, it has been commonplace to blame greed as the major cause of the global financial crisis and the great recession that followed. The devastating impacts of the global financial crisis, however, had crystallised the resolve of world leaders to deal with the problems. Greed culture in finance In the process governments, together with the monetary authorities of advanced countries, had been bailing out banks and other institutions. However, they were simultaneously also adopting stiffer regulation and supervision of the banking and financial system in general by raising the bar on the rule of risk taking. These had been done through rules to discourage excessive risk taking and limiting proprietary trading, known as the Volcker Rule; more stringent capital requirements in compliant with the Basel III rule; and others. In the US these new rules are the provisions contained in the related regulations - the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2011. Other countries, both advanced and emerging, have been doing likewise to make their financial systems more viable in the face of increasing risks and uncertainties. These rules and regulations showed resolve of the governments and monetary authorities the world over in dealing with greed in finance, by adopting regulations aimed at punishing illegal activities in finance, and limiting the use of public funds to bail out banks. Many argued that excessive risk taking and leveraging, which had become prevalent and even the norm in finance, had its roots in moral hazard and greed.

_________________________________________________________________________________

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, South Spine, Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. Tel. No. 67906982, Email: [email protected], Website: www.rsis.edu.sg.

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2 Disturbing trend As the fifth year of the global financial crisis approaches there has been some striking revelation from a survey by a US law firm Labaton Sucharow on greed culture of Wall Street. The survey was conducted through interviews involving 250 industry insiders, including traders, portfolio managers, investment bankers, hedge fund professionals, analysts, advisers, and others from a number of financial institutions operating in Wall Street. The results of the survey, which have been very disturbing, could be summarised as follows: • Only 36% of those in the industry feel that Wall Street has changed for the better since financial reform in 2020; • 24% say they would agree to insider trading activity to make US$10 million if they could get away with it. For employees having less than ten years’ experience, the percentage is 38; • 28% feel that the financial service industry does not put client interest first; • 52% feel it is likely that their competitors have engaged in unethical or illegal activity; 24% feel employees in their own company are likely have done so; • 29% believe the financial services professionals may need to engage in unethical or illegal activity to be successful; and • 26% believe the compensation plans at their companies encourage unethical or illegal activity. Of course the survey still has to be subjected to some scrutiny regarding its accuracy. And one cannot paint with a big brush to say that all financiers are the same. However, these findings may make the public wonder whether they could trust these institutions with their money. Nevertheless, something is definitely wrong in the financial sector if close to one third of the players believe in the need to engage in illegal activity to be successful. In addition they would be willing to commit insider trading if they could get away with it because they think their competitors are no different and that their institutions do not put client interest first. Certainly all are completely the reverse of the claim these institutions make, like putting client interests first and upholding high standard of integrity and treating public trust as sacrosanct. Will greed ever stop? The survey shows some disturbing signs: one is the willingness of a financier to commit insider trading and the need to commit illegal activity to succeed in finance. In this, the percentages are higher for those working relatively shorter periods, such as less than ten years. This implies that the younger executives who would become future leaders of the financial industry are more prone to commit these unethical activities to advance their career. If the above survey is valid the future of finance is certainly discouraging. Why? Since in the high and increasingly risky and uncertain world, the financial industry may be in the hands of financial leaders many of whom are willing to put rules aside and have the tendency to leave business ethics behind. They would do so due to the belief that others would do the same. Market players believe in the philosophy that greed is good. The good news, though, is that more and more cases have been brought to court and that many more have been indicted. The perpetrators have been put in jail or had to pay huge amounts of fines or both. Hopefully these will discourage the financiers from violating regulations and business ethics in the future. To name some notorious cases, there are the billion dollar Ponzi schemer Bernard Maddoff; the rogue trader UBS’ Kweku Adoboli who caused his bank to lose billions of dollars; securities fraudsters such as Raj Rajaratnam of Galeon, Rajat Gupta and Fabrice Tourre of Goldman Sachs; and the indictment of SAC Capital. Many more may still come to light to bring further disrepute to the already battered global financial system driven by unfettered greed. J. Soedradjad Djiwandono is Professor of the International Political Economy (IPE) Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is also Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Indonesia and a former Governor of Bank Indonesia, the central bank.

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LAMPIRAN 3

No. 220 – 11 November 2014

www.rsis.edu.sg

RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical issues and contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from RSIS and due recognition to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email: [email protected] for feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentary, Yang Razali Kassim.

Income Inequality: New Worry Over Impact of QE By J. Soedradjad Djiwandono Synopsis While the policy of easy money known as quantitive easing (QE) has saved the US financial sector from collapse, it has also been criticised for causing various problems. One recent criticism: QE could worsen the already worrisome global trend of increasing income inequality. Commentary THE US Federal Reserve has actually terminated the quantitative easing or QE. It is basically a programme for repeated purchase of assets – mortgage-backed securities and bonds – for an unspecified period by the Fed. QE was launched as part of efforts to fight against the credit crunch that became contagious since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. The programme was implemented in three stages. The last one (QE3) launched in September 2012 involved a monthly purchase of securities of US$40 billion (later raised to US$85 billion). When some economic indicators showed improvement the Fed decided to end the programme. This was done through the tapering-off or reduction of the monthly purchase by US$15 billion first announced in May 2013. It proved to be quite a controversial move. QE and income inequality The announcement caused some market turmoil in emerging economies leading to what has since been dubbed as ‘taper tantrum’. However, since the Fed was not sure about the economic improvement in addition to the market turmoil, the tapering was started only seven months after the announcement. The implementation of the taper had reduced the monthly purchase to zero by the end of October. As the Fed had implemented the programme according to schedule, QE was terminated accordingly by the end of October. However, the termination of asset purchase by the Fed does not mean the end of QE as a whole. Despite differing in variation the Bank of England also implemented quantitative easing in 2009 and Bank of Japan (BoJ) did so in 2013. The BoJ’s programme is still continuing. Lately there has also been pressure for the European Central Bank (ECB) to do likewise to avoid the ‘Japanification’ of

41

Europe – namely deflation and its associated phenomenon of prolonged weak or even stagnating economy. Basically under the QE the central banks create hundreds of billions of US dollars, British pounds and Japanese yen respectively to buy bonds and mortgage-based securities. The addition of trillions of dollars of liquidity saved global markets for not just bonds, but equities from collapsing as it was indeed the case. For sure, this was also the objective of the programme when the scheme was introduced. Meanwhile the ownership of equities is mostly by high income groups or the rich as the poor do not own stocks. The QE which was aimed at suppressing long term interest rates had also an additional impact of raising prices of equities. As a result the return on investment in equities had become better than the return of investment in fixed assets (bonds). The above development has been used to criticise QE as ultimately hurting savers including fixed income earners and pensioners. In addition QE has been criticised for lopsidedly benefiting the rich at the expense of the poor, and thus increasing income inequality. A global phenomenon Increasing inequality has become a global phenomenon. This was also the view from the World Economic Forum in its report about the global risks in 2011 which mentioned the consequent social risk from increasing inequality. Early this year this forum, known as the Davos Group, issued a resolution that put increasing income inequality at the top of global risks that could trigger social unrests. Dr. Olivier Blanchard of the IMF stated in introducing The World Economic Outlook 2015 that “as the effects of the financial crisis slowly diminish, another trend may come to dominate the scene, namely, increase income inequality”. In a new book Capital in the Twenty First Century, Professor Thomas Piketty of Paris School of Economics disputes the validity of established theories in economic growth and income distribution proposed by Nobel Laureates in Economics Professor Simon Kuznets of Harvard University and Professor Robert Solow of MIT respectively. The well-known Kuznets curve showed that income distribution is bell-shaped; it is increasing in the early stage of development but decreasing as an economy developed. Professor Solow proposed ‘the balanced growth path’ which also showed that income distribution will ultimately balancing toward more equal distribution. In contrast Dr. Piketty showed that inequality of income has historically been increasing in both the US and Europe. The main reason is that the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate of the economy. This had been the case through much of history until the 19th century and is likely to be the case again in the 21st century. Capital and wealth had been unequally distributed at the outset. Debates about income inequality Actually the debate about inequality of income has become more prominent since the financial crises that the world had been experiencing, especially the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. Some writings by academics like Professors Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs are all testimonies of the concerns regarding increasing income inequality. Amidst the debates about the global spread of income inequality, Fed Chairperson Janet Yellen recently made a presentation at a conference in Boston stating her great concern of the rising income and wealth inequality, and asking whether this is compatible with American values. Curiously though in her detailed presentation, Dr Yellen did not touch on the issue of whether QE contributed to the inequality. The rise of income and wealth inequality could threaten the social fabric of economies harbouring them. This is too important an issue to be ignored, even in monetary policy, no matter how unconventional it is.

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J. Soedradjad Djiwandono is Professor of International Political Economy, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University and Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Indonesia. Nanyang Technological University Block S4, Level B4, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 Tel: +65 6790 6982 | Fax: +65 6794 0617 | www.rsis.edu.sg

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Bad behaviour on Wall Street too big to ignore AMID public anxiety, if not confusion, over the possibility of the “Grexit” — Greece exiting the Eurozone — due to the stalling of negotiations between Greece and its creditors, there have been discouraging news about the record-breaking fines on a number of mega banks found to be involved in foreign exchange market rigging. Six banks were fined US$5.6 billion (RM21 billion) by American authorities last month and US$4.3 billion by the European authorities last November for their involvement in rigging the foreign exchange markets. In 2012, the Libor rigging prompted US$9 billion in fines against a number of banks. According to Martin Wolf writing in the Financial Times, from January 2012 to December last year, the total fines paid by financial institutions to US enforcement agencies amounted to US$139 billion. And this does not seem to be the end of the story. In last month’s and last November’s cases, banks were fined for conspiring among themselves to rig the prices of foreign exchange in the market. These banks were acting like a cartel, making deals in foreign exchange transactions on behalf of their clients but which actually benefitted themselves more. The transactions were considered to be a conspiracy in violation of antitrust laws by the Department of Justice (DoJ). In addition, the conspiracy also involved fraud for not providing the right information to their clients or counterparties. These have been done to maximise profit for themselves at the cost of their clients or counterparties in the transactions. But how could all this have happened? To be sure, this mind-boggling development has been facilitated by the practice of foreign exchange trade in decentralised, bank-dominated and lightly regulated foreign exchange markets. It is different from equities largely conducted over the counter. As bank dealers keep trading data as proprietary, it is difficult for outsiders to know exactly the correct market price of any currency when putting an order to bid or to offer. In this constraining environment, the most parties in selling and buying currencies could observe is a set of rates announced in a very limited time set each day — one minute at 4pm every day by WM/Reuters, a subsidiary of Thomson Reuters. Due to this limited window in foreign exchange trade, parties buying and selling currencies have to conduct their transactions via the services of a limited number of dealers who operate like a cartel and seem to make money for themselves instead of servicing their clients. The six banks fined US$5.6 billion by the US authorities last month for rigging the forex market include Bank of America, UBS, RBS, JP Morgan, Citigroup and Barclays. The same banks last November also had to pay US$4.3 billion to financial authorities in the United

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Kingdom, Switzerland and the US. Some of these banks were also taking part in the Libor rigging, which in 2012 led to US$9 billion in fines against them. They are 16 banks altogether, members of the British Bank Association, which are entrusted to make submission to the Libor committee every day on what each has to pay for acquiring short-term funds from the market. The rates that these banks reported is averaged to determine what would be the Libor rates for different maturities of fund. The list of the rates is announced daily by Thomson Reuters and used as benchmarks by practically all kinds of financial transactions globally. Any financial transaction would use Libor rates as the benchmark, to determine the rates they would charge in the transaction, that is whether it is at par with Libor rates, or plus or minus Libor rates. Libor rates used to command hundreds of trillions of dollars in volume of transactions (up to US$800 trillion) while the daily foreign exchange transactions is estimated at around US$5.3 trillion. From the nominal values of the transactions alone, we can see that both the foreign exchange markets as well as the transactions associated with or related to these legal cases are huge. They are too big to be ignored. As mentioned earlier, the story does not end here. Many transactions which were based on the rigged Libor rates that resulted in losses may ignite civil suits against the banks found committing fraud in the Libor determination in the past. The humongous fines have so far been adversely impacting the operations of these banks. However, all these banks seem to have been prepared because they have set up funds as provisions for what they would have to pay to the authorities, just as they put aside funds for bad debts provision or insurance premium. In addition, banks could ask for waiver against criminal suits, known in legal term as nonpersecution agreement, at least in regard to antitrust, though not on fraud. But, this provision of waiver taken casually by both banks and the authorities could easily cause a moral hazard. Some would argue that this is partly the reason why it has been very rare for bankers to go to jail. Some, like maverick Democrat Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, have been arguing against the liberal granting of waivers to banks or bankers accused of participating in these scandals. Senator Warren rightly stated that granting waivers to them is like giving incentive for bad behaviour. Limiting the granting of waivers to the perpetrators in these cases is one of the six items in her wish list to reform Wall Street banks. It’s still a very long way to rid the “greed is good” culture as reflected in the saying among some banker-forex traders that “if you ain’t cheating, you ain’t trying”. The public would still vote for bankers who put clients’ interests as their highest priority.

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The writer is professor of International Economics at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University and Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Indonesia. He is former governor of Indonesia’s central bank, Bank Indonesia

People walking along Wall Street in lower Manhattan. Bankers rarely face jail time as banks usually set up funds as provisions for what they would have to pay the authorities should they be fined. AFP pic

Social Activity World News

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JakartaPost,August14,2015



Reportage Facingthe‘newnormal’ J.SoedradjadDjiwandono,Singapore|Reportage|Fri,August142015,10:09AM

 Harvestinguncertainties:PresidentJoko“Jokowi”Widodo(left)listenstoWestJava GovernorAhmadHeryawanduringariceharvestintheIndramayuregency.Indonesiais bearingthebruntoflowgrowthandincreasinguncertaintyintheworldeconomy.(Courtesy ofPresidentialOffice/Cahyo) ReportageNews x BeyondThe70thIndependenceAnniversary:Competitiveworkforcekeyto

economicgrowth,development x Indonesiacelebratesits70thanniversaryofindependence x Indonesia’sturningpoints

Itisabitunfortunatethat,atthetimewecelebratethe70thanniversaryofour independenceasafreenation,Indonesiahastofacesomeeconomicrealities.Mostofthese issuesarenotreasonsforcelebrating,andthereisnochoicebuttoconfrontthemheadon.  Therecentdevelopmentsineconomicsandfinancearechallengingaswellasinteresting. Thesedevelopmentshavegivenrisetoanxietyandnervousness,possiblyleadingto sleeplessnightsforthoseresponsibleforinvestment,debtfinanceoreconomicstability.

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 TheWorldEconomicForumin2011identifiedfiveclustersofrisk,i.e.economics,social, geopolitics,climatechangeandtechnology.Itappearsthatinmostoftheseclusters,levels ofriskhavebeenhighandincreasing.Examplesofsuchriskincludethevolatilityof commoditypricesandcurrencies,theincreasinginequalityofincomedistribution,migration problems,terrorismandarmedconflict,naturaldisastersandheatwaves,cyberͲcrimeand computerglitchesthathaveoccurredatvarioustimesaroundtheworld.  Theabovedevelopmentshavecaused,oratleastexacerbated,problemsencounteredby manyadvanced,emerginganddevelopingeconomies.Theglobaleconomywassavedfrom plungingintodepressionintheaftermathoftheglobalfinancialcrisisof2008/2009,partly thankstotheimaginativeandunconventionalfiscalandmonetarypolicieslaunchedin tandemwithfinancialreforms.Nonethelessitwasarguablyinevitablethatalongperiodof severerecessioncouldnotbeavoided,thustheemergenceofthe“greatrecession”.Infact, casesofloweconomicgrowthcombinedwithhighunemploymentandpossiblydeflation appeartohavebecomethe“newnormal”.  TheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)recentlyreviseddownwarditsestimateonworld economicgrowthfor2015asreportedintheWorldEconomicOutlook(WEO)ofApril2015, from3.5percentto3.2percent.Infact,theUShashadthemostpromisingnewsongrowth amongalltheadvancedeconomies.GrowthhasbeenlowgloballyandslowingfortheEU, Japanandtheothers.AndeventhegoodnewsabouttheUSeconomyhassomepotentially adverseimplicationsasitmaytriggeraUSFederalReserve(Fed)decisiontoimplementa programofraisingFedratesresultingincapitalreversalfromemergingmarkets.  Anevenmorediscouragingdevelopmenthasbeentherecentweakgrowthlevelsof emergingeconomies.TheeconomicgrowthratesofBrazil,Russia,India,ChinaandSouth Africa(BRICS)havebeendisappointing,particularlyforRussiaandBrazil.OnlyIndiaremains promising.But,ofcourse,thebiggestconcernpertainstothesecondͲlargesteconomy globally,China.TherebalancingpolicyofChina’seconomytowardgreaterrelianceon domesticconsumptionhasbeenbadnewsfornaturalresourcesexportͲorientedeconomies, includingIndonesia.Thecommodityboomisnowover,togetherwiththeeraofChina’s doubledigiteconomicgrowth.  Atthesametime,recentdevelopmentsinmonetaryandfinancehavebeendominatedby theconfusingprocessofseekingagreementforathirdGreekdebtbailout.Themostwe couldsayatthemomentisthatthedramaseemstobeoverandthe“Grexit”didnot happen.Buthasthepossibilityreallygoneforgood?ArgumentsstatingthatGreecewould bebetterofftoleavethemonetaryunion,eventemporarily,continuetobeaired.  Forsure,thehardshipfromtheausteritymeasuresdemandedbythecreditorswillcontinue toconcerntheGreeksforsometimetocome.Questionspersistastowhethertheeurozone canlast.Andtocomplicatematters,theIMFhasofficiallystatedthatitcannotparticipatein

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thethirdbailoutbecause,initsopinion,thedebt(ofoverUS$300billionforits11million peopleeconomy)isbasicallyunsustainabledespitethepromisebytheGreekgovernmentto acceptreforms.TheIMFmanagementhasinsteadproposedalargeeconomichaircutto amelioratethissituation.  Ofcourse,thequestionofthetimingandextentofanyincreasesintheFedratefromnear zerooverthelastsixyearsremainsachallengetoeveryoneinthecurrencymarketandto monetaryauthorities.EvenIMFmanagingdirectorChristineLagardefelttheneedtoremind theFedofthedisturbancethatsuchdecisionsmaycausetothevalueofcurrenciesof emergingeconomies,adisturbancesimilartothe“tappertantrum”thatemergedinthe wakeofFedchairmanBenBernanke’sannouncementofthepossibilityoftheFedraising interestratesinJune2013.Fornow,themarketsseemtobelievethatchairwomanJanet Yellenwillcommencetheprocessofratehikeslaterthisyear.  AnotherongoingdramahasbeentheperformanceoftheChinesesharemarketsinceits suddenandrapiddropinJune2015.Concernshavenotonlyarisenfromshareprice volatilityandtheassociatedlossofwealth,butalsofrommeasuresemployedbyChinese authoritiesinaddressingtheproblem.ExamplesofheavyͲhandedstateinterventionhave includeddirectinterventionintheChinesestockexchangeinstoppingnewIPOs,the prohibitionofshortsellingandterminatingthetradingofahugenumberofstocks.Aside fromthefactthattheseeffortsenjoyedonlypartialsuccessineasingthevolatility,themore seriousmatteristhattinkeringwiththesharemarketiscontrarytothepracticesofafree market.  Thelastareatomentionhereisthatdevelopmentsinfinanceandbankinghavebeen influencedbytheimplementationofunconventionalmonetarypolicy,especiallythezero interestratepolicyandquantitativeeasingindifferentformsaspracticedbytheFed,the EuropeanCentralBank(ECB),theBankofEngland(BoE)andtheBankofJapan(BoJ).  Inresponsetotheglobalfinancialcrisisandtheensuing“greatrecession”,regulatoryand supervisoryauthoritieshavesoughttoinfluencedevelopmentsinthebankingsectorinthe courseofdevelopingafinancialframeworkconducivetosustainabledevelopment.This processhasinvolveddebateontheimplementationofcertainaspectsoftheDoddͲFrank WallStreetReformandProtectionAct,suchastheVolckerRules,aswellastheBaselIII framework.Thesereformshavelargelybeenaimedatstrengtheningcapitalizationof financialinstitutionsandtheseparationofretailbankingfrominvestmentbanking.  Despitethesemeasures,the2008globalfinancialcrisis,followedbythe“greatrecession” andcontinuedwiththemostrecentGreekdebtcrisis,haveweakenedgovernanceatthe regional,nationalandgloballevels.Globaleconomicsandfinancehavebecome characterizedbyhighlevelsofuncertaintyandrisk.Thisappearstobethe“newnormal” facedbytheworldtoday. 

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ForIndonesia,theconcernisnotjustdiminishedglobalgrowthbutalsothe“slowing growthͲcumͲrebalancing”policyofChina’seconomy.Chinaservedasaneconomicsavior duringtheaftermathoftheglobalfinancialcrisisthankstoitsinvestmentͲsupporteddouble digitgrowththatinturnledtoahugedemandfornaturalresourcesandcommodities.More recently,Beijing’srebalancingpolicieshaveshiftedthesourceofgrowthfromexpenditure oninfrastructureinvestmenttodomesticconsumption.ThechallengefacingIndonesianow isthatIndonesiahasstillalongwaytogobeforeitcanbeapartofthesupplychainofthe typeofgoodsandservicesthatwillmeetChina’snewconsumerdemands.  ThegoodnewsisthatseveralofIndonesia’sfinanceandbankingfundamentalsaresound. Meanwhile,therecentrapiddepreciationoftherupiahcomparedtothecurrenciesofother emergingeconomiesisathreatthatauthoritiesshouldnottakelightly.Emergingeconomies areoftensusceptibletosubstantialreversalsincapitalflows,especiallywhenmarkets continuetospeculateastowhentheFedwillraiseitsrateandbyhowmuch.  ThemarketislikelyevaluatingtherelativepositionofIndonesiatoothereconomies, includingcomparingthesizeofdeficitsinthebalanceofpayments,examiningthe consistencyofeconomicandfinancialpolicies,aswellasassessingthegenerallevelof confidenceintheeconomicandpoliticalmanagementofPresidentJoko“Jokowi”Widodo’s administration.Withregardstothelatter,itisinadequateforthegovernmenttosaythat wearenotaloneincurrencydepreciation,orthattheproblemisthestrengthoftheUS dollarandnottheweaknessoftherupiah.  Unfortunatelythereisnomagicformulatomanageaneconomyfacingvariousuncertainties likethoseIndonesiaiscurrentlyfacing.Thebestdefenseinthefaceofafluepidemicisthat oneshouldbeingoodhealth.Butahealthybodycannotbeacquiredovernightbypumping itwithsupplementsorvitamins;itisaresultofprolongedinvestmentinhealth.Economics isnodifference.  Inthefaceofuncertainty,thereisnoroomforcomplacencyanda“businessasusual” attitude.Anymeasuresthatthemarketperceivestobeinconsistent,shirkingresponsibility, arbitraryorpanickyisarecipeforfailure.Wehavetofacethe“newnormal”,andthe economicclimateofincreasinguncertainty,witheclecticism,nimblenessandflexibility. _________________________  Thewriterisemeritusprofessorofeconomics,UniversityofIndonesiaandprofessorof internationalpoliticaleconomy,S.RajaratnamSchoolofInternationalStudies,Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity. 

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Rabu, 26 Agustus 2015 09:30 WIB

Ekonomi RRT dan ''Senin Hitam'' (Catatan J Soedradjad Djiwandono) Oleh J SOEDRADJAD DJIWANDONO

Ilustrasi seoang pialang melihat indeks saham (Repro: finance.detik.com) Selama beberapa tahun, setiap kali membuat presentasi mengenai perekonomian Indonesia atau Asia, saya selalu menyebutkan peran ekonomi RRT sebagai penyelamat saat perekonomian negara-negara maju mengalami resesi besar. Laju pertumbuhan Republik Rakyat Tiongkok (RRT) yang selama bertahun-tahun sekitar 10 persen menolong lebih banyak lagi perekonomian negara-negara yang mengandalkan ekspor komoditas dan sumber alam sebagai motor pertumbuhan ekonominya. Indonesia jelas ikut menikmatinya. Bahkan, dalam acara bincang-bincang dengan sejumlah bankir dan financiersdi Hotel RitzCarlton Jakarta, akhir bulan lalu, sejumlah bankir menanyakan pendapat saya tentang renminbi dan ekonomi RRT yang disebutkan akan mengambil alih peran dollar AS dan ekonominya di dunia. Mereka mengacu perkiraan seorang ahli pasar modal dan keuangan kenamaan meski tanpa disertai penjelasan bagaimana terjadinya dan mengapa. Hanya menyebutkan bahwa akan ada keputusan IMF bulan Oktober nanti yang mengejutkan dan mengubah peran renminbi. Bahwa peran renminbi dan ekonomi RRT memengaruhi perkembangan pasar modal dan gonjang-ganjing nilai tukar banyak mata uang, tentu kita semua mafhum karena tidak ada media yang melewatkan. Namun, kalaupun ini suatu kejutan, jelas tidak seperti ramalan

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yang sempat bikin bingung itu. Yang terjadi adalah sebaliknya, renminbi dan perkembangan pasar modal RRT justru menjadi sumber kegoncangan karena terjadi penurunan kepercayaan pasar terhadap ekonomi dan manajemen RRT. Perekonomian RRT yang selama beberapa tahun pasca krisis keuangan global menjadi ”penyelamat” perekonomian Asia dan dunia mengalami degradasi. Dia menjadi faktor pendorong kegoncangan mata uang negara berkembang di Asia dan BRICS, kemudian pasar modal seluruh dunia. Kita semua mendengar berita tentang ”The Black Monday” atau Senin Hitam, terjadinya penurunan harga saham di semua pasar modal dunia, Senin pekan ini. Gejolak ini sudah berkembang beberapa waktu, tetapi semula hanya dirasakan di Asia dan negara BRICS— Brasil, India, Rusia, Tiongkok, dan Afrika Selatan—juga Cile dan Turki. Namun, sejak minggu lalu, gejolak ini telah menjalar ke pasar modal di negara-negara maju, termasuk AS. ”The Black Monday” Sejak Senin lalu sampai kini, kegoncangan terus berkembang. Indeks harga saham dari Nikkei (Jepang), Hang Seng (Hongkong), Shanghai dan Shenzhen (RRT) sampai ke Singapura, Indonesia, dan Australia semua menunjukkan penurunan sampai sekitar 3 persen. Perkembangan ini diikuti dengan penurunan harga saham di pasar-pasar modal Eropa, baik dalam lingkungan zona euro (Euro Stoxx 50) termasuk Jerman (DAX), Inggris (FTSE 100) maupun negara lain. Akhirnya juga di AS, baik indeks Dow Jones di NYSE untuk blue chips (S&P 500), Nasdaq untuk electronics dan derivatives, maupun Russel 2000 untuk mutual funds dan perusahaan menengah-kecil. Buat pasar modal RRT dan AS yang selama lima-enam tahun terakhir terus meningkat, penurunan terjadi sampai 30 persen dibandingkan puncak yang pernah dicapai sebelumnya. Bisa dibayangkan berapa besar nilai aset finansial yang hilang karena penurunan harga saham-saham tersebut. Semua pasar modal terguncang. Itulah ”The Black Monday”. Perlu ditekankan bahwa permasalahannya justru terbalik dari ramalan yang membuat bingung para bankir dan pelaku keuangan di atas. Renminbi bukan acuan investor global, melainkan justru sebaliknya, devaluasi renminbi dan penurunan harga saham di RRT menimbulkan keraguan pasar terhadap kepemimpinan RRT dan renminbi. Bahkan, dimasukkannya renminbi ke dalam mata uang elite dunia, dollar AS, pounds Inggris, DM Jerman, dan yen Jepang, pun baru diputuskan IMF tahun depan, bukan Oktober ini. Jadi bahwa perekonomian RRT meningkat perannya memang terjadi, tetapi dalam pengaruh negatifnya. Devaluasi dan penurunan harga saham yang drastis telah memengaruhi penurunan harga-harga saham di pasar modal Asia, Eropa, dan AS. Ini suatu pelajaran baik bagi kita semua agar jangan cepat terkesima dengan segala macam ramalan, termasuk pengamat yang dianggap pakar.

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Tentu ini juga berlaku bagi saya apabila ada yang memandang saya sebagai salah satu dari mereka itu. Silakan dikaji dulu, jangan serta-merta diterima sehaus apa pun kita ingin mengetahui. Untuk sekadar ingin tahu pun perlu sikap kritis, apalagi kalau digunakan untuk mengambil keputusan yang menyangkut kepentingan perusahaan dan tentu lebih lagi kalau untuk kepentingan masyarakat luas, perekonomian nasional. Waktu bekerja di Bank Indonesia, saya selalu mengingatkan rekan dan staf agar jangan mudah percaya kepada siapa pun. Semua orang ada tingkatdiscount-nya, ada yang besar buat tukang ngibul ada yang kecil bagi yang punya integritas. Namun, semua harus kita kritisi sebelum menerima atau menolaknya. Beberapa catatan Memang benar ekonomi RRT—saat negara-negara maju, AS, Eropa, dan Jepang, mengalami resesi besar setelah krisis keuangan global sejak 2008-2009—menjadi penyelamat Asia bahkan dunia dengan pertumbuhan ekonomi 10 persen. Pertumbuhan ekonomi RRT yang tinggi itu jadi sumber terjadinyacommodity boom yang mendorong pertumbuhan ekonomi negara-negara pengekspor komoditas dan sumber alam. Sumber pertumbuhan juga berasal dari pengeluaran investasi untuk pembangunan prasarana yang memerlukan bahan baku besar-besaran. Namun, dengan penurunan laju pertumbuhan menjadi 7 persen (mungkin lebih rendah lagi) dan kebijakan rebalancing yang mengubah sumber pertumbuhan dari investasi kepada konsumsi dalam negeri, RRT tidak lagi menjadi sumber pertumbuhan ekonomi negaranegara pengekspor komoditas dan sumber alam. Pasar modal RRT bergejolak sejak Juni lalu dan berlanjut sampai kini kendati telah dilaksanakan kebijakan intervensi terhadap pasar modal, seperti pembelian saham oleh otoritas dalam jumlah besar, pelarangan IPO, pelarangan penjualan sejumlah besar saham, ataupun pelonggaran ketentuan investasi dana pensiun untuk pembelian saham sampai 30 persen. Pengelolaan nilai tukar renminbi diubah di satu pihak dengan lebih menyerahkan kepada kekuatan pasar, di pihak lain dengan intervensi, termasuk devaluasi yang dilakukan baru-baru ini. Penurunan laju pertumbuhan ekonomi dengan kebijakan rebalancingdikombinasikan dengan kebijakan pasar modal dan perubahan pengelolaan nilai tukar—yang tampaknya kurang optimal—telah menyebabkan terjadinya perubahan fundamental. Ekonomi RRT tidak lagi menjadi penyelamat ekonomi Asia dan dunia, tetapi gejolak di pasar uang dan devaluasi renminbi yang baru dilakukan justru telah menempatkan RRT menjadi penyebab atau minimal pendorong terjadinya kegosncangan nilai tukar negara-negara Asia dan BRICS ataupun kegoncangan pasar modal di Asia, Eropa, Inggris, dan AS. Pengamatan ini bukan untuk menunjuk kambing hitam dari kemelut yang terjadi. Akan tetapi, memang terlihat terjadinya suatu perubahan. Persepsi pasar terhadap apa yang

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terjadi di dalam perekonomian RRT telah menumbuhkan langkah-langkah penyesuaian yang kesemuanya berkembang menjadi kegoncangan pasar modal dunia dan dinamakan ”The Black Monday”. Kegoncangan ini dapat menjadi krisis keuangan global yang baru sekiranya tidak diperoleh solusi yang tepat. Akan tetapi, mengenai hal ini perlu pengamatan dan analisis tersendiri, mungkin termasuk melihat bagaimana menghadapinya agar gejolak ini tidak berkembang menjadi krisis baru. J SOEDRADJAD DJIWANDONO, mantan Gubernur Bank Indonesia, Gurubesar Emerirus FE UI, Professor of IPE, Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Sumber: Kompas Cetak Rabu (26 Agustus 2015)

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TIONGKOK, AS, DAN KITA (OLEH J SOEDRADJAD DJIWANDONO) | Kamis, 17 September 2015 - 10:30 WIB | Repro: KOMPAS cetak/HANDINING Perekonomian suatu negara rentan terhadap gejolak jika ketergantungannya pada ekspor sangat besar, terutama ekspor komoditas yang harganya berfluktuasi Negara-negara dengan ekonomi yang berkembang (emerging markets/EM), termasuk Indonesia, sedang menghadapi tantangan eksternal yang tidak ringan, selain masalah domestik masing-masing. Seperti sudah banyak disebutkan, kendala eksternal menyangkut dua area: menurunnya harga komoditas atau berakhirnya boom komoditas di sektor riil dan berakhirnya era likuiditas berlimpah di sektor moneter-keuangan. Kendala-kendala itu dipertajam oleh pengelolaan ekonomi-keuangan negara-negara besar dan maju yang kadang membingungkan, tidak mendukung terciptanya kestabilan. Dalam pada itu, hubungan saling ketergantungan menyangkut pula dampak balik perkembangan negara berkembang kepada negara-negara maju, menghambat pemulihan dari resesi yang belum tuntas dengan risiko kembali pada resesi akbar sehabis krisis keuangan dunia. Apa yang sebenarnya terjadi? Menyangkut yang pertama, masa jaya komoditas berakhir dengan anjloknya permintaan mulai dari kedelai sampai batubara dan bijih besi terutama disebabkan oleh turunnya laju pertumbuhan ekonomi Tiongkok menjadi 7 persen atau lebih rendah. Harga migas juga menurun drastis karena melemahnya permintaan berbarengan dengan meningkatnya produksi karena Arab Saudi tak mau menurunkan produksinya dan perkembangan oil shale di AS. Turunnya laju pertumbuhan ekonomi Tiongkok terjadi bersamaan dengan kebijakan rebalancing, yaitu mengalihkan sumber pertumbuhan dari ekspor dan investasi ke konsumsi dalam negeri. Semuanya berdampak menekan negara-negara pengekspor komoditas dan sumber alam: Brasil, Cile, Rusia, serta Australia dan Indonesia. Laporan ekonomi triwulanan Bank Dunia terakhir menunjukkan, laju pertumbuhan impor Tiongkok dari Indonesia yang meningkat setiap tahun sekitar 30 persen dalam periode 2005-2011 (di luar krisis 2009) menjadi negatif 7,8 persen pada periode 2012-2014.

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Masalah kedua menyangkut akan direalisasikannya perubahan kebijakan moneter inkonvensional dengan suku bunga mendekati nol di AS dengan meningkatkan suku bunga fasilitas Fed (Fed Fund Rate). Sesuatu yang tak mudah dibayangkan karena sudah tujuh tahun perekonomian hanya mengenai suku bunga yang mendekati nol persen. Dunia keuangan mengenalphenomenon double blows, dampak dari suatu kebijakan terjadi dua kali. Akan dinaikkannya suku bunga dihadapi para pelaku pasar dengan memperhitungkan kenaikan suku bunga dalam operasinya meski kenaikannya belum terjadi (discounted). Pada waktu terjadi kenaikan, ini diperhitungkan (lagi). Tambahan aksentuasi dampak ini sering disebut financial amplifier. Karena itu, reaksi pasar sering ekstrem, terjadi overshoot. Kemungkinan peningkatan suku bunga ini sudah diumumkan sejak Juni 2013. Ketua Dewan Gubernur Fed Ben Bernanke waktu itu membuat pernyataan bahwa kalau perbaikan data pengangguran dan laju inflasi terus terjadi, kebijakan suku bunga sangat rendah itu akan secara hati-hati ditinggalkan,tapering off atau lifting off. Pernyataan ini telah menumbuhkan gejolak pembalikan dana dari EM ke AS. Negara-negara dengan ekonomi berkembang, termasuk Indonesia yang sebelumnya menerima aliran modal dari melimpahnya likuiditas, resah karena aliran balik modal ini (taper tantrum). Financial Times melaporkan, arus balik dana dari 19 negara EM ke AS dan negara maju lain dalam 13 bulan terakhir mendekati 1 triliun dollar AS. Jumlah ini lebih dari dua kali lipat arus balik dana saat krisis keuangan dunia 2008/2009 sebesar 490 miliar dollar AS. Kekhawatiran yang berkembang jelas, kalau kenaikan suku bunga benar terjadi, arus balik akan meningkat lagi karena phenomenon double blows tadi. Implikasinya, depresiasi mata uang terhadap dollar AS akan kian tajam. Susahnya, harapan terjadinya peningkatan ekspor dari depresiasi mata uang negara berkembang ternyata semakin lemah, antara lain karena besarnya kandungan impor dari ekspor negara berkembang. Sebaliknya, dampak negatifnya, seperti semakin mahalnya impor, lebih memberatkan negara berkembang. Bagi yang utangnya besar dan dalam dollar AS, dampak negatif semakin beratnya pengembalian utang jelas memberatkan. Utang Indonesia memang relatif belum besar sekali, tetapi rupanya Indonesia ikut juga arus makin meningkatnya utang yang mudah masuk ke tingkat riskan. Selanjutnya, arus balik dana ini telah menyebabkan tergerusnya nilai tukar kebanyakan negara yang kehilangan dana, terutama negara-negara berkembang yang kehilangan dana karena arus balik, termasuk Indonesia. Semua mata uang negara-negara tersebut terdepresiasi. Namun, besar kecilnya dipengaruhi lagi oleh faktor domestik yang merupakan discountmasing-masing, sesuai kerentanannya. Perekonomian suatu negara rentan terhadap gejolak jika ketergantungannya pada ekspor sangat besar, terutama ekspor komoditas yang harganya berfluktuasi. Demikian pula perekonomian yang defisit neraca pembayarannya besar, utangnya besar (apalagi utang jangka pendek dalam denominasi dollar AS). Juga negara yang sedang dililit permasalahan sosial politik, karena korupsi, skandal, atau lainnya.

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Momok ketidakpastian ”Senin Hitam” terjadi karena perubahan perekonomian Tiongkok, kombinasi perkembangan ekonomi dan kebijakan penyesuaian yang dilaksanakan pemerintah dan otoritas moneternya, People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Pasar modal Tiongkok di Shenzen ataupun Shanghai mengalami perkembangan luar bisa dengan jutaan investor perorangan baru dan kapitalisasinya meningkat dua kali lipat dalam setahun. Semua serba fantastis. Namun, waktu terjadi penurunan tajam harga saham bulan Juni, Tiongkok melancarkan kebijakan penyelamatan, termasuk membeli saham sampai 200 miliar dollar AS serta melarang sementara IPO dan penjualan sejumlah besar saham. Terakhir bahkan membungkam media yang memberitakan gejolak pasar modal. Semua ini mengguncang Asia dan dunia dengan terjadinya Senin Hitam dan setelahnya. Harga saham baru menjadi positif kembali setelah penurunan sekitar satu minggu, sedangkan di AS dan Eropa serta beberapa negara berkembang lain sudah menjadi positif sehari atau dua hari setelah Senin Hitam. Tiongkok sendiri dilaporkan kehilangan nilai aset finansial karena penurunan harga saham mencapai 4 triliun dollar AS, empat kali lipat PDB Indonesia. Anehnya, gejolak pasar modal di Tiongkok yang relatif belum terbuka ini dengan cepat menjadi global. Lebih aneh lagi meski dilakukan penanganan yang berani dan drastis, termasuk devaluasi yuan yang sangat ditabukan sebelumnya, gejolak pasar modal di Tiongkok berjalan lebih lama dari negara maju dan berkembang lain. Dan devaluasi yuan juga tidak memberikan hasil yang diharapkan. Tentu perlu dilakukan pengkajian lebih cermat. Akan tetapi, sementara rasanya tak keliru mengatakan, kepercayaan pasar terhadap pengelolaan pasar modal dan yuan menurun karena kurang konsistennya kebijakan pemerintah dan PBOC. Kebijakan rebalancing yang dijanjikan untuk mendorong konsumsi domestik dan mengurangi ketergantungan pada ekspor dan mendorong bekerjanya mekanisme pasar tampak tak sinkron dengan kebijakan devaluasi dan berbagai intervensi langsung yang dilakukan terhadap pasar modal dan perkembangan nilai tukar. Dalam pada itu, kenaikan suku bunga fasilitas Fed yang jelas akan berakibat aliran balik modal juga masih menggantung. Rupanya negara berkembang harus menghadapi kebijakan Fed dan bank sentral negara maju lain yang akhir-akhir ini mengalami penyakit susah membuat keputusan. Debat yang rasanya tak berkesudahan tentang kapan dimulai kenaikan suku bunga jelas menambah ketakpastian pasar yang terguncang dengan apa yang berkembang di Tiongkok. Masalah yang dihadapi Fed jelas pelik. Fed bertugas menjaga dan mengusahakan kestabilan finansial seperti di Indonesia. Fed juga bertanggung jawab mendorong ekonominya mencapai pertumbuhan yang disasar. Hal ini dikaitkan dengan perkembangan yang terjadi dalam pasar tenaga kerja dengan besar kecilnya tingkat pengangguran menjadi sasaran kebijakan moneter. BI di masa lalu juga mempunyai

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tanggung jawab pembangunan ini, tetapi penugasan ini dikeluarkan pada waktu diberi status independen tahun 1999. Pencapaian keseimbangan dua sasaran tersebut dalam paradigma ekonomi yang telah berubah rupanya semakin rumit. Mungkin hal ini yang menyebabkan Fed seperti maju mundur sejak 2013 untuk menentukan kapan akan mulai menaikkan suku bunga. Belum lagi yang menyangkut berapa besar kenaikannya dan bagaimana pola yang akan dilaksanakan. Setelah seminar dan perdebatan panjang di masyarakat, tampaknya para gubernur di bawah pimpinan Janet Yellen cenderung meningkatkan suku bunga September atau akhir tahun. Yang jelas rapat dewan gubernur dilakukan sepuluh kali setiap tahun, tahun ini tinggal dua kali, 17 September ini dan Desember nanti. Perdebatan belum kunjung berhenti juga. Di Fed, beberapa waktu lalu, Presiden Fed New York William Dudley mengatakan, dirinya tak yakin lagi apakah kenaikan suku bunga sebaiknya dilakukan tahun ini. Tak kurang mantan Menteri Keuangan Larry Summer dan ekonom peraih Nobel Ekonomi, Joseph Stiglitz, keduanya guru besar kenamaan Universitas Harvard dan Columbia, menulis kolom (di New York Times dan Los Angeles Times) menunjukkan argumen serupa. Akan tetapi, dalam pertemuan tahunan central bankers di Jackson Hole belum lama ini, Wakil Ketua Fed Stanley Fischer mengatakan, peningkatan suku bunga bulan ini masih dalam pertimbangan, menunggu data perkembangan pengangguran akhir minggu. Siapa yang tidak bingung mengikuti semua perkembangan ini? Orang-orang pintar saja bingung. Yang jelas, implikasinya adalah ketidakpastian pasar yang merupakan momok paling tidak disukai pelaku pasar ini masih berjalan. Perekonomian terkuat nomor satu dan dua di dunia sedang dalam kondisi kurang bisa dijadikan pedoman negara-negara berkembang untuk menentukan sikap. Ini jelas suatu kondisi yang kurang kondusif, perekonomian dunia kurang solid untuk menghadapi kejutan yang bisa terjadi. Kiranya benar pernyataan Henry Snyder dalam kolom di Financial Times (28/8) bahwa masalahnya bukan pada ekonomi AS, melainkan pada kebijakan moneternya. Saya ingin menambah, ini berlaku pula bagi ekonomi Tiongkok. Sektor riilnya tidak merupakan masalah, laju pertumbuhan PDB-nya jelas masih tertinggi di dunia, tetapi kebijakan dalam pengelolaan moneter dan pasar modalnya telah menimbulkan pertanyaan besar bagi pasar dan masyarakat. Dalam menghadapi tantangan tersebut, kita semua berharap adanya sikap arif dari pemerintah dan dunia usaha dalam mengambil kebijakan dan menentukan langkah agar memilih mitra usaha, dagang, dan investasi tanpa tergiur keuntungan sesaat, tetapi untuk kepentingan yang luas, kepentingan nasional berjangka panjang. Semoga. J SOEDRADJAD DJIWANDONO, GURU BESAR EMERITUS EKONOMI UI DAN PROFESSOR OF IPE, RSIS, NTU/KOMPAS cetak

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