Index Bazel III: vijgenblad of nieuwe benchmark? Europe 2020 and the Financial System: Smaller is beautiful

Index

Bazel III: vijgenblad of nieuwe benchmark?

p. 2

Europe 2020 and the Financial System: Smaller is beautiful

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Presentatie Karel Lannoo Fifo Atwerpen dd. 19.10.2010

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Bazel III: vijgenblad of nieuwe benchmark? Bazel III, de nieuwe internationale kaderovereenkomst, bevestigt de radicale wijziging in banktoezicht, en heeft verregaande gevolgen voor de financiële sector. Het accent ligt nu op meer kapitaal, en op de betere kwaliteit van de eigen middelen. Hoe groter een bank, hoe meer kapitaal zal nodig zijn, wat het omgekeerde is van wat tot voor de crisis de norm was. Het kader wordt echter nog complexer dan het al was, wat de vragen doet rijzen welke nu de norm is, of veelheid aan ratio’s niet meer onduidelijkheid creëert, en welke criterium belangrijkst is. Het Bazel comité had beter wat oud hout weggesneden, en een duidelijk verstaanbare norm vastgelegd. Het Bazel III akkoord, dat bereikt werd op 12 september 2010, is een belangrijke schakel in het nieuwe post-crisis regelgevende paradigma. Het verbreedt de huidige risico-gewogen kapitaalvereisten, met 1) een minimum ratio van eigen middelen, 2) een kapitaalbuffer en 3) een anti-cyclische provisies, dit op de basis van een strictere definitie van kapitaal. Daarenboven wordt hieraan een niet gewogen minimum kapitaalvereiste (of ‘leverage ratio’) en een minimum liquiditeitsratio toegevoegd. Deze nieuwe regels zullen vanaf 2013 trapsgewijs ingevoerd worden over een transitieperiode van zes jaar, en vanaf 2019 zullen alle nieuwe normen volledig van toepassing zijn. Over twee belangrijke elementen is nog geen beslissing genomen, de herdefinitie van de risico-weging van activa, en de bijkomende kapitaalsvereisten voor grote systemisch belangrijke financiële instellingen (SIFI’s). Het nieuwe akkoord maakt het huidige Bazel II kader beduidend complexer. Bazel II, en zijn omzetting in Europees recht in de kapitaalvereisten richtlijn (2006), vereist banken een minimum regelgevend kapitaal aan te houden van 8% gebaseerd op een risico-gewogen activa, of op interne modellen gebaseerd op de waarschijnlijkheid van niet betaling. Bazel II (2005) had de differentiatie in de weging van de activa sterk uitgebreid, en de pijlers 2 en 3 toegevoegd, de discretie van de toezichthouder (‘supervisory review’) en markt discipline, zonder evenwel de minimum kapitaal ratio of de definitie van kapitaal van Bazel I akkoord van 1988 te veranderen. Bazel III herziet de definitie van kapitaal, en voegt andere ratios toe. Het nieuwe kader is opgebouwd uit verschillende blokken, met elk verschillende deadlines (zie tabel hieronder). De huidige minimum 8% Tier 1+2 is van toepassing vanaf 2013, maar de aanpassing van de definitie van kapitaal wordt weerom pas na een overgangsperiode van 5 jaar volledig van kracht.

Componenten van het Basel III akkoord en startdata ratios minimum Minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio 3% Risico-gewogen ratios: 4.5% 1. Minimum gemeenschappelijke eigen vermogen ratio

vanaf 2018

huidig n.a.

2015

n.a.

2.5%

2019

n.a.

7% 6% 8% 10.5% 0-2.5%

2019 2015 2013 2019

n.a. 4% 8% n.a. n.a.

Liquiditeitsratio

2015

n.a.

Funding ratio

2018

n.a.

2018

n.a.

2. kapitaal beschermings buffer 1+2 3. Minimum Tier 1 4. Minimum total kapitaal (Tier 1+2) 4+2 Anticyclische kapitaal buffer

Aanpassing van de definitie van eigen vermogen

In vergelijking met Basel II is het nieuwe kader een belangrijke uitbreiding en een diepgaande verandering voor banken, toezichthouders en markten. In de plaats van maar één ratio de gebruiken zullen banken nu op zeven verschillende ratio’s worden geëvalueerd. De crisis had duidelijk getoond dat de Basel II ratio zijn relevantie verloren had. Het had een ‘bias’ tov. overheden en vastgoed, en was onvolledig mbt. buitenbalans-instrumenten en marktposities. Als gevolg hiervan gingen de markten meer en meer de leverage ratio gebruiken, een vrij ruwe maatstaf, maar misschien wel de meest doorzichtige. Het nieuwe compromis geeft me de indruk dat men de kool en de geit wil sparen. Toezichthouders gaan vrijuit, men behoudt de basis-structuur en ratio van het Bazel akkoord, maar voegt nieuwe normen toe. Banken van hun kant krijgen een zeer lange overgangsperiode, en een zeer ingewikkeld kader, wat hen meer mogelijkheden heeft zich te verbergen. Vanuit beleidsstandpunt is het een gemiste kans. Deposito-houders, die dank zij de financiële crisis net iets begonnen te begrijpen van financieel toezicht, geraken met dit voorstel alle interesse kwijt. Toezichthouders zullen er zich ook in verliezen. En de raad van bestuur van de bank zal er weerom niets van begrijpen, dit zal iets zijn voor specialisten. Wie zie ook weer ‘complexity is the avenue of capture’? De veelheid en complexiteit van de ratios, en de trapsgewijze implementatie zal het een duidelijk zicht op gezondheid van de bank niet vergemakkelijken. Daarenboven is de herziening van de risico-weging van activa, en het gebruik van de ratings van kredietagenturen, nog aan de gang. Maar ook andere vragen blijven onbeantwoord: wat gebeurt er met de interne modellen benadering van Bazel II? Waar staan we met het gebruik van Pijlers II (‘supervisory review’) en III (markt discipline). Wat in verband met de toepassing op cooperatieve en spaarbanken, die dus niet een kapitaal hebben wat uit aandelen bestaat? En wat in verband met een bijkomende bijdrage voor systemische banken? Misschien wat te veel voor een globaal gecoördineerde omzetting tegen eind 2012, zoals overeengekomen werd op de G-20? Karel Lannoo CEPS De Tijd 6 okober 2010

No. 211/July 2010

Europe 2020 and the Financial System: Smaller is beautiful Karel Lannoo eeting Europe’s 2020 objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth is even more of a challenge for the financial sector than for the EU as a whole. Smart, sustainable and inclusive growth is just the opposite of what the financial sector stood for, and how it continues to be perceived by the public. The huge regulatory agenda that is on the table should tame the financial sector, but whether it will help it to meet the Europe 2020 objectives is an open question (see European Commission, 2010a).

M

The Financial Services Action Programme (FSAP) was one of the core pieces of the Lisbon Agenda. Drafted initially in 1999 to secure the full benefits of the single currency, it was merged into the Lisbon Agenda in June 2000 “to foster growth and employment by better allocation of capital and reducing its cost”. The benefits of the single financial market were later quantified in several studies for the European Commission to amount to at least 1% of GDP annually (see European Commission, 2003). These studies should be reviewed carefully. The last ten years have seen such a large-scale waste of capital (excessive real estate investment in Spain, Ireland and the Baltics, and unsustainable consumption booms in Greece and Portugal) that one might doubt the benefits of financial market integration – at least in the absence of a better regulatory framework. As a result of the financial crisis, we are now moving in the opposite direction of the last ten years. Not only is financial integration receding on several indicators, but a vast regulatory plan is being put together where safety and stability take precedence, ultimately over credit growth and profitability. In addition, the combined effect of these measures, developed at

global, European and national level, may create new barriers to market integration. The objective of this policy brief is to provide a brief analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on the banking sector from the perspective of Europe 2020. The article starts with an overview of the effect of the financial crisis on large banks. It then reviews the key regulatory reform proposals and discusses their impact on the structure and profitability of the banking sector.

A financial system under pressure Compared to the period of unrestrained credit growth before the crisis, the post-crisis period is marked by cracks and pain throughout the EU. The key word now is deleveraging, i.e. a reduction in the degree of indebtedness in the financial system. Already in early 2008, after the first cracks appeared with the collapse of the securitisation market, it was expected that the financial system would have to reduce leverage. Back then, however, analysts did not foresee that the process would be so painful and affect the ‘real’ economy to such a degree. By November 2008, it started to become apparent that the financial crisis would have profound and far-reaching implications, leading to an average drop in GDP in the EU of 4% in 2009, the sharpest fall in post-World War II history. To limit the downside and allow the credit channel to continue to function, EU member state governments reacted with a massive support programme for the financial sector in a panoply of debt guarantee schemes, equity support and bad bank schemes, amounting in total to some 12.5% of GDP (European Commission, 2010b). For the non-financial sector, fiscal stimuli were provided to differing degrees across EU member states.

CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, with the aim of interjecting the views of CEPS researchers and associates into the policy-making process in a timely fashion. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. Karel Lannoo is Chief Executive Officer at CEPS. This commentary was initially prepared for a management briefing of the Danske Bank, Copenhagen, 29 May 2010. A first draft was published in Intereconomics (May/June 2010). Chris Napoli provided helpful research assistance, and Emrah Arbak, Rym Ayadi, Piero Cinquegrana and Daniel Gros offered useful comments. Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2010

Figure 1. Deleveraging in Europe’s ‘€1 trillion banks’ Balance Sheet Size of Largest European Banks 3,000

Country Currency (billion)

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

Barclays Bank

BNP Paribas

Credit Agricole

Credit Suisse

Deutsche Bank HSBC Holding

ING Group

2007

RBS

2008

Santander

Société Générale

UBS

Unicredit

Lloyds Banking Commerzbank Group

2009

Note: We kept the balance sheet data in local currency (euro, sterling and Swiss franc) to arrive at a correct comparison of the magnitude of the decline, as the exchange rate movements were substantial. End-of-year exchange rates £ to the € are 0.733 (2007), 0.952 (2008) and 0.888 (2009); CHF 1.655, 1.485 and 1.484. For Lloyds and Commerzbank, comparable 2007 data were unavailable, as in both cases the banks went through a merger in 2008, in the Commerzbank case with Dresdner, and in the Lloyds case with HBOS.

Has deleveraging started? The evidence is mixed. Large banks seem to have engaged in this process. Among Europe’s 14 banks with assets of €1 trillion or more, it can be noted that the total balance sheet reduction amounts to about €3.5 trillion or 16% from 2008 to 2009 (see Figure 1). In some cases, namely Commerzbank, ING, Lloyds, RBS and UBS,1 this deleveraging was forced upon the bank in return for state aid, under the EU Treaty’s state aid rules. Others did so voluntarily, such as Barclays and Deutsche Bank. At the same time, the core capital ratios (equity and reserves) increased from an average of 2.8% in 2008 to 4.1% in 2009, with core capital increasing from €638 billion to €781 billion for the total of the banks in our sample. On an aggregate basis, deleveraging is less pronounced. ECB data indicate a slight drop in the total liabilities of the euro area banking system since mid-2009, but certainly a halt to the sustained balance sheet growth observed since 2002. Core capital ratios, on the other hand, have strengthened from 5.9% at the end of 2007 to 6.3% for the first quarter of 2010.2 1

For Commerzbank and ING, the deleveraging as agreed with the EU Commission under the EU Treaty’s state aid rules amounts to over 45%, for RBS over 25% and for Lloyds under 20% (see Lannoo & Sutton, 2010). 2 ECB, Statistical Data Warehouse, Credit institutions balance sheet.

2 | Karel Lannoo

Seen over a longer period, the deleveraging of these large banks is possibly only the beginning. Growth in size and consolidation are processes that have been going on at global level since the early 1990s. Total assets of the global top 25 banks are now 6 times higher than in 1990. In 1990, none of the largest banks had a balance sheet larger than its home country’s GDP. In 2008, seven of these top 25 banks had assets exceeding the home GDP – all European by no coincidence. In the US case, the largest bank reached 15% of GDP (JP Morgan, 2010, pp. 5-7). At the EU level, authorities had stimulated the process of scale enlargement with the single market programme, which aimed at strengthening the global competitiveness of the EU’s financial firms. The EU intervened actively to promote cross-border mergers and acquisitions of financial groups (see, for example, ABN-Amro, Santander, Unicredit), but without having a solid framework in place for the integrated supervision of such groups or for burden-sharing in case of failure. The weaknesses in the supervisory framework are being addressed at the regional and global level, but the issues of burden-sharing and resolution remain highly controversial.

Figure 2. Capital strengthening in Europe’s ‘€1 trillion banks’ Capital Ratio of Largest European Banks 7%

6%

Percentage

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0% Barclays Bank

BNP Paribas

Credit Agricole

Credit Suisse

Deutsche Bank

HSBC Holding

ING Group

2007

2008

RBS

Santander

Société Générale

UBS

Unicredit

Lloyds Banking Group

Commerzbank

2009

Source: Banks’ balance sheets.

What’s cooking? A vast regulatory programme is in the making at global, European and national levels to draw the lessons from the financial crisis. At the global level, the G-20 is in the lead, in cooperation with the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Its conclusions set general de minimis rules, although so far, the G-20 has gone into considerable detail, and the implementation of its recommendations is advancing smoothly. The overall ambition of the G-20 is to achieve comprehensive regulation of all financial markets, products and institutions. The EU is following the G-20 process closely, and, at the same time, strengthening the framework for crossborder supervision of EU groups and introducing new rules. By early 2011, the new supervisory authorities should be in place. They will participate in the supervisory colleges of pan-European groups, constitute pan-European supervisory data bases and have the facility to delegate supervision and mediate amongst national authorities. On the regulatory side, efforts at harmonisation can be subdivided into three sets of initiatives: -

-

Product: Hedge and other alternative nonregulated funds; rules for standardisation of OTC derivatives and their clearing through CCPs.

-

Conduct: Credit rating agencies; bank remuneration; stricter rules against market abuse and short selling.

The core measures of the package are the new prudential rules for banks. One part, covering higher capital requirements for trading books, remuneration at banks and rules on securitisation have almost been adopted,3 but the most substantial part is still being debated, especially the rules on minimum capital ratios and buffers, dynamic provisioning and liquidity ratios. So far, only one new post-crisis measure has been effectively adopted in the EU, the credit rating agencies regulation – although the debate about their role seems to be far from over – while most others are awaiting adoption by the European Parliament and EU Council (see the annex for an overview of financial crisis-related regulation at the EU level). Also at the national level, initiatives are being taken to adapt the institutional and regulatory frameworks. In 3

Prudential: Basel III, or capital requirements Directives (CRDs) III and IV; the resolution fund; common rules for central counterparties (CCPs) and central securities depositories (CSDs).

Some changes to the CRD were adopted as technical amendments by the European Commission in April and July 2009. It concerns modifications to the rules on large exposures (to include off-balance sheet items) and securitizations (including the 5% retention on the balance sheets of the originating institution).

Europe 2020 and the Financial System: Smaller is beautiful | 3

several EU member states, the institutional framework for supervision is changing, with more powers veering towards the central bank in general, and a curtailing of the financial supervisory authorities (see, for example, the experience of Belgium and the UK). Some member states have also unilaterally adopted new laws that may impact the free provision of financial services (such as rules on liquidity regulation and living wills in the UK). Other measures are still in the pipeline. Over the last few months, the momentum behind a bank balance sheet and/or transaction tax has grown. Initially proposed by Gordon Brown in November 2009, it gained significant weight in January 2010 when President Obama proposed a Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee. It is now commonly expected that there will be a form of a bank activity and/or transaction tax in most EU countries to reduce leverage and reinforce financial stability, as proposed by the European Council in June 2010. The proceeds of such a tax could go into national resolution funds.4 A second measure concerns the structure of banking. The ‘Volcker rule’, which forbids banks from engaging in proprietary trading while maintaining interests in hedge and private equity funds, was adopted in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 25 June 2010.5 Although the EU has so far indicated that it will not adopt anything similar, the new UK coalition government agreement states that it will examine a possible separation of investment from commercial banking. Restricting certain financial activities raises many issues that touch upon the core of banking, namely maturity transformation between short-term liabilities and long-term assets (see Micossi et al., 2010, pp. 20-21).

The brave new world for banking: Smaller is beautiful The combined effect of global, EU and national rules means that regulation will drive banks’ business models even more than has been the case so far. It will lead to lower profitability for global universal banks and provides a strong incentive to reconsider the universal model in favour of a segmentation of the financial system into niches, to realise the benefits of lower capital charges for specialist players and to reduce complexity in general. This will be accelerated 4

See the European Commission consultation (May 2010) which however stops short of proposing a European resolution fund 5 The ‘Volcker rule’ is similar in several respects to the 1933 US Glass-Steagal Act, but it does not propose a formal separation of investment and commercial banking. The US House and Senate are currently reconciling the financial reform bills.

4 | Karel Lannoo

by the possible introduction of a bank tax, whose scope is not yet known. Not surprisingly, the banking industry is up in arms. JP Morgan (2010) calculated that the capital needs of global banks would be an additional 19% of tangible equity as a result of the new measures. It estimates that profitability (measured as return on equity) of global banks would decline from 13.3% in 2007 to 5.4% in 2011, due to the different proposals now on the table. The bank argues that it would be difficult to attract private capital at these levels, and hence the pricing of financial products would have to increase substantially, by about 33%. However, this argument overlooks the fact that with higher capital requirements, banking would become a much safer business, thus requiring a lower return on capital. Rating agencies see a huge need for additional capital in the banking sector. As governments progressively retrieve the guarantees and support schemes, downgrades will follow, leading to additional capital and refinancing needs peaking in 2012 (Fitch, 2010). This is aggravated by the shortening of the maturity profile of banks’ bond financing during the crisis (BIS, 2010, p. 79). Also the Institute for International Finance, the global bank’s lobby, sees a huge need for additional capital to comply with the new rules. This will have a bigger impact in Europe, because of its more bank-driven system. From a shareholder perspective, imposing higher capital requirements is like diluting the capital of the bank. Since banks were operating on an extremely thin capital base, shareholders were happily taking the upside of this situation in the form of capital gains and dividend payments, but the downside was covered by the state, through the support measures in crisis periods, and because of the preferential treatment of debt, less tax income to the state. Hence, imposing higher capital requirements should be beneficial for states and taxpayers. Furthermore, faced with the spectre of Basel III, banks have successfully argued for long transition periods, arguing that a rapid introduction would lead to further deleveraging and decline in credit availability. However, the opposite may be argued: lengthening the transition prolongs uncertainty and allows banks to restrict lending. It has therefore been proposed to make the transition period as short as possible: the faster banks are recapitalised, the sooner they will be able to borrow and lend again. If it were to be done overnight, banks would not have the time to restrict credit nor to argue the need for further delays again at a later stage. Strong banks would cut dividend and bonus payments (the payout levels for 2009 are proof that a huge opportunity was

already missed); weaker banks may resort to debt to equity swaps.6 Banks should also explore other business models. The question can be raised whether it remains interesting to be a global universal bank in the new regulatory environment. According to the JP Morgan report cited above, scale continues to have an advantage, to serve a larger and more complex client base. Economies of scale emerge from spreading fixed costs over a larger revenue base and lower funding costs, but what is an optimal size and where do scale effects really stop have not been quantified – a well-known gap in the academic literature. In addition, Basel III changes the paradigm. Whereas under the Basel II framework, capital needs were declining with the size, or barely existed if at all, for SPVs and OTC derivatives trading, for example. Now the opposite will be true. The new Basel framework adopts tougher standards for ‘Systemically Important Financial Institutions’, requiring them to internalise the risks they create for the public at large. It sets higher capital requirements for trading book activities, counterparty credit risk, complex securitisations and re-securitisations, and OTC derivative activities. Normal capital requirements will be allowed for centrally cleared derivatives, but this will require banks to participate in the capital of these CCPs. Before, these banks could propose their own risk models for these activities. As authorities will be extremely wary not to have too-big-to-fail banks under their supervision, certainly within the EU as long as fiscal policy remains local, enforcement will be guaranteed. In addition, the new bank tax that is being devised in several EU member states will target a certain part of a bank’s liabilities, minus the capital, or tax the sum of profits and remuneration in the financial sector.7 Such tax would tend to reduce the size of the financial sector, as it would tax above-level profits and remuneration (IMF, 2010). This will again hit the larger banks the hardest. Moreover, in the EU this tax will be raised at the local level to fund a national resolution fund, which will disadvantage cross-border banks that have expanded through acquisitions (as most have in the EU).

6

See “Shock therapy is best cure for banks”, Financial Times, Editorial, 29 June 2010 and Daniel Gros, “Cost of Basel III”, mimeo, June 2010. The Swiss supervisory authority introduced a minimum leverage ratio at the end of 2008 – without creating a strong competitive handicap for their banks. 7 See Joint Statement by the French, UK and German Governments on bank levies, 22 June 2010 (download at: http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/junebudget_joint_statement.pdf).

Box 1. New capital rules and charges for banks -

-

-

Capital (Basel III) o Tighter definition of core capital (confined mainly to common equity and retained earnings) o A maximum leverage ratio (or a minimum ratio of capital to total assets) o Counter-cyclical capital buffers, requiring banks to accumulate extra capital during upswings o Forward-looking or dynamic provisioning Minimum level of very liquid assets (liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio) Rules on securitisation (including e.g. the 5% retention for securitisation) Tighter trading book rules (tighter calculation of value-at-risk) Rules on remuneration Extra capital charges for OTC derivatives, other derivatives mandatorily cleared through central counterparty (CCP) Bank tax (liability, financial activity and/or transaction tax)

Segmenting a financial group according to its business lines may, from a regulatory capital and supervisory perspective, become a more advantageous model. At its core, a financial group can focus on commercial and consumer lending, but split all of its specialised activities into separate entities. Asset management can come under the UCITS Directive, and be subject to a much lower capital charge;8 money transmission (and short-term credit) can fall under the payment services Directive, investment services under MiFID, and be subject to the trading book capital requirements. OTC derivative positions could be executed through a hedge fund, and non-banking entities will not be subject to the bank tax. Distribution would happen through intermediaries and advisors. A segmented structure would also make it much easier to deal with restructuring and liquidation in case of problems, and conform to the supervisory demands for a ‘contingency plan’. In fact, the segmentation process has already begun. Bank insurance is regarded as passé. The ING Group, as an example of bank insurance in the EU, will divest its insurance activities and revert to basic banking (see ING 2009 Annual Report). As large banks discover the burden of the new Basel III package, they will start to consider other options. At the same time, competition 8

See Lannoo (2010) for a comparison of capital requirements in the asset management industry.

Europe 2020 and the Financial System: Smaller is beautiful | 5

is increasing from non-financial operators, who are looking to enter the financial system as niche players. Telecom and retail companies which manage large user-datasets are looking to enter the consumer loan or money transmission market. Also, the continuing uncertainty about the financial system has led corporates to create new banks. A consortium of 17 large corporations has started a new cooperative bank, the Corporate Funding Association, and Siemens has also stated that it would start a bank.9

Conclusions The Europe 2020 proposals regarding the financial system deserve closer elaboration as regards the modalities of their introduction and impact on the ‘real’ economy. Compared to the Lisbon agenda era, regulatory reform of the financial sector is even more crucial now, whereas it only receives scant attention in the Europe 2020 programme. The financial sector is currently in serious disrepair and the proposals on the table to better regulate financial activity will have a profound impact on the future structure of the financial system. The sector is resisting change and has argued with insistence that the new measures, essentially the Basel III proposals, should be toned down and phasedin progressively, because of the huge capital needs and its impact on lending. However, given the ongoing uncertainty regarding the soundness of the European banking sector, it could be argued from a public policy perspective that these measures should be introduced without delay. This would also force banks to consider other business models, which would at the same time reduce complexity and ease bank resolution and restructuring.

9

See www.corp-funding.com and Siemens announcement, 28 June 2010.

6 | Karel Lannoo

References BIS (2010), Annual Report, June. European Central Bank (2010), Financial Stability Report, June. European Commission (2003), Tracking EU financial integration, Working Paper, May. European Commission (2010a), Europe 2020, A strategy for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, March. European Commission (2010b), State aid scoreboard (spring 2010), COM(2010)255, May. Fitch (2010), The Outlook for European Bank Lending in 2010, Special Report, February. Gudmundsson, Már (2008), “How might the current financial crisis shape financial sector regulation and structure”, Conference speech (available from www.bis.org). IMF (2010), A fair and substantial contribution by the financial sector, Interim report for the G-20. JP Morgan (2010), Global Banks – Too Big to Fail. Big can also be beautiful, February. Lannoo, Karel (2010), Challenges to the EU Asset Management Industry, ECMI Policy Brief No. 16, April (available from www.ceps.eu). Lannoo, Karel and Alastair Sutton (2010), Bank state aids in the financial crisis: Fragmentation or levelplaying field, CEPS Task Force Report, CEPS, Brussels, forthcoming. Micossi, Stefano, Jacopo Carmassi and Elisabetta Luchetti (2010), Overcoming too-big-to-fail, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, March.

Annex. Financial crisis-related regulation at EU level: An overview Measure

Purpose

Status

Depositor protection schemes

Increase minimum level of protection to €50,000

Adopted October 2008, new consultation 2nd half 2010

Credit rating agencies

Introduce single licence

Adopted April 2009

EU Council Presidency-2nd half 2010

Amended June 2010

Start discussions in Council

• Commission directives (adopted April and June 2009)

• Conciliation with EP 2nd half 2010

Bank capital (CRD), amendments: • Securitisation, large exposures

• Min. 5% on a bank’s books

• Executive remuneration, trading book and • Extra charge for high pay packages complex products • Higher capital charge for trading book, more • Draft directive (July 2009) • Leverage ratio, capital buffers, liquidity • Consultation (April 2010), draft and better capital, minimum liquidity regulation directive July 2010?

• Discussions start in EU Council

Hedge funds

Regulate non-regulated segment of fund industry

Draft directive (April 2009)

Decision in EU Council (May 2010), conciliation with EP 2nd half 2010

Prospectus Directive

Simplification

Consultation (January 2009), draft amendments September 2009

Discussions in EU Council

Market abuse

Improve and simplify directive

Consultation (April 2009)

Draft directive 2nd half 2010?

Depositaries of funds

Segregate funds from depositaries

Consultation (May 2009)

Draft directive 2nd half 2010?

OTC derivative markets and infrastructures

Transparency, mandate central clearing for standardised OTC derivatives

Consultation (June 2010)

Draft regulation September 2010

European Systemic Risk Board

Indentify macro-financial risks

Consultation (June 2009), draft and Council decision (Dec 2009)

Conciliation with EP 2nd half 2010

European Banking Authority

Coordinate banking regulation and supervision

Consultation (June 2009), draft and Council Decision (Dec 2009)

Conciliation with EP 2nd half 2010

European Insurance Authority

Coordinate insurance regulation and supervision Consultation (June 2009), draft and Council Decision (Dec 2009)

Conciliation with EP 2nd half 2010

European Securities Markets Authority

Coordinate securities markets regulation and supervision

Consultation (June 2009), draft and Council Decision (Dec 2009)

Conciliation with EP 2nd half 2010

Omnibus directive

Adapt existing rules to ESFS

Draft directive (October 2009)

Conciliation with EP 2nd half 2010

Crisis resolution procedures and funds

Coordinate national rules

Consultation (Oct.2009, May 2010)

Draft directive 2nd half 2010?

Europe 2020 and the Financial System: Smaller is beautiful | 7

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De banksector in Europa 2020 Karel Lannoo, CEPS www.ceps.eu

1

Het kader: Europa 2020 Wat? Nieuw EU programma/strategie voor een slimme, duurzame en inclusieve groei Opvolger van Lissabon agenda (juli 2000), wat basis was voor FSAP Meer integratie financiële markten zou tot gemiddeld 1% groei per jaar leiden

Maar waar is de analyse van de impact van het huidige programma regelgeving? 2

Banken - 3 jaar na start crisis ‘De-leveraging’ en ‘downsizing’

Minus € 3.5 trn in 14 europese 1 trn banken (of -16%), vrijwillig of onder EU regels over staatssteun Licht herstel van kernkapitaal, van 2.8% in 2008 tot 4.1% in 2009 Overheden draaien steun terug

Onzekerheid nog steeds wijd verbreid

Interbank markten: ‘fully collateralised’ rating overheid ~ kost bankfinanciering Waar was Anglo-Irish in de bank stress testen?

Polarisatie tss. overheid en privé sector 3

Deleveraging in Europa’s 1 trn banken Balance Sheet Size of Largest European Banks 3,000

Country Currency (billion)

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

Balclays Bank

BNP Paribas

Credit Agricole

Credit Suisse

Deutsche Bank

HSBC Holding

ING Group

RBS

Santander

Bank 2007

2008

2009

Societe Generale

UBS

Unicredit

Lloyds Banking Group

Commerzbank

Voorzichtige versterking kernkapitaal Capital Ratio of Largest European Banks 7%

6%

Percentage

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0% Balclays Bank

BNP Paribas

Credit Agricole

Credit Suisse

Deutsche Bank

HSBC Holding

ING Group

RBS

Bank 2007

2008

2009

Santander

Societe Generale

UBS

Unicredit

Lloyds Banking Group

Commerzbank

Overheids- vs. bankfinanciering

6

EU regelgevend programma Nieuwe EU institutionele structuur is quantum stap: EBA,

ESMA, EIOPA; ESRB

Nieuwe regelgeving Prudentieel: CRD III & IV; deposito garantiestelsel, CCPs (en CSDs) Producten: hedge funds, OTC deriv’s, UCITS IV & V Gedragstoezicht: kredietagenturen, bankbonussen, marktmanipulatie en ‘short selling’, MiFID II

Verwacht? Bank tax, transaction tax? Volcker rule? Hypothecair krediet? Bank bestuur? Reddingfondsen? 7

Van Comités naar Autoriteiten regelgevend bevoegdheid (‘single rulebook’) • technische en uitvoerende verordeningen • richtlijnen en aanbevelingen

bemiddeling en bindende delegatie tss. toezichthouders deelname in college van toezichthouders toezicht op toezichthouders individuele beslissingen in crisis-situaties kontrole van financiele producten sancties specifieke unieke bevoegdheden 8

Basel II risicoweging onder SRBA (100 % risico weging = 8% kapitaal) A A A

A A A-

A A +

A A

A A-

A +

A

Corporate

20%

50%

Sovereigns

0%

20%

Banks Banks, based on their country of incorporation Retail Residential mortgages Commercial real estate mortgages

20%

20%

A -

B B B +

B B B-

B B B

B B

B B-

B +

100% 50% 50%

50%

B B +

100%

B

B -

Belo w

150%

Unrated

Past due

100%

150 %

100%

150 %

100%

–

100%

150 %

50%

–

150%

150 %

100%

–

75%

150 %

35%

100 %

From 100% to 50%, according to national supervisors 9

150 %

Basel tier 1 vs kernkapitaal (in %)

Basel tier 1 ratio

kernkapitaal

eind 07

juni 08

eind 07

Juni 08

Fortis

9.5

7.4

3.8

3

Dexia

9.1

11.4

2.4

1.6

ING

9.4

8.15

2.8

2.2

10

Basel III Basel I - II - III van 1 naar 7 ratios! heel lange overgangsperiode (tot 2019!) strictere definitie van kapitaal, maar ook na lange overgangsperiode Nog open:

herziening risico weging (wat met overheden en vastgoed?) bijkomende kapitaalvereiste voor TBTF banken (of SIFI’s) Definitie liquiditeits- en funding ratio

11

Basel III in een notedop ratios

minimum

vanaf

huidig

3%

2018

n.a.

1. minimum eigen vermogen ratio

4.5%

2015

n.a.

2. kapitaal beschermings buffer

2.5%

2019

n.a.

1+2

7%

2019

n.a.

3. minimum Tier 1

6%

2015

4%

4. minimum totaal kapitaal (Tier 1+2)

8%

2013

8%

10.5%

2019

n.a.

Minimum tier 1 leverage ratio Risico-gewogen ratios:

4+2 Anticyclische kapitaal buffer

12

0-2.5%

n.a.

Liquiditeitsratio

2015

n.a.

Funding ratio

2018

n.a.

Aanpassing van de definitie van eigen vermogen

2018

n.a.

Evaluatie veel te complex kader, veel te lange overgangsperiode onzekerheid ook slecht voor banken, typisch ‘collective action’ probleem wat met gebruik ratings in ERBA? wat met IRBA? en pijlers 2 en 3? stimuleer gebruik converteerbare schuldinstrumenten (bail-ins) kost? wat is kost van financiële crisis? 13

Impact: kleiner is beter paradigma wissel: groot is complex en duur segmentering van het financiële systeem: gespecialiseerd is goedkoper en efficienter einde van bank-verzekeringen (cfr ING) lagere kost gesegmenteerd systeem: • payment services directive (PSD) • asset management (UCITS, AIFM) • brokerage

extra kost voor grote banken (SIFI’s) impact bank tax focus op core, verkoop van niet-kern activa

terug naar goeie oude ‘relationship banking’ 14

Besluit regulering wordt nog meer de basis van het business model volgt toezicht? nieuw paradigma: groot is gevaarlijk, en duur bank systeem wordt kleiner, meer gesegmenteerd maar minder winstgevend

grote leemtes in EU kader

15

van Lissabon agenda naar Europa 2020 geen regelgevend kader voor failissementen van grensoverschrijdende bank