FÜR LEHRAMTS-STUDIERENDE BIS ZUR ZWISCHENPRÜFUNG

Attila Tanyi, Ph.D. (Zukunftskolleg/Department of Philosophy; Room Y217, tel. (ext.): 5658; email: [email protected]) Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Proseminar (undergraduate seminar), Konstanz, Summer semester 2011/12 Monday, 13.30-15.00, Room G305 FÜR BACHELOR-STUDIERENDE (For BA students) FÜR LEHRAMTS-STUDIERENDE BIS ZUR ZWISCHENPRÜFUNG (For Teacher Training students) FÜR EPG1-STUDIERENDE (For EPG1 students) 4 ECTS-Credits

Introduction. Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation is probably the funding work of the moral theory known as utilitarianism today. It is certainly the first systematic treatment of the theory and already as such it deserves special attention. But Bentham’s work has more than historical relevance; its substantial statements and arguments are also relevant and interesting today. In the book Bentham famously puts forward the principle of the “greatest happiness of the greatest number” and makes important contributions to the theory of crime and punishment. In the course we will read Bentham’s work and discuss its content. Course material. Since we will read one book, it is important that we have the same edition. The one we will use - this is one of the standard ones, available in bookshops and on the internet – is Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Dover, 2007. It is strongly recommended to purchase the book; there is nevertheless a copy in the so-called semester apparat (books on reserve for running university courses) of the course in the Library. The book costs ca. 10 EUR online (Amazon and AbeBooks). Further secondary material is also available in the same semester apparat. Background and overview reading. I am not aware of the existence of any lengthier encylopedia entry on Bentham’s philosophy that would be freely available online. If anyone knows or finds such an entry, please let me know. A decently written and informative enough entry can, however, be found in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The semester apparat of the course contains several volumes on Bentham’s philosophy, these can also be consulted as background. Course requirements. As a rule, the course will be completed by a 10-20 page long paper (Times New Roman, 12, 1.5) written by the student on topics that are related to the course (length depending on whether the student completes a ‘Hausarbeit’ or an ‘Essay’). Topics must be discussed with the course instructor and must have his permission. However, it is also possible, with the course leader’s permission, to take the course only for a ‘pass’ without a grade, or to only audit the course. During the course, student presentations will also be possible (they will be compulsory if the number of students will not be higher than the number of occasions). The idea for these presentations, however, is not that the student gives a lecture to the other participants of the course, but that he/she guides us through the text, by summarizing the author’s position and making critical remarks and commentaries (the latter are particularly welcome!).

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Grading. The final grade will be composed of three parts: seminar participation and attendance (15%), seminar presentation (15%), final paper (70%). My grading policy for student papers is the following: for a grade between 1 and 2, the student must present an original idea in some (convincing) detail, in addition to giving a good and correct summary of Bentham’s relevant discussion; for a grade between 2 and 3, the student must prove to have a competent grasp of Bentham’s relevant arguments by giving a good summary, pointing out the weak points, perhaps making suggestions how to overcome such weaknesses; for a grade between 3 and 4, the student must show that he/she understands Bentham’s text. Use of secondary material is permitted, but not required (this means: just because a paper shows that the student read a lot, will not guarantee a better grade…) Course schedule. We will read only the book, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation; no secondary material, or other work by Bentham, is included as a mandatory reading. This does not mean, however, that such material cannot be consulted for discussion in the seminars or for the papers written at the end of the course. As for the organization of the seminar, each session will begin with a student presentation (unless there are outstanding problems left over from the previous session), which will be followed by open discussion. Below follows a schedule of the seminars. (Note: Chapter numbers come first, then are page numbers listed, in brackets.) All references are to the following edition of Bentham’s work: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Dover Philosophical Classics, London: Dover Publishers, 2007. Seminar 2. Chapters I and II (1-23) Seminar 3. Chapters III, IV, and V (24-42) Seminar 4. Chapter VI (43-69) Seminar 5. Chapter VII, VIII, IX (70-96) Seminar 7. Chapter X (97-130) Seminar 8. Chapter XI (131-152) Seminar 9. Chapter XII and XIII (153-177) Seminar 10. Chapter XIV (178-188) Seminar 11. Chapters XV (189-204) Seminar 12. Chapter XVII (309-329) (Note. There are altogether 14 occasions to meet in the semester (by my counting, correct me if I am wrong). However, one falls out due to national holiday (05.28), and another because it was this week’s introductory seminar (04.16). This leaves us with 12 occasions to meet. The course schedule above is designed accordingly. I have left out Chapter XVI, which is a very long and technical chapter, interesting not so much for philosophers but for legal scholars (in my view). By popular demand, we can of course include (parts of) the chapter in the discussion. The rest of the schedule is also flexible: depending how discussion in the given seminar shapes up, we can discuss certain chapters more, and other chapters less, than as they appear in the schedule above.) !

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Attila Tanyi Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics Hauptseminar, Konstanz, Winter semester 2010/11 Montag, 10-12am, Raum D435 Introduction. Henry Sidgwick was one of the most influential ethical philosophers of the Victorian era, and his work continues to exert a powerful influence on AngloAmerican ethical and political theory. His masterpiece, The Methods of Ethics (Hackett, 7th edition, 1907), was first published in 1874 and in many ways marked the culmination of the classical utilitarian tradition. Sidgwick's treatment of that position was more comprehensive and scholarly than any previous one, and he set the agenda for most of the twentieth-century debates between utilitarians and their critics. But in addition to authoritatively formulating utilitarianism and inspiring utilitarians, the Methods has also served as a general model for how to do ethical theory, since it provides a series of systematic, historically informed comparisons between utilitarianism and its leading alternatives. C. D. Broad, a later successor to Sidgwick's Cambridge chair, famously went so far as to say “Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics seems to me to be on the whole the best treatise on moral theory that has ever been written, and to be one of the English philosophical classics”. For these reasons engaging with Sidgwick's work remains an excellent way to cultivate a serious philosophical interest in ethics, meta-ethics, and practical ethics, not to mention the history of these subjects. This course will systematically investigate Sidgwick’s position, his arguments and method. The language of instruction will be English. Hausarbeit möglich. The course will be completed by a 10-15 page long paper (Times New Roman, 12, 1.5) written by the student on topics that are related to the course. Topics must be discussed with the course instructor and must have his permission. During the course student presentations will also be possible (they will be compulsory if the number of students will not be higher than the number of occasions). The idea for these presentations, however, is not that the student gives a lecture to the other participants of the course, but that he/she guides us through the text, by summarizing Sidgwick’s position and making critical remarks and commentaries. Course material. Since we will read one book, it is important that we have the same edition. The one we will use - this is the standard one, available in bookshops and the internet – is Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 7th edition, 1907 (reprinted in 1981). Background and overview reading. Those who are interested and want to have a good overview of Sidgwick’ philosophy before the course are advised to read the entry on Sidgwick in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (accessible for free on the internet). Other places where one can find good treatment of Sidgwick' philosophy that are in the semester apparatus of the course are the following: Bart Schultz, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. An Intellectual Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Ross Harrison (ed.), Henry Sidgwick, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. !

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Bart Schultz (ed.), Essays on Henry Sidgwick, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Jerome B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge, 1967. The last two works are particularly useful since they involve extensive discussion of The Methods of Ethics. Course schedule. What follows is the schedule of the course with topic and literature for each occasion. I do not here provide secondary literature; if a student is interested in the given topic – wants to write his/her paper on it, for instance – I am happy to provide further bibliographic information. Seminar 1 (October 18). Introduction and general matters of interest (practical issues: examination, grading, student presentations etc.). Lecture by the course instructor. Overview of the work, ethics and politics, ethical judgments. Book I, Chapters I-III Seminar 2 (October 25). Pleasure and desire, free will. Book I, Chapters IV-V November 1: national holiday, All Saints day. Seminar 3 (November 8). Overview of intuitionism and egoism. Goodness. Book I, Chapters VII-IX Seminar 4 (November 15). Egoism and empirical hedonism. The congruence of happiness and duty. Book II, Chapters I, II, V Seminar 5 (November 22). Intuitionism, virtue and duty. Book III, Chapters I, II Seminar 6 (November 29). Benevolence. Book III, Chapter IV Seminar 7 (December 6). Justice. Book III, Chapter V Seminar 8 (December 13). Laws and promises (political obligation, fairness). !

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Book III, Chapter VI Seminar 9 (December 20). Review of common-sense morality. Book III, Chapter XI Seminar 10 (January 10). Moral motivation, moral judgment, philosophical intuitionism. Book III, Chapters XII, XIII Seminar 11 (January 17). Ultimate good, the meaning and proof of utilitarianism. Book III, Chapter XIV Book IV, Chapters I, II Seminar 12 (January 24). Utilitarianism and common-sense morality. Book IV, Chapter III Seminar 13 (January 31). The method of utilitarianism. Book IV, Chapters IV, V Seminar 14 (February 7). The relations of the three methods, the dualism of practical reason. Concluding Chapter

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Demokrácia elmélet Tanyi Attila A kurzus feladata a demokrácia mára elmosódott fogalmának tisztázása. Ennek megfelelően két elkülönülő, ugyanakkor egymást kiegészítő részre oszlik fel a tematika. Egyrészt tartalmazza a főbb filozófiai megközelítéseket, értve ez alatt a haszonelvű, a rousseau-i episztemikus, valamint a mára oly divatossá vált deliberativ, diskurzus alapú demokrácia modellek kritikai elemzését. Szintén kitér a közgadászok számára valószínűleg ismertebb és talán vonzóbb schumpeteri valamint downsi koncepcióra is, amely a demokráciát is a verseny és a piac fogalmaival próbálja leírni. A másik, reményem szerint a filozófiatörteneti megközelítést kiegészítő elméleti blokk inkább a politikatudomány területéhez tartozik és olyan támékat tárgyal mint a többségi elv és a demokrácia viszonya, preferencia aggregáció, szavazási procedúrák és kapcsolatos problémák. Végül de nem utolsósorban a kurzus kitér a demokrácia és az alkotmányosság (constitutionalism) viszonyára is. Mindezek során, ahogy az a tematikából is kiderül a kurzus épít az előző politikafilozófiai bevezető kurzusomra. Ugyanakkor az ott szerzett ismeretek nem feltétlenül szükségesek a tárgyalandó témák megértéséhez, bár kétségtelenül megkönnyítik azt. 1. téma Bevezetés: normatív kérdések Kötelező olvasmányok: - Brian Barry: Is Democracy Special?, in. Barry: Democracy and Power, Clarendon, Oxford, 1991, pp. 24-60 - George Kateb: The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, in. Ethics, 91 (1981), pp. 357-74 2. téma Klasszikus demokrácia koncepciók I: A haszonelvű megközelítés Kötelező olvasmányok: - John Mill: Government, in. Mill: Political Writings, Cambridge UP, 1992, pp. 143 - Richard Harrison: Bentham, in. Harrison: Democracy, Ch. III, Routledge, 1993, pp. 51-61 3. téma Klasszikus demokrácia koncepciók II: Rousseau elmélete Kötelező olvasmányok: - J.J. Rousseau: On the Social Contract, részletek, Indianapolis, Cambrdige, Hackett, 1987

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Richard Harrison: Rousseau, in. Democracy, Ch. IV, pp. 51-61

Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Joshua Cohen: Autonomy and Authority: Rousseau on Democracy, Manuscript 4. Klasszikus demokrácia koncepciók: Liberalizmus Kötelező olvasmányok: - Benjamin Constant: The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, in. Constant: Political Writings, Cambridge UP, 1988, pp. 309-28 - Quentin Skinner: The Idea of Negative Liberty, in. R. Rorty – J.B. Schneewind – Q. Skinner (eds.): Philosophy in History, Cambridge UP, 1984, pp. 193-221 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Carol Pateman: Rousseau, J.S. Mill and G.D.H. Cole, in. Pateman: Participation and Democratic Theory, Ch. IV, Cambridge UP, 1989, pp. 22-44 5. téma Demokrácia mint verseny Kötelező olvasmányok: - Anthony Downs: An Economic Theory of Democracy, Part I, Harper and Row, New York, 1957, pp. 3-74 - Joseph A. Scumpeter: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Chs XXI, XXII, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 250-83 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - D. Robertson: A Predictive Theory of Comptetive Democracy, in. Robertson: A Theory of Party Competition, Chapter 2, J. Wiley and Sons, London, 1976, pp. 2354 - David Miller: The Competitive Model of Democracy, in. Duncan (ed.): Theory and Practice, Cambrdidge UP, 1983, pp. 133-55 6. téma Választói preferenciák Kötelező olvasmányok: - G. Brennan and L.E. Lomasky: Large Numbers, Small Costs…, in. BrennanLomasky (eds.): Politics and Process, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 4259 - J. H. Aldrich: When Is It Rational to Vote?, in. D.C. Muller (ed.): Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge UP, 1997, pp. 373-90 7. téma A választói prefernciák információs háttere Kötelező olvasmányok: - A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins: The Democratic Dilemma, Cambridge UP, 1998, Chs 3-4, pp. 39-78 - A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins: Representation or Abdication?, in. European Journal of Political Research, 37/3 May 2000, pp. 291-307 8. téma Preferencia aggregáció

Kötelező olvasmányok: - W. H. Riker: Liberalism Against Populism Chs I and X, Prospects Heights, Ill, Waveland Press, 1982, pp. 1-19, 233-53 - J. Coleman-J. Ferejohn: Democracy and Social Choice, in. Ethics 97 (1986), pp. 6-25 - Joshua Cohen: An Epistemic Theory of Democracy, in. Ethics 97 (1986), pp. 2638 9. téma Demokrácia mint vita Kötelező olvasmányok: - Joshua Cohen: Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in. A. Hamlin-P. Pettit (eds.): The Good Polity, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, pp. 17-34 - Amy Gutmann-Dennis Thompson: The Consitution of Deliberative Democracy, in. Democracy and Disagreement, Belknap, Cambridge, Mass., 1996 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Seyla Benhabib: Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, in. Constellations, 1/1994 - Joshua Cohen: Democracy and Liberty, in. Jon Elster (ed.): Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge, 1998 10. téma Demokratikus egyenlőség és a többségi elv Kötelező olvasmányok: - D.W. Rae – E. Schikler: Majority Rule, in. D.C. Mueller (ed.): Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge UP, 1997, pp. 181-200 - Charles Beitz: The Subject of Political Equality, in. Princeton UP, 1989, Ch.2 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - K.O. May: A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decisions, in. Econometrica 20 (1952), pp. 680-84 11. téma Alkotmányosság és bírói felügyelet Kötelező olvasmányok: - R. Dworkin: Political Judges and the Rule of Law, in. Dworkin: A Matter of Principle, Harvard UP, 1985, pp. 9-32 - Jeremy Waldron: Rights and Majorities, Rousseau Revisited, in. J. W. Chapman – A. Wertheimer (eds.): Majorities and Minorities, New York UP, 1990, pp. 44-75 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - D.C. Mueller: Consitituional Public Choice, in. Mueller (ed.): Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge UP, 1997, pp. 124-47 - D. Gauthier: Consituting Democracy, D. Copp – J. Hampton – J.E. Roemer (eds.): The Idea of Democracy, Cambridge UP, 1993, pp. 314-34

Identity and Morality Course

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Staff at the Department of Philosophy | In Swedish | In English Mallsida för personalsidor - engelska

IDENTITY AND MORALITY Praktisk filosofi, Kandidatkurs, Litteraturkurs II vt 2008; Attila Tanyi; D713 email: [email protected] Office hours: Tue 14-16; Thu 16-18; by appointment This course will focus on personal identity and its role in ethical theory. We will discuss several theories of personal identity and examine their implications for our views about prudence, moral responsibility, bioethics, distributive justice, and special obligations. Persons seem to persist through some physical and psychological changes, but not others. What are the conditions of personal identity through time, and how are they related to a person’s physical and psychological characteristics? What unites different stages of a single life, and what distinguishes stages in different lives? Some views about personal identity are reductionist, claiming that a person’s persistence is a matter of familiar physical and/or psychological facts; others deny these reductionist claims. We will look at the classical debate between reductionists, such as John Locke (1632-1704) and non-reductionists such Joseph Butler (1692-1752) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and then turn to contemporary discussions, especially the imaginative and resourceful defense of psychological reductionism by Derek Parfit. Parfit argues that psychological reductionism makes best sense of our responses to a diverse range of thought experiments – involving brain transplants, physical and psychological scanning and modification, physical and psychological fission (and fusion), and teletransportation. He also believes that psychological reductionism has some surprising consequences. According to psychological reductionism, my survival can be indeterminate. For instance, I might know all the facts about the future, including the fact that someone will suffer tomorrow, yet, according to reductionism, I might still not know whether it will be me that suffers. Psychological reductionism also seems to imply that the difference between myself and others is a difference of degree, not kind. Is this plausible, or is the separateness of persons some deep fact? If the intrapersonal/interpersonal distinction is not a fundamental one, psychological reductionism may force us to change some common assumptions. Perhaps my relationship to my distant future self is more like my relationship to another person. If so, this may lead us to reconsider the rationality of prudence. Psychological reductionism may also lead us to see some interpersonal associations – for instance, those involving love and friendship – as held together by the same sort of glue that holds together a single life. How might this conclusion affect our view of self-love and friendship? Of there can be interpersonal, as well as intrapersonal psychological continuity, should this affect the way that we apportion responsibility for good and bad deeds? Perhaps parents should be held responsible, at least in part, for the crimes their children commit. What about distributive justice? It is sometimes thought the importance of distributional norms depends on the separateness of persons. Both John Rawls (1921-2002) and Robert Nozick (1938-2002) rest their influential criticisms of utilitarianism on the separateness of persons. How might our views about distributive justice change if we reject the separateness of persons? Finally, several areas in bioethics rely heavily on considerations of personal identity. The morality of advance directives, of embryonic stem cell research (and genetic issues in general), or of abortion are good examples. In all these cases psychological reductionism takes a leading and often revisionary role.

FORMAT The course consists of seven three-hour seminars. Each seminar will be framed by a student presentation: in the course of a close reading of the text, the student will guide us through the text (see below), while other participants can join in with their questions and comments. The number of presentations per seminar may vary depending on the number of registered students. If there is more than one presentation scheduled for a seminar, I will schedule presentations in such a way that they correspond to the structure of the topic discussed. I will also try to introduce material and ask questions in a way that aims to impose useful analytical structure on the readings and issues.

REQUIREMENTS Students registered for the course are required to give presentations and write one term paper. The outline of the presentation

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(2-3 pages) must be submitted to me 5PM of the day before the seminar takes place. Presentations should have an analytical structure, setting out the arguments employed in the text and making critical remarks, suggestions related to the arguments. Topics for the term paper will be distributed to participants before the last seminar of the course (March 31). Each student should choose one topic and write an argumentative essay of not more than 15 pages (12 point, Times New Roman, double spaced) and submit the paper to me not later than April 7, 12AM. Seminar participation, including presentation will be worth 50% of the final grade; the term paper will be worth 50% of the final grade. Participation in seminars is strictly obligatory, given the few number of occasions we will meet.

COURSE MATERIAL The following books have been ordered for the course and should (soon) be available at the University Bookstore (Akademikbokhandeln): Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford UP Perry, ed. Personal Identity, Columbia UP The following encyclopedia entries provide a good introduction to and overview of the topic: Olson, ‘Personal Identity’, in. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy D. Shoemaker, ‘Personal Identity and Ethics’, in. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy A useful course website that I borrowed a lot from: David Brink: Persons and Values

WEBSITE The website contains all the necessary information: literature, topics, schedules, practical information on the course etc. Where it was possible, I also provided links to the articles and books: they are available from the University Library. The remaining literature (only the required, not the recommended) will be available for pickup in the Philosophy Department's administration office from the beginning of March (with the exception of the above two books: Perry and Parfit). The website will also contain the uploaded student presentations (the 2-3 page long outlines mentioned above) as soon as I receive them (that is, after 5pm of the day before the seminar). Participants are therefore strongly advised to check the website regularly.

I. PERSONAL IDENTITY Session I. Locke and his critics. What is it for one person to persist through time, that is, for persons at different times to be one and the same? Why do we need a theory of personal identity? We expect persons to survive certain physical and psychological changes, but not others. Why is this? How are these physical and psychological features of persons related to their identity? We being our inquiry with Locke's memory theory and its criticism by Reid (transitivity charge) and Butler (circularity charge). Here we will also meet the main alternative theories, i.e. reductionism (physical and psychological) and non-reductionism. Required: Locke, ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ in. Perry Reid, ‘Of Identity’ and ‘Of Mr. Locke’s Account of Our Personal Identity’ in. Perry Butler, ‘Of Personal Identity’ in. Perry Recommended: Hume, ‘Our Idea of Identity’, ‘Of Personal Identity’ and ‘Second Thoughts’ in. Perry Noonan, Personal Identity, Chapter 1 Session II. Psychological reductionism and its rivals I. We start with Bernard Williams' argument against psychological reductionism. Then we turn to Parfit's development of Locke's theory - psychological continuity vs. memory as well as his defense of psychological reductionism against Williams' (and others') objections. What is quasi-memory and what is the combined spectra argument? And how do they support psychological reductionism? Required: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapters 10-11 Recommended: Williams, ‘The Self and the Future’ in. Perry

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Noonan, Personal Identity, Chapters 2-11 S. Shoemaker, ‘Persons and Their Pasts’ and ‘Personal Identity’ Grice, ‘Personal Identity’ in. Perry Rovane, The Bounds of Agency, Chapters 1-2 Session III. Psychological reductionism and its rivals II. Parfit claims that fission cases (cases when people divide) demonstrate that it is psychological continuity, rather than personal identity as such, that matters to us. Is he right? Are fission cases, as many claim, amount to an objection against psychological reductionism? We then turn to another argument, this time by fellow (physical) reductionists. Olson’s thinking animal argument against psychological reductionism (and in favour of physical reductionism). Required: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapters 12-13 Recommended: Olson, What Are We?, Chapter 2 Nagel, ‘Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness’ in. Perry Nagel, The View From Nowhere, Chapter 3 Lewis, ‘Survival and Identity’ Sosa, ‘Survival Matters’ Olson, The Human Animal and ‘An Argument for Animalism’ Noonan, 'Animalism versus Lockeanism'

II. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ETHICAL THEORY Session IV. Reductionism and special concern. Private projects (e.g. that I finish editing this website) are central to our lives and may seem to be ingredients in psychological continuity. Yet they also seem to presuppose personal identity. Are these aspects of private projects consistent? What is the justification of private projects, and how does our answer affect our views about what matters? Perry’s claim that special concern is strictly derivative; Whiting’s attempt to account for the non-derivative significance of special concern in the framework of psychological reductionism. Required: Perry, ‘The Importance of Being Identical’ in. Rorty Whiting, ‘Friends and Future Selves’ Recommended: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 305-312 Whiting, ‘Impersonal Friends’ Broad, ‘Self and Others’ Brink, ‘Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community’ Wolf, 'Self Interest and Interest in Selves' Session V. Reductionism and prudence. Parfit offers various arguments against rational egoism or prudence, some of which rest on his reductionist claims about personal identity. Is Parfit right to insist on the parity of interpersonal and intrapersonal distribution? How might the egoist appeal to the separateness of persons to defend her theory? Any defense of egoism that appeals to the separateness of persons must address Parfit’s claim that reductionism undermines the separateness of persons. Egoism’s temporal neutrality implies that it is rationally required for a person to make a sacrifice now for her own greater future good. Parfit thinks that reductionism challenges the rationality of this kind of sacrifice. One reason he offers is that personal identity is metaphysically less deep, according to the reductionist. He also appeals to the fact that psychological connectedness depreciates over time. Are these arguments compelling? Required: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapters 7, 14 Brink, ‘Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons’ in. Dancy Recommended: Brink, ‘Self-Love and Altruism’ Brink, ‘Prudence and Authenticity’ Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 418-419 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism Johnston, ‘Humean Concerns without Superlative Selves’ in. Dancy Session VI. Reductionism, responsibility and distributive j u s t i c e . Parfit also claims that reductionism should affect our attitudes toward moral responsibility and distributive justice. He thinks that reductionism makes it hard for us to hold people responsible for the actions of their earlier selves and to impose long-term punishments for crimes. He also thinks that reductionism undermines the separateness of persons, reduces the importance of distributional principles, and makes utilitarianism more plausible than it would otherwise be. Does reductionism support these moral claims, and are they

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as revisionary as Parfit thinks? Required: Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapter 15 Jeske, ‘Persons, Compensation, and Utilitarianism’ Recommended: Rawls, A Theory of Justice, §§5-6 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 33 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, pp. 138-142 van den Beld, ed. Moral Responsibility and Ontology D. Shoemaker, 'Personal Identity and Practical Concerns' Schultz, 'Persons, Selves and Utilitarianism' Session VII. Reductionism and b i o e t h i c s . Considerations of personal identity appear in several bioethical discussions. Debates concerning embryonic stem cell research, abortion, or advance directivesare all infused to a great extent with arguments from personal identity. We will only deal with one such field of application: the moral authority of advance directives. Is it morally justified for the will of the non-demented self of the patient to bind his later demented self? Is the demented self the same person? Is he a person at all? Required: Buchanan and Brock, Deciding for Others, Chapter 3 DeGrazia, 'Advance Directives, Dementia, and 'the Someone Else Problem'' Recommended: Conee, ‘Metaphysics and the Morality of Abortion’ McMahan, The Ethics of Killing Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 321-329 Becker, Gerhold K. ed. The Moral Status of Persons Burley, Justine and Harris, John, eds. A Companion to Genetics DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics, Chapter 5 Holland, S., Lebacqz K., and Zoloth, L. eds. The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate Olson, Eric T. What Are We?, Chapter 2 Singer, Unsanctifying Human Life

BIBLIOGRAPHY Becker, Gerhold K. ed. The Moral Status of Persons: Perspectives on Bioethics, Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000 Brink, David, ‘Self-love and Altruism’ in. Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): 122-57 Brink, David, ‘Rational Egoism and the Separateness of Persons’ in. Reading Parfit, Dancy ed. pp. 96-134 Brink, David ‘Eudaimonism, Love and Friendship, and Political Community’ in. Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1999): 252-289 Brink, David, ‘Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value’ in. The Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 215-245 Broad, C. D. ‘Self and Others’ in. Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy ed. D. Cheney, London: Allen and Unwin, 1971, pp. 262-282 Buchanan, Allen, ‘Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem’ in. Philosophy and Public Affairs 17:4 (Autumn 1988): 277-302 Buchanan, Allen and Brock, Dan W., Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 Burley, Justine and Harris, John, eds. A Companion to Genetics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002 Butler, Joseph, ‘Of Personal Identity’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 99-107 Conee, Earl, ‘Metaphysics and the Morality of Abortion’ in. Mind 108:432 (Oct, 1999): 619-646 Dancy, Jonathan (ed.), Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997 DeGrazia, David, 'Advance Directives, Dementia, and 'the Someone Else Problem'' in. Bioethics 13:5 (1999): 373-391 DeGrazia, David, ‘Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence’ in. Philosophy and Public Affairs 31:4 (2003): 413-442 DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005 Grice, H. P. ‘Personal Identity’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 73-99 Holland, S., Lebacqz K., and Zoloth, L. eds. The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, MIT Press, 2001 Hume, David, ‘Our Idea of Identity’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 159-161 Hume, David, ‘Of Personal Identity’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 161-173 Hume, David, ‘Second Thoughts’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 173-179 Jeske, Diane, ‘Persons, Compensation and Utilitarianism’ in. The Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 541-575 Johnston, Mark, ‘Humean Concerns Without Superlative Selves’ in. Reading Parfit, ed. J. Dancy, pp.148-179 Korsgaard, Christine, 'Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency': A Kantian Response to Parfit' in. Philosophy and Public

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Affairs, 18:2 (Spring 1989): 101-132 Lewis, David, ‘Survival and Identity’ in. The Identities of Persons, A. Rorty ed. pp. 17-41 Locke, John, ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 33-53 Marquis, Don, ‘Why Abortion Is Immoral’ in. The Journal of Philosophy, 86:4 (April 1989): 183-202 McMahan, Jeff, The Ethics of Killing, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002 Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970 Nagel, Thomas, ‘Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 227-247 Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 Noonan, H. Personal Identity, Boston: Routledge, 1989 Noonan, H. ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy’ in. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998): 302-318 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974 Olson, Eric T. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 Olson, Eric. T. ‘Personal Identity’ in. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Feb. 20, 2007 Olson, Eric T. ‘An Argument for Animalism’ in. Martin R. and Barresi J. (eds.), Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003 Olson, Eric T. What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Oxford: Oxfird University Press, 2007 Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984 Parfit, Derek, 'Comments' in. Ethics 96:4 (July 1986): 832-872 Perry, John (ed.), Personal Identity, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975 Perry, John, ‘The Importance of Being Identical’ in. The Identities of Persons ed. A. Rorty, pp. 67-91 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971 Reid, Thomas, ‘Of Identity’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 107-113 Reid, Thomas, ‘Of Mr. Locke’s Account of Our Personal Identity’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 113-119 Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1976 Rovane, Carol, The Bounds of Agency, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998 Schultz, Bert, 'Persons, Selves, and Utilitarianism' in. Ethics 96:4 (July 1986): 721-745 Shoemaker, David, ‘Personal Identity and Ethics’ in. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, March 13, 2007 Shoemaker, David, ‘Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension’ in. Social Theory and Practice 31 (2005): 51-75 Shoemaker, David, 'Personal Identity and Practical Concerns' in. Mind 116:462 (April 2007): 317-357 Shoemaker, Sydney, ‘Persons and Their Pasts’ in. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970): 269-285 Shoemaker, Sydney, ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist Account’ in. S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, eds. Personal Identity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984 Sider, Ted, Four-Dimensionalism, New York: Oxford UP, 2001 Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. Singer, Peter, Unsanctifying Human Life, ed. Helga Kuhse, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002 Sosa, Ernie, ‘Surviving Matters’ in. Nous 24 (April 1990): 297-322 van den Beld, ed. Moral Responsibility and Ontology, the Netherlands, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Whiting, Jennifer, ‘Friends and Future Selves’ in. The Philosophical Review 95:4 (1986): 547-80 Whiting, Jennifer, ‘Impersonal Friends’ in. The Monist 74 (1991): 3-29 Williams, Bernard, ‘The Self and the Future’ in. Personal Identity, J. Perry ed. pp. 179-199 Wolf, Susan, 'Self Interest and Interest in Selves' in. Ethics 96:4 (July 1986): 703-720 Wrigley, Anthony, 'Personal Identity, Autonomy and Advance Directives' in. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24:4 (2007): 381-396

SCHEDULE

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Place and time

Topic

Presentations (previous semester)

Outlines

Tuesday 7.10 13-14 D255

Introduction, scheduling of presentations, other practical matters

none.

Session 0

Tuesday 14.10 13-14 D255

Locke and his critics: Locke, Reid, Butler

Tobias on Locke Jon on Butler and Reid

Session 1

Friday 17.10 13-16 D255

Psychological reductionism and its rivals I: Parfit

Nina on Parfit Chapter 10 Joakim on Parfit Chapter 11

Session 2

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Tuesday 21.10 13-16 D255

Psychological reductionism and its rivals II: Parfit

Lisa on Parfit Chapter 12, 13

Session 3

Firday 24.10 13-16 D255

Reductionism and special concern: Perry, Whiting

Karim on Perry Joakim in Whiting

Session 4

Tuesday 28.10 13-16 D239

Reductionism and prudence: Parfit, Brink

Jon on Brink

Session 5

Friday 31.28 13-16 D255

Reductionism, responsibility, and distributiv justice: Parfit, Jeske

Nina on Parfit, Chapter 15

Session 6

Tuesday 4.11 13-16 D255

Reductionism and bioethics: Buchanan and Brock, DeGrazia

Karim on Buchanan and Brock Tobias on DeGrazia

Session 7

NEWS 3 . 3 . I have put the course material in a box marked 'Identity' in the expedition office of the Department. Except for the assigned chapter from the Brock and Buchanan book (which I will include later), all articles and chapters are there so that those who don't want to or cannot print can also have access to the assigned readings. 8.3. I have made the changes we have agreed about concerning literature and requirements. We also have a new participant in the course, Joakim. This means that the presentation burden will be reduced to 2 presentations/participant. We will briefly talk about this on Monday. 13.3 The Buchanan and Brock chapter (last session material) is now available for pick up in the expedition office. 17.3. Some of the articles disappeared from the box in the expidition office. I have now replaced them; they are again available for pick up if any of you needs them. 18.3. Please read pp. 307-312 from Parfit's book for Thursday. 24.3. I have fixed the links to the presentation outlines; they now work properly. 31.3. Here are the essay questions for the term paper. Remember: deadlines for submission is 7 APRIL 12AM! New semester 13.10. I have refreshed the site and uploaded the outline for the introductory session. 21.10. Two rescheduled seminars. Thursday 23.10. 10-13 F271 and Monday 3.11 13-16 F279 3.11. Exam: one freely chosen topic or one from the list of questions above. Length etc. are there too. Deadline: Nov. 19. Result by the end of that week. Department of Philosophy Stockholm University

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Politikai legitimáció Tanyi Attila A kurzus a legitimáció témakörét normatív szemszögből közelíti meg s célja a politikai legitimáció főbb elméleteinek kritikai vizsgálata. Alapgondolata az, hogy a politikai legitimáció az irányítók és az irányítottak közötti speciális kapcsolatot tételezi fel, amely alapjában határozza meg az egyének társadalomban betöltött erkölcsi

státuszát.

Mindebből

következően

az

egyének

erkölcsi

alapú

kötelezettségekkel tartoznak államuk felé, amely kötelezettség azonban igazolást igényel. A kurzus célja a filozófiatörténetben fellelhető válaszok tanulmányozása, kritikai vizsgálata (szerződéselmélet, jogi pozitivizmus, integritás, igazságosság stb.): ha ezek közül egyik sem megfelelő, akkor nem marad más hátra mint az anarchista pozíció elfogadása. A kurzus folyamán ezen kérdés megválaszolására fogunk törekedni. 1. téma Bevezetés, a téma behatárolása Kötelező olvasmányok: - David Copp: The Idea of a Legitimate State. In. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1/1999 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - David Beetham: The Legitimation of Power, Houndmills, 1991, pp. 64-100 - Richard Flathman: Legitimacy, in. R.Goodin – P. Pettit (eds.): A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, 1993 - A: John Simmons: Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton UP, 1979 2. téma A probléma: a filozófiai anarchizmus koncepiója Kötelező olvasmányok: - Richard Paul Wolff: In Defense of Anarchism, New York, 1976, pp. 3-19 - A. John Simmons: Philosophical Anarcism, in. J.T. Sanders – J. Narveson (eds.): For and Against the State, Lanham, 1996, pp. 19-39 - H. Frankfurt: The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff, in. Political Theory 1 (1973), pp. 405-14 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - C. Gans: Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience, Cambridge UP, 1992 - A. John Simmons: Justification and Legitimacy, in. Ethics, July 1999, pp. 739-771 - K. Nielsen: State Authority and Legitimation, in. P. Harris (ed.): On Political Obligation, New York, 1990

3. téma Mitől legitim a hatalom? Kötelező olvasmányok: - R.B. Friedman: On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy, in. Joseph Raz (ed.): Authority, New York, 1990 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Joseph Raz: Introduction, in. Authority, New York, 1990 - Richard Tuck: Why Is Authority Such a Problem?, in. P.Laslett (ed.): Philosophy, Politics and Society, Oxford, 1972 - Steven Lukes: Perspectives on Authority, in. Lukes: Moral Conflict and Authority, Ch. 7, Oxford, 1991 4. téma Max Weber legitimáció elmélete Kötelező olvasmányok: - Max Weber: Economy and Society, Berkley, 1978, Part I, Ch.1, pp. 3-38, Ch.3. pp. 212-55 5. téma Jogi pozitivizmus (Herbert Hart) Kötelező olvasmányok: - H.L.A. Hart: Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in. J. Raz (ed.): Authority, New York, 1990 - H.L.A. Hart: The Concept of Law, Oxford, 1990, pp. 77-120 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Hans Kelsen: The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, in. Harvard Law Review, 55/1941 - N. Bobbio: ’Sein’ and ’Sollen’ in Legal Science, in. Archiv für Rechts- und Socialphilosophie, 6/1970 - N. Luhmann: Essay on Self-Reference, Ch.13, New York, 1990 6. téma Joseph Raz legitimáció koncepciója Kötelező olvasmányok: - Joseph Raz: Authority and Justification, in. Raz (ed.): Authority New York, 1990 - Joseph Raz: Authority, Law and Morality, in. Monist, 2/1985 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law, Ch. 1, Oxford, 1979 - Joseph Raz: The Morality of Freedom, Part I, Oxford, 1986 7. téma A társadalmi szerződés Kötelező olvasmányok: - Kim Lane Scheppele – Jeremy Waldron: Contractarian Methods in Political and Legal Reasoning, in. Yale Journal of Law and Humanities, 3/1991 - Jean Hampton: Contract and Consent, in. A.Hamlin – P. Pettit (eds.): A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, 1993

Ajánlott olvasmányok: - L. Green: Consent and Community, in. P. Harris (ed.): On Political Obligation, London, 1990 - J. Raz: Government by Consent, in. J.R. Pennock – J.W. Chapman (eds.): Authority Revisited, Nomos XXIX, New York and London, 1987 - A. Hamlin: Liberty, Contract and the State, in. A. Hamlin – P. Pettit (eds.): The Good Polity, Cambridge, 1991 - Huoranszki Ferenc: Filozófia és utópia, Osiris, 1999, Budapest, pp. 123-91 - K. Greenawalt: Promissory Obligation: The Theme of the Social Contract, in. Greenawalt: Conflicts of Law and Morality, New York-Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 62-93 8. téma Legitimáció és igazságosság (John Rawls) Kötelező olvasmányok: - John Rawls: Az igazságosság elmélete, Osiris, Budapest, 1998, 18-19§, érvelés - Jeremy Waldron: Special Ties and Natural Duties, in. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993), pp. 3-30 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - John Rawls: Political Liberalism, Columbia UP, 1996, Part II, Lecture 4 - Thomas Nagel: Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, in. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16/1987 - Thomas Scanlon: Contractarianism and Utilitarianism, in. A. Sen – B. Williams (eds.): Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge UP, 1982, pp. 103-29 - C. Bird: Mutual Respect and Neutral Justification, in. Ethics, October 1996 - Kis János: Az állam semlegessége, in. Kis: Az állam semlegessége, Atlantisz, Budapest, 1997, pp. 71-129 9. téma Legitimáció és vita (deliberatív demokrácia). Kötelező olvasmányok: - Seyla Benhabib: Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, in. Constellations, 1/1994 - Joshua Cohen: Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in. A. Hamlin – P. Pettit (eds.): The Good Polity, Oxford, 1991 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Amy Gutmann-Dennis Thompson: The Consitution of Deliberative Democracy, in. Democracy and Disagreement, Belknap, Cambridge, Mass., 1996 - Joshua Cohen: Democracy and Liberty, in. Jon Elster (ed.): Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge, 1998 - C.S. Nino : The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, New Haven and London, 1996 10. téma Legitimáció és integritás (Ronald Dworkin) Kötelező olvasmányok: - Rondald Dworkin: Integrity, in. Dworkin: The Law’s Empire, Ch. 1, Harvard, 1986

Ajánlott olvasmányok: - M. Hardimon: Role Obligations, in. Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994) pp. 333-363 - J. Horton: Political Obligation Reconsidered, in. Horton: Political Obligation, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1997, pp. 137-171 11. téma Közösségelvűség: közös jó koncepció mint legitimáló elv (Charles Taylor) Kötelező olvasmányok: - Charles Taylor: Cross-Purposes: The Liberal Communitarian Debate, in. N.L. Rosenblaum (ed.): Liberalism and the Moral Life, Harvard, 1989 - Charles Taylor: The Politics of Recognition, in. A. Gutmann (ed.): Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton UP, 1994 Ajánlott olvasmányok: - Charles Taylor: The Ethics of Authenticity, Harvard, 1992 - Will Kymlicka: Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford, 1991 - Daniel Bell: Communitarianism and its Critics, Oxford, 1993 - Michael Cooke: Authenticity and Autonomy, in. Political Theory, 2/1997 12. téma Politikai semlegesség mint legitimáló elv (Kis János) Kötelező olvasmányok: - Kis János: Natural Duties Regarding Institutions, Kézirat (későbbiekben kiosztandó)

! !

Dr.$Attila&Tanyi! Professor!in#Moral!Philosophy! Institute(of(Philosophy! GW#II#01.09! T:#+49!921!/"55"4148!(secretariat)! E:#attila.tanyi@uni"bayreuth.de! www.pe.uni"bayreuth.de!

Summer&Semester&2013!

Political(Philosophy!|"MA!A"2! Description! This%course%offers%a%systematic%introduction%to%contemporary%political%philosophy.%It% comes& in& two& parts.& The& first& part& explores& fundamental& concepts& and& values,& raising' questions' about' the' nature' of' rights,' the' sources' of' political' obligation,' legitimacy! and$ authority$ of$ the$ state,$ the$ significance$ of$ liberty,$ the$ content$ and$ scope& of& distributive& justice,& and& the& justification& of& democracy.& The& second& part& explores( contemporary( challenges( in( normative( political( philosophy,( including( just( war$ and$ the$ legitimate& use& of& force,& global& justice& and& human& rights,& and& climate& change.(! ! The$discussion$of$normative$questions$will$originate$from$particular$puzzles$and$real$ questions)in)political)debate,)introduce)historical)writings)where)doing)so)serves)a) systematic" purpose," and" reflect" questions" of" method" all" along" the" way." Students" will$enable$them$to$appreciate$contemporary$contributions$in$leading$journals.! Structure! The$course$consists$of$an#11"lectures"and"corresponding"seminars.! Instructions! 1. Each% seminar% session$ is$ based$ on$ two$ contemporary$ texts$ there$ will$ be$ one$ presentation*for*each*text.! 2. Presentations* should* last* no* longer* than* 15* minutes,* offer* a* concise* and* systematic) overview) of) the) arguments) and) topic) of) your) assigned) reading) and) include(questions(for(discussion.!

Gabriel!Wollner!|!50013!Responsibility!(SS!2012)!

!

2!

3. Seminar(presentations(may(make(use(of(beamer(slides,(but(these(should(be(kept( to#a#minimum#and#be#as#simple#as#possible#(no#special#effects#etc.);#the#idea#is#for# you$to$summarize$your$essay$argument$on"the"slides,"not"reproduce"it.! 4. To# prepare# for$ essays$ and$ exams,$ recommendations$ for$ further$ reading$ will$ be$ available'during'each'lecture.! Assessment! • A"seminar"presentation.! • A"3000"word"mid"term%essay%and%a%3000%word%end"term%essay.%Your%essays%are%to% be#taken#from#the#list#of#seminar#topics#that#you$have$not!presented.! • An#end"term%exam%(2%hours).! • The$grade$is$constituted$from$the$best$of$the$essays$(50%)$and$the$exam$(50%).! Deadlines! • Mid!term%essay:%Fri$29$June$2012$(by$e"mail).! • End!term%essay:"Fri"03!August!2012$(by$e"mail).! • End!term%exam:"TBA! Attendance! Attendance(is(compulsory.!

Course'Schedule! 1.#Introduction:#The#subject#of#political#Philosophy! Lecture'1:'16'May,'10h–12h! 2.#Authority,#Legitimacy#and#political#obligation! Lecture'2:'23#May,#08h–12h,"S"65"(RW)! Seminar(2:(30(May,(08h–12h,%S65%(RW)! (1)! Simmons,(A.J.((1999),(‘Justification(and(Legitimacy’,(Ethics,"109"(4),"739–71.! (2)! Applbaum,)A.I.)(2010),)‘Legitimacy)without)the)Duty)to)Obey’,)Philosophy)and) Public'Affairs,"38"(3),"215–39.! 3.#Democracy! Lecture'3:'23'May,'10h–12h! Seminar(3:(30(May,!10h–12h! (1)!

Christiano,+ Thomas+ (2001),+ ‘Knowledge+ and+ Power+ in+ the+ Justification+ of+ Democracy’,+Australasian*Journal*of*Philosophy,"79"(2),"197–215.! (2)! Arneson,( Richard( (2004),( ‘Democracy( Is( Not( Intrinsically( Just’,( in( Dowding,( Keith,' Robert.' E.' Goodin," and" Carol" Pateman" (eds.)," Justice( and( Democracy! (Justice)and)Democracy,)Cambridge:)Cambridge)University)Press),)40–58.!


!

3!

4.#Liberty! Lecture'4:'24'May,'16h–18h! Seminar(4:(31(May,(16h–18h! (1)!

MacCallum,) G.C.) (1967),) ‘Negative) and) positive) freedom’,) The$ Philosophical) Review,"76"(3),"312–34.! (2)! Pettit,&Philip&(2011),&‘The&Instability&of&Freedom&as&Noninterference:&The&Case& of#Isaiah#Berlin’,#Ethics,"121"(4),"693–716.! 5.#Rights! Lecture'5:'24'May,'18h–20h! Seminar(5:(31(May,(18h–20h! (1)!

Wenar,' L' (2005),' ‘The! nature' of' rights’,' Philosophy) and) Public) Affairs," 33" (3)," 223–53.! (2)! Dworkin,)R.)(1981),)‘Is)there)a)right)to)pornography?’,)Oxford'Journal'of'Legal' Studies,"1"(2),"177–212.! 6.#Justice#and#equality:#Part#I! Lecture'6:'06'June,'10h–12h! Seminar(6:(13(June,(10h–12h! (1)!

Rawls,'J'(1985),'‘Justice'as'fairness:'political'not'metaphysical’,'Philosophy)and) Public'Affairs,"14"(3),"223–51.! (2)! Nozick,(R.((1973),(‘Distributive(justice’,(Philosophy)and)Public)Affairs,"3"(1),"45– 126.! 7."Justice"and"equality:"Part"II! Lecture'7:'14'June,'16h–18h! Seminar(7:(20(June,(10h–12h! (1)!

Cohen,' Gerald' (1989),' ‘On' the' currency' of' egalitarian' justice’,' Ethics," 99" (4)," 906–44.! (2)! Casal,&P.&(2007),&‘Why&Sufficiency&Is&Not&Enough’,&Ethics,"117"(2),"296–326.! 8."Global"Justice,"human"rights,(and(world(poverty! Lecture'8:'21'June,'16h–18h! Seminar(8:(27(June,(10h–12h! (1)!

Nagel,' Thomas' (2005),' ‘The' problem' of' global' justice’,' Philosophy) and) Public) Affairs,"33"(2),"113–47.! (2)! Sen,% A% (2004),% ‘Elements% of% a% theory% of% human% rights’,% Philosophy) and) Public) Affairs,"32"(4),"315–56.!


!

4!

9.#The#use#of#force#and#just#war! Lecture'9:'28'June,'16h–18h! Seminar(9:(04(July,(10h–12h! (1)!

Fabre,'Cecile'(2009),'‘Guns,'Food,'and'Liability'to'Attack'in'War’,'Ethics,"120"(1)," 36–63.! (2)! Hurka,"Thomas"(2005),"‘Proportionality"in"the"Morality"of"War’,"Philosophy)and) Public'Affairs,"33"(1),"34–66.! 9.#Climate#change! Lecture'10:'05'July,'16h–18h! Seminar(10:(11(July,(10h–12h! (1)!

Derek% Parfit,% ‘Energy% Policy% and% the% Further% Future’,% in% Caney,% Simon% (ed.)% (2011),'Climate(Ethics(!!Essential)Readings,"1–368.! (2)! Kagan,&S.&(2011),&‘Do&I&Make&a&Difference?’,&Philosophy)and)Public)Affairs,"39"(2)," 105–41.! 11.#Realism,#institutions#and#non"ideal&theory! Lecture'11:'12'July,'16h–18h! Seminar(11:(18(July,(10h–12h! (1)!

Murphy,(L.B.((1998),(‘Institutions(and(the(Demands(of(Justice’,(Philosophy)and) Public'Affairs,"27"(4),"251–91.! (2)! Simmons,(A.((2010),(‘Ideal(and(nonideal(theory’,(Philosophy)and)Public)Affairs," 38#(1),#5–36.! !

Attila Tanyi John Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Proseminar, Konstanz, Summer semester 2010/11 Monday, 14-16pm, Room F423

Introduction. John Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong is one of the most influential works in contemporary analytical ethics. Mackie’s work is admirable both in its breadth and its depth. Its perhaps most famous first chapter is the locus classicus for error theories in contemporary meta-ethics. There Mackie argues that ordinary moral discourse and thought involve an assumption that there are what he calls “objective values,” and that this assumption is false. Consequently, ordinary moral thought and language are infected by an error that precludes any ordinary moral claims and thoughts from being true. Mackie then completes his error theory by providing an explanation of our tendency to make this error, to mistakenly suppose that ordinary moral thought and language involve our successfully coming to know about the sorts of things he claims don’t exist. Mackie's book doesn’t end here, however. He goes on to cover a wide range of territory in normative ethics and metaethics, along with a few issues in metaphysics (the existence of God and freedom of the will) that have some bearing on moral issues. In fact, despite his worries about the objectivity of morality, Mackie goes on to defend a substitute for morality, one that looks quite a bit like a broadly consequentialist moral theory, and he even weighs in on several controversial moral issues that are still with us. In short, in a little over two hundred pages of exceptionally clear prose, Mackie covers just about everything of interest in moral philosophy. This book is therefore essential reading for anyone interested in meta-ethics. Understanding some of the material and its importance may require some background knowledge, but enough of the book is more generally accessible that it also constitutes a good wide-ranging introduction to issues in both meta-ethics and normative ethics for a person with some background in philosophy (and perhaps for the general reader). Furthermore, the book, while not a work of history, is sufficiently informed about the history of the issues it discusses to provide the reader with an entry into study of the history of the subject. Hausarbeit möglich. The course will be completed by a 10-15 page long paper (Times New Roman, 12, 1.5) written by the student on topics that are related to the course. Topics must be discussed with the course instructor and must have his permission. During the course student presentations will also be possible (they will be compulsory if the number of students will not be higher than the number of occasions). The idea for these presentations, however, is not that the student gives a lecture to the other participants of the course, but that he/she guides us through the text, by summarizing Sidgwick’s position and making critical remarks and commentaries. Course material. Since we will read one book, it is important that we have the same edition. The one we will use - this is the standard one, available in bookshops and on the internet – is John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin, 1991. It is strongly recommended to purchase the book; there is nevertheless a copy (both the English original and the German translation) in the semester apparat of the course. Background and overview reading. I am not aware of the existence of any lengthier encylopedia entry on Mackie’s philosophy. If anyone knows or finds such an entry, please let me know. The semester apparat of the course contains two edited volumes on Mackie’s !

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philosophy, these can be consulted as a background. ! Course schedule. What follows is the schedule of the course with topic and literature for each occasion. I do not here provide the secondary literature; if a student is interested in the given topic – wants to write his/her paper on it, for instance – I am happy to provide further bibliographic information. ILIAS will have the secondary material as well. Seminar 1 (April 11). Introduction and general matters of interest (practical issues: examination, grading, student presentations etc.) Overview of Mackie’s life. Seminar 2 (April 18). The subjectivity of values, Part I. Chapter I, sections 1-6 Seminar 3 (April 25). The subjectivity of values, Part II. Chapter I, sections 7-12 Seminar 4. No seminar, Easter holiday. Seminar 5 (May 2). The meaning of ‘good’. Chapter II Seminar 6 (May 9). Obligations and reasons. Chapter III Seminar 7 (May 16). Universalization. Chapter IV Seminar 8 (May 23). The object of morality. Chapter V Seminar 9 (May 30). Utilitarianism. Chapter VI Seminar 10 (June 6). Consequentialism and deontology. Chapter VII Seminar 11 (June 13). No seminar, public holiday. Seminar 12 (June 20). Elements of a practical morality, Part I. Chapter VIII, sections 1-5

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Seminar 13 (June 27). Elements of a practical morality, Part II. Chapter VII, sections 6-10 Seminar 14 (July 4). Determinism, responsibility and choice. Chapter VIII Seminar 15 (July 11). Religion, Law, and Politics. Chapter IX

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Attila Tanyi John Stuart Mill’s Political and Moral Philosophy University of Konstanz Winter 2011/2012 Course requirements. The course will be completed by a 5-15 page long paper (Times New Roman, 12, 1.5) written by the student on topics that are related to the course (length depending on whether the student completes a Hausarbeit or an Essay). Topics must be discussed with the course instructor and must have his permission. During the course student presentations will also be possible (they will be compulsory if the number of students will not be higher than the number of occasions). The idea for these presentations, however, is not that the student gives a lecture to the other participants of the course, but that he/she guides us through the text, by summarizing the author’s position and making critical remarks and commentaries. Course material. Since we will read one book, it is important that we have the same edition. The one we will use is The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill. On Liberty, The Subjection of Women, and Utilitarianism, Modern Library Paperback Edition, New York: Random House, 2002. The book is not available in the Library but can be purchased online – on Amazon.de and Abebooks.de - for under 5 EUR. Background and overview reading. For those who want to read something on Mill’s philosophy before the start of the course, the relevant Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry is recommended. The semester apparat of the course as well as the material available online in ILIAS will contain secondary material on Mill’s philosophy. These databases will be available by the start of the course in October. Grading. The final grade will be composed of three parts: seminar participation and attendance (15%), seminar presentation (15%), final paper (70%). My grading policy for student papers is the following: for a grade between 1 and 2, the student must present an original idea in some (convincing) detail, in addition to giving a good and correct summary of Mill’s relevant discussion; for a grade between 2 and 3, the student must prove to have a competent grasp of Mill’s relevant arguments by giving a good summary, pointing out the weak points, perhaps making suggestions how to overcome such weaknesses; for a grade between 3 and 4, the student must show that he/she understands Mill’s text. Course schedule. We will read three essays by John Stuart Mill. We will read “Utilitarianism” in full, most of “On Liberty”, and parts of “The Subjection of Women” (most probably in this order). As for the organization of the seminar, each session will begin with a student presentation (unless there are outstanding problems left over from the previous session), which will be followed by open discussion. (Note. There are altogether 15 occasions to meet in the semester. However, one falls out due to national holiday, and another because it is next week’s introductory seminar. This leaves us with 13 occasions to meet. Below I have listed 12, which gives us some leeway when scheduling discussion during the semester.)

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COURSE SCHEDULE (Note. Title of essay is listed first, then follow chapter numbers and page numbers (the latter are given in brackets).) All references are to the following edition of Mill’s essays: The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill. On Liberty, The Subjection of Women, and Utilitarianism, Modern Library Paperback Edition, New York: Random House, 2002 Seminar 1. On Liberty, Chapter I (3-16) Seminar 2. On Liberty, Chapter II (17-36) Seminar 3. On Liberty, Chapter II (36-56) Seminar 4. On Liberty, Chapter III (57-76) Seminar 5. On Liberty, Chapter IV (77-96) Seminar 6. The Subjection of Women, Chapter I (123-152) Seminar 7. The Subjection of Women, Chapter IV (205-239) Seminar 8. Utilitarianism, Chapter I/II (233-245) Seminar 9. Utilitarianism, Chapter I/II (245-259) Seminar 10. Utilitarianism, Chapters III and IV (260-276) Seminar 11. Utilitarianism, Chapter V (277-287) Seminar 12. Utilitarianism, Chapter V (287-301)

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Attila Tanyi G. E. Moore’s ‘Principia Ethica’ University of Konstanz Winter 2011/2012 Course requirements. The course will be completed by a 5-15 page long paper (Times New Roman, 12, 1.5) written by the student on topics that are related to the course (length depending on whether the student completes a Hausarbeit or an Essay). Topics must be discussed with the course instructor and must have his permission. During the course student presentations will also be possible (they will be compulsory if the number of students will not be higher than the number of occasions). The idea for these presentations, however, is not that the student gives a lecture to the other participants of the course, but that he/she guides us through the text, by summarizing the author’s position and making critical remarks and commentaries. Course material. Since we will read one book, it is important that we have the same edition. The one we will use is G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica, Dover Philosophical Classics, Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2004. The book is not available in the Library but can be purchased online – on Amazon.de and Abebooks.de - for under 6 EUR. Background and overview reading. For those who want to read something on Moore’s philosophy before the start of the course, the relevant Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entries (one on Moore, and one specifically on his moral philosophy) are recommended. The semester apparat of the course as well as the material available online in ILIAS will contain secondary material on Moore’s philosophy. These databases will be available by the start of the course in October. Grading. The final grade will be composed of three parts: seminar participation and attendance (15%), seminar presentation (15%), final paper (70%). My grading policy for student papers is the following: for a grade between 1 and 2, the student must present an original idea in some (convincing) detail, in addition to giving a good and correct summary of Moore’s relevant discussion; for a grade between 2 and 3, the student must prove to have a competent grasp of Moore’s relevant arguments by giving a good summary, pointing out the weak points, perhaps making suggestions how to overcome such weaknesses; for a grade between 3 and 4, the student must show that he/she understands Moore’s text. Course schedule. We will read Moore’s book chapter by chapter. As for the organization of the seminar, each session will begin with a student presentation (unless there are outstanding problems left over from the previous session), which will be followed by open discussion. (Note. There are altogether 15 occasions to meet in the semester. However, one falls out due to national holiday, and another because it is next week’s introductory seminar. This leaves us with 13 occasions to meet. Below I have listed 12, which gives us some leeway when scheduling discussion during the semester.)

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COURSE SCHEDULE (Note. Section numbers are listed first; page numbers follow in brackets.) All references are to the following edition of Moore’s book: G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica, Dover Philosophical Classics, Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2004 Seminar 1. 1-14 (1-21) Seminar 2. 15-23 (21-36) Seminar 3. 24-35 (37-58) Seminar 4. 36-44 (59-74) Seminar 5. 45-57 (74-96) Seminar 6. 58-65 (96-110) Seminar 7. 66-71 (110-122) Seminar 8. 72-85 (122-141) Seminar 9. 86-100 (142-167) Seminar 10. 101-109 (167-182) Seminar 11. 110-123 (183-207) Seminar 12. 124-135 (207-225)

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Attila Tanyi The philosophy of John Rawls Hauptseminar, Konstanz, Summer semester 2009/10 Dienstag, 10-12am, Raum G305 Introduction. The course aims to discuss the main themes of John Rawls’ philosophical thought. Although Rawls is mostly known for his two principles of justice, he has left behind a comprehensive body of philosophical work that ranges from political theory to meta-ethics (and, arguably, even beyond). For this reason, this course, instead of focusing on the reading of one particular work by Rawls, intends to give an overview of the defining elements of his thinking. This means that we will read not only the customary works by Rawls, such as his A Theory of Justice, but will also discuss some of his lesser known but equally important writings both before and after Theory. Thus we will read some of his articles that led to the birth of Theory (from his Collected Papers) such as his classic article on the two concepts of rules, as well as some of the works that are illustrative of the change that has occurred in his thinking after the publication of Theory. In particular, we will deal with the basic ideas of his Political Liberalism. The most time, however, we will devote to the ideas of Theory: to Rawls’ theory of justification (the construction of the original position), to his rejection of utilitarianism, to his two principles of justice (especially the difference principle), to his theory of rationality and goodness (including its relation to rightness), and to his idea of a moral division of labour (the role of institutions in a theory of justice). The course will be a reading course, which means that we will read works by Rawls only; secondary literature will be provided for the help of the students as recommended literature but will not be discussed. The language of instruction will be English. Hausarbeit möglich. The course will be completed by a 10-15 page long paper (Times New Roman, 12, 1.5) written by the student on topics that are related to the course. Topics must be discussed with the course instructor and must have his permission. During the course student presentations will also be possible (they will be compulsory if the number of students will not be higher than the number of occasions). Background and overview reading. Those who are interested and want to have a good overview of Rawls’ philosophy before the course are advised to read the entry on Rawls in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (accessible for free on the internet). Other places where one can get a good introduction to Rawls' philosophy are the following: Adam Swift, Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide for Students and Politicians, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, Part I, esp. 21-9. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, Chapter 3, esp. 53-74. Jonathan Wolff. An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, Chapter 5, esp. 168-195. Paul Graham, Rawls, Oxford: Oneworld, 2007. Key texts by John Rawls. We will use several books by Rawls. They are all available in the University library. However, some of them, in particular Theory and Political Liberalism might be worth purchasing. Here is the list: TJ PL

A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1st edition 1971, revised edition 1999. Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, paperback edition 1996. 1

CP

Collected Papers, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, ed. by Samuel Freeman.

Other books of interest by Rawls. By today the Rawls scholarship can said to be complete. There are several other books by Rawls that we are not going to use, the list can be found below. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, ed. by Erin Kelly. This book contains Rawls' last views on his theory of justice. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, ed. by Barbara Herman. Rawls' Harvard moral philosophy course that he held for more than 20 years. The book contains lectures on Hume, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, ed. by Samuel Freeman. Harvard course lectures on political philosophy. The book contains lectures on Hobbes, Locke, Butler, Rousseau, Mill, Kant, and Marx. A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, ed. by Thomas Nagel. The book contains Rawls' bachelor thesis on religion as well as his late essay on religion. The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. This is Rawls’ final and most detailed statement of the justice of international relations. An earlier, much shorter piece can be found in CP. Secondary literature on Rawls. There is a huge literature on Rawls’ views. Below I provide those that I take to be the best texts or collections of texts: Reading Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Philosophy of Rawls, 5 volumes, eds. Henry Richardson and Paul Weithman, London: Routledge, 1999. John Rawls: Critical Assessment of Leading Philosophers, ed. Chandran Kukathas, London: Routledge, 2002. Thomas Poggge, John Rawls: His Life and His Theory of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Samuel Freeman, Rawls, London: Routledge, 2007. Percy B. Lehning, John Rawls: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Course schedule. What follows is the schedule of the course with topic and literature for each occasion. I do not here provide secondary literature; if a student is interested in the given topic – wants to write his/her paper on it, for instance – I am happy to provide further bibliographic information. Seminar 1 (April 27). Introduction and general matters of interest (practical issues: examination, grading, student presentations etc.). The path to Theory. Rawls' influential discussion of rules and utilitarianism. 'Two Concepts of Rules', CP, 2. Seminar 2 (May 4). Discussing Theory. The basics of Rawls’ approach. 2

Chapter I, TJ. Note: §§4, 9 will be discussed later. Seminars 3 and 4 (May 11 and 18) . Discussing Theory. The two principles of justice. Chapter II, §§10-17, TJ. Seminar 5 (May 25). Discussing Theory. Rawls's view of political obligation and the social contract. Chapter II, §§18-19, TJ. Chapter VI, §§ 51-2, TJ. Background reading, particularly for presenters: 'Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play', CP, 6. Seminars 6 and 7 (June 1 and 8). Discussing Theory. The derivation of the two principles. Chapter III, TJ. Seminars 8 and 9 (June 15 and 22). Discussing Theory. The priority of liberty. Chapter IV, §§31-9, TJ. Chapter VI, §54, TJ. Chapter IX, §82, TJ. Seminar 10 (June 29). Discussing Theory. The method of reflective equilibrium. The good and the right. Chapter I, §§ 4, 9 Chapter VII, §§60, 68, TJ. Chapter VIII, §77, TJ. Chapter IX, §87, TJ. Background reading, particularly for presenters: ‘Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics’, CP, 1. Seminar 11 (July 6). The path to Political Liberalism. Rawls' constructivist project. 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', CP, 16. Background reading, particularly for presenters: ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, CP, 18. !!! Note: I will not be in Konstanz for seminar 6 (June 1) and the course has already missed one occasion (not counting the originally first seminar which was meant to deal only with practical matters). Therefore, unless we can make up for the lost seminars (i.e. find time to add extra seminars), the course will end at this point. If we can hold extra occasions, we will proceed with the schedule below. Seminar 12 (July 13). Discussing Political Liberalism. Fundamental ideas. Recasting the framework of Theory. 'Introduction to the Paperback Edition', PL, esp. pp. 1-4. Lecture I, PL. Seminar 13. Discussing Political Liberalism. The notion of the reasonable, the burdens of 3

judgments, moral psychology, publicity. Lecture II, PL. Seminar 14. Discussing Political Liberalism. The idea of an overlapping consensus. Lecture IV, PL.

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Témák Rawlstól Miklós András – Tanyi Attila A kurzus a John Rawls munkássága által felvetett problémák közül az általunk legfontosabbnak tartottakat tárgyalja Rawls szövege és a legfrissebb kritikai irodalom felhasználásával. 1) Metodológia: reflektív egyensúly a) N. Daniels, Rawls: A Theory of Justice b) Illeszkedés a szerződéselvű hagyományba c) Alternatíva: Sidgwick intuicionizmusa 2) Túl sokat követel a haszonelvűség? (the strains of commitment) a) a rawls-i pozíció és Williams ellenvetései b) Scheffler elmélete c) Murphy alternatívája 3) Rawls és az indokok a) Rawls racionalitáskoncepciója / vágyelvű racionalitásfogalom b) Korsgaard c) Scanlon az indokokról 4) Rawls-i egyenlőség: a különbözeti elv a) érvelés az eredeti helyzetből b) G. A. Cohen: koherens-e a különbözeti elv elfogadása az eredeti helyzetben? 5) Erkölcsi munkamegosztás a) alkalmazhatók-e az igazságosság rawls-i elvei egyéni cselekedetekre? (Cohen) b)

Az intézmények szerepe az egyenlőségelvű igazságosságban.

6) A rawls-i elmélet kiterjesztése – Nemzetközi igazságosság a) Társadalmi liberalizmus: A népek törvénye – Rawls b) Kozmopolita igazságosság: T. Pogge, Ch. Beitz Bibliográfia

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Rawls, John: Az igazságosság elmélete The Law of Peoples Beitz, Charles: Rawls’ Law of Peoples Cohen, G. A.: Incentives, Inequality, and Community The Pareto Argument for Inequality Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice Daniels, Norman (szerk.): Reading Rawls Korsgaard, Christine: Skepticism About Practical Reason The Normativity of Instrumental Reason Murphy, Liam: Institutions and the Demands of Justice Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory Pogge, Thomas: An Egalitarian Law of Peoples Scanlon, T. M.: What We Owe To Each Other, 1. Fejezet Scheffler, Samuel: The Rejection of Consequentialism Human Morality Sidgwick, Henry: The Methods of Ethics Smart - Williams: Utilitarianism For and Against Williams, B: Internal and External Reasons

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Tanyi Attila – Politikaelmélet

Delta Politikai Iskola Politikaelmélet Oktató: Tanyi Attila (email: [email protected]; telefon: 70/2310392) A kurzus leírása A kurzus némileg rendhagyó megközelítését kívánja adni a politika elméleti problémáinak. Az órák első felében a politika és az erkölcs viszonyával fogunk foglalkozni. A politika: hivatás; a kérdés az, hogy mint a hivatások általában a politika is rendelkezik-e saját értékrendszerrel és ha igen, akkor ez miképp viszonyul más értékrendszerekhez. Még konkrétabban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy a politikai cselekvésnek létezik-e erkölcsi dimenziója, és ha igen, akkor hol húzódik a határ az erkölcsös és erkölcstelen politikai cselekedet között. Ezt követően, az órák második felében áttérünk azokra az értékekre, amelyek ezeket, az erkölcsös vagy erkölcstelen cselekedeteket gyakran motiválják: a politikai ideológiákról lesz szó. Három klasszikus értékrendszert fogunk tárgyalni, a liberalizmust, a konzervativizmust és a szocializmust. Miközben a hangsúly az egyes ideológiák legújabb változatain lesz, nem felejtkezünk el az adott ideológia belső kohéziójáról és történelmi dinamikájáról sem. Megközelítés Témánkat a következő módon dolgozzuk fel. A szemináriumok első harmadában az oktató előadása nyitja a téma tárgyalását, majd a hátralévő részben gyakorlati, a jelenlegi magyar helyzettel összefüggő eseteket tárgyalunk meg napi publicisztikák segítségével. Ugyanakkor a két írásbeli számonkérés tárgyát nem ezek és nem is az oktató előadásai, hanem tudományos tanulmányok képezik, amelyek a probléma analitikus megközelítését adják, ezzel kiegészítve az előadó elméleti, de áttekintőbb, illetve a szemináriumok esetorientált tárgyalását. Tematika Első alkalom: a Medgyessy-vita – a ’moralista’ pozíció. A politika erkölcsi elmélete. A politika rendelkezik saját értékekkel, de ezek az értékek, legalábbis részben, az erkölcs kontrollja alatt állnak. A ’piszkos kezek’ problémája, mint speciális erkölcsi dilemma.

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Erkölcsi minimum és felelősség a politikában. Politikai realizmus és belső konfliktus: a politikus mint tragikus hős. Kötelező irodalom Nádas Péter: ’Áldatlan és fölösleges vita’ in. Magyar Narancs 2002, június 27 Kis János: ’Erkölcsi minimum’, in. Élet és Irodalom (ÉS) 46:52 (2002) Ambrus-Lakatos Lóránd: ’Folyamatos erkölcsi válság’, in. ÉS 47:13 (2003) Ajánlott irodalom Ambrus-Lakatos Loránd: ’Politikáról és morálról: türelmesen’ in. ÉS 47:17 (2003) Hack Péter: ’A politikai cselekedetek mércéjéről’ in. ÉS 47:2 (2003) Eörsi István: ’Morál és politika’ in. ÉS 47: 3 (2003) Kerpel-Fronius Gábor: ‘Vég vagy Kezdet’ in. ÉS 47:5 (2005) Bernard Williams: ’Politics and Moral Character’ in. Moral Luck, Cambridge: The University Press, 1981, pp. 54-71 Thomas Nagel: ’Ruthlessness in Public Life’ in. Mortal Questions, Cambridge: The University Press, 1979, pp. 75-91 Stuart Hampshire: ’Public and Private Morality’ in. Hampshire (ed.): Public and Private Morality, Cambridge: The University Press, 1978, pp. 23-55 Kis János: A politika mint erkölcsi probléma, Budapest: Élet és Irodalom, 2004, 4-7 Fejezet Második alkalom: a Medgyessy-vita – az ’anti-moralista’ pozíció. A politika instrumentális megközelítése. Az erkölcs és a politika elkülönült területet alkot, amelyeknek meg vannak a maguk egymástól független értékei. Politikai realizmus és közvetett motiváció. A tézisek kibővítése: közelebb az erkölcshöz. Kötelező irodalom Bozóki András: ’A mérlegelő döntés’ in. ÉS 47:3 (2003) Haraszti Miklós: ’A politikai minimum’ in. ÉS 47:6 (2003) Fleck Zoltán: ’A moralisták ellen’, in. ÉS 47:15 (2003) Ajánlott irodalom Nádas Péter: ’Az értelem kockázata’ in. ÉS 47:1 (2003) Bojtár Endre: ’Kis-minimum’ in. ÉS 47:1 (2003) Salamon János: ’A félelem liberalizmusa’, in. ÉS 47:24 (2003) 2


Kis János: A politika mint erkölcsi probléma, Budapest: ÉS, 2004, 1-3 Fejezet Thomas Hobbes: Leviatán vagy Az egyházi és világi állam formája és hatalma, Budapest: Helikon, 1970 (Vámosi Pál fordítása) David Hume: Értekezés az emberi természetről, Budapest: Gondolat, 1976 (Bence György fordítása) David Hume: Tanulmány az erkölcs alapelveiről, Budapest: Osiris, 20003 (Miklósi Zoltán fordítása) Immanuel Kant: Az erkölcsök metafizikájának alapvetése, Budapest: Gondolat, 1991, (Berényi Gábor fordítása) Adam Smith: A nemzetek gazdagsága, Budapest: KJK, 1992 (Bilek Rudolf fordítása) Harmadik alkalom: a Gyurcsány-vita – pro és kontra. Kis János elmélete az erkölcsi dilemmák és a politikai erkölcs kapcsolatáról: reziduális kötelezettségek. Kötelező irodalom Kis János: ’Pengeélen I-II’, Élet és Irodalom 50: 40, 44 (2006) Ajánlott irodalom Ld. előző két alkalom irodalma Első írásbeli vizsga. Politika és erkölcs. Tananyag: Niccolo Machiavelli: A fejedelem, in. Niccolo Machiavelli művei, Budapest: Európa, 1978, I. kötet (Lutter Éva fordítása) vagy http://mek.oszk.hu/00800/00867/ Max Weber: ’A politika mint hivatás’ in. Weber: Tanulmányok, Budapest: Osiris, 1998, pp. 156-209 (Wessely Anna fordítása) Michael Walzer: ’Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2 (1973), pp. 160-180 Negyedik alkalom: a liberalizmus. Klasszikus, neoklasszikus és modern liberalizmus. Jogok, individualizmus és közösség, a piac és az állam szerepe. Legújabb fejlemények: liberális egyenlőségelvűség és libertarianizmus. Kötelező irodalom Szabadság,

verseny,

szolidaritás,

Az

SZDSZ

2006-os

választási

programja,

http://program.szdsz.hu/valasztasi_program_2006.pdf 3


Liberális Charta, SZDSZ, http://www.szdsz.hu/hu/cikk/liberalis_charta Ajánlott irodalom A korszakváltás programja, SZDSZ, http://www.korszakvaltas.szdsz.hu/ Isaiah Berlin: ’A szabadság két fogalma’ in. Berlin: Négy esszé a szabadságról, Budapest: Európa, 1990, pp. 334-444 (Fordította Erős Ferenc és Berényi Gábor) John Rawls: Az igazságosság elmélete, Budapest: Osiris, 1997, 5, 6, 48, 68, 84§ Friedrich von Hayek: ’A liberális társadalmi rend alapelvei’, Egyenlőség, érték és érdem’, ’Miért nem vagyok konzervatív?’ in. Hayek: Piac és társadalom, Budapest: KJK, 1995, pp. 325-343; 367-385; 420-439 (Fordította Atkári János) Robert Nozick: ’Anarchia, állam, és utópia’ in. Bujalos István, Nyilas Mihály (szerk.): Az új jobboldal és a jóléti állam, Budapest: Hilscher Szociálpolitikai Egyesület, ELTE Szociológiai Intézet, 1996, pp. 84-107 (Fordította Békési József) Ötödik alkalom: a konzervativizmus. Hagyományos, neokonzervatív, individualista és vallásos konzervativizmus. A tömegtársadalom kritikája, paternalizmus és pragmatizmus. Az új jobboldal, neoliberalizmus, és thatcherizmus: (neo)konzervativizmus vagy liberalizmus? Kötelező irodalom A

cselekvő

nemzet

programja,

A

FIDESZ

2006-os

választási

programja,

választási

programja,

http://www.fidesz.hu/download/programfuzet.pdf Képviselt értékek, MDF, http://www.mdf.hu/ Ajánlott irodalom A

normális

Magyarországért!,

Az

MDF

2006-os

http://www.mdf.hu/index.php?akt_menu=99 John Gray: ’Conservatism, Individualism and the Political Thought of the New Right’ in. Gray: Postliberalism: Studies in Political Thought, New York-London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 272-282 Roger Scruton: ’Mi a konzervativizmus?’ in. Scruton: Mi a konzervativizmus?, Budapest: Osiris, 1995, pp. 11-43 (Fordította Jónás Csaba) David Clarke: ’The Conservative Faith in a Modern Age’ in. Philip W. Buck (ed.): How Conservatives Think, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975, pp. 165-173

4


Robert Nisbet: Conservatism: Dream and Reality, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986 N. P. Barry: The New Right, London: Croom Helm, 1987 Bujalos István, Nyilas Mihály (szerk.): Az új jobboldal és a jóléti állam, Budapest: Hilscher Szociálpolitikai Egyesület, ELTE Szociológiai Intézet, 1996, pp. 157-157 Hatodik

alkalom:

szocializmus

és

szociáldemokrácia.

A

kezdetek.

Utópikus

szocializmus. A kapitalizmus marxi kritikája: kommunizmus. Posztmarxiánus ortodox marxizmus:

leninizmus.

Utópikus

és

radikális

szocializmus

(szindikalizmus).

Szociáldemokrácia, új baloldal és a Giddens-i harmadik út. Kötelező irodalom Új magyar szociáldemokrácia, MSZP http://www.mszp.hu/index.php?gcPage=public/szervezetek/mutatAloldal&fnId=1962 Gyurcsány Ferenc: Szembenézés http://www.mszp.hu/download/dokumentumok/GyF_szembenezes.pdf Ajánlott irodalom Erős köztársaság, sikeres Magyarország, Az MSZP 2006-os választási programja, http://www.mszp.hu/index.php?gcPage=public/szervezetek/mutatAloldal&fnId=5184 R. N. Berki: ’What is Socialism’ in. Berki: Socialism, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975, pp. 9-38 Adam Przeworski: ’Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon’ in. New Left Review, 122 (July-August 1980), pp. 27-58 Adam Przeworski: ’The Neoliberal Fallacy’ in. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner (eds.): Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Revisited, Baltimore-London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, pp. 39-53 C. Wright Mills: ’The New Left’ in. Mills: Power, Politics, and People, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 247-259 Anthony Giddens: Beyond Left and Right, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, Chapters 1-3 Második írásbeli vizsga. Ideológiák. Tananyag: Ronald Dworkin: ’Liberalizmus’ in. Ludassy Mária (szerk.): Az angolszász liberalizmus klasszikusai II, Budapest: Atlantisz, pp. 173-213 (Fordította Huoranszki Ferenc) 5


Michael Oakeshott: ’Konzervatívnak lenni’ in. Oakeshott: Politikai racionalizmus, Budapest: Új Mandátum, 2001, pp. 431-455 (Fordította Kállai Tibor és Szentmiklósi Tamás) Roger Scruton: ’Mi a konzervativizmus?’ in. Scruton: Mi a konzervativizmus?, Budapest: Osiris, 1995, pp. 11-43 (Fordította Jónás Csaba) Anthony Giddens: A Harmadik út: A szociáldemokrácia megújulása, Budapest: Agóra Marketing Kft, 1999, 1. és 2. Fejezet (Fordította Battyán Katalin) Célok A kurzusnak kettős célja van. Egyrészt fejleszti a hallgatók képességeit az alábbi területeken: az irodalom kritikus és analitikus olvasása, a konkrét esetek és az elméleti háttér összekapcsolása. Másrészt tartalmi ismeretekkel szolgál a kötelező olvasmányok illetve az oktató előadásai révén. A kurzus végére a hallgatók látni fogják, hogy mennyire és milyen tekintetben különleges a politikai szférája és arról is lesz elképzelésük, hogy milyen erkölcsi korlátok állnak a politikusok előtt. A kurzus második fele pedig segíteni fog nekik abban, hogy eligazodjanak a különféle, a mindennapokat is átitató ideológiai vitákban. Egyfelől elképzelésük lesz arról, hogy melyek általában az ideológiák jellemzői, miben különböznek az egyes ideológiák egymástól. Másfelől tisztában lesznek azzal, hogy az egyes ideológiák milyen összetett viszonyban állnak egymással, különösen ami kortárs változataikat érinti. Követelmények A kurzus végi jegy az alábbi két részből tevődik össze: 1. Órai munka: vitában való részvétel és aktivitás. Az óra látogatása kötelező. Maximum egy igazolt hiányzás megfelelő indok alapján (fontos családi, munkahelyi elfoglaltság, betegség, részvétel az Iskola más szakmai rendezvényein). A végső jegy 30%-a. 2. Félév közbeni és félév végi írásbeli ’take home’ vizsga. Esszé kérdések, amelyekből egyet lehet választani, otthon kidolgozni, majd megadott határidőn belül benyújtani az oktatónak. A kérdések a kurzusvezető által megadott (jelen kurzusleírásban megjelölt) tanulmányokat érintik, de segítségül használhatók az oktató előadásai is. A válasz nem lehet hosszabb 10 oldalnál (12-es betűméret, dupla sorköz, Times New Roman betűtípus). Egyenként 35%, összesen a végső jegy 70%-a. 6


Technikai apparátus Jelszavas munkafelület, ahol a kötelező irodalom nehezebben beszerezhető része elérhető lesz (ahol ingyenes az elérés megadtam a vonatkozó webes linket, kivéve az ÉS és Magyar Narancs cikkeket: ezek a lapok honlapján az archívumban elérhetők). Az ajánlott irodalom beszerzésében az oktató segítséget nyújt (az irodalom nagy része megtalálható a CEU, ELTE, MTA könyvtárában). A munkafelület egyben a hallgatókkal való kapcsolattartásra is szolgál, ezért rendszeres látogatása ajánlott.

7

BIOETHICS: DISTRIBUTIONAL QUESTIONS IN HEALTH CARE University of Bayreuth Winter Semester 2012/13 Tuesday, 10.00-12.00 For BA students, 3rd, 5th, 7th semester

Course overview The course aims to investigate a not so often discussed area of bioethics: the ethics of health care distribution. We all are in need, at certain points in our lives, of health care. In many Western European countries the receipt of such services is taken, in most cases, to be granted, very often without payment in return. However, from an ethical perspective, this is far from obviously so the right thing to do. It is in itself a question whether the state has an obligation to provide health care to its citizens; and if it does have such an obligation, it is still an open question whether in the particular situation, given limited resources, the individual should in fact receive such care. Accordingly, the course will be structured into two major areas of discussion. In the first, our primary question will concern the above mentioned obligation; whether, in particular, there exists a right to health care and what this right consists in. If this question is answered in the positive, there still needs to be discussed if in concrete health care systems, in concrete situations, particular individuals should receive health care. This is the second area: the topic of socalled macro-allocation. In both areas of discussion we will discuss the major approaches – consequentialist, communitarian, libertarian, and egalitarian – with the help of country case studies for further illustration. Course requirements and evaluation The course can be taken either for 2 ungraded credits, or for 6 graded credits. In the former case, students will be required to give a presentation that will be based on a short position paper (2-3 pages long, 12 points, Times New Roman, double spaced, default margins). In the latter case, in addition to the presentation and the position paper, students will be required to submit a final paper for the course (10-20 pages long, formal requirements as above). In each case, attendance as well as active participation in seminars are required. The final grade will be composed of three parts: seminar participation and attendance (15%), seminar presentation and position paper (25%), final paper (60%). Registration and course materials Registration for the course will be done using Google Forms.

COURSE SCHEDULE: CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS DEMANDS (Note: the list below indicates the order of discussion and the material to be discussed. The exact seminar structure might, however, change, in the course of the three days of the block seminar.) 1. Utilitarianism Bykvist, Utilitarianism, Chapters 2 and 3 2. The (Over-)Demandingness Objection Wolf, “Moral Saints”, in. The Journal of Philosophy 3. Extremism Singer, “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, in. Philosophy and Public Affairs 4. Restructuring I Slote, “Satisficing Consequentialism”, in. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 5. Restructuring II Hooker, “Rule Consequentialism”, in. LaFolette (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Chapter 10 6. Restructuring III Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Chapter 2 7. Restructuring IV Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence”, in. Philosophy and Public Affairs 8. A priori arguments I Sobel, “The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection”, in. Philosophers’ Imprint 9. A priori arguments II Cullity, “Demandingness and Arguments from Presupposition”, in. Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness 10. Morality, reasons, and overridingness I Stroud, “Overridingness and Moral Theory”, in. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 11. Morality, reasons, and overridingness II Hurley, “Does Consequentialism Make Too Many Demands?”, in. Ethics 12. Morality, reasons, and overridingness III McElwee, “Impartial Reasons and Moral Demands”, in. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13. Institutions and demands Murphy: ‘Institutions and the Demands of Justice’ in. Philosophy and Public Affairs

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY University of Bayreuth Winter Semester 2012/13 Wednesday, 14.00-16.00 For BA students, 3rd, 5th, 7th semester

Course overview This course explores the meaning of constitutionalism, its basic features, and its relationship to democracy. It is assumed that the central categories of constitutionalism – basic rights, the rule of law, limited government, constitutional judiciary, the constitution – are relevant for political science and political theory. While the course is organized largely around fundamental categories rather than country-specific case studies, the readings and lectures will raise topics that students are encouraged to apply to the analysis of their own or other countries, both in seminar discussions and in written work. We begin with a conceptual and normative inquiry into the notions of constitutionalism and constitution. Next we discuss the politics of constitutionmaking. We proceed by exploring basic elements of the constitutional content: fundamental rights and formal institutional arrangements. Following the premise that the constitutional text matters to the extent it effectively promotes liberty, equality and the rule of law, we will pay attention to both ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’. Upon these analyses, we will address two issues that feature importantly in the contemporary constitutionalist discourse: the state of emergency and EU constitutionalism. Course requirements and evaluation The course can be taken either for 2 ungraded credits, or for 6 graded credits. In the former case, students will be required to give a presentation that will be based on a short position paper (2-3 pages long, 12 points, Times New Roman, double spaced, default margins). In the latter case, in addition to the presentation and the position paper, students will be required to submit a final paper for the course (10-20 pages long, formal requirements as above). In each case, attendance as well as active participation in seminars are required. The final grade will be composed of three parts: seminar participation and attendance (15%), seminar presentation and position paper (25%), final paper (60%). Registration and course materials Registration for the course will be done using Google Forms.

COURSE SCHEDULE: POLITICS AND MORALITY (Note: the list below indicates the order of discussion and the material to be discussed. The exact seminar structure might, however, change, in the course of the semester.) 1. Realism I Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, sections 2-3, 5-8 2. Realism II Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapters VI, VIII, XV-XXIV 3. Realism III Lukacs, “Tactics and Politics”, in. (eds.)Political Writings 4. The politician as a tragic hero Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics”, in. Lassman and Speirs (eds.), Political Writings, pp. 345-369 5. Dirty hands I Sartre, “Dirty Hands”, in. No Exit, Acts V-VII 6. Dirty hands II Walzer, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands”, in. Philosophy and Public Affairs 7. A systematic discussion I Kis, Politics as a Moral Problem, Chapter 3 8. A systematic discussion II Kis, Politics as a Moral Problem, Chapter 4 9. A systematic discussion III Kis, Politics as a Moral Problem, Chapter 5 10. A systematic discussion IV Kis, Politics as a Moral Problem, Chapter 6 11. A systematic discussion V Kis, Politics as a Moral Problem, Chapter 7 12. A systematic discussion VI Kis, Politics as a Moral Problem, Chapter 8 13. A systematic discussion VII Kis, Politics as a Moral Problem, Chapter 9 14. “Living in truth” Havel, “The Power of the Powerless”, in. Keane (ed.), The Power of the Powerless

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