NAUTILUS. de jaar ème année. Maandelijkse lunch mei Lunch mensuel mai. Bestuursvergadering juni Réunion du Conseil juin

NAUTILUS Maandblad van het Koninklijk Belgisch Zeemanscollege v.z.w. Revue mensuelle du Collège Royal Maritime Belge a.s.b.l. Zetel / Siège: Stella Maris Italiëlei 72 - 2000 Antwerpen Permanent secretariaat / Secrétariat permanent: dinsdag en donderdag / mardi et jeudi: 09-12 h & 14-17 h Mw. Caroline Smits Tel.: 03-233.34.75 / Fax: 03-232.29.10 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.kbz-crmb.be Bankrekening / Compte bancaire: 416-6095341-49 IBAN: BE97 4166 0953 4149 BIC: KREDBEBB BTW-nummer / Numéro TVA: BE 0410.000.192 Raad van Bestuur / Conseil d’Administration 2014 Voorzitter / Président: A. Pels Ondervoorzitters / Vice-Présidents: I. De Cauwer, T. Heiremans, C. Maerten, D. Vanderplasschen Schatbewaarder / Trésorier: T. Heiremans Secretaris-generaal / Secrétaire-général J.Cuyt Raadsleden / Membres du Conseil: T. Aga*, A. Annaert, R. Bijlsma*, P. Boyens*, T. Coornaert*, J. Cuyt, J. De Bock*, E. Deleu, F. Doomen*, T. Goethals, C. Lacroix, W. Mazijn, J. S’Jegers*, R. Van Damme, H. Van Herendael*, K. Van Overloop*

106

de jaar

mei

ème année

mai

AGENDA Maandelijkse lunch mei

donderdag, 15 mei jeudi, 15 mai

om

Lunch mensuel mai

om

Bestuursvergadering juni

dinsdag, 3 juni

Réunion du Conseil juin

mardi, 3 juin

Buitengewone Algemene Vergadering

mardi, 3 juin

om

Ledenvergadering juni

dinsdag, 3 juni

om

Réunion des membres juin

mardi, 3 juin

Maandelijkse lunch juni

dinsdag, 19 juni

Monochromie van/de “Dover Lighthouse” aquarel van / aquarelle de André Paquet

Verantwoordelijke Uitgever / Editeur Responsable: KBZ Italiëlei 72 2000 Antwerpen

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à à

om à

12h00 19h30 20h00 20h15 12h00

LEDEN / MEMBRES Nieuwe leden / Nouveaux membres (april 2014): Werden voor de tweede maal voorgesteld en aanvaard: Ont été présentés en seconde lecture et acceptés: DE WANNEMAEKER Bruno en VERHULST Fernand (effectieve leden) Werden voor de eerste maal voorgesteld: Ont été présentés en 1ère lecture: EDDINGH Salah, ROELS Christophe, MONTULET Sophie Overlijden / Décès: Nous apprenions le décès de notre membre le plus âgé, le Capitaine a.l.c. Edouard CARETTE. Cdt. Carette est né à Mechelen le 6 juin 1922, et est décédé à Ottignies le 10 avril 2014, à l’âge de 91 ans. Le CRMB offre ses sincères condoléances à la famille du Cdt. Carette.

• KBZ / CRMB - Verslag maandelijkse vergadering

Omslag / Couverture:

mardi, 19 juin

Lunch mensuel juin

INHOUD / SOMMAIRE

Tous les articles sont publiés sous l’entière responsabilité de leurs auteurs et ne reflètent pas nécessairement la conception du CRMB.

à

dinsdag, 3 juni

* varend lid / membre naviguant

Alle artikels worden gepubliceerd onder de verantwoordelijkheid van de auteurs en vertolken niet noodzakelijk de mening van het KBZ

à

Assemblée Générale Extraordinaire

Bestuurssecretaris / Secrétaire de direction: J. Gleissner

Lidgeld / Cotisation: e 75,00 Studenten HZS / Etudiants ESN: e 40,00 Steunend lid / membre soutenant: e 55,00 Abonnement : e 55,00 (excl. BTW)

2014

• Open Forum / Forum ouvert - Korean ferry disaster shows Concordia lessons tough to implement 150

• Milieu / Environnement - Un atoll energetique sur les bancs de Flandre?

170

• Aanvaring / Collision - Exces de confiance

171

• Marine Component / Composante Marine - Belgisch patrouillevaartuig “Castor” te water 153

• Zeerecht / Droit maritime - How do you calculate loss of earnings following a collision? 172

• Security - The risk of deliberate attacks on maritime tankers

• Bibliography - Stowaways by sea

148

154

• Piracy (1) The world has a new piracy hotspot 158 (2) Oil is treasure as African piracy shifts west 161 • Scheepsrampen / Sinistres maritimes (1) ‘Costa Concordia’... two years on 164 (2) Calm, safe waters, but ill-fated Korean ferry may have been going too fast 166

174

• De Belgische vlag van toen / Le pavillon Belge autrefois - “Lapland” grootste Belgische Red Star Liner 176 • Causerie

178

• Uitnodiging / Invitation

179

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CM

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Nautical charts & publications Safety equipment Navigation equipment

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Oude Leeuwenrui 37 2000 Antwerpen tel: 03/213.41.70 email: [email protected]

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Mensen en kennis van zaken

Dat is de kracht achter Jan De Nul Group’s grote succes. Dankzij de gedrevenheid en betrokkenheid van zijn werknemers en de hypermoderne vloot is de groep marktleider in bagger- en mariene werken, alsook in gespecialiseerde diensten voor de offshore markt van olie, gas en hernieuwbare energie. De groep is bovendien een belangrijke speler in de civiele bouwsector en de milieusector. Onze professionele en innovatieve oplossingen genieten het vertrouwen van de industrie. Of het nu gaat om de bouw van nieuwe sluizen in het Panamakanaal of om de bouw van een nieuw havencomplex in West-Australië, samen met onze klanten bouwen we op een verantwoorde manier mee aan verdere economische ontwikkeling.

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JAN DE NUL GROUP 34-36, Parc d’Activités Capellen Nautilus, mei 2014

8308 Capellen I Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

147

T +352 39 89 11 F +352 39 96 43 I [email protected]

KBZ CRMB KBZ CRMB

VERSLAG VERSLAGMAANDELIJKSE MAANDELIJKSE VERGADERING VERGADERING (1 april 2014) avril 2014) RAPPORT REUNION MENSUELLE RAPPORT REUNION MENSUELLE (1 (1 avril 2014) _________

Op de maandelijkse ledenvergadering van dinsdag, 1 april 2014, stonden o.m. volgende onderwerpen op de agenda:

Lors de la réunion mensuelle des membres du mardi 1er avril 2014, e.a. les points suivants ont été portés à l’ordre du jour :

Leden - Werden voor de eerste maal voorgesteld: EDDINGH Salah, ROELS Christophe, MONTULET Sophie (effectieve leden) - Werden voor de tweede maal voorgesteld en aanvaard: DE WANNEMAEKER Bruno en VERHULST Fernand (effectieve leden)

Membres - Ont été présentés en première lecture : EDDINGH Salah, ROELS Christophe, MONTULET Sophie (membres effectifs) - Ont été présentés en seconde lecture et acceptés DE WANNEMAEKER Bruno et VERHULST Fernand (membres effectifs)

Bestuur In een bijzondere bestuursvergadering werden volgende mandaten verdeeld: - A.Pels: blijft voorzitter - I.De Cauwer: blijft ondervoorzitter - T.Heiremans: wordt ondervoorzitter/schatbewaarder - C.Maerten: wordt ondervoorzitter - D.Vanderplasschen: blijft ondervoorzitter - J.Cuyt: blijft secretaris-generaal

Conseil d’administration Lors d’une réunion du Conseil extraordinaire, les mandats suivants furent accordés : - A.Pels : reste président - I.De Cauwer : reste vice-président - T.Heiremans : devient vice-président/trésorier - C.Maerten : devient vice-président - D.Vanderplasschen : reste vice-président - J.Cuyt : reste secrétaire général

Varia - Op de Open Campusdag HZS van 22 maart werden op de stand van het KBZ drie nieuwe leden ingeschreven. - KBZ info-avond studenten HZS: dinsdag, 6 mei - Watererfgoed: de open brief van Geert De Vriese aan het MAS wordt besproken - Aandacht wordt gevraagd voor de Enquête Carrière verloop, georganiseerd door de BZB (zie Nautilus april, blz. 121) - Bezorgdheid voor mogelijke criminalisatie ten gevolge van de strengere MARPOL-regels 

Divers - Lors de la Journée Portes Ouvertes à l’ESN du mardi 22 mars, trois nouveaux membres CRMB se sont inscrits - Soirée info CRMB étudiants ESN : le mardi 6 mai - Patrimoine maritime : la lettre ouverte de Geert De Vriese au MAS est évaluée. - L’attention est attirée sur l’Enquête Evolution de la Carrière, organisée par la Ligue Maritime Belge (voir Nautilus avril, page 121) - Inquiétude pour criminalisation éventuelle, suite à la réglementation plus rigides des règles MARPOL



BELANGRIJK AVISIMPORTANT IMPORTANT BELANGRIJKBERICHT BERICHT –- AVIS BUITENGEWONE ALGEMENE VERGADERING Het KBZ organiseert een eerste Buitengewone Algemene Vergadering op de zetel van de vereniging, Italiëlei 72 te 2000 Antwerpen op dinsdag, 3 juni om 20u00 ter goedkeuring van de voorgestelde statutenwijzigingen die aan alle leden per post of per e-mail worden toegezonden. Indien op de eerste BAV minder dan tweederden van de leden aanwezig of vertegenwoordigd zijn, dan zal er een tweede Buitengewone Algemene Vergadering plaats vinden op vrijdag, 27 juni om 18u30 in de Captain’s Lounge, Beatrijslaan 27 – 2050 Antwerpen.

ASSEMBLEE GENERALE EXTRAORDINAIRE Le CRMB organise une première Assemblée Générale Extraordinaire au siège du Collège, Av. d’Italie 72 à 2000 Anvers, le mardi, 3 juin à 20h00, afin d’approuver les modifications des statuts envoyés à tous les membres par poste ou par courriel. Si les deux tiers des membres ne sont pas présents ou représentés à la première réunion, une seconde Assemblée Générale Extraordinaire aura lieu le vendredi, 27 juin à 18h30 au Captain’s Lounge, Beatrijslaan 27 – 2050 Anvers.

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Nautilus, mei 2014

Creating land for the future 149

OPEN OPENFORUM FORUM

FORUMOUVERT OUVERT FORUM Que penser de…?

Wat te denken van…?

FERRY KOREANTOO BIGDISASTER TO SAIL? SHOWS TOUGH TO IMPLEMENT CRUISE SHIPS FACE SCRUTINY CONCORDIA LESSONS _________

by JAD MOUAWAD

The sinking of the Sewol ferry off South Korea raises new concerns about ship safety more than two years after the capsizOne theCosta largest cruise ships in 1985 the a 46,000-ton CarnivaltoHoliday. years ago, the biggest, the of Queen Mary 2, ing ofofthe Concordia ocean liner was spurred global campaign improveTen passenger security. The sight terrified paswas three timesplucked as large. Today’s record are two 225,000-ton displacement, measure lying of a on ship’s sengers being from the side of theholders listing ferry stirred memoriesships from whose January 2012 of the a Concordia its weight, is Giglio about the same of a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. side near Island, off as thethat western coast of Italy. As with the Concordia, authorities say the Sewol’s captain abandoned ship while the rescue was still in progress, passengers were told to remain below deck even as the ship began taking on water and life rafts were scarce. “Passengers are usually advised to remain on a ship because it has been designed to remain stable even when badly damaged in one part of the hull,” said Richard Clayton, chief maritime analyst at IHS Maritime in London. “The crew advised this course of action before the extent of the damage was known. With hindsight, the crew should have reconsidered their advice as the ship began to list heavily.” The Concordia accident prompted amendments to the main international treaty on maritime safety that required mandatory evacuation drills, better access to life rafts and new rules on voyage planning. The fact the treaty is applied only to international shipping and varying rules for different classes of passenger ships have limited its effect in shoring up passenger safety amid the chaos during an emergency situation. Life Jackets “This accident was caused because safety measures weren’t in place,” said Park Moo Hyun, an analyst at E*Trade Securities Korea in Seoul.

The International for the International MariAllure ofConvention the Seas - 225,282 GT Safety of Life at Sea, which is administered by the United Nations’ James geddes.pro time Organization, regulates everything from hull types to the placement of life jackets. The treaty counts 170 countries as signatories it’sgrowing up to treaty apply the rules domestic shipping industries. Cruise shipsand keep bigger,members and morewhether popular.toThe Cruise Lines to International Association said thatThe lastSewol year itssinking North illustrates the IMO’s American cruise line limitations. members carried about 17 million passengers, up from seven million in 2000. But the expansion in ship size is worrying safety experts, lawmakers and regulators, who are pushing for more accountability, saying the supersize The treaty requires all cruise and international ferries of more than 3,000 tons have a voyage data recorder -- a craze is fraught withthat potential peril ships for passengers and crew. naval black box -- to record all the ship’s communication and course changes. South Korea didn’t apply that regulation to the 6,825-ton Sewol, which regularly made the 13.5-hour trip between Incheon and Jeju island, it operates in Ko“Cruise ships operate in a void from the standpoint of oversight and enforcement,” said James E. because Hall, a safety management rean not international waters, of said Guard Director General KoBoard Myung. consultant and the chairman theCoast National Transportation Safety between 1994 and 2001. “The industry has been very fortunate until now.” The perils were most visible last year when the Costa Concordia, owned by the Carnival CorporaThe cause of based the sinking remains unknown. “We canofget more about communications the ship only after tion, which is in Miami, capsized off the coast Italy. Theinformation accident killed 32the people and revealedatfatal lapses in safetaking to the surface,” he said. For domestic ferries such as the Sewol, South Korea applies the Ships Safety Act, its own ty and itemergency procedures. set of rules that are based on U.N. standards, said an official at the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries who asked not to be In February, fire crippled the Carnival Triumph, stranding thousands without power for four days in the Gulf of Mexico until named citingapolicy. the ship was towed to shore. Another blaze forced Royal Caribbean’s Grandeur of the Seas to a port in the Bahamas in Rescue diversshowed are seeking to penetrate the 479-foot Sewol in hopes that some of the almost 300 missing might be alive and May. Pictures the ship’s stern blackened by flames and smoke. trapped in possible air pockets. In the case of the Concordia, a crew member was pulled from the ship 36 hours after it capsized,most though considerably more of the ship remained above water thanand thefires Sewol. Although have not resulted in any casualties, the string of accidents has heightened concerns about the ability of megaships to handle emergencies or large-scale evacuations at sea. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Democrat of In bothVirginia, accidents rescue efforts werethis hampered a lack of strengthen life crafts being deployed. Forofthe Costa Concordia, the angle West introduced legislation summerby that would federal oversight cruise lines’ safety procedures of the ship made it impossible to lower lifeboats on out onethat sidebigger and complicated to release them on theand other. and consumer protections. Cruise operators point ships have efforts more fire safety equipment, contend they are safer. The Sewol had 44 self-inflating 25-person life rafts stored in cases on the main deck, said Kim Sung Jae, an official at After fire aboard the Carnival three years ago, Carnival training safetyafter feaSouthaKorea’s Ministry of OceanSplendor and Fisheries. The speed at whichadopted the shipnew capsized -- itprocedures sank less and than added three hours tures it sayssignal helped-- with rapid detectionthe and suppression of theLocal fire on the Triumph. Afteronly the Triumph fire, Carnival its firstthat distress maythe have prevented rafts from inflating. press reported that two of the rafts were seenannounced after the boat went down. also it would spend $700 million to improve its safety operations, including $300 million on its fleet of 24 Carnival Cruise Lines ships. Carnival is the largest cruise operator, owning about half of all cruise ships worldwide. “The ship quickly tilted to 90 degrees,” the mother of An Min Soo, a student who survived the accident by jumping into the sea with teacher friends,the said in aofphone interview. “He was in theand water for technology five minutesand andlearning was transported to a “We haveaover timeand improved safety our vessels by better training better from incidents lifeboat. said thereover were announcements but he couldn’tCarnival’s hear themvice because the scene was too chaotic with noise.” that haveHe happened the years,” said Mark Jackson, president for technical operations, who joined the company in January after 24 years with the Coast Guard. Under South Korean regulations the ship wasn’t required to have larger lifeboats that hang off the side of the vessel because experts it was only traveling in coastal waters, Kim said.than Withthe 25 current of the ship’s 475 passengers crew confirmed dead and Some doubt that ships can grow much larger behemoths, marvels ofand naval engineering that com271 missing, scale of the toll of the Sewolbiggest sinking ship, is one of the starkest differences with the Concordia. In the bine the latestthe technology and human entertainment. Today’s Royal Caribbean’s Allure of the Seas, has 2,706 rooms, case of the cruise ship, 32 and people died of the moreasthan 4,200 people boardaas the park, Concordia nevertrack, fully sank 16 decks, 22Italian restaurants, 20 bars 10 hot tubs, as well a shopping mall, aon casino, water a half-mile a zip and went down more slowly than the line, mini golf and Broadway-style liveSewol. shows.

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Car-carrying ferries are prone to rapid sinking when they take on water. This type of ferry, known as a ro-ro because vehicles can be rolled on and off, feature wide, open cargo decks, limiting the ability to install the kind of water-tight compartments that might slow the intake of water should the hull get pierced. “The ships have very different designs. The cruise ship has several watertight sections to provide safety if one or two sections are breached and fill with water,” Clayton said. “A passenger roll-on/roll-off ferry has a large vehicle deck with doors at one or both ends. If water gets into this space, the ship immediately becomes unstable and is in danger of capsizing.” In 1994 more than 800 people were killed when a ro-ro called the Estonia went down in the Baltic Sea, sinking in less than half an hour after its cargo door was ripped off in heavy seas. That accident also prompted changes to the treaty meant to phase out ships built to a one-compartment design. The Sewol would likely have been exempt from that safety measure as well because it stayed in national waters. The grimmest comparison between the two accidents may prove to be the difficulty in recovering the remains of any victims trapped in the Sewol. The bodies of the last two missing Concordia passengers weren’t recovered until nine months after the accident, when the 114,500-ton ship was righted from where it came to rest in the shallow water off the vacation island of Giglio. The Sewol may be South Korea’s biggest ferry disaster since 1970, when the sinking of the Namyoung led to 323 fatalities. As in the case of the Concordia and Sewol, the captain of the Namyoung was among the survivors. He was charged with professional negligence and initially sentenced to death before a higher court overturned the sentence, according to the Court of Korea. Source : Bloomberg  Maritime Press Clippings – 20.04.14 Note from the Nautilus „ editor Whereas the KBZ fully sympathizes with the victims of this tragedy, it wishes to refrain from any comment on the Sewol-disaster, and on the guilt or innocence of the master and crew of the vessel, as long as an investigation has not revealed all the facts and circumstances and established the real causes of this disaster. The infamous Hebei Spirit trial in mind [see Nautilus January 2010, May 2010], the KBZ hopes though that this time the arrested Master, officers and crewmembers, and all parties involved will get a fair trial from the South Korean courts. De redactie aanvaardt met dank alle commentaar op de artikels onder de rubriek “Open Forum” La rédaction accepte avec reconnaissance tous commentaires concernant les articles sous la rubrique « Forum Ouvert »

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MARINE MARINECOMPONENT COMPONENT

COMPOSANTEMARINE MARINE COMPOSANTE

BELGISCH PATROUILLEVAARTUIG “CASTOR” TE WATER _________

Midden april proefde de Castor, het eerste van twee nieuwe patrouillevaartuigen die op de Franse werf Socarenam in Boulogne-sur-Mer in aanbouw zijn, voor het eerst water toen het van het bouwdok naar de scheepshelling werd gesleept waar het de komende weken verder wordt afgewerkt.

De nog ongeschilderde P901 Castor onderweg van het bouwdok naar de afwerkhelling in Boulogne

Foto: Flor Van Otterdyk

De oplevering van het nieuwe vaartuig staat geprogrammeerd voor eind juni. De doop zal een paar dagen later, op 10 juli, plaats vinden. Na een opwerkperiode van enkele maanden wordt verwacht dat de Castor in november volledig operationeel zal zijn. Begin 2015 wordt de oplevering van het zusterschip, de Pollux, voorzien. Beide zusterschepen zullen hoofdzakelijk ingezet worden voor kustwachttaken, zoals patrouillemissies, bewakingsopdrachten, ordehandhaving, speurwerk en reddingsoperaties in het Noordzeegebied, meer in het bijzonder de exclusieve economische zone voor de Belgische kust. Hun thuishaven wordt Zeebrugge. Ze zullen deze opdrachten van de drie nu verouderde Belgische “ready duty ships” overnemen. Hoewel dus meer dan de helft van hun inzet louter als “politionele” taken kunnen omschreven worden die zullen worden uitgevoerd in nauwe samenwerking met de maritieme politie en de douane, worden ze niet uitgerust met de traditionele kleuren van kustwachtschepen. Omdat ze deel uitmaken van het Belgische Marine Component krijgen ze daarentegen een zo genaamd pennant number: P901 voor de Castor en P902 voor de Pollux. Elk van de schepen wordt uitgerust met twee boten voor snelle interventies en een up-to-date Sewaco-systeem (sensoren, wapen- en commandosystemen). Grote aandacht ging naar de zeewaardigheid en wendbaarheid van de vaartuigen. De rompvorm werd uitgetest om zelfs bij zeer woelige zee een hoge snelheid te halen. Aldus moet bij zeegang 4 nog een snelheid van bijna 21 knopen gelopen kunnen worden. De vaste bemanning van de 53,5 meter lange eenheden bestaat uit een vijftiental personen, maar aan boord is er eveneens ruimte om additioneel 15 passagiers mee te nemen voor de bijzondere opdrachten. Ze hebben een actieradius van meer dan 5000 mijl bij een kruissnelheid van 12 knopen en kunnen tot negen dagen volledig onafhankelijk opereren. Met de bouw van deze schepen is een investering van 26,6 miljoen EURO gemoeid, wat ver onder het voorziene bedrag ligt.  Flor Van Otterdyk

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SECURITY SECURITY

THE RISK OF DELIBERATE ATTACKS ATTACKS ON MARITIME TANKERS _________

On Wednesday, 9 April, a Senior Stakeholder Workshop took place in Brussels, organised by: 1 - RAND EUROPE - ELS (Explosive Learning Solutions)² - WPI (Wise Pens International)³ The subject was: the study on the consequences of a deliberate attack on different types of liquefied gas, oil and chemical tankers. The study was assigned by the Directorate-General of Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) of the EU. The workshop was attended by representatives from 12 European countries, drawn from a range of backgrounds including security organisations, national transport authorities, national maritime administrations, trade associations, and the European Commission. The EU Shipowners Association (ECSA) was also represented. CESMA, the Confederation of European Shipmasters’ Associations, represented by Capt. Jef Cuyt, was the only association representing the ships’ crews interests. Overview Awareness of the potential for deliberate maritime attacks has increased as a result of both piracy and terrorism-motivated attacks on maritime targets in recent decades. There are multiple examples of tankers having been successfully targeted by terrorists, pirates or other radical groups. The high volume of piracy in recent years has demonstrated the need to improve security measures for maritime tankers. The need for proactive security measures is further emphasised by the potential for deliberate attacks by terrorists. This type of attack would likely aim for large-scale damage and casualties and could have long-lasting economic, environmental, legal, political and social consequences ln June 2013, RAND Europe, Explosive Learning Solutions (ELS), and Wise Pens International (WPI) were commissioned by the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) to conduct a study on the risks to maritime tankers from deliberate attack. The primary focus of the study is to help the European Commission assess the risks posed to liquefied natural gas (LNG) / liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), oil and chemical tankers by deliberate attacks and propose recommendations to address them. To deliver the study objectives, the project team has investigated the motivations, methods and outcomes of deliberate maritime attacks through data collection, analysis and validation. Research was conducted through desk-based reviews of past attacks and proxy event scenarios. Additional data collection and validation was undertaken through a series of key informant interviews with expert stakeholders. This evidence base was combined with the operational and subject matter expertise of the project team. The interim findings identify the key vulnerabilities, threats and consequences of potential deliberate attacks. Tankers may present an attractive target – for both pirates and terrorists – and have inherent vulnerabilities. Due to the standardised design of tankers, common vulnerabilities exist across different tanker types. The distinction between safety and security considerations is not always clearly defined: while the structure of modern tankers conforms with strict safety standards, it may not always be invulnerable to security threats. Tanker vulnerabilities are also exacerbated in particular situations, such as when the tanker is isolated, in restricted waters or physically connected to a facility. In addition to structural vulnerabilities, tanker crews and port operations may also present vulnerabilities that can be exploited in a deliberate attack. The understanding of vulnerabilities is strongly tied to the awareness of potential threats to tankers. Past historical events demonstrate the maritime terrorist attacks are both conceivable and attractive from a terrorist perspective. The specific nature of threats will vary depending on factors such as location of the vessel, direction and vector of attack, weaponry used and intended outcome. The study has also addressed potential consequences of deliberate attacks against maritime tankers. Attack consequences will be both immediate and longer term. Immediate consequences, which occur early in the attack timeline, will depend on attackers' modus operandi and may include structural damage, casualties and localised impact. Secondary consequences, which last beyond the immediate crisis period of response, are likely to be persistent and multifaceted. External variables help determine the severity of these longer term consequences in the economic, environmental, political, legal and social domains. Secondary consequences are strongly interconnected and will vary in their causal patterns depending on the characteristics and context of a specific attack scenario. 154

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DE START van een BOEIENDE CARRIERE

De vraag naar hoogopgeleide koopvaardijofficieren is groot. Ook de vraag van de maritieme industrie naar ex-zeevarenden overtreft ruimschoots het aanbod. Goedbetaalde tewerkstelling is dus zowel tijdens als na de vaartijd verzekerd! De Hogere Zeevaartschool is de enige hogeschool in België die hiervoor de gepaste opleidingen (in het Nederlands en in het Frans) aanbiedt:  Bachelor & Master in de Nautische Wetenschappen  Bachelor in de Scheepswerktuigkunde Geïnteresseerd in een boeiende maritieme carrière? Bezoek onze website www.hzs.be voor meer informatie.

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Findings Members of the research teams then gave an introduction to the study and an update on the initial findings, and an individual risk-ranking exercise of potential threats to maritime tankers. They gave an overview of:  vulnerabilities (structural): speed limitation, restricted manoeuvrability, visual blind spots, radar sector blanking, low freeboard, hazardous cargo  vulnerability (exacerbated): isolated location, restricted waters, physical connections (SBM), loading or lightering operations  vulnerabilities of crews and ports: predictable method of operations, inadequate vetting of crews, non EU-flagged vessels, large degree of data sharing by various parties  threats, depending on multiple factors, e.g. : location: open sea or restricted waters, direction of attack: air-based or landbased, weaponry used, vector of attacks: small boats, submersibles, intended outcome: hijacking, scuttling  consequences (immediate): local impact to vessel and port  consequences (long term): economic, environmental, political, legal, social. Workshops During the afternoon session the participants were subdivided in three working groups, which had to evaluate different situations and threats by ranking them into higher or lower likelihood and impact. Some examples: - small boats to plant external explosives in open location - cyber attack to cause damage in critical location - submersibles to use tanker as guided weapon - land-based attack in critical location RESULTS FROM THE WORKSHOPS Risk assessment revealed trends in certain threats’ likelihood and impact The cumulative analysis of the group’s risk-ranking showed that certain threats emerged as relatively higher likelihood or impact. The majority of feasible threats came from terrorists; the only feasible pirate attacks were those which had an intended outcome of holding the tanker for political or economic gain. Piracy threats were predominantly higher likelihood and lower impact. In terms of likelihood, attack vector was a primary determining factor of threats’ higher or lower ranking. Use of hidden and fraudulent means of attack in critical locations and use of small boats were predominantly higher likelihood threats. Use of submersibles and use of light aircraft / UAVs were ranked as lower likelihood. In terms of impact, location of an attack was strongly correlated with its perceived level of impact: all ‘higher impact’-‘higher likelihood’ threats involved critical locations (ports, narrow channels, etc.) rather than open (blue water) locations. While higher impact attack vectors varied, threats with the intended outcome of using the tanker as a guided weapon were all ranked as higher impact. Stakeholders showed some divergence in their agreement with overall rankings The overall likelihood and impact trends observed in the workshop were qualified by areas of divergence around certain attack vectors. There was some disagreement about intent and vulnerability associated with the use of submersibles, though there was largely agreement about the relative difficulty of the capability required to carry out this type of attack. Similarly, there was some disagreement about the extent to which terrorists or pirates would be perceive as attractive the use of hidden or fraudulent means to attack a tanker in a critical location. There was also strong debate about multiple elements of a potential threat from cyber attack. Some stakeholders questioned the capability required and whether access to the necessary technology is feasible. There was also disagreement about the relative vulnerability of the ship to a successful cyber attack. While some stakeholders suggested that manual overrides were an effective mitigation, others pointed out that the increasing use of autopilot navigation could increase the vulnerability to future cyber attacks. There was also some disagreement about whether the ‘higher likelihood’-‘higher impact’ threats were credible in a realworld setting. Stakeholders suggested that in reality, terrorists may be more likely to prioritise feasible attacks over more spectacular outcomes (such as the use of a tanker as a guided weapon). Similarly, specific threats were considered to be potentially overstated (i.e. use of divers) or understated (i.e. use of small boats as an IED) in the final overall rankings. Stakeholders also stressed the need to contextualise theoretical threats in the light of the likely real-life priorities and networks of terrorists. A range of additional factors could help determine a threat’s likelihood and impact Stakeholders identified a wide range of additional factors which could play a role in either decreasing or increasing a given threat’s likelihood or impact. The characteristics of a specific tanker could have significant bearing on its vulnerability to attack or on the impact of a successful attack. The type of cargo (oil, chemical, LPG or LNG) could result in a range of outcomes, with varying societal, environmental and economic impacts. The size and age of a ship could also contribute to its structural vulnerability to attack, since these factors dictate cargo storage methods and the level of technology aboard. A number of wider, contextual factors were also identified as important determinants of a threat’s severity and likelihood. Geopolitical context could play a strong role in an attack’s attractiveness from a terrorist or piracy perspective. 156

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Similarly, it could significantly influence the level of impact following the event by determining the type of regional or international response that occurs. Regional factors, such as instability leading to the increased availability of small arms, could also have an effect on the level of threats and modus operandi of attackers. General advances in technology could also influence the severity of threats, either enhancing attackers’ capability or improving mitigation strategies to protect tankers. Mitigations could be improved and implemented by both national and international actors In addition to the factors described above, the effectiveness of current and future mitigations has a strong influence on which threats are attempted and which are successful. Stakeholders identified a range of mitigations that could be bolstered to help protect maritime tankers from the risk of deliberate attack. While noting that many of these suggestions were already encompassed in the existing ISPS code, participants stressed that full and consistent compliance with security standards remains lacking and should be improved. A number of proposed mitigations focused on security procedures at both the vessel and port levels. These recommendations included proper observation of best management practices, improved physical security measures, heightened access control and better surveillance methods. Attention was also drawn to the need for enhanced vetting of personnel and oversight of manning agencies, although the feasibility of such efforts was questioned. Recommended mitigations also included better interagency communication and training. Stakeholders suggested that liaisons between maritime actors and the law enforcement community should be improved. Interagency training and cooperation should also increase to better coordinate and benefit from existing initiatives. In carrying out these mitigations, national- and international-level interventions were seen as playing distinct and complementary roles. At the national level, the use of committees, inspections, and engagement with the particular law enforcement community could be used to advance proposed mitigations. Internationally, actors such as the European Commission, International Chamber of Shipping, and the International Maritime Organization serve to establish consistent standards and provide overarching guidance on best practice. Private companies will also need to be involved in implementing and upholding effective mitigation strategies. Stakeholders pointed out that energy companies, shipping companies and manning agencies all have a responsibility to ensure security in their various domains, and face reputational risk if their efforts fall short. Stakeholders identified their top three ‘priority threats’ To conclude the workshop, stakeholders were asked to select and justify their top three ‘priority threats’ from the range of ‘higher likelihood’-‘higher impact’ attacks. These threats were selected based on individuals’ subjective criteria, including considerations of not only likelihood and impact but also capability required, evidence of similar past attacks, and level of ‘realistic’ threat perceived. General consensus emerged around the top three attack vectors to address: 1. Use of small boats to board the tanker for use as a guided weapon or to cause damage in a critical location; 2. Use of hidden or fraudulent means to board the tanker for use as a guided weapon or to cause damage in a critical location; 3. Land-based attack to cause damage in a critical location. CONCLUSION It was clear that this study addressed mainly the threats emanating from terrorists activities. The piracy problem was hardly th discussed. Apart from a few cases – for instance the attack on the motortanker Limburg on October 6 2002 – terrorist attacks are rather exceptional, and although some hypothetical situations reviewed in this study could give the impression of a James Bond scenario, we are convinced that this study will help not only the European Commission, but also shipowners and crews to enhance the awareness of the risks of terrorist threats and activities, anytime, anywhere. Remember 9/11 and better be prepared…  Notes compiled by Capt. Jef Cuyt 1

RAND Europe is an independent not-for-profit policy research organisation that aims to improve policy- and decision-making through research and analysis. RAND Europe’s evidence-based research across a range of policy relevant topics informs decisions made by European governments and institutions and others in the charitable and academic sectors.

² Explosive Learning Solutions (ELS) Ltd is a UK-based award winning specialist company offering bespoke training and solutions. ELS specialises in counter-improvised explosive device training, search and detection solutions, international capacity building, risk assessment, MOD training and counter-thread training for the UK and global defence and security markets. ³ Wise Pens lnternational (WPl) is a well-established group of international defence and security experts drawing on extensive strategic, operational and tactical experience in safety, security and defence issues. WPI specialises in maritime security policy and advice and benefits from a wide network in the global maritime domain. 

Quote…Unquote “…Analysis has shown that a large number of dangerous shipboard situations arise due to poor communication or coordination, rather than technical failures or lack of skill…” Lars Rhodin – Managing Director of The Swedish Club Ship Management International – Issue no. 45 – Sept/Oct. 2013

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THE THEWORLD WORLDHAS HASAANEW NEW PIRACY PIRACYHOTSPOT HOTSPOT by Patrick Winn

Bangkok -Maybe God has a soft spot for pirates. That would explain the Strait of Malacca, a natural paradise for seafaring bandits. Imagine an aquatic highway flowing between two marshy coasts. One shoreline belongs to Malaysia, the other to Indonesia. Each offers a maze of jungly hideaways: inlets and coves that favor pirates’ stealth vessels over slow, hulking ships. It’s a narrow route running 550 miles, roughly the distance between Miami and Jamaica. This bottleneck is plied by one-third of the world’s shipping trade. That’s 50,000 ships per year — ferrying everything from iPads to Reeboks to half the planet’s oil exports. The world’s fascination with neo-piracy now centers on Somalia. Thanks to the 2013 thriller “Captain Phillips,” in which Tom Hanks plays a cargo ship captain abducted by Somalis, even US teenagers know the anarchy-prone African state is a breeding ground for pirates. At least it was. In truth, Hollywood stumbled onto Somalia’s piracy phenomenon rather late. In the last three years, pirate strikes in Somali waters have plummeted 95 percent to a meager seven incidents in 2013; none were successful. Piracy in Southeast Asia, meanwhile, is accelerating. Attacks and attempted attacks in the waters of Indonesia — which controls much of the Malacca Strait and its environs — totaled 107 last year. That’s a 700 percent increase in just five years. The German insurance firm Allianz, which released these figures in a new report, is now sounding a warning: Southeast Asian piracy must be reined in before it’s too late. The attacks mostly amount to “opportunistic thefts carried out by small bands,” according to Allianz, but these syndicates could potentially “escalate into a more organized piracy model.” Somali hijackers vs. Indonesian bandits None of this would surprise 18th-century European spice traders. They lived in terror of Malacca Strait pirates who staged bloody ship raids — all from the same shores cargo ships chug past today. Piracy has long transfixed locals “born to the hard and dreary life of the fisherman,” writes historian Donald B. Freeman in the 2003 book “Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet?” A pirate’s life, Freeman wrote, was traditionally viewed in the region as a “passport to adventure, riches and prestige rather than a criminal occupation.” This tradition, paired with the pirate-friendly terrain, “helped give the region a reputation that made merchants and legitimate seafarers tremble at the very thought of traversing the strait.” Modern-day captains plying risky waters look to a guide called the BMP. Based on intel from Western navies and shipping firms, it offers tactics on avoiding pirates and — if that doesn’t work — fending them off and surviving abduction. The guide’s best advice? Go really fast. No pirates have ever boarded a ship pushing 18 knots, or nearly 21 miles per hour, the guide says. But that’s practically impossible in the Strait of Malacca. The channel is simply too crowded and too shallow. Gigantic vessels are instead forced to churn through at slow speeds that invite pirates in fast-moving skiffs. (To save fuel, today’s cargo ships often travel at about 14 miles per hour. That’s slower than 19th-century sail boats.) Indonesian pirates typically have different tactics from their Somali counterparts, who’ve made headlines by invading vessels and demanding multimillion-dollar ransoms. In the Malacca Strait, pirates like to get in and get out. Their “modus operandi isn’t to kidnap,” according to Tim Donney, an Allianz marine risk consultant. “These pirates just want the cash aboard the vessel or to rob the crew of any valuables.” In 2005, piracy in the Malacca Strait grew so rampant that Lloyd’s of London, a prestigious insurer, declared it a “war zone.” Regional militaries of Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia responded by upping warship patrols in the strait. But pirates have simply shifted into distant island chains beyond the strait’s exit along the route to China. 158

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Indonesia isn’t nearly as lawless as Somalia. But both are coastal nations where poverty is rife and police are ill-equipped. Both also happen to be situated on routes trafficked by wealthy nations’ trade vessels. “Most piracy takes place in areas where people are poor. Their livelihood has been taken from them by globalization, civil unrest or war,” writes Nigel Cawthorne, author of the book “Pirates of the 21st Century.” Somalia’s turnaround is owed to several factors: NATO- and EU-backed naval patrols, ships hiring on-board riflemen and, perhaps most importantly, a new Somali government working to stabilize its lawless coast. Somali pirates also forced the shipping industry to get creative. They’ve come up with effective pirate-proofing techniques that could be applied to more ships entering the Malacca Strait. The BMP recommends blasting approaching pirates with hot water, ringing ships with razor wire and even installing electric fencing. Discharging foam, according to the manual, is “effective as it is disorientating and very slippery.” Piracy poses no existential threat to the shipping industry. Considering the volume of international trade, losses from piracy “amount to little more than a rounding error,” according to piracy analyst Martin N. Murphy. But the “sense of disorder” created by piracy, he writes, “may be hard to calculate in dollars.” Piracy along the Malacca Strait route should be easier to fight than in Somalia. All of the nations patrolling the strait have functioning governments, committed to fighting the problem, and are financially incentivized to maintain a bandit-free trade route. Piracy’s historical influence here is legendary. In the 1820s, the Dutch and British empires drew a line in the sea and agreed to hunt down pirates on their respective sides; that line went on to become the modern-day border between Malaysia and Indonesia. The word “boogeyman” is also inspired by fearsome pirates from an ethnic group in Indonesia known as the Bugis. Taking a longer view of history, the rise and fall of Somalia’s piracy may eventually be seen as a blip — a brief aberration from the traditional order in which the Malacca Strait area is the world’s top piracy zone.  From the GlobalPost website – 27.03.14

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PIRACY PIRACY (2) (2)

OIL OILIS ISTREASURE TREASUREAS AS AFRICAN AFRICANPIRACY PIRACYSHIFTS SHIFTSWEST WEST by Jordan Stutts

The Kerala cargo vessel loaded with 60,000 tons of diesel on January 18 was an easy target for pirates lurking in the waters off West Africa. After maritime security firms warned of a tugboat stalking the Kerala off the coast of Angola, the tanker’s communication systems were turned off and the ship went missing for eight days. On January 26, the Kerala was back on the map and headed for safety at a port near Accra, Ghana. The crew said pirates stabbed one crew member, beat others, and unloaded close to 13,000 tons of diesel in three separate transfers. The Kerala is one example of a dramatic upswing in attacks on high-value oil tankers on Africa’s west coast, replacing Somali waters as the world’s new piracy hotspot.

Pirates surrender to a NATO counter-piracy task force

(Photo: Official U.S. Navy Page via Flickr)

In its annual global piracy report, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported piracy is on the decline with 264 attacks in 2013, an 11 percent decrease from 2012. Though the waters in Southeast Asia experienced the most incidents, these were low-profile events. West African rebels commandeering oil tankers are proving much more costly and attracting increased international attention. The waters off Somalia’s coast were once infamous for rebels seeking unsecured ships to take hostage. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and around Somalia grew so rampant it was having a negative effect on global commerce, with shipping lanes being avoided entirely. A blockbuster film starring Tom Hanks highlighting piracy in East Africa made waves at the 2014 Academy Awards. But an international collaboration of navies and heightened onboard security finally corralled the high seas to Africa’s east. Since this effort, there were just 15 incidents of Somali piracy in 2013, down from 75 in 2012, and 237 in 2011. “The single biggest reason for the drop in worldwide piracy is the decrease in Somali piracy off the coast of East Africa,” IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan said. Rebels from another corruption-riddled country in Africa are quickly replacing Somalia’s numbers in pirate attacks. Around one-fifth of global pirate attacks come from Nigeria, ranked by Transparency International as 144 in corruption out of 177 nations (Somalia was 175). Of 51 incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, Nigerian rebels were responsible for 31. In some ways, the upswing in Nigerian oil pirates is an extension of the Niger Delta conflict, where rebels have sought to sabotage the oil industry through theft and disruption for years.

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Like Somalia, many Nigerian youth are believed to turn to piracy as a result of their country’s corruption and bleak economic opportunity. An amnesty program launched to aid Niger Delta rebels has not recorded much success thus far. Legal jobs are still hard to come by, forcing some to find other means to provide for their community. Nigeria’s culture of corruption has disadvantaged large portions of its population, leading to an increase in crime onshore and off, but, ironically, the country’s soft approach to punishing these criminals is what allows them to thrive. Rumors exist that Nigeria’s Joint Task Force, assigned to crack down on militants, has “created a culture of impunity for successful thieves” by receiving payments for allowing their lucrative actions to slide. The causes for piracy may be similar on Africa’s east and west coasts, but the way they conduct business differs. Somali pirates looked for profit in the ransom game. Charles Nolfo, a longtime shipping executive, told Vice, “In the early years, the ransom was dropped by the ship owner on the deck of the ship and taken ashore to be divided among the tribes. Later on, the Somali pirates had London lawyers involved. They had bank accounts in Geneva. It was sophisticated.” Nolfo went on to say rebel attacks in West Africa resembles “more piracy and thievery.” Here, pirates are looking for petroleum tankers to hijack, steal its cargo and sell on the black market. A U.N. report estimates that pirates could make as much as $30 million a year from stolen oil, and the attacks are robbing African nations dependent on oil export revenue. It’s because of oil’s high value in a blooming black market, experts say, that West Africa is becoming notorious for sea-born robberies. The New York Times detailed a report from three leading maritime organizations that hostages in West Africa were held captive for an average of four days, and Somali pirates held their hostages on average for 11 months; some hostages had been in captivity for more than two years. The threat of piracy spreading from the Gulf of Guinea further down Africa’s west coast, with the Kerala as example, is a growing fear for African countries and the international community. An international fleet of shipping lane protectors has not been organized yet like what happened with Somalia, but several world powers, including the U.S., took part in a sea exercise with several African nations off the coast of Nigeria to help prepare for how to deal with west coast piracy. At the exercise, recently appointed Africa’s rear admiral for the Western Naval Command, Samuel Alade, acknowledged the importance of securing the region’s “huge resources and potential in the Gulf of Guinea” and vowed to tackle the “security challenges of piracy, poaching, smuggling, oil theft.”  Foreign Policy Association – 21.04.14

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(1) (1)

SINISTRESMARITIMES MARITIMES SINISTRES

‘Costa Concordia’ tow tow away setset for for JuneJune ‘Costa Concordia’ away

‘COSTA CONCORDIA’... CONCORDIA’…TWO ‘COSTA TWO YEARS YEARS ON ON _________ JANUARY 13, 2014 — As ceremonies marked the two year anniversary of the Costa Concordia tragedy which cost 32 lives, details emerged on progress with plans to tow the wreck away and scrap it. It now appears that the ship will be towed out in June. However, its final destination will not be known until by the end of February-early March 2014 when the responses to an invitation to tender that was sent out last month have been evaluated. Removing the wreck of the giant cruise ship from the environmentally sensitive waters of Italy's Isola del Giglio is widely considered the most daunting salvage ever attempted on a ship of its size. The ship's owner, Carnival Corporation subsidiary Costa Crociere, awarded the contract to remove the ship in one piece to Titan-Micoperi Srl, a joint venture between Crowley Maritime's Titan Salvage and Italy's Micoperi. Titan-Micoperi's offer was chosen based on stringent criteria, 90% of which referred to environmental protection, safety and the socio-economic fabric of the island community and the successful bid was actually the most expensive of the six submitted. The parbuckling, or righting, of the ship was successfully carried out September last year. Since being raised, the wreck has been resting on the false sea bed created beneath it as part of the parbuckling procedure at a depth of about 30 meters. To guarantee additional stability for the wreck, winterization measures saw 28 tubular steel braces positioned to connecting the sponsons on the wreck to the underwater platforms on the offshore side, the positioning of additional grout bags on the inshore side and the installation of an additional holdback system for the bow. Following the parbuckling, the wreck was surveyed to assess its overall condition, particularly the starboard side, which was previously submerged and inaccessible. Engineers then determined the structural repairs required ahead of the installation of the 15 sponsons that must still be placed on the starboard (inshore) side. The installation of the sponsons is planned to start in April 2014. They have already been built and are being prepared for installation in the Titan Micoperi Terminal in Livorno. Another four sponsons are still to be installed on the port side, making a total of 15 on this side as well. Initially, the 30 sponsons on either side of the vessel will be filled with water. A pneumatic system will be used to empty the water gradually, thus providing sufficient buoyancy for flotation. It is a delicate operation and engineers estimate that it might take several days. On completion of this process, a portion of the hull of about 18.5 meters will remain submerged. After refloating, the wreck will be ready for transportation to its final port of destination for dismantling and recycling. The wreck is regarded as waste and therefore, according to Italian law, the Tuscan Regional Administration is in charge of authorizing its transportation. Various possibilities are being considered for transportation of the wreck: a) Currently, traditional towing is considered the first option. b) With a US$ 30 million contract, Costa Crociere has also optioned the world's largest semi-submersible ship, the Dockwise Vanguard, as an additional alternative. The Dockwise Vanguard offers two possible offloading methods for the Concordia: - "float off", which means that the wreck would be offloaded into the sea afloat, or - "skid off", whereby the Concordia would be transferred from the Dockwise Vanguard directly onto a pier or an adjacent quayside area. A decision on the offloading method will be made in due time, should this mode of transportation be required. When delivered afloat, the wreck (including the attached sponsons) is expected to have the following overall dimensions: - Length Overall (LOA): 289.6 meters - Extreme Breadth including sponsons: approximately 62.5 meters - Maximum Draft: 18.5 meters Weight Approximately 75,000 tons 164

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According to Italian media reports, 12 ports and companies in six different countries are bidding for the contract to dismantle the vessel for scrap. The companies angling for the contract are believed to come from Italy, England, France, Norway, Turkey and the Netherlands. Italy's environment minister Andrea Orlando has reportedly said that the government would prefer "a domestic destination" for the ship's dismantling. Genoa seems the Italian port best placed to win the contract, while Costa Croceria is reported to favors the Turkish port of Aliağa. In late 2012 the company sent its Costa Allegra cruise ship to Aliağa for scrapping, after suffering a fire off the coast of the Seychelles that year.  MarineLog – 13.01.14

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SINISTRESMARITIMES MARITIMES SINISTRES

The South Korean ferry disaster

CALM,SAFE SAFEWATERS, WATERS, BUT CALM, BUTILL-FATED ILL-FATED KOREAN FERRYMAY MAYHAVE HAVE BEEN TOO FAST KOREAN FERRY BEENGOING GOING TOO FAST _________ _________ It It should should have have been been plain plain sailing sailing for for a a South South Korean Korean ferry ferry carrying carrying hundreds hundreds of of children children and and their their teachers teachers on on an an outing outing to to the the sub-tropical sub-tropical island island of of Jeju, Jeju, an an annual annual trip trip for for Danwon Danwon High High School. School. The The Sewol Sewol had had 476 476 passengers passengers and and crew crew on on board, board, including including 339 339 children children and and teachers. teachers. It It had had an an experienced experienced captain, captain, was was navigating navigating well-known well-known waters waters and and had had passed passed its its annual annual inspections inspections since since it it was was bought bought second second hand hand in in 2012 2012 by by Chonghaejin Chonghaejin Marine Marine Co. Co. Ltd. Ltd.

But prosecutors prosecutors believe believe the the vessel vessel capsized capsized after after turning turning at at too too high high a a speed. speed. Sixty-four Sixty-four people people are are known known to to have have died died and and But 238 are are missing, missing, presumed presumed dead, dead, mostly mostly children. children. In In an an arrest arrest document, document, the the captain captain was was charged charged with with undertaking undertaking an an 238 "excessive change change of of course course without without slowing slowing down" down" while while traversing traversing a a channel channel off off South South Korea's Korea's southwestern southwestern tip. tip. He He was was "excessive also charged charged with with negligence negligence in in evacuating evacuating passengers. passengers. The The sequence sequence of of known known events events however however offers offers little little clarity clarity on on why why also the ship ship should should have have turned turned at at speed. speed. the According to to fishermen fishermen and and others others who who navigate navigate the the tidal tidal waters waters around around Jindo Jindo island island where where the the Sewol Sewol started started to to sink sink last last According Wednesday, the the route route followed followed by by the the ferry ferry from from the the port port of of Incheon Incheon to to Jeju Jeju was was regularly regularly used used by by ferries ferries and and larger larger vessels vessels Wednesday, such as as oil oil tankers. tankers. There There were were few few navigation navigation risks risks in in the the main main channel, channel, they they said. said. The The Korean Korean Meteorological Meteorological Association Association such said there there was was a a 0.5 0.5 metre metre swell. swell. It It was was cloudy, cloudy, but but there there was was no no fog. fog. said "The shores shores of of the the islands islands nearby nearby drop drop straight straight down," down," said said Hwang Hwang Wan-soon, Wan-soon, captain captain of of a a fishing fishing boat boat who who has has 40 40 years' years' "The experience sailing sailing in in the the area. area. Han Han Sang-sik, Sang-sik, head head of of the the Jindo Jindo office office of of the the Dadohae Dadohae Haesang Haesang National National Park Park -- an an area area experience covering 1,700 1,700 islets islets -- said said the the channel channel in in the the spot spot where where the the Sewol Sewol sank sank was was 37-43 37-43 metres metres (122-142 (122-142 feet) feet) deep deep and and the the covering channel itself itself was was 3 3 km km (two (two miles) miles) wide, wide, offering offering plenty plenty of of room room for for manoeuvre. manoeuvre. channel "People living living in in nearby nearby islands islands say say fishing fishing boats boats tend tend to to avoid avoid the the area area at at full full moon moon as as the the current current is is especially especially strong strong at at "People that time," time," he he said. said. There There was was a a full full moon moon the the night night before before the the accident. accident. But But that that should should not not have have been been an an issue issue for for the the that Sewol, with with a a gross gross tonnage tonnage of of almost almost 7,000 7,000 tonnes tonnes and and one one of of the the largest largest passenger passenger ferries ferries in in operation operation in in Korean Korean waters. waters. Sewol, The accident accident happened happened when when the the ship ship made made an an abrupt abrupt turn turn and and started started to to list list sharply. sharply. That's That's when when the the ship ship was was suspected suspected The of going going too too fast. fast. It It was was not not clear clear if if the the sudden sudden change change of of direction direction was was one one of of two two scheduled scheduled course course changes changes to to navigate navigate of the channel. the channel. The vessel vessel was was bought bought second-hand second-hand from from Japan's Japan's A-Line A-Line shipping shipping company, company, reconfigured reconfigured and and expanded expanded and and was was subject subject The to a a five-month five-month testing testing period period by by the the Korea Korea Register Register of of Shipping Shipping between between October October 2012 2012 and and February February 2013 2013 before before it it entered entered to service on on March March 15, 15, 2013. 2013. It It was was subjected subjected to to an an annual annual check check again again in in February February 2014. 2014. service Jung Young-jun, Young-jun, executive executive vice vice president president of of the the survey survey division division at at Korean Korean Register Register of of Shipping, Shipping, said said the the capacity capacity expansion expansion Jung from 800 800 to to 900 900 passengers passengers was was completed completed in in accordance accordance with with "national "national laws laws and and Korean Korean Register Register requirements". requirements". Evidence Evidence from given to to prosecutors prosecutors and and from from the the dialogue dialogue between between the the ship ship and and control control centres centres say say cargo cargo started started to to shift shift on on the the foredeck, foredeck, given but it it was was not not clear clear whether whether that that caused caused the the boat boat to to heel heel after after the the turn turn or or was was a a consequence consequence of of the the heeling. heeling. but Moon Ki-han, Ki-han, an an executive executive at at Uryeon Uryeon (Union (Union Transport Transport Co.), Co.), the the firm firm that that undertook undertook supervision supervision of of cargo cargo loading, loading, told told Moon Reuters there there were were 105 105 containers containers onboard. onboard. Of Of these, these, 45 45 were were loaded loaded on on to to the the front front deck deck and and 60 60 into into the the lower lower decks. decks. In In Reuters total, the the ship ship was was carrying carrying 3,600 3,600 tonnes tonnes of of cargo cargo including including containers, containers, vehicles vehicles and and other other goods. goods. total, 166

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One of the lines of investigation is that a sharp turn could have caused the cargo to shift, which in turn could have contributed to the swift capsizing of the ship. Investigators have seized the records of Uryeon and the ship owner. The captain was not on the bridge at the time of the initial listing - not unusual on a 13.5-hour voyage. Navigation was the responsibility of a 26-year-old third mate on her first passage in charge through these waters. Transcripts of conversations between the bridge of the Sewol and land-based shipping control indicate that the ferry initially contacted the control in Jeju island about 56 miles (90 km) away and not the nearest centre on nearby Jindo island when it started to list. It is normal procedure to use the destination control as the centre except in the case of an emergency and it is not known why the radio operator continued to contact Jeju. At 08:55 a.m on April 16, while traversing the Maenngol Channel, the Sewol told Jeju Vessel Traffic Service: "This ship is in danger. This ship is listing. " A minute later the ship radioed: "This ship is starting to capsize. Please come quickly." By 9 a.m, it had reported the ship had tilted leftward. "Containers have fallen," it said. At 0905 a.m., Jeju control contacted the Jindo station, which was in a position to call for assistance from local vessels. Testimony from witnesses and the transcript of the conversation between the ship's bridge and the control centre in Jindo shows that the crew of the ship did not believe there were enough rescue vessels in the area to save the passengers. It was not known why no more than two of the Sewol's 46 lifeboats were deployed, nor why the captain and crew did not follow emergency procedures laid down in their own manual. "In case of fire, collision, retreat, terror and any other emergency, the crew should follow the captain's command; make an announcement of an evacuation and (location of) the emergency exit doors; guide (passengers) to escape routes in the area of their responsibility," the manual says, adding that lifeboats and lifebuoys should be checked monthly. Witness testimony and the conclusion of prosecutors investigating the sinking show that the captain and some of the crew evacuated the ship before most of the passengers, who were instructed in some cases to remain where they were. Later transcripts show the decision to evacuate being placed in the hands of the captain and under the standing rules of the ship, it was the captain's final decision. "We don't know the situation over there, so captain you should make a final decision about whether or not to evacuate the ship," the control on the island of Jindo said. Source : Reuters  Excerpt from Maritime Press Clippings – 23.04.14

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Bredastraat 139 - B-2060 antwerpen tel.: +32 3 231 89 50 - Fax.: +32 3 233 00 40 telex: 31536 vhulle-b - [email protected] - www.vanhulleships.be Nautilus, mei 2014 tel. after hours: +32 499 53 57 10 - +32 497 54 84 39

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MILIEU ENVIRONNEMENT MILIEU ENVIRONNEMENT

UN ATOLL ENERGETIQUE SUR ? SUR LES LES BANCS BANCS DE DE FLANDRE FLANDRE? _________

A l’instar d’autres pays, la Belgique étudie également la réalisation d’une île artificielle, comprenant deux bassins de retenue d’eau situés à des hauteurs différentes, qui permettrait de « stocker » de l'énergie électrique produite par nos champs éoliens implantés en Mer du Nord. Et ce, parce que souvent en cas de surproduction de courant, une partie importante de celui-ci est généralement perdu ! Et donc, convient-il de ne pas gaspiller cette énergie surnuméraire et de l’utiliser idéalement. Pour faire fonctionner une Stations de Transfert d’Energie par Pompage (et Turbinage) – STEP, par exemple.

La technique consiste à pomper de l'eau (avec des pompes électriques) pour la stocker dans des bassins d'accumulation hauts placés lorsque la demande d'énergie électrique est faible --c'est le pompage-- et ensuite, lorsque la demande augmente, et donc aussi le prix, de turbiner cette eau via des génératrices, pour produire de l'électricité. Sans anticiper sur le débat politique et/ou de faisabilité, disons qu’un tel atoll aurait l’aspect d’un grand « donut » posé sur un banc de sable, avec à l’intérieur un grand puits et des bassins de retenue. Réalisé à 3 km au large de Wenduine, il aurait un diamètre de 2,5 km, et un tirant d’air de 10 mètres au-dessus du niveau de la mer. En outre, il jouxterait les parcs C-Power (54 turbines à la fin de 2014) ; celui de Belwind (55 éoliennes), et aussi celui encore à l’étude de Northwind dont les 72 éoliennes devraient être implémentées vers 2015-2016. Le but à l’issue de 2020, étant de porter la capacité globale de nos champs éoliens de 380 mégawatts (MW) à 2.300 MW. Selon Bacha Seddik, chercheur au Laboratoire de génie électrique de Grenoble, le système de turbinage-pompage couplé à des éoliennes est une très bonne solution pour absorber l'intermittence et produire de l’électricité de manière réglable. Toutefois il faut tenir compte que la seule construction de ce type d’île représentera probablement 90 % du prix du projet. L'idée d'îles multi-énergétiques, utilisant l'énergie éolienne, houlo-motrice et/ou hydrolienne, voire les trois à la fois, pour produire de l'électricité en mer et l'expédier à terre, est en fait un concept inspiré du roman de Jules Verne « L’île à hélice », --sous-titré Les Milliardaires ridicules, paru en 1895-- et réactivé au début des années 2.000 par des ingénieurs particulièrement audacieux. Depuis elle fait l'objet de recherches e.a., au Danemark, où des chercheurs du laboratoire national Risø travaillent sur un plan d’île doté d’un réservoir de 3,3 km² pouvant produire 2,75 GWh d'électricité ; soit l'équivalent de la consommation de Copenhague pendant 24 heures. A Singapour, c’est Hexifloat et sa déclinaison en Sea Flower, qui planchent sur un concept marine hybrides, exploitant à la 1 fois l’énergétique éolien, solaire, houlomotrice et hydrolienne sur des îles artificielles situées à proximité des côtes . Voire l’un des projets actuellement le plus avancés de la compagnie danoise Floating Power Plant qui présentait publiquement dès 2 2009, un prototype d'île multi-énergétique baptisé "Poseidon" . 170

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Sans oublier une solution concrète lancée par Virgin en 2008 et proposé aux autorités maltaises et aux autorités chypriotes en 2012 mais qui ne fut jamais totalement concrétisée. Et aussi le très ambitieux Hexicon suédois ; un hexagone de 460 mètres de largeur, pouvant abriter 36 turbines éoliennes pilotées électroniquement sur une structure arachnéenne hébergeant aussi un parc houlomoteur, un héliport et une 3 centrale solaire à panneaux photovoltaïques. Certes, sur le plan environnemental, une île énergétique construite intégralement en sable sur le Wenduinebank pourrait également accueillir des colonies de mammifères et/ou d’oiseaux de mer. Et en outre, la production d’énergie devrait compenser en partie, celle des centrales nucléaires de Doel et Tihange, dont la fiabilité fait soucis selon des experts. Mais il reste à analyser le bilan « pollution » d’une telle entreprise, qui pourrait peutêtre dépasser le return environnemental de cette forme de production d’énergie. Il n’empêche que ces défis technologiques sont à suivre avec intérêt car ils sont non seulement basés sur la complémentarité des (re-)sources énergétiques renouvelables, mais répondent aussi au credo de l’océanographe français Jacques Rougerie qui affirmait que : C’est de l’Océan que naîtra le destin des civilisations à venir !

1. http://energiesdelamer.blogspot.be/2011/02/hexifloat-ile-modulable-et-mix.html 2. http://www.floatingpowerplant.com/ 3. http://www.hexicon.eu/

 Freddy Philips - Membre de l’Académie Royale de Marine de Belgique

AANVARING COLLISION AANVARING COLLISION

EXCES EXCESDE DE CONFIANCE CONFIANCE _________

Le London P&l Club a cherché à rappeler aux armateurs que les dangers de l'excès de confiance à la passerelle peuvent contribuer à l'apparition des accidents. Dans une analyse récente des collisions de navires [19.03.13], le P&l a conclu que la majorité était due à une erreur humaine, avec souvent un excès de confiance comme facteur contributif important. Il cite comme exemple récent le cas d'un vraquier [Chou Shan] qui approchait de la sortie d'un dispositif de séparation de trafic. Le navire ralentissait pour faire son ETA dans une station de pilotage située dans la zone de circulation c6tière adjacente et était sur le point de modifier sensiblement sa route sur tribord, conformément à son passage-plan. Dans le même temps, le navire était dépassé par un navire porte-conteneurs [CMA CGM Florida]. «Alors qu'un changement de quart à la passerelle approchait, il était devenu évident pour l'officier de quart sur le vraquier que le navire qui dépassait ne prenait pas les mesures pour passer suffisamment clair, en conformité avec ses obligations au titre l’article 13 du règlement pour prévenir les abordages» a annoncé le P&I. Une conversation VHF aurait ensuite eu lieu dans laquelle le vraquier a fait connaître ses intentions au navire porteconteneurs le dépassant, et un accord a été conclu selon lequel le vraquier ferait son changement de route sur tribord, et le porte-conteneurs en dépassement changerait de cap sur bâbord et passerait sur le côté bâbord du vraquier. Peu après, l'officier de relève est arrivé sur la passerelle du vraquier et le processus de relève de quart a commencé. Le P&l dit qu'il était évident que l'officier de quart était convaincu que la manoeuvre avait été bien comprise par les deux navires et qu'il prévoyait que le porte-conteneurs passerait sur l'arrière bâbord. « Malheureusement, il n'a pas réussi à contrôler la situation, ni réussi à changer de cap sur tribord comme convenu, et a été prís par surprise au milieu de sa conversation de passation de quart, lorsque Ie porte-conteneurs en dépassement est entré en collision avec le vraquier juste sur l'avant de la passerelle sur le côté tribord», a indiqué le P&I. « II était clair que, tout au long de l'épisode, les navires étaient dans une situation très rapprochée qui se développait, et que le bon sens marin aurait dicté à l'officier de quart de surveiller de très près la conduite du navire le dépassant jusqu'à ce qu'il soit finalement passé et clair, ce qui pouvait retarder la relève de quart ». Le Club ajoute que la confiance mal placée et l'excès de confiance peuvent avoir contribué de manière significative dans l'indemnisation résultant de la collision. « La confiance en soi est toujours un facteur important dans les accidents.»

Dale Wainwright à Singapour - 06 novembre 2013  Extrait de Marine Marchande Informations n° 206 – 1er trimestre 2014 Vous trouverez le rapport complet sur cet accident sur www.maib.gov.uk Nautilus, mei 2014

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ZEERECHT ZEERECHT

DROITMARITIME MARITIME DROIT

The recent case of Astipalaia vs Hanjin Shenzhen [2014] EWHC 120 (Admlty) has revisited the existing case law on assessment of damages following a collision and provided further clarification as to the appropriate test to be applied.

HOWDO DOYOU YOUCALCULATE CALCULATE LOSS LOSS OF EARNINGS HOW EARNINGS FOLLOWING A COLLISION? COLLISION? FOLLOWING _________ On 26 March 2008 there was a collision between the fully laden VLCC tanker Astipalaia and the container ship Hanjin Shenzhen in the approaches to Singapore where Astipalaia was due to discharge. As a result of the collision, Astipalaia suffered damage to her hull, guard rails and mooring chock. Astipalaia was able to proceed into Singapore to discharge her cargo. The background facts At the time of the collision, Astipalaia was trading in the VLCC spot market which in early-mid 2008 was particularly buoyant and the vessel was acceptable throughout the industry to oil majors and other first class charterers. However, Astipalaia was unfixed for her next employment at the time of the collision. As a result of the incident, the vessel‟s oil major approvals were temporarily placed on “technical hold” by the majors pending the usual investigation into the collision. Astipalaia was also required by class to undertake permanent repairs before any further employment. Astipalaia sailed from Singapore to Dubai in ballast and entered dry dock for permanent repairs which lasted around 10 days. On exiting dry dock, Astipalaia was still unable to resume trading on the VLCC spot market as the “technical hold” had not then been lifted. In the absence of oil major approvals, Astipalaia was fixed to NITC to be employed as floating storage off Kharg Island, Iran on a 60 day period charter, during which time the “technical holds” were dealt with and lifted. She completed the NITC fixture and was redelivered at Fujairah on 29 June 2008 after which she resumed her normal pattern of spot trading. Accordingly, despite the time in dry dock only lasting some 10 days, Astipalaia was effectively unavailable for her primary trading market for the entire period from 26 March 2008 to 29 June 2008. Astipalaia brought a claim for loss of profits based on what the vessel would have earned had she traded on the normal VLCC spot market during that period, giving credit for the mitigation earnings obtained while on charter as floating storage to NITC. The total amount claimed by Astipalaia was approximately US$5,640,000 lost income during that period. The Reference to the Registrar Following agreement on liability, the quantum of Astipalaia’s claim was disputed and referred for determination by the Admiralty Registrar. The Court had to consider how to calculate loss of earnings of Astipalaia in circumstances where (1) the vessel did not have a specific next fixture concluded at the time of the collision such that there was no certainty as to what the vessel would have earned next, but for the collision, and (2) the vessel‟s oil major approvals had been placed on “technical hold” and were not reinstated until the end of a less lucrative storage fixture. Astipalaia’s position Astipalaia’s Owners contended that damages should be assessed on the basis that the best evidence of Astipalaia’s potential earnings, but for the collision, were that Astipalaia would either (i) have been fixed to Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) with whom they had been negotiating for a West Africa-East Coast India fixture at the time of the collision, after which Astipalaia would have resumed a „typical‟ spot trading pattern of a round voyage from Arabian Gulf (AG) to the Far East, or (ii) had Owners not secured the IOC fixture, the vessel would have undertaken two AG-Far East round voyages. Under either alternative, these two hypothetical voyages would have been completed within roughly the same period of time as the detention period, i.e. by 29 June 2008, such that a reasonable comparison could be drawn between what the vessel could have earned during that period, with what she did in fact earn. Astipalaia’s Owners relied on the “time equalisation method” set out in the Vicky 1 [2008] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 45, which they argued supported their approach of comparing what the vessel would probably have earned but for the collision with what she did in fact earn in the same period. The hypothetical voyage schedule advocated by the Astipalaia’s Owners and prepared by their expert sought to provide comparable fixtures she could (but not necessarily would) have performed in the detention period in order to place a value on the vessel‟s lost earnings. On that basis Astipalaia claimed damages of approximately US$5,640,000. 172

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Hanjin Shenzhen’s position In the Vicky 1, the claimant tanker owners had lost an actual fixture. Hanjin Shenzhen’s Owners argued that the principles from Vicky 1 only applied if the claimant ship owner had lost a secured fixture, not where there was no definite next business secured. Their primary case was that the loss period should be split into two distinct periods: (i) the period during which the vessel was completely out of service, when repairs were being completed; and (ii) the period during which she performed the floating storage charter. On that basis, Hanjin Shenzhen argued that whilst they were liable in damages for lost income for approximately US$800,000 for period (i) during the dry docking, by the time of the floating storage charter being entered into after dry docking the spot market had in fact fallen such that no damages were recoverable for period (ii) as the rates achieved under the floating storage business successfully mitigated Astipalaia’s loss. Hanjin Shenzhen interests also opposed the “time equalisation method” of seeking to model hypothetical voyages on the basis that it was too speculative to seek to calculate when the vessel might have been back in the AG after the first hypothetical voyage, and what the spot rate might have been at that time for the second hypothetical voyage. During proceedings it was accepted by both experts that VLCCs operate in a well-defined and straightforward trading pattern. The largest loading area (around 72% of all VLCC cargoes) is the AG followed by West Africa, with a limited number of cargoes loading in the Caribbean or North Sea/Mediterranean. The Registrar accepted this evidence, and further evidence that of the 72% of cargoes lifted from the AG, around 70% of those cargoes are for Far East discharge. Accordingly, it could be established on the balance of probabilities what sort of business the vessel most likely would/could have achieved during the total detention period. The Admiralty Court decision The Registrar considered and analysed various leading cases, including The Argentino (1888) 13 PD 191 (C/A), 14 App Cas 519 (H/L), The Soya [1956] 1 WLR 714 (C/A) and The Vicky 1 [2008] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 45 (C/A). Having done so, the Registrar accepted Astipalaia’s approach to assessing damages. The court upheld Astipalaia’s argument that the detention period should include not only the repair period but also the additional period the vessel needed to obtain reinstatement of oil major approvals before returning to her normal employment, and that this detention period should be taken as a single period finishing on 29 June 2008, not broken into two parts. The arguments on behalf of Hanjin Shenzhen that there were principles of law curtailing or precluding such an assessment were rejected. On the basis of the expert evidence before him, the Registrar assessed damages in the total sum of approximately US$ 4,960,000 (a loss of earnings of US$ 9,860,000 less US$ 4,900,000) earned during the floating storage contract. Comment This Judgment confirms that an owner can claim damages not just for the immediate loss of use of the vessel during the period of repairs but also for further knock-on effects to the vessel‟s ability to return to normal trading, provided of course that such knock-on effects are not too remote or unforeseeable and that the loss can be proven by evidence. The Judgment also confirms that there is no set rule as to the recoverability of damages for loss of use, and that such recovery is not dependent on proof of a specific lost fixture, nor (if such a fixture is established) that damages are limited to that one fixture but no more. While there is no set methodology for calculating loss of profits, the methodologies used in earlier cases may be adapted to suit the facts of each case. The principles applied in this case were ultimately the same as those applied in The Vicky 1 and can be said to represent a recognised and well principled approach to modelling a vessel‟s likely earnings over a given period which properly takes into account the relevant market position as at the time the hypothetical voyages would have been fixed. It should be noted, however, that proving one‟s loss may be more difficult in other trades. The VLCC trade is sufficiently well established and „predictable‟, with enough data published, to allow a meaningful expert analysis of what the vessel could have earned. It would be more difficult to undertake the same exercise for ships with a more varied and unpredictable trading pattern. This article was first published in Maritime Risk International on 5 March 2014.  From the Ince & Co website

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Maritime Security Handbook

STOWAWAYS BY SEA _________

by The Nautical Institute

Improvements in security have not reduced the number of stowaways or the number of incidents and it is seafarers who have to cope with the extra work, delay, uncertainty and possible violence. This is why The Nautical Institute has today (Wednesday) launched Maritime Security handbook: stowaways by sea, aimed at helping people who have to deal with stowaways by giving advice on the preparation and training that is needed both onboard and ashore. The handbook gives practical guidance on making a vessel secure against stowaways, managing any that have succeeded in getting onboard, collecting the necessary evidence and organising the repatriation process. It includes an explanation of who stows away and why, how trading patterns affect risk, the responsibilities of all parties involved in a stowaway incident and the importance of reporting. Author Steven Jones MSc BSc (Hons) MNI commented: “Stowaways pose significant security, safety, commercial and liability issues for shipping. The problem is a serious one and shows no sign of abating.” He added that as Maritime Director of the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI), his primary focus is on people. He aims, through the book to make available best practice on protecting vessels, training, and provision of useable and timely intelligence to all, whether they are onboard vessels or ashore. He pointed out that stowaways are one of the threats that must be assessed and planned for in the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and in the provision by owners and operators of training and specific instructions and procedures. This will ensure that crews can react to a difficult problem with “understanding, compassion and authority” while protecting themselves and their vessel. In addition to a decade of onboard experience as a navigation officer, including dealing with stowaways and instigating intensive searching processes, Steven Jones has advised numerous shipping companies on security planning and has worked for insurers, publishers and professional bodies. Speaking at the launch, the Institute’s Vice-President, Captain Allen Brink FNI, commented that many at sea, including himself, had experience of dealing with stowaways and it was essential that the Institute’s information and advice on the subject was practical and up to date. “There may be a lot of information out there on stowaways, particularly from P&I clubs. However, in our work at The Nautical Institute we like to relate that information to practical measures mariners can take to help towards their own security,” he said. As an NGO at the IMO, he added, the Institute is able to bring the realities of dealing with stowaways to the world’s attention. Captain Nicholas Cooper MNM FNI, past President of the Institute, shared his experience of having his vessel and crew held hostage by stowaways – something “no amount of training, drills and SMS procedures prepares you for.” A recent IMO initiative focusing on the top 12 embarkation ports for stowaways in West and Central Africa was described by the organisation’s Head of Facilitation Section, Maritime Safety Division, Julian Abril. The regional seminar on stowaways held in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire on 25-27 March called for port facilities to strengthen their capacities for surveillance and access control. In his Foreword to the handbook, Giles Noakes, Chief Maritime Security Officer at BIMCO, pointed out that “resolution of a stowaway case can include a considerable burden in terms of discomfort and sometimes even threat to the crew, administrative hassle, and the risk of fines or sanctions from port authorities.” He commended the handbook as “timely and prescient” and for providing “sound and up-to-date best practice and guidance”. The book was launched at a seminar held in conjunction with a SAMI workshop on port security. Maritime Security handbook: Stowaways by Sea is the third book in The Nautical Institute’s maritime security suite and a companion volume to “Maritime Security – a practical guide” published in 2012 and “Maritime Security handbook: coping with piracy published in 2013”. 174

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All books in the suite are aimed at providing comprehensive and practical guidance to support development of a security culture both onboard and ashore that is based on excellence rather than compliance. Maritime Security handbook: Stowaways by Sea is available from The Nautical Institute price: £20; ISBN: 978 1 906915 47 6 http://www.nautinst.org/pubs For more information and review copies please contact Bridget Hogan, Director of Publishing and Marketing, The Nautical Institute +44 (0)20 7928 1351, [email protected] Editor’s notes: The Nautical Institute is the international professional body for qualified seafarers and others with an interest in nautical matters. It provides a wide range of services to enhance the professional standing and knowledge of members who are drawn from all sectors of the maritime world. Founded in 1972, it has nearly 50 branches world-wide and some 7,000 members in over 110 countries. In 2012, the Institute was the proud recipient of the Training Award for its range of human element videos at the Lloyd’s List Global Awards.  From The Nautical Institite Press Office 9 April 2014

Waar u ook voor gaat, wij gaan met u mee. KBC Bank & Verzekering Sint-Jansplein 51, 2060 Antwerpen Tel. 03 206 84 10 Fax 03 206 84 11

Wij gaan met u mee

Imago 105_148 Antwerpen St Jans.indd 1

25-11-2010 15:03:21

WWW.ANTWERP-TOWAGE.COM +32 (0)3 2121000 Nautilus, mei 2014

(24/7)

175

DE BELGISCHE VLAG VAN TOEN DE BELGISCHE VLAG VAN TOEN

LE PAVILLON BELGE AUTREFOIS LE PAVILLON BELGE AUTREFOIS

“LAPLAND” “LAPLAND” GROOTSTE BELGISCHE RED STAR STARLINER LINER GROOTSTE BELGISCHE RED _________

Tussen de allereerste aankomst in de thuishaven Antwerpen op 1 april 1909 en de eerste afvaart naar New York tien dagen later bood de S.A. de Navigation Belge Américaine (SANBA), beter gekend als de Red Star Line, geïnteresseerden gedurende vier dagen de gelegenheid “le nouveau transatlantique monstre”, zoals de Lloyd Anversois de “Lapland” toen voorstelde, te bezichtigen. Ze moesten er wel twee frank voor neertellen - een toch niet te versmaden bedrag voor die tijd - om aan boord van het nieuwe vlaggenschip van de rederij te mogen gaan. Met zijn lengte van net geen 190 meter en zijn breedte van 21,45 meter en een bruto inhoud van 17540 ton behoorde de onder Belgische vlag varende“Lapland” tot de grootste passagiersschepen van zijn tijd.

Het schip was door de International Mercantile Marine Company (IMMC), de machtige Amerikaanse groep waartoe de Belgische rederij behoorde, besteld bij de scheepswerf Harland & Wolff uit Belfast, die het order in de portefeuille noteerde onder het nummer 393. Hierbij kan worden aangetekend dat in de jaren voor het uitbreken van de eerste wereldoorlog de Ierse werf heel wat schepen heeft gebouwd voor de vele dochterondernemingen van de Amerikaanse groep. Ze kon in dit opzicht worden beschouwd als de “thuiswerf” van IMMC. Na de stapelloop op 27 juni 1908 duurde het nog negen maanden vooraleer de “Lapland” eind maart 1909 kon opgeleverd worden. Onmiddellijk na de overdracht op 27 maart zette het schip koers naar zijn thuishaven. Het schip was bij de indienstneming ingericht voor de accommodatie van 2536 passagiers onderverdeeld in drie klassen: 394 in eerste, 352 in tweede en 1790 in derde en telde 370 bemanningsleden. In de loop van de 24-jarige carrière werd de passagiersaccommodatie enkele malen aangepast en kon het opgegeven cijfer variëren naargelang de bron die werd geraadpleegd. Essentieel bleef het schip de hele tijd een drieklassen vaartuig met uitzondering van de periodes toen het als troepentransportschip of in de cruisemarkt werd ingezet. Duidelijk werd de “Lapland” niet exclusief ontworpen voor het vervoer van emigranten, maar werd er ook aandacht geschonken aan de ontvangst van meer gegoede gasten. Het met twee schoorstenen en vier masten uitgeruste schip werd aangedreven door twee schroeven elk gekoppeld aan een quadruple expansiemachine. Het totale voortstuwingsvermogen beliep 15.000 ipk waardoor een snelheid tot 17 knopen kon gelopen worden. De “Lapland” kwam in de vaart op het hoogtepunt in het bestaan van de Red Star Line. Op dat ogenblik voer nagenoeg de hele vloot van de rederij onder Belgische vlag. Deze gunstige ontwikkeling is mogelijk te verklaren door de wederzijdse vriendschap van de toenmalige koning Leopold II en de Amerikaanse zakenman Pierpont Morgan, die zeer actief was binnen de moedermaatschappij van SANBA. Bij de indienstneming was het schip het zesde onder Belgische vlag, een getal dat een jaar later tot zeven werd opgetrokken toen de “Samland” van de Amerikaanse vlag naar de Belgische tricolore werd overgeheveld. Zeven is het grootste aantal schepen die gelijktijdig door de RSL onder Belgische vlag werden uitgebaat. 176

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Zoals in de aanhef gemeld vertrok de “Lapland” op 10 april 1909 op zijn “maidentrip” naar New York via Dover. De Britse haven was sedert augustus 1904 als vaste aanloophaven ingeschakeld, een toestand die onveranderd bleef tot aan het uitbreken van de eerste wereldoorlog. Van meet af aan kende de “Lapland” een enorm succes. Dit, samen met de toenemende concurrentie van de HollandAmerika Lijn – nochtans een maatschappij uit dezelfde groep – leidde tot de bestelling van wat later de beroemde “Belgenland” zou worden. Zoals gebruikelijk bij de maatschappij stond het vlaggenschip onder bevel van een niet-Belgische gezagvoerder. Van 1912 tot 1914 was dat kapitein Bradshaw, die later ook gezagvoerder werd van de “Belgenland”. In de vijf jaar volgend op de indienstneming kwam de “Lapland” nauwelijks in het nieuws. Wel kan worden vermeld dat het in april 1912 een gedeelte van de pas vergane “Titanic” uit de VSA repatrieerde bemanning naar Plymouth in GrootBrittannië. In augustus van hetzelfde jaar verliet het op zaterdag 24 augustus de Antwerpse haven met een (toen) uitzonderlijke diepgang van 27’6”. Dit gebeuren ging enigszins verloren omdat op dezelfde dag de gloednieuwe “Anversville” zijn maidentrip naar Congo aanvatte. Kort nadat begin augustus 1914 Duitse troepen België waren binnengevallen, kwam de “Lapland” uit New York in GrootBrittannië aan. Honderdtwintig Duitse bemanningsleden van het schip werden onder gewapend escorte van boord gehaald en naar Portsmouth gebracht voor internering. Ook vijftig Belgische bemanningsleden verkozen toen af te monsteren en naar België terug te keren. Een ander gevolg was dat de rederij al kort na het uitbreken van de vijandelijkheden haar hoofdzetel van Antwerpen naar Liverpool overhevelde en, op twee na, alle schepen zonder naamsverandering onder Britse vlag plaatste, waar ze ondergebracht werden in de vloot van de International Navigation Company met thuishaven Liverpool. De “Lapland” maakte deel uit van het eerste konvooi dat op 3 oktober uit Canada naar Engeland vertrok met aan boord een gedeelte van het First Canadian Expeditionary Force. In dit 32 schepen tellende konvooi bevond zich ook de “Zeeland”. Na het ontschepen van de troepen werd de “Lapland” op 15 oktober 1914 “uitgeleend” aan de White Star Line en voer voor rekening van die rederij vanaf 27 oktober het volgende anderhalf jaar op de lijndienst tussen Liverpool en New York. Op 7 april 1917 liep het mis. Toen voer het schip kort voor de aankomst te Liverpool op een mijn. Het zwaar beschadigde schip kon echter de haven aanlopen en na reparatie, in de vaart gebracht worden als troepentransportschip in dienst van de Britse overheid. Na het beëindigen van de oorlog maakte de “Lapland” nog een aantal trans-Atlantische reizen alvorens het aan de eigenaar werd teruggegeven waarop een grondige opknapbeurt volgde alvorens het opnieuw in commerciële dienst werd genomen. Bij deze ingreep, die onder meer tot gevolg had dat de bruto tonnage van het schip verhoogde tot 18565 ton, veranderde er niet veel aan de passagierscapaciteit met uitzondering van de derde klasse, waarvan de capaciteit werd teruggebracht tot 1200 personen. Op 3 januari 1920 keerde het passagiersschip terug op de route tussen Antwerpen en New York, met ditmaal Southam pton als intermediaire Britse aanloophaven in plaats van Dover. Blijkbaar zou op deze eerste reis al assistentie verleend zijn geweest aan het Franse passagiersschip “L’Afrique”, maar het is me niet gelukt bevestiging van dit nieuws te vinden. In 1924 moest het evenals de “Belgenland” tijdelijk uitwijken naar Londen, toen de diepgang op de Schelde niet meer toeliet naar Antwerpen te varen. Snel uitgevoerde baggerwerken lieten toe dat het euvel snel kon verholpen worden en de schepen Antwerpen terug konden aanlopen. In december van hetzelfde jaar was de “Lapland” echter betrokken bij een aanvaring op de Schelde met het vrachtschip “Java”. De immigratiebeperking die in de eerste helft van de jaren twintig geleidelijk door de Amerikaanse overheid werd ing evoerd, liet zijn weerslag voelen op de uitbating van de passagiersdiensten naar de “Nieuwe Wereld”. De Red Star Line kreeg, zoals andere scheepvaartondernemingen, met overcapaciteit te kampen. Door de accommodatie in derde klasse terug te schroeven en schepen in te zetten in de cruisevaart trachtte de rederij de toestand te verhelpen. Aldus werd de capaciteit van derde klasse in de “Lapland” teruggeschroefd tot 540 en werd het schip vaker uitgebaat als cruiseschip. Aan deze uitbatingwijze werd niets gewijzigd toen in 1927 de International Navigation Co overgenomen werd door Frederick Leyland & Co. De economische crisis die na zwarte donderdag 29 oktober 1929 wereldwijd uitbrak, maakte de toestand enkel erger. De “Lapland” werd nog slechts sporadisch in de lijndienst tussen Antwerpen en New York ingezet, afgewisseld met cruises vanuit Londen. Voor een groot gedeelte lag het schip tussen de zomer 1931 en de herfst 1933 lange periodes op in een uithoek Antwerpse haven. In oktober 1933 werd bekend dat via een Londense makelaar de “Lapland” voor sloop verkocht was aan een Japanse firma. Op 19 november verliet het eens de trots van de Belgische koopvaardijvloot voor de laatste maal Antwerpen met als eindbestemming de sloopwerf in Osaka, die op 29 januari 1934 werd bereikt na een tussenstop in Kaapstad.  Florent Van Otterdyk Nautilus, mei 2014

177

CAUSERIE CAUSERIE De

MERCATORKRING organiseert een lunchcauserie

op dinsdag, 10 juni 2014 om 12u00 in de ROYAL YACHT CLUB van BELGIË Thonetlaan 133 – 2050 Antwerpen L-O met als onderwerp

“Oostendse kapers”

I

door

Willy Versluys

Reder ter Zeevisserij Leden (en hun partner): € 35,00 pp

Niet-leden: € 40,00pp

(3-gangen menu, incl. aperitief, wijn en koffie)

te storten op rekening nr. 068-2413784-63 van de Mercatorkring IBAN: BE40 0682 4137 8463

BIC: GKCCBEBB

Alle leden en sympathisanten zijn van harte welkom! Aanwezigheid bevestigen vóór 5 april: e-mail: [email protected]

FOTO’s GEVRAAGD Redactie Nautilus is op zoek naar foto’s voor publicatie in ons maandblad NAUTILUS, en op onze website. Daarom nodigen wij onze leden/fotografen uit om ons fotomateriaal te bezorgen van een maritiem onderwerp, zoals: bemanningen, techniek, natuur, milieu, schepen, enz. De redactie zal dan een keuze maken uit het ingezonden materiaal maar is niet gebonden een van de inzendingen te gebruiken. Foto’s moeten aangeleverd worden via electronische weg ([email protected]). De eigenaar/maker van de geselecteerde foto heeft geen recht op vergoeding, maar eeuwige roem staat hem te wachten! Met dank bij voorbaat!

RECHERCHE PHOTOS La rédaction de NAUTILUS recherche des photos pour publication dans notre mensuel NAUTILUS, et sur notre site web. Nous invitons donc nos membres/photographes à nous faire parvenir des documents photographiques ayant trait à des sujets maritimes, comme par exemple : navires, équipages, technique, nature, environnement… La rédaction effectuera une sélection des photos envoyées, mais n’est nullement obligée d’en faire usage. Les photos doivent nous parvenir par courriel à [email protected]. Le propriétaire/photographe de la photo sélectionnée ne recevra aucune rémunération, mais la gloire éternelle lui attend ! Merci d’avance !

178

Nautilus, mei 2014

UITNODIGING / INVITATION UITNODIGING / INVITATION Een gezamenlijk initiatief van / Une initiative conjointe de

KBZ - CRMB

Kon.Gallois Genootschap

De Mercatorkring

Alumni

Kon. Belg. Mar. Aca. Aca. Roy. Mar. Belg.

MARITIEME

Belg. Mar. Liga Ligue Mar. Belge

Belgian Branch

Vrienden van het Nationaal Scheepvaartmuseum

BBQ MARITIME

Wanneer ? / Quand ?

vrijdag, 27 juni om 19u00 - le vendredi, 27 juin à 19h00 Waar ? / Où?

Captain’s Lounge (Club VVW) Beatrijslaan 27 - 2050 Antwerpen (Linker-oever / Rive gauche) Prijs / Prix

€ 32,00

gegrilde sardines, scampibrochette, chipolata, kalkoenbrochette, spare ribs, côte à l’os sardines grillées, brochette de scampi, chipolata, brochette de dinde, spare ribs, côte à l’os verrassingsdessert / dessert surprise excl. dranken / boissons excl. Huidige studenten HZS en maritieme scholen / Etudiants actuels ESN et institutions maritimes:

€ 20,00

Vooraf betaling en inschrijving (met onderstaande strook) verplicht Paiement et inscription préalables (par le talon-réponse ci-dessous) obligatoires

vóór / avant:

21.06.14

Iedereen welkom / Bienvenu à tou(te)s !--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Ik, ondergetekende, / Je, soussigné ………………………………………………………………………………. " Lid van / Membre du ……………………………………………………………………………………………… " Student / Etudiant: school………………………………………………………………………………………… (aanduiden wat past / marquer ce qui convient)

neem deel aan de Maritieme BBQ op vrijdag 27 juni / participera au BBQ Maritime du vendredi, 27 juin met in totaal / avec en total……………personen / personnes

met in totaal / avec en total…. ………. studenten / étudiants

en stort / et verse € ………….. op bankrekening / sur le compte bancaire: BE77 2100 8979 1942 van/du BZB met vermelding / avec mention: BBQ Te zenden (per post, fax of e-mail) aan :

À renvoyer (par poste, fax ou courriel) à : vóór / avant 21.06.14

Nautilus, mei 2014

LMB – BML

Kapt. François De Meulder

Olmendreef 3 – Bus 4 - 2950 Kapellen E-mail : [email protected]

Fax:

03-666.16.98

of [email protected]

179

Jachthavens Antwerpen - 01/2013 - Galabal Marine 2013

Jachthaven Antwerpen

Jachth aven Antwerpen Willemdok

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BELGISCHE LIGUE BELGIAN

ZEEVAARTBOND

MARITIME MARITIME

BELGE LEAGUE

"Maritieme Agenda"

www.lmb-bzb.be