jubileumi kötet Jubilee Volume First 5 Years of the Postgraduate Doctoral kecskés gábor kecskés, gábor

jubileumi kötet Jubilee Volume

A SZE ÁLLAM- ÉS JOGTUDOMÁNYI DOKTORI ISKOLÁJÁNAK ELSŐ 5 ÉVE First 5 Years of the Postgraduate Doctoral School of Law and Political Sciences (Széchenyi István University).

szerkesztette

kecskés gábor edited by

kecskés, gábor

2013

jubileumi kötet Jubilee Volume A SZE ÁLLAM- ÉS JOGTUDOMÁNYI DOKTORI ISKOLÁJÁNAK ELSŐ 5 ÉVE First 5 Years of the Postgraduate Doctoral School of Law and Political Sciences (Széchenyi István University).

szerkesztette

kecskés gábor edited by

kecskés, gábor

2013

IMPRESSZUM

Tartalomjegyzék/Table of contents I. Bemutatkozás/Introduction...............................................................................8 I. 1. Az Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola bemutatása...........................9 I. 2. Adatok és sikereink – számokban...............................................................13 I. 3. Törzstagok, témavezetők, oktatók...............................................................14 I. 4. Kurzusok, kutatási témák.............................................................................18 I. 5. Partnerek és programok...............................................................................21 I. 1. Introduction of the Postgraduate Doctoral school of Faculty of Law and Political Sciences...............................................................................30 I. 2. Data and our Success – in Numbers...........................................................33 I. 3. Core members, Supervisors and Lecturers................................................34 I. 4. Doctoral Courses, Research Topics............................................................40 I. 5. Partners and Programs.................................................................................42 II. Megvédett értekezések/Theses Defended ...................................................52 III. Válogatott tanulmányok/Selected Studies................................................114 III. 1. Egyes törzstagjaink, vezetőink válogatott tanulmányai/ Selected Studies of our Certain Core Members and Leaders.......................115 III. 2. Egyes partnereink tanulmányai/Some of our Partners’ Selected Papers....................................................................................................156 III. 3. A Doktori Iskola által 2012-ben szervezett nyári egyetem írásos anyagai/Papers of the 2012 Summer Seminar organized by the Postgraduate Doctoral School.................................................................. 207

jubileumi kötet – jubilee volume

Lectori salutem!

5 év az első jelentős jubileum egy szervezet életében. Alkalmat ad már számvetésre, visszatekintésre, a tapasztalatok összegzésére és talán – szerénytelenség nélkül – ünneplésre is. Amikor a Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskolája 2008-ban megkezdhette működését, már mintának tekinthette a győri jogakadémia többszáz éves történetét, valamint a régióban meghatározó szerepet betöltő Széchenyi István Egyetem Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Karának sikeres működését. Ezzel együtt azonban egy járatlan úton is elindult, hiszen az önálló jogú jogtudományi és az igazgatásszervezési doktori képzés a régióban eleddig nem folyt. A Doktori Iskola jogelődje, a Multidiszciplináris Társadalomtudományi Doktori Iskola keretei között folyó képzés minősége, öröksége viszont bizakodással tölthette el a vezető professzorok vezetésével felálló, és működését megkezdő fiatal intézményt, amely – „kis doktori iskola” lévén – a személyes kapcsolatokra, a témavezető-hallgató szoros együttműködésére, egyes tutoriális elemek képzésben való megvalósítására mindvégig kiemelt figyelmet fordít. Ha számot vet az intézmény, az 5 év szakmai sikerekkel van tele, de ami még fontosabb, az 5 év alatt Közösség született a Doktori Iskolában, és önmaga is Közösséget teremtett. Eme közösségi-szakmai műhely mindennapjait, főbb teljesítményeit ajánljuk a kedves Olvasó szíves figyelmébe, bízva abban, hogy a betűk és a képek visszaadják azt a kedves, szeretet árasztó hangulatot, amely Doktori Iskolánkat jellemzi. Meggyőződésünk, hogy a következő 5 év is hasonlóan sikeres lesz! Kecskés Gábor, szerkesztő, a Doktori Iskola titkára 2013 júniusában The fifth year is the first significant date in an organisation’s life. It provides opportunity to value, look back, summarize experiences and maybe – saying it without modesty – to celebrate. When Széchenyi István University’s Postgraduate Doctoral School of Law and Political sciences started to operate back in 2008, it could regard Győr’s Law Academy’s more than a hundred year-old history and successful operation of the University’s Faculty of Law and Political Sciences that has had significant role in the region as examples. However, together with this we also stepped onto an unknown path as doctoral education of law and administration management with its own rights had not been known to this region until then. Quality, heritage of education

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organised among the frames of the Postgraduate Doctoral School’s predecessor, the Multidisciplinary Social Sciences Postgraduate Doctoral School, could, however, encourage the young institution’s set up and start with leading professors, which as a „small Doctoral School” – puts extremely high emphasis on personal relations, strong cooperation of supervisor-student, realizing certain tutorial elements in education. If the institution values itself, the five years is full of professional successes, however, what is more important, during these years a Community has been formed in the Doctoral School and has itself created a Community. We invite readers to gain information on this community-professional workshop’s everyday life, main achievements, hoping that words and pictures give back that kind, loving feeling which is the characteristics of the Doctoral School. We firmly believe that the next five years will be similarly successful, too. Kecskés, Gábor, editor, secretary of the Postgraduate Doctoral School June, 2013

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I. Bemutatkozás/Introduction

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j u bi l e u m i k ö t e t – j u bi l e e v o l u m e

I. 1. Az Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola bemutatása A Doktori Iskola előzményei és a megalakulás folyamata A Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskolájának létrehozása a több mint két évszázados múltra visszatekintő győri jogászképzés régóta várt, méltó kiteljesedését jelentette, hiszen tevékenysége, küldetése szoros összefüggésben áll a győri jogászképzés célkitűzéseivel. Mária Terézia 1776-ban emelte a Királyi Jogakadémia rangjára az ekkor már hat évtizede működő Királyi Jogakadémiát. Az 1892-ig működő intézmény a magyar tudomány és közélet olyan kiemelkedő alakjait is hallgatói között tudhatta, mint például Deák Ferenc, a haza bölcse, gróf Batthyány Lajos, Reguly Antal és Mikszáth Kálmán. A Királyi Jogakadémia megszűnését követően egy évszázadot kellett várni arra, hogy Győr városában újra kezdetét vegye a jogászképzés. Egy 1995-ben született megállapodás értelmében az akkori Széchenyi István Főiskola és az Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kara közös oktatási intézetet, tagozatot hozott létre, ahol évente közel száz jogászhallgató folytathatta tanulmányait, az ELTE hallgatójaként, így a végzett hallgatók az ELTE diplomáját szerezték meg. A jogászképzés újraindulását követő években a győri intézmény deklarált célkitűzése lett egy önálló jogú képzési struktúra akkreditációja, önálló intézményi keretek között. Az Országgyűlés 2001-ben döntött a Széchenyi István Egyetem létrehozásáról, amelynek égisze alatt lehetővé vált az önálló jogú jogászképzés beindítása (újraindítása) mellett a doktori képzési rendszerek, a doktori iskolák akkreditációja is. 2002. január 1-je tehát két szempontból is mérföldkő a győri jogászképzés történetében. Egyfelől ezen a napon született meg a Széchenyi István Egyetem, másfelől – a Magyar Akkreditációs Bizottság fenntartások és feltételek nélküli, teljes körű akkreditációja révén – az új intézmény Jog- és Gazdaságtudományi Kara immár saját jogon végezhette a jogászhallgatók képzését. Az integrált Kar keretei között haladéktalanul megkezdődött a két tudományág együttműködése és egy közös kutatási program kidolgozása. A végzett jogászok számára is nyitva álló multidiszciplináris társadalomtudományi doktori képzés 2004 februárjában – „Gazdaság, jog, regionalitás és társadalom az integrálódó Közép-Európában” címmel – indult meg a Széchenyi István Egyetemen (2003/7/II/1/1. számú MAB-határozat). Miként azt meglehetősen sokrétű kutatási programjának elnevezése is jelzi, a Multidiszciplináris Társadalomtudományi Doktori Iskola mindenekelőtt a közép- és kelet-európai regionális együttműködési lehetőségek, az ösztönző és a gátló tényezők, a gazdasági, a társadalmi és az intézményi kapcsolatok, valamint

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az ezeket körülvevő – tágabb értelemben vett – jogi és politikai környezet megismerésére és tudományos igényű vizsgálatára vállalkozott. 2007. január 1-jén a Jog- és Gazdaságtudományi Kar helyett két önálló szervezeti egység – a Kautz Gyula Gazdaságtudományi Kar és a Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudomány Kar – alakult, melyek keretei között ezen túl külön szervezeti keretek között folyt a jogászok és közgazdászok képzése. A különválás és az önálló jogú graduális képzések megindulása után jogos igényként merült fel mindkét utódintézményben az önálló jogú doktori képzés akkreditálása. Noha a multidiszciplináris keretek között folytatott oktatási és kutatási tevékenység három éve összességében sikeresnek tekinthető – 2007 közepéig a Multidiszciplináris Társadalomtudományi Doktori Iskolában tizenhat jogász végzettségű hallgató kezdte meg doktori tanulmányait. Közülük 2004 és 2007 között hat fő szerzett abszolutóriumot –, a karok szétválását követően mindkét részről felmerült a saját doktori képzés kialakításának igénye, melynek különös aktualitást kölcsönzött a doktori iskola létesítésének eljárási rendjéről és a doktori fokozat megszerzésének feltételeiről szóló 33/2007. (III. 7.) Korm. rendelet megjelenése, valamint a Magyar Akkreditációs Bizottság – 2007 márciusát követően kiadott – doktori iskolák létesítésének és működésének követelményeiről szóló állásfoglalása. A folyamat lezárásaként a Magyar Akkreditációs Bizottság alapos vizsgálatot követő, 2008/3/VIII/2/129. számú döntésével jóváhagyta Doktori Iskolánk 2008. évi létesítését, tematikáját és követelményrendszerét az állam- és jogtudományok tudományágában (a Magyar Akkreditációs Bizottság besorolása szerint), minek következtében 2008 szeptemberében kezdődhetett meg a doktori képzés az első évfolyammal és a jogelőd Multidiszciplináris Társadalomtudományi Doktori Iskolába felvételt nyert joghallgatók átvételével. A Magyar Akkreditációs Bizottság határozata szerint a Doktori Iskola akkreditációja 2015. október 31-ig érvényes. Az Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskola célja A Doktori Iskola ugyan önálló szervezeti egysége a Széchenyi István Egyetemnek, viszont a Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Karral való szoros együttműködés keretei között elkötelezett a hazai (és nemzetközi) jogtudomány fejlesztése, a Kar személyi feltételeinek javítása és nemzetközi hírnevének öregbítése iránt. Fontos céljának tekinti továbbá a magas színvonalú oktatói utánpótlás biztosítását, és ekként a minőségi jogászképzés hosszútávra történő megalapozását. Mindezen célok sikeres és folyamatos megvalósítására kizárólag egy ös�szetett és szigorú minőségi kritériumokra épülő feltételrendszer útján nyílt lehetőség. Az alapítói szándékok szerint maximalizálni kívánjuk azt az

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előnyt, ami az egyetemi kar és a Doktori Iskola hallgatóinak kisebb létszámából adódik. A Doktori Iskolát a legfelkészültebb oktatók és a legkiválóbb hazai, határon túli magyar és külföldi doktoranduszok színvonalas alkotó együttműködése, intenzív közös kutatómunkája és hatékony pályázati tevékenysége jellemzi, e szellemben kezdte meg, és azóta is eszerint végzi tevékenységét a Doktori Iskola valamennyi munkatársa és hallgatója. A Doktori Iskola eddigi történetét végigkíséri egy markáns célkitűzés, mégpedig a gyakorlat-orientált, sok vonatkozásban tutoriális képzési elemekkel kiegészített képzési forma megvalósítása, kiemelt célunk a gyakorlat felé nyitás, amely a klasszikus jogászi hivatásrendek (bírák, ügyészek, ügyvédek, közigazgatási szakemberek) képviselőinek bevonását jelenti a képzés és a hallgatók szintjén egyaránt. A doktori képzésben a klasszikus jogtudományi doktori témák mellett az államtudományok (pl. politikatudomány, igazgatási és szervezéstudományok) is hangsúlyos szerepet játszanak. A doktori képzés elméleti jellegű és gyakorlatot segítő kutatási témákat is kínál, és egyben egyes módszertani tárgyak gondozásával segíti elő a kutatói készségek és képességek növelését, színvonalasabbá tételét. A minőségi oktatók és témavezetők alkotta személyi állomány a garancia arra, hogy a Doktori Iskola hallgatói aktívan és sikeresen vegyenek részt a hazai és nemzetközi tudományos közéletben. A hallgatói létszám lehetővé teszi a témavezetőkkel való konzultáció hangsúlyosabb megjelenítését, egyfajta tutoriálisabb szerepfelfogás erősítését, amely ma már mindinkább elengedhetetlen követelménynek és hatékonyságot növelő faktornak tekinthető. Doktori képzésünk olyan módon kívánja végezni alapvetően tudományos-kutatási jellegű tevékenységét, hogy az ennek eredményeként felhalmozott tudás – oktatóink és hallgatóink közvetítésével – a gyakorlat számára is hasznosítható legyen, és adott esetben értékes segítségül szolgáljon a joggyakorlat számára is. Hisszük, hogy a kutatási területek elméleti és a gyakorlati aspektusai egymást kölcsönösen kiegészítik, azok maga szintű ötvözése a kutatói kompetenciákat nagyban fejleszti, ezáltal biztosítva az elméleti és gyakorlati szakemberek fogékonyságát az állam- és jogtudományi problémák megismerésére, megértésére és megoldására. Végül, de nem utolsó sorban, a Doktori Iskola kivételes lehetőségeit a páratlanul előnyös földrajzi fekvés (Győr elhelyezkedésére kétségtelenül igaz azon sokszor hangoztatott felvetés, hogy a Budapest-Bécs-Pozsony háromszög középpontjában található a város) és az ebből adódó kitűnő regionális kapcsolatok fizikai és – talán nem túlzás ezt állítani – szellemi közelsége is nagyban erősíti, ennek előnyeit a hallgatókkal megismertetjük, az ezekhez való hozzáférést pedig igyekszünk biztosítani. Felvettük a kapcsolatot a Leuven-i Egyetem közjogi oktatóival és a Nemzetközi Közigazgatástudományi Intézettel. A határmenti tudományos együttműködést a határmenti magyar oktatók és PhD-hallgatók együttműködését, valamint a határmenti államok nem ma-

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gyar nemzetiségű oktatóival és hallgatóival való kapcsolatfelvételt kiemelt feladatunknak tekintjük (Kolozsvár, Pozsony, Újvidék). E kapcsolatainkat bővíteni és a jövőben szélesíteni szeretnénk. Az alapítók meggyőződése szerint az intézmény személyi feltételei, oktatási és kutatási tevékenysége, követelmény- és minőségbiztosítási rendszere, továbbá hazai és nemzetközi kapcsolatai megfelelő garanciával szolgáltak, és szolgálnak arra nézve, hogy a Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskolája a magyar felsőoktatásban, a posztgraduális képzések között is nevet szerzett és elismert tudományos műhelyei közé emelkedett. A Doktori Iskola ötéves fennállása, első „igazi jubileuma” kiváló lehetőséget teremt eme eredményeink számbavételére. Prof. Verebélyi Imre, a Doktori Iskola vezetője.

A Széchenyi István Egyetem Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Karának és Doktori Iskolájának hivatalos címere (Mária Terézia királynő korából)

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I. 2. Adatok és sikereink – számokban A Doktori Iskola hivatalos neve: Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskolája, azonosító: 187. Elérhetőségek, székhely: 9026 Győr, Áldozat utca 12. Postacím: 9007 Győr, Pf. 701 Tel.: 0036 96 613 675 Fax: 0036 96 310 336 E-mail: [email protected] Honlap: http://doktiskjog.sze.hu/bemutatkozas Doktori honlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=191&di_ID=171 A Doktori Iskola vezetője: Prof. Dr. Verebélyi Imre DSc., egyetemi tanár. Titkár: • 2008-2012: Dr. Smuk Péter PhD., egyetemi adjunktus, majd egyetemi docens; • 2012- : Dr. Kecskés Gábor PhD., egyetemi adjunktus. Asszisztens: • 2008-2011: Horváthné Körmendi Katalin; • 2011-2013: Csizmarik Eszter; • 2013- : Szalay Orsolya. Törzstagok száma: 7 fő. A Doktori Iskola Tanácsa 7 törzstagból és további 6 tagból, illetve az állandó meghívottakból áll. Tudományterületi és tudományági besorolás: társadalomtudományok, ezen belül állam- és jogtudományok. Kiadott fokozat típusa: PhD. MAB minősítése: megfelelt 2015. október 31-ig. Felvételt nyert hallgatók száma (nappali, levelező, egyéni képzési tagozat szerinti bontásban): • 2008: 1 fő nappali, 12 fő levelező. • 2009: 3 fő nappali, 9 fő levelező. • 2010: 3 fő nappali, 3 fő levelező. • 2011: 10 fő levelező, 3 fő egyéni képzés. • 2012: 4 fő nappali, 4 fő levelező.

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• 2013: 4 fő nappali, 6 fő levelező, 1 fő egyéni képzés. Fokozatot szereztek: eddig összesen 16 sikeres fokozatszerzés. Éves bontásban: • 2008: 2 • 2009: 1 • 2010: 1 • 2011: 4 • 2012: 7 • 2013: 1 I. 3. Törzstagok, témavezetők, oktatók Törzstagjaink A Doktori Iskola törzstagjai jelentik a garanciát a képzés minőségére, színvonalára, akik fő kötelezettsége emellett folyamatos témavezetési tevékenység ellátása. A hatályos jogszabályok szerint minimálisan 7 törzstag (valamen�nyien a Széchenyi István Egyetem alkalmazottjai) szükséges egy doktori iskola alapításához, működéséhez. Törzstagok 2008 és 2012 között: • Prof. Verebélyi Imre (a Doktori Iskola vezetője) • Prof. Lamm Vanda • Prof. Szigeti Péter • Prof. Vavró István • Prof. Lenkovics Barnabás • Dr. Patyi András • Dr. Sulyok Gábor Törzstagok 2012-től (Dr. Patyi András egyéb vezetői megbízatása miatt történt változás a törzstagok összetételében) • Prof. Verebélyi Imre (a Doktori Iskola vezetője) • Prof. Lamm Vanda • Prof. Szigeti Péter • Prof. Vavró István • Prof. Lenkovics Barnabás • Prof. Szente Zoltán Zsolt • Dr. Sulyok Gábor Rövid életrajzukat itt közöljük.

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Prof. Verebélyi Imre DSc. (1944) Egyetemi tanár, a Doktori Iskola vezetője. Közigazgatási jogot és szervezéstant oktat. Egyetemi oktatói tevékenysége mellett a brüsszeli székhelyű Nemzetközi Közigazgatástudományi Társaság alelnöke volt. Másfél évtizeden át vezette a Magyar Közigazgatási Intézetet, ahol helyi és központi államszervezési kísérleteket irányított és alkalmazott kutató-fejlesztő munkát végzett. Különböző állami vezető beosztásokban (közigazgatási miniszterhelyettesként, kormánybiztosként, miniszteri biztosként) részt vett a magyar közigazgatási rendszerváltás szakmai előkészítésében, majd a továbbfejlesztés feladatainak megoldásában. Rendkívüli közigazgatási követként és meghatalmazott miniszterként az OECD mellett és más európai intézményeknél fejtett ki közigazgatási joggal és igazgatásszervezéssel kapcsolatos tevékenységet. Az Új Magyar Közigazgatás szakmai-tudományos folyóirat szerkesztőbizottságának elnöke. Publikációi: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=10008955 Doktori adatlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID=2173 Prof. Lamm Vanda, az MTA rendes tagja (1945) Egyetemi tanár, akadémikus, a Széchenyi István Egyetem Nemzetközi Köz- és Magánjogi Tanszékének volt vezetője, az MTA Jogtudományi Intézetének (illetve jogutódjának, az MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Jogtudományi Intézetének) volt igazgatója. Több mint három évtizede egyetemi oktató (Miskolci Egyetemen és a Széchenyi István Egyetemen), nemzetközi közjoggal és nukleáris joggal foglalkozik. Különböző nemzetközi szervezetek részére rendszeresen végez szakértői tevékenységet, 3 évig volt a CEDAW ENSZ nőjogi bizottságának tagja. A Nemzetközi Nukleáris Jogi Társaság tiszteletbeli elnöke; a Nemzetközi Jogi Intézet alelnöke, az OECD-NEA Nukleáris Jogi Bizottságának alelnöke, az EBESZ Békéltetési és Választottbíróságának helyettesbírája, a Nemzetközi Jogi Egyesület Magyar tagozatának főtitkára, tagja az MTA elnökségének, a hágai Állandó Választottbíróságnak, a Nemzetközi Jogi Intézetnek, valamint az Európai Tudományos és Művészeti Akadémiának. Publikációi: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1189973 Doktori adatlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID=2179 Prof. Vavró István DSc. (1936) Professzor emeritus, az igazságügyi statisztikai tudományok professzora, kriminálstatisztikai kutatások vezetője. 1958-ban kezdődő szakmai karrierjének főbb állomásai a Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, valamint az Igazságügyi Minisztérium, ahol 8 éven keresztül főosztályvezető volt. 1993-2005 között az Országos Statisztikai Tanács tagja. Győrött a jogászképzés újraindításától kezdve oktat. Számos tudományos testület tagja, többek között az MTA Demográfiai Bizottságának, a Jogi Szakvizsga Bizottságnak, valamint alapító tagja a Magyar Kriminológiai Társaságnak.

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Publikációi: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=10005202 Doktori adatlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID=2184 Prof. Szigeti Péter DSc. (1951) Tanszékvezető egyetemi tanár (Széchenyi István Egyetem Jogtörténeti Tanszéke), a jog- és államelmélet professzora, az MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Politikatudományi Intézetének tudományos tanácsadója, az Országos Választási Bizottság volt elnöke. Harminc éve áll a katedrán és foglalkozik társadalomkutatással, több éven keresztül a Széchenyi István Egyetem Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Karának tudományos és általános igazgatóhelyettese volt. Főbb kutatási területe a szintetikus jogfelfogása szerint a jogi jelenségek – jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás és a jogügyletek – a társadalmi lét szövedékébe ágyazódnak. A Magyar Politikatudományi Társaság és a Condorcet Kör alapító tagja, több folyóirat (Leviatán, Eszmélet) szerkesztőjeként, főszerkesztőjeként tevékenykedett. Publikációi: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=10018525 Doktori adatlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID=2178 Prof. Lenkovics Barnabás CSc. (1950) Tanszékvezető egyetemi tanár (a Széchenyi István Egyetem Polgári Jogi és Polgári Eljárásjogi Tanszéke), a győri polgári jogi oktatás megszervezője, az ELTE Állam- és Jogtudományi Karán kezdte oktatói tevékenységét. Fő kutatási területe a dologi jog, a tulajdonjog, illetve az alapjogok a magánjogban. Több éven keresztül a Széchenyi Professzori Ösztöndíj keretében kutatott. 2001-2007 között az állampolgári jogok országgyűlési biztosa. 2007 márciusában az Országgyűlés alkotmánybíróvá választotta. Publikációi: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=10006828 Doktori adatlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID=4315 Dr. Sulyok Gábor PhD. (1976) A Nemzetközi Köz- és Magánjogi Tanszék habilitált egyetemi docense, több éven keresztül a Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar tudományos dékánhelyettese, az MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Jogtudományi Intézetének tudományos főmunkatársa, illetve jogelődjének több éven keresztül ügyvezetője. Kutatási tevékenysége a humanitárius intervenció elméletét és gyakorlatát, az erőszak és a beavatkozás tilalmát, az emberi jogok védelmét, a nemzetközi jog történetét, valamint az Egyesült Nemzetek Szervezetét érintő kérdéseket öleli fel. A Nemzetközi Jogi Egyesület Magyar Tagozatának, a Magyar Menekültügyi Társaságnak, az MTA Köztestületének, a Magyar ENSZ Társaságnak, a European Society of International Law, a Jog-Állam-Politika, a Föld-rész: Nemzetközi és Európai Jogi Szemle, a Közjogi Szemle, a Journal of Jurisprudence and Legal Practice (Cseh Köztársaság), valamint a Hungarian Yearbook of Interna-

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tional Law and European Law szerkesztőbizottságának, a Pro Futuro tanácsadó testületének tagja. Publikációi: https://vm.mtmt.hu//search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=10001460 Doktori adatlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID=4344& lang=EN Prof. Patyi András PhD. (1969) 2011-ig (törzstagságáig) tanszékvezető egyetemi tanár (Közigazgatási Tudományok Tanszéke), oktatási, majd tudományos dékán-helyettes a Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Karon. Jelenleg a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem rektora. Az Alkotmánybíróság egykori főtanácsadója több alkotmánybíró mellett, a Legfelsőbb Bíróság egykori bírája, közel egy évtizeden keresztül a főváros egyik kerületének jegyzője, főosztályvezetőként dolgozott az Országgyűlési Biztosok Hivatalában is. Főbb kutatási területei a közigazgatási bíráskodás, a közigazgatási eljárásjog és az önkormányzati alapjogok. Tagja – többek között – az MTA Állam- és Jogtudományi Bizottságnak, a Nemzetközi Igazgatástudományi Intézet (IIAS) Európai csoportjának (EGPA) és több szakfolyóirat szerkesztőbizottságának. Publikációi: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=10013253 Doktori adatlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID=2177 Prof. Szente Zoltán Zsolt DSc. (1966) 2012-től törzstag, egyetemi tanár, egykor a JATE Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar Alkotmányjog Tanszékének tudományos munkatársa, majd a Magyar Közigazgatási Intézet (2007-től ECOSTAT) tudományos főmunkatársa, több éven keresztül a Rendőrtiszti Főiskola meghívott előadója, 2006-tól az ELTE-MTA Jogtörténeti Kutatócsoportjának tudományos főmunkatársa. Kutatási terület: parlamenti jog, európai alkotmánytörténet, alkotmányelmélet, alkotmányértelmezés, közigazgatástan, központi-helyi kormányzati viszonyok, korrupció. Az Európa Tanács önkormányzati szakértője, ezen megbízatása keretében több tagállam önkormányzati rendszeréről készült jelentés szakmai előkészítője volt. Publikációi: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=10014771 Doktori adatlap: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID=8563 A Doktori Iskola Tanácsának a törzstagokon kívül tagjai: • Prof. Finszter Géza DSc., egyetemi tanár (ELTE) • Dr. Stumpf István CSc., alkotmánybíró • Prof. Patyi András PhD. egyetemi tanár, rektor (NKE) • Prof. Lévayné Fazekas Judit CSc. egyetemi tanár, dékán (SZE Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar)

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• Dr. Révész T. Mihály CSc. egyetemi docens (SZE Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar) • Dr. Szegedi András PhD., tanszékvezető egyetemi docens (SZE Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar) Témavezetők A témavezető szakmai irányítása alatt végzi el a doktorandusz a kutatásait, amely elengedhetetlenül szükséges a fokozat megszerzéséhez. Doktori iskolánknak jelenleg 24 témakiírása és 18 témavezetője (jelentős többségük a Széchenyi István Egyetem alkalmazottja) van. Oktatók A doktori képzés iskolarendszerű képzési struktúrájához szorosan kapcsolódik az oktatók személye, akik a doktori tárgyú kutatásokat elősegítő módszertani tárgyakat és szakkurzusokat tartanak. Ezek teljesítése a doktorandusz kutatómunkáját kiegészítik, és nagyban elősegítik, hiszen olyan készségekhez, ismeretanyaghoz jut hozzá, amelyek nélkül egy doktori disszertáció elkészítése lehetetlen vállalkozás lenne. Doktori iskolánknak jelenleg 32 oktatója van (jelentős többségük a Széchenyi István Egyetem alkalmazottja). Közülük Frank Orton (volt svéd legfelsőbb bírósági bíró, Bosznia-Hercegovina egykori ombudsmanja), Prof. Michael Silagi – német professzor – és Korhecz Tamás (a vajdasági tartományi kormány volt minisztere) személyében több külföldi előadó is rendszeres oktatási tevékenységet lát el. I. 4. Kurzusok, kutatási témák A Doktori Iskola kurzusai és kutatási témái felölelik a kutatáshoz elengedhetetlen módszertani tárgyakat, az állam- és jogtudományok valamennyi ágát, illetve az igazgatásszervezési tudomány valamennyi releváns területét. Ezek révén nyílik lehetőség egy teljes kutatási profilt megvalósító intézmény sikeres működtetésére. Kurzus-kínálat (kötelező és választható kurzusok) • A bírói jogvédelem alkotmányos alapjai és szerepe a modern közigazgatásban • A büntetőjogi felróhatóság alapelemei; hasonlóságok és különbségek más jogágakkal; nemzetközi tendenciák

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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

A fegyveres összeütközések jogának büntetőjogi aspektusai A jogorvoslás eszközei és hatásmechanizmusa a hatósági eljárásban A jogrendszer fogalma és tagozódásának jog- és államelméleti alapjai A kommunikációs jogok fejlődéstörténete A központi és a helyi közigazgatás A magyar állam és jogfejlődés az újkortól a XX. század közepéig A magyar államélet klasszikusai Eötvöstől Bibóig A nemzetközi béke és biztonság alapkérdései A nemzetközi gazdasági és pénzügyi intézmények A nemzetközi jog intézményrendszerének fejlődése A társadalomtudományi kutatások módszertana Alapjogok a magánjogban Államelméleti kutatószeminárium: szinoptikus államelmélet – alkalmazások Az alkotmánybíráskodás modelljei Az európai integráció fejlődése Elektronikus kereskedelem Fejezetek az európai büntetőjog történetéből Jog és irodalom Jogracionalizáció és jogfejlődés Jogszabály-előkészítés, reguláció és dereguláció Magyar alkotmányosság és parlamentarizmus 1989-2008 Mediation in Civil Law Processes Nemzetközi bűnügyi együttműködés az Európai Unióban Nemzetközi fuvarjog Nemzetközi versenyjog Orvosi jog Összehasonlító alkotmányjog Összehasonlító jog Problems of the State Succession of Central and Eastern Europe Személyiségi jogok a médiában.

Kutatási témák • • • • • • • • •

jogfilozófia, jogelmélet szinoptikus alkotmányelmélet az alkotmányosság fejlődése és jellemzői alkotmányosság védelme a kollektív alapjogok intézményesedésének problémái parlamentarizmus, parlamenti jog politikai rendszerek és a kormányzás demokratikus kontrollja jogforrások alapjogok a magánjogban

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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

magánjog és közjog viszonya európai versenyjog nemzetközi kereskedelmi jog elektronikus kereskedelem és fogyasztóvédelem alapjogok a büntetőjogban nemzetközi bűnügyi együttműködés a demográfiai változások és a bűnözés kapcsolata statisztikai módszerek alkalmazása a bűnügyi kutatásokban bioetika, büntetőjog és orvostudomány a magyar büntetőjog 19. századi kodifikációja a közigazgatás alkotmányossága a modern jogállamokban a közigazgatás működése és központi szervezete a helyi közigazgatás alapvonalai a közigazgatás kontrollja a bírósági jogérvényesítés szerepe és jellemzői médiajog az emberi jogok nemzetközi védelme nemzetközi viták békés rendezése a nemzetközi béke és biztonság megőrzése és helyreállítása az európai integráció fejlődése az EU szakpolitikáinak alapjai.

Túl a tudományon – közösség kovácsolódik

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I. 5. Partnerek és programok Partnerek A Doktori Iskola együttműködésre törekszik valamennyi hazai társintézmén�nyel és a hazai állam- és jogtudomány művelőinek szakmai műhelyeivel. Mind intézményközi viszonylatban, mind az oktatók személyes összeköttetéseinek szintjén kiterjedt és tevékenysége szempontjából közvetlenül is hasznosítható nemzetközi kapcsolatrendszerrel rendelkezik. A kapcsolatrendszer eredményeként több közös rendezvény szervezésére nyílik lehetőség, a tanulmányutak száma évről-évre nő és a tudományos együttműködés egyéb formái is bizonyítják a gyümölcsöző kapcsolatot. A Doktori Iskola és a Kar több intézménnyel írt alá együttműködési megállapodást a közép-kelet európai régióból.

Háromoldalú együttműködési megállapodás ünnepélyes aláírása az újvidéki Dr Lazar Vrkatić Kar, a Doktori Iskola és a Deák Ferenc Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar részéről

Partnerek az újvidéki jogi karról és a vajdasági Magyar Nemzeti Tanács részéről/ Hallgatóink szereplése a vajdasági Magyar Nemzeti Tanácsnál

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A Doktori Iskola működésének szempontjából különösen az alábbi külföldi egyetemekkel és intézményekkel ápolt kapcsolatok bizonyulnak hasznosnak: • Comenius University (Szlovákia) • Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (Olaszország) • Dr Lazar Vrkatić Fakultet za pravne i poslovne studije (Szerbia) – együttműködési megállapodás a Doktori Iskolával • Goerg-August-Universität Göttingen, Juristische Fakultät (Németország) • Masaryk University (Csehország) – együttműködési megállapodás a Karral • Moscow State Law Academy (Oroszország) • Österreichisches Institut für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik (Ausztria) • Pôle Européen d’Administration Publique (Franciaország) • Universität Passau, Juristische Fakultät (Németország) • Universität Potsdam, Juristische Fakultät (Németország) • Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté de Droit (Franciaország) • University of Białystok (Lengyelország) – együttműködési megállapodás a Karral • University of Nagoya, Graduate School of Law (Japán) • Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Právnická Fakulta (Csehország) • Ústav Státu a Práva, Akademie věd České Republiky (Csehország) • Vysoká Skola v Sládkovicove, Fakulta Práva Janka Jesenského (Szlovákia) – együttműködési megállapodás a Karral • Wiener Universität, Juridicum – Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät (Ausztria).

Újvidéki látkép – ahogy mi látjuk

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Újvidéki csoportkép

A vajdasági tartományi parlament és a tartományi kormány ülésterme

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Programok Konferenciák és nyári-téli egyetemek, szemináriumok A Doktori Iskola alapítása óta elkötelezett olyan szakmai konferenciák szervezésében, amelyek valamennyi hazai és a partnerintézményekből érkező doktorandusz számára kínálnak megjelenési lehetőséget. Eme rendezvények mindig egy aktuális, a közvéleményt és a szakmai közösséget foglalkoztató témára fókuszálnak. Meggyőződésünk, hogy eme programok, az itt kapott szakmai visszajelzések nagyban elősegítik doktori kutatásaikat, és kiváló alkalmat teremtenek a szakmai kapcsolatépítésre is. A programok rendszeresen plenáris előadásokkal kezdődnek, ahol professzoraink, más elismert szakértők tartanak általános, bevezető jellegű előadásokat. A kutatási területek szerint szervezett délutáni szekciókban a doktoranduszok mutatják be tudományos eredményeiket. Angol nyelvű szekciót is rendszeresen szervezünk, ahol partnereink hallgatói is részt tudnak venni. Az elhangzott előadások anyagait rendszeresen publikáljuk. Konferenciát tartottunk – többek között – a minőségi jogalkotás követelményeiről, jogállamiság 20 évéről, a középszintű közigazgatásról, Vajdaságról, figyelemmel a lehetséges EU-csatlakozásra és a kisebbségi jogokra. a magyar jogrendszer átalakításáról. A legtöbb rendezvényt a TÁMOP-4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0010 számú projekt támogatta.

Konferencia a Doktori Iskolában

Több nyári és egyetem szervezését sikerült lebonyolítani szintén a TÁMOP4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0010 számú projekt keretében. A gazdasági válság közép- és kelet-európai országokra, ezek államszervezetére, jogára gyakorolt hatásait

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2012-ben (2012 júliusa) egy nyári egyetem, míg ugyanezen államok vonatkozásában az EU-csatlakozás társadalomra, jogra, gazdaságra és politikára gyakorolt hatásait 2013-ban (2013. március eleje) egy téli egyetem keretében vizsgálták a nyári egyetem résztvevői számos országból. Eme rendezvények kiváló fórumot teremtenek a közös gondolkodásra és a számos országból érkező fiatalok közötti eszmecserére. A szemináriumokra – ahol elismert szakértők, professzorok segítenek a problémák jogi, politikai és gazdasági vetületeinek megértésében – elsősorban PhD-hallgatókat és fiatal kutatókat várunk, miközben ezek az események kulturális programokat is magukban foglalnak.

A 2012-es nyári egyetem résztvevői

TÁMOP

Bemutatkozás – közvetlenül a téli egyetem előtt

A Doktori Iskola 2012-ben jelentős pénzösszeget kapott a Széchenyi István Egyetem által elnyert „Tehetséggondozás és a és a tudományos műhelyek fej-

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lesztése a Széchenyi István Egyetemen” című, TÁMOP-4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0010 számú projekt keretében. A pénzösszeget transzparens és ésszerű módon költötte el a Doktori Iskola, amelynek keretében – többek között – támogattuk: • a hallgatók tudományos eredményeinek disszeminálását, • a hallgatók és témavezetők együttműködését; • a hallgatók tanulmányírását és konferencia-szereplését; • nagy kutatási projektek elvégzését; • kiadványok, kötetek (pl. eme jubileumi évkönyv) elkészítését; • konferenciák, nyári és téli egyetemek, szakmai utak szervezését; • a Doktori Iskola hazai és nemzetközi kapcsolatrendszerének fejlesztését; • a könyvtárfejlesztést, a HeinOnline elektronikus jogi szakfolyóirat-adatbázis ideiglenes beszerzését; • a doktori kurzuskínálat bővítését – idegen nyelvű kurzusokkal is; • a Doktori Iskola infrastruktúrájának fejlesztését. A programot igen nagy sikerként értékeljük.

Konferencia plenáris ülése (elnökség)

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Tanulmányutak Varsói tanulmányi kirándulás 2012 októberében a Széchenyi István Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Doktori Iskolájának számos hallgatója egy varsói tanulmányúton vett részt, melyet részben a TÁMOP-4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0010 számú projekt finanszírozott. A tanulmányút célja – a Doktori Iskola filozófiájának, szakmai célkitűzéseinek megfelelően – a külföldi felsőoktatási és tudományos intézményekkel való kapcsolatok építésén, fejlesztésén és elismert kutatókkal való szoros együttműködésen túl a külföldi jogalkotásért felelős és közigazgatási szervek megismerését, azok működésének áttekintését szolgálta. A tanulmányúton résztvevők kötetlen beszélgetés formájában tartottak szemináriumot, ahol számos aktuális lengyel és magyar közpolitikai és jogi téma mellett az európai integrációról és a gazdasági válság jogi és politikai vonatkozásairól folyt az angol nyelvű eszmecsere a jog- és politikatudomány szakértőjével, Wawrzyniec Konarski professzorral, majd Jaroslaw Kuisz-sal, a Varsói Egyetem oktatójával, egy lengyel közpolitikai témájú internetes periodika, a Kultura Liberalna szerkesztőjével.

Tanulmányút a lengyel alsóházban, a Szejmben és a Varsói városházán

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A résztvevők emellett látogatást tettek a Heinrich Böll Alapítványnál, illetve részletesen megismerkedtek a lengyel törvényhozás alsó- és felsőházának működésével, feladataival. A Szejm és a Szenátus bemutatásában egy vezető lengyel párt parlamenti szakértője és Piotr Pyzek alsóházi képviselő segédkezett. A csoport tagjai egy frakciószobában – amely egyben a 2010-es szmolenszki tragédiának is méltó emléket állított – folytattak közös eszmecserét a magyar és lengyel parlamenti jog aktuális kérdéseiről. A varsói városházán a főpolgármester kabinetirodájának helyettes vezetője, Ewelina Kozak asszony egyórás prezentáció keretében mutatta be a lengyel önkormányzati rendszert, illetve Varsó speciális helyzetét a lengyel közigazgatásban. A tanulmányút zárásaként pedig lehetőség nyílt a Varsói Egyetem könyvtárának megtekintésére, ahol a résztvevők tudományterületüknek megfelelő katalógusokat átböngészve kerestek forrásokat Közép-Európa egyik legnagyobb és legszínvonalasabb állományával bíró könyvtárában.

Küldöttségünk a Szejm bizottsági üléstermében

Kolozsvári tanulmányút 2013-ban a Doktori Iskola küldöttsége felkereste a kolozsvári Babes-Bolyai Tudományegyetemet, valamint a Sapientia Erdélyi Magyar Tudományegyetemet is. Az időpont kiválasztásában szerepet játszott az, hogy május 30. és június 1. között Kolozsváron került megrendezésre a Magyar Politikatudomány Társaság XIX. Vándorgyűlése, amely az egyik legrangosabb, évente megrendezett politikatudományi konferencia. A küldöttség találkozott a Babes-Bolyai Tudományegyetem összevont doktori iskoláinak vezetőjével, Andrei Marcus professzorral, rektorhelyettessel és titkárával, Aurel Todorutcal. A találkozón az erdélyi képzési központ 29 összevont doktori iskolájának működéséről szerezhettek a résztvevők információkat, majd röviden bemu-

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tatásra került a magyar és a román doktori képzés, különös hangsúllyal a doktori képzés szerkezetére, időtartamára, illetve a fokozatszerzési eljárásra, az előmeneteli követelményekre. A küldöttség ezután találkozott Soós Anna rektorhelyettessel, a magyar nyelvű képzés felelősével, akivel széleskörű tapasztalatcsere történt.

A Babes-Bolyai Tudományegyetemen – tapasztalatcsere

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I. 1. Introduction of the Postgraduate Doctoral School of Faculty of Law and Political Sciences The history of the Postgraduate Doctoral School and process of its formation Establishing Széchenyi István University’s Postgraduate Doctoral School of Faculty of Law and Political Sciences meant a long awaited, worthy completion of Győr’s legal education with its more that two-century old tradition, as its activity and mission are strongly connected to the objectives of the ones of Győr’s legal education. The Royal Law School that by that time had been operating for over sixty years was raised to the rank of Royal Law School by Queen Maria Teresia in 1776. The institution that operated until 1892 could call such outstanding figures of Hungarian science and public life as Ferenc Deák, Wise Man of the Nation, earl Lajos Batthyány, Antal Reguly and Kálmán Mikszáth its members. After the cessation of the Royal Law School, we had to wait a century until legal education started again in Győr. Based on a 1995 agreement, the then Széchenyi István College and Eötvös Loránd University’s Faculty of Law and Political Sciences established a mutual educational institution and division, where year by year nearly a hundred law student was educated as students of ELTE; hence, graduated students obtained ELTE’s degree. After having reintroduced legal education, accreditation of an individual legal education’s structure, among frames of an individual institution became the institution of Győr’s declared objective. The Parliament decided on the establishment of Széchenyi István University in 2001, under which, besides starting (reintroducing) legal education with its own rights, doctoral educational systems, accreditation of doctoral schools also became possible. Hence, in Győr’s legal education 1st January, 2002 was a milestone from two points of view. On the one hand, Széchenyi István University was born on that day, on the other hand, – based on Hungarian Accreditation Committee’s full accreditation, without reserves and conditions – the new institution’s Faculty of Law and Economic Sciences could manage law students’ education in its own rights. Among the frames of the accredited Faculty, immediately began the two discipline’s cooperation and an elaboration of mutual research program. The multidisciplinary social sciences doctoral education opened for graduates, as well - entitled “Economy, law, regionality and society in integrated Central-Europe” – started in 2004 at Széchenyi István University (nr. 2003/7/II/1/1. HAC provision). As its fairly wide range of research program’s name indicates, Multidisciplinary Social Sciences Postgraduate Doctoral School undertook the cognition and scientific investigation of cooperative possibilities between Central and Eastern Europe, of encouraging and hindering factors, and of economic, social and institutional relationships, and

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– in broader sense – legal and political environments surrounding them. On 1st July, 2007, two individual organisational units - Kautz Gyula Faculty of Economics and Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences – replaced Faculty of Law and Economics, among which education of lawyers and economists was managed in separate organisational units. After the separation and start of graduate education with their own rights, accreditation of a doctoral education with its own rights was a justifiable desire in both institutions. However, all in all, the three years educational and research activity done among multidisciplinary frames can be regarded as successful, after the separation of the faculties, establishing an own doctoral education emerged on both sides, and the appearance of 33/2007 (III.7) Government Regulation on the procedure of establishing doctoral schools, and the viewpoint of the Hungarian Accreditational Committee on the requirements of establishing and operating doctoral schools – issued after March, 2007 – gave topicality to it. As closing the process, the Hungarian Accreditational Committee, followed by a thorough investigation, with decision nr. 2008/3/VIII/2/129. ratified the establishment of our Postgraduate Doctoral School in 2008, its theme and measures in the disciplines of national and legal sciences (according to the classification of the Hungarian Accreditational Committee) due to which doctoral education could start in September, 2008 with the first class and with taking over students who were accepted by the predecessor Multidisciplinary Social Sciences Postgraduate Doctoral School. According to the provision of the Hungarian Accreditational Committee, accreditation is valid until 31st October, 2015. Objectives of Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences However, the Postgraduate Doctoral School is an individual organisational unit within Széchenyi István University but via its strong cooperation with Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences it is committed to improve national (and international) legal sciences, the Faculty’s personnel requirements and to increase its international fame. Furthermore, the Faculty regards ensuring supplies of high-standard professors, hence, establishing quality legal education for a long time as its objective. For successfully and continuously completing all these objectives, there was possibility only via a system of conditions that is based on complex and strict quality criteria. According to its founding members, the Postgraduate Doctoral School is characterized by high-quality, constitutive cooperation, intensive mutual research and effective tendering activity of the most well prepared professors, the most outstanding native, Hungarians outside the country’s territory and foreign PhD students, and all of the Postgraduate Doctoral School’s students and lecturers started and have been doing their activity in such spirit.

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So far a strong objective has followed the history of the Postgraduate Doctoral School, this is being the realization of an educational form which is practice-oriented, in many ways completed with tutorial educational elements; our significant objective is to open towards practice, which means involving representatives of classic legal professions (judges, attorneys, lawyers, professionals of public administration) on the level of education and students, as well. In the doctoral education besides classic doctoral themes of legal sciences, national studies (such as political sciences, administrational and organisational sciences) also play significant part. Doctoral education also offers research themes that are theoretical-like and support practice, all in all, via culturing other methodological topics it helps to improve research promptitudes and capabilities and to make these more high-quality. The personnel that consists of qualitative professors and supervisors is a guarantee for the Postgraduate Doctoral School’s students to actively and successfully participate in national and international scientific social life. The number of students makes recognition of consultation with supervisors more significant and strengthening a kind of more tutorial role possible, which today can be regarded as a more and more indispensable condition and factor for improving efficiency. Our doctoral education wishes to summarize its basically scientific-research activity in a way that knowledge cumulated as its result - via our professors and students’ mediation - can be used in practice as well, and in a given case it would serve as a worthy assistance for legal practice, too. We believe that theoretical and practical aspects of research areas complete each other and their high-level combination improves research competencies, hence, it ensures theoretical and practical susceptibility of professionals to recognize, understand and solve problems of national and legal science. Last but not least, the exceptional possibilities of the Postgraduate Doctoral School are also strongly strengthened by its uncommonly advantageous geographical location (regarding Győr’s location it is undoubtedly true the many times said proposal that it can be found in the centre of Budapest-Vienna-Bratislava triangle) and the excellent regional relations’ physical and – maybe it is not exaggeration to state this that – spiritual closeness coming from this, we acquaint this advantages with students and we strive to ensure access to them. We got into touch with the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and professors teaching public law at Leuven University. We regard frontier scientific cooperation, Hungarian professors and PhD students’ cooperation from the neighbouring countries and getting into touch with frontier (Bratislava, Cluj Napoca, Novi Sad) professors and students of Hungarian origin as our mission. According to the mission of the founding members, the institution’s personnel conditions, educational and research activity, measure- and quality assurance system, moreover, national and international relations have appropriate guarantee regarding that our Postgraduate Doctoral School of Faculty

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of Law and Political Sciences have risen among the most well-recognised and acknowledged scientific workshops of postgraduate educations in Hungarian higher education. The Postgraduate Doctoral School’s five-year existence, its first “real jubileum”, is an excellent opportunity to review its achievements. Prof. Verebélyi, Imre - head of the Postgraduate Doctoral School

Official seal of the Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences and Postgraduate Doctoral School of the Széchenyi István University (from Queen Maria II Theresa)

I. 2. Data and our Success – in Numbers The official name of the Doctoral School: Széchenyi István University, Postgraduate Doctoral School of Law and Political Sciences, identifier: 187. Address, headquarter: H-9026 Győr, Áldozat utca 12. (Hungary) Postal address: H-9007 Győr, POB. 701 Tel.: 0036 96 613 675 Fax: 0036 96 310 336 E-mail: [email protected] Homepage: http://doktiskjog.sze.hu/bemutatkozas Doctoral homepage: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=191&di_ID=171 Head of the Postgraduate Doctoral School: Prof. Dr. Verebélyi, Imre DSc., professor of law. Secretary: • 2008-2012: Dr. Smuk, Péter PhD., senior lecturer, later associate professor; • 2012- : Dr. Kecskés, Gábor PhD., senior lecturer.

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Assistant: • 2008-2011: Horváthné Körmendi, Katalin; • 2011-2013: Csizmarik, Eszter; • 2013- : Szalay, Orsolya. Number of core members: 7 members. The Doctoral Council consists of 7 core members, 6 members and further invited guests. Field of science and branch of the field: humanities, law and political sciences. Accredited degree: PhD. Qualification of the Hungarian Accreditational Committee: qualified till 31 October 2015. Enrolment (number of students according to the divisions: scholarship holders, correspondents, individual qualification): • 2008: 1 scholarship holder, 12 correspondents. • 2009: 3 scholarship holders, 9 correspondents. • 2010: 3 scholarship holders, 3 correspondents. • 2011: 10 correspondents, 3 students with individual qualification. • 2012: 4 scholarship holders, 4 correspondents. • 2013: 4 scholarship holders, 6 correspondents, 1 student with individual qualification. Number of graduation and PhD degrees: 16 degrees. In years: • 2008: 2 • 2009: 1 • 2010: 1 • 2011: 4 • 2012: 7 • 2013: 1 I. 3. Core Members, Supervisors and Lecturers Core members The main duty and respectful task of the core members is to guarantee and maintain the quality of the education with continuous supervisory activities. Pursuant to the laws in effect, at least 7 core members (all of them are em-

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ployed by the Széchenyi István University) can establish and maintain a postgraduate doctoral school. The short curriculum vitae of them follow now. Core members between 2008 and 2012 • Prof. Verebélyi, Imre (head) • Prof. Lamm, Vanda • Prof. Szigeti, Péter • Prof. Vavró, István • Prof. Lenkovics, Barnabás • Dr. Patyi, András • Dr. Sulyok, Gábor Core members since 2012 (Dr. Patyi, András had been appointed as the rector of an other university, thus, the composition of the Doctoral Council has changed) • Prof. Verebélyi, Imre (head) • Prof. Lamm, Vanda • Prof. Szigeti, Péter • Prof. Vavró, István • Prof. Lenkovics, Barnabás • Prof. Szente, Zoltán Zsolt • Dr. Sulyok, Gábor The biographies of the core members follow. Prof. Verebélyi, Imre DSc. (1944) Professor, head of the Postgraduate Doctoral School. He is an expert on administrative law and management studies. Besides his teaching activity, he was vice-president of the International Science of Public Administration Committee, located in Brussels. He was director of National Institute of Public Administration for a decade and a half, where he led experiments on local and central organization of States and carried out applied research and development tasks. He participated in the technical preparation of Hungarian public administration’s transition in various state managerial positions (Deputy Minister of Administration, Government Commissioner, Prime Minister’s Commissioner), then in solutions of initial start-up and tasks of further development. As an exceptional envoy of administration and as a delegated minister, he carried out administrative and management work at OECD and other European institutions. He is the editor-in-chief of the journal entitled Új Magyar Közigazgatás [New Hungarian Administration] Publications: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1000 8955

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Doctoral homepage: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID =2173 Academician Lamm, Vanda, full member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1945) Professor, academician, former head of department (Department for Public and Private International Law of Széchenyi István University), former director of the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (and its successor, the Institute for Legal Studies of the Centre for Social Sciences). She has been a university professor for more than three decades (Miskolc University and Széchenyi István University), she deals with public international law and nuclear law. She regularly does expert activity for various international organizations; she was member of CEDAW for 3 years. She is the honorary president the Presidium of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, honorary president of International Nuclear Law Association, Vice-President of the Institut de Droit International and the OECD-NEA Nuclear Law Committee and Secretary-General of the Hungarian Branch of International Law Association. She is deputy-judge at the OSCE, member of the Presidium of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the Permanent Court of Arbitration located in Hague and the European Academy of Sciences and Arts. Publications: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1189 973 Doctoral homepage: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID =2179 Prof. Vavró István DSc. (1936) Professor emeritus, professor of sciences of justice statistics, director of researches on criminology statistics. Main stages of his carrier that started in 1958 are the Central Statistical Office and Ministry of Justice, where he was head of department for 8 years. Between 1993 and 2005, he was member of the National Statistical Council. He has thought in Győr from the re-start of legal education. He is member of various scientific councils, for instance the Demographic Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Legal Professional Exam Committee and he is founding member of the Hungarian Society of Criminology. Publications: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1000 5202 Doctoral homepage: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID =2184

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Prof. Szigeti, Péter DSc. (1951) Head of department (Department of History of Law), professor of law and state theory, scientific advisor of Institute for Political Sciences of the Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Ha was the President of the National Electoral Committee. He has taught for thirty years and has dealt with social science research, besides he was deputy-director responsible for general and scientific affairs at the Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences. His main research field is synthetic legal interpretation, legal phenomena – legislation, implementation of rights and transaction – are embedded in contextures of social life. Founding member of the Hungarian Political Science Association and the Condorcet Circle, he was editor and editor-in-chief of several journals (Leviatán, Eszmélet). Publications: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1001 8525 Doctoral homepage: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID =2178 Prof. Lenkovics, Barnabás CSc. (1950) Professor, head of Department of Civil Law and Civil Procedural Law, one of the organizers of the education of civil law in Győr in the 1990s. His main research area is property law, property rights and fundamental rights in civil law. For years, he was carrying out research by the support of the Széchenyi Professorial Scholarship. Between 2001 and 2007, he was commissioner for fundamental rights. The Hungarian Parliament elected him as judge of the Constitutional Court in March, 2007. Publications: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1000 6828 Doctoral homepage: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ID =4315 Dr. Sulyok, Gábor PhD. (1976) Habilitated associate professor of the Department of Public and Private International Law of Széchenyi István University; for years, he was vice-dean for academic affairs of Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences. He is senior research fellow and former executive director at the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (and its successor, the Institute for Legal Studies of the Centre for Social Sciences). Field of research: humanitarian intervention, international peace and security, human rights, humanitarian intervention, United Nations, sources of international law, history of international law. He is member of the Hungarian Branch of the International Law Association, the Association for the Study of the World Refugee Problem Hungarian Branch, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Public Body, the United Nations Association of Hungary and the

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European Society of International Law. He is also member of the editorial board of Közjogi Szemle, Állam- és Jogtudomány, Föld-rész: Nemzetközi és Európai Jogi Szemle and the editorial staff of Jog-Állam-Politika, the editorial board of Journal of Jurisprudence and Legal Practice (Czech Republic), the advisory board of Pro Futuro and the editorial board of the Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law. Publication: https://vm.mtmt.hu//search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1000 1460 Doctoral homepage: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ ID=4344&lang=EN Prof. Patyi, András PhD. (1969) Till 2011 (for the time, he was our core member) he was head of department (Department for Administrative Studies), professor. He was vice-dean for educational then scientific affairs at the Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences. Now, he is the rector and professor of National University of Public Service. He was former main advisor to more judges of the Constitutional Court and former judge at the Supreme Court of Hungary; besides he was notary of a district of Budapest for nearly a decade, he was also head of department at the Office of Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. Fields of research: administrative jurisdiction, administrative procedural law and fundamental rights at the level of local government. He is member – inter alia – of the Committee of Law and Political Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the European Group of International Institute of Administrative Sciences and editorial boards of several journals. Publications: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1001 3253 Doctoral homepage http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ ID=2177 Prof. Szente, Zoltán Zsolt DSc. (1966) Core member since 2012, professor, former research fellow at Department of Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of József Attila University. Ha was senior research assistant at National Institute of Public Administration (since 2007, ECOSTAT), in he was also visiting lecturer at Police College and senior research fellow at the Research Group of History of Law of ELTE-Hungarian Academy of Sciences cooperation. Fields of research: parliamentary law, European constitutional history, constitutional theory, constitutional interpretation, public administration studies, relations of central and local governments, corruption. He is an expert of Council of Europe in issues attached to local governments, where he prepared several reports for the organization.

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Publications: https://vm.mtmt.hu/search/slist.php?lang=0&AuthorID=1001 4771 Doctoral homepage: http://www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=192&sz_ ID=8563 Members of the Doctoral Council - besides the core members: Prof. Finszter, Géza DSc., professor (ELTE) Dr. Stumpf, István CSc., judge of the Constitutional Court Prof. Patyi, András PhD. professor, rector (NKE) Prof. Lévayné Fazekas, Judit CSc. professor, dean (SZE Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences) Dr. Révész, T. Mihály CSc. associate professor (SZE Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences) Dr. Szegedi, András PhD.,head of department, associate professor (SZE Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences) Supervisors Our PhD students carry out their researches under the professional supervision supplied by our supervisors, which is inevitably necessary for gaining the PhD degree. For the time being, our Postgraduate Doctoral School has 24 PhD subjects and 18 supervisors (high majority of them are employed by the Széchenyi István University). Lecturers The course-based structure of the whole doctoral education system is closely linked to the personality of lecturers, who hold courses promoting methodology issues as well as specific subjects in order to strengthen the research activity of the PhD students. By fulfilling these courses, a PhD student can obtain such abilities, skills which are essential in carrying out the chosen PhD research subject, and without these skills and knowledge, the completion of the thesis would be an unreal enterprise. For the time being, our Postgraduate Doctoral School has 32 lecturers (high majority of them are employed by the Széchenyi István University). Inter alia, the lecturers include experts from abroad, such as Orton, Frank (former judge of the Swedish Supreme Court, former ombudsman of Bosnia-Herzegovina), Prof. Silagi, Michael – professor of law from Germany – and Dr. Korhecz, Tamás (former minister of the government of Vojvodina province), who hold courses in our Postgraduate Doctoral School regularly.

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I. 4. Doctoral Courses, Research Topics The courses and research topics of the Postgraduate Doctoral School involve the methodological education having been considered crucial during the research activities as well as the branches of law and political sciences and all the relevant domains of the management studies. Accordingly, this is the method thereupon a doctoral school could maintain its quality and success within the whole spectrum of research profile. Course-list (mandatory and facultative courses) • A bírói jogvédelem alkotmányos alapjai és szerepe a modern közigazgatásban (Constitutional Basis and Role of Judicial Protection in Modern Administration) • A büntetőjogi felróhatóság alapelemei; hasonlóságok és különbségek más jogágakkal; nemzetközi tendenciák (Basics of Accountability in Criminal Law – Similarities and Differences with other Branches of Law, International Tendencies) • A fegyveres összeütközések jogának büntetőjogi aspektusai (Criminal Law Concerns of Armed Conflicts) • A jogorvoslás eszközei és hatásmechanizmusa a hatósági eljárásban (Means and Effect-mechanism of the Right of Remedies in the Procedure of Authorities) • A jogrendszer fogalma és tagozódásának jog- és államelméleti alapjai (Legal and Theoretical Fundamentals of the Classification of Legal System) • A kommunikációs jogok fejlődéstörténete (History of Development of Communication Rights) • A központi és a helyi közigazgatás (Central and Local Administration) • A magyar állam és jogfejlődés az újkortól a XX. század közepéig (The Development of Hungarian State and Law from the New Age to the Middle of the 20th Century) • A magyar államélet klasszikusai Eötvöstől Bibóig (Classics of Hungarian State Theory from earl József Eötvös to István Bibó) • A nemzetközi béke és biztonság alapkérdései (Basic Issues of International Peace and Security) • A nemzetközi gazdasági és pénzügyi intézmények (International Economic and Financial Institutions) • A nemzetközi jog intézményrendszerének fejlődése (Development of the System of Institutions within Public International Law) • A társadalomtudományi kutatások módszertana (Methodology of the Research within Social Sciences) • Alapjogok a magánjogban (Fundamental Rights in Private Law)

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• Államelméleti kutatószeminárium: szinoptikus államelmélet – alkalmazások (Research Seminar: Synoptic Theory of State – Applied Theories) • Az alkotmánybíráskodás modelljei (Models of Constitutional Judicature) • Az európai integráció fejlődése (Development of the European Integration) • Elektronikus kereskedelem (E-Commerce) • Fejezetek az európai büntetőjog történetéből (Chapters from the History of European Criminal Law) • Jog és irodalom (Law and Literature) • Jogracionalizáció és jogfejlődés (Rationalization of Law and Development of Law) • Jogszabály-előkészítés, reguláció és dereguláció (Preparation of Laws, Regulation, Deregulation) • Magyar alkotmányosság és parlamentarizmus 1989-2008 (Hungarian Constitutionality and Parliamentarism 1989-2008) • Mediation in Civil Law Processes • Nemzetközi bűnügyi együttműködés az Európai Unióban (International Cooperation in Criminal Matters in the European Union) • Nemzetközi fuvarjog (International Law of Carriage) • Nemzetközi versenyjog (International Competition Law) • Orvosi jog (Medical Law) • Összehasonlító alkotmányjog (Comparative Constitutional Law) • Összehasonlító jog (Comparative Law) • Problems of the State Succession of Central and Eastern Europe • Személyiségi jogok a médiában (Right of Privacy in the Media). Research topics • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

legal theory - philosophy of law synoptic constitutional theory development and features of constitutionality problems of institutionalization of the collective basic rights parliamentarism, parliamentary law political systems, democratic control of the government legal sources fundamental rights in the private law relation between civil law and public law European competition law international transport law E-commerce and consumer protection fundamental rights in criminal law international criminal cooperation the connection between the demographic changes and crime

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• application of statistical methods through the examination of crime • bioethics, criminal law and medical science • criminal law codification in Hungary in the 19th century • the constitutionality of the public administration in the modern constitutional state • the central organization and operation of public administration • the basic lines of the municipality administration • the control of public administration • the role and features of remedy in the judicial procedures • media law • international protection of human rights • law of peaceful settlement of international disputes • basic issues of conservation and restoration of international peace and security • the development of European integration • fundamentals of the policies of EU.

Beyond science – a community is under formation

I. 5. Partners and Programs Partners The Postgraduate Doctoral School endeavours to cooperate with Hungarian partners and all the relevant professional research units from the field of law and political sciences. Both the inter-relations of institutions and the personal liaisons of our core members and lecturers have useful and fruitful network of contact of potential partners in Hungary and abroad, as well. The results and outcome of this network of cooperation are the growing number of common events, study tours, field trips organized by the partners; be-

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sides, the other forms of scientific cooperation prove the fruitfulness of these contacts. The Postgraduate Doctoral School and the Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences undersigned several cooperation agreements with partners from the Central and Eastern European region.

Ceremonial signing of a trilateral agreement on behalf of the Dr Lazar Vrkatić Faculty of Novi Sad, the Postgraduate Doctoral School and the Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences

Partners on behalf of the Faculty of Law from Novi Sad and the Hungarian National Council of Vojvodina/ Presentations of our students at the Hungarian National Council in Vojvodina

As for the activity and mission of the Postgraduate Doctoral School, we consider the following partnership with universities and research units as the most important ones: • Comenius University (Slovakia) • Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (Italy)

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• Dr Lazar Vrkatić Fakultet za pravne i poslovne studije (Serbia) – cooperation agreement with the Postgraduate Doctoral School • Goerg-August-Universität Göttingen, Juristische Fakultät (Germany) • Masaryk University (Czech Republic) – cooperation agreement with the Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences • Moscow State Law Academy (Russian Federation) • Österreichisches Institut für Europäische Sicherheitspolitik (Austria) • Pôle Européen d’Administration Publique (France) • Universität Passau, Juristische Fakultät (Germany) • Universität Potsdam, Juristische Fakultät (Germany) • Université de Montpellier 1, Faculté de Droit (France) • University of Białystok (Poland) – cooperation agreement with the Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences • University of Nagoya, Graduate School of Law (Japan) • Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Právnická Fakulta (Czech Republic) • Ústav Státu a Práva, Akademie věd České Republiky (Czech Republic) • Vysoká Skola v Sládkovicove, Fakulta Práva Janka Jesenského (Slovakia) – cooperation agreement with the Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences • Wiener Universität, Juridicum – Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät (Austria).

Novi Sad panorama – as we see it

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Group photo in Novi Sad

Plenary hall of the assembly of Vojvodina province/ Chamber of the government of Vojvodina province

Programs Conferences and summer-winter seminars, schools Since its establishment, our Postgraduate Doctoral School has organized several conferences with special regard to promoting the participation of the PhD students from other doctoral schools in Hungary and from the partners abroad. The events always focus on actual issues which were considered to be challenging for the public and the scientific community, as well. We are certain that these events, the professional feedback can significantly improve

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their researches, and provide an excellent forum for contact-building. The programs regularly begin with plenary sessions, where our professors and other esteemed experts deliver general presentations, keynote speeches. The afternoon sessions are for PhD students in numerous panels, sections based on the research fields. We regularly organize sections in English language, where the representatives of our partners can take part. The papers of the presentations are regularly published. We organized events – inter alia – on the issues of the requirements of quality legislation, on the apropos of 20 years of Hungarian constitutionality, on the subject of medium-level public administration, on the autonomous region of Vojvodina – with special regard to the EU-accession and minority rights and on the Transformation of the Hungarian legal system. Most of them were supported by the EU-project entitled TÁMOP4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0010.

Conference at the Postgraduate Doctoral School

We organized more summer and winter seminars, also by the financial support of TÁMOP-4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0010. The 2012 summer seminar (July 2012) focused on the effects of the economic depression to the law and state in Central and Eastern Europe, while the 2013 winter seminar (early March 2013) dealt with the EU Impacts on Central and Eastern European States with special regard to law, politics, economy and society. These events offer excellent fora for thinking together and discussion for young people coming from Europe. We are waiting for PhD-students and young researchers to apply from all over Europe. Noted lecturers, experts and professors help to discuss the legal, political and economic aspects of these issues, whilst these events include cultural programs.

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Participants of the 2012 Summer Seminar

Introduction – right before the Winter Seminar

Project entitled TÁMOP The activity of the Postgraduate Doctoral School was supported by a significant sum of money in 2012 from the obtained budget of Széchenyi István University under the aegis of the project entitled „Talent Management and Development of Scientific Research Units at the Széchenyi István University” (number: TÁMOP-4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0010). The great sum of money has been spent via transparent ways and according to the requirement of reasonableness. Thus, the Postgraduate Doctoral School – inter alia – supported:

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• the dissemination of scientific results achieved by the PhD students; • the cooperation between the students and the supervisors; • the publication of studies of the students and their participation at conferences; • major research projects attained by leading professors; • the publication of monographs, volumes and other collection of studies; • conferences, summer and winter seminars, study tours and field trips; • the development of the Hungarian and international partnership of the Postgraduate Doctoral School; • the development of the library, the subscription to the HeinOnline online database with temporary effect; • the extension of the course-list; • and the development of the infrastructure of the Postgraduate Doctoral School. We evaluate the project as a huge success.

Plenary session of a conference (presidium)

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Field trips Field trip in Warsaw In October 2012, numerous doctoral students of the Postgraduate Doctoral School of Law and Political Sciences took part in a field trip in Warsaw. The trip was partly financed by a project entitled TÁMOP-4.2.2/B-10/1-2010-0010. In accordance with the Postgraduate Doctoral School’s philosophy and professional aims, besides creating and improving relationships with foreign institutions of higher and scientific educations and strongly cooperating with well-noted researchers, its aim was to survey the operation and come to know bodies responsible for foreign law-making and public administration. Participants held seminars in form of loose conversations, where, besides numerous Polish and Hungarian public policy and topics of law, topics like European integration, legal and political aspects of the economic crisis were also discussed in English, together with Wawrzyniec Konarski, professor of law and political sciences, then with Jaroslaw Kuisz, professor of the University of Warsaw, editor of a Polish online periodical, entitled Kultura Liberalna.

Field trip in the Polish lower chamber, the Sejm and at the Warsaw City Hall

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Participants also visited the Heinrich Böll Foundation and got detailed insight into the operation and tasks of the Polish upper and lower House. The introduction of Sejm and the Senate was assisted by a parliamentarian expert of a leading Polish party and also by the lower house MP, Pyotr Pizek. The group discussed the actual issues of the Hungarian and Polish parliamentarian law in a fraction room, which is dedicated to the 2010 tragedy in Smolensk. At the city hall in Warsaw, the deputy-leader of the major’s Cabinet Room, Ewelina Kozak presented the Polish governmental system and Warsaw’s special situation in the Polish public administration. As the trip’s closure, participants had the opportunity to visit the University Library, where they searched for books according to their scientific field of interest in one of the greatest libraries in Central Europe.

Our delegation in the committee session room of the Sejm

Field trip in Cluj-Napoca In 2013, the delegation of the Postgraduate Doctoral School visited the Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca and Sapientia-Hungarian University of Transylvania. When choosing the date, the fact that Hungarian Political Science Association took its XIX. conference between 30th May and 1st June played a crucial role, this is being one of the most noted annual conference of political sciences. The delegation met with Prof. Marcus, Andrei, vice-rector of the Babes-Bolyai University, also the head of the complex doctoral council embracing 29 doctoral schools and with the secretary of the doctoral council, Todorut, Aurel. At this discussion, the participants could gain information on the operation of the complex doctoral research unit of 29 doctoral schools; then the Hungarian and Romanian doctoral education and experiences were introduced, with special regard to the systematic is-

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sues, duration of the education, process of gaining PhD title and requirements of further promotion. Thereafter, the delegation visited Prof. Soós, Anna vice-rector and in charge of the education in Hungarian, with whom the representatives of our Postgraduate Doctoral School were discussing on general issues on the experiences of higher education.

At the Babes-Bolyai University – discussion on experiences

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II. Megvédett értekezések/ II. Theses Defended

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j u b i l e u mi k ö t e t – j u b i l e e v o l u m e

A doktori tanulmányok ideális és kívánt befejezése – a jelölt oldaláról – a doktori értekezés sikeres megvédésével történik. A doktori tanulmányok, egyben a képzés minőségét és hatékonyságát a megvédett értekezések száma és minősége határozza meg. Eme munkák későbbi publikálása azt is jelzi egyben, hogy a tudományos közösség a műveket megjelentetésre és ezáltal a szakma figyelmére és érdeklődésére érdemesnek tartja. A Doktori Iskolát büszekességgel töltik el a működése során megvédett, PhD-fokozat megszerzését eredményező értekezések, melyek alábbi kétnyelvű (magyar és angol) összefoglalói a főbb tartalmi megállapításokra és a tudományos újdonságokra fókuszálnak. The ideal and wished outcome of the doctoral studies – on the side of the candidate – is the dissertation, which is normally successfully defended. The quality and efficiency of a doctoral school, as well as the studies, is based upon the number and quality of these theses. The later publication of the theses defended can prove that the scientific community holds those theses valuable to be forwarded to the market of professional publications and monographs. The Doctoral School is very proud of these theses, therefrom, the following bilingual (Hungarian and English) résumés emphasize the core content and scientific novelty of these works, whereupon our former candidates were entitled to gain their PhD degree.

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SMUK Péter

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Kukorelli István. A nyilvános védés éve: 2007, eredménye: summa cum laude. A disszertáció megjelent nyomtatásban: Smuk Péter: Ellenzéki jogok a parlamenti jogban. Budapest, Gondolat, 2008.

Ellenzéki jogok a parlamenti jogban

A demokrácia örök dilemmája, hogy a többség számbeli fölényének hol húzódnak a korlátai. A többség által gyakorolt hatáskörök mellett az ellenzék hatalmi pozícióit és jövőbeli kormányra kerülési esélyeit is intézményesítik a modern demokráciák. Ezen hatalmi pozíciók találkozásai azonban sok értelmezési nehézséget és elemzési szempontot kínálnak. Értekezésemet három fő részre tagolom, az ellenzéki jogok értelmezéséhez szükséges megközelítések szerint. Az első részben az ellenzék funkcióit és fogalmát fejtem ki, míg a második rész a politikai rendszerek és szűkebben a parlamentek fő szervezési elvei közül a hatékonyság elvét részletezi. A hatékonyság elvéből a contrario következik az ellenzéki funkciók ellátását támogató parlamenti jogi, házszabályi intézmények taglalása – immár a harmadik részben. A dolgozat összefoglalásában az interdiszciplináris – az alkotmányjog és a politikatudomány határterületén végzett – kutatási eredményeit az ellenzéki magatartásformák szerint egy új keresztmetszetben tekintem át. Az ellenzék funkcióinak és fogalmának tisztázása olyan módszertani eszközt is kínál, amellyel az alkotmányos és házszabályi intézmények, illetve azok változásainak elemzését elvégezhetjük, alapvetően a demokrácia és a jogállamiság alapelveihez kapcsolódóan. Az ellenzék fogalmát a következőképpen írhatjuk le. Ellenzékieknek tekintem azokat a kormányzati felelősségből nem részesülő, így a kormányzati hatalommal szembenálló politikai pártokat, amelyek intézményesített jogaik révén sajátos funkcióik ellátásával vesznek részt a politikai akaratképzésben és a demokratikus kormányzati rendszer legitimációjában. Az ellenzék funkciói a következők: politikai akaratképzési funkció és mobilizálás, kritikai funkció, alternatívák megfogalmazása, kezdeményező és innovációs funkció, ellenőrzési funkció, a hatalom ellensúlyozásának és felváltásának funkciója. Ellenzéki jogoknak tekintem az ellenzéki funkciók betöltéséhez és a politikai pluralizmus fenntartásához szükséges parlamenti jogi intézményeket és intézményi garanciákat, amelyek gyakorlása nem függ a kormánytöbbség akaratától, lévén egyrészt biztosítottak bármely politikai párt és országgyűlési képviselő, illetve a képviselők bizonyos (50%-nál kisebb)

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hányada, a „minősített kisebbség” számára, másrészt kifejezetten nevesítik gyakorlásuk alanyaként az ellenzéket. Disszertációmban az ellenzéki jogok érvényesülése szempontjából végeztem el az akkor hatályos házszabály és más jogszabályok elemzését. Ennek során több kifogást és de lege ferenda javaslatot fogalmaztam meg. Hat év távlatából megállapítható, hogy az ellenzék házszabályban biztosított jogai azóta nem bővültek, ám az ellenzéki funkciók ellátásának hatékonyságát egyéb szociológiai-politikai tényezők is befolyásolták.

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SMUK, Peter

Supervisor: Prof. Kukorelli, István. The open defense took place in 2007, result: summa cum laude. The dissertation has already been published: Smuk, Péter: Ellenzéki jogok a parlamenti jogban [The Rights of Opposition in Parliamentary Law]. Budapest, Gondolat, 2008.

The Rights of Opposition in Parliamentary Law

Democracy is struggling with the problem of the limitations of majority. Along with the competences of the majority, positions of the opposition in the power structure and possibility of becoming the majority shall be also institutionalized in modern democracies. The meeting points of these powers provide many challenges for interpretation and analysis. The dissertation is divided into three main parts, according to the approaches suitable for studying the rights of the opposition. First, functions and the concept of the opposition are introduced by the majority rule, and then effectiveness as a principle of political system and the parliamentary procedures is set forth. From effectiveness a contrario follows the introduction of different institutions of parliamentary law and standing orders in the third part. Summarizing the interdisciplinary – concerning political science and constitutional law, as well – research, the thesis looks over the analyzed results in a new cross-section of the opposition-behaviors. The functions and the concept of the opposition offer a methodology, as well; they are applicable to analyze constitutional and procedural issues of parliaments, expounding the principles of democracy and rule of law. The concept of the opposition can be drawn up as the followings. The dissertation regards those political parties as oppositional that do not take any part in the responsibility of the government, so they oppose the governmental power, and those who using their established rights and fulfilling their special functions in parliaments take part in the political will-building process and also in legitimating of the whole political system. The functions of the opposition are political will-building and mobilization; critical function; offering alternatives, initiative and innovative function; controlling function; counterbalancing and being successor of the governmental power. The rights of opposition are those that are necessary to fulfill the opposition’s special functions; and also those institutional guarantees that exist to maintain political pluralism. Exercising these rights shall not be dependent on the will of the governmental majority, as they are provided for every single political party or member of the parliament, or for a certain part (but

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obviously less than 50%) of the representatives (the so-called ‘qualified minority’), or political opposition is expressly entitled to exercise them. The dissertation deals with the standing orders and other acts from the viewpoint of the opposition. During this research, many critics and several de lege ferenda proposals were being concluded. In sum, we can observe that the rights of opposition – taking into consideration the time that has gone since the defence of the dissertation – were not broadened in the standing orders. However, effectiveness of the functions of opposition was influenced by different sociological or political factors, too.

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LAPSÁNSZKY András

A disszertáció témavezetője: Dr. Révész T. Mihály és Dr. Patyi András. A nyilvános védés időpontja: 2008, eredménye: summa cum laude.

A távközlés nyilvános piaci közszolgáltatási rendszerének fejlődése és szerkezeti reformja (A távközlés fejlődését és liberalizációját meghatározó, „fejlett távközléssel rendelkező” piacgazdaságokban)

A disszertáció elsődlegesen a piaci típusú közszolgáltatások fogalmát, elméleti alapjait, ellátásának megszervezését, reform-lehetőségeit, illetve mindennek közigazgatási vonatkozásait mutatja be a hírközlés, a hírközlési igazgatás mintáján keresztül és alapvetően nemzetközi viszonylatban, valamint a fejlett piacgazdasággal rendelkező országok szempontjából. A kutatás újdonságát jelenti, hogy hazánkban ritka a gazdasági közigazgatás valamely területének nemzetközi alapokra és „ország-minták” összehasonlítására épülő tudományos feldolgozása. A témának különös aktualitást kölcsönöznek napjaink világgazdasági viszonyai, hiszen a közpolitikákban eddig is folyamatosan napirenden lévő kérdés tovább erősödött, miszerint az állam hol húzza meg a közszektor, a közszolgáltató ellátás határait? Az értekezés elemzi a fogyasztók állami ellátásának garanciáit és a piaci verseny működését, struktúráját (a piaci közszolgáltatásokon belül általánosan a villamosenergia-, a gáz-, a vízszolgáltatással, a közúti-, légi, vízi- és vasúti közlekedéssel, a postával, valamint a műsorszolgáltatással, különösen pedig a hírközlési szolgáltatási rendszer közszektor-fejlődésével és reformjával foglalkozik). A kutatás döntően a piaci versenyre, a magántulajdon gazdasági hatékonyságára és a közszolgáltatásokat jellemző alapvető szükségletre, illetve közérdek állami garantálása közötti határokra irányul. Egyfelől ugyanis a globalizálódó gazdasági helyzet egyre inkább indokolja a közszektor, a közkiadások csökkentését, másfelől azonban a közszolgáltatások szerkezeti reformja (különösen liberalizációja és privatizációja) nem minden esetben minősíthető hatékony, a közérdek szempontjából megfelelő megoldásnak. Egy elhibázott közszolgáltatási reform jelentős károkat okozhat a társadalom, az adott közösség számára, amelyhez képest – a piaci verseny kizárásának hátrányaival együtt is – nagyságrendekkel előnyösebb a közszektor, az állami ellátórendszer keretében működő közszolgáltatási struktúra. A piaci közszolgáltatások sajátosságai alapján az értekezésben feldolgozott témakör kivételesen fontos és szinte egyedülállóan érdekes: a hálózatos pia-

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ci közszolgáltatások alapvető sajátossága ugyanis, hogy egyrészről kiterjedt, napjainkra már világméretű hálózatok útján működnek, másrészről mind az átvitel, mind a műszaki, technológiai alapok, mind pedig a gazdasági szempontok mentén, országhatárokat nem ismerve mutatnak egységes, közös jellemzőket. Ebből következően a piaci közszolgáltatások működtetése, igazgatási és piacszerkezeti reformja csak a közszektor-reformban élenjáró országok által igen hosszú időn keresztül „kijárt-kifejlesztett”, illetve részben nemzetközi összefogás mentén kiforrott és napjainkra világviszonylatban egységesedő közigazgatási eszközök, intézmények keretében folytatható sikeresen. Az értekezésben tehát különös hangsúlyt kapnak azok a közigazgatási jogintézmények, amelyek nélkülözhetetlenek a közszolgáltatási rendszer átalakításában, vagyis amelyek nélkül a közszolgáltatás magánszektorba „helyezése” sikeresen nem folytatható. A piaci közszolgáltatások szerkezeti szintű reformjának – liberalizációjának – ugyanis egyetlen („legitimálható”) valódi értelme, funkciója és egyben célja lehet, mégpedig a közérdek hatékonyabb érvényesülése, vagyis a társadalmi jólét, a „közjó” fokozása. A disszertáció mindezt döntően az állami beavatkozás, a közigazgatás szempontjából vonja elemzés, alá és részleteiben ismerteti a gazdasági közszolgáltatások megszervezésének módszereit, valamint a közigazgatás-tudomány szempontjából a témát érintő legfontosabb kérdést, miszerint érdemes-e az adott közszolgáltatást a hierarchikus irányításhoz képest eltérő közhatalmi közjogi rezsim és garanciális korlátok közé szorított jogérvényesítési rend körébe helyezni. Pontosan ez a szempontrendszer, mégpedig egyik oldalról a hierarchikus irányítás keretében az állam gazdasági-, közösségi-, fejlesztési-, stratégiai- és egyéb céljainak, szempontjainak könnyebb érvényesítési lehetősége (gyakran a közszolgáltató állami szervezet gazdaságtalan működése mellett), míg másik oldalról a gazdasági, piaci alapú verseny hatékonysága (de az állami akarat nehezebb és lassabb közhatalmi alapú érvényesítése) képezi az egyik legfontosabb határvonalat a piaci közszolgáltatások megszervezésének módszereiben. A kutatás keretében kiemelt figyelmet érdemel, hogy a hírközlési szolgáltatási rendszer milyen eszközökkel, módszerekkel „helyezhető át” az állami tulajdon és az állami szolgáltatási monopólium struktúrájából a gazdasági verseny és a magántulajdon keretébe. Az értekezés monografikusan, elméleti jelleggel dolgozza fel egyrészt a hírközlés közszolgáltatás-időszakát és fejlődését, mégpedig általánosítva, illetve nemzetközi alapokon, nemzetközi összehasonlításban, sőt országmodelleken keresztül is (pl.: Amerikai Egyesült Államok, Egyesült Királyság, dél-európai-, skandináv-, német-osztrák-francia modell). Ezt követően ismerteti a liberalizációt, privatizációt kiváltó távközlési („belső”) és világgazdasági, nemzetközi kereskedelmi („külső”) okokat. A disszertáció legfontosabb része azonban mégis a hírközlési közszolgáltatás-reform világviszonylatban általánosítható alapjának, tartalmának és közigazgatási eszközeinek elemzése. Ezen belül az értekezés feltárja azokat a közigazgatási

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jogintézményeket, amelyek nemzetközi értelemben egységesen nélkülözhetetlenek, illetve elengedhetetlenül szükségesek a hírközlési liberalizáció és privatizáció sikeres megvalósításához, valamint a hírközlési piaci verseny közérdek szempontjából előnyös fenntartásához, fejlődéséhez.

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jubileumi kötet

LAPSÁNSZKY, András

Supervisor: Dr. Révész, T. Mihály and Dr. Patyi, András. The open defense took place in 2008, result: summa cum laude.

Development and Structural Reform of the System of Public Services on the Open Telecommunications Market (in Market Economies “with Developed Telecommunications” Determining the Development and Liberalisation of Telecommunications)

The thesis primarily examines the concept of market-type public services, their theoretical basis, organisation, possibilities of their reform and public administrative aspects through the example of communications and communications governance, primarily on an international scale and from the perspective of countries with developed market economies. The novelty of the research lies in the followings: scientific investigation of the economic public administration’s certain areas based on the comparison of international base and “country models” is very rare in Hungary. The topic is much more relevant in light of the current trends in global economy: the matter has continuously been on the agenda for quite a while — namely, the issue of where should the state draw the boundary of the public sector and public services — has become even more pressing. The thesis primarily examines both the boundaries between economic effectiveness of market-based competition and private property and state guarantees for the fundamental need characterising public services and public interest. On the one hand, the increasingly globalised economy warrants the curbing of the public sector and public spending, while, on the other hand, the structural reform of public services (in particular their liberalisation and privatisation) is not always the most effective solution serving public interest the best. One thing is certain: botched public service reform can cause great harm to society and the affected community; in comparison, a public service structure operating within the framework of the public sector and the state provision system is far more beneficial, even if it does have disadvantages proffered by market-based mechanisms. The question cannot be settled simply by stating that public sector reform is unnecessary or can be delayed due to its inherent risks, as successful liberalisation and privatisation will yield unparalleled development, imA bű nözés tá rgy i olda lá nak főbb...

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kecskés gábor

provements in quality, increases in consumption and economic effectiveness within the specific public service segment. The thesis, therefore, attempts to compare the guarantee of supply to consumers provided by the state and the operation and structure of marketbased competition. (The monograph examines market-based public services within electricity, natural gas and water supply, public road, air, water and railroad transportation, postal services and broadcasting, in particular public sector development and reform within the system of communications service provision.) Based on the characteristics of market-based public services, the topic examined in the thesis bears great importance and is uniquely interesting: the fundamental idiosyncrasy of network market public services is that they operate via large global networks on the one hand, while presenting unified, common traits based on transmission, technical, technological and economic aspects, independent of national borders, on the other hand. Accordingly, the operation, and the governance and market structure reform of market-based public services can only be carried out successfully in the context of increasingly unified public administrative instruments and institutions, devised and tested over protracted periods in countries in the vanguard of public sector reform, and partially as a result of international cooperation. The thesis, therefore, examines in depth the public administrative legal institutions that are not only globally but also generally — from a theoretical perspective — indispensable in reforming the public service system, in other words, without these public services cannot be “placed” within the private sector. The sole (“legitimate”) point, function and objective of the structural reform — liberalisation — of marketbased public services can be none other than the more effective prevalence of public interest, i.e. the improvement of social welfare. The thesis examines these topics from the perspective of state intervention and public administration, and presents the organisational methods of economic public services, as well as the key question from the perspective of the study of public administration: should public services be placed within a public authority and law regime diverging from hierarchical governance and a framework of legal enforcement constricted by safeguards? Precisely, this set of criteria, that is the easier achievement of the state’s economic, community, development, strategy and other objectives within the context of hierarchical governance (often alongside such an operation of the public service organisation that lacks cost-effectiveness), on the one hand, and the effectiveness of economic, market-based competition, on the other hand (but alongside slower and more difficult enforcement of state objectives), is what forms the most important boundary within the methods of organising market-based public services. The instruments and methods for “relocating” both the system of communications service provision from state hands and

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V A V R Ó , I s t v á n DS c .

jubileumi kötet

a state-owned monopoly structure to the realm of economic competition and private ownership present themselves as a unique and pivotal point in the research. The communications network and service provision system is a perfect example from the perspective of the above-mentioned aspects because it is the only sector in which, similarly to the other public service sectors, a state monopoly operated for nearly a century, but which sector has so far been opened successfully to market competition and private ownership for numerous reasons — as discussed in detail in the thesis — nearly entirely and for public benefit. Thus, telecommunications followed a quasi one-of-a-kind independent trajectory among the global processes of public sector reform (primarily liberalisation and privatisation), and exerted influence on other sectors as well. On the other hand, this development also represents the most effective liberalisation process unfolding among market-based public services up to the present. Thus, the rules of communications governance generally reflect all the elements and model-like criteria of the relationship between the state and the economy, the organisation of public services, their structural reform, and the public administration methods and forms of intervention in economic processes linked to public services. The provision of communications services, situated on the boundary between the private and the public sectors, and between market-based competition and state monopoly, is characterised by such unique attributes and regulatory content that reflect fully individual criteria and generally applicable principles for the analyses of the topic. Based on this and in this context, the thesis delves into the period and development of public communications services on a theoretical basis in the form of a monograph presenting a general overview, as well as an international picture, an international comparison and country models (e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom, the Southern European, the Scandinavian, and the German-Austrian-French model). The thesis then presents the drivers of liberalisation and privatisation: drivers that are linked to telecommunications (“internal”), on the one hand, and to the global economy and international trade (“external”), on the other hand. Nevertheless, the most important part of the thesis is the analysis of the foundations, contents and public administrative instruments of the public service reform in communications, which can be generalised on a global scale. In this context, the thesis examines the public administrative legal institutions that are indispensable on an international scale and are vital for the successful liberalisation and privatisation of communications, and for the maintenance and development of competition on the communications market, yielding public benefits.

A bű nözés tá rgy i olda lá nak főbb...

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FRIEDERY Réka

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Lamm Vanda. A nyilvános védés időpontja: 2010, eredménye: summa cum laude.

Az európai ombudsman az Európai Unió intézményi világában

A kutatás témájának kiválasztása, a kutatatás lefolytatása és a disszertáció elkészítése azt a célt szolgálta, hogy bemutatásra kerüljön egy viszonylag újnak nevezhető, közel másfél évtizede felállított uniós szerv, az Európai Ombudsman Hivatala. A téma kiválasztásánál hangsúlyos volt, hogy ez idáig Magyarországon még nem született átfogó, az ombudsman szupranacionális szinten felállított hivatalát vizsgáló monográfia, amely bemutatta volna e hivatal sokrétű és sokoldalú tevékenységét. A változások közepette a jelenlegi formájában működő Unióval szemben megfogalmazódó igény, hogy polgárai számára elősegítse érdekvédelmük mind szélesebb körű megvalósulását. Az első nagy szerkezeti egység, az elméleti rész tematikus felosztása két alapvető fontosságú fogalom, az ombudsman és a rule of law definiálásával kezdődik. Ezt követően az ombudsmani intézmény történetének bemutatására kerül sor. A történelmi kitérő szükséges, mivel az antik világtól kezdve számos példát látunk olyan hivatalok létesítéséről, melyek feladata a hivatalnokok tevékenységének felügyelete volt. A hivatalok és ezzel összefüggésben a tisztviselők tevékenységénél szükségesnek tartották azok kontrollját, nemcsak az egyszerű polgárok, hanem az uralkodók jól felfogott érdekei miatt. A különböző államok eltérő időpontokban felállított testületeinek sorsa a történelem folyamán különbözőképpen alakult: vagy az ismeretlenség homályába vesztek, vagy eredeti funkciójukat elvesztve, esetleg azokat kibővítve fennmaradtak, példaképül szolgálva később felállított intézményeknek, így a kutatás tárgyát képező hivatalnak is. Az intézmény elterjedésének bemutatása a két alapmodell, a svéd, illetve a dán felvázolásával történik, egyfajta komparatív módszertan segítségével. Meghatározó ugyanis, hogy egy állam a svéd vagy a dán modellt követi, mivel a modell-választás hatással van az ombudsman és a jogállam egyéb intézményei közötti kapcsolatra, a köztük lévő viszony minőségére, mint ahogy azon szervek tevékenységére is, amelyek az ombudsman vizsgálati hatásköre alá tartoznak. A disszertáció elvégzi az Európai Unió politikai háttéreseményeinek bemutatását, amely a hivatal felállítását megelőző közvetlen történések, az okozati összefüggések megértéséhez elengedhetetlen. Fontos ugyanis azt áttekinteni, hogy a felállítás ötlete milyen környezetben, milyen reakciókat

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váltott ki a többi meghatározó intézményi szereplőnél. A tisztább és áttekinthetőbb kép kialakítása miatt volt szükséges felosztani időben két szakaszra: egyrészt az 1970-es évektől a Maastrichti Szerződésig tartó, másrészt a Szerződést, illetve általa a hivatal létrehozatalát közvetlenül eredményező periódusra, valamint aktuális változásokra. Ezt követően az európai ombudsman jogi alapjai kerülnek bemutatásra, hiszen ezek felvázolása egy olyan komplex keretet ad, amely lehetővé teszi a továbblépést a jogállás (hangsúlyosan a Hivatal és Parlament viszonyát tekintve), illetve a hatáskör két különálló témakörére. Utóbbihoz szervesen kapcsolódik az ombudsman tevékenysége eredményességét megtestesítő helyes hivatali magatartás európai kódexének bemutatása. Kiemelkedő fontossága okán egy, a Hivatal életében fordulópontot hozó eset elemzésével zárul a dolgozat első szerkezeti egysége, mivel az ügy a hivatal tevékenységét, pozícióját is minősítő elemeket tartalmaz. A második nagy szerkezeti egység, az eljárási rész az európai ombudsman által lefolytatott eljárás menetét tárgyalja: a panasz átvételét kiindulópontnak tekintve, a vizsgálat és a döntéshozatal specifikumai kerülnek ismertetésre. Ebben a részben már a különböző ügyek bemutatására is sor kerül, amely az utolsó fejezet, vagyis a panaszok típusainak szemléltetésénél is folytatódik. Az esettanulmány kimondott célja, hogy általa az európai ombudsman tevékenységének sajátosságai, pozíciójának jellegzetességei az elméleti bemutatást követően gyakorlati oldalról is alátámasztást nyerjenek. Az érintett intézmények és a jellemző típusok kombinációja egy sajátos csoportosításban látható, így áttekinthetőbbé válnak az ombudsman és más intézmények, szervek kapcsolódási pontjai is. Itt egy külön pontban kerülnek ismertetésre a magyar vonatkozású panaszok. A dolgozat összegzése előtt az utolsó fejezet az ombudsmani nem peres eljárás alternatív jellegével foglalkozik. A dolgozat lezárásaként a kutatás menetének összefoglalója és a konklúzió levonása lehetővé teszi az Európai Ombudsman Hivatalának elhelyezését, szerepének megértését az uniós intézményrendszerben.

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FRIEDERY, Réka

Supervisor: Prof. Lamm, Vanda. The open defense took place in 2010, result: summa cum laude.

The European Ombudsman in the Institutional Life of the EU

The selection of the research topic, the actual research and the preparation of the dissertation had the objective to introduce a relatively novel European body, set up nearly fifteen years ago, namely, the Office of the European Ombudsman. When choosing the topic emphasis was given to the fact that so far this supranational office has not yet been examined in a comprehensive monograph in Hungary, which would have presented the complex and versatile activities of this body. The novum nature is complemented with actuality; in the midst of changes there is a growing need in the Union to promote a wider protection of its citizens’ interests. The thematic division of the theoretical part starts with the definition of two fundamental concepts, the ombudsman and the rule of law. It is followed by an attempt to present the extensive story of the ombudsman institution: it is necessary to point out that many examples of bodies and offices with responsibilities for supervising the activities of officials can be seen from ancient times. This control over the administrative bodies, offices and their officials was considered to be essential in the interest of ordinary citizens and also of the rulers. The fate of these bodies and offices established in different states at different times during the course of history developed in different ways: they disappeared, lost their original functions or – although, with extended functions – they remained serving as a model for subsequently established institutions – as for the research subject. The spread of the ombudsman institution is outlined with the comparative analysis of two basic models: the Swedish and the Danish, because with the comparative approach the features of the European office have become clearer. With the help of the political science another chapter is being extracted: the display of the Union’s political background gives important facts to understand the events which directly preceded the establishment of this body and to understand the reason for this. Indeed, it is important to review what reactions and what context had the other institutional actors. For a univocal view this chapter was split into two sections: the first was the period from the 1970’s to the Maastricht Treaty, the second period involves events directly influencing the office’s establishment and the current changes. This is followed by the discussion of the legal grounds, as they outline the complex framework of

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two separate topics: status (underlining the relationship between the office and the Parliament) and powers. A separate chapter deals with the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour which can be seen as the embodiment of the effectiveness of the European Ombudsman’s work. Because of its utmost importance, a case study closes the first part of the dissertation: a significant turning point in the life of the office, as it contains qualifying elements to the office’s activities and position. The second, procedural part deals with the proceedings conducted by the European Ombudsman; receipt of a complaint, specific requirements of the investigation and decision making procedure are detailed. In this chapter various cases are presented which continues in the last chapter with the different types of complaints. After the theoretical introduction of the specific characteristics of the European Ombudsman’s procedure and the features of the position, the explicit goal of the case analysis is to get support from the practical side, too. The combination of institutions involved and the representative types of complaints can be seen in specific grouping, through which the interfaces among the European office and other institutions and bodies can be more understandable. Here, in a separate section, Hungarian related complaints are detailed, as well. Before the summary of the dissertation, the final chapter investigates the alternative dispute features of the European office. The closing chapter summarises the research, which allows conclusions to be drown from the position and role of this office in the EU’s institutional system.

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GÁRDOS-OROSZ Fruzsina

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Kukorelli István. A nyilvános védés időpontja: 2011, eredménye: summa cum laude.

Az alapvető jogok alkalmazása a magánjogi jogviták során

A horizontális hatály, az alapvető jogok magánjogi alkalmazásának problémaköre a legtöbb modern demokráciában felmerül ma már. Hogyanmiként köteleznek az alapvető jogok, ha köteleznek egyáltalán egyes magánjogi jogviszonyok során? A horizontális hatály tétele elsősorban azon a felismerésen nyugszik, hogy az alapvető jogokat a magánjogi jogalanyok, a magánszemélyek és a szervezetek legalább olyan mértékben veszélyeztetik, mint az állami szereplők. Az alapvető jogok horizontális hatálya egy olyan kategória, olyan alkotmányjogi probléma, amely csak akkor kerül elő, ha az állam más, jogalkotási eszközeivel nem tudja elérni a magánjogi jogviszonyokban az alapvető jogok megfelelő védelmét. A tézis alapvetően leíró és analitikus szemléletben született, célja annak megállapítása, hogyan értelmezhető Magyarországon az alapvető jogok magánjogi alkalmazhatóságának helyzete. A magyar gyakorlat jó példa arra, hogy egy fiatal, átmeneti demokráciában hogyan vetődik fel a kérdés. Legelőször a német gyakorlat megismeréséhez fordult a szerző, mivel a magyar Alkotmánybíróság köztudottan és vállaltan kívánt igazodni a német felfogáshoz joggyakorlatának kialakítása során. Annak ellenére, hogy megfigyelhetőek különbségek, mindkét állam – Magyarország és Németország is – tagja az Európai Uniónak, és így a dolgozat a következő lépcsőben azt vizsgálta meg, hogy az Európai Unió milyen iránymutatással szolgál az alapvető jogok magánjogi alkalmazhatóságát illetően. A probléma eredetének feltárása érdekében a disszertáció foglalkozik még röviden az amerikai gyakorlattal, amely azt a szélsőséget jeleníti meg, amely szerint – eredetileg – az Alkotmány az állam és az egyének viszonyának szabályozására szorítkozik. Írország és Lengyelország példájának áttekintését pedig azért vállalja fel a szerző, mert ezekben az államokban a másik véglet jelenik meg, azaz az alkotmányban foglalt alapvető jogokra a bíróságok előtt közvetlenül lehet hivatkozni a magánjogi jogviták során is. Magyarországon a disszertáció születésekor igen nagy vita volt a jogirodalomban a témáról, tekintettel az új Polgári törvénykönyvvel és az új alkotmánnyal-alaptörvénnyel kapcsolatos kodifikációs folyamatokra.

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A disszertáció konklúziója szerint az alapvető jogok indirekt horizontális alkalmazása, azaz, hogy azokat a jogszabályok értelmezése során kell figyelembe venni, de közvetlenül nem lehet rájuk hivatkozni, alapvető jellemvonása a magyar jognak, akkor is, ha ez nem került kodifikálásra. Ahhoz, hogy a bíróságok ilyen indirekt módon, az értelmezés során alkalmazni tudják az alkotmányos rendelkezéseket, tisztában kell lenniük azok tartalmával, és azok speciális értelmezési kereteivel. Mindezek miatt a disszertáció nem utolsósorban azt ismerteti, hogy hogyan lehet értelmezni ezeket az alkotmányos rendelkezéseket az alkotmányjogban kifejlesztett dogmatika jelen állása szerint, az általános szükségességi és arányossági teszt segítségével.

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GÁRDOS-OROSZ, Fruzsina

Supervisor: Prof. Kukorelli, István. The open defense took place in 2011, result: summa cum laude.

Application of Basic Rights in Private Relations

The problem of horizontal effect of constitutional norms arises in many modern democracies. How are constitutional rules binding if they are binding at all in certain private relations? The doctrine of horizontal effect is primarily based on the recognition of the dangers posed to human rights by private entities. In our contemporary world individuals and private entities can violate human rights as extensively and, sometimes more frequently than the state can. Horizontal effect of constitutional rights is a “residual category”, which means that the horizontal application of constitutional rights occurs only if ordinary legislation fails to protect fundamental rights. This primarily descriptive and analytical thesis chose to exhibit six jurisdictions with different emphasis: My starting point was to examine the Hungarian controversy as an example for what young democracies have to face. In studying the Hungarian situation, I found that the broader description of the German example could help to understand the evolution of the extension of certain fundamental rights in horizontal relations, since the Hungarian constitutional system as interpreted by the constitutional court has become very close in nature to the German one. Apart from their internal similarities, these countries are both member states to the European Union (EU). Analyzing the tendencies in the EU concerning the protection of fundamental rights and in private relations is essential to understand what kind of pressure the Hungarian law and legal thinking must face. Thus, I have chosen to examine primarily the Hungarian, the German, and the EC/EU jurisdictions from the perspective of third party effect. As to the origins of the problem, however, one has to mention the first written constitution in the United States which was undoubtedly drafted with the aim of governing the relationship of the state and its citizens. Similarly, as a further example for the contradictory assessment of the role of constitutional norms in private relations we must mention Ireland and Poland, where constitutional norms have direct horizontal effect. In Hungary, the doctrinal debate on the issue of horizontal applicability of the constitution is fairly heated, especially a propos the present codification process of the new Civil Code, but also with regard to the drafting process of the new Constitution. I demonstrate that the indirect horizontal effect

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operates as an inherent feature of the Hungarian constitutional system. No matter of review guarantees or explicit declarations: judges have to interpret legal provisions in the light of the constitutional regulations and thus, understand law together with its constitutional constraints. Last but not least, the thesis suggests that in order to implement either the indirect or the direct form of horizontal effect, judges must interpret constitutional provisions. This requires certain interpretative skills that could be achieved with the knowledge of dogmatic concepts of interpretation of the Constitution and fundamental rights developed by the Constitutional Court. This is the so called necessity-proportionality test used for assessing constitutional rights.

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CZIGLER Dezső Tamás

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Vörös Imre. A nyilvános védés éve: 2011, eredménye: summa cum laude.

Az Európai Unió nemzetközi (kollíziós) magánjogának és családi jogának főbb kérdései

A disszertáció egy dinamikusan fejlődő és aktuális területtel, az Európai Unió nemzetközi (kollíziós) magánjogával és családi jogával, annak hátterével és fontosabb jogforrásaival foglalkozik. Az e területen hozott, töredezett tárgyi hatályú szabályok azt határozzák meg, hogy bizonyos – alapvetően nemzetközi elemmel rendelkező – jogviszonyokra mely állam jogát kell alkalmaznunk. A szabályok legtöbbje közvetlen hatállyal bír és közvetlenül alkalmazandó hazánkban is. A munka kimondottan a magánjogi (polgári jogi), illetve családi jogi területekre koncentrál, egyéb normakollízióval – például a közjogi-közigazgatási szabályok kollíziójával – nem foglalkozik. Miután a téma erős európai jogi beágyazottsággal rendelkezik, a disszertáció kitér az európai közjogi gyökerek áttekintésére, a normák megalkotásának mikéntjére, a Lisszaboni Szerződés jelentősebb, e területet érintő újdonságaira is. Emellett természetesen a munka fő része az uniós kollíziós joggal, annak felépítésével és egyes rendelkezéseivel foglalkozik. Itt egyrészt a kodifikált jogot tekinti át, másrészt – ahol szükséges – kitér az Európai Bíróság joggyakorlatára is. E joggyakorlat bizonyos területeken kiemelkedő szereppel bír. A munka a fentiek mellett szűk körben foglalkozik a kapcsolódó tagállami nemzetközi magánjogi szabályokkal is. Utóbbi szabályokból levonhatunk következtetéseket az uniós jogi rezsimre nézve is. Érdekes kérdés ugyanis, hogy az uniós jogalkotó mennyiben támaszkodik a nemzeti jogalkotásra, illetve mennyiben teremt új, a tagállami normáktól eltérő jogot. Végül, de nem utolsósorban a disszertáció tárgyalja a kapcsolódó hazai szabályokat is. E normák bizonyos esetekben jelentős szereppel bírhatnak. Bizonyos uniós instrumentumok ugyanis a tárgyi hatályukat szűkítő rendelkezéseket tartalmaznak. Ebből eredően a fennmaradó – kevésbé jelentős – területeken a magyar bíróságoknak továbbra is alkalmazni kell a magyar kollíziós jogot is. E téma választására több körülmény sarkallta a szerzőt. Amikor a polgári jogi együttműködés területével elkezdett ismerkedni, egy nemzetközi magánjogi „robbanás” előtt álltunk. Elégtelenek voltak az uniós instrumentumok, viszont megindult egy kiterjedt kodifikáció, mely a kollíziós kötelmi jog, azaz a szerződési jog és a kárkötelmek jogának reformját vetítette előre.

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Azt követően, hogy e reformot végrehajtották, illetve az elfogadott szabályok hatályba léptek, egyre nehezebben lehet eligazodni az újabb és újabb uniós kollíziós rendelkezések között, annak ellenére, hogy e normák jelentősége igen nagy. Az uniós kollíziós jog ráadásul számos kérdést vet fel: milyen irányba fejlődjön a joganyag és hol találhatóak a határai? Mik azok a területek, amiket be lehetne és be kellene vonni a szabályozásba? Mely területek szabályozása a legproblematikusabb? E kérdésekre a választ legfőképp egy átfogó, kimondottan európai joggal, európai nemzetközi magánjoggal foglalkozó mű adhatta meg számunkra.

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CZIGLER, Tamás Dezső Czigler

Supervisor: Prof. Vörös, Imre. The open defense took place in 2011, result: summa cum laude.

Cornerstones of European Private International Law and International Family Law

The dissertation deals with an actual and continuously developing area, namely with the private international law (further on: „PIL”) and conflict of laws rules on family law issues of the European Union (further on: „EU”). Regulations adopted on these fields determine which law to apply in legal relationships containing relevant international element(s). Since most of the provisions have direct effect, they are binding in Hungary, i.e. before the Hungarian courts as well. The work concentrates on the rules on private law and family law. Consequently, it does not pay attention to the collision of other rules like public law or administrative law. Since the European background of the topic may also be of importance, as an introduction, the work analyzes the European institutional rules, the legislative procedures and the related provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Secondly, the main part of the dissertation overviews the legislation of the EU on PIL. Beside the adopted laws, the work also analyses the most important judgements of the European Court of Justice (further on: „ECJ”). Thirdly, it tries to give an outline about the overruled laws of the member states related to EU PIL. Since the European legislation is mainly based on the „common core” or „better law” approaches, it is an interesting question whether the EU provisions adopted conform to the former national rules, or the European legislator creates new and independent, earlier unknown legal rules. Last but not least, the dissertation discusses those national rules which will stay in effect in the future too and have relevance concerning the decision of cases. There were several conditions that led the author to choose a broad research topic like the private international law of the EU. When he started to deal with private international law, we were before a boom of conflict of laws: the provisions brought by the EU were fragmented and not satisfactory. There was an ongoing reform that was supposed to create conflict of laws rules on obligations (i.e. on the law applicable to torts, on the law applicable to contracts). After the regulations were adopted and the reform was realised, selection of applicable sources became extremely difficult.

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Secondly, there was an essential need to have a book that discusses EU PIL as part of European Law. The benefits of this approach are easy to be seen: this way, the relationship of different European rules and their effect to international and domestic provisions could be discussed more accurately.

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VÁCZI Péter

A disszertáció témavezetője: Dr. Patyi András. A nyilvános védés időpontja: 2011, eredménye: summa cum laude.

A jó közigazgatási eljáráshoz való alapjog és annak összetevői

„Az Európa Tanács célja a tagjai közötti nagyobb egység megteremtése a közös örökségüket képező elvek védelme és megvalósítása, továbbá a gazdasági és társadalmi haladás elősegítése érdekében.” „Tagjai közötti nagyobb egység” – az Európa Tanács célja számos úton elérhető. A nemzetközi szervezet statútumának 1. cikke külön utal az Európa Tanács azon feladatára, hogy fenntartja és előmozdítja az emberi jogokat és alapvető szabadságokat ezen „nagyobb egység” elérése érdekében. A közigazgatási eljárás mindenképpen közös európai szabályozást igényel, lévén, hogy ez egy olyan speciális jogterület, ahol a közigazgatási szerv közvetlenül találkozik az állampolgárokkal. Ebből következően ezen esetek magukban hordozzák annak a veszélyét, hogy sérülnek az állampolgárok alapvető jog, miközben napjaink nemzeti közigazgatási rendszereit nézve a közigazgatási hatósági eljárásjog egyre nagyobb hangsúlyt kap. A gyakorlatban a főbb tendenciák az állami végrehajtó hatalom alkotmányos korlátok közé szorítása, az állampolgárok alapvető jogainak biztosítása, a „jó közigazgatás” megteremtése. Az európai közigazgatási jogok elnézve, vajon létezik egyáltalán európai közigazgatási eljárásjog? Milyen formájú és szintű egységesítés várható el? A válasz az Európa Tanács ezen jogterületen megalkotott dokumentumai alapján ragadható meg. Az Emberi Jogok Európai Egyezményének aláírásával az Európa Tanács tagállamai kifejezték azon eltökéltségüket, hogy tiszteletben tartanak bizonyos jogelveket, amelyek a hatóságoknak a magánszemélyekkel való viszonyát szabályozzák, ideértve a közigazgatási jogot is. Ezen elvek azután számos, a Miniszteri Bizottság által elfogadott döntés és ajánlás révén tovább lettek csiszolva, amely jogforrások így a részes államok által alkalmazandó azon alapvető elveket tartalmazzák, amelyeket az adott kormányzatnak követnie kell ahhoz, hogy eleget tegyen a jogállamiság kívánalmának. Az Európa Tanács ajánlásai és döntései kétségkívül nagy hatással bírnak, érdemes azonban ezzel kapcsolatosan megjegyezni azt, hogy az egyes államok által megkötött egyezményekkel ellentétben az ajánlások és határozatok nem bírnak jogi kötőerővel a tagállamok számára. Mindazonáltal nem elhanyagolható erkölcsi és politikai hatásuk van, amely két dologból ered: mindenekelőtt, meglehetősen nehéz, habár nem lehetetlen egy kormányzat

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számára hosszú időn keresztül olyan jogelveknek a figyelmen kívül hagyása, amelyek tiszteletben tartására a térség összes többi állama vagy legalábbis az országok többsége ígéretet tett. Ezen túlmenően, nyilvánvalóan kétséges lenne egy olyan állam jóhiszeműsége, amely nem csupán részt vett a javaslat kidolgozásában, de szavazatával hozzájárult ahhoz, hogy az egy határozat vagy ajánlás formáját öltse, majd később megtagadja annak követését. A disszertáció megállapításai szerint az európai jogalkotó „nem csupán az egyedi közigazgatási aktusokra, hanem magára a közigazgatási eljárásra” fókuszál. Más szavakkal, szemléletváltás történt, melyben a hangsúly a közigazgatási működés végeredményéről (eredmény) a közigazgatási magatartásra (funkció) tevődött át. A folyamat végére így a jó közigazgatási eljáráshoz való jog elve olyan lehet a közigazgatási jog számára, mint a „jó kormányzás” vagy a „jó törvényhozás” a nemzetközi jog számára. Magyarország Alaptörvénye és a közigazgatási hatósági eljárás és szolgáltatás általános szabályairól szóló törvény sikeresen átvették a főbb nemzetközi szabályokat és garanciákat a jó közigazgatási eljárásjog vonatkozásában. Melyek a legfontosabb garanciák ezen a jogterületen? Miként tesz eleget a magyar rendszer a nemzetközi követelményeknek? A disszertáció ezekre a kérdésekre keresi a választ, egységes szerkezetben elemezve mind az Európai Unió és Európa Tanács jogában megtalálható nemzetközi szabályokat, mind pedig a magyar jogi előírásokat.

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VÁCZI, Péter

Supervisor: Dr. Patyi, András. The open defense took place in 2011, result: summa cum laude.

The Right to Good Administrative Procedure and its Elements

“The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.” “Greater unity between its members” – the aim of the Council of Europe may be furthered in a range of different ways. Article 1 of the Statute of the Organization makes specific reference to the Council of Europe’s mission in maintaining and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms as a way of achieving this “greater unity”. Administrative procedure requires common European regulation by all means, as this is that special field of law by which the administrative body directly meets citizens. Consequently, these cases carry the danger that fundamental rights of citizens may be impaired – its occurrence in a constitutional state is undeniably not desirable by any means. Considering the current national administrative systems, the administrative official procedural law is being emphasized. Main tendencies in practice are to constrain the executive power of the state within constitutional frame of law and to guarantee and gradually expand the fundamental rights of citizens, establish “good administration”. Regarding the European administrative law, does European administrative procedural law exist at all? What forms and levels of standardization can be expected? The answer can be given through the documents of the Council of Europe achieved in this field of law. Having subscribed to the European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe member states have agreed to respect certain principles which, therefore, govern the relationship of their authorities with private persons, including in the branch of administrative law. Those principles have been further refined in several conventions and various recommendations and resolutions which were adopted unanimously by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers and which, thus, reflect the standards applicable in member states in pursuance of their devotion to the Rule of Law. As regards the significance and practical impact of Council of Europe Recommendations and Resolutions, it is important to observe the following: contrary to conventions which states may have ratified, recommendations and resolutions have no legally binding effect on the states and governments. They do

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have, however, a moral and political effect on them. This effect stems from two facts: first of all, it is difficult, albeit possible, for a government to totally ignore certain standards for a long period of time to which all or most of the other democratic states of the region pledge commitment; moreover, there can be an obvious problem with a government’s good faith in case a government itself is among those who have not only participated in the negotiations of a text, but also voted for its adaptation in the form of a recommendation, if such government later on refuses to conform to its own appeal. Fortunately, it seems so that the European legislator now focuses “not just on specific administrative acts, but also on the administrative procedures themselves. In other words, there has been a shift in emphasis from the outcome of administrative action (result) to the administrative behavior (functioning).” And at the end of this process, “the principle of good administration could be to administrative law what ‘good governance’ and ‘good legislation’ are to international law.” It does not work otherwise in Hungary, either; the Basic Law of Hungary and the Hungarian Act on the General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and Services has successfully implied the main international rules and guarantees regarding good procedural administrative law. Which are the main guarantees in this field of law? How does the Hungarian system fulfill the international requirements? The dissertation chases the answer for this question analyzing both the international safeguards existing in the EU-law and the law of the European Commission and the national legal prescriptions as well in a unitary frame.

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BARTKÓ Róbert

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Lévay Miklós és Dr. Kovács Gábor. A nyilvános védés időpontja: 2011, eredménye: summa cum laude.

A terrorizmus elleni küzdelem kriminálpolitikai kérdései

A terrorizmus elleni küzdelem szempontjából mind nemzetközi, mind pedig hazai szinten a 2001. szeptember 11-i események éles cezúraként értékelhetők. Az ezt megelőző időszakban ugyanis a nemzetközi közösség inkább a terrorizmus keretei között megvalósuló sui generis kriminalitásokra és a velük szembeni fellépés hatékonyságára koncentrált, míg a magyar büntető törvény – figyelemmel a Btk. korábbi 261.§-ára – tulajdonképpen nem is a klasszikus értelemben vett terrorcselekmény tényállási elemeit szabályozta. Ezért az értekezés legfőbb célja egy olyan átfogó munka megalkotása volt, melyben a terrorizmus elleni küzdelem büntetőjogi frontja szempontjából lényeges paraméterek bemutatásra, és értékelésre kerülnek. A disszertáció elkészítése során törekedtünk a büntető anyagi jog terrénumán belül a lehető legkomplexebb megközelítés alkalmazására, kiindulva a fogalmi alapok lefektetéséből egészen a hatályos szabályozás kritikáján keresztül a de lege ferenda javaslat megalkotásáig. Az értekezés – különös tekintettel annak céljára, valamint az alkalmazott módszertanára – három nagy egységre, „részre” tagolódik, mely alapvetően a kutatás iránya szerint differenciál, és fogja össze a kérdéskört érintő fejezeteket. Az első rész a terrorizmussal kapcsolatos fogalmi alapvetéssel foglalkozik, melyben kutatási célként szerepelt azon keretek megadása, melyek között a későbbi, tulajdonképpeni büntetőjogi elemzések helyet kaphatnak. Az értekezés első nagy szerkezeti egysége tehát bevezetés is egyben, melyben a terrorizmus, és a terrorcselekmény fogalmi összetevői, valamint a terrorizmus, mint kriminalitás kriminológiai jellegzetességei kerülnek vizsgálat alá. Újító szándékkal kísérli meg a disszertáció ezt követően egy lehetséges büntetőpolitikai stratégiát felvázolni, melynek egyes szintjeivel külön, részletesebben is foglalkozik a munka. A második rész – a fentieket követően – a terrorizmus elleni büntetőjogi fellépés nemzetközi vonatkozásaival foglalkozik, ezzel nyitva a dogmatikai elemzés számára teret az értekezés keretei között. A nemzetközi értelmezési szint a disszertációban tulajdonképpen három kisebb részegységben kerül kibontásra. Vizsgálat tárgyát képezi a nemzetközi terrorizmus elleni küzdelemben kirajzolódni látszó büntetőpolitika, valamint annak főbb pillérei,

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illetve ehhez kapcsolódóan a nemzetközi bűnözéssel szembeni büntetőhatalom internacionális szintre történő emelésének lehetőségei, gyakorlati modelljei. A disszertáció harmadik része már a hazai szabályozással foglalkozik, ezzel leszűkítve a vizsgálat terjedelmét a magyarországi keretek közé. Ebben a szerkezeti egységben már kifejezetten a terrorcselekmény tényállása kerül górcső alá, megvizsgálva azt a dogmatikai elemzés szempontjából releváns látószögből. Ez a rész mindösszesen két fejezetre tagolódik, melyekben részben a terrorcselekmény tényállás-történetére, részben pedig a hatályos szabályok kritikájára, egyben de lege ferenda törvényjavaslat megalkotására fókuszál a disszertáció. Közép és hosszú távon ugyanis csak akkor lehet hatékonyan felvenni a küzdelmet a terrorizmus ellen, ha az egyes érintett tudományterületek művelőinek eredményeit összehangoltan sikerül alkalmazni a gyakorlatban. Erre mind a nemzetközi, mind pedig a hazai szakirodalomban, valamint az egyes jogi manifesztumokban jelentős előrelépések mutathatóak ki, melyek további és folyamatos fejlesztése elengedhetetlen a jövő, demokratikus nemzetei számára. Az értekezés szerzője bízik abban, hogy a büntető-jogtudomány oldaláról tekintve sikerült összefoglalnia a téma szempontjából releváns tényezőket, és kidolgozott tételeivel hozzájárulnia a terrorizmus elleni küzdelemben egy hatékony, és hosszú távon is viszonyítási pontként szolgáló büntetőjogi front kidolgozásához.

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BARTKÓ, Róbert

Supervisor: Prof. Lévay, Miklós and Dr. Kovács, Gábor. The open defense took place in 2011, result: summa cum laude.

Criminal Political Questions of Fight Against Terrorism

From the point of view of the fight against terrorism the events of 11 September 2001 constitute a sharp caesura both in international and national level. Indeed, before this event, the international community rather concentrated on sui generis crimes committed within the scope of terrorism and the efficiency of intervention against these actions. While the Hungarian Criminal Code – with regard to the former § 261 – did not actually regulate facts of act of terrorism in the classical sense. Therefore, the main aim of the work was creating such a comprehensive work, in which the parameters relevant from the view of the criminal law front of the fight against terrorism will be demonstrated and analysed. During the preparation of the work we were making an effort to the most complex approximation possible within the field of substantive criminal law, starting from conceptual basics through the critic of effective regulation to the creating of proposals de lege ferenda. The work is divided into three parts, which distinguishes on the basis of the direction of research. The first part deals with standard work on terrorism, in which the aim was to give those frames under which the later proper criminal law analysis will take place. The first structural unit of the work is also an introduction, in which the dissertation touches upon terrorism, the definitive elements of the act of terrorism and terrorism as criminological nature of crime. After that the thesis attempts – with a reformative intent – to outline a new possible criminal policy strategy, whilst it deals with the different levels thereof separately in a more detailed manner. In the second part – after the above-mentioned – the dissertation deals with the international aspects of criminal law intervention against terrorism, opening space for dogmatic analysis in the frame of the work. The level of international interpretation is actually extracted in three smaller parts. It examined the outlining criminal policy in the international fight against terrorism and its main pillars, furthermore connected the opportunities and practical models of the raising of criminal authority against international delinquency to international level with it. The international aspect is followed by the European viewpoint under which the examination also divides into

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two parts dealing with on the one hand the European criminal policy and on the other hand the dogmatic interpretation of cross-border terrorism. The third part of the work deals with the national regulation, narrowing the extent of examination to the framework of Hungarian legislation. In this structural unit we deal with the facts of the act of terrorism specifically, examining the issues relevant from the aspect of dogmatic analysis. This part divides only into two chapters, in which on the one hand we concentrate on the history of the factors which constitute the act of terrorism, on the other hand on the critics of the effective regulation, together with creating a draft de lege ferenda. We do not think by any means that the work would contain a complete elaboration on terrorism. In our view, it is not possible in a single monograph because when one would like to deal with terrorism, (s)he should necessarily touch upon more sciences, and it is not possible to create the amalgam thereof in a single volume. In medium and long term, the fight against terrorism can be taken up effectively only if the results of the scientists working in certain relevant sciences are applied and combined in practice. Significant progress can be demonstrated both in the international and in the national special literature, furthermore, in legal manifestos, whose further and continuous development is indispensable for the future of democratic nations. The author of the work believes that he managed to summarize the factors relevant from the view of legal science and to contribute to the creating of an effective criminal law front serving as a basis of comparison regarding the fight against terrorism in long term.

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KECSKÉS Gábor

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Lamm Vanda. A nyilvános védés éve: 2012, eredménye: summa cum laude.

A környezeti károkért való felelősség a nemzetközi jogban

A kutatási téma a környezeti kárfelelősség nemzetközi jogi vonatkozásaival foglalkozik, amely tágabb értelemben a nemzetközi jog és a környezetvédelmi jog egyes releváns részterületeit, a két „jogág” szükségszerű határterületeit érinti. A disszertáció elkészítése során célként jelent meg a kutatási témára jellemző, a jogalkotási specifikumok következtében létrejött anomáliák és intézményesülési problémák, valamint a jogintézmények közötti sajátos átfedések által generált nehézségek eredetének feltárása, amely a probléma-felismerés fázisán túl azok feloldásához is javaslatokat, a megoldást segítő módszereket kíván fűzni. A nemzetközi jogban a környezeti károk és a felelősségi szempontok, a kártelepítési módok meghatározása számos olyan nehézségbe ütközik, amelyek a belső jogokban, ezen belül a közigazgatási jog egyik leágazódásában, a környezetjog belső jogi rendszerében csaknem ismeretlen jelenségeknek tekinthetők. Ennek oka egyrészt a nemzetközi jogra jellemző, ennek a belső jogtól lényegileg eltérő sajátosságaiból adódó speciális ismérvek, szabályozási-jogalkotási mechanizmusok léte, másrészt pedig a környezeti károk határokon átnyúló, tulajdonképpen államközi és univerzális vonatkozásaiból egyenesen következő problémák ténye. A kutatás tárgya valójában három olyan terület vizsgálatát érinti, ahol a belső jogban tapasztalt pozitivista, a teljes körű szabályozásra törekvő elgondolások nem, illetve kevéssé tudnak hatékony formákat ölteni. Eme területek ugyanis jellegüknél fogva igen különbözőek, és magukban hordozzák a három terület vonatkozásában már más jelentéstartalommal, következésképpen eltérő hatékonysággal bíró önálló jogintézményeket. A kutatás tehát a környezetvédelmi jog – nemzetközi jog – felelősségi jog hármas rendszerét vizsgálja, feltérképezve ezek kapcsolódási pontjait, feltárva ezek egyedi és más területekkel való összevetésben fennálló anomáliát, és egyben áttekinti azon metódusokat, amelyek a szükségszerűen jelentkező problémák kiküszöbölésére alkalmasak, illetve amelyeket ilyen célzattal alkottak meg az államok, vagy jöttek létre egyéb módokon a nemzetközi jog tudományában. Az értekezés logikailag tulajdonképpen egyfajta lineáris utat követ, miszerint a környezeti kárfelelősség tágabb értelemben vett témáján belül fokozatosan az egyes részterületekre fókuszál. Így először a kár, illetve a környezeti

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kár fogalmát, valamint ennek jelentésváltozatait elemzi. Ennek feltérképezése után a felelősség-kárfelelősség jogintézmények széleskörű, nemzetközi szerződéseken nyugvó, illetve speciális uniós megoldásai, kártelepítési módozatai kerülnek a vizsgálódás középpontjába, amely már egyenesen elvezet a bírói úton való kikényszeríthetőség nemzetközi jogi problematikájához, egyben sajátosságához, amely különböző bírói fórumok környezetjogi ítélkezésében nyilvánul meg.

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KECSKÉS, Gábor


Liability for Environmental Damage within the Field of International Law

As for the subject, the thesis surveys the entire concept of environmental liability seizing its inherent substantial connections to the field of public international law. However, it must be stated that the roots of the subject are traced back to the fundamentals of domestic private law and particularly private international law. Subsequently, the research has necessarily and knowingly concentrated on the boundaries of (public and private) international law as well as the basis of environmental law. As a matter of fact, the latter category regularly forms and focuses on the essential legal institutions and solutions on such a way that a model-like adaptable option could be transformed into the previous legal branches. The realization and articulation of such kind of overlaps and obstacles may provide methods for solving and rectifying the anomalies enumerated within the single chapters. The international legal aspects of environmental liability determine and predestine self-standing controversies comparing with the domestic legal systems, notably contemplating administrative law and environmental law, as well. The causes, as outlined repeatedly, are at least two-folded: i) firstly, several specific and distinctive characteristics of international law shall be taken into consideration in comparison with domestic legal systems (unique legislative issues, unique rules, unique forms of handling inter-State issues); ii) secondly, due to transboundary character of environmental damages, the attribute of bilateral, regional and universal damages may require different underlying rules and altered means of dispute settlement methods on the grounds of nature of damage and other criteria. The thesis takes an in-depth scrutiny within the framework of the socalled triad established by i) public and private international law, ii) environmental law and iii) responsibility-liability law. The complexion of ‘matrix’ and network being perceptible among the aforementioned three fields may determine the key legal anomalies accumulated herein and demanded by positive law. In addition to that and beyond positivist approaches, the customary international law and case-law (judge-made law) as well as didactic, for instance academic and scholarly, views can elaborate the “escaping way” in order to initiate efficient liability rules regarding the sophistication of specific areas of international environmental law suffering damages.

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The thesis follows a linear way based upon the approach of analysis from the general to the specific areas. Firstly, the notion of damage had been highlighted with its inherent anomalies, afterwards, secondly, within the diversified framework of international treaties and EU-law concerning the comprehension and exact notion of damage, the liability-responsibility debates considered here reflect and outline an essential role, which is inevitable in order to scrutinize – thirdly – the practice of several judicial for a being charged with “environmental jurisdiction”.

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MENYHÁRT Ádám

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Lenkovics Barnabás. A nyilvános védés éve: 2012, eredménye: summa cum laude.

A tévedés a szerződések körében

A doktori értekezés tárgya a tévedésnek a szerződések körében való vizsgálata, amely kizárólag a szerződéses tévedéssel foglalkozik, így nem tárgya annak az egyoldalú jognyilatkozatok tévedés miatti megtámadhatósága, a tévedés öröklési jogi kérdései (a végrendelet érvénytelensége), nem tartalmazza a tágabb értelemben vett civilisztika egyéb jogterületeinek tévedési szabályait (családi jog: a házasság érvénytelensége; társasági jog: a társasági szerződés érvénytelensége; munkajog: a munkaszerződés érvénytelensége). A kutatás célja az volt, hogy átfogó képet nyújtson a szerződéses tévedés történeti kialakulásáról, a rá vonatkozó elméletek fejlődéséről és a különféle jogrendszereknek a témát érintő jelenlegi hatályos szabályozásáról. A kutatás módszere egyértelműen a jogösszehasonlítás és a történeti elemzés. Alapvetően azt kellett eldönteni, hogy egyrészt milyen időszakot és milyen részletességgel ölelje fel a tudományos kutatás (történeti módszer), másrészt pedig azt, hogy a jelenlegi nagy jogrendszerek közül melyeket ismertesse (jogösszehasonlító módszer). A dolgozat időbelileg a római jogig tekint vissza, a részletes római jogi ismertetés és vázlatos fejlődéstörténet, majd az egyes jogrendszereknek a lehető legalaposabb szintű normatív, tudományos és a bírói gyakorlatot alapul vevő bemutatása. A jogrendszerek kiválasztása körében az értekezés azokat vette figyelembe, amelyek vagy európai szinten meghatározók (pl.: németsvájci) vagy a magyar jog fejlődésére közvetlen hatással bírtak (pl. osztrák). Az angolszász jog kuriózumként került bele a dolgozatba mint a kontinentális, írott jog ellenpéldája. Alapvető kérdés volt, hogy az összehasonlítás módszertana mi legyen. Válassza szét a mű elemeire a tévedés témakörét, úgy mint pl. lényeges tévedés, a szerződés tárgyában való tévedés, tartalmi tévedés, jogban való tévedés, stb. és ezen kategóriákon belül közvetlenül legyenek az egyes jogrendszerek eltérő jogi megoldásai ismertetve, vagy jogrendszerenként, általánosságban vizsgálódjon a tévedésről? Az értekezés az utóbbi módszer mellett tette le a voksát, részben azért, mert csak az összehasonlítható dolgokat lehet összehasonlítani, és az egyes jogrendszereknek adott tárgykörben született megoldásai olyannyira különböznek egymástól már fogalomkezelés szintjén is, hogy gyakorlatilag lehe-

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tetlenné vált a közvetlen jogösszehasonlítás. Részben pedig azért, mert ez a megoldás lehetővé tette azon óriási időbeli eltérések áthidalását, amely például egy római társadalom és gazdaság és az ehhez kapcsolódó jogrendszer, illetve a jelenlegi európai uniós ius commune között tátong. A másik fajta összehasonlító módszer alkalmazásával az összehasonlítás nyilvánvalóan torz eredményt szült volna. Az értekezés a lehető legteljesebben próbált azon óriási tudományos ismeretanyagra közvetlen forrásként támaszkodni, amely egyáltalán elérhető volt Magyarország területén belül, sőt azon kívül is.

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MENYHÁRT, Ádám

Supervisor: Prof. Lenkovics, Barnabás. The open defense took place in 2012, result: summa cum laude.

Mistakes within the Scope of Contracts

The subject of the doctoral dissertation is the examination of mistakes within the scope of contracts, and it solely deals with contractual mistakes, therefore, its subject does not include the contestability of unilateral legal declarations due to mistakes, legal issues of inheritance of mistakes (voidness of wills) and it does not cover the mistake rules of other legal domains of civilistics in a wider sense (family law: voidness of marriage; corporate law: voidness of deed of association; labor law: voidness of labor contract). The goal of the research was to provide a comprehensive overview of the historical evolution of contractual mistakes, the development of the relevant theories and the currently effective regulations of the various legal systems concerning the subject. The aim of the research work merely and mechanically was not to present the various solutions of the different legal systems concerning the subject but also to expose more in-depth scientific conclusions and relationships. The method of the research is clearly legal comparison and historical analysis. The fundamental decision to make was what period was to be encompassed by the scientific research (historical method) and to what level of detail, as well as which of the current major legal systems to review (legal comparison method). The timeline of the dissertation dates back to Roman law while the issue of depth was the following: a detailed overview of Roman law and a brief evolution history, followed by the presentation of each legal system based on normative, scientific and judicial practice at the most exhaustive level. With respect to the selection of the legal systems the dissertation assessed those that are dominant at a European level (e.g. German and Swiss) or which had a direct influence on the development of Hungarian law (e.g. Austrian). Anglo-Saxon law was included in the dissertation as a curiosity to serve as a counter-example of continental, written law. A primary decision to make was what the methodology of comparison would be. Whether it should split the subject of mistake into the elements of the work, such as relevant mistake, mistake in the subject of the contract, mistake in the content, mistake in the law, etc., while the different legal solutions of the individual legal systems would be assessed directly within such categories, or whether it should review mistake with respect to each legal system and in a general manner? The dissertation opted for the latter meth-

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od, partly because only comparable things can be compared and given that the solutions of each legal system on a specific subject vary from each other so much that even at the level of terminology a direct legal comparison was impossible, and partly because this solution enabled the bridging of enormous time differences gaping between e.g. a Roman society and economy and the related legal system and the current ius commune of the European Union. By applying the other method of comparison, any comparison would have consequently yielded a skewed result. To the possible extent, the dissertation sought to rely on the vast pool of scientific knowledge as a direct source that is available within Hungary and beyond its borders.

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GELLÉN Márton

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Verebélyi Imre. A nyilvános védés éve: 2012, eredménye: summa cum laude.

Közigazgatási reformok az államszerep változásainak tükrében

Az értekezés a válság éveinek első tapasztalatait inkorporálva áttekinti az elmúlt két évtized közigazgatási elméletének fejlődését. Megállapítása szerint az állam szerepének kérdése kellően centrális fogalom ahhoz, hogy a közigazgatási reformok vizsgálatának kiindulópontjául szolgáljon. Az állam és piac, az állam és társadalom kapcsolatrendszerében megvalósuló feladatátadás jelentőségét a közigazgatási reformok fejlődési pálya elmélete korábban is ismerte, azonban nem ágyazta kétirányú folyamatokat lehetővé tevő rendszerbe. A nemzetközi szervezetek és integrációk részére történő vertikális irányú feladatátadás pedig nem szerepelt a közigazgatási reformirányok között. Az értekezés megállapítása szerint a közigazgatási reformok az állam szerepének szempontjából elemezve új pályára állhatnak, amennyiben az emberi közösség szempontjából így kívánatos. A feladat-átadás kétirányúsága azt is jelzi, hogy nem csak differenciálatlan feladat-átcsoportosításra van lehetőség a modellbe bevont szereplők között, hanem a feladatellátáshoz szükséges együttműködési formák rugalmas alkalmazására is, amennyiben a szereplők egymás iránti bizalma ezt lehetővé teszi. Az értekezésben kifejtett tudományos modell alkalmas a jelenlegi és jövőbeli közigazgatási reformok csoportosítására, ábrázolására, egyúttal tágabb összefüggésbe ágyazza a szakirodalomban észlelt „ingapályát” a közigazgatási reformok és az állam viszonya területén. A jogszerűség, stabilitás, áttekinthetőség értékeit szem előtt tartó új weberi közigazgatást az értekezés úgy helyezi el mint az NPM ellentétpárját, amelyről egyelőre korai megállapítani, hogy szintézis értékű-e. Az értekezés külön tárgyalja az elektronikus közigazgatás hatását a közigazgatási reformirányzatokra. Megállapítása szerint az e-közigazgatás korai fázisában az NPM-et erősítette, az időközben elért technológiai fejlődés azonban – az e-közigazgatás alapjául szolgáló adatátvitel, adatfeldolgozás és tárolás kapacitásai lényegesen meghaladják a gyakorlati igényeket – az irányzatok technológiai preferenciájában meglévő különbségeket felszámolta. A rendszerváltás utáni magyar közigazgatási reformok áttekintése során az értekezés kiemeli, hogy az egyes reformirányzatok törekvései milyen szerepet játszottak az állam szerepének változásában. A hazai közigazgatási

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reformelképzelések ismertetését az értekezés kiegészíti az utóbbi két évtized közszolgálati létszámának és közigazgatási intézményi darabszámának elemzésével, amelyet a hatékonyság és eredményesség szempontjai közötti gyakorlati versengésként mutat be. A hazai közigazgatás jogi környezetének bemutatása eredeti empirikus elemzés keretében történik. Az értekezés külön tárgyalja a magyar elektronikus közigazgatás fejlődését, mely az infrastrukturális keretrendszer kiépítésében, és az ügyfélforgalom jól standardizálható keretek közötti kezelésében vitathatatlan eredményeket ért el, azonban elmaradt attól a várakozástól, hogy tartalmilag megújítsa a közigazgatást műveleti szinten. Az elektronikus közigazgatás adós maradt a szinte korlátlan informatikai eszközrendszer döntés-előkészítés területén való alkalmazásában, valamint az e-közigazgatás átláthatósági lehetőségeinek kiaknázásában. Az értekezés a 2010 utáni magyar közigazgatási reformjainak elemzése kapcsán a vizsgált jelenségekre való tudományos reagálás frissességével emelkedik ki. Az elemzés a koordináció, a kontroll valamint a hatékonyság és eredményesség szempontjainak szem előtt tartásával a reform kulcselemeit tárgyalja.

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GELLÉN, Márton

Supervisor: Prof. Verebélyi, Imre. The open defense took place in 2012, result: summa cum laude.

Public Administrative Reforms with Regards to the Changes of the Role of State

The dissertation describes the reform history of the last two decades, including the first experiences of the years of the crisis. The issue of the role of state within the reform theory is a valid starting point for examining public administrative reforms. The public administrative path dependence theory acknowledged the task-transfer phenomenon between state - civil society and state - market although, this was not embedded into a single logical framework that allows reversibility. The vertical task-transfer to international organizations and integrations were not included among the potential reform agendas. The two-way connections between the players indicate that there is not only a potential for undifferentiated task-transfer among the subjects of the model, but there is also a systemic potential for appropriate cooperations if the level of trust between the interacting subjects allows it. The use of the scientific model – elaborated in the dissertation – can be used for the evaluation of future public administration reforms. It also provides a wider interpretation background for the “pendulum path” regarding the relation between the state and the public administrative reforms recognized by the scientific literature. The dissertation details the opinions of the relevant international organizations regarding the public administrative reforms that – in different extent – influence the reforms of the recipient countries, including Hungary. From the role of state point of view, these organizations used to be interested in re-allocation of resources and competencies from the central state to the market, to the social partners or to the municipal local governments. The European Union is to be highlighted among the other international knowledge-transfer and donor organizations, since it appeared to be interested in transparently operating, accountable, responsible and stable national public administrations. The EU is also unique among the other international stakeholders in that its public administration reform strategy contains elements of vertical re-allocation of competencies. The dissertation highlights the influence of the international reform tendencies in the formation of the Hungarian public administration reforms throughout the two decades after the regime change. The overview of the

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domestic reforms is completed with data analysis on the figures of legal entities of public administrations and the figures of the public service. The longitudinal data are presented as the rivalry of efficiency and effectiveness. As part of the empirical analysis, the dissertation contains data on the figures of the Hungarian legal system including an original research regarding the longitudinal empirical analysis of the internal complexity of the Hungarian law as a high priority environmental factor for a Rechtsstaat-oriented public administration system.

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GÖNDÖR Éva

A disszertáció témavezetője: Dr. Hágelmayer Istvánné. A nyilvános védés időpontja: 2012, eredménye: summa cum laude.

A családi és a munkahelyi feladatok összehangolását segítő és gátló jogintézmények a munkajogban

A kutatás tárgya a családi és a munkahelyi feladatok összehangolását segítő, illetve gátló jogintézmények feltárása a magyar munkajogi szabályozásban, ezen belül az anyaság védelmére vonatkozó speciális munkajogi szabályozás bemutatása, a kapcsolódó társadalombiztosítási juttatásokra is kiterjedően. Azokat a munkajogi és társadalombiztosítási szabályokat elemzi a disszertáció, amelyek jelentős befolyást gyakorolnak a család belső életére és anyagi helyzetére. Vizsgálat tárgyát képezték továbbá a témával kapcsolatos nemzetközi és európai uniós normák, ajánlások és kezdeményezések. A kutatás hipotézise, hogy a férfiak és a nők közötti egyenlő bánásmód a munka világában nem valósítható meg mindaddig, amíg a családon belüli munkamegosztás, különös tekintettel a gyermeknevelésre, nem válik közös szülői feladattá, amiben az apának és az anyának mértékét tekintve azonos szerep jut. Nagy társadalmi csoportok magatartásának megváltozása azonban tisztán jogi eszközökkel nem érhető el, a szemléletváltáshoz más eszközökre is szükség van. A szülői feladatokkal kapcsolatos gondolkodásmód függ az adott társadalom kulturális, történelmi hagyományaitól és beidegződéseitől. Megfigyelhető a társadalmaknak azon törekvése, hogy a nemi különbségeket szétválasztja és ezeket a differenciákat természettől valónak tekinti, nem pedig társadalmilag létrehozottnak. A kutatás célja a nők munkajogi helyzetét érintő magyar jogintézmények fejlődési történetének feltárása. Az elemzés során nem hagyható figyelmen kívül, hogy a jogi szabályozást alapvetően befolyásolja az adott korszakot jellemző gondolkodásmód, ideológia és a gazdasági, társadalmi környezet. A történeti elemzésen túlmenően a másik vizsgálódási szempont az volt, hogy a piacgazdaság jogi szabályozása a nők munkahelyi szerepét illetően hordoz-e magában sztereotípiákat, tehát hogy rejtetten azok közvetítése történik-e az egyes rendelkezésekben és ezek az előítéletek miből eredeztethetők. A harmadik megválaszolandó kérdés az volt, hogy milyen legyen a védelmi szint a várandós és a kisgyermeket nevelő nők számára az egyes védelmi rendelkezésekben. Hol van az a határ, amely még nem túl alacsony ahhoz, hogy kiszolgáltatottá tegye a nőket, de nem is túlzottan magas, amely vis�szaüt a munkaerőpiacon és hátrányos megkülönböztetést eredményez. A

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disszertáció arra keresi a választ, hogy a kedvezmények, „többletjogok” a munkában való egyenlő részvétel lehetőségét teremtik-e meg? A téma elemzése során mind a jogalkotási, mind a jogalkalmazási gyakorlat bemutatására sor került, ez utóbbi inkább az uniós jogban volt fellelhető, ami arra világít rá, hogy Magyarországon a nők jog- és érdekérvényesítő képessége csekély, másrészt azt is mutatja, hogy a hagyományos családmodell szemlélete a legtöbb nő számára elfogadott, vagyis a családon belüli munkamegosztás tekintetében nem történtek jelentős változások az elmúlt húsz évben.

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GÖNDÖR, Éva

Supervisor: Dr. Hágelmayer, Istvánné. The open defense took place in 2012, result: summa cum laude.

Supportive and Obstructive Judiciary Institutions of the Labour Law regarding Work-Family Balance

The research is concerned with the harmonisation of family and work responsibilities. It explores concepts, including the Hungarian labour legislation, the labour legislation for the protection of maternity including related social benefits. The thesis analyzed those labour and social security rules, which have significant influence on the financial situation of families and on the internal family life as a whole. Furthermore, it examined the related international and European Union standards, recommendations and initiatives. The hypothesis of this research is that equal treatment of men and women in work cannot be achieved till the work in the family, especially in children’s care, is not equally distributed. However, significant changes in the behaviour of large social groups, by purely legal means are not achievable. For the right approach, other instruments are also needed. The mindset of the society related to parental tasks depends on the cultural and historical heritage of the society. Societies tend to see the origin of gender roles natural, not social. The demanded objective is to uncover the past, discover the history of the development of Hungarian legal instruments regarding women’s labour status. During the analysis, it cannot be overlooked that the legislation is essentially influenced by the era’s characteristic mindset, ideology and the economic and social environment. In addition to the historical analysis, the other point is the consideration of whether the regulation of labour law, concerning the role of women in the workplace carries stereotypes or not. Whether they are hidden by the individual provisions and how they are linked to certain prejudices. The third question to be answered is what the necessary level of protection for pregnant women and women with small children is. What limit is neither too low, to expose women, nor excessively high, which can strike back in the labour market and result in discrimination. The dissertation tried to find answer for the question, whether the provided benefits help equal participation in work or not? The thesis focused on analysing both legislative practice and low enforcement practice, the latter was rather found in Union law. That suggests that

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the ability of women to get support in advocacy and law are weak. It also shows that the traditional family model is still adopted by most women. That means, with regard to the division of labour within the family, there have been no significant changes in the past twenty years.

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GLAVANITS Judit

A disszertáció témavezetője: Dr. Szalay Gyula. A nyilvános védés időpontja: 2012, eredménye: summa cum laude.

A kockázati tőkebefektetések jogi aspektusai

Az Egyesült Államokban az 1970-es évektől eredeztetik a kockázati tőkebefektetések irodalmát, szabályozását. Ehhez képest az Európai Unió számottevő késéssel, 1998-ban kezdett el először foglalkozni ezen piaci jelenséggel, bevonva azt az innováció-finanszírozás és az állami támogatások szabályozása körébe. Hazánkban szintén 1998-ban született először jogszabály, amely rendezte a kockázati tőkepiac egyes szereplőinek jogait és kötelezettségeit. Az ezen időszak alatt megjelent jogforrásokból azt a következtetést tudjuk levonni, hogy a kockázati tőkebefektetések kapcsán az állam a magánjogi szerződésektől távol tartotta magát, szabályozási igénye elsősorban a kockázati tőkealapok és alapkezelők, valamint a jelentős vagyont kezelő társaságok adminisztratív kötelezettségeire terjedt ki. Az állami szerepvállalás másik fő iránya a kockázati tőkepiacon való megjelenése, amely nem csak adminisztratív, hanem versenyjogi kérdéseket vet fel, és amellyel elsősorban az Európai Unió joga foglalkozik kiemelten. Bár a nemzetközi szakirodalom megosztott abban a kérdésben, hogy az állam milyen szerepet töltsön be a kockázati tőkebefektetések piacán, a szerzők abban közös állásponton vannak, hogy a befektető-védelmi, adminisztratív szabályok megalkotás elsődleges feladat, azon belül is kiemelkedő jelentőséggel bír a nemzetközi jogharmonizáció. Ennek kiváló példáját láthatjuk az európai kockázati tőkealap tervezetének megalkotásakor is. Szintén az egységesülő szabályozás felé mutató tény, hogy a 2011-es év folyamán elfogadott Egyesült Államokbeli részletszabályok és az Európai Unió rendeletei a terminológiai kérdésekben közeledést mutatnak, bár az is kétségtelen tény, hogy mindkét térség elsősorban a saját területén letelepedett szereplők számára biztosít előjogokat. A kockázati tőkealapok, illetve a kockázati tőkebefektetést végző társaságok szabályozásának jellege, hogy tudniillik azok a kollektív befektetési vállalkozásokon belül önálló, egyéni szabályozást igénylő tulajdonságokkal bíró szereplők, a gazdasági válságot követő pénzügyi szabályozási folyamat egyértelműen igazolta. A kockázati tőkebefektetések jellemzően határon átnyúló ügyletek, amely megállapítás alól azok a társaságok jelentenek kivételt, amelyek állami háttérrel működnek, és megalapításuk célja kifejezetten a hazai kis- és közép-

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vállalkozások forráshoz jutásának könnyítése. Ezen állami alapok befektetési szabályzatának része az ügyletek illetve szerződő felek székhelyének földrajzi korlátozása. A piaci szereplők tekintetében azonban elmondható, hogy határon átnyúló tevékenységet végeznek, ezen belül is kiemelkedő az ún. regionális alapok jelentősége. A céltársaságok számára szintén előny lehet, ha az adott piacon több szereplővel is folytathat tárgyalásokat, ez nagyban erősíti tárgyalási pozícióját, és csökkenti az információs aszimmetriából eredő kockázatokat is. Azon kockázati tőkebefektetők, amelyek piacilag szegmentáltak, szintén előnyös a nemzetközi megjelenés, hiszen például egy olyan kis piacon, mint a magyar, egy biotechnológiára szakosodott kockázati tőkealap nem feltétlenül tudja potenciálját kihasználni. A nemzetközi jelenlét ugyanakkor fokozott kockázatokkal, azon belül fokozott adminisztratív és pénzügyi teherrel jár. A nemzetközi szervezetek (EVCA, OECD) állásfoglalásai szerint a jogharmonizáció az államok egyik legfontosabb feladata a kockázati tőkepiac ösztönzése terén. Az elvárt szabályozás legfontosabb eleme, hogy a befektetési alapkezelők szabadon csatornázhassák forrásaikat a legnagyobb nyereséggel kecsegtető vállalkozásokba. A befektetők számára az adózási szabályok átláthatósága nélkülözhetetlen, valamint igényként merül fel az alapkezelői díjak adótartamának megfizetéséért való felelősség, illetve a befektetéseket szükségtelenül korlátozó szabályoktól való mentesség. Alapvető követelmény az országokkal szemben a más államban alapított befektetési alapok és alapkezelők tevékenységének elismerése, elkerülve ezzel a kettős adóztatást. Az angolszász joggyakorlat megállapodások sorozataként köti meg azt a szerződést, amely során egy kockázati tőkebefektető tulajdonrészt szerez egy társaságban. Mivel a megállapodások több fázisban köttetnek, és néha a tőkebefektetés is szakaszosan valósul meg, majdnem minden esetben elmondható, hogy nem egy, hanem több jogi kötőerővel bíró dokumentum születik a felek között. Ez alól kivételt jelenthetnek az állami tőkealapok, ahol a szerződési gyakorlat a piaci kockázati tőkebefektetésektől eltérő sajátosságokat mutat, ezért gyakran egy befektetési szerződés keretében található a felek jogaira és kötelezettségeire vonatkozó, mindenre kérdésre kiterjedő megállapodás. Jogdogmatikai szempontból a legfontosabb kérdés, hogy vajon a kockázati tőkebefektetési szerződés önálló szerződéstípusnak tekinthető-e, vagy több szerződés sajátosságait hordozza. Tekintettel arra, hogy a felek közötti megállapodás tartalmát több tényező is determinálja, véleményünk szerint nem indokolt a kockázati tőkebefektetési szerződés önálló szerződési típusként való azonosítása. Az egyes szerződési feltételek ugyanis döntően attól függenek, hogy a felek új társaság alapításával, a meglévőben történő tőkeemeléssel, vagy a társaság átalakulásával, mint módszerrel valósítják meg a tőkebefektetést. A szerződési feltételeknek leginkább a magyar gyakorlatban ismert szindikátusi szerződés felel meg, amely szintén nem nevesített szerződési típus, ugyanakkor annak elemző vizsgálata során kiderül, hogy

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a kockázati tőkebefektetési szerződésekkel lényeges hasonlóságot mutat. A szindikátusi szerződés elnevezése a nemzetközi szerződési gyakorlat egyidejű vizsgálatával azonban ellentmondáshoz vezet. Az angolszász szerződési jogban a kockázati tőkebefektetésekhez kapcsolódó szindikátusi szerződésről csak abban az esetben beszélünk, amennyiben a befektetői oldalon több alany szerepel, vagyis több befektető egymásra tekintettel emel tőkét a vállalkozásban, vagy a kockázati tőkebefektető mellett, annak tevékenységére tekintettel a tőkeemeléssel egyidejűleg pénzintézeti szerződő fél hitelszerződést köt a céltársasággal. A kockázati tőkebefektetési szerződés, mint atipikus vegyes szerződés gondossági és eredménykötelemre jellemző sajátosságokat egyaránt mutat, hiszen a szerződésben a befektető vállalja a céltársaság számára meghatározott pénzösszeg társasági tulajdon fejében történő rendelkezésre bocsátását, ugyanakkor a szerződési feltételek része a céltársaság részéről bizonyos pénzügyi és/vagy vállalkozási eredmény létrehozására irányuló magatartás kifejtése, amely tekintetében a társaság vezető tisztségviselőinek megfelelő gondossággal kell eljárniuk. Így a kockázati tőkebefektetetési szerződésben megjelennek az adásvételi, a megbízási, a vállalkozási szerződés elemei is, valamint ezek mellett a társasági szerződésre vonatkozó szabályok és korlátozások is érvényesülnek. Külön kiemelendő ezen kérdéskörben, hogy a felek megállapodása nem lehet ellentétes a társasági szerződéssel. A további kutatási irányok kapcsán világos, hogy az európai kockázati tőkealap működése, annak nemzeti részletszabályai egyértelműen kijelölik a vizsgálati utat a kockázati tőkebefektetések közjogi vonatkozásai kapcsán. Az iparág fejlődése, azon belül a statisztikailag is kimutathatóan növekvő szerződésszám indokolja a kockázati tőkebefektetés, mint szerződéses jogviszony további, nemzetközi magánjogi összehasonlító vizsgálatát, minthogy alapvetően az EU-s országok kockázati tőkebefektetési szerződési modellje alulkutatott.

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GLAVANITS, Judit

Supervisor: Dr. Szalay, Gyula. The open defense took place in 2012, result: summa cum laude.

Legal Aspects of Venture Capital Financing

According to the fact that in the United States the literature of venture capital investments is counted since the 1970’s, and that the EU reacted to the expectations of the market only from 1998, and also that in Hungary the first regulation of venture capital activity appeared in 1998, we can state that the governments and regulators kept themselves away from venture capital investments for a long time. Even for long, since then the role of the state was only to govern the basics of formal venture capital investors, i.e. the venture capital funds, and the regulation only covered the administrative and taxation minimums of these companies. The other appearance of the state on the venture capital market is to present itself as a sole actor by managing state-affiliated venture capital funds, which brings up questions not only administratively but on the field of competition law regulated primarily by EU norms. Though the international scientific literature is dividend in the question of suitable role of the state on the venture capital market, the authors agree that the most important task for the governments is to create venture capitalfriendly market conditions, such as legal and administrative rules, investor’s security rights, and most of all, international harmonization of laws. A sufficient step in this way is the preparation of European Venture Capital Fund. Also an important fact is that the rules accepted during 2011 as answers for the current financial crises are showing approximation of laws in connection with the USA and the EU in terminology, but also a fact, that both regions guarantee privileges for the resident actors. The current legislation and regulations of the venture capital activity show the urgent and up-to-date demand for adequate rules of venture capital investments. The accepted regulations also shows that the venture capital contract are separate phenomena of the investment activities, and needs to be handled with different legal instruments, than other alternative investment actors. Venture capital transactions are characteristically realized on international field, except those supported by national government to increase the available amount of capital for national small- and medium sized companies. These state-backed funds has both territorial and target-company restrictions. But for the – basically European – market actors we can set out

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that most of them make investments across the borders, and among them the “regional funds” play an important role. As for the target companies, it can be an important factor to start negotiations with more than one venture investor to boost the negotiation position, and to lower the risks arising from informational asymmetry. The specialized or market segmented venture capital investors also benefit from international appearance, for example, on a small market like the Hungarian one, a biotechnology-based venture capital investor could not exploit its potential. Operating on international level also has several risks, among them are increased administrative and financial liabilities. The international organizations as the EVCA or OECD stated that harmonized legal rules are the most important task for national governments to increase venture capital investments. The desirable regulation‘s base should be that the investment funds or investment companies may channel their capital free across borders, and this way seek for the best investment alternatives. Transparent tax system is essential for investors, and there is also a need for the termination of rules hampering the money and capital transfers. A basic need is to admit the foreign-established venture capital investment bodies, and to avoid double taxation. The Anglo-Saxon legal practice writes down the venture capital investment contracts as a serial of legally relevant documents. As the agreements on terms born in different stages of investment, and sometimes the caching of capital in a firm is also made step-by-step, in almost all cases the contractual relation of the parties is laid down in more than one basic document. An exception can be the government-supported venture capital fund’s investment agreement, which can occur in only one document according to the empirical study of Hungarian and European contractual practice, but we have to settle down, that these state-backed companies apply different terms and conditions than the ones market actors use. Dogmatically, the question is if the agreements or contracts made by a venture capital investor and the target-company can be identified as a separate kind of contract of private law, or as a mixed type with features of other specified contractual types. In consideration of the content of the agreement it is determined by a lot of factors like the age of the target-company, the number and relation of the investors, the transformation of the company caused by the investment, the author of the doctoral study states that the venture capital investment contract cannot form an independent kind of contract. In the Hungarian legal practice studying the terms and substance of different contractual forms, the venture capital investments’ contractual conditions are the closest to the syndication contract, which is a so-called not-nominated contractual type, but in terms and conditions is close to what we can call a venture capital contract. The syndication contract as a contractual type is very different from the Anglo-Saxon type of syndication. The latter is used when there is more than one party on the subject side of inves-

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tors, and they raise capital in the company in regard to the others, and often a bank is involved in the investment. The venture capital contract as an atypical mixed contract that contains duties both on diligence and on result, as in the contract the investor takes responsibility to raise capital in the company under certain conditions (duty on result) in exchange for realizing a certain financial or business development that have to be achieved by the company’s leaders by presenting the due foresight (duty on diligence). According to these, in venture capital investment documentation we found the specifics of sale and purchase contract, the mandatory agreement, venture agreement, and the obligatory rules of company law also appear in the relation of the parties. It should be mentioned here that the agreement of the investor and the company cannot be opposite with the articles of association of the company. For the upcoming research of venture capital investments it is obvious that the European Venture Capital Fund and its functioning is one important question to examine. The development of the industry and the increasing number of venture capital contacts shows the other important subject of further researches, as basically in the EU the contractual design of venture capital agreements has not been examined widely enough.

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KŐHIDI Ákos

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Lenkovics Barnabás A nyilvános védés éve: 2012, eredménye: summa cum laude.

A polgári jogi felelősség digitális határai Európában. A P2P fájlmegosztó rendszereken elkövetett szerzői jogi jogsértések felelősségtani vonatkozásai

A dolgozat a szerzői jog megsértésének egy viszonylag jól elkülöníthető esetkörével foglalkozott, az internetes fájlmegosztó rendszerek használata során jelentkező jogsértésekkel, továbbá az ezekhez kapcsolódó polgári jogi felelősséggel. A fájlmegosztás folyamata, annak többszörösen összetett jellege miatt olyan kísérleti térnek felel meg, amelyben a polgári jogi felelősség digitális környezetben történő alkalmazásának határai jól vizsgálhatóak. Egyrészt azért, mert Európa több országában is felhívják e jogsértések esetében a polgári jogi felelősség szabályait, ezzel azt és annak dogmatikai elemeit olyan új környezetbe helyezik, ahol alkalmazhatóságának határai merülnek fel. Másrészt kifejezetten Magyarországra tekintve elmondható, hogy a polgári jogi felelősség klasszikus szabályait még nem alkalmazták ilyen esetekre, így a kutatás ennek későbbi lehetőségét a tudomány szemüvegén keresztül vizsgálhatja. Míg az Egyesült Királyságban vagy Németországban több ezer felhasználóhoz intéznek a jogkezelő szervezetek vagyoni követelést is megjelölő felszólításokat, addig Magyarországon hasonló esetekről egyelőre nem lehet hallani. Ez azonban nem jelenti azt, hogy a jövőben ne kerülhetne sor tisztán polgári jogi igényérvényesítésre. Ennélfogva egy, a polgári jogi felelősség vonatkozó, európai irányvonalaiból kiinduló, annak közös elemeit (témaspecifikus) vizsgálat alá helyező dolgozat nem csak a jogösszehasonlítás érdekessége miatt indokolt, hanem a hazai, egyelőre teljesen hipotetikus (így pedig nyitott) kérdésekre adható, megalapozott jövőbeni jogi válaszok megtalálása miatt is.

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KŐHIDI, Ákos

Supervisor: Prof. Lenkovics, Barnabás. The open defense took place in 2012, result: summa cum laude.

Digital Limits of Civil Liability in Europe. Liability Issues Concerning Infringements Committed via P2P File Sharing Systems

The dissertation deals with a relatively separate field of copyright infringements: the infringements committed via online file sharing systems, furthermore with the civil liability related to the formers. From my point of view, the process of file sharing – through its complex character – is deemed such an experimental space, in which the limits of the application of civil liability can be easily examined. On the one hand, the reason is, that in several countries of Europe civil liability is applied in the case of similar infringements (and therefore setting the dogmatic elements into a new environment, in which these can hardly be applied in a consistent way). On the other hand, – focusing on Hungary – it can be stated, that the classic rule of civil law liability has not been applied yet to such cases, thus, the research can examine the future possibility of this under academic spectacles. While thousands of users getting warning letters from copyright trolls in the United Kingdom and Germany, similar case in Hungary has not been existed yet. According to the former facts, research of civil liability issues and common elements (traced back to the European origins) is reasonable, not only for law comparison, but for finding the future, grounded answers to the currently hypothetical questions in Hungary concerning this topic.

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GANCZER Mónika

A disszertáció témavezetője: Prof. Lamm Vanda. A nyilvános védés időpontja: 2013, eredménye: summa cum laude.

Állampolgárság a nemzetközi jogban – államutódlás esetén

Az államiságtól függő állampolgárságra hatással van, ha egy terület felett megváltozik az állami szuverenitás. A terület feletti szuverenitás-változással járó államutódlás esetén az elődállam állampolgárságának elvesztése, és az új állampolgárság megszerzésének nehézségei vagy képtelensége számos kérdést vet fel, és valamennyi olyan tárgykör felmerül, melyet az állampolgárság kapcsán az államok a nemzetközi jog által szabályozni kívánnak: a hontalanság kiküszöbölése, a kettős állampolgárság elkerülése vagy rendezése, a gyermekek védelme, a nők, illetve a házastársak védelme, az állampolgársághoz való jog, az állampolgárságtól való önkényes megfosztás tilalma, valamint a diszkrimináció tilalma. A fenti problémák és a nemzetközi jog szabályozási területeinek vizsgálatát megelőzően az értekezés néhány előkérdést is elemez. Elsőként az állampolgárság fogalmának tisztázását végzi el, melyhez a történeti háttér szolgál kiindulópontként. Az állampolgárság történeti előképeinek ismerete hozzájárul a napjainkban alkalmazható fogalmi elemek megértéséhez, így az értekezés feltárja az állampolgárság előképeinek jellemzőit, a mai értelemben vett állampolgárság kialakulásának folyamatát és az állampolgárságra használt kifejezések eredetét. Az állampolgárság definiálása iránti igény mind a belső jogban, mind a nemzetközi jogban megfigyelhető, azonban az egyes meghatározások különböző alapokra helyezkednek. Az értekezés ezért az állampolgárság belső jogi értelemben, valamint nemzetközi jogi értelemben használható fogalmait, és az állampolgárságra használatos kifejezések jelentésbeli különbségeit is elhatárolja annak érdekében, hogy a nemzetközi jogi értelemben vett állampolgárság általánosan elfogadható fogalmi elemei megismerhetővé váljanak. További előkérdésként vizsgálandó az állampolgárság kizárólagos belső joghatóságba tartozásának elfogadottsága és a nemzetközi jogi szabályozásának szükségessége. Az értekezés ily módon kifejti a fenntartott joghatóság lényegét, valamint a nemzetközi jog állampolgársági szabályozás behatárolásában betöltött szerepét. Emellett külön kérdésként foglalkozik az állampolgárság kapcsán más államok egy sajátos eszközével: az állampolgárság el nem ismerésének lehetőségével, ezen belül pedig elemzi az effektivitás elvének tartalmát, jogi jellegét és esetleges kötelező erejét.

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A kutatás fontos eleme az államutódlás állampolgárságra gyakorolt hatásának elméleti alapjainak feltárása. A doktori értekezés olyan mértékben elemzi az államutódlás alapvető kérdéseit, amennyire az állampolgárságra gyakorolt hatás vizsgálata érdekében szükséges. Az államutódlás fogalmának és az államazonossághoz való viszonyának meghatározását követően sor kerül az államutódlás releváns eseteinek csoportokba rendezésére, és ennek keretében a cesszió tartalmának tisztázására. Személyi téren, az államutódlás által érintett egyének köre azokat öleli fel, akik valamely államutódlás által érintett állam állampolgárságát elveszítik vagy megszerzik. Az érintettek körénél vizsgálandó az adott területen élő lakosság (elődállami állampolgárok, külföldiek, hontalanok), valamint a területen kívül élő elődállami állampolgárok vagy más személyek csoportja. Ennek keretében sor kerül az érintettek meghatározására használt kritériumok vizsgálatára, valamint azok tartalmának és helyes alkalmazhatóságának értékelésére. Az állampolgárság megváltozását jellemző egyik sajátosság a megváltozás módja, melynek kapcsán több elmélet alakult ki: az automatikus változás elmélete, az egyén akaratának nézete, valamint az állam belső jogának szemlélete. (Az optálás jogának bővebb elemzését az értekezés az egyén akaratának elmélete keretében végzi el.) Ezek az elméletek azonban szintetizálhatók, és ennek eredményeként egy közvetítő elmélet alkotható, az államok akaratának elmélete, mely alkalmasnak tűnik a megváltozás módjának helyes leírására. Az állampolgárság megváltozásának másik sajátosságaként a változás időpontja vizsgálandó. Az értekezés az elődállam állampolgárságának elvesztését és az utódállam állampolgárságának megszerzését azok ideje tekintetében értékeli, és meghatározza a leginkább elfogadható megoldásokat. Ennek keretében elemzésre kerül az optálási nyilatkozat deklaratív vagy konstitutív jellege, illetve az állampolgárság megváltozására gyakorolt hatásának időpontja is. Az államutódlás állampolgárságra gyakorolt hatása megfelelő belső jogi szabályozás hiányában számos problémához vezet. Az egyének számára leginkább a nemzetközi jog nyújthat védelmet, bár az államutódlás állampolgársági kérdései tekintetében a nemzetközi szabályozás korántsem mondható kielégítőnek. Így a doktori értekezés elemzi a jelenleg hatályos, releváns nemzetközi emberi jogi és állampolgársági tárgyú dokumentumokat és a jövőbeli nemzetközi szabályozás lehetőségeit. Az emberi jogi dokumentumokban különös figyelmet szentel az állampolgársághoz való jogot, az állampolgárságtól való önkényes megfosztás tilalmát és a diszkrimináció tilalmát rögzítő rendelkezéseknek. A jövőbeli szabályozás lehetőségeinek feltárását az értekezés az Egyesült Nemzetek Nemzetközi Jogi Bizottsága által készített szerződéstervezet – a természetes személyek állampolgárságáról államutódlás esetén –, valamint az államutódlás esetén bekövetkező hontalanság elkerüléséről szóló, az Európa Tanács égisze alatt kötött és négy évvel ezelőtt hatályba lépett egyezmény tükrében végzi el. Mindezek alapján az értekezés értékeli a jelenlegi szabályozást és rámutat annak hiányosságaira, egyúttal

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megoldási javaslatokat nyújtva. Megállapítja, hogy a nemzetközi közösségre még számos feladat vár az állampolgárság államutódlás esetére vonatkozó szabályozása terén, ám a legnagyobb kihívást alighanem az jelenti, hogy az államok felismerjék érdekeltségüket, és belássák, hogy a szabályozás elmulasztásából vagy hiányos voltából eredő későbbi problémák megoldása szintén rájuk vár. A kutatás esettanulmányokat is tartalmaz abból a célból, hogy rávilágítson az elméleti részben említett problémák gyakorlati megjelenésére, és ezáltal a nemzetközi jogi szabályok megalkotásának szükségességére. Ennek keretében elemzésre kerülnek hazánk első és második világháborút követő területváltozásai, a német egyesülés, a balti államok elszakadása, Csehszlovákia szétválása, valamint Jugoszlávia felbomlása. Utóbbi eset jogilag ugyan három szakaszra – a Jugoszláv Szocialista Szövetségi Köztársaság szétválására, Montenegró Szerbia és Montenegróból való kiválására, és Koszovó Szerbiától való elszakadására – osztható, de történelmi és földrajzi, valamint az állampolgárság szabályozásában fellelhető összefüggésük az egy helyen való tárgyalásukat indokolja. A kiválasztást hazánk esetében érintettségünk és az eseményeknek a magyar állampolgárság napjainkban történő alakulásában is érezhető hatása indokolja, a további esetek elemzése pedig az 1990-es éveket követő főbb európai államutódlási esetek bemutatására szolgál.

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GANCZER, Mónika


Nationality in International Law – In the Context of State Succession

The changing of sovereignty over a territory also has an effect on nationality, as statehood is a precondition of nationality. In the case of state succession, the loss of nationality of the predecessor state and the difficulty or impossibility of acquiring a new nationality raises numerous questions and issues that need to be regulated by international law. These questions and issues include the elimination of statelessness, the avoidance or settlement of dual nationality, the protection of children, women or spouses, the right to a nationality, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and the prohibition of discrimination. Before a thorough examination of these questions, however, the thesis clarifies certain preliminary matters. First and foremost it offers a definition of nationality based upon the historical backgrounds of the concept. The historical overview obviously facilitates the understanding of elements of the definition of nationality. Hence the thesis reveals the characteristics of historical antecedents and the development of nationality in the modern sense as well as the origins of the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’. The necessity of defining nationality naturally arises both in domestic law and international law, but the resulting definitions have different bases. The thesis, therefore, determines the definition of nationality in domestic law and in international law respectively, and delimitates the relevant terms on the basis of their meanings, all in order to determine the generally acceptable elements of the definition of nationality in international law. Further issues calling for scrutiny include the belonging of nationality to the domaine réservé of states and the necessity of its regulation in international law. In line with that, the thesis explains the essence of domaine réservé, the role of international law in the regulation of nationality, and introduces a special instrument, that is, the non-recognition of nationality by other states. The effectiveness of nationality, its content, legal nature and possible binding force is examined under this last heading. The theoretical bases of effects of state succession on nationality are important segments of the research. The thesis analyses the fundamental issues of state succession to such extent as it is necessary to examine its impacts

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on nationality. Having defined state succession and clarified its relationship with state continuity, the thesis classifies the relevant cases of state succession, and describes the case of cession. From a personal point of view, the individuals affected by state succession are those, who lose the nationality of the predecessor state or acquire the nationality of the successor state. Inhabitants of the given territory (i.e., nationals of the predecessor state, foreigners, stateless persons) as well as nationals of the predecessor state living abroad and certain other individuals all need to be taken into account. The thesis analyses the criteria used to determine the exact scope of such persons, and examines the content and appropriate application of such criteria. A peculiar feature of the change of nationality is the way that change takes place, which has been explained by different theories: the theory of automatic change, the theory of the will of the individual, and the theory of domestic law of the state. (A detailed analysis of the right of option is carried out under the heading of the theory of the will of the individual.) These theories, however, may be synthesized into a new intermediate approach, the theory of the will of the state, that seems to suitably describe the way the change takes place. Another important factor of the change of nationality is the time of change. The thesis examines the loss of the nationality of the predecessor state and the acquisition of the nationality of the successor state in light of the time of change, and identifies the most appropriate solutions. In this context, it also analyses the declarative or constitutive effect of the declaration of option and its impact on the time of change of nationality. The effect of state succession on nationality, in absence of appropriate domestic regulation, leads to numerous problems. It is mainly international law that can provide protection for the individual, although the international regulation of nationality in relation to state succession is far from being satisfactory. Thus the thesis analyses the relevant international documents concerning human rights and matters of nationality currently in effect as well as the perspectives of future international regulation. The provisions of human rights instruments subjected to careful study include articles on the right to a nationality, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality and the prohibition of discrimination. The perspectives of future regulation, on the other hand, are examined on the basis of the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission on nationality of natural persons in relation to state succession, and the Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to state succession that was concluded under the aegis of the Council of Europe, and entered into force four years ago. Bearing all that in mind, the thesis evaluates the regulations in force and indicates their deficiencies and at the same time proposes solutions. It concludes that several tasks are expected to be performed by the international community in relation to nationality and state succession. Nevertheless, the greatest challenge of all is perhaps to make states recognize the benefits of taking action in this field,

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and to realize that the solving of problems resulting from a lacking or defective regulation is a task that only they can fulfil. The research also includes case studies in order to highlight the practical manifestation of theoretical problems identified, and as such, the necessity of the establishment of international legal standards. The thesis analyses the Hungarian territorial changes after the First and Second World Wars, the German unification, the secession of Baltic states, the separation of Czechoslovakia and the break-up of Yugoslavia. Although the latter case can be divided into three parts – the dissolution of the Yugoslav Socialist Federal Republic, the secession of Montenegro from Serbia and Montenegro, and the independence of Kosovo from Serbia – their historical and geographical coherence and the connection between their nationality regulations justify their analysis in the same subsection. The inclusion of Hungarian cases is due to historical considerations and the impact of these events on the recent modification of our nationality regulation. The other case studies serve to introduce the principal instances of state succession in Europe after 1990.

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III. Válogatott tanulmányok/ III. Selected Studies

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III. 1. Egyes törzstagjaink, vezetőink válogatott tanulmányai E fejezetben a Doktori Iskola egyes törzstagjainak, vezetőinek munkáit jelenítjük meg. Eme írásokban törzstagjaink olyan kérdésekre fókuszálnak, amelyeket kutatásaik, életművük során kiemelkedő eredményként tart számon a tudományos közösség, és mind hazai, mind nemzetközi összevetésben széleskörű elismertséget és hírnevet hozott törzstagjainknak. E fejezetben vegyesen található magyar és angol nyelvű írás, igazodva a munkák speciális tárgyköréhez, emellett a tanulmányok a szerzők kéziratához való szöveghű ragaszkodás miatt kerülnek az eredeti nyelven publikálásra.

III. 1. Selected Studies of our Certain Core Members and Leaders This chapter contains some selected studies from our certain core members and leaders from the Doctoral School. By means of these studies, our core members emphasize numerous influential researches from their scientific oeuvre, which are taken into consideration by the scientific community as outstanding research methods and results, which yielded, both in Hungary and abroad, wide and unique reputation and fame to our core members. The studies are not bilingual, they are written either in Hungarian or in English in order to illustrate the researchers’ specific subjects and to adhere to the original form and faithful version of the manuscripts.

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LAMM, Vanda (academician) akadémikus/ordinary member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, kutató professzor/honored professor Institute for Legal Studies of the Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, egyetemi tanár/professor of international law, Széchenyi István University

The Influence of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on Domestic Legal Orders

I. The International Bill of Rights, being the core instrument of the international protection of human rights, consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter: ICCPR), the two Optional Protocols to the Covenant and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter: ICESCR). Among these documents, the ICCPR is unquestionably the most comprehensive international instrument regarding civil and political rights, first of all because it is much more precise and detailed than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is not a treaty. The ICCPR, as Christian Tomuschat points out, “in its structure of drafting closely resembles a constitutional statute of human rights and fundamantal freedoms,” especially because it “lays down the main corner-stones of an open society in which any political opinion which respects the rights and freedoms of others may be voiced.”1 The fundamental character of all human rights conventions is that these are not mere exchanges of obligations between states, but concluded for the benefit of persons within states’ jurisdiction and the implementation of most of their provisions require states’ action. Thus the incorporation of these instruments in domestic legal orders is not enough to meet the requirements of the human rights conventions. The necessity to harmonize domestic laws and practices with human rights conventions and take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or

1 Cf. Tomuschat, Christian: National Implementation of International Standards on Human Rights. Canadian Human Rights Yearbook, Vol. 31 (1984-1985) 47 and 51.

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other measures in order to guarantee the rights protected by the conventions has been stipulated in all major international human rights conventions. However, the direct applicability of the provisions of any human rights convention at a national level is a question that is dependent on the constitutional order of the state and the status of treaties within the domestic legal order. 2 Although the application of international human rights conventions could be best secured in those states where these conventions form part of the domestic legal systems, there is no requirement to introduce any of the human rights conventions into domestic legal orders and as Art. 2, para. 2. of the ICCPR stipulates: “Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”3 As a consequence, there are states, where the Covenant does not form a part of the domestic legal system. In those cases, where the Covenant became a part of the domestic legal order, its status varies from state to state.4 In most states, where the Covenant was incorporated, it was adopted like an ordinary international treaty, having the same rank in the hierachy of the sources of law as any other treaty, convention, agreement etc., thus making it identical to ordinary statutes. However, there are also states where the rank of international treaties is higher than normal statutes but below the constitution. Irrespective of whether the Covenant forms a part of the legal system, according to Art. 2 of the Covenant it should have precedence over any other domestic norms even over the constitution and in the event of a conflict between domestic law and the Covenant, the later prevails over domestic law.

2 Under the ‘monist’ approach, national and international law are viewed as a single legal system. In legal orders presupposing the primacy of international law over national law, no separate implementing legislation is needed to enforce the accepted international legal norms. Thus, after the ratification of a treaty, the instrument becomes part of domestic law. The essence of the ‘dualist’ system is that international law is considered as a separate system of national law which governs the conduct amongst states. Upon ratification, international treaties do not acquire domestic status and specific legislative measures are required to incorporate treaties into domestic law. 3 For the commentary of that paragraph, see Nowak, Manfred: U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary. 2nd revised edition, N.P. Engel Publisher, 2005. 57-62. 4 Cf. Tomuschat, Christian: Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. 101-104.

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The problem of the incorporation of the ICCPR5 into the domestic legal order of the contracting parties was dealt by the the Human Rights Committee – the treaty monitoring body established under the ICCPR – in its General Comment No. 31 on the „Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant”.6 In that document the Human Rights Committee reaffirmed what was said in Art. 2 para. 2 of the ICCPR, nevertheless, it did not dare state that states have an obligation to introduce the ICCPR into domestic legal order. According to the Committee, the obligation of the contracting parties is only that, where there are inconsistencies between domestic laws and a provision of the ICCPR, they should change domestic law and practice as necessary to ensure their conformity with the ICCPR. Under para. 13 of that General Comment, the Covenant allows a state party the pursuit of this in accordance with its own domestic constitutional structure and does not require that the Covenant be directly applicable in the courts, by incorporation of the ICCPR into national law, emphasizing that “The Committee takes the view, however, that Covenant guarantees may receive enhanced protection in those states where the Covenant is automatically or through specific incorporation part of the domestic legal order. The Committee invites those States Parties in which the Covenant does not form part of the domestic legal order to consider incorporation of the Covenant to render it part of domestic law to facilitate full realization of Covenant rights as required by article 2.” The incorporation of the ICCPR in domestic legal order would help national institutions to refer directly to the ICCPR and the decisions, legal documents coming from the treaty monitoring body established by the Covenant. That act could also encourage the change of the practice, which is characteristic of most states whereby the direct application of international treaties in courts is rather limited. Since the Covenant clearly requires execution though domestic legal measures,7 one could say that the incorporation of the Covenant in domestic legal systems is essential and even giving the Covenant the rank of an enactment of constitutional value, which already exists in many countries.8 Conferring constitutional status to an international human rights treaty is not unknown in international and constitutional law and the best exam-

5 The status of these committees will be treated later in that study. Regarding the Human Rights Committee, see McGoldrick, Dominic: The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. 6 The legal position of General Comments will be discussed later. 7 See further Schachter, Oscar: The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law. In: The International Bill of Rights (ed. Henkin, Louis), Columbia University Press, New York, 1981. 311. 8 Cf. Tomuschat: Human Rights…op. cit. 103.

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ple one could refer to is the domestic law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As it is well known under the Dayton Peace Agreement, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols have direct applicability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, without any incorporation and have priority over all other laws of that state.9 II. The major universal human rights conventions contain not only substantial provisions on different human rights protected by the respective conventions but norms on efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken by state parties and for that purpose these conventions are providing for the establishment of expert committees, which are called “treaty monitoring bodies”.10 In connection with human rights treaties not only does the question of implementation and the legal position of the instruments themselves in domestic legal orders emerge, but so too does the impact of the treaty monitoring bodies on the domestic legal order of the contracting parties. As it is rightly pointed out by several authors the success of these monitoring mechanisms depends largely on their influence on national legal orders, since “the main rationale of human rights treaty monitoring mechanisms is that they effect the protection of human rights at the domestic level.”11 The treaty monitoring bodies are composed of independent experts elected by the general assembly of the contracting parties of the convention under which they were established. The members of the treaty monitoring bodies are acting in their individual capacity and the committees should perform their duties impartially. The number of members and composition of the treaty monitoring bodies are determined in the conventions, with the exception of the Committee on

9 See Dayton Peace Agreement Annex 4. Constitution. Art. II. para.2. 10 At a universal level, there are ten such human rights treaty monitoring bodies which include the following: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination – CERD, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – CEDAW, Committee against Torture – CAT, Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of the Committee against Torture – SPT, Human Rights Committtee, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – CESCR, Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families – CMW, Committee on the Rights of the Child – CRC, Committee on Rights of Persons with Disabilities – CRPD, Committee on Enforced Disappearances – CED. On the treaty monitoring bodies, see The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, ed. by Alston, Philip and Crawford, James. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 11 Cf. van Alebeek, Rosanne – Nollkaemper andré: The Legal Status of Decisions by Human Rights Treaty Bodies in National Law. In: UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (ed. Keller, Helen and Ulfstein, Geir), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. 356.

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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was established under a resolution of the UN Economic and Social Council. The membership of the treaty monitoring bodies vary between 10 and 23. The main task of these committees is to monitor the implementation and observation of the human rights convention concerned as well as the extra protocols joined thereto by the contracting parties first of all by considering the periodic reports submitted by these states. Some of the treaty monitoring bodies are invested with the competence of dealing with complaints lodged by a contracting party against another state party.12 There are treaty monitoring bodies who may conduct inquiries on their own initiative if they obtain reliable information regarding serious, grave or systematic violation of certain rights protected by the respective convention.13 Six of the treaty monitoring bodies are mandated to receive communications from individuals or groups of individuals14 submitting claims of violations of the rights protected under the Convention concerned.15 At the end of the consideration procedure of individual complaints or communications the treaty monitoring bodies forward their “views” to the state party concerned and the individual or group of individuals initiating the procedure.16

12 State-to-state complaints could be brought to the HRC, CERD, CAT and CMW; however, that procedure does not exist in practice and not a single such complaint has been submitted for consideration. 13 See Art. 20, para. 3, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Arts. 8-10 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 14 The human rights instruments use the term “communication”; however, in the current administrative structure of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, such communications are initially handled by a section known as the Petitions Team. On individual complaints, see Ulfstein, Geir: Individual complaints. In: UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies… op. cit. 73-115. 15 For the treaty monitoring bodies’ competence to consider individual complaints or communications, it is not enough that the state has ratified the convention concerned, but it is a further requirement that the State should expressly accept that procedure. This could be done either by ratifiying or acceding to the optional protocol joined to the underlying convention, which provides that individuals may complain about the violation of their rights to the treaty monitoring body, or, under some conventions the states could make the necessary declaration recognizing the competence of the treaty monitoring body to consider individual complaints or communications alleging violations of human rights. In the case of the Human Rights Committee and CEDAW, Optional Protocols are providing that the treaty monitoring bodies have the competence to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals. For other conventions, see Art. 14 para. 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art 22 para. 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Art. 31 para. 1 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Under the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families the provisions on individual complaints shall come into force only after ten states parties to the Convention have made such declarations (Cf. Art. 77 para. 8) and up to 31 December 2012, only two states had accepted this procedure. 16 In French the term of “views” is “constatations” and in Spanish “observaciones”. The CERD publishes instead of a “view” and “opinion”.

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With their competence to hear individual complaints or communications on human rights violations, treaty monitoring bodies are competing with human rights courts and the victims of human rights violations practically have the choice between human rights courts and treaty monitoring bodies in terms of where to address their grieviances. By considering the abovementioned individual complaints or communications, the treaty monitoring bodies are acting as quasi-judicial bodies. This is underlined e.g. by Art. 5 para. 2 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR providing that the Committee should not consider any communication if the same matter is being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. According to Manfred Novak, the Committee is thus expressly empowered to decide on matters that have already been decided on by another international fora.17 In order to avoid the situation whereby the Human Rights Committee could act as an appeal forum against a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recommended that the member states of the Council of Europe ratify the First Optional Protocol with a reservation.18 Thus, the cited provision of the Optional Protocol was the subject of reservation by several member states of the Council of Europe making it clear that the Human Rights Committee shall not solely have competence in cases where the same matter is being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement, but it shall also have competence in those cases where the same matter has already been considered under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.19 The quasi-judicial status of the Human Rights Committee was reaffirmed in para. 11 of its General Comment No. 33 on “The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” stating that “[w]hile the function of the Human Rights Committee in considering individual communications is not, as such, that of a judicial body, the views issued by the Committee under the Optional Protocol exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial decision (emphasise mine – the author).”20 The human rights conventions are silent regarding the implementation of the treaty monitoring bodies’ decisions on individual complaints or communications, with the exeception of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. That instru-

17 See Nowak: op. cit. 881. 18 See Nowak: op. cit. 881. 19 See the reservations to Art. 5 para. 2.a) by Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, France, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey and Uganda. 20 It should be added that in 1979 the Human Rights Committee in the Massera et al. v. Uruguay case adopted a court-like design for its decisions, which had been kept till nowadays. Cf. Nowak: op. cit. 892.

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ment provides that the state party concerned should give due consideration to the views of the Committee, together with its recommendations and shall submit to the Committee a written response, including information on any action taken in light of the views and recommendations of the Committee. After receiving the written response the Committee has the right to invite the state party to submit further information about any measures that have been taken in response to the Committee’s views or recommendations.21 In the case of the international human rights courts, the situation is clear. Their judgements have binding force, they should be executed and thus e.g. in Art. 46 of the European Convention of Human Rights the member states have undertaken “to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights”.22 The states have a legal obligation to remedy the violations found by the Court, they should not only wind up, as far as possible, the consequences of the human rights violations and make compensation to the victims, but they should also make changes to their domestic legal systems. Thus the decisions of international human rights courts have a strong influence on national laws, although they are not vested with the competence to annul, repeal or modify legislative provisions or individual decisions taken by national authorities.23 Since “views” of the human rights treaty monitoring bodies are not stricto sensu legally compelling on their binding effect, the literature of international law is rather divided.24 The effect of the views was treated by the Human Rights Committee’s General Commment No. 33. According to para. 20 in most states there is no specific legislation to receive the views of the Committee into their domestic legal order; however, there are also states whose domestic laws provide for the payment of compensation to the victims of violations of human rights as found by international organs. “In any case, States parties must use whatever means lie within their power in order to give effect to the views issued by the Committee.”25

21 Cf. Art. 7 para. 4 and 5 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 22 On the executions of the Court’s decision in friendly settlement cases, see Art. 39 para. 4 of the Convention. 23 See Polakiewicz, Jörg: International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law, Law and Decisions of International Organizations and Courts. In: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (ed. Rüdiger Wolfrum), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. 868. 24 It should be added that the binding effect of the decisions on interim measures of protection could be raised as well, however, that issue will not be treated in this paper. On this score, see Ulfstein: op. cit. 92-102. 25 It should be added that in 1997 the Human Rights Committee established a special follow up procedure on the complience and implementation of its views and a special rapporteur was appointed who through written representations and frequently also through personal meetings with diplomatic representatives of the state party concerned, urges compliance with the Committee’s views and discusses factors that may be impeding their implementation.

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Giving effect to the views means not only the implementation of a decision of the treaty monitoring body, but that it could have an influence on the domestic legal order of the state concerned as well. Since in order to avoid recurrence of the same type of violation in question, in most cases there is a need to make changes in the laws and practices of the state concerned.26 Thus although views are decisions on individuals’ or a group of persons’ grievances, they have an impact on the national law of states and as a consequence of the views several states have amended laws being in conflict with the Covenant.27 The importance of the interpretative case law of the Human Right Committee was highlited by International Court of Justice in the Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo and stating that the Court „believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent body.”28 III. Over the course of time, treaty monitoring bodies while considering state reports have dealt not only with the implementation of rights – protected by the respective treaties – and individual complaints, but they have published “general recommendations”, “general comments”, or “observations générales”.29 The formulation of general comments were necessitated by the reporting systems. First of all, because the human rights conventions were rather laconic on the content of the reports and in order for the reports submitted by states to meet certain requirements, it was necessary to interpret the conventions. In the human rights conventions one is able to find very few provisions on general comments and the travaux préparatoires do not provide any instruction either. However, some human rights conventions refer to the general comments, thus e.g. Art. 40 para. 4 of the ICCPS provides that

Cf. Schmidt, Markus G.: Protocol facultatif se rapportant au Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et poilitques. In: Le Pacte international ralatif aux droits civils et politiques. Commentaire article par article. Sous la direction d’Emanuel Decaux. Economica, Paris, 2011. 863-864. 26 General Comment No. 31. para. 17. 27 Cf. Schmidt: op.cit. 862. 28 Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo. Judgement of 30 November 2010. I.C.J. Reports, 2010. 664. 29 It should be mentioned that treaty monitoring bodies do not use the same terminology, thus CERD and CEDAW are refering to the term of general recommendation; while other treaty bodies denominate them as general comment. In that paper the term of general comment would be used for both of them. In 1972, the CERD was the first body publishing such a general comment. Until nowadays no general comment was issued by CMW and CRPD. On the general comments, see Keller, Helen – Grover, Leena: General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their legitimacy. In: UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies…op. cit. 116-194.

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“4. The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the Economic and Social Council these comments along with the copies of the reports it has received from States Parties to the present Covenant.”30 By the general comments, new elements have been introduced in the practice of the treaty bodies and the practice of the monitoring system established by the conventions, because these general comments have an important role in defining the normative content of the rights protected and the meaning of individual rights and state obligations.31 At the beginning of their activities, in view of the reporting system, the Human Rights Committee and other treaty monitoring bodies concentrated on general comments regarding the reporting system and only those adopted later on have treated the substantive provisions concerning the rights protected by the conventions. In drafting general comments the Human Rights Committee has the most extensive practice. Not only because that committee has published more general comments than any other committee, but that committee has drafted most of the general comments on substantive provisions and thus has been interpreting the rights protected by the ICCPR. Some rights were even the subject of not only one but even two general comments. Thus Christine Chanet was right by stating that this committee has developed a real corpus juris.32 The importance of that body of general comments could be reinforced by the fact that both the International Court of Justice,33 the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Rwanda Tribunal have refered to general comments.34

30 Under Art. 9 para. 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Committee “may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of the reports and information received from the States Parties.” One could find literally the same provisions in Art. 21 para. 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In other conventions there are no references to general comments. However, since most of the treaty bodies have issued general comments one could state that general comments are legal instruments developed in the practice of the treaty bodies. 31 Cf. Mechlem, Kerstin: Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 42. (2009) 905. 32 Préface by Chanet. Christine: In: Le Pacte international… V. 33 In the advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences cf the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory the Court while interpreting the restrictions on liberty of movement has dealt with the interpretation given by the Human Rights Committeee in para 14 of its General Comment No. 27. Cf. Legal Consequences cf the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports, 2004, 193. 34 These ad hoc criminal courts have alluded to the general comments of the Human Rights Committee and Committee against Torture.

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The same holds to the Venice Committee which referred also to the general comments of treaty bodies in his opinion on the new Hungarian Basic Law.35 Taking into consideration the treaty monitoring bodies’ practice one could differenciate between four categories of general comments: a) The first group consists of general comments relating to the reporting obligations under the conventions, e.g. one could refer to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 1 and 2 on “Reporting guidelines”. b) To the second group belong those general comments, which relate to substantive provisions of the conventions or the protocols joined to the conventions; thus the general comments belonging to that category are important in the interpretation of the rights protected by the conventions concerned; from the practice of the Human Rights Committee one could mention General Comments No. 9 on “Human treatment of persons deprived of liberty”, or No. 10 on the “Freedom of expression”. c) The third group comprises general comments concerning special categories of persons protected under the conventions; such are the Human Rights Committee’s General Comments No. 17 on the “Rights of the child” and No. 23 on “The rights of minorities”. d) The fourth group includes general comments, which are formulated in connection with one of the conventions; however, having certain effects not only with respect to the convention concerned but others as well, as an example of that category one could refer to General Comment No. 24 of the Human Rights Committee relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the ICCPR or the Optional Protocols thereto. The legal status of the interpretation given by these four categories of general comments differs. There is a communis opinio doctorum that general comments regarding the reporting systems have binding force and states should comply with these comments, since the submission of the reports and the obsevance of the requirements specified by the treaty monitoring bodies form an important element of their obligations assumed in the conventions. A great part of general comments treating substantial provisions on different rights protected by the conventions and although they are legally not binding their legal significance is not questionable.36 General comments on substantial provisions have a very important role not only in the interpretation and development of international human rights norms, but they also have a strong influence on the domestic legal order of

35 Cf. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Opinion no. 614/2011, CDL-AD(2011)001 Opinion on Three Legal Questions Arrising of Drafting the New Constitution of Hungary. Para. 27. 36 Cf. Keller-Grover: op. cit. 128-130.

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states parties as well. As Helen Keller and Leena Grover pointed out, in connection with the ICCPR general comments, they could influence the national implementation of Covenant obligations as their visibility and legitimacy increases among members of their intended audience and they also have an important educative function for states and members of civil society.37 IV. While discussing the legal effects of the views and general comments issued by human rights monitoring bodies, as well as their influence on state practice and domestic legal order, it is necessary to treat the legal status of these committees as well. As it was already mentioned, the treaty bodies’ main task is to monitor the implementation and the observation of human rights conventions. These commissions are, strictly speaking, not UN organs, but treaty based organs created by states parties to the human rights conventions concerned.38 According to the human rights conventions, in the composition of treaty monitoring bodies, the equitable geographical distribution, the representation of different forms of civilization and the principal legal systems should be taken into account.39 States have a certain liberty in nominating the members to the treaty monitoring bodies and only a few of the human rights conventions provide on “the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience”.40 As a consequence, among the members of the treaty monitoring bodies one could find not only persons having law degrees, but sociologists, economists, doctors, teachers as well. Some states designate professors, former diplomats, other experts having practice in public administration or working with NGOs. That composition has some benefits to the activities of the treaty monitoring bodies, since it gives the possibility to them to consider the reports submitted by the contracting parties with an interdisciplinary approach.41

37 Cf. Ibid. 194. 38 At the same time, however, they are much dependent on the United Nations by reporting on its activities to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, receiving support from the UN human rights bodies, the Human Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 39 Cf. Art. 18 para. 1 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Art. 43 para. 2, Convention on the Rights of the Child; Art. 72 para. 2 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; Art. 8 para. 1, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 40 See e.g. Art. 28 para. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art. 17 para. 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 41 Cf. Mechlem: op. cit. 918.

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Thus the composition and the position of the treaty monitoring bodies represent very well that these committees are, as Christian Tomuschat pointed out in connection with the Human Rights Commission, “the best-suited meeting point and clearing-centre for diverging interpretations of the ICCPR put forth by states with different ideological standpoints.” 42 While interpretating the human rights conventions by the treaty monitoring bodies questions emerge as to what rules are governing that process of interpretation and what method of interpretation is prevailing in the practice of the treaty monitoring bodies. The interpretation given by the treaty monitoring bodies, which also manifest in general comments, at first sight could be perceived as a practical and doctrinal interpretation as well. Regarding the practical interpretation, one could take as a guide Art. 31 para. 3 b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties providing that concerning the interpretation of a treaty one should take into consideration “b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” In terms of the perspective of practical interpretation, the situation of the human rights treaties is rather special, since one can find two levels of interpretation.43 On the one hand, it is possible to speak about the practice of different international fora – including the practice of human right courts, treaty monitoring bodies and other international institutions, NGOs etc. – and the practice of domestic courts, public administration authorities, institutions, etc. in respect of the contracting parties on the other hand. Thus, in the case of human rights treaties, it is hard to speak of the Vienna convention in terms of the subsequent practice of states in the sense that it is “in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”, because in the case of human rights treaties one should take into consideration the practice of several states and different international fora, which do not constitute a “uniform practice” as it was referred to by Humphrey Waldock, special rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the Vienna convention.44 The treaty monitoring bodies when elaborating and drafting general comments, due to the reporting system, have comprehensive information on the legislative, judiciary and administrative practice regarding the contracting parties. Since the general comments are formulated by the treaty monitoring bodies as a result of their experiences gained while considering, discussing states’ reports and practice and examining individual complaints or com-

42 Cf. Tomuschat: National Implementation … op. cit. 36. 43 On the subsequent practice of States, see Gardiner, Richard: Treaty Interpretation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. 225-249. 44 Cf. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Dokumente (ed. Rauschning. Dietrich – Metzner, Alfred), Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main. 1978. 247.

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munications, that constitutes the guarantee that treaty monitoring bodies are aware of the human rights situations in the contracting parties and the problems connected with the implementation of the conventions. The same opinion was reflected in the report of the International Law Association as well, by stating that in the case of human rights treaties “relevant subsequent practice might be broader than subsequent State practice and include the considered views of the treaty monitoring bodies adopted in the performance of the functions conferred on them by the States parties.”45 One could state that the interpretations given by the treaty monitoring bodies have been based on the practice of the contracting parties. However, such practice is not an agreed practice of the contracting parties in the sence of the Vienna convention, but instead it is the individual practice of each state or a group of states, which unquestionably are coinciding and reflecting similarities. In the general comments the treaty monitoring bodies are either adopting or refuting certain states’ practice or interpretation. Thus the interpretation given by the treaty monitoring bodies is not a direct interpretation by states, nevertheless, in the process of elaboration of general comments the states have the possibility to express their views.46 According to the present writer the interpretation given in the general comments by the treaty monitoring bodies could be considered to be a special instance of doctrinal interpretation as well. The traditional doctrinal interpretation means treaty interpretation by publicists and, as the Statute of the International Court of Justice makes reference to among the subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law to the “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.” The interpretation given by treaty monitoring bodies in their general comments differ from that since these comments reflect the collated opinion of well know experts coming from different states, who are educated on different legal cultures. Of course, the multicultural character in the composition of each treaty monitoring body depends on the universality of the convention concerned. The level of the argumentation of the general comments is very divergent. Some general comments are brief and concise, reminding us of the decisions of international organizations; others are much longer and detailed, having precise legal argumentation. In that respect there are great differences between general comments. The first general comments were rather brief, but the comments published in the last fifteen years have been much longer with precise legal argumentation.

45 Cf. International Law Association, Report of the Seventy-first Conference, Berlin, 2004. 1970. 629. 46 General comments before publication are sent to states parties in order to make comments.

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The weight of the doctrinal interpretation depends largely on the authority of the person interpreting the treaty and the level of its argumentation.47 Regarding the general comments one could state that these are formulated by experts having great authority and the level of argumentation, especially in respect of those general comments published in the last fifteen years, has been high and persuasive. In connection with these interpretations the question emerges as to what is their legal status, especially because, as the report of the International Law Association stated, the human rights conventions do not provide on the competence of the treaty monitoring bodies to interpret the conventions with binding force and some states suggested that this power has not been confered even implicitly.48 The position of the Human Rights Committee regarding that question differs from that and in Para. 13 of its General Comment No. 33 it held that “The views of the Committee under the Optional Protocol represent an authoritative determination by the organ established under the Covenant itself charged with the interpretation of that instrument. These views derive their character and the importance which attaches to them, from the integral role of the Committee under both the Covenant and the Optional Protocol.” The authority of the Human Rights Committee to interpret the substantial provisions of the human rights conventions with binding effect was considerably strenghtened by the “Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties” adopted by the International Law Committee in 2011.49 That instrument put an end to a long dispute between the International Law Commission and the Human Rights Committee and recognized the competence of the Human Rights Committee to assess the permissibility of reservations. It should be recalled that from the 1970s more and more states made reservations to human rights treaties. That caused more and more problems in practice, since the treaty monitoring bodies, while discussing the reports of some states or individual communications, made it necessary to determine whether specific reservations were permitted or compatible with the object and purpose of the human rights convention concerned;50 especially because several human rights treaties neither prohibit reservations nor mention any type of permitted reservation.51 To resolve that problem in 1994 the Human

47 Cf. Haraszti, György: A nemzetközi szerződések értelmezésének alapvető kérdései (Basic Problems of the Interpretation of Treaties). Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1965. 121. 48 Cf. International Law Association, Report … op. cit. 627. 49 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011. Vol. II, Part Two. Sixty-third session (26 April – 3 June and 4 July – 12 August 2011) . 50 See The Practice of Human Rights Treaty Bodies with respect to Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties. United Nations HRI/MC/2005/5. 51 On the problems of reservations to human rights treaties see Cohen-Jonathan, Gérard: Les réserves dans les traités institutionnels relatifs aux droits de l’homme. Nouveau aspects européens et internationaux. Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1996) No. 4, 915-949.; Baratta, Roberto:

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Rights Committee adopted its General Comment No. 24 on “Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant”. In that document the Human Rights Committee expressly stated that some caterories of reservations are not permissible and others may offend the object and the purspose of the Covenant. For that reason General Comment No. 24 was the subject of sharp criticism by several states and some authors as well, questioning the competance of the Human Rights Committee to make such an assessment. Under para. 3.2.1. of the Guide adopted by the International Law Commission “A treaty monitoring body may, for the purpose of discharging the functions entrusted to it, assess the permissibility of reservations formulated by a state or an international organization.”52 Although, after the ascertainment of an invalid reservation by the treaty monitoring body, the State making an invalid reservation will have the possibility of expressing its intention whether it considers itself to be bound by the convention concerned or not without the benefit of the invalid reservation, 53 nevertheless the appreciation of a reservation and thus the interpretation of the given convention by a treaty monitoring body will have a binding effect. Thus the Guide, as was already mentioned, considerably strengthened the role and importance of the treaty monitoring bodies in interpreting human rights conventions. That would also have an influence on the position of the other decisions of the human rights treaty bodies as well. With all probability that would highlight the importance of the views and general comments of the treaty monitoring bodies and would contribute to their full implementation, both at international and national level.

Should Invalid Reservation to Human Rights Treaties Be Disreagrds? European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11 (2000) No. 2, 413-425. 52 It should be added that this does not affect the competence of the contracting parties to assess the permissibility of reservations to the convention concerned. 53 Unless the reserving state has expressed a contrary intention, it is considered a contracting state or a contracting organization without the benefit of the reservation. (Para. 4.5.3. of the Guide).

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VAVRÓ, István DSc. Professor emeritus/emeritus professor (Széchenyi István University)

A bűnözés tárgyi oldalának főbb jellemzői Magyarországon 2000-2011 között [The Main Characteristics of the Material Side of the Criminality in Hungary between 2000 and 2011]

A bűnözés mint társadalmi tömegjelenség statisztikai módszerekkel történő vizsgálata többféle megközelítésben is lehetséges. Egyrészt vizsgálható a büntetőeljárás különböző szakaszaiban, másrészt vizsgálható bűncselekményi (tárgyi) és bűnelkövetői (alanyi) oldalról. A különböző megközelítések eredményeként szükségszerűen más-más adatokhoz jutunk, és ebből eltérő következtetések vonhatók le. A kriminálstatisztikával rendszeresen nem foglalkozók ezért gyakran megfeledkeznek arról, hogy a teljes kép kialakítása érdekében komplex megközelítést és vizsgálati módszert kell alkalmaznunk, ennek hiányában gyakran ellentmondást vélnek felfedezni a különböző adatok között. Teljeskörű megfigyelésre már csak terjedelmi okokból is ritkán van lehetőség, ezért ennek hiányában szükséges félreérthetetlenül megjelölni, hogy milyen szakaszban, milyen adatok alapján és milyen módszerrel dolgozunk. Idősorok vizsgálata esetén nem hagyható figyelmen kívül a formális jogi tényezők adatok alakulására gyakorolt hatása sem. A továbbiakban a rendőrségi-ügyészségi statisztikai rendszer 2000-2011 közötti időszakra vonatkozó adatait használjuk fel. Az ezen időszak főbb jellemzőit bűncselekményi oldalról vizsgáljuk, és terjedelmi okokból kizárólag a legfontosabb vagy valamilyen szempontból lényegesnek ítélt változásokra hívjuk fel a figyelmet. A 2000-2011 közötti időszakban 5 159 750 közvádas bűncselekmény vált ismertté (jelenleg használatos kifejezéssel: ennyi közvádas bűncselekményt regisztráltak). A bűncselekmények évi átlagos száma tehát 429 979 volt. Az évi ingadozások tendencia-alakulásának vizsgálatát esetleg megzavaró hatásának csökkentése érdekében az időszakot két egyenlő részre osztjuk, és ezeket illetőleg ezek átlagát is összehasonlítjuk. Így vizsgálva megállapítható, hogy bizonyos változás kimutatható, de mértéke nem jelentős. Az időszak első felében ugyanis 2 605 897 bűncselekmény, évente átlagosan tehát 434 316, a második felében 2 553 853, évente átlagosan 425 642 bűncselekmény vált ismertté. A csökkenés az időszak második felében – az első feléhez viszonyítva – 2,0 % volt.

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Az ismertté vált közvádas bűncselekmények Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Bűncselekmények száma összesen 450 673 465 694 420 782 413 343 418 883 436 522 425 941 426 914 408 407 394 034 447 186 451 371

A bűncselekmények 100 000 lakosra számítva 4487,3 4565,5 4135,5 4075,4 4140,5 4323,0 4227,0 4241,1 4065,6 3928,2 4465,5 4520,2

1. sz. táblázat A bűnözés mennyiségi szempontból legjelentősebb része cselekményi oldalon a vagyon elleni bűncselekmények köre: átlagos arányuk az időszak egészére számítva 64,09 %. Az időszak két részre történő felosztása alapján vizsgálva megállapítható, hogy arányuk csökkent: az időszak első felében 66,08 %, míg második felében 61,96 % volt. Ez annyit jelent, hogy 2000-2005 között 1 721 888, évenként átlagosan 286 981 vagyon elleni bűncselekmény vált ismertté. Az időszak második felében ugyanezek az adatok: összesen 1 585 249, évente átlagosan 264 208 vagyon elleni bűncselekmény. Annak az oka, hogy az arány az összbűnözés csökkenése mellett is mérséklődött, az a körülmény, hogy a vagyon elleni bűncselekmények száma az átlagot meghaladó mértékben csökkent, az összbűnözésre vonatkozóan számított 2,0 %-os csökkenéstől eltérően 7,94 %-al. A vagyon elleni bűncselekmények száma és aránya az összbűnözésben Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

A vagyon elleni bűncselekmények száma aránya (%) 311 611 69,1 317 900 68,3 283 664 67,4 275 891 66,7 262 082 62,6

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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

270 740 260 147 276 193 265 755 253 366 273 613 256 175

62,0 61,1 64,7 65,1 64,3 61,2 56,8

2. sz. táblázat A vagyon elleni bűncselekmények alakulását vizsgálva nem hagyható figyelmen kívül az e bűncselekmények által okozott kár összege sem. Ezzel kapcsolatban azt kell megállapítanunk, hogy az a 2000. évi 95 milliárd 710 millió forintról 2011-ig 123 milliárd 620 millió forintra emelkedett. Két olyan év volt, amikor a kárösszeg ennél magasabb volt: –– 2003-ban 153 milliárd 717 millió forint –– 2010-ben 139 milliárd 969 millió forint. A vagyon elleni bűncselekmények által okozott kár összegét, annak változását a 3. számú táblázat, míg a bűncselekmények számának változását, ezen belül a vagyon elleni bűncselekmények számának változását és az okozott kár összegének alakulását a 4. számú táblázat tartalmazza. A vagyon elleni bűncselekmények által okozott kár (Ft) Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Okozott kár 95 710 881 900 113 025 156 600 92 007 437 400 153 717 486 400 99 458 249 200 104 308 328 000 95 381 706 100 117 080 491 200 100 911 371 300 101 657 114 493 139 969 595 400 123 620 228 330

3. sz. táblázat

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Egy vagyon elleni bűncselekményre jutó kár 307 149 355 537 324 354 557 167 379 493 385 271 366 645 423 908 379 716 401 226 511 560 482 562


A bűncselekmények számának változás és a vagyon elleni bűncselekmények által okozott kár változása

Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

A vagyon elleni Az összes bűncseA vagyon elleni bűncsebűncselekmények lekmény számának lekményekkel okozott számának váltováltozása kár összegének változása zása 100,00 100,00 100,00 103,33 102,02 118,09 93,37 91,03 96,13 91,72 88,54 160,61 92,95 84,11 103,92 96,86 86,88 108,98 94,51 83,48 99,66 94,73 88,63 122,33 90,62 85,28 105,43 87,43 81,31 106,21 99,23 87,61 146,24 100,15 82,21 129,16

4. sz. táblázat Az okozott kár mértékének érzékeltetésére célszerű összehasonlítani azt más gazdasági, jövedelmi mutatókkal, így az egy bűncselekményre jutó kár ös�szegét és annak változását a fogyasztói árindex, valamint az egy keresőre jutó reálkereseti index alakulásával. Összehasonlításként jegyezzük meg, hogy az alkalmazásban álló, teljes munkaidőben foglalkoztatottak havi bruttó átlagkeresete 2000-ben 87 645 forint, míg az egy vagyon elleni bűncselekmény által okozott kár összege 307 149 forint volt, 2011-ben pedig a havi bruttó átlagkereset összege 213 054 forint, míg az egy vagyon elleni bűncselekményre jutó kár összege 482 562 forint volt. További összehasonlítás céljából közöljük a fogyasztói árindexhez és az egy keresőre jutó reálkereset indexével történő összehasonlítást.

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Összehasonlító adatok */ Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Az egy vagyon elleni bűncselekményre jutó kár összege (Ft) változása (%) 307 149 100,00 355 539 115,75 324 354 105,60 557 167 181,40 379 493 123,55 385 271 125,43 366 645 119,37 423 908 138,01 379 716 123,63 401 226 130,63 511 560 166,55 482 562 157,11

Fogyasztói árindex 100,0 109,2 114,9 120,3 128,4 132,9 138,2 149,2 158,2 164,8 172,9 179,6

Az egy keresőre jutó reálkereset indexe 100,0 106,4 120,9 131,9 130,5 138,6 143,6 136,9 138,1 134,9 137,4 140,7

5. sz. táblázat */ A KSH az indexek adatait egy tizedes számig közli, míg mi két tizedesig számoltuk. A bűnözés alakulásának vizsgálatánál – terjedelmi okokból – arra kényszerülünk, hogy csak néhány kiemelt bűncselekményt vizsgáljunk. Ilyen az erőszakos bűncselekmények közül a szándékos és az erős felindulásban elkövetett befejezett emberölés, valamint a szándékos súlyos testi sértés. A közvéleményben elsősorban a hírközlő eszközök hatására egyre inkább terjed az a vélemény, hogy e téren a helyzet rosszabbodik. A valóság ezzel szemben az, hogy mind a szándékos és az erős felindulásban elkövetett, befejezett emberölések száma, mind a szándékos súlyos testi sértések száma csökkenő tendenciát mutat. A megfigyelt időszakban a szándékos és az erős felindulásban elkövetett befejezett emberölések száma összesen 2152 volt, ez évente átlagosan 179 ilyen bűncselekményt jelent. Az időszak első felében 1263, évente tehát átlagosan 210, míg a második felében 889, évente tehát átlagosan 148 ilyen bűncselekmény vált ismertté. Vagyis az időszak második felében, annak első feléhez viszonyítva 29,61 %-os csökkenés következett be. Hasonló módon, ha kisebb mértékben is, de ugyanez a tendencia figyelhető meg a szándékos súlyos testi sértések esetében is. Ezek száma a megfigyelt időszakban összesen 88 803 volt, évente átlagosan 7 400. Az időszak első felében 45 373, átlagosan 7 562, míg a második felében 43 430, évente átlagosan 7 238 bűncselekmény vált ismertté. A csökkenés mennyiségében nem jelentős ugyan és mértékében is mindössze 4,28 %, de kétségkívül bekövetkezett.

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A szándékos és az erős felindulásban elkövetett, befejezett emberölések száma és 100 000 lakosra jutó gyakorisága

Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Szándékos és az erős felindulásban elkövetett befejezett emberölés száma gyakorisága 205 2,0 254 2,5 203 2,0 228 2,2 209 2,1 164 1,6 174 1,7 154 1,5 147 1,5 139 1,4 133 1,3 142 1,4

Szándékos súlyos testi sértés száma 7621 7261 7531 7428 7882 7650 7309 6796 7631 7071 7832 6791

gyakorisága 75,9 71,2 74,0 73,2 77,9 75,8 72,5 67,5 76,0 70,5 78,2 67,8

6. sz. táblázat A szándékos és az erős felindulásban elkövetett, befejezett emberölések, valamint a szándékos súlyos testi sértések számának változása Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

A szándékos és az erős felindulásban elkövetett, befejezett emberölés 100,00 123,90 99,02 111,22 101,95 80,00 84,88 75,12 71,71 67,80 64,88 69,27

7. sz. táblázat

136

Szándékos súlyos testi sértés 100,00 95,28 98,82 97,47 103,42 100,38 95,91 89,17 100,13 92,78 102,77 89,11


A társadalom közérzetét befolyásoló tényezők között nem elhanyagolható a közúti közlekedés helyzete, így az ezzel kapcsolatos jogsértések alakulása sem. A közlekedés ugyanis – néhány kivételtől eltekintve – valamilyen módon mindenkit érint, a közérzetet tehát a közúti közlekedés biztonsága jelentősen befolyásolja. A 2000-2011 közötti időszakban összesen 221 180 közlekedési bűncselekmény, évente átlagosan tehát 18 432 vált ismertté. Az időszak első felében, 2000-2005 között 117 809, évente átlagosan 19 635, míg a második felében, 2006-2011 között 103 371, évente átlagosan 17 228 közlekedési bűncselekményt regisztráltak. A csökkenés mértéke tehát figyelemre méltó: 12,26 %. A közlekedési bűncselekmények súlyosságuk szempontjából különböző kategóriákra oszthatók. A halálos közúti közlekedési balesetek okozása kétségkívül a legsúlyosabb közlekedési bűncselekmény. Ezek száma a megfigyelt időszakban összesen 5 449, évente átlagosan 454 volt. A csökkenés itt is megfigyelhető, az időszak első felében 3 087, átlagosan 514, míg második a felében 2 362, átlagosan 394 ilyen bűncselekményt regisztráltak. A csökkentés tehát jelentős: 23,49 %. A súlyos testi sértést okozó közlekedési balesetek száma összesen 40 707 volt, évente átlagosan 3 392, ebből az időszak első felében 21 516, évente átlagosan 3 586, míg a második felében összesen 19 191, évente átlagosan 3 198 bűncselekményt regisztráltak. A csökkenés mértéke itt is figyelemre méltó: 10,81 %. A közúti közlekedési bűncselekmények Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Közúti közlekedési bűncselekmények száma 18 244 17 922 20 015 18 990 20 872 21 766 20 414 21 268 17 835 16 283 14 981 12 590 8/a. sz. táblázat

137

változása (%) 100,00 98,24 109,71 104,09 114,40 119,30 111,89 116,58 97,76 89,25 82,11 69,01


A közúti közlekedési bűncselekmények A közúti közlekedési bűncselekményekből Év

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Súlyos testi sértést okozó közúti baleset száma változása (%) 3425 100,00 3184 92,96 3624 105,81 3400 99,27 3975 116,06 3908 114,10 3600 105,11 3919 114,42 3347 97,72 3003 87,68 2778 81,11 2544 74,28

Halálos közúti baleset száma 570 450 513 491 532 531 468 482 371 409 346 286

változása (%) 100,00 78,95 90,00 86,14 93,33 93,16 82,11 84,56 65,09 71,75 60,70 50,18

8/b. sz. táblázat A közlekedési bűncselekmények közül kétségkívül a leggyakoribb az ittas járművezetés. A cselekmény sajátos jellegéből adódik, hogy a statisztikai adatok alakulása nem csak az ilyen bűncselekmények számának tényleges változásától, hanem a rendőri ellenőrzés gyakoriságától is függ. Valószínű persze, hogy a gyakori rendőri ellenőrzésnek visszatartó hatása van, de feltételezhetően e cselekmény kategóriában a látencia igen jelentős mértékű. Az ittas járművezetés közlekedési bűncselekményeken belüli aránya 65,52 % volt. Az időszak során gyakorlatilag csaknem változatlan: első felében 65,80 %, második felében 65,20%. Az ittas járművezetések ismert száma 2000-2011 között összesen 144 923, évente átlagosan tehát 12 077 volt. Első felében 77 520, évente átlagosan 12 920, míg a második felében 67 403, évente átlagosan 11 234 bűncselekményt regisztráltak. A csökkenés mértéke mindenképpen említést érdemel: 13,05 %.

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A közúti közlekedési bűncselekmények

Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

A közúti közlekedési bűncselekményekből ittas járművezetés száma 11 669 11 621 13 318 12 737 13 758 14 417 13 952 14 157 11 523 10 438 9 710 7 623

változása (%) 100,00 99,59 114,13 109,15 117,90 123,55 119,56 121,32 98,75 89,45 83,21 65,33

aránya %-ban 63,96 64,84 66,54 67,07 65,92 66,24 68,35 66,56 64,61 64,10 64,82 60,55

8/c. sz. táblázat A házasság, a család, a gyermeknevelés problémái, az ifjúság helyzete folyamatosan az érdeklődés homlokterében áll. A politikusok, a társadalomtudományok művelői és természetesen a jogászok rendszeresen foglalkoznak az e téren fennálló problémákkal. A kérdés megközelítése több oldalról is lehetséges, büntetőjogi szempontból a gyermek- és a fiatalkori bűnözés rendszeres vizsgálata mellett demográfiai szempontból a családok stabilitását, a házasság felbontások számát, családjogi szempontból az ezzel kapcsolatos jogi problémák, gyermekelhelyezés, tartás elmulasztása, kiskorú veszélyeztetése képezheti vizsgálat tárgyát. Ez utóbbi két probléma tekintetében a büntetőjogi megközelítés jelentősége kétségkívül igen nagy. Terjedelmi okokból most két, a téma szempontjából lényeges bűncselekmény, a tartás elmulasztása és a kiskorú veszélyeztetése alakulását tekintjük át. A bűncselekmények száma a tartás elmulasztásánál 31 136, évente átlagosan 2 595 volt. Ebből az időszak első felében 14 539, évente átlagosan 2 423 eset, a második felében 16 597, évente átlagosan 2 766 cselekmény vált ismertté. Az előzőekben vizsgált cselekményeknél megfigyelt csökkenéssel szemben, itt 14,16 %-os növekedés figyelhető meg. Kiskorú veszélyeztetése megnevezésű bűncselekmények száma összesen 19 915, évente átlagosan 1 660 volt. Az időszak első felében 8 488, évente átlagosan 1 415, a második felében 11 427, évente átlagosan 1 905 cselekmény

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vált ismertté. A növekedés tehát igen jelentős: 34,59 %. Az adatok alapján nem lehet egyértelműen tisztázni, hogy az ilyen cselekmények váltak ilyen mértékben gyakoribbá, vagy csak a társadalom érzékenysége illetőleg a hatóságok aktivitása fokozódott. Tartás elmulasztása, kiskorú veszélyeztetése Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Tartás elmulasztása száma változás (%) 1952 100,00 2130 109,12 2398 122,85 2524 129,30 2771 141,96 2764 141,60 2668 136,68 2523 129,25 2586 132,48 2732 139,96 3107 159,17 2981 152,72

Kiskorú veszélyeztetése száma változás (%) 1014 100,00 1073 105,82 1073 105,82 1316 129,78 1973 194,58 2039 201,08 1809 178,40 1785 176,04 1863 183,73 1979 195,17 1972 194,48 2019 199,11

9. sz. táblázat A gyermek- és fiatalkorúak egészséges testi és szellemi fejlődésének biztosítása olyan társadalmi érdek, mely a nevelés szempontjainak komplex megközelítését teszi szükségessé. Ezért ez értelemszerűen kiterjed az ilyen életkorúak egészséges szexuális fejlődésének biztosítására is. Az eszközök között a büntetőjogi szabályozásnak is helye van. Így a szexuális fejlődés egyén és társadalom érdekét egyaránt biztosító szabályozása körében külön figyelmet érdemel a pubertás körüli életkor fejlődési nehézségeinek, a fejlődés zavartalanságának biztosítása. A jogalkotó ezért szükségesnek tartotta a büntetőjogi védelem kiterjesztését az ilyen korú személyek életének erre az elemére is. A védelem eszköze a megrontás nevű bűncselekmény tényállásának megfogalmazása és az ebbe ütköző magatartások kriminalizálása, szankcionálása. Ilyen minősítésű bűncselekményt 2000 és 2011 között összesen 2 235-öt regisztráltak. Ez évente átlagosan 186 bűncselekmény. Ebből az időszak első felében 1 158 bűncselekmény, míg a második felében 1 077 ilyen bűncselekmény vált ismertté. Az előbbi 193, míg az utóbbi 179 évi átlagnak felel meg. A csökkenés mértéke 6,99 %.

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Megrontás Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

A bűncselekmények száma 184 178 178 196 206 216 174 166 188 203 178 168

Számának változása (%) 100,0 96,74 96,74 106,52 111,96 117,39 94,57 90,22 102,17 110,33 96,74 91,30

10. sz. táblázat A bűnözés egészének alakulásáról akkor kapunk áttekintő képet, ha ös�szefoglalóan vizsgáljuk a Btk. más fejezeteiben szankcionált magatartásokat. A jogállam zavartalan működése szempontjából figyelemre méltó az államigazgatás, az igazságszolgáltatás és a közélet tisztasága elleni bűncselekmények száma és annak alakulása. A 2000-2011 közötti időszakban ös�szesen 90 788, évente átlagosan 7 566 bűncselekmény vált ismertté. Az eddig is alkalmazott módszerrel vizsgálva azt tapasztaljuk, hogy az időszak első felében 54 187 (évente átlagosan 9 031), az időszak második felében 36 601 (évente 6 100) ilyen bűncselekményt regisztráltak. A csökkenés mértéke tehát igen jelentős: 32,45 %. Kriminálstatisztikai adatokkal természetesen nem dönthető el, hogy a csökkenés ilyen mértéke a tényleges változást vagy az ismertté válás csökkenő arányát rejti magában. Az államigazgatás, igazságszolgáltatás, közélet tisztasága elleni bűncselekmények Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

A bűncselekmények száma változása (%) 10 408 100,00 15 558 149,48 8 836 84,90 6 980 67,06 6 036 57,99 6 369 61,19

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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

5 731 4 907 6 384 6 365 6 507 6 707

55,06 47,15 61,34 61,15 62,52 64,44

11. sz. táblázat A közrend elleni bűncselekmények szintén jelentős mértékben befolyásolják az állampolgárok biztonságérzetét. Számuk alakulása és a tendencia nem hagyható figyelmen kívül. Az adatok azt mutatják, hogy a cselekmények számának nem elhanyagolható hullámzása mellett, az említett, az időszak első és második felét összehasonlító módszerrel emelkedő tendencia figyelhető meg. Az időszak során összesen 960 147, évente átlagosan 80 012 bűncselekményt regisztráltak. Az időszak első felében 457 617 (évente átlagosan 76 269), a második felében 502 530 (évente átlagosan 83 755) bűncselekményt regisztráltak, ez 9,82 %-os emelkedés. A táblázat adataiból azonban látható, hogy az átlagnak a hullámzást csökkentő hatása van, amit a %-ban kifejezett változás világosan mutat. Közrend elleni bűncselekmények Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

A bűncselekmények száma 76 312 74 535 70 435 71 667 80 685 83 983 83 318 76 391 72 547 68 986 93 612 107 676

Változása (%) 100,00 97,67 92,30 93,91 105,73 110,05 109,18 100,10 95,07 94,40 122,67 141,10

12. sz. táblázat A gazdasági bűncselekmények sajátos csoportot képeznek. Közös jellemzőik mellett megfigyelhető e cselekmények sokfélesége. Terjedelmi okokból kénytelen vagyunk mellőzni a részletes adatokat, itt csupán a mennyiségi ada-

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tokra és a tendenciára kívánjuk felhívni a figyelmet. A vizsgált időszakban összesen 204 615 gazdasági bűncselekmény (évente átlagosan 17 051) vált ismertté, ezen belül az időszak első felében 86 501 (évente átlagosan 14 417) a második felében 118 114 (évente átlagosan 19 686). Az emelkedés tehát igen jelentős: 36,55 %. Gazdasági bűncselekmények Év 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Gazdasági bűncselekmények száma változása (%) 10 986 100,00 12 412 112,98 14 248 129,69 15 088 137,34 16 661 151,66 17 106 155,71 17 862 162,59 14 021 127,63 15 870 144,46 16 752 152,48 21 119 192,24 32 490 295,74

13. sz. táblázat Összegzés A megfigyelt időszak természetesen más szempontból is tartalmaz figyelemre méltó adatokat, úgy véljük azonban, hogy a négy fő témacsoport, az élet, a testi épség védelmével, a vagyonbiztonság helyzetével, a közúti közlekedés biztonságával, és a gyermek- és fiatalkorúak helyzetével vagy inkább veszélyeztetettségével kapcsolatban ezek az adatok ráirányítják a figyelmet a helyzet tényleges alakulására. A rövid áttekintés alapján úgy véljük indokolható e téren további, most már részletekbe menő újabb vizsgálatok lefolytatása is.

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LENKOVICS, Barnabás CSc.

tanszékvezető egyetemi tanár/head of department, professor alkotmánybíró/judge of the Hungarian Constitutional Court

A fenntartandó magánjog [Civil Law to be Sustained]* * Eredetileg megjelent: Liber Amicorum. Studia L. Vékás Dedicata. ELTE ÁJK Polgári Jogi Tanszék, Budapest, 2009. 197-208. Utánközlésben: Ember és tulajdon. Dialóg-Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 2013. 294-312. * Original publication: Liber Amicorum. Studia L. Vékás Dedicata. ELTE ÁJK Polgári Jogi Tanszék, Budapest, 2009. 197-208. Re-published: Ember és tulajdon [Human Being and Property]. Dialóg-Campus Kiadó, BudapestPécs, 2013. 294-312. I. A 21. század kezdetét két globális – egy társadalmi és egy természeti – jelenség tette emlékezetessé: egyfelől a 2008-2009-es pénzügyi (és az annak nyomán kibontakozó gazdasági) válsághullám, másfelől a klímaváltozással összefüggő természeti katasztrófa-sorozat. E két jelenség együttes hatásaként egyre szorongatóbb a felismerés és egyúttal a kérdés, hogy tudniillik amit eddig fejlődésnek neveztünk, az fenntarthatatlanná vált, de vajon hol van, és merre vezet a fenntartható fejlődés útja. Autós hasonlattal élve, ha az ember egy zsákutcába kanyarodott be, abban nem célszerű tovább menni, pláne másokkal versenyezve gyorsítani, hanem lassítani kell, megállni, hátramenetbe kapcsolni, és óvatos körültekintéssel kihátrálva a zsákutcából egy járható útvonalat keresni. Ha a fenntarthatóság-fenntarthatatlanság kérdéseiben is érdekharc, vagy más szóval verseny folyik, úgy ennek az az abszurditása, hogy az lesz a győztes, aki előbb meghátrál, azaz jobb belátásra tér. Eddig értéknek és ezáltal fejlődésnek, fejlettnek mondott kategóriákat (jövedelem, profit, haszon, fogyasztás) le kell értékelni, az eddig értékként alig tételezett fogalmakat (természet, környezet, létezés, egészség, túlélés, jövő generációk esélyei) fel kell értékelni. Az egész emberiség teljes értékren szerének átértékelése, új prioritások megfogalmazása, rangsorok felállítása óriási feladat, hiszen az életünk függ tőle: minimum az életminőségünk, de az is lehet, hogy az életben maradásunk. Az alig két évtizede társadalmi-gazdasági „rendszert” váltó posztkommunista országoknak még nehezebb a helyzete. Ezek a „legfejlettebb” (a

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„nyugati”) országok mintáit, értékrendjét fenntartások nélkül, saját speciális (történeti, kulturális) körülményeiket és hagyományaikat figyelmen kívül hagyva követték, és másolták. Most döbbenten tapasztalják, hogy a fejlett országok is válságokkal küzdenek, és új utakat, irányokat keresnek. Kiábrándító gyorsasággal szétfoszlott illúzióik romjain most újra rendszert, „értékrendszert” kellene váltaniuk. Bár az eddig példaképnek tekintett gazdagabb országoknak a felhalmozott tartalékaikból a túlélőképessége is nagyobb, a túlélés azonban csak a fenntarthatatlanság hosszabb agóniája, már nem fejlődés, csak a fejlődés látszatának fenntartása. Aki most a véges materiális javak korlátlan bőségének és élvezetének illúzióját hamarabb feladja, és a megújuló természeti és az immateriális (eszmei) társadalmi javak valóban kimeríthetetlen értékeinek bővítésére és fogyasztására tér át, az lehet a fenntartható fejlődés éllovasa, győztese, más országok példaképe. Már ha megvan ehhez az új érték- és világszemléleten alapuló kellő súlyú egyéni és közösségi, azaz társadalmi eltökéltsége és bátorsága. Tudom jól, hogy az új értékrendszer még nincs kész, de már körvonalazódik. Magyarországon a fenntarthatóság sarokpontjainak, tág kereteinek kijelölésére kínálkozott egy alkalom. Egyidejűleg folyt ugyanis az állam és a polgár életét alapvetően meghatározó két nagy közjogi és magánjogi norma, az Alaptörvény és a Polgári Törvénykönyv megalkotása. Az államélet és a magánélet terén milyen értékrendszert követ és tartalmaz, ez a két jogi dokumentum? A fenntarthatatlan régit, a fenntartható újat, vagy a kettő sajátos (magyaros, átmeneti?) keverékét? Be kell vallanom, nem irigylem sem az alkotmányozókat, sem a kodifikátorokat, tekintve, hogy ma még nincs követhető minta, még senkinek sincs kész új receptje. Van viszont sok-sok régi tapasztalati tudás, vannak új ismeretek, van bőven kreatív hajlam. Mindezekből megpróbálok megfogalmazni egy olyan egyéni elképzelést, ami továbbgondolásra érdemes, és ebből a célból másokkal megosztható. II. „A járt utat a járatlanért el ne hagyd!” – ezt a népi bölcsességet, ami az eltéve(lye)déstől, a „zsákutcás haladástól” kíván megóvni, rávetíthetjük a fenntarthatóság-fenntarthatatlanság mai dilemmájára is. Semmit, ami a történelem eddig járt útján kiállta a fenntarthatóság próbáját, elhagyni nem kell, a folytatás, az új irány pedig csak olyan lehet, ami illeszkedik ehhez a fenntartható régihez. Amilyen jól hangzik ez így általánosságban, olyan nehéz megvalósítani egy-egy konkrét területen. Nézzük ezt meg az új Ptk. kodifikációja körében. Az új Ptk. Koncepciója már bevezetőjében hangsúlyozta, hogy „[n]em érinti a Ptk-nak azokat a rendelkezéseit, amelyek – a Kodifikációs Főbizottság megítélése szerint – nem szorulnak változtatásra, mert

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megfelelnek átalakult viszonyainknak.”1 Ez az eddig járt út fenntarthatóságára utalás és egyúttal fenntartásának a szándéka, kiegészítve a Ptk. négy évtizedes bírói gyakorlatának kodifikációra érett eredményeivel, a nemzetközi jogalkotásból, az Európai Unióhoz való csatlakozásból és egyes új jogterületi fejleményekből (pl. fogyasztóvédelem) adódó követelményekkel. Az új Polgári Törvénykönyvnek tehát úgy kellett megőriznie és átmentenie a jövő számára a magánjog által kétezer év alatt kihordott, kiforrott, maradandónak, tehát fenntartandónak bizonyult értékeket, hogy közben ne merevítse be, ne konzerválja azt a fenntarthatatlan társadalmi-gazdasági-vagyonjogi rendet, ami most éppen körülvesz minket, de egyben képes maradjon minden olyan új érték befogadására, ami a régiekkel együtt tovább javítja az embert és az emberek közösségeit, végső fokon a társadalmat. Ez a nyitottság az új értékek befogadására egyúttal azt is jelenti, hogy az új Ptk. hatálybalépésének napján a magánjog „kodifikációja”, azaz folytonos megújulása – ha más módon és más ütemben is, de – folytatódik. Hiszen ahogyan Meszlény Artúr írta: „[a] törvény betűje holt jog; élő jog az, amit a betűből az élet megvalósít.”2 A magánjogi keretnormák által a felek számára biztosított autonóm mozgástéren az új értékszemléleten alapuló életviszonyokból új jogviszonyok születhetnek, melyek a jogot is új elemekkel gazdagíthatják. Ezeken a most kodifikált magánjogi kereteken, a mindenkori felek értékszemléletén és a konkrét jogviszonyok tartalmán múlik tehát, hogy milyen emberek milyen társadalmat – fenntarthatatlant vagy fenntarthatót – alkotnak majd holnap. Sok függ tehát attól, hogy a kodifikált normáknak, megelőzőleg pedig azok kodifikátorainak – a múltból a jelenen át a jövőbe tekintve – milyen (fenntartható vagy fenntarthatatlan?) az ember- és társadalomképe. III. Az, aki – miként e sorok írója – világra eszmélő kamaszkorát és felnőtt éveinek több mint felét a szocializmus építésének nevezett kommunista diktatúrában élte, még értette (vagy méginkább érezte) az első szabad választás kampányában (1990 tavaszán) az egyik rendszerváltó párt plakátján szereplő két szó súlyát: „szabadság és tulajdon.” Alatta zárójelben ott volt a szerző is: Kölcsey. De mit is jelentett ez a két szó eredetileg? A 19. századi polgárosodó társadalmak két legfőbb értékét, az embert (a polgárt) motiváló két legfőbb hajtóerőt. Társadalmi alapérték szerepükben ezek egyúttal a társadalmi béke, a kiegyensúlyozott fejlődés, a „haladás” feltételei. Mert mivel

1 Az új Ptk. Koncepciója és Tematikája. Magyar Közlöny, 2003. évi 8. szám A/I/2. p. 2 Meszlény Artúr: A Polgári Törvénykönyv szocializálása. A Jogállam Könyvtára, 8. Füzet. Franklin Társulat, Budapest, 1916. 17.

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lehet ezeket előmozdítani? Kölcsey szerint3 „[n]em egyébbel pedig, csak oly közös érdekkel, mely a társadalom tagjait egyformán kösse a hazához. S ez érdek csupán két szó: szabadság és tulajdon.” Az általános iskolák osztálytermeiben az én időmben (1950-es 60-as évek) még nagy költőink vers-idézetei voltak a falakon. Nekem ott is Kölcsey jutott: „[h]ass, alkoss, gyarapíts, s a haza fényre derül.” Ott a falusi iskolában nem minden szavát értettük pontosan, de éreztük az egésznek a jelentését és a jelentőségét. Valahogy úgy, ahogyan Deák Ferenc is értette, és ahogyan az embert motiváló hajtóerőként értelmezte ő is annakidején (1840-ben): „[a] szorgalomnak két hatalmas rugója van: szabadság és tulajdon.”4 A szülőktől és nagyszülőktől megtapasztalt, szorgalmas munkára nevelt parasztgyerekek lelkében, a mindennapi küzdelmes életre rezonáltak e fenséges szavak. A saját tulajdonban, saját munkával teremtett létbiztonságban, a család oltalmazó közegében nem éreztünk szegénységet és távoli fenyegetésnek tűnt a politikai diktatúra. A „kisbirtokos” szabadságának, függetlenségének és ezekre alapozott büszkeségének érzése volt ez, amit Veres Péter fogalmazott meg a legérzékletesebben: „[a] kisbirtokos földje tehát nem mozgatható tőkevagyon, hanem csak megélhetési alap. Egyetlen előnye csak az (…): saját földjén talál munkát és saját maga termeli a kenyerét. Ez nagy dolog, a legnagyobb dolog a földön, mert a legnagyobb egyéni szabadságot biztosítja az embernek, ezért ragaszkodik a paraszt olyannyira, életre-halálra a földjéhez. Igaza van: a legmagasabbrendű élet a szabad kisbirtokos élet.”5 A saját tulajdonban végzett saját munkán alapuló „privát autonómiának”, azaz létbiztonságnak, szabadság-érzésnek azonban komoly ára is volt: a mindennapi fáradság, küszködés, kockázatok és veszteségek. Ezek azonban nem csökkentették, sőt inkább növelték az előbbiek értékét, becsületét és megbecsülését. Ez a létforma a lakóhelyi közösség és a család minden egyes tagjának nem csupán önbecsülést adott, de biztosította az ember (a személyiség) mások általi elismerését, megbecsülését is. A szorgalmas munkánál, a „dolgos” embernél ugyanis nincs értékesebb, ő az aki hat, alkot és gyarapít, és ha ilyenek kellően sokan vannak, a nemzet is gazdagszik, s „a haza fényre derül”. IV. Valahogy így érthette, tapasztalhatta meg a nemzet gazdagodását Adam Smith is, amikor az európai felvilágosodás korában (1776-ban) ma is érvényes gondolatát megfogalmazta: „Saját munkája olyan tulajdona az embernek,

3 Ld.: Lukácsy Sándor (szerk.): Nemzeti Olvasókönyv. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1988. 256. 4 Lukácsy: i. m. 256. 5 Veres Péter: A paraszti jövendő. Sarló Kiadó, Budapest. 1948. 86.

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amely minden más tulajdonának a legfőbb forrása, s mint ilyen a legszentebb és legsérthetetlenebb (kiemelés a szerzőtől). A szegény ember minden atyai öröksége a karja ereje és a keze ügyessége; akadályozni őt abban, hogy ezzel az erejével és ügyességével embertársai ártalma nélkül a legjobb belátása szerint éljen, egyenlő a legszentebb tulajdon nyilvánvaló megsértésével.”6 A saját munka és saját tulajdon egysége, ennek embert és társadalmat formáló, társadalomszervező ereje alig másfél évtizeddel később már megjelent a magyar felvilágosodás és polgárosodás előfutárainak alkotmányozási-törvényhozási programjában. A későbbi Szabadság és Egyenlőség Társaságának tagja, a kiváló jogtudós Hajnóczy József már 1790-ben így írt: „[s]zabad megengedett tisztességes eszközökkel kinek-kinek belátása szerint helyzetét jobbá tenni, vagyonát gyarapítani. Ezeket minden egyént megillető természeti szabályoknak tartom, melyeket a törvények sem módosíthatnak, mégis törvénybe kell iktatni őket, hogy növekedjen a hazaszeretet. … Köztudomású, hogy azok, akik saját jogon rendelkeznek birtokkal, jobban művelik a földet azoknál, akiknek nincsen saját birtokuk. Azonkívül azt a sok apró földdarabot, amelynek külön-külön gazdája van, nagyobb iparkodással művelik, mint az egy tulajdonos nagy kiterjedésű földjeit. … A tapasztalat azt mutatja, hogy többet végez egy nem robotoló munkás, mint két robotoló. … Mindenki tudja, hogy a kincstári javakkal gazdálkodnak a legrosszabban. Ha a földbirtok által a haza teljesjogú polgárai lesznek, körömszakadásig védik majd azokat a törvényeket, melyek alapján birtokhoz jutottak.”7 Hajnóczy a mai magyar polgárosodás „utófutára” is lehetne, hiszen minden gondolata teljesen azonos tartalommal ma is aktuális. V. Amit már Hajnóczy is „természeti szabályoknak” tartott, annak tartotta egy évszázaddal később (1891-ben) XIII. Leó pápa is, Európában nagyhatású körlevelében, a Rerum Novarumban. „…az élet fenntartásának alapja kizárólag az a munka, amellyel valaki a földjét műveli, vagy mesterségét űzi. …a magántulajdon teljes összhangban van a természet rendjével. Mindazt, ami az élet fenntartásához és magasabb színvonalra emeléséhez szükséges, a föld nagy bőségben kínálja ugyan, de önmagától, az emberi művelés és gondozás nélkül nem teremhetné meg. Mivel pedig az ember a természet javainak megszerzésekor szellemi képességét és testi erejét fekteti az anyagba, és ilyen módon ezt az általa megmunkált anyagi természetű darabot önmagához ha-

6 Smith, Adam: A nemzetek gazdagsága. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1959. 172. 7 Hajnóczy József: A magyar országgyűlésen javaslandó törvények lényege. In: Történelmünk a jogalkotás tükrében. Szerk.: Beér János-Csizmadia Andor. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1966. 617-626.

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sonítja, és a munkában mintegy tulajdon személyiségének bélyegét nyomja rá, teljes mértékben helyes és szükségszerű, hogy ezt a darabot most már sajátjaként bírhassa, és ezt a jogát senki meg ne sérthesse…hogyan tűrné a jogszerűség, hogy valaki birtokba vegye és élvezze azt, amiért más fáradozott? Ahogyan az okozat követi a létrehozó okot, úgy a munka hozama is kizárólag azt illeti meg, aki munkáját ebbe fektette. Ezért az egész emberiség… magában a természetjogban találja meg a földi javak elosztásának alapját, így a magántulajdont, mint az ember természetének és a békés, nyugodt együttélésnek leginkább megfelelő jogot minden időben szentesítette a gyakorlat.”8 Még számtalan azonos vagy nagyon hasonló gondolatot lehetne idézni a magántulajdonra, annak a természetességére, quasi „természeti erejére” vonatkozóan, ami évszázadokon át egyúttal ember- és társadalomformáló erővé is vált és ilyenként is hatott. Ezt a hatást, ezt a folyamatot sommázta – főleg az erőszakos szocializálási kísérletekkel szemben – Navratil Ákos már 1905-ben úgy, hogy: „[a] történelmi múlt a magántulajdon mellett bizonyít.”9 Ez a megállapítás egy évszázados előretekintésben – a hatalmas kitérők, visszafordítási, totális társadalmasítási kísérletek ellenére is – igaznak bizonyult, sőt, mint folyamat, a jövőbe tekintve is aktuális. VI. Az emberközpontú és emberléptékű kismagántulajdon természetességéhez meg kell még említeni egy nagyon fontos természeti, mondhatni biológiai „szerveződést”, a társadalmi és a gazdasági élet legkisebb, ám legalapvetőbb emberi közösségét, a házasság és a család intézményét. A magántulajdonra a tételes jog és a jogtudomány a maga nézőpontjából, egy meghatározott jogalanyra (a tulajdonosra) és egy meghatározott jogtárgyra (a dologra) fókuszálva fordított kiemelt figyelmet. Más társadalomtudományokat azonban – különösen az etikát, a szociológiát és a közgazdaságtant – egyéb szempontok, a magántulajdon társadalmi és gazdasági kihatásai érdekelték elsősorban, és ezeket a jog sem hagyhatta figyelmen kívül. Amennyire természetes tény volt, hogy „a társadalmi élet alapegysége a család”, olyannyira természetes volt az is, hogy „a család jogi jelentősége a szűkebb családi kör személyi és vagyoni természetű, magánjogi viszonyaira szorítkozik.”10 A tulajdon intézményére vetítve ez azt jelentette, hogy a magántulajdon alapegysége is a családi vagyon volt, a nemzetgazdaság és a gazdálkodás alapegysége pedig a családi gazdaság. A polgár saját munkájára és saját tulajdonára alapozott

8 A társadalom keresztény alapelvei. Rerum Novarum. A KDNP kiadása. Budapest, 1991. 16-17. 9 Navratil Ákos: A gazdasági élet és a jogi rend. Pallas Nyomda, Budapest, 1905. 56. 10 Szladits Károly: A magyar magánjog I. Grill Kiadó, Budapest, 1941. 38.

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létbiztonsága és szabadsága tehát egyúttal és természetszerűleg a családja munkáját, tulajdonát, létbiztonságát és privát autonómiáját is jelentette. A vagyonos polgár fogalma felölelte a vagyonos polgári család fogalmát is, valójában ezek alkották a polgári társadalmat. Mintha a jó és gondos családapa, az ókori római jogból ismert „bonus et diligens pater familias” köszönne vissza ezekből a gondolatokból, de nem mint absztrakt jogelv, nem mint az általában elvárható magatartás magánjogi zsinórmértéke, hanem mint egy eleven, igaz ugyan, hogy eszményített (eszménnyé tett) ember. Mint a polgár modellje, aki jó (tisztességes, becsületes) ember és családapa, ugyanakkor gondos (körültekintő, szorgalmas, takarékos) gazda, aki fáradságos munkával hat, alkot és gyarapít, hogy önmaga, a családja és ezzel nemzete sorsát is jobbra fordítsa. Ezt az emberképet és az ebből összegződő társadalomképet jogilag kötelezővé tenni és minden egyestől minden életviszonyban kikényszeríteni nem lehet. Lehet és kell is azonban a jog, különösképpen a magánjog ember- és társadalomképévé, fő célkitűzésévé tenni, ahogyan tette ezt, mintegy a klasszikus magyar magánjog fejlődésének mérföldköveként Szladits Károly: „[a]z életviszonyoknak főképen két köre az, amelyben az ember túlnyomóan mint magánegyén áll szemben más magánegyénekkel: a magángazdaság és a családi élet. Ezek a magánjog főtárgyai; a magánjog lényegében vagyonjog és családjog.”11 Ugyanakkor Szladits már tisztában volt a klasszikus magánjogot, az annak ember- és társadalomképét fenyegető veszélyekkel is. Ismerte az I. világháborút, majd az 1929-33-as világgazdasági válságot követő „válságjogi” jogalkotás hatásait, a közjog „benyomulását” a magánjogba. Tudott a szovjet típusú társadalmasításról és tervgazdálkodásról, amit éppúgy határozottan elutasított, mint a német nemzetiszocializmus nálunk is divatos „gazdasági jogi” teóriáját. Mindezekben a magánjog teljes elközjogiasításának veszélyét, egyúttal a magánélet, a privát autonómia végét látta. Ugyanakkor – részben fejet hajtva a változó világ tényei előtt, részben kijavítandó a magánjognak, mint az „önzés bibliájának” hibáit és hiányosságait – maga is elismerte, sőt szorgalmazta a magánjog szocializálásának és etizálásának szükségességét. Mérsékelt kompromisszum-készséggel írta: „[a] magángazdaság és a családi élet viszonyai is át meg át vannak szőve közjogi szabályokkal. Hogy ezek az életviszonyok mennyiben állanak közjogi, mennyiben magánjogi szabályok uralma alatt, az az emberi művelődés különböző szakai szerint változik és szoros összefüggésben áll a társadalmi gazdálkodás és a családi élet formáival.”12 A megfogalmazásból úgy tűnhet, mintha Szladits tág mozgásteret adott volna az állam és a közjog térnyerésének a magánélet és a magánjog rovására. Másutt azonban konkrétabban fogalmaz, amiből egyértelmű, hogy

11 Szladits: i. m. 23. 12 Szladits: i. m. 23.

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egyfajta kiegyensúlyozottságot, „arany középutat” keresett: „[a] társadalmi gazdálkodás mindig egyéni (individuális) és közületi (kollektív) gazdálkodási módok összehatásából áll. Az elképzelhető legszélső közületi rabság (kommunizmus) sem lehetne el bizonyos egyéni (fogyasztási) vagyonkör elismerése nélkül, amelyen belül az egyén szabadon rendelkezik. Viszont – magasabb kultúrfokon – alig van olyan szélsően individuális gazdálkodás, amely bizonyos közös célokra ne egyesítene gazdasági erőket (közháztartás).”13 Ebből a megfogalmazásból derül ki, hogy Szladits a kommunizmust kollektív rabságnak tekintette, amihez képest a magasabb kultúrfokot a nem szélsőségesen individualista magángazdálkodás jelenti, aminek egyenetlenségeit – szociális és etikai indíttatású – közösségi újraelosztási eszközök korrigálják. Ebben a felfogásban a „közháztartás” éppen a magánháztartások fennmaradását, megerősítését, kiegészítését, nem pedig a helyettesítését szolgálja. Szladits tehát az emberi személyiséget, a családi kisközösséget és a magángazdálkodást óvta, és féltette a túlzott kollektivizálástól, az abban való elvegyüléstől és feloldódástól, és ami azzal szükségképpen együttjár, a közjog uralmától: „[a] közületi gazdálkodásban az egyes ember úgy szerepel, mint a közület szerve. A közületi gazdálkodás joga tehát alapjában mindig közjog. Magánvagyonjog csak az egyéni vagy magángazdálkodás körében állhat fenn … A magángazdasági rendnek nélkülözhetetlen előfeltétele a magántulajdon rendje, amely biztosítja az egyes gazdálkodó alany részére az uralmat a termelés tényezőin. … A magánjog ehhez képest a mai társadalmi gazdasági rend létfeltétele és biztosítéka” (kiemelések a szerzőtől).14 Ebben a felfogásban az „egyes gazdálkodó alany”, mint a magánjog emberképe, az egyénileg, családi keretben, egymással szövetkezve vagy társulva gazdálkodók millióit, a társadalom meghatározó többségét jelenti és egyúttal ez a társadalom arculatát, a társadalomképet is meghatározza. VII. Ez az a magánjogi ember- és társadalomkép, ami előbb a külső katonai elnyomó hatalom által ránkerőszakolt kommunista embertípusnak, a tervgazdaságnak és a totalitárius diktatúrának köszönhetően, majd folytatólagosan az ugyancsak külső gazdasági-pénzügyi hatalmi tényezők által ránkerőszakolt rendszerváltási folyamatnak, a globalizációs emberképnek, gazdasági és társadalmi modellnek az eredményeként szétesett, pillanatnyi állás szerint nem létezik, visszaállításának még a reménye sem körvonalazódik. Ami helyette kialakult, az a városokba, nagyüzemekbe koncentrált (a munka és a gazdál-

13 Ibid. 32. 14 Ibid. 33.

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kodás természeti alapjaitól elszakított) bérmunkás fogyasztók sokasága. Egyfelől „a bérmunka társadalma”, másfelől „fogyasztói társadalom”. Az ember nem mint „egyes gazdálkodó alany” részese a tőle függetlenül szervezett globális tömegtermelési folyamatoknak, hanem mint egy egységnyi emberi erőforrás, aki bármikor másikra cserélhető. Hogy ezt elkerülje, a reális értéknél kevesebbért is dolgozik, de hogy többet fogyaszthasson, hitelek fejében elzálogosítja a vagyonát és a munkaerejét is. Mai jólétéért – többnyire csak egy kicsivel jobb létéért – nem csak őseitől örökölt tartalékait, de a jövőjét is feléli, nem köt házasságot, nem vállal gyermeket, elveszi vagy rontja a jövő generációk választási esélyeit. Az önpusztításra is képes, hogy percről-percre jól érezze magát. Pazarló, hedonista ember, „good feel” társadalom; felelőtlen, fenntarthatatlan jelen, kilátástalan jövő. Lehangoló, reményvesztett emberés társadalomkép. VIII. Ezért olyan izgalmas a kérdés, van-e az új Ptk-nak ember- és társadalomképe? Ha nincs, akkor feladta volna, és többé nincs is rá szükség? Ha van, akkor az a régi, változatlanul, hiszen valójában sohasem valósult meg, vagy a mai élvezkedő fogyasztó mint realitás? A választ keresnünk kell, hiszen a magánjog a jövőben sem lehet meg ember- és társadalomkép mint cél és egyben érték nélkül. A jogirodalomban egyetlen írást találtam, amely az új Ptk. „új” emberképét felvázolta: „az öntudatos, autonóm, bátran kockáztató, saját ügyeit felnőtt módon intézni tudó emberkép, akinek nincs szüksége minden oldalról állami megtámasztásra, még kevésbé az állam gyámkodására.”15 Ennek az emberképnek az előképeként maga a szerző is utal a „bonus et diligens paterfamiliasra”, az előrelátó és okos férfira („homme prudent et prévoyant”), az ésszerűen gondokodó emberre („reasonable man”), vagy a magyar magánjogban honos „jó gazda” fogalmára. Vagyis ez az új emberkép nagyon is a régi, és én ezt helyeslem, mert olyan alapvető (civilizációs) érték, amit nagy kár lenne kidobni, különösen mert nincs, eddig sem volt, és nem is körvonalazódik jobb ennél. Elsőrendű kötelességünk tehát ezt az emberképet – mint apáink, nagyapáink, dédapáink képét szobánkban az „ősök falán” – megőrizni. De nem elég megőrizni sem, mármint holt betűként, vagy akár absztrakt magatartási mérceként a törvénykönyvben, hanem „szellemét”, azaz értéktartalmát életben is kell tartani, autonóm mozgásterét, szabadságának feltételrendszerét – folyamatosan – újra kell teremteni.

15 Lábady Tamás: Alkotmányjogi hatások a készülő Ptk. szabályaira. Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció, 2000/2. szám, 15.

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Ha ezt az értéktartalmat hordozó emberképet, úgy is mondhatjuk emberfajtát a kipusztulás veszélye fenyegeti (sok más élőlény között), mert világuralomra törő hatalmas erők (kommunizmus, multinacionális társaságok, globális pénzügyi intézmények) szándékosan – hol valóságosan, hol „csak” fondorlattal – irtják (ténylegesen likvidálják, akarattalan bábfigurává alakítják, vagy csak meggyengítik, függővé, kiszolgáltatottá teszik), akkor az új törvénykönyv és az annak szellemét tükröző magánjogpolitikai eszközök által is védetté kell nyilvánítani. Miért csak a kék bálnát, a kerecsensólymot, vagy a magyar kikericset, a bánáti bazsarózsát illetné meg az élethez, a fennmaradáshoz való jog? IX. Az emberek újabban szeretnek skanzenbe járni. Szeretik látni, hogy lehetett egyszerűbben, természetesebben, testben és lélekben egészségesebben, a közösséggel és a természettel is harmóniában – tehát boldogabban – élni, boldogulni. És nem akarják feladni a reményt, hogy ez a jövőbe tekintve sem lehetetlen. Elvégre a múlt fénye is megvilágíthatja a jövő útját. Lehet, hogy egyesek szemében ez „skanzen-romantika”, sőt történelmi anakronizmus, mások szemében viszont a fenntartható fejlődés útja, a természeti és a gazdasági-társadalmi egyensúly feltétele. A legkorszerűbb (nem a mában, hanem a jövőben) gondolkodók, az ökofilozófia és az ökoközgazdaságtan hívei újra az egyes emberben és az emberléptékű kisközösségekben, az egyéni és családi gazdálkodásban, a természetes, egészséges és kreativitást elősegítő kistulajdonban látják legnagyobb problémáink megoldását. „A kis egységekbe szerveződött emberek jobban gondját viselik a maguk földdarabjának vagy más természeti erőforrásnak, mint a névtelen vállalatok vagy a nagyzási hóbortban szenvedő kormányzatok. … A család mellett a munka és a munka által létrehozott kapcsolatok képezik a társadalom igazi alapját. Ha az alapok betegek, hogyan lehet a társadalom egészséges?” 16 Az újfajta gondolkodás lényegét Ernst Schumachar – Mahatma Gandhira hivatkozva – így foglalta össze: „tömegek általi termelést, nem pedig tömegtermelést. … Az emberek csak kicsi, áttekinthető csoportokban lehetnek önmaguk. Így hát meg kell tanulnunk olyan tagolt szerkezet fogalmaiban gondolkodni, amely kisléptékű egységek sokaságát képes magába olvasztani.”17 A magánjogi kodifikációval összefüggésben ugyanezt Meszlény Artúr már közel egy évszázada megfogalmazta: „…tudatában vagyunk annak, hogy amikor a vagyonegységek konzerválása érdekében működünk, a vagyonelosztás gazdasági törvénye-

16 Schumacher, Ernst: A kicsi szép. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1991. 35-36. 17 Ibid. 76.

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iből kifolyólag a túlnyomó számban levő kis vagyonegységekért szállunk síkra, azok teljesítőképességét fokozzuk, azok teherviselését könnyítjük, azok hitelét emeljük. Minél kisebb a vagyon, relatíve annál több munka fekszik benne; a kis vagyonok együtt-tartásában a munka gyümölcsét oltalmazzuk.”18 Meszlény a saját munkával szerzett saját vagyon oltalmán keresztül a dolgostulajdonos ember védelmét helyezte a magánjog középpontjába, és egyúttal meghatározta az állam magánjogpolitikai kötelezettségeinek súlypontjait is. Programja akár a fenntartható fejlődés és azon belül a fenntartandó magánjog programja is lehetne, ami nem csak aktuális, de jövőbemutató is. X. A kisléptékű egységek tagolt szerkezete igaz kell, hogy legyen a tulajdonszerkezetre, a gazdaságszerkezetre, a településszerkezetre, de még a demokráciára is, a szociális piacgazdaság egészére is. Ez az a szerkezet, aminek középpontjában változatlanul az ember áll, nem absztrahálva, hanem gondolkodó és érző, a maga és a családja boldogulásáért küzdő, eleven emberként. Az „emberléptékűség” sohasem lehet idejétmúlt, akármilyen technikai, nagyüzemi, társadalmasítási, multinacionális vagy globális erők támadják, és fenyegessék is. Elvégre „nem a nép van a gazdálkodásért, hanem a gazdálkodás van a népért.” Ahogyan azt már Veres Péter bölcsen összefoglalta és javasolta: „[a] kormányoknak az a kötelességük, hogy ezt a kisüzemi termelést úgy szervezzék meg minden téren, értékesítéssel, hitellel, gépekkel, traktor-állomásokkal, szövetkezetekkel, szakiskolákkal és mintagazdaságokkal, hogy a legfejlettebb nagyüzemekkel is felvehessék a versenyt. És ezt lehet is. Ha a nagy gépek nem alkalmasak a kisüzemben, akkor gyártani kell apró gépeket. … Fő az, hogy mentől több ember szabadnak érezze magát.” 19 Mintha csak folytatta, vagy idézte volna Veres Péter gondolatát, Ernst Schumacher immár szélesebb összefüggésben, ökológiai és fenntarthatósági szempontból: „[n] em kételkedem benne, hogy a műszaki fejlődésnek új irányt lehet szabni, olyan irányt, amely a fejlődést visszavezeti az ember valódi igényeihez, vagyis: az ember tényleges méreteihez. Az ember kicsi, következésképpen a kicsi szép. Az óriás méretek hajszolása az önpusztítás szenvedélye.”20 Márpedig a technikának-és a modern kor minden „vívmányának” – az embert kell szolgálnia az eltárgyiasítása, elembertelenítése helyett. Így pl. éppen a műszakitechnikai fejlődés napjainkra a gazdálkodás minden területén kifejlesztette azokat az „apró gépeket”, amelyek a kisüzemi, személyes és családi gazdál-

18 Meszlény: i. m. 48. 19 Veres: i. m. 90-91. 20 Schumacher: i. m. 163-164.

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kodást (mezőgazdasági, ipari, kereskedelmi és szolgáltatási tevékenységeket) újból lehetővé teszik. Ugyanakkor az emberléptékűség megőrzése, ideértve az ember személyiségét fejlesztő és önazonosságát erősítő kisközösségek megőrzését is, nem csupán társadalmi-gazdasági, de egyben természeti-biológiai kívánalom is. Az individuális önzésből „[a] legfontosabb kiút talán a társadalmak újraépítése kisközösségekből. Ezekben a közösségekben (…) a kölcsönösség folyamatosan monitorozható, a közösség tagjai ezáltal egymást lélekben folyamatosan nemesítik. Közösen kimunkált eszmékért harcolnak, és egy nagyobb társadalmi szerveződés, egy nemzet ideális építőköveivé válhatnak.”21 Egy önmagáért és családjáért munkálkodó, a létfenntartásához szükséges javairól öngondoskodó, közössége tagjaival kölcsönösen előnyös, együttműködésen és nem önzésen alapuló kapcsolatokat létesítő ember képe rajzolódik ki tehát újra előttünk. Ez volt és ez marad is a fenntartandó magánjog emberképe, és ezekből az emberekből áll össze a magánjog fenntartható társadalomképe. Lehet, hogy az új Ptk. – amennyiben ezt őrzi meg – a „magánjog skanzenjének” tűnik majd, de ha nem ezt teszi, eltűnik, kiüresedik maga is. A túlméretes szervezetek és intézmények már a nemzeti közjog kereteit is széttörték, a nemzeti magánjogokról pedig tudomást sem vesznek. Ahogyan nem számottevő tétel a számukra az egyes (kis-) ember és annak mindennapi élete sem. Márpedig a magánjog a „mindennapok”, a kisemberek joga.22 Ezért jól tesszük, ha ragaszkodunk – foggal-körömmel, mint Veres Péter kisbirtokosa a földjéhez – a magánjog klasszikus ember- és társadalomképéhez. Elvégre nem csupán a fenntartandó magánjogról, hanem általa is védetten az életünkről, a munkánkról, a legszentebb tulajdonunkról, a boldogulásunkról, a szabadságunkról van szó. Azaz összefoglalóan: a fenntartható jövőnkről.

21 Freund Tamás: Az önzés és az elmagányosodott ember. Magyar Szemle, Új évfolyam, XIV (2005) 2. szám, 3. 22 Asztalos László: Polgári jogi alaptan. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1987. 13.

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III. 2. Egyes partnereink tanulmányai A Doktori Iskola élénk és gyümölcsöző kapcsolatot épített ki, és tart fenn külföldi partnerintézményekkel, melynek bizonyítéka az a számos közös tudományos rendezvény, amely egyben a tudományos-oktatási együttműködés útjait, kínálkozó lehetőségeit is felvázolja. Az újvidéki dr Lazar Vrkatić Karral 2012. május 5-én kötött együttműködési megállapodás ünnepélyes aláírása után szervezett tudományos szimpózium témája egy aktuális kérdésre, Szerbia lehetséges uniós csatlakozására fókuszált. A Sovereignty of the Member States in the European Union címmel szervezett tudományos tanácskozás megmutatta, hogy az uniós magyar tapasztalatok és a csatlakozáshoz szükséges szerb jogalkotási lépések és egyéb előkészületek megosztása egy másik állam tudományos közösségének elismert képviselőivel egy jövőbeli sikeres együttműködés záloga lehet. Az alábbiakban a szerb partner képviselői (egyikőjük Doktori Iskolánk hallgatója) által tartott előadások írásos anyagait közöljük. Figyelemre méltó, hogy mindhárom tanulmány olyan kérdésekre fókuszál (emberi jogok és egyes jogvédő intézmények helyzete, a társadalom és a politikai intézmények felkészültsége a csatlakozásra, nemzeti kisebbségpolitika és az integráció), amelyek kulcskérdésnek tekinthetők egy csatlakozási folyamatban, főleg a sokat szenvedett, viharos múltú egykori Jugoszlávia utódállamai kapcsán. A Doktori Iskola nyári és téli egyetemei a közép- és kelet-európai régió fiatal kutatóinak, oktatóinak egy különös, évi rendszerességgel megrendezésre kerülő találkozási lehetőséget nyújtanak a Budapest-Bécs-Pozsony fővárosok által alkotott háromszög középpontjában. Büszkeséggel tölt el Bennünket, hogy immáron kialakult eme egyetemek, szemináriumok visszatérő közönsége, ahol számos hallgató (hívhatjuk eme közösséget már alumninak is) mellett elismert, nemzetközi hírű oktatók-kutatók iktatják be szokásos nyári vagy téli programjaik közé a Doktori Iskola rendezvényeit. Közéjük tartozik Wawrzyniec K. Konarski, a politikatudomány professzora a krakkói Jagelló Egyetemről, akinek a lengyel politikai berendezkedés 1989 utáni történetéről szóló áttekintése a partnerség interdiszciplináris jellegét ékesen bizonyítja.

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III. 2. Some of our Partners’ Selected Papers Our Postgraduate Doctoral School has built and has maintained a vivid and fruitful partnership with several research units from abroad; under the aegis of this cooperation our partners regularly organize common scientific events, which exceedingly outline the scientific and educational background of our promising partnership. The Postgraduate Doctoral School and the dr Lazar Vrkatić Faculty from Novi Sad, Serbia ceremonially signed a cooperation agreement on 5th May 2012 and after the ceremony a bilateral scientific event, a symposium was held under the title of Sovereignty of the Member States in the European Union. This event focused on a current topic, namely on the possible accession of Serbia to the European Union. This bilateral meeting pointed out that the experiences concluded by an EU member state, such as the Hungarian one after several years of membership, evaluation, review of legislative steps and preparation taken by a candidate country such as Serbia could be shared via bilateral ways within the circles of scientific community and this method could offer very promising prospects for the future of partners’ successful cooperation. Below, we publish papers of the Serbian partner’s representatives (among them, one researcher is our Doctoral School’s student); these papers are the written form of presentations delivered under the aegis of the symposium. It is worth mentioning that all of these papers concentrate on such issues (situation of human rights and their protection via institutions, preparedness of society and the political community to the accession, minority policy and integration), which are considered to be crucial key points in an accession process, chiefly, in case of the successor states of former Yugoslavia with their stormy and complicated history. The Postgraduate Doctoral School regularly organizes summer and winter schools, seminars, which can offer an ideal meeting point for young researchers as well as master and PhD students of the Central and Eastern European region in the vivid and active city of Győr, in the middle of the triangle, framed by Budapest, Vienna and Bratislava. The Doctoral School is very proud of the fame of these events, since we already have a considerable alumni group of “homecoming” participants; and beyond, we are honoured that acclaimed and reputed professors perpetually accept our invitation to these events. Among those professors, we publish the paper of Professor Wawrzyniec K. Konarski from the Jagiellonian University of Cracow. The paper deals with the system of political governance of Poland since 1989; and it exquisitely proves the remunerative interdisciplinary cooperation of our Doctoral School with our esteemed partners.

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TEOFILOVIĆ, Petar S.J.D

associate professor/School of Law and Business Studies (dr Lazar Vrkatić in Novi Sad, Serbia) former ombudsman of Vojvodina

Ombudsman as an Independent Institution for the Protection of Human Rights in Serbia

I. Introduction Serbia is among the last European countries still expecting the official date to start the process of negotiations related to EU accession. Countries aspiring to join the EU need to conform to certain principles and minimal standards, which often require thorough changes within many areas of social life. To this end, reforms of many social systems are necessary in Serbia. However, in spite of the lip service of overwhelming reforms in the last twelve years, some of them among the relevant factors were not the matter of concern at all (e.g. reform of the oligarchic political system based on particracy gradually fostered during the last two decades on all levels – national, provincial and local1; or the necessary reform of the pension system), whereas, carrying out of some others was formalistic and generally unsuccessful, sometimes even inducing serious harmful effects instead of proclaimed improvements (e.g. reform of the judicial system2; reform of health and educational sys-

1 Serbian pluralistic political system until now may be described as a facade democracy. See e.g. the interview with Vesna Pešić for Radio Free Europe, published on internet at: http://www.nspm. rs/hronika/vesna-pesic-nista-ne-smeta-da-qengleska-kraljicaq-u-srbiji-bude-tomislav-nikolic.html. 2 The outcome of the proclaimed reform of judiciary (finally started in 2009) is nigh to disastrous. Under the new constitution of Serbia adopted in 2006, judiciary remained under influence of political factors and execution. The relevant constitutional provisions fall short of providing adequate grounds for separate and independent judiciary. The same applies to the implementation of the set of acts on judiciary, adopted in 2009. See e.g. Grubač, Momčilo: Pravosuđe u predlogu novog ustava Srbije (Judiciary in the Draft of the New Constitution of Serbia), Srpska pravna revija, No. 5/2006, 33-42. Reforms included dismissal of all the judges and public attorneys and (re)election to the existing posts, but the proceedings turned out to be nontransparent, arbitrary and heavily influenced by deals among ruling political parties’ leaderships. See e.g. Pešić, Vesna: O izboru sudija i tužilaca (On the Election of Judges and Public Attorneys), speech at the National Assembly of Serbia on 23 September 2009, published in: Republika, No. 470-471, February 2010; Rodić, Nebojša: Kakvim sudom sudite, onakvim će vam suditi (The Court One Tries With Will Try Him As Well) on internet at: http://www. politika.rs/rubrike/ostali-komentari/Kakvim-sudom-sudite-onakvim-ce-vam-suditi.lt.html. In May 2012, the Council Against Corruption officially submitted a Report on the reform of judiciary to the

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tems; proclaimed reforms aimed at decentralization and regionalization of Serbia, an example of a highly centralized state; etc.). All shortcomings and deviations in the political, economic and other mentioned systems also negatively affect the enjoyment of human rights. Serbian authorities have paid little attention to the improvements in this area. In comparison with the (Constitutional) Charter on Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro issued in 2003,3 the current Serbian Constitution of 2006 was a step backwards in the area of human rights. The adoption of many legal acts relevant for particular human rights issues was postponed for years, while final solutions found in them sometimes depart from the proclaimed intentions of those acts.4 Some legal acts contain provisions that obviously violate constitutional principles.5 Still, one of the core problems in Serbia remains the lack of law enforcement.6 The existing judicial system, which should be the watchdog of constitutionality, democracy and human rights, does not seem to be able to cope with the challenges required by the principles of independence, legality, efficiency and equality of citizens. Its weakness was partly demonstrated in a footnote on the previous page, while the rulings of the European Court of

then Serbian Government containing conclusions on severe violations of constitutional principles about judiciary (particularly its independence), infringements of individual judges’ rights, serious shortcomings of the new network of courts followed by increased costs of the system, reduced accessibility to courts for citizens as a consequence of the abolition of certain courts and increased court taxes, etc. See: Council Against Corruption, The Report No. 07-00-3124/2012 on the Reform of Judiciary in Serbia, 24. April 2012, Belgrade, on internet at: http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/ izvestaji/cid1028/index/. Finally, on 12 July 2012, the Constitutional Court found that the High Judicial Council violated procedural and material legal provisions in the process of (re)election of judges, thus all the judges and public attorneys who were not reelected and who submitted complaints to the Constitutional Court are to be returned to their previous posts. The Association of Judges of Serbia demands resignations or dismissal of all members of the High Judicial Council. In brief, the judiciary in Serbia at the moment seems to be in a worse state than before the reforms. 3 The Union of States of Serbia and Montenegro, a remnant of former Yugoslavia, was established in 2003 and was dissolved in May 2006, after the referendum in Montenegro, where the required majority voted for an independent state. 4 The Act Against Discrimination, The Act on Access to Information of Public Interest, The Act on the Equality of Sexes, The Act on Protection of Personal Data, etc. 5 The Act on Churches and Religious Associations, numerous provisions of which violate the constitutional principles of secular state and equality of all churches and also indirectly the principle of non-discrimination of citizens on the grounds of religious affiliation. Several other acts included provisions according to which a warrant for eavesdropping may be issued by the Public Attorney, or the head of some security agency, contrary to the explicit constitutional provision that such a warrant may be issued only by court. Some of the latter provisions have been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Serbia, but their repeated inclusion into various legal acts every now and then precedes their constitutional review and makes it difficult to remove them efficiently and permanently from the legal system. 6 As an example, the Act on Equality of Sexes, based on the principle of equality proclaimed by the constitution, introduced quotas of minimal participation of each sex in various areas, but in practice they are rarely respected.

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Human Rights against Serbia indicate that undue delays of judicial proceedings and inefficient enforcement of court rulings make almost an endemic problem in Serbia. The introduction of independent controlling institutions for the protection of human rights was one of the means intended to improve the state in the segment of law enforcement. The aim of this article is to present and compare the relevant legal regulations, the factual status of the Provincial Ombudsman of Vojvodina and the national ombudsman of Serbia (called „The Protector of Citizens“), as types of independent institutions for the protection and improvement of human rights established in Serbia in the last decade. Final subheading contains an overview of the main obstacles that these institutions have been facing during their work in the existing legal, cultural and political setting. II. Types of independent institutions for the protection of human rights in Serbia At the beginning of 21st century, the state of human rights in Serbia was rather poor in almost all respects, far from the firmly established international standards and even from the constitutionally proclaimed guarantees. Almost half of the century the socialist understanding of human rights (closer to positivist and collectivist than to the natural law concept), lack of tradition and culture regarding the notion of rule of law, judiciary heavily dependent on execution, a decade of armed conflicts between constituents of former Yugoslavia (where Serbia was a participant in each one of them) topped with NATO bombing in 1999, a decade of sanctions against Serbia that besides the economy also negatively affected the fields of education and science and endemic corruption are among the main reasons for the substandard state of human rights in Serbia. Its improvement required a wide set of measures – constitutional changes, adoption of numerous statutes, reforms of the political system, state administration and judiciary, introduction of practices in accordance with the rule of law and with the requirement of effectiveness, etc. In order to improve respect of human rights, introduction of several types of independent institutions for the protection of human rights was among the steps announced or taken in the last decade. Their status, authorities, organization and functioning are regulated by different legal acts. They share some common features, but also differ from each other in respect of the mechanisms they use in performing their tasks. Those institutions are, respectively: 1. Ombudsman (Protector of Citizens). Independent institution for the general protection of human rights. This institution was also established at local level, but given that relevant legal acts pertaining to that local ombudsmen vary from one local community to another and that the major-

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ity of local ombudsmen lack one of the main features of this institution – independence from other branches, particularly from the executive - this article only deals with the ombudsman on the national and provincial level in more details. 2. Commissioner for Information of Public Interest and for the Protection of Personal Data. Established as such in two stages: first, as the Commissioner for the Information of Public Interest, by the Act on Access to Information of Public Interest of 2004. In 2008, upon adoption of the new Act on the Protection of Personal Data, the Commissioner’s authorities were expanded to include data protection, as well. Main differences from ombudsman are that the Commissioner deals with specific areas of human rights, whereas ombudsmen cover all human rights and that the Commissioner may issue legally binding orders, while ombudsmen may issue only recommendations, opinions and suggestions which are not legally binding. 3. Commissioner for the Protection of Equality. Established by the Act Against Discrimination of 2009. Its main function is to supervise the enforcement of this Act. Unlike two other institutions, this Commissioner may investigate cases regardless of whether the subject who was allegedly discriminated against someone is a state body, public service or a private individual and s/he may start proceedings for discrimination and upon the complaining party’s acceptance, actively participate in them before the court. The latter two institutions are not presented in details in this article. The following subheadings contain the presentation of the legal framework for the institutions of ombudsman at provincial and national level. III. Ombudsman (Protector of Citizens) This institution was first established at provincial 7 and local level and only several years later at national level as well.8 Because of the variety of solutions on local level and the fact that most local ombudsmen are not independent institutions under relevant local regulations, these local institutions are not

7 Provincial Ombudsman was established in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. Legal grounds for that were set by the Act on Establishing Certain Authorities of the Autonomous Province, adopted in February 2002, by the National Assembly of Serbia. In December 2002, the provincial Assembly of Vojvodina enacted the Decree on Provincial Ombudsman and the first Ombudsman of Vojvodina was elected in September 2003. 8 At the state level, this institution was introduced by the Act on the Protector of Citizens of 2005, whereas the first Protector was elected only two years later, in July 2007.

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included in this review.9 The title of the institution on republican level is Protector of Citizens, while on the provincial level it is named as Ombudsman. Both Provincial Ombudsman and the Protector of Citizens apply the so called „soft law“ in their work. They have no authorities to annul decisions of agencies that they control, or to decide on issues themselves. They investigate whether there was any kind of violation of one’s human rights through agencies which control is within the ombudsman’s competence. If they find that a violation has occurred they may issue recommendations, opinions or suggestions, neither of which is legally binding. Although they may apply certain measures against public officials who have violated human rights or obstructed their work in any way, their findings stated in recommendations, etc. are not enforceable. Thus, successful performance of the functions of ombudsman depends primarily on the authority of the institution, which should be based on competence, demonstrated impartiality and objectivity, quality of investigations and the persuasiveness of argumentation used in recommendations. Given that ombudsman’s decisions are not binding, an important, even crucial feature of this institution is its independence from other branches of state power, as well as from any other interest or ideological groups and organizations (e.g. business groups, political parties, religious organizations, etc.). 1. The Provincial Ombudsman of Vojvodina was the first institution of the kind in Serbia. The Decree on Provincial Ombudsman (hereinafter: the Decree) defines Provincial Ombudsman as an independent institution for the protection and improvement of human rights of any person through the control of legality, appropriateness and efficiency of provincial and local administration and public services in Vojvodina. The mandate of Ombudsman lasts for 6 years. The Decree prescribes rather strict requirements for the election of Ombudsman and enumerates a long list of activities that are incompatible with this post.10 Candidates may be proposed by at least 30 deputies at the

9 Grounds for establishing the local ombudsmen were set by the Act on Local Self-Government of 2002, according to which this institution is not obligatory but local communities decide if they need it or not. This act contained only one article with few general principles related to ombudsman, while all the rules on particular institution were to be set by regulations of respective local assemblies. This resulted in various solutions in practice, in some cases even contrary to ombudsman’s functions. Instead of fostering the core principles necessary for this institution to fulfill its tasks, the new Act on Local Self-Government of 2007 further reduced the general legal framework for local ombudsman. Less than 10% of local communities in Serbia introduced this institution in these 10 years. 10 Position of Provincial Ombudsman is incompatible with membership in any political party or organization, labor union, governing or supervisory boards of public or private companies; with the

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Provincial Assembly (out of 120), or by a parliamentary committee of matters of administration. Provincial Assembly elects the Ombudsman with 2/3 majority of the total number of deputies,11 which is the highest threshold for the election of a public servant on any level in Serbia. Besides central office in Novi Sad, according to the Decree, the Provincial Ombudsman must organize two more branch offices, one in Subotica, in the north of the Province and the other in Pančevo, in the south. Ombudsman investigates alleged violations of human rights both upon individual complaints and ex officio.12 During the process of investigation s/ he is authorized to try to mediate between the parties with the aim of reaching a peaceful solution to a controversy. Provincial Ombudsman has wide investigative authorities. If s/he finds that an administrative agency has violated one’s human rights, Ombudsman shall recommend measures to that agency with the aim of removing the violation and/or preventing such violations to occur in the future. If agencies do not follow Ombudsman’s recommendations, s/he shall inform competent authorities (the provincial assembly and/or government, other supervisory bodies if there are any) about the established maladministration and failure of the agency to remedy the violation that was committed and may inform the general public on human rights violations through the media. S/he may also initiate criminal, misdemeanor, disciplinary, or other appropriate proceedings with the competent authorities against the head and the employees of an agency that violated one’s human rights, or against those who obstructed the Ombudsman’s investigation. Once a year s/he delivers an annual report on the institution’s work and on the state of human rights and legal certainty in the Province and may submit special reports on particular issues, if needed. Upon Ombudsman’s request, his/her reports shall be put on the agenda of the Assembly, shall be debated upon and should be published in the Official Gazette of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina13 (however, in spite of the explicit provision in the Decree, none of the Provincial Ombudsman’s annual reports have been published in the Gazette until now, with a repeated excuse that there are no sources in the provincial budget for that purpose!).

performance of any other public or professional activity except fields of education, science and art; as well as with service in a number of enumerated public offices on any level in the year prior to election. Decree on Provincial Ombudsman of 2002, Art. 7. 11 Decree on Provincial Ombudsman, Art. 5. 12 Some European ombudsmen may not act upon their own initiative – e.g. in Belgium, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg or United Kingdom. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Gabriele (ed.): European Ombudsman-Institutions, Springer, Wien-New York, 2008. p. 490. 13 Decree on Provincial Ombudsman, Art. 37 and 38.

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The Provincial Ombudsman is also authorized to join the sessions of the Assembly and its boards, to participate in the debates on issues within his/ her competencies and to submit opinions and recommendations on draft laws before the Assembly. In order to improve the legislation on human rights in accordance with international standards, s/he may advise the Provincial Assembly to enact new, or to amend existing legal acts and may initiate proceedings before the Constitutional Court.14 Provincial Ombudsman may be removed from office if s/he was sentenced to prison for crime, if s/he is not performing his duties in a competent, impartial, independent and diligent manner,15 and if s/he performs activities incompatible with this office (see supra). The removal procedure is initiated by at least 1/3 of deputies, or by the board of administrative matters, while votes of 2/3 majority of the total number of deputies is required for Ombudsman’s removal from office. The term of Ombudsman ceases upon his/her own request, in case of his/her death, upon expiry of his/her mandate, if s/ he becomes permanently incapacitated to perform this duty, or when s/he fulfills the requirements for retirement. After the expiry of the first Provincial Ombudsman’s mandate, neither of the two succeeding ones fulfilled the legal requirements, i.e. their election was illegal (one had been retired for 16 years before his election, contrary to the explicit provision in the provincial decree that the Ombudsman’s mandate expires once s/he reaches the age for retirement; current Ombudsman is a member of the Democratic Party, which is incompatible with this office by an explicit statement of the same decree). This shows that after the first ombudsman’s mandate, political considerations and interests prevailed over legal requirements for the election of Ombudsman, which decreases the authority and independence of the institution and threatens to jeopardize the trust of citizens in its impartiality. From the explicit provisions of the Decree, another serious departure occurred during the mandate of the third Provincial Ombudsman, who closed the two aforementioned branch offices that were established at the beginning of the institution’s work. The latter (illegal) move reduced the accessibility of the institution to citizens.

14 Ibid. Art. 14. 15 This particular group of reasons is not specific enough, which particularly applies to the requirement of “diligence”. Given that no criteria were set by the Decree that would aid the assessment of one’s departure from this requirement, this ground may be abused to put a pressure on an incumbent in respect of his/her findings in certain cases, or to remove a him/her from office if s/he is to critical.

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2. The Protector of Citizens at the state level. According to the Act on the Protector of Citizens of 2005 (hereinafter: the Act), this is also an independent institution that protects human rights through controlling the work of state administration and other organizations vested with public authorities, providing that alleged violations of human rights come as a result of the violation of legal acts adopted by the republican (national) Assembly.16 The Act explicitly enumerates what state agencies the Protector may not control: the Assembly, the President of the Republic, the Government, the Constitutional Court, regular courts and public attorneys. The requirements and the procedure for the election of the Protector are less strict than in case of Provincial Ombudsman. Candidates are proposed to the Parliamentary Board for Constitutional Matters and only parliamentary political parties may submit such proposals. By simple majority of its members, the Parliamentary Board decides on the candidate to be proposed to the Assembly. Finally, the National Assembly elects the Protector if absolute majority (of the total number of deputies) has voted for the proposed candidate. This post is incompatible with simultaneous performance of other public services, professional activities, or any other activities that may affect his/her impartiality and with membership in political parties. The Protector’s mandate lasts for 5 years. The authorities of the Protector are generally the same as those of the Provincial Ombudsman. The Protector is accountable to the Assembly of Serbia.

16 Act on the Protector of Citizens of 2005, Art. 1 and 17. This is further specified in Article 34, stating that in cases where the complaint relates to the violation of a national (republican) legal acts the Provincial and local ombudsman shall immediately transfer that case to the national Protector and vice versa. These norms, inserted into the Act intentionally or out of ignorance, created a potential source of conflict of competences between the national Ombudsman on one side and the Provincial and local ombudsmen on the other. Human rights are guaranteed by the constitution and elaborated by legal acts adopted on the national level, whereas by-laws (the only form of legal acts that may be adopted by the provincial or local assemblies) very rarely deal with human rights. Therefore, majority of cases before ombudsman, arise from violations of republican legal acts, which in practice means that this norm, basically, stripped all the other ombudsmen in Serbia off a large part of their authorities – investigation of individual cases - making them a surplus in the system rearranged in this manner. As for the other of the two main functions – control of the work of administration – consequences are similar but to a lesser extent. Namely, the Autonomous Province and local communities may autonomously regulate the work of their own agencies, so ombudsmen may control the work of agencies at those levels. Still, such control is performed in order to protect human rights and if this aim is in fact taken away, ombudsmen of lower levels are reduced to bodies that mainly control the procedure performed by provincial and/or local agencies, while issues pertaining to the material law remain only a small fraction of their cases. Finally, given that the Autonomous Province has the authority to autonomously create its own agencies and regulate their work and that Provincial Ombudsman is responsible before the Provincial Assembly for the performance of tasks vested to it by the provincial Decree, this provision is also unconstitutional since the Republic factually infringed the original authority of the Province by indirectly reducing the authorities of Provincial Ombudsman, which is not within the scope of authorities of the Republic.

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Certain provisions in the Act, which do not exist in relation to the Provincial Ombudsman, weaken the position of the Protector. The first of them forbids the Protector to make “statements of political nature”. Such a restriction is too vague. Human rights generally restrict the authorities of a state, thus, most issues related to human rights violations are in substance political issues per se. Moreover, most ombudsmen in the world, including the Protector, have legal obligation to assess the state of human rights at least once a year, in their annual reports. Would it be a prohibited “political statement” if an ombudsman states in his/her report that, for instance, the rights of ethnic minorities are seriously violated by the state; or that certain groups are systematically discriminated against by state bodies; or that the poor state of human rights is largely induced by the corruptive and incompetent practices of the government and its administration? Such statements are undoubtedly of “political nature” and some deputies might not like them - but should they be banned because of that? This provision may be abused by political factors to remove the incumbent from the office and replace him/her with one who is less critical about human rights violations of the current administration. Besides, what would occur if some Protector’s statements were found to be “political”? This is not mentioned as a ground for his/her removal from office (unless construed as a form of careless performance of his/her tasks, or a conflict of interests – see infra) and there is no procedure or sanction foreseen in such cases. On the other hand, politically biased statements, or the Protector’s active participation in the electoral campaign of certain political parties and the like, are indeed contrary to the requirement of his/her impartiality. The conclusion is that this norm was incompetently drafted and it should have been worded more carefully - instead of “political statements”, in order to prevent or at least diminish the possibilities for abusing and/or retaliating against the Protector who is according to someone’s opinion is being too critical, it should read: “politically biased statements”, or “political statements outside the scope of the authorities of the Protector of citizens”, or the like. Another questionable provision is related to reasons for the Protector’s dismissal. The Act prescribes that the Protector may be removed from office if s/he is not performing his/her duties in a competent and diligent manner; if s/he simultaneously performs another public service or professional duty, or any other activity that may be in conflict with his/her independence, or is against the laws regulating conflict of interests, or if s/he is sentenced for a crime which makes him/her unfit for this office.17 The last of these reasons is not specific enough. It is clear from the wording that not every crime is suffi-

17 Act on the Protector of Citizens of 2005, Art. 12. Similar reason in the Decree on Provincial Ombudsman is more specific and reads: “if sentenced for a crime to prison”. In the latter case the criterion is the type of criminal punishment (prison), which can be objectively established

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cient ground for the Protectors removal from office. Certain crimes obviously fall within this category (e.g. taking a bribe, falsifying official documents and the like), but it remains open to interpretations (and certain deals among deputies, i.e. political parties) what other crimes may indicate that one is not suitable for this office. For this vagueness, this reason may be abused to get rid of an incumbent. The Protector is also authorized to act upon complaints or own initiatives. His/her investigative powers are generally the same as those of the Provincial Ombudsman (see supra). The Protector has another explicitly formulated authority: s/he may propose to the relevant body that the public officer responsible for human rights violations be removed from office. IV. Challenges in the practice of ombudsmen in Serbia so far. I. Successful work of this institution depends a lot on the character of the legal system. Firmly established rule of law and respect for it is an important prerequisite for adequate fulfillment of controlling and protective functions of these independent institutions for the protection of human rights. Unfortunately, such setting has not yet been established in Serbia. Thus, cases of not responding to ombudsman’s requests, ignoring his/her recommendations and opinions by agencies or other organizations whose work is controlled by ombudsman, or even obstructions of its work are not rare exceptions. On the positive side, the practice has shown that after some time of adjustment, which may last for years, the majority of agencies accepts the existence of a new controlling institution and cooperates with it in investigations or in carrying out its recommendations. II. There seems to be no genuine political will to support and improve this institution. So far, the supervisory function of the Assembly over the execution remained underdeveloped in the Serbian legal system. Parliamentary debates on annual reports of ombudsman institutions are usually just a formality, problems in the area of human rights and/or in the work of administration are often neglected. Relevant assemblies usually make no steps after debating these annual reports (e.g. adopting conclusions on the recommendations made in the reports, ordering the relevant agencies to answer to those recommendations or suggestions and the like). Thus, sometimes it seems that ombudsman’s findings and recommendations, generally aimed at the improvement of the performance of administration, are not taken as seriously as they should be. III. Respective governments still tend to ignore the findings of ombudsman, particularly those that are critical of the performance of administration. Sometimes members of the execution also tend to obstruct the independ-

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ence and functioning of ombudsman (e.g. in the process of preparation of the institution’s budget, in providing offices and equipment necessary for its work, avoiding or delaying communication with ombudsman even contrary to explicit legal provisions, etc.), which, to some extent, is the consequence of the fact that supervisory bodies are often seen by the administration as adversaries rather than collaborators. IV. In general, the level of citizens’ awareness of their rights is rather low. In practice it is demonstrated through numerous applications to ombudsman in matters, or against bodies, which are not within the competences of ombudsman. On the other hand, expectations of citizens who address ombudsman are often rather high (various surveys suggest that this is at least partly the result of a rather low trust that citizens have in state institutions in general), even if a concrete issue is not within the authorities of ombudsman. V. Lack of adequate funding, as a consequence of objective (economic crisis, high unemployment rate), but also some other reasons (these institutions are usually not on the priority list when it comes to securing the budget necessary for their work), adversely affect ombudsmen’s work. V. Summary and conclusion In the last decade, several types of independent institutions have been established in Serbia for the protection of human rights. The article deals with institutions of ombudsman on the provincial and national levels. Major part of the article consists of the presentation and comparison of legal framework for these institutions, with an analysis of certain solutions that should be improved in order to alleviate ombudsmen’s work and fulfillment of their major functions – control over the administration and other public services in order to prevent or at least decrease violations of human rights by the execution. These institutions face various challenges during their work, the most important of which are also presented in the article.

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RADOSAVLJEVIĆ, Duško PhD.

associate professor/Faculty of Law and Business Studies “Dr Lazar Vrkatić”, Novi Sad, Serbia

Serbia’s Preparedness for the EU-Accession “One should stop pretending that the European Union post-1989 is simply an enlarged version of what existed before. The identity of the EU simply cannot be the same as it was when there is an open border to the East – and increasingly to the South too.” (Giddens, Anthony)

I. Preface The process of Eurointegration is the activity that all former socialist countries have to experience. Serbia, owing to a much belated transition/transformation, is notably falling behind in this race. The process of Eurointegration has two components; vertical (EU-isation) and horizontal (Europeanisation). This paper explains the causes and effects of both components. Two hundred years after the greatest overthrow in the history of the world, the French Revolution in 1789, Europeans geographically located in Central and East Europe, by turning autumn into spring (known as “The Spring of Nations”), were determined to take their sovereignty back from the eastern vastness,1 decide their destiny on their own and choose how and with whom they should share it. We, the citizens living within the borders of the old and different Yugoslavia, realized far too late that the activities on the streets of Berlin were not “painting and decoration works”, but rather overthrowing of an epoch – the epoch of fear, single-mindedness and a system in which a person was not treated as a unique individual, a world of its own, a unique micro-cosmos. Some among us have never realized this fact, especially, the elite leading our tragic people.2 The demand to live in truth prevailed. And it did so in the way Vaclav Havel3 cried out and was followed by millions of people in the streets and squares of Warsaw, Prague, Berlin, Budapest, Kaunas,

1 According to famous Brezhnev’s “doctrine of limited sovereignty”, the borders of the Soviet Union were borders of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, i.e. the territory that the Soviet Union liberated/occupied during World War II. 2 See the introduction by Pusić V. in: Cviić, K. and Safney, P. (ed.): Od konflikata do saradnje [From Conflicts to Cooperation] In: Jugoistočna Evropa, Zagreb, 2008. 10. 3 For more information on transformation/transition see Radosavljević, Duško: Elite i transformacija [Elite and Transformation]. Centar za istraživanje demokratije, Novi Sad, 2001.

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Riga, etc. They were determined to break loose from the existing regimes and to make a new start. Responsible people in responsible countries have developed a change-making strategy debating at round tables, where the “former” together with the “future” have shown the necessary level of awareness to preserve the essence of people, the minimum of the country and security as well as to take all possible routes for the development of the country and the society. They reached three key agreements. Their societies, or, as they called them then, transitional societies were about to follow three basic principles: 1. Democratic rules of the game will be determined based on multiparty democracy along with the establishment of institutions for the protection of human rights followed by adequate legislation. 2. Market economy shall be introduced with all its implications and it will be based on private property. 3. Active participation in the Euro-Atlantic integration process. The European Union will have priority in international relations.4 This decision has been made by the elite of the “old” and the “new” regime taking into account their responsibility and historic role at time of great social turbulences. Unfortunately, this kind of agreement was not reached in Serbia and the result is known by all of us! Millions of refugees, thousands of destroyed homes, thousands of dead and wounded, a ruined industry and an overall disaster of cosmic proportions. The principle “if we don’t know how to work, at least we know how to fight” prevailed and eventually, “the story had a bitter end”! Of course, the results achieved in structural changes differed from country to country; “partially because the enthusiastic transitional missionaries did not always understand two crucial things. First, the main reason why the local society wanted changes was the urge to reach the West European living standard. And the second, the same society was completely unaware of the hard work that the process required.”5 Actually, this is where our story begins… The accession of Serbia to the European Union is not brought into question6 at all, even though members of different political options offer different interpretations of this rather demanding venture.7

4 Radosavljević, Duško: Političke elite u socijalnoj transformaciji – od kolektivističkog ka liberalnodemokratskom etosu: Sedam poglavlja jedne zajedničke povesti [Political Elites in Social Transformation – from Collectivist to Liberal-Democratic Ethos: Seven Chapter of One Common History]. In: Anali poslovne ekonomije, 2008/ 2. Banja Luka. 5 See Cviić-Safney: op. cit. 90. 6 Public opinion polls have revealed so far that the majority of the citizens of Serbia are pro on joining the EU. 7 It is important to point out that many offices, starting at the former federal level, the ones in the Republic and in Vojvodina, which have been involved in the preparations for the accession of Serbia to the EU, have always been up to the task, but the problem was the will of political mandatories in the country.

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II. Serbia – what the problem is; what the task is? The accession to the European Union is evaluated at two basic levels: the vertical and the horizontal one. The first one is similar to the one accepted by the post-communist elite when taking “the road less travelled”, the path into the EU where one stage of development ended. That path presupposed the fulfillment of the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”, meaning that candidate countries are expected to fulfill certain requirements regarding the establishment of democracy and institutions guaranteeing human rights, the development of effective market economy mechanisms and accepting the legacy of the European Union legislation – acquis communautaire.8 This process is completed through several stages: Feasibility Study, Stabilization and Association Agreement, Candidacy, Negotiation and Accession. It presupposes the following activities: minimum convergence of politics, harmonization of legislation and political integration, which requires partial transfer of the sovereignty to the EU. In a nutshell, the minimum fulfillment of conditions from the Community Acquis is required. The problem with some political mandatories in Serbia is that they see this process as a way of acquiring means allocated in the form of pre-access assistance and later in the form of European structural funds. However, it has to be noted that the aid provided by the EU does not exceed a total of 4% of the national GDP in a particular country so that this issue should be taken into consideration. Obviously, detailed analyses, empirical data and expected growth projections should be conducted to adjust the proper accession time. This vertical process of the accession is colloquially referred to as EU-isation. It is a political project, carried out by politicians and/or skilled bureaucrats. The problem with this project is that it involves only a small number of those who will actually access the EU, such as politicians, parts of the establishment, upper bureaucracy levels and a small number of citizens. Nevertheless, the challenges caused after the accession of Bulgaria, Romania9 and even Greece, indicate that the process of accession requires more than just the following steps: –– Proliferation of the legislation harmonized with thousands of already translated EU standards and norms; –– Development of incoherent national development strategies that do not comply with European objectives;

8 Radosavljević, Duško – Matijević, Nikolina: Evropska unija – Razvoj, institucije, proširenje [European Union – Development, Institutions, Enlargement]. Fakultet za pravne i političke studije, Novi Sad, 2007. 9 Bulgaria and Romania, who did not fulfill the criteria for the accession to the EU in 2004, were given the promise that they would be accepted on 1st January 2007. The waiting time was not invested in any changes, it simply ran out and the problems of these two states were simply transferred to the EU.

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–– Establishing provisional institutional arrangements hardly contributing to the achievement of developmental objectives through relatively democratic governing; –– Spinning achieved through people close to the government used as evidence of their achievements and relative reform results. Though constantly multiplied, they can be completely effectuated only after the accession; –– Politically motivated oaths to cherish European values without actually adopting them. The other level of the accession to the EU is deemed to be a horizontal reform process, representing the overall influence of European values on economic and any other development, such as the efficiency of institutions, social relations and everything that comprises ordinary citizens’ quality of life. This process is referred to as Europeanization and the date of the accession of Serbia to the European Union is conditioned by what we manage to accomplish during this process. Modern society has determined certain values as European; among others they include peace, democracy, human and minority rights, as well as sustainable development. If we integrate these values into our own system of values, we are not only closer to the EU, but are also bound to overcome some of the basic issues in our society, such as the completion of social reforms, recovery from the effects of a delayed transition, stabilization of weak democratic institutions and institutions for human rights protection, strengthening the economy and creation of conditions for sustainable development. If we really want Serbia to improve, the decision to join the European Union is a logical one; the process of adopting these values is expected and has as equal value as the accession to the EU itself. It is important to mention that the accession to the EU is part of a carefully planned domestic policy based on structural change of the country to accept the upcoming challenges rather than argue about foreign policy issues on a daily basis. Quoting Zoran Djindjić seems more than appropriate at this point: “Serbia will not change if we all remain the same. To change Serbia, we all have to make a change – in the way we approach problems, in our mentality, in our work habits… Because Serbia is a collection of all of us. First of all, we have to be optimistic and stop perceiving all that is unfamiliar as if it were created by an enemy. Or, stop thinking that whatever we do not understand, is working against us. “ To clarify, European standards and norms are not obligatory. They are inevitable and should be regarded as guidelines, useful advises and parameters. If they were incorporated into our domestic activities, they might lead to the optimization of existing developmental capacities and the creation of new developmental policies, especially at regional and local level. Such incorporation would benefit the cooperation with some parts of the EU at all levels but also strengthen the European Union itself as a new world player protecting

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the interests of every member country and the whole EU. Already in 1953, Konrad Adenauer prophesied: “[t]hough our national ego might be hurt, we have to admit that nowadays, no single European national country by itself and on its own is capable of providing prosperity and freedom to its citizens or protect its national territory.”10 Therefore, only uniting can make European countries able to respond to the upcoming challenges and achieve their national interests. This includes Europe as a whole because “without its integrity, Europe will not be stable and will not be able to play a leading role in the world history.”11 This is especially important for Serbia because there is no “strategic partnership” more important to Serbia than the accession to the EU. III. What should be our next step? Despite being still predominant in society and among political mandatories, at least in writing, it has to be accepted that there are fewer and fewer supporters of the idea of the European integration. Therefore, we believe that an essential precondition for the development of society is determining institutionalized assumptions for an independent and responsible judicial system. Recent activities in that area have caused far more regrets about the process than satisfaction with it. The next step would be to strengthen the independence of regulatory and controlling authorities, agencies and institutions, starting with the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia, the National Bank of Serbia, the Council of the Broadcasting Agency of the Republic of Serbia, the Anti-Corruption Agency, the State Audit Agency, the Commissioner for Information, the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, etc. Furthermore, they would have to be liberated from political pressure and the pressure caused by the system itself. In addition, the role of the Serbian parliament, that is the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, should be redefined in order to be transformed into a representative body of citizens as opposed to its current role of a mere collection of party delegates devoid of initiative, responsibility and reasonable judgment. A fundamental issue to resolve is to enable citizen participation through their own active engagement or via their organizations (NGO sector), as well as enable the involvement of local self-governments in making political decision of crucial importance for the society. Therefore, Serbia should re-examine the content of its 52 devel-

10 Evropska integracija kao teritorijalna nužnost [European Integration as Territorial Necessity], in: EVROPA S DUŠOM - Govori koji su odredili Evropu (ed. Popović, Aleksandra). Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, Belgrade, 2009. 75. http://www.uef.rs/materijal/dokumenta/Evropa%20s%20dusom.pdf 11 Đinđić, Zoran: Evropa s dušom [Europe with Soul], in: EVROPA S DUŠOM - Govori koji su odredili Evropu (ed. Popović, Aleksandra). Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, Belgrade, 2009. 175. http:// www.uef.rs/materijal/dokumenta/Evropa%20s%20dusom.pdf

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opment and reform strategies, adjust them to the developmental programs of the EU12, as well as plan, support and control the implementation of policies for an overall national and a balanced regional development by establishing institutional arrangements furnished with qualified personnel who are capable enough to carry out such tasks. In addition, a functional process of decentralization and regionalization of Serbia has to be implemented because the process of Europeanisation is so broad that it has to be shared with the authorities from regional and local self-governments. This process should not be an exclusive activity of only central authorities. Due to its complexity, it would become an impossible mission, if it were. Local authorities must respond to those needs of their citizens, associations and educational organizations, which have developed as real and concrete, which are directed at improving the quality of life at the local level, securing European standards and strengthening human and social capital that has deteriorated over the years. To sum it up, Europeanisation is an essential process in the framework of activities contributing to the accession of Serbia to the European Union and it includes social, economic, political and legal aspects. If politicians, the economic and intellectual elite, active citizens and the NGO-sector enter this process together and give their best, success may be expected. A successful Europeanisation requires a coalition because only then will our engagement, as a state and a society, while handling all the demanding and usually painful activities, known as vertical accession or EU-isation make sense. EU-isation without Europeanisation leaves us no hope for a confirmed development. It leaves us halfway through. And Serbia is tired of waiting for her Godot.13 In the Serbian play, just as in the one written by the famous Irishman, Godot is simply gone! We measure our own time, we decide for ourselves about when, how and why we will join the European Union.

12 See: Jelinčić, J. (work sheet) – Europe 2020 Monitoring Platform underlines three priorities that complement each other /COM (2010) 2020 from 3 March 2010/ is in fact a revised version of the Lisbon Agenda from 2000, the objective of which has been defined as turning the European economy into the most competent world economy based on knowledge and it actually suggests the restructuring of the European economy); smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge; sustainable growth: promoting a more resource-efficient (using energy and raw materials in an economical way) and greener economy; inclusive growth: fostering a high employment-economy (especially for the population between 20 and 64) and contributing to the social and territorial cohesion (in the sense of providing equal regional development and equal population density) of the Union and each member state, individually. 13 Becket. Samuel: Waiting for Godot. 54. Estragon: Well? Shall we go? Vladimir: Yes, let’s go. They don’t move. Curtain

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IV. Concluding remarks In 1989, the former socialist countries “voted with their feet”14 are determined to leave the past behind them, to tear down the “Iron curtain” (Winston Churchill) and return back to Europe, their home. A shortcut to the European house was identified in the project that was then in its infancy – the European Union, supported by Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission at the time. He determined the criteria and developed a strategy to assist those countries in becoming member states after they fulfill those criteria. The citizens of former Yugoslavia, though belonging to the most developed socialist world at the time, believed their leaders that the path to independency, prosperity, reputation and happiness was to be achieved by means of wars, destruction, immorality and the breaking of human dignity, as opposed to the principles of the European Union, based on a strong respect of antifascist values, human rights, as well as the right to be different and unique. It all ended by leaving former Yugoslav countries in the last compartment on the train of European integration with different explanations for not being there, with an array of excuses telling them why they should not fulfill the criteria to join the European Union and avoid fulfillment of international obligations, which would actually improve the life of their own citizens. For this reason, we believe that a certain change in the behaviour of governing authorities can be achieved only through the interaction with the European Union, whereby the following should be kept in mind: “One of the few great moments in the history of the EU is its role in the consolidation of the transitional countries of Eastern Europe. Leaving the regimes they did not want, they had to accept the task to define the kind of country they wanted to live in. For all revolutionary movements, even the velvet ones, this seems to be the hardest task. Almost an insurmountable one. The EU was there, waiting with its acquis communautaire, the Copenhagen criteria and the guidelines for building a country. That influence as well as the opportunity given to them have been crucial for the countries of South Eastern Europe. Among all the types of power exercised by the international community in this region, this kind of soft power has had the strongest influence.”15 Serbia is a European country and it is her time to play its role in the family of the European people and countries in the most efficient, rational and effective way. We owe to ourselves and to the younger generations that much. And to our neighbours, of course.

14 Statement made by the former minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. 15 See the introduction by Pusić, V., in: Cviić-Safney: op. cit.14.

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BERETKA, Katinka

PhD candidate Széchenyi István University, Postgraduate Doctoral School of Legal Studies, Győr advisor/Hungarian National Council (Vojvodina)

Serbia’s National Minority Policy in Light of the EU Integration Process

During the spring of 2012, media was thick with Romania’s statement, namely, that it does not support Serbia’s EU accession if the latter does not change his policy toward the Vlach minority. Although this statement is more a hyperbole than a case in point, it proves that status and guaranteed rights of national minorities in national states are of high political relevance in light of eastward enlargement. The European Union primarily formed as supranational organization of economic character has become more and more sensitive regarding national, ethnic questions in the last years but these problems still lack the real resolution. Maybe adoption of the Lisbon Treaty will revise the current situation but until then the question hangs: whether respect of minority rights is precondition of EU accession or not. Hereinafter, the paper is going to present legal development of this field together with challenges connected to the further EU integration, especially focusing on Serbia’s opportunities of successful accession. In the second part of the paper, the European Commission’s opinion on Serbia’s application for EU membership expanded by the author’s subjective reflections on the topic will be in details discussed. I. Aspects of minority protection in the EU Lawyers engaged in the field of human rights know that talking (and writing, as well) about the EU’s national minority policy is not an easy task at all. Up to this day it has been unambiguous that in regulation of human and minority rights there have been international legal norms and national rules implementing the international ones with the condition that „the protection of national minorities is ius cogens of international relations which realization does not depend on state’s deliberation and constitutional concept”1

1 Hegedűs, Dániel: Az Európai Unió nemzeti, etnikai és nyelvi kisebbségeket érintő politikáinak rövid összefoglalása. [Brief Resume of the Policies of the EU in the Field of National, Ethnic and Linguistic

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(statement of the Badinter Arbitration Committee). By introducing EU standards in national minority protection, a new, third factor, the so called supranational level would show up eventuating in formation of the EU’s own standpoint on legal standing of national minorities. In other words, instead of the member states, the EU should define the subject, object and content of the regulation that has been, up to this day, without bigger success in international law. The lack of a generally accepted legal definition of national minority just burdens this process. In the Recommendation 12012 the Council of Europe attempts to compensate this defect but this optional act does not provide correct ground for evolution of Community Law. By an oppositional opinion, national minorities’ legal status living in the territory of the EU cannot be uniformly regulated on the Community-level without constitution of a so-called EU majority. EU majority should be a new category of EU population as group of EU citizens with common “EU identity”; this would provide benchmark for determination of “others”, the EU national minorities as such.3 We can debate with this statement but up to its realization it is more reasonable to talk about national minority policy of the member states than national minority policy of the EU itself. Currently, EU policy includes only few criteria up to which each candidate state should be measured. Having in mind the main topic of the paper, the question is whether this system of prerequisites exists at all or not. At first, respect for and protection of national minorities as requirement for accession besides democracy, rule of law and stable institutions guaranteeing human rights has appeared by adoption of the Copenhagen criteria,4 even though it was quickly discovered that “issue of minorities is not value but more interest principled engine of the accession.”5 For example this prerequisite was only “forgotten” by the Amsterdam Treaty among the political criteria.6 Also double standards have evolved between the full members and candidate states because the accession criteria do not concern the “olds” just the new ones (e.g. some member states, like France, still deny that national minorities live in their territory at all, so in these cases, the best opportu-

Minorities] 13. http://www.europeer.hu/tanulmany_EUkisebbsegek.pdf 2 22th Sitting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 1. 3 Toggenburg, Gabriel N.: Minority Protection in a Supranational Context: Limits and Opportunities. In: Minority Protection and the enlarged European Union: the way forward (ed. Gabriel N. Toggenburg) Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2004. p. 10. http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2004/261/MinorityProtection-and-the-Enlarged-EU.pdf (24.08.2012.) 4 European Council in Copenhagen – 21-22 June 1993 – Conclusions of the Presidency DOC/93/3, 7. A iii) http://ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/72921_en.pdf 5 Hegedűs: op. cit. 15. 6 Amsterdam Treaty, Art. I. 8)

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nity to enforce national minority rights lies in the protection of minority languages). On the one hand, this fact decreases credibility of the EU and on the other hand, asks for the question: on which basis can the EU control the fulfillment of concerned criteria on national minorities without own control mechanism, rules and procedures. There are two opportunities: if the EU cannot stop the gap (namely, does not adopt universally applicable provisions on national minorities) then it should either accept the conclusions of other European organizations’ state reports or pressurize the flow of events through diplomatic communication with the candidate states.7 Without doubt, none of the options would result in adequate solution because as long as correspondence with Copenhagen criteria (as political and not legal criteria) is only evaluated during the integration processes, the protection of national minorities can be studied only in context of security and not human right policy of the EU bodies. The biggest problem is caused by starting point of the regulation, namely, that the Union usually equals traditional national minorities of the member states and immigrant population as one category. Because of this approach sometimes protection of national minorities appears as issue of foreign and security policy, sometimes as issue of internal affairs. To protect them or to protect the Union from them?! Or as Judit Tóth drew: “we can consider this from such aspect that the common European migration policy has been widened by reference on national minority rights because of prevention of new waves of immigrants and refugees in its territory”.8 Today, it seems that the most adequate political, moral and legal basis for national minority protection has been found in the EU’s antidiscrimination principle. Prohibition of discrimination can be reasonable to protect minority groups from discrimination on basis of national or ethnic membership – even though for a long time prohibition of discrimination was only defined in context of four freedoms, especially focusing on the prohibition of discrimination on basis of citizenship. The question is whether accentuation of equality can be effective for protection of something or somebody which essence lies in its distinctness from the national majority. According to some standpoints and I agree with them, prohibition of discrimination is not enough per se: it should be applicable together with some other mechanisms of national minority protection as supplementary principle. Still, prohibition of discrimination aims at preserving equality in equal circumstances, protection of minorities aims at emphasizing the right to be different and at

7 Tsilevich, Boris: EU Enlargement and the Protection of National Minorities: Opportunities, Myths and Prospects, p. 5. http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/eu-minority-protection-20011001.pdf 8 Szajbély, Katalin – Tóth, Judit: Kisebbségvédelem az Európai Unióban [Protection of Minorities in the European Union] http://www.hhrf.org/kisebbsegkutatas/kk_2002_02/cikk.php?id=1134

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preserving equality in different circumstances.9 This theory also proves that such protection provided by antidiscrimination principle refers more to immigrants than to traditional minorities. However, after adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the approach to national minorities has considerably changed. In accordance with the Article 2 of the Treaty on EU „ the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.”10 We can see that the EU moves away from the concept of collective rights that run along the Copenhagen criteria and talks about rights of people belonging to minorities (or in other words about individual rights). But such changes of the prevailing approach and slight of collective rights is not surprising at all, having in mind the attitude of other international documents, especially the Framework Convention.11 In this place I do not deal with problems of interpretation, namely, that minority groups can evolve on different bases as language, race, sexual orientation or gender, not only on basis of national membership. The term ‘belonging to national minorities’ is not clear either, especially because of legislative activity of the EU that has adopted a directive about racial and ethnic but not about national minorities. „To ensure the development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, specific action in the field of discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin should go beyond access to employed and self-employed activities and cover areas such as education, social protection including social security and healthcare, social advantages and access to and supply of goods and services.”12 The character of the text proves that in this context reference to ethnic origin is connected more to immigrants than to natives, autochthonous national communities in the EU – in other words, there is nothing about cultural or language rights, about preservation of national identity but about aspects of social integration. However, we cannot confuse two principles: prohibition of discrimination on basis of national origin and duty of all to promote equality notwithstanding ethnic origin. The only similarity between them is the opportunity to introduce affirmative actions in both cases. Although in the spring of 1999, the major tendency was totally different: the Commis-

9 Tshilevich: op. cit. 8. 1-3. 10 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Art. 2. Official Journal of the EU C115/13, 09/05/2008 11 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Strasbourg, 1.02.1995. CETS No.: 157. 12 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, implementing the principle of equal treatment between people irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.

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sion by order of the Council reviewed the candidate states’ measures taken against racism because “refusal of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism is an elemental part of basic rights and protection of minorities is located within the borders of fights against racism and xenophobia.”13 The fact that the mentioned Article 2 does not constitute new competences just determines basic principles, is also important. Of course, it can be expected that respect of these principles lays a legislative charge on national parliaments but finally it is only the Court of Justice’s interpretation(s) of the concerned article that can show final direction of EU minority law’s development (even though the Court very rarely issues decisions on basis of principles).14 Anyway, concerning this possible tendency, two parallel court practices can evolve: i) one during the activity of the above-mentioned Court of Justice and the second by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) with seat in Strasbourg. The latter is more significant because of the EU, as after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it is a legal person’s new opportunity to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights. Accordingly, EU citizens can complain to the ECHR against EU institutions because of breach of any provision of the Convention. It means that they can even complain because of breach of provision on prohibition of discrimination, that unequivocally makes difference among various forms of discrimination, e.g. on basis of language, race, national or social origin and last but not least membership of national minority.15 So, belonging to a national minority can be enough per se to commit discrimination by the EU institutions without any further reference to language, race, origin or ethnicity. Probably practice of ECHR will affect legal interpretation of the EU Court, especially concerning the antidiscrimination provision. Otherwise, issue of minority rights is not unknown before the Court of Justice. Just to mention one case: in the famous Bickel-Franz proceedings in 1998, the Court has concluded that protection of minorities can be a legitimate and just aim of the member states.16 The question is when will the same statement be given on the Union and its bodies? To sum it up, today there is no obligatory legal act on the EU-level that would directly correct the situation of national minorities in legal sense. „The EU cannot refer to its own legal development except of prohibition of discrimination and its commitment besides human rights including security

13 Szajbély-Tóth: op. cit. 8. 14 Juhász, Hajnalka: A nyelvi jogok helyzete az Európai Unióban: korlátok és lehetőségek (Gyakorlati kihívások a nemzetpolitikában) [Position of Language Rights in the European Union: Borders and Opportunities (Practical Challenges in National Policy)] Presentation on the Symposium „Language Rights, Use of Language in the Carpathian Basin”, organized by the Research Institute of National Policy, Budapest, 8 June 2012. 15 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 14. 16 See Bickel-Franz case 274/96, [1998] ECJ I-7637 (24 November 1998).

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corrective intervention of police and criminal law against racism, xenophobia and resultant prevention.”17 By becoming obligatory, the provisions of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be applied by both the member states and the EU institutions,18 so prohibition of discrimination on basis of ’membership of a national minority’ directly binds the member states.19 What it exactly means in field of enforcement of national minority rights, is how much the real values can be preserved, I have tried to circumscribe it before. II. (Non)-existing EU standards in national minority protection as prerequisites of the successful accession of Serbia to the EU The previous part of this paper aimed at clarifying whether successful accession is conditioned by respect for national minority rights in candidate member states or not; but as we, without clear EU standards established control of the fulfillment of concerned requirements in field of national minority protection, it is nearly impossible to do in an adequate way. Still, the other criteria (e.g. economic) are handled by due diligence, the EU does not have any procedures to do the same with the minority issues. Irrespective of the non-existing EU standards in its opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the EU, the European Commission spoke about Serbia’s national minority policy on high terms, namely that it is, “overall, in line with European standards.”20 However, when the Commissioners were asked about the conditions they take into account at a candidate state during the supervision process of the Copenhagen criteria, only the ratification of the Framework Convention was mentioned. By their words that is the primary device of the criteria’s practical realization and as such, it is enough per se. Even without an exact, written system of criteria, the Commission studies candidate states’ preparedness for implementing the EU’s pre-accession requirement under similar measures; this can be concluded by researching several reports and opinions of the Commission about states representing territory of eastward integration.21 There is no uniform level of development

17 See Szajbély-Tóth: op. cit. 8. 18 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 51. 19 Ibid. Art. 21. (1). 20 Commission Opinion on Serbia's application for membership of the European Union. COM(2011) 668 final Brussels. 21 Hughes, James – Sasse, Gwendolyn: Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs. p. 20. http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/ JEMIE/2003/nr1/Focus1-2003_Hughes_Sasse.pdf, see also, Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for Membership of the European Union. DOC/97/20 Brussels, 1997.

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a country has to reach: level of development of each concerned candidate state was compared to its own previous position. It is noticeable that the Commission did not formulate its own definition of national minority. Studying other documents about countries of East/ South Europe, the Commission touched upon numerous data of national minorities but the content of questionnaire given to former candidate states – nowadays including Serbia – proves that even today there is tendency of confusing the problems of immigrants and traditional, autochthonous ethnical groups from the Commission’s side. Contrarily, national minorities fight for safekeeping their own identity, so, issues on political representation and cultural rights should be primary, especially, the conditions of establishment of minority political parties, their participation in elections and proportional representation in decision-making bodies. Approximately 20% of Serbia’s overall population belongs to national minority groups. Although, there is no enumeration of legally recognized national minorities in national laws (there is a wide determination of national minorities in accordance with provisions of the Framework Convention) every citizen of Serbia has right to declare its own national origin and membership of a national minority. It results in that some groups only with few members can get similar rights as greater (by population) national communities. It is beyond dispute that guarantees provided by the domestic legal system, especially by the Constitution of Serbia are on the first place. Article 79 contains special provision on freedom of expressing national affiliation within separate chapter on human and minority rights concerning preservation of national, ethnic, cultural specialty, education and media on minority language, use of names of the mother tongue, different aspects of official use of minority languages, etc. It is a fact that the Constitution recognizes national councils of national minorities as significant, too. Along these provisions, the Commission can most correctly and easily control whether regulation of national minorities’ status has domestic legal basis at all and in which quality they appear. However, at the same time, advanced state of minority regulation does not mean practical usefulness. Besides “pure” reading of laws, implementation of legislation needs to be studied, too, in order to diagnose active enforcement of law in this field. It means that adequate level

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/slovakia/sk-op_en.pdf , Agenda 2000 Commission Opinion on Slovenia’s Application for Membership of the European Union. DOC/97/19, Brussels, 15.07.1997. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/slovenia/sn-op_ en.pdf, Commission Opinion on Hungary’s Application for Membership of the European Union. DOC/97/13, Brussels, 15.07.1997. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/hungary/hu-op_en.pdf , Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership of the European Union. DOC/97/18, Brussels, 15.07.1997. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ pdf/dwn/opinions/romania/ro-op_en.pdf (29.07.2012.)

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of employees’ qualification in police, state administration or jurisdiction, transparent financial regime and state-aids should be stepped up in Serbia to realize real meaning of the constitutional provisions. Anyway, monitoring assisted by committees (who supervise execution of different international conventions) shows that everything works well in Serbia, which statements are of high relevance in the processes of EU integration. The problem is that usually convention duties are fulfilled only “on paper” and exhausted by adoption of acts implementing international norms into Serbian legal order. For example, the Commission highlighted such events that do not have practical effects at all, e.g. establishment of Council of the Republic of Serbia for National Minorities in 2002 with task of coordinating communication between national councils and state bodies was welcomed but it has only had two meetings to date when members adopted the Rules of Procedure and appointed the Secretary. The case is similar with the Government of the Republic of Serbia’s Conclusion on measures to increase participation of members of national minorities that deal with problems of representation of national minorities among employees in public offices only futilely, without adoption of concrete measures. However, there are imperfections in application of intergovernmental agreements, too. Serbia has concluded different agreements in matter of national minority rights with kin-states of minorities living in the territory of Serbia. These acts contain bilateral duties and rights of both parties but in practice Serbian law enforcement actors and entities do not take into consideration their provisions in case of adoption of new laws or implementation of existing ones. One practical example supports the validity of this statement: during the census of 2011, in Serbia, the National Council of Hungarian National Minority asked the Republican Institute of Statistics to employ such questioners in the field to find out that besides Serbian who knows one other language that is in official use in the territory of the municipality. Although this petition was in accordance with the minutes of sessions of intergovernmental body of Hungary and Serbia, there were no questionnaires on Hungarian language. This issue also refers to the rules of official use of language. Comparing with other European states with numerous minorities in their population, Serbia’s regulation in this matter is fairly detailed, liberal and progressive. Despite elaborated language rights provisions, there is no human, technical, financial capacity of the state to provide adequate basis for their implementation. Unfortunately, this problem is visible in other fields of monitoring but in the report defects are not emphatic and at first sight, the situation seems to be ideal. Such unfinished survey about problems is characteristic of other matters of the report. For example, the Commission has welcomed the constitution of Ministry for Human and Minority Rights but after half a year of its publication the concerned ministry has been abolished and faded into

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another ministry. During writing of this paper even the newly formed ministry, called Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, Public Administration and Local Government was abrogated because of results of elections in the spring of 2012. Such institution alterations cannot be said about others, about the so-called independent institutions of Serbia, as ombudsman offices on three levels (State Ombudsman, Provincial Ombudsman of Vojvodina and local ombudsmen in municipalities) or the commissioner of equality. They function well and try to control public administration without broad political impact on their work. Other quite important bodies of Serbia are national councils of national minorities established by Serbian law in 2009 to represent national communities in fields of education, culture, media and official use of language. Such forms of ethnic self-governance seem to correct lacks in Serbia’s national minority policy because competence of participation in institution management and decision-making make these sui generis bodies good device of enforcement of minority rights. They were elected democratically by registered minority voters with the aim of making possible for members of national minorities to exercise granted right of self-government. However, experience shows that state bodies neglect role and legal power of councils in administrative procedure and in many cases realization of projects depend on political consensus and not on existence of legal basis. What is interesting is that during the public debate about law on national councils the opponents of the bill criticized consultative nature of these bodies and missed more considerable role in real decision-making; but today the practice clears that even these consultative competences are not respected and seem to be too much for some political forces. Besides national councils, autonomy of Vojvodina was accentuated in the report as good sign that Serbia is capable of falling in line with both EU’s and international standards. Both arrangements represent a kind of autonomy including territorial and personal autonomy models that is of high significance in EU policy supporting widespread decentralization. This fact is really interesting in light of EU norms that do not recognize existence of collective rights of national minorities – but without those it is hard to imagine success of any realizable ambition towards getting autonomy. Otherwise, some experts see a new dimension of national minority protection in the development of regionalism – that is in some ways connected to autonomy constructions. The Maastricht Treaty has required respect for national and regional diversity from the member states.22 These two concepts are not mentioned incidentally in the same provision: usually, issues of national mi-

22 See Maastricht Treaty, Art. 128.

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norities are resolved by cooperation of regions and state.23 Most national minority groups live in cross-border areas, pretty well in neighbor of their kinstate (Roma people are exceptions from this phrase). Constitution of Regions of Europe, enhancement of cross-border cooperation can pacify those contrasts/conflicts that interstate diplomacy was not able to do in many cases. Otherwise, the report only deals with this question in marginal way, proving that such level of development of regionalism has not evolved yet. To remain at Roma people, the Commission welcomes Roma inclusion programs that were intensified after adoption of the report because Roma strategy framework 24 was adopted during the Hungarian EU presidency. In Serbia the “Roma-case” is not as burning question as it is in the neighboring countries. The state does not provide such social welfare and benefits for this ethnic group that usually lives under ordinary standard of living that would show Serbia attractive enough to stay there. So, Serbia is only “used” for transition. But this point of the Commission’s opinion finally proves that even though there aren’t any exactly determined prerequisites in the field of protection of national minorities, the Commission deals with every issue that usually occur as problem in candidate (and later in member) states, namely, Roma people. National policy of minority groups and functioning of their institutions are out of the report’s closer content that is a big deficiency. Although, generally it can be concluded that usually lack of resources, unprofessional clerks and low level of social awareness characterize Serbia, the greatest worry is resulted by appearance of some signs of indirect assimilation. In accordance with dilemmas on prohibition of discrimination contra providing plus rights, Central European countries usually reach equality by programs helping integration (e.g. pupils being members of national minority groups must learn the state language because of easier emergence and promotion).25 To discourage such tendencies, national minorities need their adequate political representation in main state bodies. In 2009, besides the mentioned Law on National Councils of National Minorities, the Law on Political Parties has been adopted in Serbia, too, that made registration of minority political parties with smaller number of signatures possible. Furthermore, this act has abolished the electoral threshold for political parties of national minorities in the statewide elections. Although, the changes concerning financing of parties can negatively affect effective functioning of political parties of national minorities, in general, maybe pressure from the EU side will slow

23 See Hughes-Sasse: op. cit. 21. 24 EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020, COM(2011) 173 Final, Brussels, 2011. 25 Compare Hughes-Sasse: op. cit. 17.

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eventual further amendments of the existing legal order towards restriction of rights and benefits granted to national minorities. III. Conclusion At first sight, pointless protection of national minority has taken a great leap forward by coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Although it has not dissolved the conflict between the old member states and pre-accession, expectations met by candidate states appearance of concept of national minority undoubtedly refers to recognition and demand for fast(er) resolution of the existing problems. This step is especially important in light of this field’s previous EU policy that has suggested that enforcement of minority rights can be effective only through provisions on language rights – even though in most of the cases national and lingual identity overlap. However, the fact that the Charta of Fundamental Rights does not emphasize separately the principle of national diversity as it does with the cultural one, religious and lingual diversity cannot be at all neglected.26 Concerning Serbia’s case, it can be concluded that even in the absence of clear EU standards and elaborated approach to national minorities, national legal background of minority rights is in line with European values; but none of well formulated legal provisions is enough without effective implementation, financial resources and real demand to succeed in its object.

26 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 22.

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KONARSKI, Wawrzyniec K. PhD

professor of political science at the Institute of Area Studies head of the Chair of Ethnocultural Politics (Jagiellonian University in Cracow)

In Search of Systemic Efficiency in the Transformation Period: Selected Remarks upon the Debate on the System of Governance in Poland since 1989

I. The short introduction to the core terms Transformation in its narrow sense is often understood as democratization led by the pro-reform oriented political leaders of formerly undemocratic states. In its wider sense it equals with transition and concerns all endeavors oriented to the change of political regime from undemocratic towards democratic one.1 Both notions refer to well-known examples of the Central and East European states as well some other outside Europe, e.g. in South America, to quote Brasil, Chile or Paraguay.2 However, it should be underlined, that both terms are sometimes understood as significant changes, political, but even more of economic nature, which are not necessarily oriented on pro-democratic results. Thus the political power of a certain state – within its regional and also global position – matters more than its liberal-democratic image. It is definitely People’s China in last twenty years as the most distinctive case here.3 The post-soviet Central Asiatic states fit to the above pattern either.4 The notion political system in its institutionalized understanding includes several elements, to quote: state institutions (legislative, executive and judiciary), political parties, groups of interest et al. as well as interactions between them regulated by law, but also shaped by practical experience. It may

1 Linz, J. T. – Stepan, A.: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996. passim. 2 Konarski, W.: Isolationism, Dependency and Clientelism as Traditional Features of the Paraguayan Foreign Policy. Politeja, Vol. 12 (2009) No. 2, 292-297. 3 Fenby, J.: The Penguin History of Modern China. The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850-2008. Allen Lane, London, 2008. especially part no 6. 4 Bodio, T. – Mołdawa, T.: Konstytucje państw Azji Centralnej: tradycje i współczesność [Constitutions of the Central Asia States: Traditions and Contemporaneity]. Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa, 2007. passim.

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be equal with the system of government (or governance), if to juxtapose it with practical functioning of a given state’s institutions during the certain period in particular. II. The initial phase of transformation June 4th remains the anniversary of the first, known as partly free, parliamentary elections held in Poland not only after the second World War. In fact they were the first elections on partly limited scale since 1928, namely since the moment of the final instalment of the authoritarian system in the pre-war Polish state, known as the Second Republic (Druga Rzeczpospolita).5 Their results gave the already existing slow erosion of the Communist party rule a considerable popular legitimation. The elections were possible because of the agreement made during the so-called round-table negotiations which lasted from the early February till the early April 1989.6 This was a unique form of political contract made within the system known so far as real socialism. There were two partners to the negotiations. One of them, the so-called government side, was composed of the ruling at that time Communists, namely the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR),7 supported by its allies: the United People’s Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL, farmers) and the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD, middle class, intelligentsia).8 The other party consisted of democratic and anti-systemic opposition, i.e., an internally heterogeneous set of formally illegal political and trade union structures linked to the movement of political protest against the Communist rule, which came to be in August 1980 and which appeared together as the Independent Selfgoverning Trade Union “Solidarity” (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”, NSZZ “Solidarity”). One of the main points agreed at the round table was to hold elections for the two houses of the Polish parliament, i.e., the Sejm (the lower house) consisting of 460 members and the Senate (the upper house, re-established after several decades), consisting of 100 senators. This was the actual beginning of the period of systemic transformation in Poland, initially in its political understanding (and later

5 Zieliński, H.: Historia Polski, 1914-1939 [A History of Poland, 1914-1939]. Ossolineum, Wrocław et al., 1985. 198-199. 6 Skórzyński, J.: Rewolucja okrągłego stołu [A Revolution of the Round Table]. Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków, 2009. 7 The abbreviations of the political parties’ and other organizations’ names appear here in Polish. 8 Grzybowski, M.: The Polish Party System in Transition. In: Berglund, S. – Grzybowski, M. – Dellenbrant, J. Ǻ. – Bankowicz, M. (eds.): East European Multi-Party Systems. University of Helsinki Press, Helsinki, 1988 (Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium, no. 37).

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also economic), which has been extensively analysed in the Polish specialist literature.9 Its evolutionary character was expressed in the fact that the elections for the Sejm were to be only partly free and for the Senate, completely free. The partly free formula meant that 35% of all the seats in the Sejm were to be allocated as a result of free political game of all political forces and the remaining 65% were to be divided among the three formerly ruling political parties mentioned above. Such limitations did not concern the Senate, where the formula of completely free elections was in force.10 Despite such guarantees for the former rulers, they sustained utter defeat. The elections became a choice ‘for’ or ‘against’ the system of government identified with the hegemony of the Communist party. The Solidarity candidates gained all the seats within the 35% available for the Sejm and 99 seats in the Senate. As a result, 2 months later a government led by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, representing the democratic anti-Communist opposition, was formed. It was composed also of the representatives of the Communist party, but they were a minority. III. The Polish Constitution of 1997 and the election system The lasting but increasingly controversial in the course of time symbol of legal and systemic changes in the Polish transformation period was the Constitution adopted on April 2, 1997. The debate on it went on for several years and inspired numerous comments, both in the parliament and outside it.11 As the document of written law of the highest rank, it sanctioned the parliamentary-cabinet system of government (with some modifications) which functioned in Poland since the beginning of the transformation.12 The increasingly intensified critical discussion about its content has been carried out in 2007-2009 in particular by two main participants: the government and the head of the state.13 After the elections held in autumn 2007 the gov-

9 See one of the latest, Błuszkowski J. (ed.): Dylematy polskiej transformacji [Dilemmas of Polish Transformation]. Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa, 2007. 10 Jednaka W.: Proces kształtowania się systemu partyjnego w Polsce po 1989 roku [A Process of the Polish Party System Shaping after 1989]. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław, 1995 (Acta Universitatis Vratislaviensis no. 1761- Politologia XV). 74. 11 See Chruściak, R.: Przygotowanie Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. – przebieg prac parlamentarnych [A Preparatory Process of the Republic of Poland Constitution of April 2, 1997 – A Course of Parliamentary Works]. Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa, 1997. 12 See Sarnecki, P.: Przemiany kompetencyjne Sejmu i Senatu dokonane w konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 [The Sejm and Senate Competence Changes as Accomplished in the Constitution of April 2, 1997]. In: Szmyt, A. (ed.): Wybrane zagadnienia nowej konstytucji [Selected Problems of the New Constitution] (ed.). Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk, 1998 (Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze, vol. 3). 107 and passim. 13 Compare: 15 lat polskiej konstytucji I Konserwatysta.com [Fifteen Years of Polish Constitution

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ernment was formed by the coalition of the centre-right Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO, with post-Solidarity roots) and the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) with rural roots, partly identified with the United People’s Party, already mentioned ally of the ruling (before 1989) Communists. In autumn 2005, Lech Kaczyński, a representative of the conservative-national party called Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), was elected President of the Polish Republic. PiS was also the ruling party in the years 2005-2007. Since 2007, this party has been the largest opposition group, which shall be discussed later on in this paper. The numerous ideas of reforming the system of government in Poland are interesting, but in fact have a symptomatic character. This is so both because of their authors and the time when these ideas are put forward. They appear cyclically and this strongly supports the hypothesis about their opportunistic character. A good example is provided by the repeated incentives to change the electoral system, which are usually toned down whenever the opinion polls show little support for their authors.14 The postulate of changing the electoral system was put forward e.g. during the electoral campaign in autumn 2005 by the then largest opposition party, the Civic Platform (PO).15 That party did not give it up (with some modifications) during the campaign of 2007, yet when it became necessary to form a coalition government with the PSL, which opposed the idea, it became abandoned.16 However, it has been re-appearing for some months later on as a topic for discussion among politicians from the other parties.17 It was fostered by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, but his arguments were only seemingly rational. Tusk used to be well known as the supporter of a majority electoral system for the lower chamber, namely Sejm realised in single-member constituencies (system of relative majority or first-past-the-post). The Prime Minister once argued that only in this way would it be possible to make the party system more effec-

I Conservatist.com]. http://konserwatysta.com/15-lat-polskiej-konstytucji/; Zapomniana rocznica konstytucji RP [A Forgotten Anniversary of the Republic of Poland Constitution]. http://www.azraelk.eu/2012/04/02/zapomniana-rocznica-konstytucji-rp/#more-5483. 14 Lazarowicz, R. – Przystawa, J. (eds.): Otwarta księga. O jednomandatowe okręgi wyborcze [An Open Book. Towards Single-Member Constituencies]. SPES, Wrocław, 1999. passim. 15 Państwo dla Obywateli – plan rządzenia 2005-2009 [A State for Citizens – Plan for Governance, 2005-2009], chapter I.1: Propozycje zmian w konstytucji [Constitutional Amendments Proposals]. 26-27. panstwo_dla_obywateli.pdf http://www.wybory.platforma.org/download/(gqWYZ57YrXailKWWZ0Xf32iiiqWVaIypo4HQW52fll2frq-hVKbXZ1WkrWjXgtnXoZre0qrTgsrTj5zm1LrMjdSSnYfVlYHk)/pl/defaultopisy/3/6/1/ panstwo_dla_obywateli.pdf. 16 Program PO. Polska zasługuje na cud gospodarczy [The Civic Platform Program. Poland Deserves to Become an Economic Miracle]. http://www.slaski.platforma.org/files/files/0/34940/program_wyborczy_po7ebook.pdf (2012.06.24). 17 See the radio interview with Andrzej Celiński, a left-wing politician – Polish Radio, channel 1 (14 March 2009, 8.00-9.00 a.m.).

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tive: by changing its character and, as a further result, of the whole political system. According to the Prime Minister (and his circles) if such an electoral system were adopted the truly popular local leaders would be elected to the parliament. As a result, instead of the currently existing in Poland moderately multi-party system, a two-party system would be formed, which would considerably facilitate forming the government. However, on the other hand it should be stressed that such a system would not reflect the complexity of political divisions in the Polish society, what is constantly ignored by the ruling Civic Platform. Such a system would decrease the number of existing political parties hence the domination of Polish politics by two largest among them, namely PO and PiS would be the overwhelming one. The members of parliament would be practically selected among the representatives of especially those two parties over the non-party local leaders. This is proved already by the results of the Senate elections. Since 2011 they are conducted on the basis of an absolute majority system in 100 constituencies each with 1 seat. Representatives of two largest parties have constantly an overwhelming majority of more than 90 % of total number of seats in this chamber. The number of senators not affiliated to any party is minimal.18 At present the elections to the Sejm are conducted in 41 constituencies each with 7 to 19 seats. They are established according to the d’Hondt’s method, which, combined with the existing election thresholds (5% for parties and voters’ electoral committees and 8% for cross-national alliances of political parties), shows preference for the largest parties.19 As it has been said, the change of the voting system for the lower house into the majority one would lead to the change of the party system facilitating the government forming process. On the other one, however, the voters would follow the principle of choosing so-called ‘lesser evil’ (voting for the candidate who has greater chances of being elected instead of on the one who is politically closer to a given group of voters), which would have negative consequences. Namely, the fossilisation of the two-party system would not increase the subjective character of the voters, but rather eliminate the chances of choosing truly popular but not affiliated to any party local leaders. The voters would be unwilling to take part in the elections and this would

18 Compare Election to the Senate. The Republic of Poland.. http://wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SNT/PL/ WYN/W/index.htm; Elections to the Sejm and Senate. The Republic of Poland. http://wybory2011. pkw.gov.pl/wsw/pl/000000.html#tabs-2. 19 Jarentowski, M. G.: Wielopoziomowe okręgi wyborcze w systemie proporcjonalnym [Multilevel Constituencies in the Proportional System], in: Błuszkowski, J. – Zaleśny, J. (eds.): Wielowymiarowość systemów politycznych.Teoretyczne założenia i praktyczne uwarunkowania [Multidimensionality of Political Systems. Theoretical Assumptions and Practical Determinants]. Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa, 2009. 74-75.

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perpetuate the current tendency for low voter turnout, which at present is one of the lowest in Europe.20 It is worthwhile to mention here that more or less 45% of potential voters deliberately stay at home during the elections in Poland. They form a large group of people to be ‘captured’ by a skilful politician. Thus, in Poland there are social and statistical resources for significant, anti-systemic radical movement. However most of its potential supporters are apathetic and do not have a strong and charismatic leader at the moment. A certain tendency on the left-liberal side of the political spectrum was initiated recently by controversial Janusz Palikot’s Movement (Ruch Palikota, RP) which successfully exploited the left oriented electorate’s disappointment with the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD.21 There is not however anyone on the right-wing side of society having the same influence as Palikot has shown recently. A former PiS deputy leader and Minister of Justice, Zbigniew Ziobro, may have such a chance, but it is unpredictable now he may be able to repeat Palikot’s phenomenon with his own movement called Solidarity Poland (Solidarna Polska, SP). There is not a chance for revitalization of the former League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), a far right-wing party of Roman Giertych who left politics four years ago. It is hard to say whether right-wing populism will gain an influential position in Polish circumstances and when. However such a tendency may be fostered by the possible deterioration of economic situation. Interestingly, in the Polish public debate on the shape of the electoral system to the Sejm there are very few voices supporting the mixed systems existing, e.g., in Germany, or the modified proportional vote following the formula of Single Transferable Vote (STV) used e.g. in Australia, Ireland and Malta.22 On the one hand, one may go as far as to assume the ignorance, especially among the politicians of the Civic Platform. On the other one, it may be claimed that they have dishonest intentions to win many segments of the

20 Compare Cześnik, M.: Partycypacja wyborcza Polaków [Electoral Participation of Poles]. Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa, 2009. 6. 21 Poljaci žude za državnikom [Poles Are Missing a Statesman]. http://www.matica.hr/Vijenac/vijenac473.nsf/AllWebDocs/Poljaci_zude_za_drzavnikom. 22 Compare: Bowler, S. – Grofman, B.: Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000.; Garlicki, L.: Ustrój polityczny Republiki Federalnej Niemiec [The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany]. Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, Warszawa, 1985. 139-145; Konarski, W.: System konstytucyjny Irlandii, [The Constitutional System of Ireland]. Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2005. 43-45; Nohlen, D.: Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny. O teorii systemów wyborczych [Wahlerecht und Parteiensystem. Zur Theorie der Wahlsysteme – Election Law and Party System. On the Election Systems’ Theory]. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa, 2004. 316-345 and 351-360; Ross, J. F. S.: The Irish Election System: What It Is and how It Works. Pall Mall Press, London, 1959.

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electorate by eliminating other participants of the political life by applying the majority electoral system. IV. Character of the Polish party system and the special importance of the 2007 parliamentary elections The model of the Polish party system, existing during the most part of the transformation period, may be defined as a variable multi-party system, oscillating between short-term two-block-party system in the 1997-2001 and, in the 2001-2005 and is at present, since 2007, one-party domination. For many years and from the point of view of the whole political system, its dysfunctional character consisted in its inability to reproduce itself in the form of 4-6 political parties, existing in the same organisational shape and under the same name during at least 2-3 terms of office.23 Additionally in many years none of the ruling parties has been able to survive the confrontation with reality, i.e., was not able to rule for at least two terms of office in a row. One term of office was enough for the initially large ruling parties to lose their power: the right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS), which ruled in 1997-2001 and the post-Communist Democratic Left Alliance, which held the power in 2001-2005. The elections of October 22, 2007, which ended in a defeat of the ruling for the previous two years Law and Justice, have confirmed that regularity. However the precedence here appeared in the last parliamentary elections of October 9, 2011. The Civic Platform has been elected the largest party for the second time in row and once more formed the ruling coalition together with Polish People’s Party.24 The other feature of the Polish party system is the presence of a group of politicians frequently changing their party affiliation, which at the moment is not a socially approved phenomenon. Thus, this is a changing in its quantity and personal composition and strongly ideologised party system, also with respect to its origin: suffice it to mention the important division into two historical camps: the postCommunists and the post-Solidarity. Curiously enough, during the term of office 2005-2007 an attempt was made by the former to do away with this division by creating an electoral alliance called Left and Democrats (Lewica i Demokraci, LiD) composed of the representatives of the two above-men-

23 Antoszewski, A. – Herbut R. – Sroka J.: System partyjny w Polsce [The Party System in Poland], in: Antoszewski, A. – Fiala, P. – Herbut, R. – Sroka, J. (eds.): Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej [Parties and Party Systems in the Central Europe]. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław, 2003. 133 and further. 24 A Question of Leadership. http://www.wbj.pl/article-56832-a-question-of-leadership.html?type=wbj (2013.05.18).

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tioned historical camps, which, however, did not survive the test of time.25 In the latter, in turn, the developing since 2005 antagonism between the now two strongest political parties originating from the Solidarity movement, i.e., the Law and Justice and Civic Platform, has become fossilised. Already a few weeks before the voting day in October of 2007 the leaders of the two largest parties repeatedly claimed that these will be the most important elections after 1989.26 The rhetoric of the breakthrough influenced the character of the electoral campaign, which may be defined as a sequence of actions and events based on the domination of symbolic arguments over the substantial ones. An important part was played in it by the symbolism reflecting the social reality in contrasting colours, e.g., by dividing Poland into Solidarity and liberal one and the Poles into oligarchs and outsiders, i.e., those who sustained losses during the period of transformation. At that background the Law and Justice very strongly negated the existing legal and systemic shape of the Polish state called the 3rd Polish Republic and suggested that it should undergo changes leading to the creation of the so-called 4th Polish Republic. The use of the latter name inspired doubt from the very beginning, especially as the postulates concerning the new system were imprecise. In fact, the greater stress was placed on the historical chronology of Polish statehood, presented by Jarosław Kaczyński, the Law and Justice leader. Suggesting the name of the 4th Republic, that politician recalled the period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, existing until 1795, i.e., the 1st Republic of Poland, then the years 1918-1939, i.e., the 2nd Republic of Poland, omitted the limited sovereignty of the state which existed as the Polish People’s Republic until 1989 and treated the period starting at the beginning of transformation till the elections of 2007 as the 3rd Republic of Poland. In fact this criticism, justified only by propaganda reasons, was not followed by concrete suggestions concerning the change of the system of government. For that reason the possible associations with the consecutive changes of the republican rule in France seemed to be exaggerated. The 4th French Republic differed considerably from the 5th, the political institutions were situated within the state in a different way and the internally unstable parliamentary system was replaced by a strong executive power called quasi- or semi-presidential rule. As a result the attempts made by, e.g., the Polish People’s Party (PSL), at reverting the debate to the substantial topic, were unsuccessful in confrontation with sensationalism aimed at destroying the reputation of the political opponents. The campaign of autumn 2007 had three main chronological

25 Money.pl – Tag Lewica i Demokraci [Money.pl – Tag Left and Democrats]. http://info.wyborcza. pl/temat/wyborcza/Lewica+i+Demokraci (2013.05.18). 26 Konarski, W.: Polens Parteien nach der Wahl [Polish Parties after Election]. In: Liberal: Vierteljahreshefte für Politik und Kultur, No. 4, Dezember 2007. 49 Jahrgang.

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parts. It was begun by large billboards created by the Civic Platform (PO) and directed mainly against the Law and Justice (PiS) party. Then there were spots in the form of short films focusing mainly on negative campaigning, the aim of which was to suggest that the power in recent years was in the hands of oligarchy, especially during the ‘liberal’ rule, i.e., until 2005, (antileft-wing and anti-Civic Platform) or criticising the political doctrinaire attitude or incompetence of the ruling in 2005-2007 Law and Justice party. Finally, there came the debates of the most important politicians from the main parties. The key debate was the televised contest between the leader of the PiS party and the then Prime Minister, Jarosław Kaczyński and the leader of the PO (then an opposition party), Donald Tusk, which ended with a clear victory of the latter. The campaign, as it has been said, was not based on substantial issues. It was dominated by an exchange of views concerning mainly the incompetence of the opponents and their inability to rule. In the last week of the campaign the ruling Law and Justice party undertook an unprecedented attempt at discrediting the Civic Platform by means of revealing by the Central Anticorruption Bureau (Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne, CBA) details suggesting that one of the members of parliament from that party accepted an offer of corruption in fact controlled by the CBA.27 The above-presented features of that campaign allow claiming that the decisions taken by the majority of the voters at its end were inspired by: the Tusk’s victory in the debate with Kaczyński and then the negative social reception of the ways the PiS party fought with the PO using the above-mentioned corruption scandal. These two events changed the image of the Civic Platform and especially of its leader, from a party leading a passive electoral campaign to an active and effective one, which was illustrated by its growing opinion poll ratings. It should be mentioned here that the latter were reviewed sometimes with growing scepticism.28 The stress on the pivotal character of the elections resulted in an unprecedented electoral mobilization in terms of the rhetoric used of the two main political parties. In general, the voters voted mainly against a party perceived as one appropriating the power and unwilling to accept the rule of its alternation. The Law and Justice party and especially J. Kaczyński, definitely an authoritarian personality, were considered to be like that.29 In turn, the majority of those voting for the Civic Platform was guided not by their knowledge of the political position of that party but by the positive reception of the main symbol of that party, i.e., Donald Tusk, who was gaining increased

27 Beata Sawicka uniewinniona [Beata Sawicka Declared Unguilty]. http://www.polskieradio. pl/5/3/Artykul/833768,Beata-Sawicka-uniewinniona-Prokuratura-wniosla-o-uzasadnienie-wyroku (2013.05.18). 28 Nie ufam sondażom [I don’t Trust Polls]. In: Świat elit, 2007/10 (63). 29 Compare with Christian Science Monitor, 29 August 2006 and Super Express, 31 January 2009.

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social approval. The elections had again, reaching a scale similar to that of 1989, the character of a plebiscite and, more precisely, their result showed whom the voters did not want as the winner. This reasoning resulted in a greater than in previous confrontations voter turnout, which was more than 53,8%. It should not, however, be considered only from the Polish perspective. From that perspective the election results were optimistic as they were better by cca. 13% from those of 2005 and also because of the considerable turnout of very young people (50% of the people aged 18-19 took part) and of those who had just started their families and professional lives. However again, the scepticism in this sphere was confirmed four years later. In the next elections of October 9, 2011, the voter turnout was again smaller than in 2007 and reached slightly more than 48,9 %.30 Thus in comparison to other European countries Poland still occupies one of the last places here. I personally do not see any particular reason to believe that it is going to grow the more so that such a high level of vote abstention suggests that the democratic axiology has in a way worn itself in the recent more than twenty years. The degree of vote abstention reflects the general disaffection of the majority of the society with politics. This disaffection is surely the result of the systemic errors made during the transformation period. These include especially: i) the adopted model of privatisation, which alienated numerous social groups; ii) the inability to create the rule of law and the ineffectiveness of the courts of law; iii) the examples of helplessness of the state with respect to large-scale swindlers; iv) the progressive and not effectively regulated by the law conglomeration of the politics, business and mafia-like structures; e. the syndrome of devouring by the Polish revolution of its initiators (decomposition of the shipyards and partly miners’ political role); v) oligarchic tendencies in the power performance and vi) still evident inverting the formula for the foreign policy expressed by the former President of Finland, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, i.e., looking for friends (or at least reliable partners) far away and enemies close by. The above formula is still discussed in spite of controversies around its inventor.31 V. State of affairs The opinions, often very critical, about results of the period of political transformation in Poland are clearly varied. On the one hand more or less real achievements of the recent two decades are perceived with exaggeration.

30 Elections 2011 to the Sejm and Senate. The Republic of Poland. http://wybory2011.pkw.gov.pl/ wyn/pl/000000.html#tabs-1. 31 Gorbunov, A.: Was Urho Kekkonen a KGB Agent? http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/net/user/tytso/usenet/ americast/mosnews/71.

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The most frequent words-myths usually stress that Poland is a state ruled by law and already has two important classes: the middle class and the political class, that the existing form of the free market is the result of the only possible variant of privatisation and that a given politician or his party are working for Poland, not for themselves, etc. However, it seems quite clear that in the majority of cases the politicians diagnosing the situation in Poland follow a misguided loyalty to the, metaphorically speaking, school of political thinking which is close to them. This is the Polish parliamentary opposition, both the left- and right-wing: they often give way to unreasonable criticism, use dubious rhetorical devices and are often quite carefree when proposing motions of non-confidence. The weakening sense of responsibility of the Polish members of parliament is also reflected in the empty chamber of the Sejm even during important debates such as the one concerning the reform of the health care system. All that brings to mind a basic, or even banal, question concerning both the party in power and the opposition, about, respectively, the reason of keeping the power and fighting for it. Surprisingly enough it has never been posed by any journalist, even though it would be very interesting to learn what the arguments of these groups of politicians are. Since the low voting turnout indicates that the attributes of democracy became unimportant for the voters, making the politicians answer the question: what for do, they really need the power, seems to be more and more justified. This is so due to the basic fact that the Polish political spectrum suffers from ideological degeneration in which the large part of the left has lost its social sensitiveness and became an oligarchy-business network and the conservative right represents a mixture of social and fundamentalist ideas. Following this train of thought one should admit that the unquestioned value of the years of the Polish transformation has been the very opportunity of exchanging the views on the issues important for Poland, although, paradoxically, there not always has been a suitable place to conduct it. On the other hand, these debates only apparently influence the reality. For example, the debate on ethics in business does not improve the former. Also the insistence that Poland is a state ruled by law has resulted in the production of new laws but not their implementation or increased respect for them among the members of the political class. As a result, the sporadically re-appearing debate on the need for improving the political culture does not have any tangible effects. Despite that the reflections on the need of reforming the Polish system of government are important. They refer to the elements which, if functioning effectively, may improve the attitude of the citizens to the state and shape the external image of Poland. At the same time they stimulate the debate on improving the practice of the Polish parliamentary system. That system is, namely, frequently criticised. As a result, besides the low voting turnout mentioned above, there formed a group of people, loftily called the political class, characterised with a Byzantine attitude to politics.

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I consider this term mainly as a stratifying category not as a definition of the high competences of its members.32 Adapting for the Polish realities the opinion expressed in 2003 by the former President of Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker, who used the expression of the rule of political mediocrity, one may say that also Poland has suffered from that syndrome.33 And most probably after the next elections this will not belong to the past either. It was irritating to listen earlier to the rhetoric of both the left-wing politicians, to mention the former Prime Ministers, such as Józef Oleksy or Leszek Miller and watch the thirst for power evident in the behaviour of the right-wing politicians, such as Jan Rokita, Jarosław Kaczyński or Roman Giertych. One may say, the elites are just like their society. However, it is also true that the attitudes of the latter may be shaped by the political visionaries who are able to overcome their obsessions. Megalomania and narcissism evident in the world of Polish politics show the mediocrity and not sagacity among the contemporary Polish politicians. In other words, the society created politicians guided by their own interests, or mundane performers, or simply, party activists and not politicians dealing with ideas, having the sense of their mission and willing to be submitted to the judgments of the public opinion.34 The main aim of the former is their re-election.35 This is to be achieved also by means of attacking the direct political opponents. One can mention here first the ruthless criticism of the Prime Minister of the centre-right government of 1997-2001, Jerzy Buzek, by Leszek Miller, the then leader of the left-wing parliamentary opposition, but also similar attacks by Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Justice party, against the left-wing President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 2001-2005. This tendency is continued in a form of very strong critical expressions against the current Prime Minister Donald Tusk and other members of government, which are demonstrated by Jarosław Kaczyński (and his followers). This criticism is so intensive in regard to the tragic death of 96 Polish officials – including President Lech Kaczyński and his wife – in the air crash by Smolensk on 10 April 2010.36 The PiS leader blames partly the current Prime Minister and his collaborators for the crash. This form of wooing the voters has, however, unfavourable effects. Due to it the society’s political passiveness is growing, which results in creating mediocre politicians who just want to survive their term of office without any disturbances and not to initiate pivotal actions. I presume, for that reason

32 See Higley, J.: Elite Theory in Political Sociology. http://theoriesofsocialchange.files.wordpress. com/2010/02/higley_elite_theory_ipsa_2008.pdf. 33 See Die Zeit, 27 February 2003. 34 See the opinion of Guy Sorman in Rzeczpospolita, 26-27 May 2012. 35 Siedem grzechów poolityków [Seven Sins of Politicians]. http://www.gazetakrakowska.pl/ artykul/545521,siedem-grzechow-politykow,id,t.html#czytaj_dalej. 36 Gazeta Olsztyńska, 10 April 2012.

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Prime Minister Tusk’s ideas about the change of the voting system may still gain approval, although, as I have said above, he is hiding his true intentions. VI. The conceptual inspirations for systemic reforms Besides the idea of changing the voting system, mentioned above, the postulate of strengthening the role of the head of state considered as a particularly important element of the executive power remained another frequent topic of the public debate in recent years. It was put forward at the background of the more than two-year-long dispute between the former President Lech Kaczyński and the Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Its basic context was the foreign policy and the question who of these two persons has legally guaranteed higher competences. The provisions of the Polish Constitution and the opinions of the specialists in the constitution law leave no doubt in this respect. In the Polish modified parliamentary-cabinet system of governance the foreign policy is implemented on the day-to-day basis mainly by the cabinet and the Prime Minister. According to the Polish constitutional law the President has no powers actively to conduct such policy; he cooperates with the Prime Minister and appropriate minister (Art. 133 of the Polish Constitution).37 However, so far the Presidents of Poland, starting with Lech Wałęsa, elected in 1990, assumed the right to more active involvement in this respect. They derived this unjustified belief, among other things, from the fact that the head of state is chosen in direct elections. Hence, Lech Wałęsa included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in so-called President’s ministries, that is, ones de nomine submitted to his control. Aleksander Kwaśniewski actively took part in the foreign policy, however, unlike Lech Wałęsa, he had natural skills for promoting himself as a co-creator of the Polish foreign policy and did not get into conflicts with the then governments, even if they were ideologically alien to him, like the government of 1997-2001. The President’s Lech Kaczyński intentions were oriented on following the Kwaśniewski’s example, although he has never said so explicitly. However, his personality was very different from that of Kwaśniewski (and his political background was definitely weaker) and, I presume, he has not been able to equal his predecessor in that matter. And this was the base of the conflict between President Kaczyński and Prime Minister Tusk, which has lasted until the tragic death of the first one. These were the two politicians’ mutual negative emotions, which were additionally fuelled by the people from their close circles. It had negative con-

37 Kierończyk, P.: Regulacja instytucji prezydenta w nowej Konstytucji RP [The Regulation of the President’s Institution in the New Constitution of the Republic of Poland], in: Szmyt (ed.): op.cit. 187.

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sequences concerning the image of the Polish foreign policy. The repeated disputes concerned the decisions which of the politicians might to represent Poland at the European Union summits. Thus the opinions often expressed by the collaborators of the two politicians (and sometimes by them themselves) that the blame should be placed on the imprecise regulations in the Constitution which thus should be changed, are untrue. Those who voice such views reveal a lack of knowledge of the Polish constitutional law and also unwillingness to acknowledge that the negative emotions of the two politicians stimulated the disputes mostly.38 The public was shocked by the fierceness of the arguments between those two. For the Polish citizens, it was strange, because they both came from the Solidarity movement, from the same political family, so to speak. And they could not sustain one another. The competition between conservative Lech Kaczynski and liberal Donald Tusk personified in fact conservative and liberal Poland. In connection with these disputes the term of cohabitation is sometimes mentioned. It is a French political term and it can be implemented – in its pure political understanding – in the French semi-presidential case in particular.39 It goes back to the system of the 5th French Republic and, I presume should not be misunderstood as a global term, at least not in the narrower political science meaning. It was first used after Charles de Gaulle came to power in order to illustrate the situation in which the President in the office represented another political option than the Prime Minister. It appeared in the context of a concrete system of government based on the strong position of the head of the state resulting from the Constitution. This term has been quite groundlessly transferred to the Polish reality in order to explain the reason for bad relations between the President and the Prime Minister. In fact, the situation in which the head of the state and the Prime Minister differ in their political views and their party affiliation is a daily routine in many European countries which does not give grounds to mutual animosity. And it certainly cannot be called cohabitation in its literal sense; it may be only treated as an overused colloquialism. The latter interpretation appears in Poland indeed.40 Today, we do not have a cohabitation as it is perceived in the colloquial mode, as President Bronislaw Komorowski and Prime Minister Tusk are from the same party. Nevertheless, Komorowski shows he wants

38 Prof. Konarski: spór prezydent-premier to spór charakterów [Prof. Konarski: a Quarrel between President and Prime Minister Is a Quarrel of Characters]. http://www.money.pl/archiwum/wiadomosci_agencyjne/pap/artykul/prof;konarski;spor;prezydentpremier;to;spor;charakterow,87,0,377175.html. 39 Compare Elgie, R. – McMenamin I.: Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation Under Semi-Presidentialism. In: Working Papers in International Studies, 2010/12. passim. 40 See Buniewicz, N.: Polish Presidential Election: The Perfect Storm. http://www.cepa.org/ced/view. aspx?record_id=249.

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to be more active in everyday politics. It is not unreasonable to speculate he might be interested in forming his own faction within his own (Tusk’s) ruling Civic Platform.41 Besides the hypothesis of the emotional causes of the above mentioned fierce dispute between the President and the Prime Minister, in the Polish political discourse there occasionally appear suggestions concerning modification of the relations between the state authorities. They often postulate strengthening the agendas of the executive power. And so it is proposed to depart from the parliamentary-cabinet system in favour of the system of government closer to the American presidential system or the semi-presidential system existing now in France. And it is probably only the traditional Polish “Russophobia” which prevents using the President of modern Russia as a possible point of reference. It should be stressed here, that despite the Poles’ antipathy to Vladimir Putin it is hard to negate the feasibility of maintaining a strong presidential power in the torn by internal conflicts Russia. On the other hand, however, maintaining such a system of government for a prolonged time often leads to the departure from the democratic values and practices. In the recent almost twenty years both Boris Yeltsin and also Putin succumbed to such a temptation.42 Interestingly, the strong position of the President in Finland in the Twentieth century is completely disregarded as model for possible adoption in Polish circumstances. It seems that this special system of government, which for many years has been a synthesis of parliamentary-cabinet system – based on the liberal traditions and of constitutionally strong rank of the head of state – remains a good idea to be adopted in Poland. However, the absence of Finland in the current debate in Poland shows the scarcity of knowledge of its initiators about the Finnish system of government in its shape until the end of the Twentieth Century.43 Not getting into an extensive analysis of the systems of government in the United States of America, France or Finland until recently, one should mention here only their main features together with the historical and political contexts in which they were established. It seems that the increasing rank of the President in the American system of government is not suitable to consider as a model possible to implement in the Polish conditions. This rank is the result of more than a two hundred year long tradition shaped in a specific political culture and within the boundaries of the constitutional law which rejected the parliamentary model

41 Rzeczpospolita, 13 June 2012. 42 Skrzypek, A.: Druga smuta. Zarys dziejów Rosji, 1985-2004 [The Second Time of Troubles. An Outline of the History of Russia, 1985-2004]. Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, Warszawa, 2004. 119129, 149-159 and passim. 43 Constitution of Finland. http://web.eduskunta.fi/Resource.phx/parliament/relatedinformation/ constitution.htx.

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as unwanted because typical of a former colonial metropolis. Guaranteeing autonomy to the respective types of power and, more broadly, the possibility for mutual blocking of their activities (and not their cooperation as it occurs in the European parliamentary tradition), the specific way of electing the head of the state, making the President the head of the state administration (instead of the Prime Minister, who simply does not exist) and also the President’s right to the veto (including pocket veto as well): these features do not co-occur in any European state.44 Due to the legal and political traditions existing in Europe they would be difficult to adopt in the Old World. An attempt at combining selected features from America with some principles of the parliamentary-cabinet system is reflected by the system of government of modern France, i.e., still under the name of the 5th French Republic. The main position of the President has been legitimised, thus giving him the status of the highest exponent of the nation’s will, stabiliser of the whole state and initiator of actions leading to its successful development. According to the Constitution he leads the sessions of the Council of Ministers, even though the function of the Prime Minister with the status of the leader of the government, but not its head, has been retained in France. The position of the French President is supported by his personal rights: to nominate the Prime Minister and to dissolve the National Assembly or even to decide whether projects of laws should be voted upon in a cross-national referendum. According to the Constitution, the French President has the right to shape the foreign policy. 45 The last mentioned right has been a part of the duties of the Finnish President for many years either. In this system the head of the state did not have such power as in France. Despite that his traditionally demonstrated competencies combined with the features of the parliamentary-cabinet system have made the Finnish model of government unique and, what is more, effective for many years.46 It should not be forgotten that it was fostered by the fact that the President is chosen for 6 years in general, but indirect, elections conducted for several ten years by the selected in this way electoral college. For more than twenty years, these elections have been general and direct. The

44 Compare An Outline of American Government. United States Information Agency, Washington D.C., 1990. 56-59; Osiński, J.: Prezydent Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki [President of the United States of America], in: Osiński, J. (ed.): Prezydent w państwach współczesnych [President in Contemporary States]. Oficyna Wydawnicza Szkoły Głównej Handlowej, Warszawa, 2000. 45 Compare Bokszczanin, I.: Prezydent V Republiki Francuskiej [President of the Fifth French Republic], in: Osiński (ed.): op. cit.; Stembrowicz, J.: Systemy polityczne wybranych państw kapitalistycznych. Francja [Political Systems of Selected Capitalistic States. France]. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa, 1977. 78-91 and passim. 46 Compare Ciemniewski, K.: Zasady ustroju politycznego Finlandii [The Rules of the Government of Finland]. Bydgoskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, Bydgoszcz, 1971. 124-178; Osiński J.: Prezydent Republiki Finlandii [President of the Republic of Finland], in: Osiński (ed.): op. cit.

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traditions of the active President’s position go back to the time when Finland gained its independence and when the republican form of the state was ultimately adopted. Granting the President the position of a stabiliser of the whole political system resulted from the difficult experiences that country had in that period, namely the war between the Whites and Reds in 1918. For the former this was the war of independence; the latter called it a civil war.47 It also caused instability of the then party system, which resulted in political and economic crises. The President’s role understood in this way was more strengthened after the 2nd World War. It was stimulated by Finland’s negative experiences of the war itself and its geopolitical location close to the Soviet Union. What is particularly stressed, however, when analysing the post-war period in the history of that state is the leading role played by two presidents. They were, consecutively, a conservative, Juho Kusti Paasikivi (in office: 1946-1956) and an agrarian, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen (in office: 19561981).48 The dynamic presidential style they created, combined with defining the foreign policy by implementing the conception of active neutrality, confirmed the high rank of these two political personalities in the cold war epoque. It also imposed on their successors the obligation to maintain this effective tradition, but they were not as much successful as their predecessors and after the collapse of the Soviet Union not obliged to continue this sort of foreign policy either. VII. The personal inspirations for systemic reforms The postulates of strengthening the executive power in Poland appear mostly with reference to the head of state position. The politicians who put it forward represent the Polish right-wing spectrum in particular. They were, for example, Roman Giertych, Lech Kaczyński and Jan Rokita. Interestingly and surprisingly a proposal put forward already on November 21, 2009 by Prime Minister Donald Tusk referred rather to the strengthening of Prime Minister constitutional position and not a President.49 It is also worth to remind here that in the recent two decades discussions on the justifiability of changing the system of government in Poland were also held in the academic milieu, especially among lawyers and political scientists. Such topics were often

47 Compare Jutikkala, E. – Pirinen, K.: A History of Finland. William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1979. 216 and further; Kirby, D. G.: Finland in the Twentieth Century. A History and an Interpretation. C. Hurst & Company, London, 1979. 40 and further. 48 See Korhonen, K. (ed.): Urho Kekkonen. A Statesman for Peace. William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1975. passim. 49 Polacy nie chcą silnej władzy [Poles Don’t Want a Strong Power]. http://www.wprost.pl/ ar/180359/Polacy-nie-chca-silnej-wladzy/.

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dwelt on during the annual sessions held by the chairs of the constitutional law in Poland.50 At this point we come to the juxtaposition of the earlier diagnosis of the situation in Poland with the ideas of the politicians who from time to time call for its improvement. Observation of these European countries which made an attempt at strengthening the executive power either through the President or the Prime Minister leads us to an important conclusion. The prospects of success of such an experiment were not the outcome of the mere change of suitable legal regulations. In each case the spiritus movens was usually a concrete politician who had worked for his social prestige for many years and as a result gained the approval of the majority of the citizens to carry out the reforms. No matter what Giertych’s, Kaczyński’s, Rokita’s or Tusk’s intentions were, this seems to be the greatest weakness of their ideas. In modern Poland it is difficult to find politicians of stature similar to such Presidents as de Gaulle, Paasikivi, Kekkonen or Vaclav Havel. The first leader of the Solidarity movement, Lech Wałęsa, is no longer a prophet in his own country, although he has remained a symbol of the Polish transformation for the foreign observers. Looking at other examples from abroad, one may also mention the unquestioned rank of Kemal Atatürk who effectively modernised the structures of the Turkish state after the 1st World War.51 Among the Prime Ministers who enjoyed a similar charisma (although are also criticised now) it is worth to mention the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer and from the later times, Willy Brandt or Helmut Kohl, Italian Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi,52 the long term Prime Minister (and then twice the President) of Ireland, Eamon de Valera,53 the former Prime Ministers of Great Britain: Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, or even the two Prime Ministers of Greece, Konstantinos Karamanlis54 and Andreas Papandreou.55

50 Compare Gebethner, S. – Chruściak, R. (eds.): Demokratyczne modele ustrojowe w rozwiązaniach konstytucyjnych [Democratic Models of Governance in the Constitutional Solutions]. Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa, 1997. passim; Witkowski, Z. (ed.): Wejście w życie nowej Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [The Coming into Force of the New Constitution of the Republic of Poland]. Towarzystwo Naukowe Organizacji i Kierownictwa, Toruń, 1998. passim. 51 Balfour, J. P. D. (Baron Kinross): Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey. William Morrow, New York 1965. 52 Compare De Maio, T.: Alcide De Gasperi e Konrad Adenauer. Tra il superamento del passato e il processo di integrazione europea, 1945-1954 [Alcide de Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer. Between Overcoming the Past and the European Integration Process, 1945-1954]. G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2004.; Craveri, P.: De Gasperi. Il Mulino, Bologna, 2006. 53 Compare Coogan, T. P.: De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow. Arrow Books, London et al., 1995.; Ferriter, D.: Judging Dev. A Reassessment of the Life and Legacy of Eamon de Valera. Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, 2007. 54 Konstantinos Karamanlis. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/312125/KonstantinosKaramanlis. 55 Andreas Papandreou. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/441874/Andreas-Papandreou.

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In contemporary Poland it would be hard to find a potential performer of such a mission, regardless of the fact that, e.g., de Gaulle was often remembered as narcissistic or egocentric politician and also as manipulating the provisions of the Constitution.56 Despite that almost no one denies the influence of these and other, mentioned earlier, politicians, on shaping in their countries an effective model of government, I personally believe that at present there are only three persons with real charisma on the global scale. They are: i) the symbol of peaceful resistance against the military junta in Burma (Myanmar), Aung San Suu Kyi; ii) the symbol of fight against Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and then its first non-white President, Nelson Mandela and iii) the Tibetan leader, Dalai Lama. On the one hand, we need someone similar for Poland, but on the other one we do not like anyone too long. Pope John Paul II is still existing popularity is an exception which confirms the above rule. VIII. Conclusion There has arisen an important dilemma. Should we, in the existing atmosphere of criticism of political leadership and of the state structures in Poland, focus on improving them, not changing the current system of government? If so then it would be necessary to ascribe the notion of the rule of law a rank possible to verify in practice instead of using it as a spell to charm the imperfect reality. This would greatly increase the psychical comfort of the majority of the citizens who would feel that the state respects the laws it has created. Or perhaps an experiment should be made in order to improve the quality of the government by a constitutional strengthening the President (or at least the Prime Minister) and then consistent observing these changes? This is a very serious dilemma exactly because of the doubts as to who should carry it out. At the moment there are no candidates for the part of the visionary politician having the approval of the large majority of the society [underlined by the author] who could improve significantly the state effectiveness and prestige. I do not think it might be the current President, Bronisław Komorowski (despite his popularity as it is shown in current – late spring 2013 – polls), but neither the Prime Minister, Donald Tusk.57 I do not see such potential in Jarosław Kaczyński either, in spite of his current political activeness.

56 Compare Bielecki, R.: Co to jest Gaullizm? [Gaullisme – What Is It?]. Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa, 1978. 125-135 and passim; Gerhard, J.: Charles de Gaulle. Książka i Wiedza, Vol. 2 (1972) 186-190. 57 See pl.wolności polityka [pl.Freedom Politics]. http://www.kubekpolityczny.plwolnosci.pl/a/1529/ Slaby-Tusk-ciagnie-Platforme-w-dol.

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It has to be acknowledged that the idea of changing the system of government put forward by Jan Rokita in January 2005 (then from Civic Platform) aiming at the radical strengthening the Prime Minister’s position seemed then very inspiring cognitively, of course, on condition that Rokita’s main intention was to lay the foundations for a truly effective model of government, perhaps bringing Poland closer to the German chancellor’s system and not only to create greater support for his then party in the coming parliamentary elections. This idea also showed Rokita’s intentions and ambitions as the in spe Prime Minister, whom he did not become and ultimately withdrew from political activeness in 2007.58 Thus the aspiring Polish (and not only) both former and present politicians should heed the immortal dictum of John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, better known as Lord Acton: “[a]ll power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”59 This motto should be adopted especially by those participants in Polish politics who call for extraordinary steps in the process of changing the government thus ignoring and/or undermining democratic procedures.60 The impatience in politics has been frequently a sign of overwhelming ambitions and a lack of individual modesty. It is unfortunately forgotten by many those who aspire for power.

58 Politycy o decyzjach Nelly i Jana Rokity [Politicians on Decisions of Nelly and Jan Rokita]. http:// www.money.pl/archiwum/wiadomosci_agencyjne/iar/artykul/politycy;o;decyzjach;nelly;i;jana;roki ty,111,0,265583.html. 59 Power (Excerpted from How to Argue and Win Every Time by Gerry Spence). http://www.mainemediaresources.com/mpl_bookquotes.htm. 60 Compare Tusk: nie zgodzę się na propozycje związkowców [Tusk: I Don’t Agree with the Proposals of Trade Unions]. http://www.polskieradio.pl/42/259/Artykul/830662,Tusk-nie-zgodze-siena-propozycje-zwiazkowcow; Związkowcy po expose: Tusk to kłamca…, [Trade Unions after expose: Tusk Is a Liar…,]. http://www.wzz.org.pl/posty/zwiazkowcy-po-expose:-tusk-to-klamca,-po-to-partia-obciachu.-trzeba-budowac-ruch-spolecznego-oporu-przeciwko-nim.

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III. 3. A Doktori Iskola által 2012-ben szervezett nyári egyetem írásos anyagai A Doktori Iskola 2012 júliusában szervezte meg Effects of the Economic Depression to Law and State in Central Europe címmel nyári egyetemét, amelyre számos országból érkeztek résztvevők. A nyári egyetemen elhangzott egyes főelőadások és workshop-előadások írásos anyagai jól szemléltetik azt a fajta tudományos értéket, amellyel a rendezvény hozzájárult a tudományos diskurzushoz, a gazdasági krízis jogi, politikai és gazdasági vetületeinek feltérképezéshez, ezáltal pedig egyes megoldási módozatok megfogalmazásához. Az alábbiakban eme – angol nyelvű – tanulmányok kerülnek bemutatásra.

III. 3. Papers of the 2012 Summer Seminar organized by the Postgraduate Doctoral School The Postgraduate Doctoral School organized its habitual summer seminar under the title of Effects of the Economic Depression to Law and State in Central Europe in July 2012. The event hosted numerous participants from several European countries. The papers of the keynote speeches and workshop presentations delivered at the summer seminar clearly and unambiguously demonstrate the scientific value that was added to them by these lectures, which undoubtedly promoted the scientific discourse in order to analyse and conceive the causes and solution methods of the economic crisis via legal, economic and political ways. The studies below summarize these challenges and issues in English.

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MILASSIN, László PhD.

associate professor/head of department Széchenyi István University

EU – Questions and Answers for the future

I. Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European Commission, was a German politician and professor. He was one of the emblematic figures of European integration. In his famous metaphor, this was the “bicycle theory” of integration: if we do not keep riding the bicycle forward, we will all fall off. Looking at the structural evolution of the European integration, we could observe different stages of a certain development, from the cooperation of member states towards a possible federal “United States of Europe”. (See the table below).

On this scale, probably, we could place the above mentioned federal state at the point 10th. The bicycle‘s forward motion could lead to the next evolutional stage of the European integration. Concerning the further procedure of the integration, the following questions can be arisen: how to preserve the aquis communautaire and how to extend it? There is no consensus among the member states in this respect on the European finalité politique. But on the other hand, the European Union is also a community of law. Nevertheless, the EU does not focus on the creation of one European Law in contrast to the laws of its Member States. Instead, the European Union focuses on the harmonization of the national legal system only to the extent that is required for functioning of the common internal market.1 The har-

1 See Mock, Sebastian: Harmonization, Regulation and Legislative Competition in European Corporate Law, 3 German Law Journal (2002).

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monization of national laws is one of the main fields of the continuous process of European integration and – at the same time – the harmonized EU law is the precondition for keeping the “bicycle” of the European integration in motion. The aim in the EU is to make a consistent whole of law. Important concept of the EU is to create a common standard in the internal market. II. Harmonization, approximation The legal definition of the harmonization in the EU includes the cooperation between governments to make laws more uniform and coherent. A policy of the EU is can be considered as to achieve uniformity in laws of member states to facilitate free trade and protect citizens. Generally, the EU harmonises laws as standard by issuing Directives. Directives set out standards and objectives that must be realised. Members States are obliged to implement it within certain time limits. It is worth mentioning that the general principle is the mutual recognition.2 The harmonization of the EU law has three different types: (1) Full harmonisation. Characteristics: i) no room for member state to take action, ii) the national rules are replaced by a single EU rule leaving no room for national state to take action. (2) Completely harmonised standards include banking financial services, insurance of motor vehicles, cosmetics, telecommunication, etc. (3) Minimum harmonisation: The EU provides minimum standards but the member states are free to impose higher standards on goods and services. Minimum standards mean a floor below, which national standards cannot fall. A Member State might apply more stringent provisions than those resulting from the EU law.3 Most important legislative instrument to harmonize the Member State’s laws is the Directive. The very purpose of the Directives is to reconcile the dual objectives of both securing the necessary uniformity of Union Law and respecting the diversity national traditions and structures. They try to remove contradictions and conflicts between national laws. The main aim of this whole exercise is not the unification but harmonisation and by so doing, to build and maintain the Single Market. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) deals with harmonization - with other terms approximation. The general legal basis for

2 Compare with McMahon, Paul: Harmonisation of Laws, Lavelle, Coleman Solicitors. www.lovellecolema.ie/cuuploads/editor/file/England%20and%2. 3 Ibid.

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the approximation of laws in EU can be found in the Article 114 and Article 115 of the TFEU. The European Parliament and the Council have the competence to adopt the measures for approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States in order to secure the establishment and functioning of the internal market. Such measures cannot be applied to fiscal provisions (free movement of persons – rights and interests of employed persons, as well). An important aspect of the approximation of national laws is that the European official organs, actors, entitites will take as a base of high level of protection concerning health, safety, environment and consumer protection, taking account in particular of any new development on scientific facts. After the accept of the European provisions concerning the approximation of national laws, a Member State is able to maintain its regulation on grounds of public morality, public policy or security, protection of the environment and working environment (based on new scientific evidence), moreover on grounds of health, national treasure, industrial and commercial property. In this case, the Member State is obliged to notify the Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them. The Commission can approve or reject the national provisions. III. European Stability Mechanism (ESM) The ESM is set up by 17 euro area Member States. The Treaty was signed on 2 February 2012. This is an organization to provide assistance to member states with unstable economies. Its aim is to provide precautionary financial assistant to its Member States that are experiencing and being threatened by financing problems.4 It grants loans for recapitalisation of financial institutions of the Member States. The EU Member States have different options outside of the open market to seek financial support. Other than the European Financial Stability Facility, EU countries can seek money from European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), which is guaranteed by the EU‘s budget, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Starting in 2013, the EFSF will be replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). It is foreseen that the new ESM will enter into force on 1 July 2013, following an amendment to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.5 The ESM will be an intergovernmental institution established under public international law. The most important decision in relation to the ESM will be taken by its Board of Governors (Ministers of Finance from the euro area). European

4 See www.investopedia.com. 5 The European Stability Mechanism, ECB, Monthly Bulletin, July 2012.

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Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of European Central Bank has the observer status. The chairperson will be elected by the Board of Governors. One Director will be appointed by each of Member State (and one Alternate). Decisions on four principal questions will be taken by mutual agreement:6 a) Granting of financial assistance; b) Terms and conditions of financial assistance; c) Lending capacity of ESM; d) Changes to the menu of instruments. The other decisions of the Board of Governors will be taken by qualified majority (urgent decision, with the majority of 80%). The votes will be weighted in number of shares allocated to the country in the capital stock of EMS. The Board of Directors is also a decision-making body. This body is responsible for specific issues delegated by the Board of Governors. How the ESM is funded? The capital (EUR 80 billion) of EMS comes from Member States. Furthermore EUR 620 billion will be able to call. Total lending capacity of EUR 700 billion („firewall”). Its purpose is to support countries that have got into financial trouble and cannot obtain loans normally. IV. Contributions

The diagram is the authors.

6 Mutual agreement means the decision, which is taken unanimously (abstentions do not prevent the decision from being adopted.

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Critics have expressed that ESM severely limits the economic sovereignty of its member states and criticise that it provides extensive powers and immunity to the Board of Governors without parliamentary influence or control. Some critical questions were formulated by Zivile Koalition für Deutschland, Die freie Welt (Die Internet – und Blogzeitung für Zivilgesellschaft and Abgeordneten Check:7 –– By whom and on what bases had been the total lending capacity of EUR 700 billion calculated? –– “ESM Members hereby irrevocably and unconditionally undertake to pay on demand any capital call made on them (…) within seven days of receipt of such demand.” (Art. 9 ESM Treaty). What irrevocably and unconditionally really mean? What happens, if a new parliament does not want to pay for ESM? Does the Member State have to pay anyway? –– “The Board of Governors may decide to change the authorized capital and amend Art. 8 (…) accordingly.” (Art. 10 ESM Treaty) Is 700 billion just the beginning? Are The Member States required, under Art. 9, irrevocably and unconditionally to pay up? –– “1. The ESM (…) shall have full legal capacity (…) to institute legal proceedings. 2. The ESM, its property, funding and assets (…) shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process (…)” Art. 27 ESM Treaty. Can the ESM programme sue us and can the Member States challenge it in court? –– “4. The property, funding and assets of the ESM shall (…) be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form of seizure, taking or foreclosure by executive, judicial, administrative or legislative action.” Art. 27. Does it mean that neither the governments, nor legislators, nor any of our democratic laws had any effect on ESM organizations? –– “1. Governors, alternate Governors, Directors, alternate Directors, the Managing Director and staff members shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them (…) and shall enjoy inviolability in respect of their official papers and documents.” Art. 30 ESM Treaty. So, anyone who involved in ESM cannot be accountable for anything? Cannot the people see the papers and documents? Is there no independent reviewer? Is that the new EU? These questions are remaining to be answered.

7 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BM5udVZbHpw&feature=endscreen.

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LUKÁCS, Eszter PhD.

Senior lecturer, Kautz Gyula Faculty of Economics, Széchenyi István University Member of Presidium, United Nations Association of Hungary (UNA-H)

Economic Downturn: Fiscal Responses and the Role of FDI in Job Creation

I. The year 2012 has brought significant changes in the approaches how a country’s development could and should be measured. On one hand, the inadequacy of the traditional macroeconomic indicators, primarily that of the GDP, in reflecting the expansion of actual welfare is almost a platitude, on the other hand assessment methods such as the GNH (gross national happiness) that underline the primacy of spiritual and cultural values over economic performance leave a great room for subjectivity and are short of an exact quantitative definition. The ten day mega-summit in June 2012, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, ended with a document that entails the idea of measuring sustainable development, a progress that encompasses economic, social and environmental dimensions within the entire UN system. Though the indicators are yet undefined, there is a consensus in the creation of a set of measurable targets (latest by 2015) that “incorporate in a balanced way all three dimensions of sustainable development and their interlinkages.”1 The adequacy of the GDP was, inter alia, challenged as pre-crisis growth even within the confines of a single nation has been often accompanied by massive intra-regional disparities and the increase of the output has not always been translated into a rise of living standards or, in any case, not for all the members of a country’s society. The financial turmoil and the economic downturn that started in 2007, smote the advanced world in 2008 and reached the developing countries in 2009 not only raised responsibility issues in the sense of the global financial architecture but also in the context of finding a solid basis, a source for future development.

1 Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, A/CONF.216/16, 46-47. http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/814UNCSD%20REPORT%20final%20revs.pdf.

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II. Fiscal stimuli: robust but short-lived To stabilise the financial system and to prevent the global community from an even more severe economic meltdown governments ensured astonishing amounts of cash for bank bailouts and introduced various forms of fiscal stimuli. (The US Senate has committed itself, with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, to a fund of $700 billion in October 2008, while EU governments have pledged to offer a sum of €3000 billion, some $4000 billion, for “guarantee umbrellas, risk shields and recapitalisation measures for the financial sector”, in April 2009.2 In Japan, a framework of 27000 billion Yen was promised, but the part really funded by the government was in fact no more than 5000 billion Yen, approximately $55 billion.)3 “During the financial crisis, many national economies have looked to their government and foreign lenders for financial support, which has translated to increased spending, borrowing and, in most cases, growing national debt. Overleveraged consumers and companies struggled to survive their crippling debts, while highly indebted governments enacted austerity measures and sought the aid of international organizations for bailouts in the face of sovereign defaults. Deficit spending, government debt and private sector borrowing are the norm in most Western countries, but due, in part, to the rough economy, some nations are in considerably worse debt positions than others.”4 According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 2012 database the public debt per GDP ratio in the US and Japan grew to 102.94 and 229.77% in 2011 while that of the EU increased to 82.5 in the same year.5 Figures rose from the 2008 level of 74.1,6 191.8 and 62.5, respectively.7 The Japanese bank bailout was modest compared to its American and European counterpart most probably for the country had already experienced a massive indebtedness for at least the previous two decades. However, this is to underline that fiscal stimuli were more like a “one-time” therapy, immediate answers to the most daunting shock the developed world has ever experienced since the great depression. Further fiscal policy responses can be characterized

2 Vucheva, Elitsa: European Bank Bailout Total: $4 Trillion, http://www.businessweek.com/ globalbiz/content/apr2009/gb20090410_254738.htm. 3 Junhong, Liu: Japan's bailout package subtly different, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/ 2009-03/17/content_7585236.htm. 4 Toscano, Paul: The World’s Biggest Debtor Nations, http://www.cnbc.com/id/30308959/The_ World_s_Biggest_Debtor_Nations. 5 Eurostat: Provision of deficit and debt data for 2011 – first notification, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-23042012-AP/EN/2-23042012-AP-EN.PDF. 6 US National Debt & Interest Expense by Presidential Term, Percentage of GDP, http://www.skymachines.com/US-National-Debt-Per-Capita-Percent-of-GDP-and-by-Presidental-Term.htm, 7 Japan Country Report, http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/247-japan-gdp-country-report.html#axzz29OEYUss1.

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as tightening in their nature, especially in countries with high external and fiscal deficits, in order to reassure financial investors of the solvency of their governments and banking systems. UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Report, 2010 stressed that employment creation should be “the” global economic priority and “warned” above all the developed states that without further fiscal spending they would not be back on track. In the context of the sources of growth, UNCTAD cautioned that “there is a high risk that a withdrawal of fiscal stimulus before the return of strong domestic consumption and investment will jeopardize economic recovery.”8 The document further stated that “while developing countries are leading the recovery, it remains fragile and uneven in developed countries.” Among the developed countries, in a repeat of global pre-crisis patterns, the United States has witnessed a stronger recovery in domestic demand than the leading current-account surplus countries – Germany and Japan. But in moving forward, the United States has to deal with the problem of 8 million crisis-related job losses and it faces strong headwinds as the fiscal stimulus peters out in the course of 2010. In 2011, its overall fiscal stance could even become restrictive as fiscal retrenchment is expected at the state and local levels. Europe has become the centre of the global crisis and a laggard in the global recovery, as its homegrown problems add to the vulnerability of its shaky financial markets.”9 III. ILO reports on recovering trade and investment figures accompanied by long-term unemployment ILO’s Global Employment Trends 2011 report explains that „despite the negative GDP growth rate registered in 2009, real global GDP never actually shrank below the 2007 level during the crisis and is estimated by the IMF to have been more than 7 per cent higher in 2010 as compared with 2007. Similarly, private consumption declined only modestly in 2009 and is estimated to have been 3.3 per cent higher in 2010 than in 2007. Gross fixed investment contracted sharply in 2009, falling by nearly 10 per cent; however, investment is estimated to have surpassed the 2007 level in 2010. Global trade dropped by nearly 12 per cent in 2009, but this too is estimated to have risen above the 2007 level in 2010. Thus, while there is clearly tremendous regional and country-level variation in economic performance and recovery patterns, despite the massive and widespread shock that accompanied the collapse in

8 See UNCTAD: Trade and Development Report, 2010. http://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdr2010_en.pdf, 33. 9 See Ibid. IV.

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growth in 2008 and 2009, based on these four key macroeconomic indicators, the global economy has recovered. IV. Global trends and projections in GDP growth, consumption, investment, trade and unemployment, 2007-11

Source: ILO: Global Employment Trends 2011. 6. Unfortunately, the contrast between recovery in the macroeconomic indicators and the unemployment indicator could not be starker. Global unemployment began to grow in 2008 as the crisis increased uncertainty and led to reduced hiring. This was followed by a massive increase of more than 22 million in global unemployment in 2009. The year 2010 brought little change to this elevated level of unemployment. In all, there were 27.6 million more unemployed people in the world in 2010 as compared with 2007, with little hope for this figure to revert to pre-crisis levels in the near future. The current projections for these indicators for 2011 show a further widening of the gap between the macroeconomic recovery and a recovery to pre-crisis unemployment levels.”10

10 ILO: Global Employment Trends 2011. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_150440.pdf. 6.

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V. Austerity measures to regain investors’ confidence The World of Work Report 2012 is introduced with an editorial section where Raymond Torres, the Director of the International Institute of Labour Studies (IILS) poses the question: “How to move out of the austerity trap?” The subject raised epitomises the main concerns of the whole document, which portrays a labour market picture that has “fallen between two stools” where governments fail to finance job creation because of credibility reasons and companies are reluctant to come up with major, employment creating investments due to uncertainty considerations. According to Torres “since 2010 and despite the job-friendly statements in successive G20 meetings and other global forums, the policy strategy has shifted its focus away from job creation and improvement and concentrated instead on cutting fiscal deficits at all costs. In European countries, cutting fiscal deficits has been deemed essential for calming financial markets. But even in countries which have not suffered from the effects of the crisis this remedy is being applied for pre-emptive reasons – fiscal deficits are being reduced to avert any negative reactions from financial markets. This approach was intended to pave the way for greater investment and growth, along with lower fiscal deficits.”11 The latter suggests that governments are more willing to struggle with the consequences of long term unemployment than with negative credit ratings and diminishing investments. In 2011 Standard & Poor’s adjusted its long-term sovereign credit ratings for 45 nations, compared to 34 ratings changes in 2010. In the first few weeks of 2012 S&P has downgraded 10 further countries. The main headline grabbers have been the countries that lost their coveted AAA ratings: United States (Aug. 2011), New Zealand (Sept. 2011), Austria (Jan. 2012) and France (Jan. 2012). In all, the January 2012 changes encompassed downgrades to nine of the 17 Eurozone countries, with three others having already seen one or more downgrades during 2011 (Belgium, Greece and Ireland). In January 2012 only 16 countries or organizations around the world had the AAA rating; interestingly, the Eurozone was one of them, even though only four member countries were rated AAA by S&P (Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands).12 Fitch cut Japan’s sovereign credit status in May 2012 to the lowest level among global ratings agencies as they viewed the political stalemate dimmed the chance that the country could curb its snowballing debt. Fitch warned

11 ILO: World of Work Report 2012. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_179453.pdf. VIII. 12 Ups in Downgrades: S&P accelerates negative credit ratings changes in 2012. http://www.factset. com/insight/2012/2/sp-downgrades-2012,

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further downgrades were possible unless the government takes new fiscal policy measures to stabilize public finances and its ratio of debt to gross domestic product. “The downgrades and negative outlooks reflect growing risks for Japan’s sovereign credit profile as a result of high and rising public debt ratios” andrew Colquhoun, head of Asia-Pacific sovereigns at Fitch said in a statement. The Fitch rating is one notch below its rival ratings agencies. Moody’s Investors Service rates Japan Aa3 with a stable outlook. Standard & Poor’s rates Japan at AA minus with a negative outlook.13 Though eight of the ten least-risky countries for investment were European till June 2012, Moody’s ratings for the Netherlands and Germany (9th and 10th places) were revised to negative in July. (The outlooks of France and the U.K. had previously been revised to negative.) Moody’s put the European Union on notice at the beginning of September that its top-notch Aaa rating is at risk of downgrade, cutting the outlook on the EU’s creditworthiness to “negative” from “stable” because of the continent’s ongoing debt crisis.14 The latter suggests that the worries of the governments are not unfounded thus they rather tend to abide by long-term unemployment rates than lose the trust of the investors. The major problem currently is that there are approximately 200 million people unemployed globally and around 50 million jobs are missing relative to the pre-crisis situation. Projections further indicate that, on present trends, employment in advanced economies will not reach pre-crisis levels until late 2016. The current economic slowdown has also affected employment prospects in emerging and developing economies. The general issues of youth unemployment along with involuntary part-time and temporary employment touch both advanced and developing economies. Youth unemployment rates have increased in about 80 per cent of advanced economies and in two thirds of the developing economies and share of informal employment remains high, standing at more than 40 per cent in twothirds of emerging and developing countries for which data are available.15 VI. Unemployment and social unrest ILO’s World of World Report 2011 warned governments that unemployment is a matter that should not be taken lightly as it can destabilize political systems. The publication explains that unemployment and disposable income

13 FOX Business: Fitch Cuts Japan's Credit Rating, http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2012/05/22/fitch-cuts-japan-credit-rating/. 14 CNN Money: Moody's puts European Union on notice, http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/03/news/ economy/moodys-european-union/index.html. 15 ILO: World of Work Report 2012. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_179453.pdf. 1-2.

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are the major factors of social unrest whereas the growth of the GDP has much less impact on the welfare perception of people. Further determinants that may destabilise societies and hinder governments in their efforts putting their economies back on track are income inequalities and perception of injustice; austerity measures; and higher food prices; the heavy-handedness of the state when tackling with social upheavals; the presence of educated but dissatisfied (young) populace and the prevalence of mass media and 21st century communication technologies that enable a swift spread of information and the organisation of mass movements.16 VII. Determinants of Social Unrest, 2010

Source: ILO, World of Work Report 2011. 16. A 2012 spring interview with IILS director Raymond Torres confirms the findings above stating that “out of 106 ILO countries with available figures, 54 per cent reported an increase in the score for the risk of unrest in 2011 compared to 2010. The two regions with the highest risk are Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa. However, there are also important increases in advanced economies and in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Latin America and some Asian countries have experienced a decline in the risk of social unrest over this period. These regions have performed relatively well in terms of creating jobs and reducing income inequality – although there are still concerns regarding poverty and high informal employment in China, India and much of Latin America. In

16 ILO: World of Work Report 2011. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_166021.pdf. 16-17.

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advanced economies, the situation is very different. Unemployment rates remain high in the majority of countries and income inequality has increased in more than half of the cases. In 2011, 54 per cent of the countries analyzed reported lower confidence in their national government compared to 2010. It is not surprising to see low levels of confidence in some Arab countries. This can be seen as a consequence of the recent struggle for democracy. In advanced economies, notably in Europe, there is also a decline in confidence towards national governments. On the other hand, we see an increase in confidence in Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Policies aimed at creating good-quality jobs are crucial to reduce the risk of exclusion and promote a sense of fairness. Key policies include: i) strengthening labour market institutions and ensuring that wages grow in line with productivity (not less, as has been the case until now); ii) adopting special measures – and there are many examples of good practices in this area – for young workers and other vulnerable groups; iii) restoring credit to small firms, which are key providers of jobs; and, in Europe, iv) avoiding ill-conceived fiscal austerity – which has affected job prospects while failing to reduce fiscal deficits. Governments have also been long on promises and short on action when it comes to financial sector reform. All these measures would help to enhance the sense of fairness that the current model of globalization is so lacking.”17 The ILO further argues that while “austerity driven” employment growth could be around 0.8 million in 2013 government spending is not necessarily a source of indebtedness. They say that “a fiscally neutral change in the composition of expenditures and revenues would create between 1.8 and 2.1 million jobs in the following year alone, depending on the policy mix selected.”18 Though the ILO urges governments to stop further financial restrictions as – according to their findings – they only result in short term GDP boosts; they also acknowledge that “additional public-support measures alone will not be sufficient to foster a sustainable jobs recovery. Policy-makers must act decisively and in a coordinated fashion to reduce the fear and uncertainty that is hindering private investment so that the private sector can restart the main engine of global job creation. Incentives to businesses to invest in

17 ILO: High unemployment and growing inequality fuel social unrest around the world, http://www. ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_179430/lang--en/index.htm. 18 ILO: World of Work Report 2012. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_179453.pdf. 60.

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plants and equipment and to expand their payrolls will be essential to jumpstart a strong and sustainable recovery in employment.”19 VIII. The role of FDI in job creation As detailed above employment creation does not seem to be a current priority among most governments of the world, yet the “sad news is” that companies are similarly reluctant in job creation as states. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report (WIR) 2012, global FDI flows rose by 16 per cent in 2011 to $1,524 billion, up from $1,309 billion in 2010. Though this has been already the second consecutive year of growth in FDI flows after the decreasing values of 2008 and 2009 and Multinational Enterprises’ (MNEs) foreign affiliates’ economic activity rose across all major indicators of international production the record levels of cash have so far not translated into sustained growth in investment levels. During the year 2011, foreign affiliates of MNEs employed an estimated 69 million workers, who generated $28 trillion in sales and $7 trillion in value added. Although recent figures suggest that TNCs’ capital expenditures in productive assets and acquisitions are picking up, rising 12 per cent in 2011, the additional cash they are holding – an estimated $105 billion in 2011 – is still not being fully deployed. Renewed instability in international financial markets will continue to encourage cash holding and other uses of cash such as paying dividends or reducing debt levels. Nevertheless, as conditions improve, the current cash “overhang” may fuel a future surge in FDI. Projecting the data for the top 100 TNCs over the estimated $5 trillion in total TNC cash holdings results in more than $500 billion in investable funds, or about one third of global FDI flows.20 The main reason behind the corporate unwillingness to invest is uncertainty. Though major macroeconomic indicators tend to bounce back and reach their pre-crisis levels, there is a massive and underlying global shift behind the aggregate figures. The main investors of the early 21st century are still the advanced economies yet the structure of host regions has altered immensely with developing nations attracting more than half of all FDI inflows. The prominence of East and Southeast Asia and partly Latin America in capital attraction is remarkable whereas other regions of the world have gained less momentum.

19 ILO: Global Employment Trends 2012. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_171571.pdf. 86. 20 UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2012. http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTADWIR2012-Full-en.pdf. XVI.

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Traditionally multinational enterprises prefer their own home regions when seeking for investment locations the economic downturn triggered an impulse of going global for many transnational corporations (TNCs) of the world. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Prospects Survey (WIPS) 2009-2011 “while most of the respondent TNCs have been focusing more on regional than on global expansion strategies in the past few years, they might progressively expand their geographical scope in the future. There is an ongoing debate about the geographical scope of the largest TNCs. Are they only regional giants? For instance Rugman and Verbeke (2004) assert that very few TNCs can be considered global or even bi-regional. Are they becoming progressively more global? Dunning, Fujita and Yakova (2007) for example found that while TNCs from some home regions may exhibit a strong regional character in their investments, the trend of outward FDI is towards a more dispersed, global pattern. The results of this year’s WIPS seem to support their analysis. Respondent TNCs, while still according greater emphasis to their home regions, expressed a growing interest in other regions of the world as well.”21 Going global is rather an economic compulsion than a matter of real choice where investors choose outsourcing instead of downsizing. Pankaj Ghemawat’s CAGE distance framework explains how cultural, administrative (government), geographic and economic distances may negatively influence investment relations between countries and within companies.22 The rise of East and South-East Asia as outstanding host regions is thus a circumstance that European and North American investors have to live with however the relationships are loaded with all forms of distances that each bring about uncertainties. To abridge them companies do their best to find the least risky modes of entry into the unknown business environment. A significant trend of the years 2010 and 2012 became the so-called nonequity modes (NEMs) of entry into the host country. According to WIR 2011, “non-equity modes of internationalisation, such as contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, franchising, licensing, management contracts and other types of contractual relationship through which TNCs coordinate the activities of host country firms, without owning a stake in those firms, estimated to have generated over $2 trillion of sales in 2009.” In most cases, NEMs are growing more rapidly than the industries in which they operate.

21 UNCTAD: World Investment Prospects Survey 2009-2011. http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20098_en.pdf. 27. 22 See Ghemawat, Pankaj: CAGE Comparator, http://www.ghemawat.com/cage/.

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NEMs can yield significant development benefits. They employ an estimated 14-16 million workers in developing countries. Their value added represents up to 15 per cent of GDP in some economies. Their exports account for 70-80 per cent of global exports in several industries. Overall, NEMs can support long term industrial development by building productive capacity, including through technology dissemination and domestic enterprise development and by helping developing countries gain access to global value chains.23 NEMs also pose risks for developing countries. Employment in contract manufacturing can be highly cyclical and easily displaced. Concerns exist that TNCs may use NEMs to circumvent social and environmental standards. And to ensure success in long-term industrial development, developing countries need to mitigate the risk of remaining locked into low-value-added activities and becoming overly dependent on TNC-owned technologies and TNC-governed global value chains.” At the start of the twenty-first century, MNEs were estimated to directly employ over 95 million people, representing 3.4 per cent of the world’s total employment of 2.8 billion. Early ILO estimates put direct employment in MNEs at around 40 million in the mid-1970s and at around 65 million in the mid-1980s. After growing slowly throughout most of the late 1980s and early 1990s, partly as a result of relatively slow employment growth in United States multinational parents and affiliates, employment in MNEs began to quicken in the mid-1990s.24 Based on the statistics of WIR 2012 the employment by the foreign affiliates of MNEs grew from 21 million in 1990 to the 2005-2007 pre-crisis average level of 51 million and to further 63 and 69 million in 2010 and 2011, respectively.25 Though estimations on MNEs home and host country employment are rather imprecise and scarce, as they omit work places created by NEMs and are loaded with national data provision divergences, it is undeniable that FDI play a key role in the job creation of undercapitalised developing and transition economies. According to McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) “from 1980 to 2010, the number of workers in the world rose by 1.2 million, to approximately 2.9 billion. Most of this growth was in developing economies, where a massive “farm-to-factory” shift also took place that raised non-farm jobs from 54% of global employment in 1980 to nearly 70% in 2010. This shift not only

23 UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2011. http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTADWIR2011-Full-en.pdf. XII. 24 Compare Kim, Kee Beom: Direct employment in multinational enterprises: Trends and Implications, International Labour Office – Geneva, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/--emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_125661.pdf. 13-14. 25 UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2012. http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTADWIR2012-Full-en.pdf. 24.

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drove the growth of national economies in China, India and other developing countries, but also contributed to the exit from poverty of an estimated 620 million people worldwide in the past 20 years. We estimate that at least one-fifth of non-farm jobs created in developing countries in the past decade were associated with rising exports, in effect bringing 85 million workers to the global economy. Also adding to this pool are immigrants from developing countries, who contributed an estimated 40% to labour force growth in advanced economies in the past three decades.”26 FDI attraction remains a challenge for many European counties. The investment per GDP ratio world average was 21.7% in 2012, it equalled 18.6, 18.5 and 20.8 for the EU, the advanced economies and Central and Eastern Europe respectively, whereas it totalled 31.0 in the emerging and developing economies and 42.1% in developing Asia. In China and India the ratio reached 48.7 and 37.8%, correspondingly.27 Though the inadequacy of the GDP as a measure of development was underlined in the introductory remarks of this paper it has to be acknowledged that major FDI attraction factors are market attractiveness, the availability of low-cost and skilled labour, the presence of natural resources and enabling infrastructure. Market attractiveness; entailing the size of the market (GDP purchasing power parity), spending power (per capita GDP PPP) and the growth potential of the market (real GDP growth rate);28 dominates the determinants with half of the companies going abroad being “market-seekers”. The “size and growth of the market are by far the most important location criteria followed by the quality of resources (including skilled labour) and of the technical and administrative business environment. On the other hand, government incentives play a limited role in attracting FDI.”29 In the absence of fiscal stimuli and the presence of heavy indebtedness, European countries have no way out of the crises but the maintenance of their unity as this is the only possible chance in competing for FDI with the huge economies of the US or the BRIC countries.

26 MGI: The world at work: Jobs, pay and skills for 3.5 billion people, June 2012. http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Labor_Markets/The_world_at_work. 3-4. 27 Economy Watch: Investment (% of GDP) Data for All Countries, http://economywatch.com/economic-statistics/economic-indicators/Investment_Percentage_of_GDP/. 28 UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2012. http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTADWIR2012-Full-en.pdf. 30. 29 UNCTAD: World Investment Prospects Survey 2008-2010. http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wips2008_ en.pdf. 37.

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ŞENER, Hasan Engin PhD.1

assistant professor Yıldırım Beyazıt University, School of Management, Ankara

Hungary’s Anti-Crisis Policies and the “Goulash” Way

Introduction The traditional Hungarian dish called “goulash” (gulyásleves) is not only very famous in the world cuisine, but also in politics since it has “political” connotations indicating the exceptional “Hungarian way”. For example the Hungarian way of socialism is called “goulash communism.”2 Furthermore, according to Pogátsa,3 Hungary was the pioneer of the model called the “dependent competitive state”; “dependent” upon foreign direct investment and “competitive” for “accommodating foreign investments i.e. low wages” in the early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) except for Slovenia. It should also be underlined that Hungary is one of the rare examples of the peaceful transformation from communism to capitalism without even abolishing the constitution adopted in the communist era in the CEE.4 It seems that Hungary is even today also following a unique path in order to overcome the political and economic crisis experienced in the year 2007 and onwards, although it is questionable how successful they are. The aim of this article is to discuss anti-crisis policies implemented in Hungary and to show that Hungary is following a sort of a “goulash” way in-between neo-liberalism and unorthodoxy. On the one hand, Hungary is playing the game to an inch of the rules in terms of anti-debt and anti-deficit policies; on

1 I would like to thank to Pogátsa Zoltán, Nacsa Mónika and Laki Ferenc for their valuable comments on the draft version of this article. 2 Even according to Clark it is also possible to talk about goulash liberalism: “[s]ome time ago someone coined the phrase “goulash communism” to describe the revisionism of Khrushchev & Company; if this be so, then the mixture of bourgeois liberalism and Southern nationalism put forward by SSOC in its final months could very well be characterized as goulash liberalism.” See Clark, Ed: Southern Students Defeat Liberalism: The South Must be Won. Progressive Labor, 1969/7(3). 3 Pogátsa, Zoltán: Hungary: From Star Transition Student to Backsliding Member State. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2009/5(4), 600. 4 For the constitutional changes in Hungary between 1989 and 2010 and the re-design of the Hungarian constitutional system in 2010-2011, see Smuk, Péter: Constitutional Changes in Hungary and the Character of the Hungarian Democracy. International Conference “Constitutional and Political Processes in Central and Eastern Europe: 20 Years After” February, 2012. Moscow.

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the other hand, Hungary is infiltrating unorthodoxy into the rules of the game. In the first section, the macroeconomic performance, that is the relationship between growth, inflation and unemployment, of Hungary will be evaluated. Then in the second section, the effects of the crisis on the new constitution, which was entered into force on 1 January 2012, will be discussed. In the third and final section, anti-crisis policies in terms of (un)employment will be discussed. 1. Macroeconomic performance of Hungary: before and after the economic crisis As is seen in Table 1, during the membership negotiations (1998-2002), Hungary achieved a reduction both in inflation (from 14,2% to 5,2%) and the unemployment rate (from 7,8% to 5,8), while keeping the growth rate band between 3,2-4,5%. The figures show that between 1997 and 2011, the correlation between the unemployment and the GDP growth rate is negative and significant. Years 1997 1998* 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004** 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators of Hungary GDP growth Inflation Unemployment rate 3,1 18,5 8,7 4,1 14,2 7,8 3,2 10 7 4,2 10 6,4 3,7 9,1 5,7 4,5 5,2 5,8 3,9 4,7 5,9 4,8 6,8 6,1 4 3,5 7,2 3,9 4 7,5 0,1 7,9 7,4 0,9 6 7,8 -6,8 4 10 1,3 4,7 11,2 1,6 3,9 10,9

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts at a Glance 2011. OECD 2011, Economic Surveys: Hungary – OECD, 2012. * Negotiations between 1998 and 2002; ** EU Membership

Except for 2004-2006, after EU membership Hungary experienced bad economic performance. GDP growth fell to 1.6% in 2011 from 2004’s 4.8%,

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hitting the highest negative GDP change in 2009 with -6.8%. Moreover the unemployment rate increased from 6.1% to 10.9%. The only positive development regarding the macroeconomic performance was the decrease in the inflation rate from 6.1% to 3.9%. Although there was a tendency in favor of inflation and to the detriment of unemployment between 2004 and 2006, GDP growth was relatively high. Despite the fact that economic crisis mostly hit Hungary especially in 2009 when the Prime Minister resigned in March, Hungarian economy could not climb over 1.6% growth rate on average in a year after 2007. From 2007 to 2011, while unemployment increased from 7.4% to 10.9%, the inflation rate decreased from 7.9% to 3.9% confirming Phillip’s curve that unemployment was the price to be paid for the sake of inflation.

Years

2011** 2012 2013 2014 2015

Table 2: Expected macroeconomic performance according to convergence programs (%) Difference 1st convergence 2nd convergence (1st program - 2nd program March program April 2012 2011 program) InflaInflaInflaGDP* U* GDP U GDP U tion tion tion 3,1 10,9 4,0 1,7 10,9 3,9 1,4 0,0 0,1 3,0 10,5 3,4 0,1 10,9 5,2 2,9 -0,4 -1,8 3,2 9,9 3,0 1,6 10,3 4,2 1,6 -0,4 -1,2 3,3 9,3 3,0 2,5 9,5 3,0 0,8 -0,2 0,0 3,5 8,7 3,0 2,5 8,9 3,0 1,0 -0,2 0,0

Source: Government of Hungary: Convergence Programme of Hungary 2011-2015, Budapest, 2011; Government of Hungary: Annex 1: Convergence Programme of Hungary 2012-2015. In: A következő lépés, Széll Kálmán Terv 2.0, Budapest, 2012. “U” stands for unemployment; * According to the conservative but not dynamic path of growth; ** Prediction for the 1st Plan.

According to the OECD economic predictions, priority of inflation against unemployment would continue. According to the OECD Economic Outlook,5 inflation would drop to 2.9%, while unemployment hit 11.8% in 2013. However, the 2nd Convergence Program says the opposite. Instead of increase, the plan foresees a decrease in the unemployment rate to 10.3%, while it predicts

5 The consumer price index for 2013 is expected to be at 2.9% and the unemployment rate (% of labour force) is expected to be at 11.8. Projections from 2011 onwards are from OECD Economic Outlook No. 90. In: OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database), 2011. (28 August 2012).

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an increase in the inflation rate to 4.2% in 2013 as is seen from Table 2. So, at least as of 2012, it is possible to argue that the Hungarian government gave priority to unemployment instead of inflation. Table 2 also shows that the 1st Convergence Program released in March 2011 was not so realistic that Hungary had to readjust the predictions about the data in April 2012. As of 11 September 2012, according to the latest data released by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal – KSH) the inflation rate (consumer price changes) in July 2012 is 6%, the unemployment rate in May-July 2012 is 10.5% and GDP for the 2nd Quarter of 2012 is –1.3%. It seems that despite readjustments in the figures in the 2nd Convergence Program, realizations for 2012 (except for the unemployment rate6) are still worse than expected and the Hungarian economy is still in crisis with deteriorated macroeconomic performance. 2. Deficit, debt and the new constitution Due to the latest elections in 2010, Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Szövetség/Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Alliance) and Viktor Orbán could get the supermajority (with the 68%) of the seats in the parliament with the 53% of the votes.7 With this supermajority, the ruling government could have power to change the constitution adopted in 1949. The influence of the crisis on the constitution is quite clear especially in terms of fiscal regulations, which will be discussed at the end of this section. Table 3: Government deficit and debt in Hungary, 1995-2011, percentage of GDP General government defiGeneral government gross Years cit/surplus debt 1997 -6,00 62,90 1998* -8,00 60,90 1999 -5,50 60,80 2000 -3,00 56,10 2001 -4,10 52,70 2002* -9,00 55,90 2003 -7,30 58,60

6 However, despite the relative amelioration of the rate of unemployment, there is still long way for the pre-crisis level of unemployment. 7 For an elaborate analysis of the political composition of the Hungarian Parliament between 1990 and 2010, see Smuk, Péter: The Hungarian Parliament 1990-2010. In: Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi, 2010/18(2), 153-157.

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2004 2005 2006* 2007 2008 2009 2010* 2011

-6,50 -7,90 -9,40 -5,10 -3,70 -4,60 -4,20 4,30

59,50 61,70 65,90 67,10 73,00 79,80 81,40 80,60

Source: Eurostat, *Elections.

In order to understand why debt and deficit related rules are included in the constitution, it will useful to look at the government deficit and debt figures of Hungary. In Table 3, two out of five Maastricht criteria, namely budget deficit and public debt rates,8 are indicated in terms of Hungary. For the ruling government, these two variables are the biggest challenges as they are the two of the main policy objectives in the structural reform programme.9 Graphic 1

Source: Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin= 1&language=en&pcode=tec00023 8 It is interesting to note that Hungary’s general government gross debt (80.60% in 2011) is relatively better than EU17 Euro Area (87.2% in 2011) and EU27 (82.5% in 2011) according to Eurostat data. See: http:// epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb090. 9 Ministry for National Economy: Hungary’s Structural Reform Programme 2011 – 2014 based on the Political Thesis of the Széll Kálmán Plan, Budapest, 2011. 12.

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Hungary’s government surplus performance in 2011 of 4.30% is quite positive due to a sudden increase of total general government revenues from 45.2% in 2010 to 52.9% in 2011 and decrease in total general government expenditures from 49.50% in 2010 to 48.70 in 2011. What is also striking is that after the economic crisis, Hungary’s level of total general government expenditures, for the first time after passing to capitalism, is below the average of the EU27 in 2010 and even continued in 2011 as indicated in Graphic 1. Furthermore, it seems that for the first time, “electoral cycle”10 did not apply to 2010 elections. There used to be a steady pattern in Hungary that in each election year, public expenditures and budget deficit hit the highest rate when compared to previous four years term. However this pattern was broken in 2010. On the contrary, even the level of general government expenditures went down in the same year. However, this time, Hungary’s debt hit record high with 81.4% in 2010 election year. As part of structural challenges’ strategy, the first aim of the government is to reduce public deficit and debt, by improving the structure of expenditures,11 which means revenue increase, debt and expenditure reduction.12 At this point, it should be underlined that on the one hand Hungary is following the neo-liberal way in terms of decreasing public expenditures; on the other hand it is flirting with the unorthodoxy in terms of decreasing the debt. Unorthodox policies of the Hungarian government are as follows:13 Orban’s government nationalized about $14 billion in assets from private pensions, imposed big taxes on corporations and fixed the exchange rate for loans taken by individuals from banks in Swiss francs for three years, to make it easier for people to pay. Kotosz14 adds the anti-IMF stance into the unorthodoxy as arguing that IMF has seen as an “enemy” against the “independence” of Hungary.

10 The general trend was that “in the election years both budget deficit and public expenditures increase together.” See Şener, Hasan Engin: Administrative Reform as an Opportunity: The EU Accession Process in Hungary and Turkey, Phoenix, Ankara, 2009. 252. See also Pogátsa: op.cit. 605. and Jankovics, László: Public Finance Reform in Hungary: Light at the End of the Tunnel? In: ECFIN Country Focus, 2008/5(4), 1-6. 11 Government of Hungary: National Reform Programme of Hungary 2011-2015, Budapest, 2011. 81. 12 Government of Hungary: Convergence Programme of Hungary 2011-2015, Budapest, 2011. 32. 13 Compare Oprita, Antonia: Investors Unnerved by Hungary's 'Unorthodox' Measures. In: CNBC, 25 September 2011. http://www.cnbc.com/id/44639381/?Investors_Unnerved_by_Hungary_s_Unorthodox_Measures. 14 Kotosz, Balázs: The unorthodox answer of Hungary to global financial crisis. http://www.assoeconomiepolitique.org/political-economy-outlook-for-capitalism/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/kotosz_balazs _The-unorthodox-answer-of-Hungary-to-global-financial-crisis.pdf.

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As for the role of the nationalization of the pensions in terms of the debt reduction andrás Giró-Szász,15 government spokesman, explains the point that “the private pension scheme blew a 400 billion forint hole in the state budget each year.” Therefore it is argued that the nationalization policy was followed for the sake of expenditure reduction. As to “plugging the revenue gap with a windfall tax on banks”16, which was initiated for the sake of revenue increase, Giró-Szász17 argues that the transaction tax has spread to France and Slovakia after Hungary. Nevertheless, these unorthodox policies attracted much criticism and “Fitch became the third ratings agency to downgrade Hungary’s debt to junk”18 after Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. Under these circumstances, the Hungarian government added new and hard measures in the constitution to challenge the two archenemies, namely government deficit and debt. As already mentioned, the constitution’s anticrisis feature is quite clear. By using Szente’s titles,19 it is possible to explain the situation with the following amendments and consequences: i. Debt ceiling rules; ii. Restricting judicial control over public finance; iii. The restriction of budgetary power of the Parliament; iv. Curbing the freedom of action of the next governments. Debt Ceiling: It is a fact that anti-debt policy priority is reflected in the constitution with strict regulations. Although Maastricht criterion is 60%, according to the constitution (or the Fundamental Law of Hungary) the objective of the debt is set to 50% of the GDP.20 If there is a reverse situation (as always was) the constitution rules that budget act must envisage a debt reduction.21 Restriction of Judicial Control over Public Finance: What is also important to note is that the constitution introduced a controversial limitation22 to the

15 Giró-Szász András: Government Spokesman: Unorthodox Hungarian Economic Policy is Spreading in Europe. In: Website of the Hungarian Government. http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/government-spokesman-unorthodox-hungarian-economic-policy-is-spreading-in-europe. 16 The Economist: Hungary's Economy: Hat in Hand Again. 21 November 2011. 17 Giró-Szász: op.cit. 18 Oprita, Antonia: Fitch Cuts Hungary to 'Junk' on 'Unorthodox' Policies. In: CNBC, 6 January 2012. http://www.cnbc.com/id/45898685/Fitch_Cuts_Hungary_to_Junk_on_Unorthodox_Policies. 19 Szente, Zoltán: The Constitutional Effects of the World Economic and Financial Crisis – a Case Study of Hungary. Summer Seminar: Effects of the Economic Depression to Law and State in Central Europe, Széchenyi István University, Doctoral School of Law and Political Sciences, Győr, Hungary, 17 July 2012. http://doktiskjog.sze.hu//downloadmanager/details/id/4395/m/3620. 20 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 36(4): “Parliament may not adopt a State Budget Act which allows state debt to exceed half of the Gross Domestic Product.” 21 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 36(5): “As long as state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, Parliament may only adopt a State Budget Act which contains state debt reduction in proportion to the Gross Domestic Product.” 22 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 37(4): “As long as state debt exceeds half of the Gross Domestic Product, the Constitutional Court may, within its competence set out in Article 24(2)b-e),

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power23 of the Constitutional Court, which was criticized24 by Venice Commission25 as follows: In its March Opinion, the Venice Commission has already expressed its regrets with regard to this serious limitation of the competences of the Constitutional Court introduced in November 2010 by constitutional amendment. In its view, such a limitation creates the impression that capping the national budget at 50 per cent of the GDP may be considered to be such an important aim that it may even be reached by unconstitutional laws. Restriction of Budgetary Power of the Parliament: Budget council (a.k.a. fiscal council or monetary council) is another important regulation in the new constitution, which limits the power of the Parliament. The fiscal council was firstly introduced by the “Act LXXV – Cost efficient State Management and Fiscal Responsibility” in 2008 and became functional in 2009. However, the functions of the council were highly limited and “the council did not receive any decision-making powers.”26 The old system was changed in 2011 with the “Act CXCIV of 2011 on the Economic Stability of Hungary”27 and “a right to return the draft budget” for only once was granted.28 However, with the new constitution, a veto right was granted to the council29 and became a very powerful constitutional institution.

only review the Acts on the State Budget and its implementation, the central tax type, duties, pension and healthcare contributions, customs and the central conditions for local taxes for conformity with the Fundamental Law or annul the preceding Acts due to violation of the right to life and human dignity, the right to the protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and with the rights related to Hungarian citizenship. The Constitutional Court shall have the unrestricted right to annul the related Acts for non-compliance with the Fundamental Law’s procedural requirements for the drafting and publication of such legislation.” 23 According to Gniazdowski and Sadecki (2011) “Fidesz reduced the court’s powers already in 2010. When the court deemed a law retroactively imposing an additional 98% tax on the highest severance pays in the public sector to be unconstitutional, Fidesz amended the constitution to reduce the court’s competences in budget and tax related issues and adopted the law in an unchanged form.” As for the changes related to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, see Smuk: Constitutional…5-6. 24 However, State Secretary for Government Communication argues that “with the introduction of the national debt ‘cap’ we are not weakening control, but strengthening it.” 25 Venice Commission: Opinion on the new Constitution of Hungary adopted by the Venice Commission at its 87th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 June 2011), CDL-AD(2011)016, 25. 26 Domokos, László: Credibility and Flexibility: Changes in the Framework of Hungarian Public Finances. Public Finance Quarterly. 2011/3, 294. 27 What is interesting to note is that Fidesz was critical of the fiscal council’s previous version. See Fehér, Margit: Hungary to Disband Fiscal Council. Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2010. http:// blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2010/11/22/hungary-to-disband-fiscal-council/. 28 Domokos: op.cit. 294. 29 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 44(3): “The adoption of the State Budget Act shall be subject to the prior consent of the Budget Council in order to meet the requirements set out in Article 36(4)-(5).”

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Curbing the freedom of action of the next governments: Independence of the Central Bank (whose president is elected for 6 years by the President of Hungary) and the State Audit Office (whose president is elected for 12 years by a 2/3 vote of the members of Parliament) becomes crucial since the presidents of these institutions will form the council with the president of the council to be appointed for six years by the President of Hungary.30 This means that the future governments will have to work with the bureaucrats appointed under the influence of the current Prime Minister Orbán. Fiscal council, once a “toothless lion,” despite its smallest organizational structure in the world, today becomes the strongest.31 That is why the Hungarian government is criticized by Fukuyama as follows: “[a]ffected institutions include the National Bank of Hungary, controlled now by a Monetary Council largely in turn loyal to Fidesz – what’s gotten the IMF upset.”32 3. Employment policies against the crisis in Hungary In the National Reform Program of Hungary33 there are five annual growth priorities and five national targets in the context of Europe 2020 strategy. Annual growth survey priorities are as follows: i. Growth-friendly fiscal consolidation; ii. Restoring normal lending to the economy; iii. Strengthening Growth and Competitiveness; iv. Tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis; v. Modernizing public administration; As for Europe 2020 Strategy and national targets: i. Increase of employment rate to 75% for the 20 to 64 year old population; ii. Increasing the level of expenditure on research and development to 1.8% of the gross domestic product; iii. Increasing the proportion of renewable energy resources to 14.65%, a total energy saving of 10% and a maximum increase of 10 % in the emis-

30 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 44(4): “The members of the Budget Council shall include the President of the Budget Council, the Governor of the National Bank of Hungary and the President of the State Audit Office. The President of the Budget Council shall be appointed for six years by the President of the Republic.” 31 See Domokos: op.cit. 299. 32 Fukuyama, Francis: What’s Wrong with Hungary? The American Interest, 6 February 2012. http:// blogs.the-american-interest.com/fukuyama/2012/02/06/whats-wrong-with-hungary/. 33 Government of Hungary: Annex 2: National Reform Programme of Hungary 2012-2015. A következő lépés, Széll Kálmán Terv 2.0, Budapest, 2012.

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sion of greenhouse gases outside the EU’s emission trading system (compared to the level in 2005); iv. Increasing the share of those having completed tertiary level education or equivalent to 30.3% within the population aged 30-34 and reducing the share of early school-leavers (those without education or training in lower secondary education) to 10 per cent within the population aged 18-24; v. The poverty rate of families with children, the number of people living in severe material deprivation and the number of people living in low work intensity households by 20% each (reducing the above numbers by 450 thousand people by excluding overlapping figures). As can be seen from the objectives of the government, (un)employment policies are among the top priorities. According to Pogátsa34 “the central weakness of the Hungarian economy” is low employment. Indeed, according to 2011 Eurostat data,35 Hungary has the lowest employment rate for persons aged 20 to 64 rate (60.7%) after Greece (59.9%).36 In this section, some of the policies supported by the government will be evaluated including pensions, early retirement, disadvantaged people and flexibility. 3.1. Pensions and early retirement Regarding the pension system,37 the government implemented a very controversial policy by nationalization of private pensions38 as mentioned above as part of unorthodox policy. This policy has been especially criticized in that it is against the “property rights.”39 Another dimension of pensions is related to the removal of early retirement schemes, which is recommended by the European Commission,40 as well. The early retirement scheme has been reviewed and a new law was introduced on 28 November 2011 and came into effect on the 1st of January 2012.41

34 See Pogátsa: op.cit. 610. 35 See on this issue further on the official site of the Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tsdec420 &language=en 36 Although the employment rate is still very low, as of May-July 2012, Hungary reached the precrisis level of 62.6%. See: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/gyor/fog/efog21207.pdf 37 “Public expenditures on pensions are projected to increase from 11.9% to 12.6% of GDP between 2010 and 2060” (Government of Hungary, 2012. 44). 38 “Argentina is the only other country to nationalize private-pension assets in this way” (OECD, 2012. 79). 39 See Szente: op.cit. 40 European Commission: Annual Growth Survey 2012. 23 November 2011. Brussels, 4, 11. 41 MTI: MPs vote to scrap early retirement pensions. Politics.hu, 29 November 2011. http://www. politics.hu/20111129/mps-vote-to-scrap-early-retirement-pensions/.

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Former police officers, other law enforcement and disaster management staff under 57 who used to be eligible for early pension will pay personal income tax on their pension if they decide not to return to work. This pension, however, cannot be lower than 150% of the minimal wage. The objective was “to redirect as many people receiving pension below the retirement age into the labor market as possible.”42 Until 2012 the statutory retirement age was 62 for both men and women. It will gradually increase to 65 in the future. For men, only if they complete the statutory retirement age, can they qualify as pensioners. However as for women, it is possible to qualify as pensioners after 40 years of service.43 So the government did not review the regulation regarding the women concerning early retirement.44 Another change is related to the budget to be paid for pensions. Instead of the social security fund, the central budget45 will be used to finance the early pensions. However, “support paid to family members (widow’s pension, orphan’s benefits, parent’s benefits) will continue to be financed from the Pension Insurance Fund.”46 3.2. Disadvantaged people and flexibility in labor market According to the Hungarian government’s job protection plan as indicated in Table 4, there are five prioritized groups who are considered the most disadvantaged segments of society in terms of employment. Table 4: Prioritized groups in the job protection action plan Prioritized groups Action 1.Unskilled job seeker & employee * Social contributions will be cut 50% 2.Below the age of 25 job * Vocational training contributions seeker & employee 3.Above the age of 55 job seeker & employee

42 Government of Hungary: Convergence…62. 43 Government of Hungary: Annex 2…24-25. 44 See Ibid. 65. 45 “Pursuant to the Act on the Central Budget of Hungary, the budget of the Pension Insurance Fund is already a “pure” budget for pensions only and the benefits that are not considered pensions anymore have been moved to two other Funds: the National Family and Social Policy Fund and the Health Insurance Fund.” Government of Hungary: Annex 1: Convergence Programme of Hungary 2012-2015. A következő lépés, Széll Kálmán Terv 2.0, Budapest, 2012. 56. 46 Government of Hungary: National…65.

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4.The long-term unemployed

5.Mothers with small children

* Employer liabilities by 100% for the initial two years of employment * Third year on payable contributions will be half as much as they are today * If they return to work from child care/maternity leave, no contribution payment will be required either in the initial two years and only half of the current liabilities from the third year

Source: http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/8c/90000/Job%20protection%20 action%20plan.pdf

Main incentive for the disadvantaged people is the tax relief for the employers if they employ one of those categories. There are multiple programs in Hungary, which are called START. START is a program aiming at young people below the age of 25 (in the case of university, threshold is 30). Up until 31 December 2011, there used to be START Plusz and START Extra program for those who took parental leave and those over the age of 50. As from 1 January 2012, START Bónusz program and cards were initiated for those “job seekers registered permanently for no less than 3 months and after receiving child care allowance/parental leave/child raising allowance/care allowance.”47 Benefits also exist for people with disability and low-skilled labor. Looking at the figures in Table 5, unskilled (those who took fewer than 8 grades of primary school or finished primary school) persons are mostly unemployed. 49.8% of those completed less than 8 grades of primary school are jobless, as for those who finished primary school, 23.8% of them are unemployed. Government would like to promote vocational training to make those unskilled persons skilled. However, it should also be underlined that due to huge numbers of vocational school graduates, they constitute the most unemployed percentage. Nevertheless, despite their huge numbers, 12.2% of their graduates are unemployed, which is closer to the average number of unemployed.

47 Government of Hungary: Annex 2…117.

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Table 5: Unemployed persons by highest educational qualification in Hungary, 2011 Unemployed Unemployed (U*100)/(U+E)* Educational level (Thousands) (%) (%) Less than 8 grads of 10 2,1 49,8 primary school Primary (general) 127,8 27,3 23,8 school Vocational and ap154,9 33,1 12,2 prentice school Grammar School 40,7 8,7 10,5 Other secondary 89,1 19,0 8,6 School College 31,3 6,7 5,1 University

14,1

3,0

3,4

Total

467,9

100,0

10,9

Source: KSH http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_long/ mpal9807_03_05a.html?943 *Derived by the author from KSH data. U=Unemployed (thousands), E=Employed (thousands)

According to the KSH’s latest figures of May-July 2012,48 the unemployment rate of persons aged 15-24 increased by 3.1% to 28.1%. It seems that despite the relative decrease in the unemployment rate, youth employment is continuing to increase. As for the unemployment rate of those aged 55-64, it decreased by 1.3% to 7.3%.49 New regulations concerning early retirement may have had an effective on the decrease of the unemployment rate of the 55-64 age group. As for long-term unemployment, 46.8% of unemployed people had been searching for a job for one year or more. It was 49.6% in 2011.50 As a consequence of the conservative ideology of the ruling government, family and women with children become highly important issues to be tack-

48 See www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/gyor/mun/emun21207.pdf 49 “The number of employed young people aged 15-24 years – which is low anyway – lessened to 211 thousand and their employment rate decreased by 0.4 percentage point to 18.2% compared to the same period of the previous year. On the other hand, the number and rate of employed people in the ‘best working age’, i.e. the age group 25-54 years, as well as in the older, 55-64 age group increased. The employment rate in these age groups showed an improvement of 1.9 and 1.5 percentage points and grew to 75.2% and 37.6%, respectively.” See. www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/gyor/fog/efog21207.pdf 50 See www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/gyor/fog/efog21207.pdf

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led. On the one hand the government is trying to increase the population; on the other hand, it is trying to attract women with children to work. It is a fact that Hungary is one of the EU countries having the lowest employment rate of women except for Malta, Greece and Italy according to the 2011 Eurostat data.51 In May-July 2012, the number of women aged 20 to 64 in employment increased by 1.9% to 57% compared to the same term in 2011. As of 1 January 2011, the modified family support system increased the age of the child from two to three for childcare allowances. Furthermore, tax allowances52 for families are applied for parents raising children to reduce their tax base.53 Government also promises to take measures in order to reduce labor costs of those returning from parental leave.54 One of the policies to increase the number of those returning from parental leave to the labor market is the promotion of part-time employment.55 The promotion works as follows. If an employer fills one full-time position with two part-time employees and if one of this part-time positions is allocated to an employee returning from parental or childcare leave, then the employer will receive tax relief, that is, allowance from the social contribution tax.56 Similar promotion exists for the youngsters. “Employers may also be eligible for a social contribution tax benefit in the event of the part-time employment of young workers.” According to the Act I of 2012 on the Labor Code, which was entered into force on 1 July 2012 and adopted by Parliament on 13 December 2011, parttime workers can be “employed under employment contract in jobs for up to six hours a day,” (193/1) that is 30 hours a week. It should be underlined that 30 hours a week is the maximum working time for a part-time worker. According to the article 99(1), working time may even be less than four hours a day for part-time workers. The duration is very important because, the employee will acquire a right to terminate a contract without an obligation to provide information to the employee: “[t]he employer’s obligation to provide information shall not apply if the working time does not exceed eight hours per week.” (46/5b) Also the working time arrangement becomes very flexible since an employer can change the working time if the employer “informs the employee of the time of working at least three days in advance” (193/2).

51 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdec42 0&plugin=1 52 Government of Hungary: National…60. 53 Government of Hungary: Convergence…49-51. 54 Government of Hungary: National…, p.27. 55 Ibid. 26 and 53. 56 Ibid. 118.

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Furthermore, it is possible to work on Saturdays or Sundays according to the article 101(1f) for part-time workers.57 Nevertheless, although the government is promoting part-time employment as a solution for unemployment, the rate is still the lowest among European countries with 6.4% as is seen in Table 6.

Hungary

Table 6: Part-time employment rate (2000–2011) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 3.4

3,3

3,4

4,1

4,3

3,9

3,8

3,9

4,3

5,2

5,5

6,4

Source: http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_int014.html

Conclusion Hungary’s anti-crisis policies fit to neo-liberal priorities up to a certain point. However, unorthodox policies diverge from neo-liberalism. That is why in this article the way followed by Hungary is defined as the “goulash” way. It is not the Blairite “third way” since it has nothing to do with the aim of social democracy, but rather “Hungarian” way of neo-right policies. The Hungarian government is aiming at decreasing public expenditures, however, in terms of the inflation vs. unemployment clash as depicted by Phillips curve; Orbán has chosen the unemployment as a primary concern after 2011. The government introduced a budget council having a veto power for the sake of budgetary discipline, but levied a transaction tax on the monetary transmissions and even considered the extension of the tax on the central bank taking a risk to clash with the IMF. While making early retirement difficult and increasing the retirement age, the Hungarian government nationalized pensions. The government on the one hand promotes the flexibility of labor market; on the other hand it prioritizes the employment of the disadvantage people. It remains to be seen if Hungary will be successful or not vis-à-vis economic crisis, since the biggest problems are still there despite incremental amelioration: Low employment and high indebtedness. But what is clear now is that Hungary is following a unique “goulash” way.

57 Ibid. 30.

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LAZAREVA, Marina CSc.,

Candidate of Legal Sciences, Moscow State Law Academy

Development of Democracy in Russia and the World Economic Crisis

I. The global economic crisis was exactly at the same time then the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, who held this office from May 2008 to May 2012. However, the basis of his presidency (including economic, political and legal conditions) of course was formed during the terms of the previous presidents. In this article I will focus on supreme bodies of state power and elections in Russia, as these are essential parts of the political regime. The current Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted at the referendum in 1993 was drafted in very hard economic and political conditions, when there was a real danger that the country could disintegrate, there was a high level of crime, national economy was on the verge of collapse and standard of living fell to a very low level. The Constitution of 1993 was based on the draft developed under the guidance of the then Russian President, Boris Eltsin. In the science of constitutional law the following pattern can be found: the one who develops the constitution, gets and ensures the dominant position for himself under this constitution (that is why it is better that the constitution is drafted and adopted by a specially established representative body – a constitutional convention). A pro-president constitution is not a unique phenomenon in Russia, we can draw on the example of the existing French Constitution of 1958 which was drafted for and under the actual guidance of Charles de Gaulle; this constitution has, for a long time, carried a noticeable anti-parliament character, but gradually, together with the development and democratic evolution of the political system, the anti-parliament character of the French constitution has been softened (numerous amendments to this effect were introduced during the term of Nicolas Sarkozy, at the very beginning of the global economic crisis in July 2008). However, in Russia, unlike in France, during further implementation of the Constitution, powers of the President were more and more increased due to the use of presumption of “implied powers” (powers which are not written in the Constitution directly but are implied by

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their meaning). Basically, the concept of “implied powers” is known to other countries, for example, to the USA, but there it is limited by the system of “checks and balances.”1 So, what kind of system exists in Russia? Firstly, the President of Russia is elected by the population with direct elections and due to this, the president already enjoys a considerable political power. Secondly, though the government is formed jointly by the president and the Parliament, the president dominates this process. Thirdly, the same goes for the dissolution of the government: though the government bears political responsibility before the president and the Parliament, the main role here is played by the president. Last but not least, under the Constitution the president has the right to dissolve State Duma (lower chamber of the Parliament). However, this right of the president is rather limited. So, Russia is a mixed republic with a dominating president. Most Eastern Europe countries are parliamentary republics or mixed republics with dominating parliaments. A certain role was played by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. In general, the Constitutional Court has a huge authority in the Russian Federation, the court employs highly qualified specialists, doctors of sciences, professors of law. However, a number of the court’s judgments directly or indirectly increased the power of the president. With an example: in any country a procedure for forming the government has a great significance. Under Article 111 of the Constitution the President of Russia appoints the Prime Minister “with the consent of the State Duma.” If the State Duma declines the candidates offered by the president three times, the president appoints the Prime Minister himself, dissolves the State Duma and declares new elections. In 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled that the president has the right to offer the one and the same candidate two or three times, or to offer a new candidate each time.2 Thus, right from the start, the president can decide upon one candidate of the Prime Minister, can offer only this candidate three times and the State Duma, under threat of dissolution, evidently, finally has to approve the candidate chosen by the president. As we can see in this process the dominance of the president has been enhanced.

1 See Конституционное (государственное) право зарубежных стран [Constitutional (State) Law of Foreign Countries]. (ed. Strashun). Moscow, 2008. 92. 2 Compare Постановление Конституционного Суда РФ от 11.12.1998 N 28-П «О толковании части 4 статьи 111 Конституции РФ» [Decision of Constitutional Court of Russian Federation on 11 December 1998, on interpretation of the part 4 article 111 of the Constitution of Russian Federation].

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Some people call Russia a presidential or even a super-presidential republic. But this is not quite correct. The USA is a model of a presidential republic. For example, the USA does not have a Prime Minister. The president is the head of the government (administration). The government bears no responsibility before the Congress. Unlike the USA, the Russian Parliament participates in issues related to the government, though to a limited extent. The president of the USA has no right to dissolve the Congress. Let me explain these statements and draw on some examples from the practice of the last years. President In the modern history Russia has had three presidents. Boris Eltsin was the first Russian President since presidency was introduced after the Soviet regime (the first president of the USSR was Mikhail Gorbachev), Eltsin was president for one and a half term (from 1991 to 1999). Vladimir Putin was the second Russian President, he held this position for two successive terms, from 2000 to 2008 and now he became the president for the third time – since May 2012. In domestic affairs Putin followed a policy to centralize and strengthen state power. He changed the procedure of the formation of Federation Council (upper chamber of the Russian Parliament representing territories of the Federation), abolished direct elections of Governors of the territories of the Federation and State Duma was exclusively formed by party lists. Active measures were taken against terrorism, including Chechnya. In the area of economics the most well known events were court proceedings over Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the owner of the oil company, named UKOS. The direct result of the proceedings was that all oil companies specified their taxes and started to pay more money into the budget. During Putin’s term a deputy of his Administration set forward a concept of a sovereign democracy, which means that policy of the president must, first of all, be supported by majority of the population in Russia, such majority support is main principle of a democratic society. A sovereign-democratic regime develops democracy and at the same time defends personal and state independence as much as possible in the modern world. Dmitry Medvedev was the third Russian president; he held this position from May 2008 to May 2012. To describe the political regime of Medvedev, they often use the phrase – imitation of democracy – it is a form of political system where there is formal democratic legislation and formal elections, but civil society does not take part in ruling the state and feedback from society is minimal. Imitation of democracy as a rule has a political system with one dominant party. During his term there were important amendments to the

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Constitution of Russia, which rose the term of the president to 6 years and the State Duma to 5 years and he also introduced the responsibility of the Government to submit annual reports to the State Duma about results of its activity (formal increase of the Parliament’s controlling functions). Medvedev actively and demonstratively fought against corruption in state bodies. During his term a reform of militia was performed, the main change was made to its name (a clear sign of the imitation of democracy): militia is now called police; there were checks of militia, but these checks were mainly formal and ineffective. Of course, results of the presidential and parliamentary elections, electoral and party legislation and existing party system are also significant. Presidential elections The president of Russia is elected according to a rather standard way, as in France, Poland and many other countries – through direct elections by the population, under the system of absolute majority; in other words, to win the candidate must get over half of the votes of the turned-up voters (if over half of the registered voters turn up at the elections). If none of the candidate gets such a majority, there is a second round for the two strongest candidates and the winner is the candidate who gets more votes than his competitor; in other words, relevant majority decides. As you know, since direct presidential elections were introduced in France, all the presidents have been chosen in the second round. If we look at the statistics of the presidential elections in Russia, we can see that the main struggle has always been between two direct opposite candidates – communists and anti-communists. To put it more correctly, there has always been a battle between the candidate of the “party of power” and the communist candidate (this is also a feature of the post-socialist character of this historic period). The democratic period of modern Russia is not long; there have not been such a great number of elections (only six). 1. In 1991 out of six candidates Boris Eltsin (a non-party candidate, supported by “the Democratic Russia”) received 57.30% of the votes. His main competitor, Nikolay Ryzhkov (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) received 16.85% of the votes. This was the first nationwide presidential election in the history of Russia. In 1990, Gorbachev, president of the USSR was not chosen nationwide; he was elected by the convention of the USSR Deputies. 2. In 1996, out of eleven candidates the main competitor of Boris Eltsin (who was not a member of any party at that time) was Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of Russia. This was the only presidential election so far when the second round was required. The struggle was very strong; the main issue was which way Russia would decide – demo-

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cratic or communist. In the first round the gap between the candidates was small: Eltsin got 35.28% of votes, Zyuganov – 32.03%. In the second round 53.82% of votes were cast for Eltsin, while 40.31% of votes were cast for Zyuganov. It is interesting that now some media say that at that time the actual winner in the second round was Zyuganov, but Eltsin gave him money “to back off”. Other authors say that manipulations in favor of Eltsin really took place, but this only affected the gap between the candidates, not the general outcome of the elections. 3. The only pre-scheduled presidential election was in 2000. Eltsin resigned at the very end of 1999, not just due to a very low level of support within the population (the GDP in 1990-98 decreased by 40%, 44% of the population found themselves below the poverty level), but due to poor health (a little-known fact is that between the 1st and the 2nd round of the 1996 elections Eltsin was sent to hospital with a heart attack, but he managed to hide this from the voters). Out of eleven candidates Vladimir Putin had the biggest chance to win the 2000 elections; in 1999 he was appointed as Government Chairman and as acting president. The main intrigue was whether Putin would win in the first round or a second round would be required. As a result, Putin (from the Party “Unity”) received 52.99% of the votes, Zyuganov (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) – received 29.24%. 4. In 2004, out of six candidates no one presented a real danger to the then President Vladimir Putin. The main competitor of Putin, the Communist party of Gennady Zyuganov was represented by a newcomer, Nikolay Kharitonov. As a result, Vladimir Putin (a self-nominated candidate) got 71.31% of the votes, while Nikolay Kharitonov (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) – got 13.69%. 5. In 2008, Putin, despite of a strong temptation and persuasion, decided not to violate the Constitution and run for the third term. Out of four candidates the main challengers were: Dmitry Medvedev, officially offered by the Party “United Russia” and supported by President Putin and other three parties, the First Deputy of the Government Chairman, Gennady Zyuganov from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The result was that Medvedev (“United Russia”) got 70.28%, Zyuganov – 17.72%. 6. In 2012, the then President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev under the Constitution had the right to run for the second term. He repeatedly declared about his possible participation in the elections. However, in September 2011 the convention of the “United Russia” Party offered the then Prime Minister and the former President, Vladimir Putin as presidential candidate for 2012. Medvedev supported him. Putin in return for this offered the position of Prime Minister to Medvedev, if he wins the elections. Out of five candidates Putin got 63.6% of the votes, Zyuganov got 17.18%.

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Parliament Under its current Constitution Russia has a two-chamber Parliament (Federal Assembly, which consists of the State Duma and the Federation Council). Speaking of the formation of the Russian Parliament, it is necessary to mention the feature specific to all post-socialistic countries, this is being the instability of electoral and party legislation. This is the area of active competition of political parties and state bodies which, through changes of electoral and party rules, try to influence the structure of supreme state bodies and number of parties in the country. So, very often this is a way to fight political opposition. Formation of the State Duma To this date there have been six compositions of the State Duma. Unlike some Eastern Europe countries, the Russian Parliament has never been prescheduled or dissolved since 1993, in other words, it has always worked its full term in office, which is a very good sign (though, let us not forget that before the Constitution was adopted in 1993, there was an armed conflict between the president and the Parliament in October 1993, which resulted in the dissolution of the then Parliament, called the Supreme Soviet). The first State Duma was elected for two years (1993 – the first calling). Successive State Dumas were elected for four years (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 – 2-5th callings, respectively). The current Duma was elected at the end of 2011 for the period of five years (the 6th calling). If we study the State Duma’s election results, we can see patterns valid to the present day. At each election, the leading positions were taken by three parties: 1. “The party of power”, namely, the party set up by high officials to occupy pro-presidential and pro-government positions. It is interesting to see that the party of power, unlike its competitors, was not formed straight away and could not get majority in the chamber. Firstly, it was an electoral bloc “Choice of Russia” (most famous leaders are Egor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais), then – a political organization “Our home is Russia” (its leader was Viktor Chernomyrdin), later – electoral blocs “Unity” (its leader was Sergey Shoigu) and “Homeland – All Russia” (its leaders were Yury Luzhkov and Evgeny Primakov). Almost all the above mentioned people were either Prime Ministers or Ministers at their time. In 2001, political organizations “Unity”, “Homeland” and “All Russia” united into the party called “Edinaya Rossiya” (United Russia). Since the elections of 2003, this party achieved majority in the State Duma, moreover, twice it did not only get majority, but constitutional majority, which enabled it to apply amendments to the Constitution as it wished. Notably, the party regards itself

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as a right-of-center, conservative party. The basis of the party ideology is “conservative modernization” (a rather conflicting notion). Now, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev is the chairman of the party (before him, Vladimir Putin was the party chairman). 2. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation is the largest (extreme) left-wing political party of modern Russia. In fact, it is direct successor of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. But legally it does not have any relations to the Communist party of the Soviet Union, because since 1991, activity of the Communist party of the Soviet Union on the territory of Russia has been forbidden. In their documents the party declares that it is guided by teachings of Marx-Lenin and stands for building a “renewed socialism” in Russia. It is mainly supported by elderly people who look back to the Soviet Union and their youth with nostalgia. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation was founded at the beginning of 1993 and it immediately started its fight for positions of president, State Duma Deputies and members of the government. In 1993, due to strong anticommunist moods it lost its leadership to the right-wing parties. However, already in 1995 when voters were disappointed with President Eltsin’s policy, the party won the first place by the number of deputy seats in the State Duma (157). Now, it often takes the second place at parliamentary elections and asserts itself as a party opposed to the existing power. Its constant leader is Gennady Zyuganov. 3. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is a right-wing political party. It was set up at the end of 1992. It is direct successor of the Liberal Democratic party of the Soviet Union. Despite its name, many political scientists believe that it does not use liberal democratic ideas. In reality, it is an extreme right-wing populist party, “a party of one man”, its constant leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who is famous for his emotional behavior and speeches. That is why this party is mostly favored by young people. Since its formation, it asserts itself as an opposition party, but this position is doubted by some political scientists. Despite of emotional behavior of its leader, the Liberal Democratic Party managed to achieve 3-4th places at each election and in 1993 it gained as many votes as “the party of power”. As you know, in any country, especially at the time of economic crisis there are people with nationalistic feelings. 4. I would like to tell you about one more party, which has recently appeared – the party called “A Just Russia”. This is a left-of the center party with ideology of social democracy and modernized socialism. It was set up in 2006, as usually, with participation of the Kremlin. It was intended to be the second large party, together with the United Russia, within the two-party system desirable for the Kremlin. It was supposed that it would attract and channel the left-wing opposition voters who do not support any kind of administration into positive direction. At first, “A Just Rus-

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sia” worked together with the ruling party, “United Russia” and supported the policy of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, but in 2011 the party started to assert itself as opposition to the existing power. After that its leader, Sergey Mironov who, as a chairman was removed from his office of the Parliament’s upper chamber, which he had held since 2001. At last at two elections “A Just Russia” took 4th and 3rd places in the State Duma. As it is emphasized before, the structure of the parliament is influenced by electoral and party laws. The largest number of parties took part in the elections to the State Duma in 1995 (at the time of political and social crisis) – 43 parties. It is very important that the smallest number of parties participating in the elections was during the last elections in 2011 – only seven (and only four parties could pass to the Parliament). This is connected to the high requirements of member numbers in political parties as well as to the current electoral laws. I am referring to the Federal law “On political parties” adopted in 2001. Since that time it has been changed over fifty times. We can distinguish three stages in the development of legislation in this area. 1. At first, in 2005-2007 strict rules for minimal number of party members and party regional branches were introduced, as a result, out of many parties there were only seven left. These are “United Russia”, “A Just Russia”, Communist Party of the Russian Federation, LibDem Party of Russia, Yabloko (Apple), “A Just Cause” and “Patriots of Russia 2. Then in 2007, the State Duma, regional and municipal parliaments were elected by party lists, in other words, exclusively by proportional system. This improved and strengthened the position of the existing seven parties. 3. Since 2004, the third stage started, when President Dmitry Medvedev in the last months of being in office offered to carry out a political reform to make party legislation more liberal. Before, the minimal number of the parties was 40 000, now it can be only 500 people (so, it is 80 times smaller). This part of the reform had the most heated discussions. The point is that current electoral laws forbid political parties to set up electoral blocs at elections. This can lead to the situation when there are many new parties (now there are about 85 of them), however, they can participate only one by one at elections, which will divide the political opposition. There is a phrase from a famous political scientist, called Alexis de Tocqueville about media, “the only way to decrease influence of newspapers is to increase their number”. Besides, the procedure for party registration at the department of justice was simplified and now such parties exist as “Against all”, “Club of Russian people friends”, “Subtropical Russia”, “Party of social nets” and even a political party “Without a name”, “Kind people of Russia”, “Party of love”, “Russian party of ten commandments”.

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Let us not forget about the electoral barrier (threshold to enter Parliament). According to the law of 2007, the barrier was 7% for a party to pass to the State Duma. If we study foreign experience, this is a rather high figure for parties (not coalitions). At the next parliamentary elections in 2016 it will be lowered to 5%, which is still high. Opposition considers this reform as “an attempt to keep monopoly of power”, as “political fraud intended to eliminate the opposition”. Government The third supreme body of the state power in any country is the government. This is a key body for understanding the form of state rule. In Russia, the president plays a dominant role in the formation and taking responsibility of the government; thereby, we can see changes of government depending on the personality of the president. First term of Boris Eltsin (1991 – 1996) During his term heads of the government were: Boris Eltsin, in other words he, himself – from November 1991 until June 1992 (eight months). He ran the government as president of the Russian Federation, because under the last revision of the soviet Constitution of 1978 the president was at the same time the head of the Government, like it is now in the USA. Egor Gaidar – from June 1992 until December 1992. He held the position of the Prime Minister for six months only, but he took important measures to reform the Russian planned economy into a market one, though, with huge social losses (this policy was called “shock therapy”), that is why people still have different feelings for him. Viktor Chernomyrdin – from December 1992 until March 1998 (five and a half years). His name was closely connected to the name of President Boris Eltsin. Thus, over five years, three heads of the government replaced each other. The average term in office was fifteen months. The second term of Boris Eltsin (1996 – 1999, that is he was president for three and a half years, then resigned from his office before the schedule). Viktor Chernomyrdin continued to carry out functions of the government chairman until March 1998 (about one year and eight months). Sergey Kirienko – from March 1998 until August 1998. Like Gaidar, he was Prime Minister only for six months, but he left a bad fame, because during his term Russia had a significant economic crisis which led to a considerable devaluation of people’s monetary stock. After the economic crisis of 1998 there was a succession of dissolved governments.

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After Kirienko, Chernomyrdin came again, though, for less than a month. He was followed by Evgeny Primakov – from September 1998 until May 1999 (nine months), by Sergey Stepashin – from May 1999 until August 1999 (four months) and by Vladimir Putin – from August 1999 until May 2000. But when Eltsin resigned before schedule in December 1999, according to the constitution, Putin as being the Prime Minister, temporarily became the president and his functions were actually performed by his first deputy Mikhail Kasyanov. In other words, Putin was the Government head for 5 months during the term of Eltsin. Thus, over three and a half years six heads of the Government replaced each other, this shows political crisis of power. Average term of the Prime Ministers in office was seven and a half months. Vladimir Putin (President for four years – first term was between 2000 – 2004). Prime Ministers: Mikhail Kasyanov – from May 2000 until February 2004 (almost four full years, three years and ten months). Viktor Khristenko – from February 2004 until March 2004 (two weeks). Vladimir Putin (second presidential term of four years, 2004 – 2008). Mikhail Fradkov – from March 2004 until September 2007 (again, almost a complete term in office, three years and seven months). Viktor Zubkov – from September 2007 until May 2008 (nine, in total). Dmitry Medvedev (2008 – 2012). Right at the time of the global economic crisis. Vladimir Putin – from May 2008 until May 2012 (four full years in office). So, all previous terms, especially the two last presidential terms of Putin created a good basis for the existing power and helped to survive a serious economic crisis. Another question is why the situation became stable during the time of Vladimir Putin. The point is that before he came to power, Eltsin had carried out important reforms. Vladimir Putin (2012 – 2018, this term lasts for six years). Dmitry Medvedev – from May 2012 up to this date. Summary History of relations between the president and the Parliament shows that during Eltsin’s time they were often in conflict (I have already mentioned the pre-scheduled dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in October of 1993 – it was armed).

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In 1995 (that is at the end of the first term of Eltsin), it was the only time in history when State Duma used its constitutional right to pass a no-confidence motion against the government, but this led nowhere because it did not vote again on this issue in three months as it was required by the Russian constitution. Later, in 1998 (already during the second term of Eltsin) the State Duma under the threat to be dissolved refused to give its consent to the president to appoint the Prime Minister two times, besides, in the first case, the threat of dissolution made the Duma to approve the candidate offered by the president (Sergey Kirienko), while in the second case, the Duma was ready to be dissolved, but at the end a compromise candidate for the position of the government chairman was approved (Evgeny Primakov). Finally, in 1998, the State Duma made an attempt to impeach the president. 177 State Duma deputies put their signatures to initiate this procedure, a special deputy commission was set up, but in 1999 none of the four charges against the president collected a qualified majority in the State Duma as the Constitution required (however, the simple majority of the deputies voted for each charge). However, when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000 and especially since his second term in office, in 2004 the situation changed to opposite. All employment issues which required consent of the Parliament were and are settled as the president desires. Of course, it was helped by the fact that since 2003 the pro-presidential party “United Russia” has the majority in the parliament, due to certain party and electoral laws. The form of rule fixed in the Russian constitution assisted to it. But let us not forget about the support and popularity that Putin enjoys among ordinary people. Of course, apart from state bodies, a political regime includes other elements: rights and freedoms of citizens (this is a topic of its own). The global economic crisis gave rise to a wave of active protests among citizens. There was dissatisfaction, protest votes and meetings took place against Putin and for democratization of political life in the autumn of 2011 and spring 2012, during the elections of the State Duma on 4th December and presidential elections on 4th March. Moreover, political activity of citizens was helped by globalization, development of IT and social nets. People are used to getting information quickly, evaluating activity of state bodies this information based on these information, getting together into public interest groups. The conclusions are that it is necessary to set up and develop competitive political environment in Russia, to exclude monopoly of one party (group of people), to develop active civil society and to increase powers of the Parliament, rights of opposition.

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NACSA, Mónika

PhD Candidate University of Szeged

Lost and Found: Regulation of Personal Insolvency in the 19th Century in Hungary

1. Introduction Privacy and independence are truly capitalist needs of human beings. They extend to almost every aspect of one’s life, let it be having private life or making ends meet for guaranteeing private life. In terms of legal thinking and at the legislative level, these concepts mean autonomy for the individual and rule of law for the society. If economy goes on the rocks and insolvency among business participants takes place, it means in legal terms that the creditors entitled to the right of being satisfied by the debtors cannot be satisfied, the debtors’ default results in the impairment of creditors’ rights. If such a phenomenon reaches a critical number and revelation comes that the occurring problems cannot be solved by already existing solutions, tendency is that finally the legislature is asked to give answers for those relations in question that fall under the scope of regulation. Nowadays, the public debate is fuelled by the possible introduction of personal insolvency proceeding in Hungary. In recent years both non-governmental organizations and the government articulated their wish to solve the problem of heavily indebted members of the society by legal measures. The present regulation of individual economic conduct does not contain any provision about personal insolvency, while Act XLIX of 1991 on bankruptcy proceedings and liquidation proceedings covers only economic operators that are mostly legal entities and unincorporated business associations. The economic operators1 are expected in their business conducts to bear higher standards of responsibility than natural persons in their contracts of minor

1 See for the term of former Civil Code of Hungary, Act IV of 1959 Article 685 c): economic organizations: state-owned companies, other state-owned economic agencies, cooperatives, business associations, professional associations, nonprofit companies, companies of certain legal entities, subsidiaries, water management organizations, forest management associations and private entrepreneurs. The provisions governing economic organizations shall be applied to the state, local governments, budgetary agencies, associations, public bodies and foundations in connection with their economic activities, unless the law provides otherwise for such artificial persons.

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importance aimed at satisfying their everyday needs. If an individual debtor finally becomes insolvent, now the creditors are entitled to several rights before different authorities to find remedy for their impairment. But none of these possibilities give the right to a third person or group of creditors to gain full sight over the individual debtor’s estate or gain the right to control the debtor’s economic conduct. While insolvency proceedings relative for legal entities and unincorporated business associations mostly result in the termination of independent economic conduct and with the vanishing of independent operations, a third person and/or group of creditors are put in a decisive position over the debtor’s estate. Evidently insolvency results in the loss of economic independence. The phenomenon of heavily indebted individuals cuts its two ways. One can argue against personal insolvency proceeding and the limitations brought upon autonomy, however in certain social and economic establishments individuals are used to the thought of having the chance to rely on a third person, let it be the State, who supports in need. The simple fact that the possible introduction of personal insolvency proceeding occurred shows that in Hungary a critical number of heavily indebted individuals broke the ceiling of perception, whilst actors in name of the state find the present regulation and conduct insufficient in terms of the individual creditor-debtor relations. The present paper is aiming to elaborate an overview about the ongoing debate about the possible introduction of personal insolvency proceedings in contemporary Hungarian legislation, while the second part of the paper covers the first regulatory measures taken by the state about personal insolvency proceedings in the late 19th century in Hungary. Relevant acts of the Parliament and comprehensive secondary scholastic legal sources and law report books of the Hungarian Royal Supreme Court will be used. Lastly, necessary conclusions will be drawn about the measures taken by the state a hundred years ago and nowadays and the author here expresses her wish to be able to give the answer for the question: is there anything new under the sun? 2. Developments of the recent years The Hungarian society and especially households in recent years have built up as much as 728 billion HUF (almost 250 billion EUR) in foreign exchange debts which amount tends to reach the point at which neither the full satisfaction of creditors can be pursued, nor already existing solutions can be used for the decrease of the indebtedness of the society.2 In legal terms it

2 „Non-performing loans to households and firms are high at 14 percent and are expected to continue to rise over the coming two years”, IMF Country Report No. 12/13, Hungary, 2011 Article IV

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means in a simplified sense that the debtors cannot satisfy the creditors as it was originally agreed between the parties. Let it be satisfaction of the creditors through judicial execution under the provisions of Act LIII of 1994 or other non-judicial means of satisfaction, the key point is that there is an ultimate tension between the main interest of the creditors namely that the debtors must perform their contractual obligations and the interest of the debtors in getting possible easements on their individual obligation to payment.3 At this point it is essential to highlight important details of the Hungarian insolvency procedure and the ruling philosophy behind the conduct: ever since Act 22 of 1840 introduced the first provisions of insolvency proceedings and later on other acts entered into force in Hungary regulating insolvency, it is safe to say that insolvency proceedings were and are created in order to support mainly if not exclusively the interests of the creditors and the possible satisfaction of their claims once the debtor’s insolvency was declared by the court.4 Lőrinczi in his work5 described the well-seen differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the Austro-German insolvency conducts: while the former system of insolvency leaves more flexibility for the debtor, the latter focuses on the satisfaction of the creditors and leaves almost no possibility for the debtor to restart economic operations. The Hungarian system of insolvency proceedings stands on Austro-German grounds.6 In theory insolvency proceedings in Hungary cover bankruptcy proceedings and liquidation proceedings.7 There are also provisions of Act V of 2006 on Public Company Information, Company Registration and Winding up Proceedings relative for the so-called „wind-up procedure” in which business associations are to be wound up without succession if they are not insolvent. However, a business association deciding termination without succession by a „wind-up procedure” may be finally terminated in a liquidation proceeding. The most important feature above all is that presently in Hungary a natural person cannot be qualified insolvent in a sense as it is used for business associations.8 In such circumstances it can be better understood why the Hungarian regulation has been unable to adapt to the current demands of both regulatory and market actors and ultimately the society as such.

Consultation and Second Post-Program Monitoring Discussions, January 2012. 10., available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1213.pdf. 3 http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_zrh001.html. 4 See Lőrinczi, Gyula: A mai magyar csődjogi szabályozás jogtörténeti gyökerei (Szomorújáték három felvonásban) [The Historic Background of the Contemporary Hungarian Bankruptcy Regulation]. Jogtörténeti Szemle 2011/4. 19. 5 Ibid. 20. 6 See Ibid. 21. 7 Act XLIX of 1991 on Bankruptcy Proceedings, Liquidation Proceedings. 8 Lőrinczi: op. cit. 25.

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Providing proper legal solutions for problems not completely originated from legal grounds lies in the hands of the Parliament and the initiative bodies of the legislation. The most favored solution for the distressed household debtors’ financial problem is the desired introduction of personal insolvency procedure. The most recent developments on the subject are connected to the negotiations between the relevant international organizations – the IMF and the EU respectively – and representatives of the Hungarian government in 2012.9 In March 2012, the Parliament issued its 21/2012. (III. 20.) parliamentary resolution on the subjects related to the non-performance of household loans.10 The draft of the decision contained a provision according to which the Parliament asked the Government to observe the potential introduction of the personal insolvency proceedings.11 In its wording the resolution focuses on debt restructuring that can serve as a complex solution for the debtors. In order to gain full picture on the subject, it must be also mentioned that as early as October 2010 a private member’s bill was submitted to the Parliament on the subject of personal insolvency proceedings however the draft was not even consulted by the legislation.12 3. The first regulation of personal insolvency proceeding of Hungary According to our present knowledge, the first insolvency procedures took place before municipal courts in the early 18th century in Hungary.13 Legal practice of municipal courts demonstrated that both natural persons and business associations were put into legal procedure by the end of which creditors were granted only with fractions of their original claims.14 Customary rules applied for the litigation, no specific or detailed regulation existed in the early 18th century for insolvency procedure.15 It was in 1840 that the legislation passed the first comprehensive act on insolvency proceedings.16 The

9 „To provide further safeguards, staff urged the finalization of a bank resolution framework as well as creation of a personal insolvency regime to aid in the process of addressing distressed debtors and troubled institutions.” See IMF Country Report No. 10. 10 Compare 21/2012. (III. 20.) OGY határozat a 2002-2010 közötti lakossági deviza-eladósodás okainak feltárásáról, valamint az esetleges kormányzati felelősség vizsgálatáról szóló jelentés elfogadásáról, available at: http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o12h0021.htm/o12h0021.htm#kagy2. 11 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/06068/06068.pdf. 12 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/01273/01273.pdf. 13 Kállay, István: A csődeljárás kezdetei Magyarországon a 18-19. században [Beginnings of Bankruptcy Proceedings in the 18th and 19th Centuries in Hungary]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1992. augusztus, 377. 14 See Ibid. 377. 15 Apáthy, István: A magyar csődjog rendszere, Első rész, Anyagi csődjog [The System of the Hungarian Bankruptcy Law]. Eggenberger-féle Könyvkereskedés, Budapest 1887. 41. 16 Act XXII of 1840 on insolvency proceedings, also Act VII of 1844 on the modification of Act XXII of 1840.

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timing of the codification of the already existing rules of insolvency practice was strongly attached to the introduction of the Commerce Code and the Bill of Exchange Act.17 Act XXII of 184018 was relative for persons pursuing economic activities without expressed differentiation upon their commercial or non-commercial status and also defined the concept of insolvency for the first time in Hungarian private law.19 One can argue about the procedural concept of the regulation: instead of substantive verification of the debtor’s financial positions, the early statutory regulation of insolvency focused on the procedural aspects of the possible declaration by the court.20 The contemporary jurisprudence distinguished between the so-called concursus materialis and the concursus formalis.21 The first term stood for the situation in which there was no asset available, so that the debtor was unable to pay his current debts, while the latter definition described such a situation in which the authority declared insolvency because the debtor was unlikely to be able to pay his future debts when they became due. Apáthy described that in their effects the concursus materialis and the concursos formalis did not differ however the concursus formalis was applied for only merchants.22 In such a procedure the debtor did not have to verify the actual lack of assets, it was a formal procedure indeed. Concursus materialis was mostly applied for individuals of non-commercial activity. The jurisprudence that evolved upon the application of the First Bankruptcy Act in Hungary led to the adoption of Act XVII of 1881.23 In the Second Bankruptcy Act the legislation made clear distinction between the so-called ordinary bankruptcy and commercial bankruptcy.24 At that time the Hungarian regulation of insolvency proceedings was in accordance with European trends.25 Even in the cradle of merchant law, in England the first

17 Kertész, Gábor: Csődeljárás és csődbűntett a reformkorban [Bankruptcy Proceedings and Bankruptcy Offences in the Era of Reforms]. Jogtörténeti szemle 2007/1. 40., see also: Rákosi, Tibor: A csődjogi fejlődés a 19. századi Magyarországon, különös tekintettel az 1881. évi XVII. törvénycikkre [Evolution of the Legal Regime of Bankruptcy in the 19th Century in Hungary with Special Regard to Act XVII of 1881]. Studia Iurisprudentiae Doctorandorum Miskolciensium, Tomus: 4/2, Fasciculus: 1-14. 78-79. 18 Hereinafter: the First Bankruptcy Act. 19 Kertész: op. cit. 40., On the definiton of insolvency see also: Apáthy: op.cit. 2. 20 Lőrinczi: op. cit. 20. 21 Apáthy: op.cit. 2. 22 Ibid. 3. 23 Hereinafter: the Second Bankruptcy Act. 24 Act 17 of 1811 in relevant parts: Article 1 About insolvency of the ordinary debtors, while Article 72 About the commercial bankruptcy of business associations. See also: Juhász, László: A magyar fizetésképtelenségi jog kézikönyve [Handbook of Hungarian Insolvency Law]. Novotni Alapítvány, Miskolc, 2010. 29. 25 Apáthy: op.cit. 3.

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modern code was introduced only in 186126 as the result of reform movements. It was “applied to all debtors whether traders or not.” In a comparative overview it is noteworthy to mention that the German Bankruptcy Act of 1876 did not regulate the dual system of bankruptcy, it only covered in its provisions the ordinary bankruptcy proceedings.27 Declared insolvency meant the impoundment of the debtor’s estate that was under the sole control of the so-called liquidator. The creditors were authorized to form a so-called creditors’ select committee that gained the right to supervise the conduct of the liquidator.28 Insolvency proceedings focused on the satisfaction of the registered creditors’ claims, at this time no reorganization or debt forgiveness could take place as a comprehensive easement for the debtor’s burdened economic position. Satisfaction meant practically the effectuation of execution over the debtor’s assets that left no space for the release for all or part of the bankruptcy debts. In such circumstances the debtor not only lost influence over his/her assets and business activities but also had to face possible criminal charges related to the circumstances resulting insolvency.29 Those individuals who were proven to be guilty of using deeds and even falsifying them in order to camouflage their de facto insolvent position were sentenced for committing bankruptcy offences.30 In Hungary shortly after 1861, the everyday practice of courts showed that fraudulent bankruptcy and other offences were widespread and this trend was mostly the result of the insufficient regulation of the restored Act 22 of 1840.31 Besides private law and commercial law influences over the codification of the Second Bankruptcy Act, one can see that the criminal aspects of bankruptcy also had their own effects on the necessary changes of the regulation. The jurisprudence of the Second Bankruptcy Act shows a continuous tendency until 1949 in Hungary when the first socialist regulation appeared in bankruptcy law, as well.32 Given the fact that the present paper is not aiming to cover either the regulatory aspects or the practical consequences of the statutory changes after 1949, the last part of the analysis will cover the application of Act XVII of 1881 by focusing on the jurisprudence of the Royal Hungarian Supreme Court between 1895 and 1900.33 In the observed period

26 The Bankruptcy Act 27 Apáthy: op.cit. 3. 28 Kertész: op. cit. 41. 29 Kertész: op. cit. 43. 30 See Ibid. 44. 31 Apáthy: op.cit. 46. 32 Lőrinczi: op. cit. 21. 33 See for the relevant Royal Hungarian Supreme Court decisions: A magyar kir. Curia felülvizsgálati tanácsa által a sommás eljárásról szóló törvény (1893. évi XVIII. tcz.) alapján hozott határozatok

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the available law report books of the Supreme Court contained five major cases in which the Court decided in its judicial review procedure about legal issues related to the individual insolvency or ordinary bankruptcy procedure and interpreted the provisions of the Second Bankruptcy Act. The first observed decision of the Supreme Court dated back to 1895.34 The legal question rose about how to interpret Article 22 of the Second Bankruptcy Act. In relevant parts the provision said that the liquidator had mandate only to represent the estate under bankruptcy but was not authorized to take mandate to represent the debtor before third person or in court procedure for those liabilities that the debtor take as an individual person. In its decision the Supreme Court ordered that in absence of a special mandate, ex lege the liquidator could not take representation for the debtor before third person or in court procedure. This decision delivered a limited interpretation for Article 22 of the Second Bankruptcy Act. On the subject of individual debtor’s contractual obligations the Supreme Court delivered its decision in 1896.35 In its orienting decision the Court explained that once the individual debtor became insolvent and his contracts were to be terminated, the debtor’s contracting parties could only make claim for the damages originated from the contract but not for the interests. 36 The third relevant, bankruptcy related decision of the Supreme Court also dealt with the same legal issue dating back to 1897.37 In its decision the Court argued for the limited interpretation of the debtor’s contractual liabilities deriving from those contracts that had been made before insolvency happened to take place. As for the contractual liabilities, the forth decision of the Supreme Court also delivered the limited interpretation of liability but this time in favor of the creditor.38 The fifth and last decision carried interpretation of both the Second Bankruptcy Act and the contemporary Civil Procedure Code.39 The Supreme Court had to decide if the debtor’s contractual performance in form of judicial deposit shortly before the order of bankruptcy fell within the scope of such an action that could be challenged in a court trial by the liquidator. The Supreme Court finally declared that the debtor’s performance by satisfy-

gyűjteménye, összeállította Dr. Fabiny Ferencz, I-V. kötetek [Law Report Book of the Decisions Delivered in the Judicial Review Procedure of the the Hungarian Royal Supreme Court under the provisions of Act XVIII of 1893, Volume I-V]. Franklin Társulat, Budapest (hereinafter: Fabiny-döntvénytár I-V.) 34 Fabiny-döntvénytár I. (1895): 133. 35 Ibid. 253. 36 The Supreme Court argued for the application of the provisions of the Commerce Code in the relevant case however the debtor was a non-trader individual. 37 Fabiny-döntvénytár III. (1897): 467. 38 Fabiny-döntvénytár V. (1900): 276. 39 Ibid. 118.

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ing the creditor’s claims with judicial deposit did not violate other creditors’ interests.40 4. Conclusions: The author of the present paper asked the question if there was anything new under the sun in terms of the initiatives of personal insolvency proceedings regulation in Hungary. It is now time to draw the conclusions. The possible introduction of personal insolvency regulation in nowadays Hungary may result a new act but it is not guaranteed that the non-performing household loans and the debts behind them will vanish. Possible debt restructuring and easement on the obligations are not in comply with the historic and systematic evolution of Hungarian insolvency proceedings however both national and international actors envisage personal insolvency proceeding as a magic wand for indebtedness. Personal insolvency proceeding in a historic perspective shows that the creditors’ claims and their satisfaction overruled the debtors’ interests. Even as the jurisprudence of the Royal Hungarian Supreme Court was observed, the concerning cases of individual/ordinary bankruptcy demonstrated the pro creditor approach of the insolvency proceedings. Considering present economic conditions and the historic example of personal insolvency proceedings regulation in Hungary, in that regard, if the problem of indebtedness cannot be solved, let us hope that we will not enlarge it.

40 Ibid. 120.

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MIROSHNYCHENKO, Ivan V.

PhD Candidate Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna

The Nature and Extent of Informal Economy in PostCrisis Ukraine

I. Introduction The right to decent work for everyone is widely recognized all over the world (European Commission, 2007; UN, 2006; ILO, 2002a). The informal sector is an essential obstacle in terms of its size and vulnerability of its participants (ILO, 2002b). Owing to drain in tax and social security contributions, it directly affects the state (Williams, 2007). The knowledge about informal economy and its implications are rather limited due to its naturally hidden form (Williams, 2009; Pfau-Effinger, 2003). In recent years, the European Commission has made several attempts to obliterate informal economy (European Commission, 2007; European Commission, 2005). The Commission has established a ‘knowledge bank’ of policies tackling informal employment (European Commission, 2007). The first known empirical survey of the Ukrainian informal sector, using activity-based definition, reveals need for developing an increasingly multilayered understanding of informal economy (Williams and Round, 2007; Round and Kosterina, 2005). This provides an opportunity to examine the informal sector in Ukraine by synthesizing contrasting theories of informal economy. The present paper investigates the nature and extent of informal economy in post-crisis Ukraine. A better understanding of the diverse nature of the informal sector can assist the development of a more comprehensive policy, while promoting enhanced working conditions and paying in the Ukrainian formal economy. The remainder of this paper is organized as followings: first, a literature review presents an overview of prior researches and theoretical foundations for this paper. Then an overview of the Ukranian informal sector is provided. Next, the focus will turn to research design and methodology. This is followed by discussion of the results. Finally, an overall summary and conclusions are drawn from the research.

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II. Literature review of indicative references Informal economic practices are extensive in many nations across the world (Williams and Round, 2008; European Commission, 2005; UN, 2006). They have been linked to the drain in tax and social security contributions (Williams, 2009; Pfau-Effinger, 2003). The private sector is the major creator of employment and the state establishes conditions for the productive employment of people (OECD, 2002; European Commission, 1998). Therefore, recent decades have witnessed calls for effective policies to encourage compliance rather than punish non-compliant economic agents (Williams and Round, 2007). However, the informal economy is still considered to be one of the major concerns of the European member states (European Commission, 2007; Stefanov, 2003). The first cross-national survey of the extent and the nature of undeclared work in EU27 brought a fresh understanding of this phenomenon (Williams, 2008; European Commission, 2007). According to Williams (2008), in Nordic countries and Continental Europe, informal economic activity is practiced on a self-employed basis, while in southern Europe and East-Central Europe it is more likely to be connected to official employment. The motives behind informal employment are not always conducted for the financial benefits of employees or enterprises (Williams and Round, 2008). A complex geography of informal economy across EU nations has been revealed by Williams (2008). Besides that, the ‘knowledge bank’, combining European states’ experiences, for developing measures to combat informal economy, was created in 2007 (European Commission, 2007). Thus, an important step has already been made by the European Commission in creating a global learning hub for tackling undeclared employment in various contexts. A significant body of literature suggests three contrasting types of definition: i) enterprise-, ii) job- and iii) activity-based definitions. In studies of developing countries, enterprise- and job-based definitions have predominated until recently (ILO, 2002a, ILO, 2002b). An activity-based definition is commonly used for studies in OECD countries and European states (European Commission, 2007; Williams, 2006). Informal sector is widely recognized as “involving the production and sale of goods and services that are licit in all respects besides the fact that they are unregistered or hidden from the state” (European Commission, 2007. 47.). As part of what has been called informal sector (ILO, 2002a, OECD, 2002), employees and businesses seek to participate in both formal and informal operations in market society (Williams, 2004; ILO, 2002b).

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1. Informal economy as a residue Until recently, a widespread belief was that both formal and informal economic practices belong to completely separate spheres (Williams and Round, 2008; Williams and Round, 2007; OECD, 2002). Consequently, a large proportion of hidden earnings have been invisible to state authorities (Williams, 2008). The formalisation thesis depicts formal sector as ‘advancement’ while the informal sector represents a ‘sign of underdevelopment’ (Williams and Round, 2008; Smith and Stenning, 2006). Inspite of the wide acceptance of traditional theory, in recent years a body of literature has contested and rejected various assumptions of this traditional theory (Williams and Round, 2007). Several scholars have indicated that businesses and populations are quite often simultaneously engaged in both formal and informal sectors (UNDP, 2008; Williams and Round, 2008; Smith and Stenning, 2006). In short, it has been widely recognized that shadow sector actively grows in the modern global economy (Williams and Round, 2008; Williams, 2007; ILO, 2002a). 2. Informal economy as a by-product of the formal economy The second discourse represents the informal sector as a by-product of the formal sector in global economy (Williams and Round, 2008; Williams and Round, 2007; Amin et al, 2002). Economic players of informal economy are forced to participate not by choice, but more likely by necessity (Williams and Round, 2007; Pfau-Effinger, 2003). Moreover, informal economy is displayed “as a new form of work emerging in late capitalism as a direct byproduct of the advent and deregulated open world economy” (Williams and Round, 2008. 370.). In this by-product understanding, informal economy is enormous in marginalised groups of western and developing nations due to weak status of formal economy (Williams and Round, 2007; Amin et al, 2002). Marginalised populations engage in the informal sector in order to survive in this sphere as a last resort (Williams, 2008). Thus, within market economy, informal sector exists as an opposite realm to the formal sector (Williams and Round, 2008; Round et al, 2008). 3. Informal economy as a complement to formal economy For the third school of thought, the relationship between the formal and informal sector is seen as complementary rather than substitutive (Williams, 2009; Williams and Round, 2008; Williams and Round, 2007). In this perspective, informal sector is read as consolidating disparities produced by the formal sector (Williams and Round, 2007; Williams and Windebank, 2003). Both realms of the economy are seen as intertwined with each other (Wil-

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liams and Round, 2007). Williams and Round (2008) posit that affluent households, as main beneficiaries of shadow economy, conduct more informal economic activities than marginalised households. From this view, informal economy tends to possess more positive attributes than residue and by-product theorisations (Williams, 2009; Williams and Round, 2008). Until recently, the complementary approach has been commonly investigated in context of western nations (Williams and Round, 2008; Williams and Round, 2007). 4. Informal economy as an alternative to formal economy The final approach reads the informal sector as a chosen substitute for the formal sector (Williams and Round, 2008. 372.; Williams and Round, 2007; Williams, 2005). For this group of researchers, the state over-regulation represents the main obstacle to economic growth and sustainability (Williams and Round, 2008; Williams, 2008). Besides that, these authors advocate the deregulation of the labour market from an over-burdensome state as a “resurgence of the free market against state regulation” (Williams and Round, 2008. 372.). This discourse is mainly applied in relation to developing countries (Williams and Round, 2007). 5. An integrative understanding of the nature of informal economy The evidence suggests that different theories of informal economy are valid when analysing different types of informal economic activities (Williams and Round, 2008; Williams and Round, 2007; Williams, 2008). This is exemplified by the assertion that the range of an informal sector can simultaneously possess positive, as well as negative features and can be relatively separate from the formal sector (Williams and Round, 2008; Williams and Round, 2007). In a study concerning the informal sector’s nature in Ukraine, Williams and Round (2008. 384.) argue that “universal theorisations are not possible.” These authors suggest an integrative understanding of the theories of informal employment to achieve a more nuanced and multilayered understanding of the phenomenon. III. Overview of the informal sector in Ukraine Ukraine is the largest state in Europe by territory and the second most-populated post-Soviet state after Russia (Mykhenko and Swain, 2010). It possesses one of the biggest natural resources in Europe (Tkachuk, 2010a). The Orange Revolution accelerated the state’s regional divergence to the highest levels in

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Europe (Mykhenko and Swain, 2010). Due to the political turmoil, Ukraine has difficulty in capitalizing on its well educated human capital, abundant resources and strategic trade position between two major markets, the European Union (EU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In Ukraine, the informal economic behaviour is accepted as part of everyday life, as previously identified by researchers in other East-Central European countries (Tkachuk, 2010b; Round and Williams, 2010). The informal sector grows as a consequence of the deteriorating formal sector (Wallace and Latcheva, 2006). It gains economic players forced by the need to survive (Williams, 2009) (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Size of the Informal Sector in Ukraine 2002-2010 (percentage)

Source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2011.; State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2011.

This figure indicates that there are different estimates of the informal sector among public institutions due to usage of an enterprise-based definition of employment, or indirect measures using proxy indicators. According to the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine (2011), size of the informal sector in Ukraine was 34% in 2010, while using the estimates of State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, it was 16.5% during the same year. The first known empirical survey of the Ukrainian informal sector by Williams and Round (2008) reveals that around 16% of households in Ukraine are involved in the informal sector. Three main categories of undeclared work complement the informal sector in Ukraine, such as informal waged work, informal ownaccount work and paid favours for friends, neighbors and kin (Round and Williams, 2010). Given the relatively low levels of economic development and economic freedom, Ukraine has maintained low rankings regarding its transparency in public life, levels of corruption, barriers of formalisation and tax morality

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(Transparency International, 2009; UNDP, 2008). Rent-seeking behaviour and bureaucracy became main barriers to both economic growth and the formalisation of economy in Ukraine (Chernyshev, 2006; Hanson, 2006). According to Rose (2005), 73% of Ukrainians indicate that their main income is not sufficient to purchase basic goods. The unemployment rate in Ukraine increased to 9.5% in 2009 due to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 (The World Bank, 2009). In the category of world countries, Ukraine was referred to as most vulnerable to global crisis effects (Tkachuk 2010b). GDP of Ukraine fell by 14% and national debt increased by 59%t during 2009 (Tkachuk 2010a). Briefly, as a consequence of the stagnant formal economy in post-crisis period, informal economy dramatically grows in Ukraine. There are various estimates of the Ukrainian informal sector due to the usage of direct or indirect proxy indicators. The most prevalent types of undeclared work are informal waged employment, informal self-employment and paid favours for friends, neighbors and kin. IV. Methodology Traditionally, the methodology to be adopted has occupied the center stage in scholarly discussions, whether it should be quantitative, qualitative, or mixed-method (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Fabozzi et al, 2005). There is also a question of whether large or narrow data collection is preferable (Baker, 2001). Quantitative research can be defined as a research strategy that focuses on quantification during data collection and analysis involving statistical techniques (Fabozzi et al, 2005). It is founded on numerical measurements of indicators of unique phenomena (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Qualitative research emphasizes words rather than quantification in data collection and analysis (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). It aims at gathering an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons behind it (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Mixed-method research can be defined as a strategy that uses qualitative and quantitative approaches (Scandura and Williams, 2000). 1. Research Approach This study uses a mixed-method research approach to investigate the nature and extent of the informal economy in post-crisis Ukraine. The activitybased definition of the informal sector was used in the present study. Survey appeared as a justifiable research strategy to achieve the purpose of the study. The research process included the following steps: literature review, setting the objective of the study, research design (data collection and limitations), data analysis and discussion of the results, reliability and validity of the study and conclusions.

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1. Data Collection The evidence can be quantitative, qualitative, or both (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Quantitative data can be collected from surveys, experiments, questionnaires, official statistics and structured or semi-structured interviews (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In comparison, qualitative data can be collected from observations, unstructured interviews and documents (Baker, 2001). Primary data collection was conducted from 200 surveys in late 2009 and early 2010. The survey questionnaire has been adopted from previous studies by Williams and Round (2007). Secondary data was obtained from other comparable studies conducted in Ukraine, as well as from literature written on this subject. An extensive literature review was created to identify the contributions and gaps in this field. Detailed information regarding the phenomena was revealed from official sources related to the study (see Appendix 1). 2. Sample Maximum variation sampling was used for this study due to the evidence that there are essential inequalities in the extent and nature of informal economy between deprived and affluent populations of Europe (European Commission, 2007; Williams and Round, 2007; Williams, 2004). Two contrasting regions were investigated in Ukraine – Donetsk and Sumy regions. 100 surveys were distributed in the affluent area of Donetsk that is one of the leading industrial, educational and scientific cities in Ukraine. 100 surveys were distributed in the deprived area of Sumy city. Sumy relied heavily on its manufacturing industry that is currently undergoing a reorganization process. Since then it has suffered from a high rate of unemployment and lack of financial support from the government. V. Findings First and foremost, we investigate whether participation in the informal or formal sectors represents the main income source of households for their standard of living. Table 1 indicates that some 23% of households in Ukraine rely on the informal sector as the principal source of livelihood. Every sixth household (15%) indicates dependence on other informal form of employment as their income source on a daily basis. Overall, around 38.1% of Ukrainian households identify informal economic activities as either major or secondary income sources to their standard of living. In a previous study by Williams and Round (2008), around 16% was found to heavily rely on the informal sector. This suggests that the amount of informally self-employed

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people has doubled after the financial downturn of 2008-2009 in Ukraine. In short, the Ukrainian informal economy can not be classified as a residual and underdeveloped sphere under the ‘formalization’ thesis. Table 1. Major Income Sources for Living Standard (percentage of households) Self- provisioning Informal work Formal work Pension/benefits

Primarily Source 2.8 23.0 27.0 4.1

Source 1.2 15.1 23.4 3.3

Total 4.0 38.1 50.4 7.4

Source: 2009/10 Ukraine survey.

Therefore, our focus turns to the different forms of participation within the informal economy in Ukraine. Some 55.3% of respondents belong to a group of informal employees working for an informal or formal organization (see Table 2). This suggests that the most common type of informal employees is the one that receives primary official wage and secondary informal wage that is called “envelope-wage” from employers. Official wage is used for tax declaration purposes, while informal wage is paid in cash. This finding is supported by similar studies of undeclared work in Ukraine (Williams, 2009; Williams and Round, 2008). In addition, similar informal practices have been identified by researchers in Bulgaria and Russia (Tkachuk 2010a; Stefanov, 2003). Furthermore, vast amount of gender studies highlighted that women are more likely to be involved in the informal sector (Smith and Stenning, 2006; Losby et al, 2002). This study, confirms the stated-above assumption that women have higher incidence of informal waged work than men. So, women prevail over men in informal waged work in informal or formal enterprises in Ukraine, corresponding to 30.1 and 25.2% (see Table 2). The prevalence of informal waged work shows how formal and informal sectors are intertwined and interdependent within Ukraine. Moreover, it highlights on how modern Ukrainian capitalists avoid meeting certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maximum hours, safety or healthy standards. Waged informal work is mainly common in domestic services (housecleaning, childcare, cooking), trade (salesforce) and tourism-related industries (i.e. regarding waiters and cooks). Briefly, the nature of informal waged work can be considered as complement to the formal economy in Ukraine.

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Table 2. Engaging in the Informal Sector (percentage of households) Informal waged work Informal own-account work Paid favours for kins, neighbours and relatives

Women 30.1

Men 25.2

Total 55.3

20.4

15.7

36.1

3.1

4.5

7.6

Source: 2009/10 Ukraine survey

As Table 2 reveals, 36.1% of households operate their own business as a primary source of income or as the way to supplement their income from formal work. In particular, women prevail over men in own-account work on an informal basis, with corresponding shares of 20.4 and 15.7%. However, Losby et al (2002) argues that in transition economies specifically large percentage of both genders engage on a regular basis in informal economic activities. The most common types of the informal own-account work belong to construction (masonry, painting and carpentry), agricultural (seasonal employees) and IT sectors (mainly consultancy). In short, informal own-account work can be seen as an alternative to the formal economic sector in Ukraine. In recent years, the factor of social relations has been identified behind informal employment by several researchers and been associated to analogous unpaid community exchange (Round and Costerina, 2005; Williams, 2006; Williams, 2004). From Table 2 we can see that some 7.6% of respondents engage in paid favours for kins, neighbours and relatives on a regular basis. This finding corresponds to similar results that depict paid informal work on the basis of motives other than making financial gain (Williams, 2004). Due to the social relations factor, paid favours are mainly conducted in the service sector. Given the above-mentioned, the ‘alternative’ discourse describes informal economy as the chosen substitute to the formal one. This study reveals that the informal sector in post-crisis Ukraine incorporates simultaneously different theories of the informal economy. These results correspond to the similar findings by Williams and Round, 2007; Williams, 2006. The informal economy in Ukraine is not an underdeveloped and residual sphere. In contrast, it is highly intertwined and interdependent within the formal economic sector. Therefore, the formalization thesis does not describe the nature of the Ukrainian informal economy. Analysis of the informal waged work reveals that by-product perspective of the informal economy is the most appropriate that depicts the informal sector as a substitute to the formal economy. The alternative approach, meanwhile, is valid

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when examining the informal own-account work of the households engaged in informal economic activities by necessity. In the dimension of paid favours, however, complementary discourse of informal economy is relevant as consolidating the disparities produced by formal economy. To sum it up, our results suggest that different theoretical discourses are valid for different kinds of informal economies. There are some implications and opportunities for researchers and policy-makers to create a collaborative platform on the informal economy in Eastern Europe. Primarily, cross-disciplinary studies could help obtaining an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in the region. Given the essential inequalities in the extent and nature of informal economy between the deprived and affluent populations of European states, development of specific context-based scenarios of tackling informal sector might be more appropriate rather than the common usage of best policy practices borrowed from advanced economies. Finally, in terms of future policy directions, it appears that instead of struggling with an informal economy it would be more efficient to remove barriers to formalize informal economic activities (i.e. informal taxes, bureaucracy and bribes). VI. Conclusions By using data from two regions in a single country, we were able to investigate the nature and extent of the informal economy in post-crisis Ukraine. This study finds that the informal sector incorporates simultaneously different theoretical discourses of the informal economy in Ukraine. Our results go in line with previous researches in the field suggesting that different theories are valid for different kinds of informal economy (for example, Williams and Round, 2007; Williams, 2006). Informal economy in Ukraine is not an underdeveloped and residual sphere. In contrast, it is highly intertwined and interdependent within the formal economic sector. We find that the amount of informally self-employed people has doubled after financial downturn of 2008-2009 in Ukraine. The present study confirms the assumption that women have higher incidence of the informal waged work corresponding to the prior literature on gender studies. This study makes several contributions to the existing literature on informal economy. Firstly, it adds to the limited knowledge about informal sector due to its naturally hidden form. Then, it investigates empirically the phenomena of informal economy using an activity-based definition in postSoviet states, such as Ukraine. Finally, it extends the growing body of literature based on a better understanding of the diverse nature of the informal sector by synthesizing the contrasting theories of informal economy.

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It would be interesting to carry out a survey of households on the nature and extent of informal economy using a larger sample size in Ukraine. It could help to obtain an in-depth understanding of the diverse nature of the informal economy in the region and to develop specific context-based scenarios of tackling the informal sector. Furthermore, it would be interesting to carry out similar studies in other regions of the Eastern European states to compare with the present study. This could assist in the development of a more comprehensive public policy, while promoting enhanced working conditions in the Eastern European region. References • Amin, A. – Cameron, A. – Hudson, R. (2002): Placing the Social Economy. Routledge, London. • Baker, M. (2001): Selecting a Research Methodology. The Marketing Review, 1(1) 373-397. • Bryman, A. and Bell, A. (2007): Business Research Methods. Oxford, NewYork. • Chernyshev, I. (2006): Socio-Economic Activity and Decent work in Ukraine: A Comparative View and Statistical Findings. Working Paper №76. ILO, Geneva. • European Commission (2005): Feasibility of a Direct Survey and Pilot Study of Undeclared Work in the European Union. European Commission, Brussels. • European Commission (2007): Stepping up the Fight against Undeclared Work. European Commission, Brussels. • Eisenhardt, K. – Graebner, M. (2007): Theory Building From Cases: Opportunities and Challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1) 25-32. • Fabozzi, F. – Focardi, S. – Ma, C. (2005) : Implementable Quantitative Research. The Journal of Alternative Investments, 8(2) 71-79. • Flyvbjerg, B. (2006): Five Misunderstandings about Case Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 12(2) 219-245. • Hanson, M. (2006): Transition in Ukraine. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report Number 065 Escew 06 E. • International Labour Organisation (2002a): Resolution and Conclusions Concerning Decent Work and the Informal Economy. Available from: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/ pdf/pr-25res.pdf [Accessed on the 6th August 2012] • International Labour Organisation (2002b): Decent Work and the Informal Economy. Available from: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/ pdf/rep-vi.pdf [Accessed on the 5th June 2012]

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• Transparency International (2009): Global Corruption Barometer 2009. Available from: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2009 [Accessed on the 8th September 2012] • Tkachuk, V. (2010a): People First: The Latest in the Watch on Ukrainian Democracy. Available from: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/87598/ #ixzz14tITMJqv [Accessed on the 7th September 2012] • Tkachuk, V. (2010b): An Invitation to Corruption: Constitutional Turmoil Disaster for Ukraine Should be a Major Concern for EU. Available from: http://www.kyivpost.com/blogs/blogger/601/post/5538/ [Accessed on the 7th September 2012] • United Nations (2006): Full and Productive Employment and Decent Work. • Available from: http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/publications/ECOSOC%20BOOK%202006. pdf [Accessed on the 8th July 2012] • United Nations Development Programme (2008): Global Economy, Local Effects: Poverty in Ukraine. Available from: [http://europeandcis.undp.org/poverty/show/5C2C1F7FF203-1EE9 B7380FF2BCFE3C9A]. [Accessed on the 8th July 2012] • Williams, C. C. (2009): Illegitimate Wage Practices in Central and Eastern Europe: A Study of the Prevalence and Impacts of “Envelop Wages”. Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 17(1) 65-83. • Wallace, C. – Latcheva, R. (2006): Economic Transformation outside the Law: Corruption, Trust in Public Institutions and the Informal Economy in Transition Countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. Europe and Asia Studies, 58(1) 81-102. • Williams, C. C. – Round, J. (2008): Retheorizing the Nature of Informal Employment: Some Lessons from Ukraine. International Sociology, 23(3) 367-388. • Williams, C. C. – Round, J. (2007): Beyond Formalization: Rethinking the Future of Work. Foresight, 9(3) 30-41. • Williams, C. C. – Windebank, J. (2003): The Slow Advance and Uneven Penetration of Commodification. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(1) 250-264. • Williams, C. C. (2005): Market Delusions: Rethinking the Trajectories of Post-Socialist Societies. Foresight, 7(3) 48-60. • Williams, C. C. (2008): Cross-National Variations in Undeclared Work: Results From a Survey of 27 European Countries. International Journal of Economic Perspective, 2(1) 46-63. • Williams, C. C. (2006): Evaluating the Magnitude of the Shadow Economy: a Direct Survey Approach. Journal of Economic Studies, 33(5) 369-385. • Williams, C. C. (2004): Beyond Commodification: Re-Reading the Future of Work. Foresight, 6(6) 329-337.

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• Williams, C. C. (2007): Tackling Undeclared Work in Europe: Lessons from a Study of Ukraine. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 13(1) 219-237. • The World Bank (2011): Country Brief of 2011. Available from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine [Accessed on the 5th September 2012] Official sources related to the study Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of Ukraine, Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Ukraine, Ukrainian National Committee of International Chamber of Commerce, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, the Sumy Municipal Council, the Donezk Municipal Council, the World Economic Forum, the World Bank, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, the International Financial Corporation, Transparency International.

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