START F E ISO 9660
FORNASINI MICROFILM SERVICE"5
PROPRIETE EXCLUSIVE DES ARCHIVES HISTORIQUES DE L 'UNION EUROPEENNE. TOUS LES DROITS DE REPRODUCTION ET D'hXPLOITATION LEUR SONT STRlCTEMENT RESERVESo - - - - - - - - - - - - ,- - -
E;'[(Y1JSIVE PROPERTY O~' TRE HlSrORICAL ARCHIVES o« THE EUROPEAN UNIONe ALL THE RIGHTS REGARDING THE USE AND REPRODUCTION OF THESE DOCUMENTS ARE STRlCTLY RESERVED.
ARCHIVES HISTORIQUES DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE
*** * * * * *.* * * * L.E.C.E
FOND8 CODE:
DOSSIER:
n0000170
DATE:
1995
TITLE
:
Conférence
t'o
~O~?nC&2
6 /1
Cf? GY/' t24~ ' P: !9'!
, 7 1:. J.
-.e )tt~
'* L-//:;:uel
:J:./" .5:/.2.2acY9 - .k
.f:?'/. /6,' / 0
.--..........
. . -- . . -- .. __
~ced ùl&Jtt .};'bWJt/}uvtÙ»UV!
de la e::tr?Ue 0t1/JeojtéMVJW de 'fioojt&1caUO# 0CMUmUftUe, Il/ne
de !t.tb/ U/;C e leI tlat4r/;l d '(l(J6i6WJt
v«'t /
dOJ!/Jt&Jta
le
,
____. a
............. h etI/J((36
Pll../1.çJJJ 2, m e
~----_. .. .--,.. - .- . .. _... __. ,
(le J I~4J1{{'"
fl2t.
-
/ooo 2?)"u,:miie,)
5 /2.20. 8.9
LIGUE EUROPEENNE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE - L.E.C.E. EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - E.L.E.C.
Le 13 décembre 1995 Réf.757jCté alI . Le Secrétaire Général
Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, Je vous prie de trouver en annexe le texte de la Conférence que M. Hilmar KOPPER, Porte-Parole de la Deutsche Bank, a prononcé dansles locaux de la Générale de Banque. Vous avez collaboré, ainsi q~e vos adjoints- et je pense spécialement à Madame Linard -, à la parfaite organisation d'une réunion qui a trouvé un -écho important dans la presse internationale. Croyez que je suis conscient et reconnaissant des efforts que vous a demandé la mise au point d'un projet qui avait ' plusieurs partenaires extérieurs. Et c'est dans cet esprit que je vous dis toute la gratitude de la Ligue et de son Président, M. Daniel CARDON de LICHTBUER, pour votre soutien . Espérant que cette collaboration agréable puisse se poursuivre dans les annéesJqui vienrrn~, cr~yez, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, C~ ~ .f'l lA. lo CA à l 'expression de ma parfaite considération.
Thierry DEMEURE Baron Huber t SIMONART Se cré tai re Général Générale de Banque Montagne du Par c, 3 10 00 BRUXE LLES Rue de Namur 2 - 10 0 0 BRUXELLES A ss o ci ati on in t e r n a t io n a le à but s c ie n t ifi g u e ( Loi b eI g e du 2 5 oc to b re 1 9 1 9 ) T é l. : 32(2) 5 12 20 89 a
F a x : 3 2 (2)5 1 1 1610
LIGUE EUROPEENNE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE - L.E.C.E. EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - E.L.E.C.
Le 13 déeembre 1996 Réf.756/Cté alI. Le Secrétaire Généra!
Monsieur le Président, Je vous prie de trouver ei-joint le texte de la eonférenee que Mr. Hilmar KDPPER, Porte-Parole de la Deutsehe Bank, a prononeé dans le eadre prestigieux de la Générale de Banque. Je souhaite également vous remereier au nom de la Ligue et de san Président, 'M. Daniel CARDDN de LICHTBUER, pour l 'assistanee préeieuse que vous nous avez apportée en permettant que eette réunion se tienne dans vas loeaux et avee l'appui de votre banque. c'est dans eet esprit que nous vous disons notre reeonnaissanee et vous assurons, Monsieur le Président, de notre eonsidération la plus distinguée.
J
Thierry DEMEURE Monsieur Ferdinand CHAFFART Président Générale de Banque Montagne du Pare, 3 1000 BRUXELLES
R u e de N amur 2 - 1000 B RUXELL E S A s s oci ati on internati on a le à but s c ie n t ifi q u e (Lo; b eI ge du 2 5 o c to b re 1 91 9 ) Té J. : 3 2 (2) 5 12 20 89 ·
F a x : 3 2 (2) 5 1 1 1 6 10
LIGUE EUROPEENNE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE - L.E.C.E. EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIe eO-OPERATION - E.L.E.C.
MESSAGE BY TELEFAX
2, rue de Namur 1000 BRUSSELS TELEFAX N° + 32 2 511 16 lO
DATE
27 Novembre 1995
ATTN
Monsieur Michel THYS
FRaM
Mo n si e u r Thierry DEM EURE
MESSAGE :
Avec les compliments de Thierry DEM EURE, ci-jo int le te xte de la présentation de Hilm ar KOPPER du 24 novembre qui contient quelquesid ées t r ès fo rtes.
Number cf pages (incl. ccver page):
10 pages.
Should pages be missing, please calI us immediately Phcne: + 32 2 512 20 89.
Ru e d c Na rn u r 2 - 1000 BR U X EL L E S Axsoc in t ion i n le r n a t io nalt· ù hu t s c ic m it'i qu e ( L o ; h el g l'
.~ 2 I.~l
5 1 1 H, I li
GELD EN .MARK1EN
8 - Zaterdag 25 november 1995
De Financieel-Economische Tijd '
Hilmar Kopper, voorzitter Deutsche Bank:
De bankiers moeten kiezen, of anderen zullen dat in hun plaats doen BRUSSEL (tijd) - Hoe zullen de Belgische bankiers zich banken die pro -actief werken en handhaven als de eenheidsmunt er is? Hilmar Kopper, niet aan volgers', zei Kopper. Hij voorzitter van de Deutsche Bank wijst erop dat het veran- gaf het voorbeeld van Deutsche Bank dat al zes kantoren heeft in deringsproces heel snel gaat en voorspellen dus lastig is. Indie en daar aanwezig was De kleinere bankiers zullen het moeilijk krijgen. De Europe- vooraleer het Duits zakenwezen se banken moeten in elk geval snel bepalen welke rol ze daar neerstreek. 'De tijd dat je voor zichzelf weggelegd zien. 'Anders zullen anderen dat strategie het volgen van de klanten is, is voorbij', zei Kopper (zei in hun plaats bepalen.' ook pagina 1). Een uitsmijter Kopper sprak vrijuit , iets dat bankiers niet snel doen. Ais topman van de grootste Duitse bank het woord nemen in het kleine Belqi è, is natuurliik een comfor- ' tabele positie . Kopper voorspelt grote veranderingen in het Europees bankieren. De , eenheidsmunt zal het landschap definitief hertekenen. De Duitse banken staan achter de EMU maar niet jedereen is even enthousiast, gaf Kopper toe, 'Ik begrijp dat kleinere banken hulp kunnen gebruiken maar de steun mag de concurrentie niet scheef trekken.' De introductie van de eenheidsmunt kost Deutsche 8ank zeker 100 miljoen DM, zei Kopper. Bovendien zul/en verschillende inkomstenbronnen wegvallen, bijvoorbeeld de lucratieve Europese wisselkoersmarkt. Het is zeer de vraag of het volume tegenover munten als de dollar en de yen zal toenemen . Over veel prijsstabiliteit moet men zich niet te veel il/usies rnaken, Het volstaat naar de koers dollar/yen te kijken . 8ank iers zul/en in elk geval omvang kunnen gebrui' ken'. , . Kopper ziet het Zwitsers en Duits model van universele banken als ideale uitvalbasis doordat de verschillende activiteiten de risico 's spreiden wat voor stabiliteit zorgt. De jongste jaren tekenen zich meer universele bankiers af waarb ij klassieke commerciéle banken aan belang ver-
liezen, zeker in vergelijking met investment banking. De toenemende complex iteit zet aan tot meer specialisatie. 'Europa heeft behoefte aan
richting Belgische bankiers die niet onopgemerkt voorbij ging. Corporate finance is al lang de , nationale grenzen ontgroeid. Internationaal opererende bedrij -
ven verwachten dat hun bank hen bijstaat op een gepersolnaliseerde manier via oplossingen op maat. In het klassiek :segment, financiering, krijgen de banken steeds meer concurrrentie van institutionelen. Vraag en aanbod vinden er elkaar ZOlnder dat er een bank aan te pas ktornt. Aanwezig zijn in al/e grote fhnancl éle centra met een ruim produktenaanbod is een dure zzaak enbrengt steeds minder op <door de overcapaciteit in de sectoir, McKinsey zegt alvast dat
slechts enkele bankiers zich als wereldspelers kunnen profileren terwijl de rest een focusstrategie zal moeten volgen. 'De Europese bankiers .moeten zelf hun rol definièren of anderen zul/en het voor hen doen.' Deutsche 8ank weet ondertussen al wat het niet wordt: een Europese retailstrategie. De bank kocht retailbanken in ltallè eri Spanje maar dit smaakt dus niet naar meer. 'Je inkomen in een markt waar al te veel banken zijn, is duur en je hebt enkele barrières die moeilijk
Kredietbank bekijkt dossier Anhyp niet, BBL,voorzichtig
Chaffart: 'Onze 400-kilometerstrategie Jheeft prioriteit' (tijd) - De Belgische bankiers zien geen reden om hun strategie invraag te stellen naar aanleiding vande uitspraken van de voorzitter van de Deutsche Bank. De Kredietbank rekent op de eigen efficièntie orn onafhankelijk doorte groeien terwijl de Generale Bank prioritair de 400-kilorneterstrategie blijft volgen. De BBL blijkt het meest open te staan voor de idee van een vergroting van het draagvlak, In de sector is men al eens ge- trum zal .dan in Nederland Iig" neigd om het pleidooi van Daniél ' gen. , Cardon, directievoorzitter van de Cardon wijst erop dat zijn BBl, af te doen als de vlucht bank niet te koop staat. 'Mijn opvoorwaarts van de BBl voor het roep tot fusie gebeurt vanuit een oplossen van een aantal moei- positie van sterkte. Enkele jaren lijkheden waaronder deze op het geleden zou dit delicater ge' niveau van het aandeelhouder- weest zijn.' schap. De bekommernis van Volgens de directievoorzitter Cardon is evenzeer 'human res- kunnen de Belgische bankiers sources' gebonden. enkel rekenen op het verwerven Ais een buitenlandse bank, bij- van een Europese positie met voorbeeld het Nederlandse ING een venster op de wereld. 'Een de B8l inlijft, wordt de bank een plaats aan de wereldtop is niet onderdeel van een groter geheel haalbaar.' en wordt de bank een stuk minJan Huyqhebaert, directievoorder aantrekkelijk voor ambitieuze zitter van de Alman ij-KB holding, kaderleden: het beslissingscen- rekent op de eigen kracht om
onathankellik te blijven. Huyrghe-' . : 'Er zijn steeds verschillende baert wijst erop dat de Kreediet- , opties mogelijk. Voor ons is de bank de jongste tien jaar al i ver- ' strategie van de 400 km een be schillende posities heeft verrwor- " tere optie. Er is heel veel han ven in een groeimarkt als: het : delsbeweqinq tussen Nederlanc : ,"" en Belgie wat een goede basis Verre Oosten. Fred Chaffart, directievoom:itter .:.vormt.' De G-Bank zou graag ir van de G-Bank, wees eropi dat { ',Nordrhein Westfalen eenregio de Generale Bank destijds een ' n aie bank verwerven in het kade . . mooi net had in Oost-Europsa 'en ' ·.·." v,an de 400 km. al sinds 1903 in China aamwezig ,cr .Gevraaqd over een locaal dos was. Beidenetten werden ' on( ; iOlsier, Anhyp, zei de voorzitter var ,:j;.?:,!jt. de _BBl een indicatief bod ge afgenomen, zei Chaffart. Nog .stee~s volgens Chaffiartls} [daan te hebben om inforr:na~!e ui het pleldoo l van Kopper (vocorzlb ill:de dataroom te kunnen inkijken ter Deutsche Bank) pertect tee be,:"i'i; 'We zullen echter zeer voorzich grijpenvanuit zijn stand!pllnt.;'c'j'tig moeten zijn', zei Cardon 'Voor Kopper is Belgie eem ·te ;".li q ver een alliantie met verzeke klein fenomeen. Dat heeft .ook ' .il raar Generali in het kader var zijn positieve punten. Hij zall ons .(t; Anhyp, zei Cardon glimlachenc wellicht hier niet lastig ko~men ,- ;' dat nog niemand van Generai val/en.' Chaffart ontkende daa.t de ; l.contact heeft opgenomen. Huyg circa 20 miljard frank die G-EBankj '.hebaert zei dat zijn holding geer in Nederland investeerde vol- ,;! bod gedaan heeft. 'Na de over geris de redenering van Ko~pper >;f'name van het Spaarkrediet is An blijkbaar beter in internatio)naaf : \ hyp voor ons minder interes wholesale banking was ge'irflves~ ' sant.' PDC ' l 'L teerd.
te nemen zijn zoals culturele verschillen en klantentrouw.' Kopper ziet wel broodin een sterke internationale aanwezigheid in het segment van 'wholesale banking ', dit zijn activiteiten als aandelenmarkten, afgeleide produkten , vermogensbeheer... 'Voor een bank als Deutsche is dat zelfs de te volgen strategie omwille van de toenemende internatonalisatie van ons cliénteel', zei Kopper. De bankvoorzitter merkte op dat ook vermogende rijke particulieren meer en meer over de grenzen heen kijken. De komst van een Europese munt zou wel eens een revolutionaire ommezwaai kunnen veroorzaken inzake private banking. De komst van de eenheidsmunt stelt de bankiers voor zware uitdagingen. Kopper weeserop dat de eenheidsmunt minstens dezelfde stabiliteit moet bieden als de Duitse mark. Volgens hem kan zo'n stabiele munt er komen zover al/e criteria van Maastricht nauwgezet ,gevolgd worden. Kopper zei Waigels idee over een 'stabiliteitscontract' te onderschrijven . Wie niet van het begin meedoet met de eenheidsmunt zal onder grote druk .ko men om nog op de boot te springen. 'Geloof niet wat de Britten zeggen vòòr 1 januari 1999. Ik Hllmar Kopper, voorzitter Deutsche Bank: 'Gewoon je klanten in het (Folo : Reuter) buitenland volgen is een strategie die afgedaan heeft'. heb een weddenschap lopen dat ze v66r eind 2002 deel uitmaken zou ons veel verder terugplaathebben voor de inspanningen van de eenheidsrnunt' . die Belgie levert met het oog op sen dan waar we waren in 1991. Kopper gaf financieel Brussel stabiliteit. De start van het geheel Wat de politiek betreft zei Kopper ook een lesje in de Duitse oprispingen. 'Wat de Duitsers zeg - , moet alvast sterk zijn. De Euro- dat men ook aan Oost-Europa gen, moet.je niet te ernstig nepese munt zal een Europese zou moeten denken, 'Maar laten obligatiemarkt creéren die de we Karl Poppers waarschuwing , men.' Volqens de sterke man van Deutsche Bank is het zinvol tweede grootste ter wereld zal niet vergeten. 'De wens om mensen gelukkig te rnaken is de dat er een nieuwe versie van het zijn. De toegenomen liquiditeit zal kleinere Europese markten meest gevaarlijke politieke amb iEuropees muntsysteern komt om tie. Te hard proberen de hemel de Iidstaten te helpen in hun , nieuwe kansen geven. Volgens Kopper is er geen te brengen kan toteen hel lei~ convergentie-oefening richting den.' PDD Maastricht. Kopper zei respect te weg terug. 'Maastricht opgeven /
I
ET
CENTRE O 'ANALYSE O 'INTERVENTION SOCIOLOGIQUES
54, BOULEVARD RA SPA IL 75006 P AR IS
C AO IS
TELEPHONE ECOLE D E5 H AUTE 5 E T UDE5 EN 5CIENCE5 50CIALES
:
49·54·24-57
FAX : 4 2-84-0 5·91
CNRS
Paris, le 18 octobre 1995
Monsieur Thierrr. DEMEURE LIGUE EUROPEENNE DE COOPÉRATION ÉCONOMIQUE Ru e de Namur, 2 1000 - BRUXELLES Belgiqu e
Monsieur, l'ai le regret de devoir vous informer que Monsieur Alain Touraine est engagé le 24 novembre prochain à participer à un colloque sur l'Amérique Latine organisé par la réunion que vous l'Assemblée Nationale , et ne pourra, de ce fait, participer organisez, ce mème jour, à Bruxelles, sur le r òle des banques. à
Croyez, je vous prie, Monsieur, à l'expression de mes meilleures salutations.
Blayac
\~~rirglé/ piOnnier de~ banques i .\ . \
"(;:Hr·'·"+. ~;
e
i: ~8iiconcen.trations
deoraient , 'Iime'iJte~ aoec la monnaie unique, '; ~'élon la,Deutsche Bank . '; "
.
.:.~.:-'
au niveau national notamment en Belgique, devrait s'accroitre au niveau international avec l'arrivée de la monnaie unique. La Deutsche Bank espère tirer tout bénéfice del'Union monétaìre tout en étant consciente que cela lui coùtera « plusieurs ' millions de DM» et lui enlèvera certaines acti vi tés bénéficaires (notamment SUI' les marchés cles changes). D'après : Hilmar Kopper, , l'Europe a besoin des banques, lesquelles devront servir de 10-
comot.ive dans les change:nen ts structurels à venir. « Les
ranques sont de plus en plus .les courtiers du risque. Il est réuolù le temps ',~ o ù elles se i ontentaietit d'accompagner leurs cliente à l'étranger. Dans t eaucoup de régions, ce sont eiles qui monirentle chemin ». 1\ fais de préciser qu'il n'y aura Il 3.S dans le futur dejoueur glob 11 offrant tous les produìts et SI .r vices financiers.C'est aussi v: '1.i pour la Deutsche Bank. Bref les banques ont un fam eux défi à r elever a vec , i l l'1JEM. Cette monnaie unique apporterà un poids supplémenta .re 'à l'Europe par rapport aux marchés amérìeaìns et ja~.
~_
l
i
ponais. Ce qui devrai t a ccroitre l'sttrait de I'E urope vis-à-vis des investisseurs internationaux. Dans la foulée, les petires places européennes devraient ètre mieux intégrées et , profiter d'une plus grande lìquidit é. h1ais une « mo nnaie u nique qU I n'cffre pas la m ème sta bilité qu e le mark n'est pas une alterna.si ue viable » , pré vient M. Kopper. De plus , le processus d'int égration a atteint un niveau si avancé qu'une l'emise en cause engendrerait un dommage considérable ».
AvC.
LIGUE EUROPEENNE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE - L.E.C.E. EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - E.L.E.C. 1.
Le 22 n ov e mb r e 1 9 9 5 DOCUMENT N° 42 2 6
CONFERENCE DE M. Hilmar KOPPER Bruxelles, 24 novembre 1995 ONT ACCEPTE: Pierre BAKEEF, Che f du Bu reau de re présentation de la Géné ra le de Ba n qu e auprès d e l ' Uni on Eur o p éenne André BERGEN , Admi n ist r at eur Dé légué , Membr e du Comité de Di rect ion d e l a Géné r a l e de Ba nque Krzysztof BERNACKI , Premier Secrétaire de l 'Ambassade d 'Autr iche Ra iner W. BODEN, Chef du Bureau de Rep ré s en t at ion de l a De u t sche Bank auprè s de l'Un ion Européenne Yv e s BOeL , Vi c e- Pré s i d e n t d u Con s e i l d 'Adm i n i s t r a t io n de l a Gé n é r a l e de Banque Ariane van CALOEN, Journaliste, La Lib r e Be l g i q u e
Daniel CARDON de LICHTBUER , Pré s iden t de la Banque Brux e l l e s Lambert , Prés iden t In t e r national d e l a Li gue Eur o péenn e de Coopéra tion Economique Ferdinand CHAFFART, Pr é s i d e n t du Co mit é de Directi on d e la Géné rale de Banque Serge CHIMKOVITCH , Co n s e i l l e r en relations in t erna t i onales , Sol vay S .A. Alber t COPPE , Présiden t Hono raire d e l a Gé n é r a l e de Banque Mar e DASSESSE, Avoc a t a u Ba r reau de Br u x ell e s, Akin, Gump, St rauss , Haue r Feld & Dassesse Di rk DE CORDT , Conseil ler , Association BeI ge d e s Ba n ques Jean DEG IMBE , Directeu r Gé n é r a l Honoraire , Commis si on Eu ropée nne
Rue de Namur 2 - 1000 BRUXELLES A ssociation internationale
à
but s ci e n t ifi q u e
( L o i be Ige du 25 octobre 19 19 ) Tél.: 32 (2) 512 20 89 • Fax: 3 2 (2) SII 16 lO
2
Thierry DEMEURE, Secrétaire Général de la Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique Baudouin DIERCKX de CASTERLE, Ad mi n i s t r a t e ur d e Sociétés André DIRCKX, Administrateur Délégué , Membre du Comité Directi on de la Générale de Banque Michel DUSSENNE, Prési dent de Belgacom John EDWARD, Executive , Belmont European Policy Centre Jean-Claude EECKHOUT, Dir e c t eur du Se c r ét a r i a t Général , Comm iss ion Eu r opéenne Sylvester C.W. EIJFFINGER, Professor , Depa r tm e n t of Econo mics, Ti lburg University Francis FOBE, Ge n e r a I Ma n age r, Eur opean Group o f Fi nan cial Institutions Jean GODEAUX, Gouverneur Hon oraire de la Banque Nationale de Be J. g i q u e Catherine GERNAY, Directeur de l a Commu n i c a t i o n , Rectic el Dirk HERREMANS, Bestuurder Generale Bank , Centrum voor Ec onomische S t u d i e n Jan HINNEKENS, Président Honoraire du Boerenbond Basil HOLDER, Di r ection Géné rale XIX , Commission
Eur opéenne Jan HUYGHEBAERT, Prés ident d 'AJ.mani j Christian JACOBS, Managing Dire ctor , Mo r g a n Guaranty Trus t Comp a n y Barry JEYNES, Manager , S. W.I .F .T. Ricca rdo I OZZO, Bureau de Liais on aup rès d e l ' Uni o n Européenne de l' I st i tuto Bancari o San Paolo di Torino Jean-Claude KOEUNE, Ch ie f Economi st, Banque Bruxell es La mbe r t Norbe rt v o n KUNI TZK I, Administr a t eur Di r ecteur Géné ra l d e SIDMAR N. V. Olivier LEFEBVRE , Che f du Cabinet du Ministre des fin anc e s de Bel gique Régis MALBOI S , anc i e n Fonctionna ire de l a Comm ission Européenne, Cons ei l l e r s pé cial d e l a LECE
3
Francesco MARIGLIANO CARACCIOLO, Avocat Jean-Paul MINGASSON , Directeur Général , Dir ection Géné ra le XIX , Commission Eu ropéenne René MYNCKE, Direc t eur Géné ral , Généra le de Bangue Simon-Pierre NOTHOMB , Secrétaire Général du Comité Ec onomigue et Social de I IUn ion Européenne J ean PARDON, Directeur d e l lAss oc iation BeIge d es Bangues Theo PEETERS, Vic e - Pr é s i d e n t du Conseil d 'Administration d e Fidelitas Geoffrey PET IT, Admin istrateur , Petr ofina I nt er n a t i o n a l Group Peter PRAET, Chief Economist , Générale de Bangue Salvatore ROSSETTI di VALDALBERO , Eu r o p ean Consultant , SRJ Representative in Brussels Jean-Benolt SEPULCHRE Baron Hubert SIMONART , Secrét aire Génér al de la Généra le de Ba n g u e Baron Pierre SNOY , European Re p r e s e n t a t i v e , Global Bus iness Rel a t ions , Inc. Johan TACK , Admin istrateur Délégué , Membre du Comité de Direct i on de la Géné rale de Bangue Mi chel TILMANT, Memb r e du Comité de Di r ection , Bangue Brux ell e s Lambert Berna rd de THOMAZ de BOSSIERRE , Direct e ur Adjoint , Bangue Bruxell e s Lamb e r t A. TONNAER , Char g é d e s affai r es eu ro péennes , Mondia l Int e r n a tio na l M. v an d e r VELDEN, Sec rétai re Génér al du c o mit é n é e r l a nda i s d e l a LECE Ma rk VAN WAUWE , Sec re t ar y Gener a I , Eu r opay I nt er n at iona l TOTAL : 52 p e r sonn e s à ce j our .
~
~
j ~
'>
o
~
....:;r
d
·S
.s ~
\~
i
~
.-LI
o
:2
/
23-11-1995 15:59
FROM L.E.C.E/E.L.E .C
ro
32 .2 5111610
l.ISTE DER ZUSAGEN FUR DIE ELEC-VERANSTAL.TUNG MIT HERRN KOPPER ANI 24.11.1995 NAME. VORNAME 1 Bade, WolflClm 2 Bakeeff, Comte Pierre 3 .6.a rber. lioO~ 4 Sergen. André 5 Bemacki. Krzysztof 6 Boden, Dr. Rainer W
...;:r
7 ~son BaCQ[} Philip{)~ 8 BOéJ. i::~ 9 Boél. Françoise 10 Boyd , Cnristophcr
FUNKTION
Chef du Bur. de Représ. UE Chef eu Eur. de Représ. UE Journanste Administrateur-Délt..gué et Membre du Com. de Direction Premier Secrétaire EU-Beauftragter Administrateur-Oélégué Vice-Présid. du Cons. d'Admill. Intemational Secretariat
Kabinett Kìnnocl<
11 Candries. Jan F.
Director European Affairs
12 ~oo de LjchtQl.jer. DgnieJ.
Président President Intemational Membre Président du Com. de Direction Oireaeur Financier
~13
casscy,
6ryan M.D.
,,:q14 çbqbrt. FerQ.ì.tWJ.g, 1S Cheney. 16 Chimk.ovitch, Serge 17 Clarotti, Paolo 18~
19 Cuvelier. Ueven
20 Damm, Dr. Walter 21 Dassesse. Mare
22 Q,avigaoa Vi~te Etieone 23 de ccret, Dirle 24 de Decksr, Jean-Michel
FIRMAIlNSTITUTlON 8ASFAG
Générale de Sanque 'j{; Eioao~1 TImes , Générale de Banque ~ Ambassade d'Autriche Deutsche Bank AG
Tractebel SA Générale de Ba~ue
ElEC Europaische ,t
Econ.
*
AAzo Belgium' Conseiller en relations intemat SofVay 5.,6.; Referatsleiter/GD XV/C Europais~ Kommission Président Honoraire Générale de Barique Directeur Deutsche.'BankAG Generalbevollffiachtigter sal. Oppen~im" Al(in, Gumpi ~uss. Hauer Avocat su Barreau de BTUX~lles .Feld. & Dassesse . Pl"ésident du Cons. d'Adminstr_ Soc. Généraie :de8elgique Conseiller
Directeur de Oépartement
Association Beige .des Banques Oeutsehe" Bank:AG Volvo Europa Truck Deutsche Sank AG Ytong : GeneraI Motors.
25 De Larivi èra, Etienne 26 de Meyer, Yves
Directeur Kantoordìrekteur
27 De Roeck.. Marcel 28 De 5chrijver, J.E.
Direkteur Generaal Managing Director
29 de Thomaz de Bossierre, Bemard 30 Degimbe. Jsan 31 Demellre. Thierry 32 Dierckx de casterte, Baudou ìn
Directeur Adjoint
Banque'Bruxel.1es Lambert
Directeur Général Honoraire
Commission ·Eu'ropéenne
Secrétaìre Généi8\
l.igue Europ. decOOp. Econom.
33 Dilewyns, Walter
Administrateur de sociétéS Hoofd (FC1Jntem. Financies
34 .Djrc!sx André.
Adrninistrateur-Oélégyé et
35 Douglas. Rob H. V3S Oraye. 1'110 37 Driessens, Dirk
-
/,!3SQ~M~
.--- . 39 Edward . John 40 Eeckhout. Jean-Claude 41 EijffingE:~r. Syfvester C.W. 42 Feller. Dorninique
43
Fèvrc.&o.·?ierr~
M Fobe. Francis
. .. . Agfa Gevaert Gén~le dè~.ngue
Membm dv Com de Djrection Prés~nt du Cons. d'Adminstr. Belgian
~hèn
.
Directeur Directeur-Generaal Présidenl
Toepfet.NV Belgo Faetors .: Belgacom :: Executive Belmont European Policy center Directeur du Secrétariat G énér, Commissiono ~utopéenne Professar ( Dep. of Econorncs Tilburg Unive'rsjtY
Directeur de Départernr::nt D irektor!~~c.
Gerreral Manager
Deutsche Ba.nl< :A G Europ~isChe ·K6~mission Europ. Group·ofFinanciòllnStitut. . .:'
Stal1d: 23.11, '~5
P .82
23-11-1995 15:59
FROM L.E.C .E /E.L.E.C
32 2 5111610
lO
Direeteur de la Communication Recticel Sevollmachtigt. des Vorstandes Daimler-Benz AG ,
45 Gemay. Catherine 46 ~tz Or. Hanos R
i i
Direktor/GO Il
~1J.SW~)4atjcnaléae' 8el9iaU;e EuropaiSche Kcm~ission
Ministerialdirigent Director cf Final"\ce Europa Adrninistrateur-Délégué Joumaliste
Standige Vertretung :bei der EU 8F Goodrich Europe SA BelgeAEG OieWelt
53 !:iMo. Qr. 01to!sar 54 Herremans. Dir!<
Hautpberater/GO VII BesNurder
55 Hinnekens, Jan
Président Honoraire Head of Divlslon I GO XIX Président VICe-President and Represent Managing Director Représentant auprès de "UE
Europaische Kommission Generale Banl<. Centrum voor E~nom. Studian Soerenbond
/47 !Jslsf.e.PJ.I~ 48 Grosche. Dr. GOnter 49 ~asIe J9Cb~Cl 50 Gulkin. Robert S1 Gumpert, Fred
52 Hadler, Wilhelm
~uyemeur H9nQraire
(pas su lunc:h)
56 Holder, Basìl 57 H~baertJ3e{on
Ja.n.
58 lozzo. Riccardo 59 Jacccs, Christian
60 Jacques, Philippe
Commission Européenne
A1many Istituto Bene,san: Paolo di Torino Morgan Guaranty 1:'r:ust Company Elf Aquìt2ine .:
(pas au lunCh)
61 Jeynes, Barry 62 ss 64 65
66 67 68
69 70 71 72
K:lmpfer. Dr . Hartmut ISaYser Dr VQlkm~ Kisch!aLRr....'tl2!f Koeune. Jean-Claude Kopper, Hilmar KunjtzJsi Norbert yon Kyaw. Dr, Dietrich von ~kkw Olivier Unaro. Ariette LOWenberg, Or. 8emward Ludwig. Michael
73 Malbois. R~,gi& 74 MalQu.. Xa,vjer
SVVlFT
Financieel Directeur
,BayerAotwerperi SfnMdjge Vene bej ~ EU BanQue BruxelleS' Lambert
Botschaftsrat erster Klasse Chief Economist
Oeutsche Bank. AG . Administrateur Direeteur Génér. ~
80tschafter Chef de Cabinetdu
Standige Vertretung, ~i der EU Ministre des Fina~CéS de Selgiqve
Events Organization Reprasentant (sein Vertreter) AAcien Fonctionnaire Conseiller Spécial
Générale de,BanqU'è RWE. AG BrOsset',' sal. Op;>enheim
Commission Evropeenne Ugue Europ. deCOOp. Econom.
Président
Ante
8D5èfen Admistrateuc Dé/égué
Générale de Bangue
8elgolaise'
76 Martin. NorPert 77 Meller, Or. Eberhard
BA5F Belgium
79 Mosig, Hans Jorgen
SO Monster, Petra 81 Myncke. René
:'
Vorstandssprecher
Conseiller 75 Marigliano Caracefolo, Francesco Avocat
78 MingmJìJ2...:/..~an-eaul
.--/7
Manager Beauftr. des Vorstandes
8MW AG 8~S$eli :
Administrateur.Délégué Oirektor Directeur-GénéraVGO XIX Directeur
Joumaliste
' ",
BDI EU-Vertretung Commission Européenne
Hapag·L1oy~, Betgium Neve ZOÒcber Zeltung Générale Baoqué
cse
82 Niemeyer. Dr. Hans~Jorg
Directeur Général Rechtsanwalt
83 t1.91bSll1Jl2. $jmQo-Pierre
~~taire Général
Comité.EcpnomjC2\l~ et.§OCial
84 Oldag., Qr. MQr.Q$. 85 Pardon. Jean
Joumaliste Directeur Oirecteur Vice-Prés. du Cons. d'Adrnin. Admlnistrateur Représentation acpr ès de rUE
~e CUnico EUl'Qp$Mne ~jlddeutscDeZeitYOg Association ,8 elge: ees Banques OcutSche Bank ~ Fldelitas Petrofina Intem~iOnal Group Deutsche Bank AG'
86 Eedrani...J2.i.usepoe 87 Peeters. Theo 88 Petit, Geoffrey 89 Poulain, Françotse
P.El3
Gleiss Lutz Hoo~::t:ltrsch & Partner '
23-11-1995 16:88
~
FROM L.E.C.E/E.L.E.C
TO
Chief Economist
90 Praet. Peter
93 Ric;htbofeo. Dc Hermaan Frbr. '{.,
Vors. wanrungsunterausschuss Generaklirektor/GD Il E\,lropaische·.Komtnfssion aotscnaner Standige Vertr. irn NATO
94~~
.J..Q.Ym~
~
9S Roth
Joumaliste Administr. Directeur Général
yyall Stmet Joucoal Bayer Betgium
Lelter des EU-80ros
VEBA AG
(p:ilS
au lunc+B125h)
92 Bavasio. Gio~
Iere.o.~
96 §.g}jJJlqt-Menschaer. Qr 97 98 99 100 101 102 103
KJau~
Schneider, Norbert M. Schrader. JUrgen-5ven Schwerin, Otto Graf von
Sears. David J . Sepulcre. Jean-6enoit Sill, Dr. Emst-Knut SimonarLBaroo Hvbert
104 Snay. Baron Pierre 105 Springorum. Friedrich 106 stecher. Or. 107 Tack, Johan 108 Telegdy. Stephen I. 109 Thijs. Mich~1 ~11TiJmaa~
.
111 Tonnaer. A. 112 Irobers. Dr. peter 113 van Caloen, Ariane 114 Van Coillie, Antoon 115 Van den Broeck, Robert 116 van der Velden, Mathijs 117 Van Oierdonck, Henri 118 van Wavwe. Mari<
119 vom Steiri. Henning 120 Wagner, Maurice
121 Wenig, Harald
Lid v/h Directie<::omité 8ASF Antwerpen 'N.V. ReferatsleiterfGD XII Euro~ische Komntission Manager, Gov, Relations Europ Exxon Ch.emjcal È.urope GeschaftSfOhrer Secrétaire Général European Representative
Oeutsclle 8al'\k AG I EU·Repra..scnt::lnz
Columbus Container Géné@/ede ·Babaue Deutsehe sank AG.
Direktor Administrateur Délégué et Membro du COm. de Oirection Director Govemement Affai~ Joumaliste Membre eu Com. de Diy-ectio."'l Chargé des reiations europ.
SiemensAG
~"tqts!eiterfGD
xy
Joumalist9 Adm. en Fin. Oirek.teur Bestuurder Secrétaire Gén. du Com. Néerl. Gedelegeerd Sestuurder secretary Generai Assistant Manager EU-Representative Office Manager EC Affairs Assist, des Generaidirektorsllil
Générale de Banque .
;.
~
DowEurope.
Agente Europa . &;ànque sruxeHeS"iambert Mondiallnte~onat Europaisehe Ktimmisslon La Ubre Belgiaué
Van Laere.NV· ... .: . . Holdifima . Ligue Europ. ~e ·CooP. Econom. As~ Weà~rs Belgium Europay Intemational Deutsche BankAG Hoffmarin~La ~9Che
EuropaiSche Kommission SidmarNV
Joumaliste ReferatsfeiteriGO Il
J,t
GIobal Business :Relations tnc,
Directeur
122 Willmes. P. 123 Wimmer. Hans 124 VVittelsberger, Dr. Helmut
P.84
*
Générale de Banque Europ3isches Parlament
91 BlàQdzlo-P1ath Christa
?
32 2 5111610
..
.
BOrsen-Zeitung . . Europaische K~mmission
S1'J",~ ;
23. , , .19!')5
TOTRL. P.84
LIGUE EUROPEENNE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE - L.E.C.E. EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - E.L.E.C.
HILMAR KOPPER SPOKESMAN OF THE BOARD OF MANAGING DIRECTORS OF DEUTSCHE BANK
"THE ROLE OF THE BANKS IN THE NEW EUROPE"
LECTURE GIVEN AT THE INVITATION OF EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
Brussels, November 24, 1995
- CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY -
Rue de Namur 2 - 1000 BRUXELLES Association internationale à but scientifique (Lo i beIge du 25 octobre 1919) Tél.: 32 (2) 512 20 89· Fax: 32 (2) 511 16 lO
1
Ladies and Gentlemen, I don't wish to speculate about whether, when and with whom monetary union will come into being .
Since the signing of the Maastricht Agreement, the goal of European Monetary Union has been the subject of debate largely from the vantage point of economie policy. This debate tended to be theoretical and quickly subsided. Six months ago a mantle of silence was stili hanging over this topic. This was one of the reasons why the European Commission published its Green 800k dealing with the concrete problems associated with the switch to a single currency. Since then no one can complain that this matter has not been given a thorough airing in the public arena. Two weeks ago the EMI issued its report on "the changeover to the single currency". I fully subscribe to the rationale of 8aron Lamfalussy that we need a strong beginning and a strong end and the market to decide on the time in between.
The German banks are committed to the goal of Monetary Union. The shades of commitment vary however. This is perfectly understandable bearing in mind the banks' differing interests. It goes without saying that Deutsche 8ank harbours different expectations to those held e.g. by a Raiffeisenbank in rural 8avaria. The impact of this development on the latter bank will hardly be the same as in our case. I do understand that smaller banking institutions need backup facilities in respect to the conversion process of currencies. However, it seems to be necessary to keep in mind that these supportive actions do not distort competition among banks.
The European banking market will undergo irrevocable change. It is difficult to assess, however, not only what changes will take piace but also to what degree and how rapidly they will impact on the market. If we only
2
look back ten years no one could have foreseen events taking the course they have done. The liberalised markets have substantially altered the banking landscape - and an end to this development is stili not in sight. The internationalisation, globalization and at the same time concentration of banking business are progressing at break-neck speed. The concentration process is following a two-stage pattern. The first often builds on national mergers. The second and more seldom event is a cross-border merger. With a single currency, the latter could very well occur more frequently.
There's no doubt that in a united Europe, banks will continue to exercise their traditional function as managers of the monetary econorny. In the future too, money will need its protagonist in order to fulfil its functions as a means of payment, as a unit of account and as astore of value. This will always be the banks' role. They are the brokers between capitai supply and demando But when we talk of banks in a future Europe, we should always be aware of how unpredictable the play of forces has become in our operating environment.
In spite of the uncertainties involved, what are our expectations when we go to bat for monetary union? The most unequivocal and at the same time most non-committal answer is: We expect to get something out of it. And these advantages need to be substantial and lasting since Deutsche Bank alone is Iikely to incur switch-over costs amounting to some hundred million D-Marks. On top of this, we stand to lose certain areas of business and income. A good part of intra-European forex business and the associated currency exchange will disappear altogether. Whether the new currency will result in higher trading volumes against Dollar and Yen remains to be seen. Conversions on European cross-border transfers will disappear.
3
When we nevertheless champion the cause of monetary union we do so far the advantages we will derive strategically. The globalization of the financial markets is an irrevocable fact. Only the big boys will survive in the global banking markets. It is very difficult to learn how to swim when you have to practise in the bath tub instead of a spacious swimming pool. It is the monetary union in Europe which will create the domestic environment the big-Ieague banks require to go about their international business efficiently. This process will undoubtedly be accompanied by a wave of mergers similar to that we are presently witnessing in the United States. A likely further result will be a shift in the emphasis of banking business.
I stili regard the universal bank of the Swiss or German type to be anldeal vehicle. One of its strengths is the spreading of risk through the various types of business and revenue it generates. This balancing function isa force for stability in the banking sector. The world-wide trend towards universai banking is characteristic of the banking sector's development over the past few years. But it should also be noted that universal banks themselves are subject to constant change. The signs are that classicaI commerciai banking will diminish in significance compared with investment banking. A growing variety and complexity of needs continue to cali for greater specialisation.
Europe needs banks to drive forward the process of structural change. As far back as the Middle Ages economie progress was contingent upon the money and banking sector. That has remained the case until this very day. Banks are - if I may say so - the agents of the monetary economy. Formerly, their role was seen as a broker function between lenders and borrowers. Essentially today, it is no longer solely a matter of liquidity and maturity transformation , but rather of risk transformation. Banks are more
4
and more risk brokers. At the same time, however, they are also risk takers in an economy. And on top of this, they are corporate advisors and facilitators in ali financial matters. They can also take on the role of pioneers in opening up new markets. The time-honoured rule that banks follow their local clients abroad no longer holds good. In many regions, it is the banks who now lead the way.
In the corporate banking segment, customer requirements have long ago moved beyond national markets. Internationally active companies expect their banks to assist them in ali business dealings, domestic and foreign, and to offer a comprehensive product range. They no longer ask for standardised products only, but look for tailor-made solutions satisfying their individuai needs as issuer, borrower or investor. While providing capitai - debt or equity - used to be one of the banks' centrai tasks as well as . one of their major sources of income, institutional investors have meanwhile joined the banks as other large suppliers of loans and equity. Those who supply funds, and those who frequently demand capitai co-operate directly in the money and capitai markets without using banks as financial mediators. That iswhy we talk about securitization and disintermediation.
This development has far some time now resulted in fiercer competition. To be present internationally - in ali major financial centres - with a broad range of products requires substantial investment in technology and staft, and this implies high costs. At the same time margins have considerably decreased due to overcapacity. A recent McKinsey study concludes that onlya few banks will have a chance to perform the role of a truly global player in this area. As an alternative to the global approach they suggest a "niche strateqy", Le. focusing on certain segments. Each bank must decide which of these strategies makes the most sense for itself in order to
5
remain competitive in an international environment. In this context, a decisive factor will be the individuai bank's size. The McKinsey paper gets to the heart of it: "European players must aggressively define their own role, or it will be defined for them".
As for us, we are not seeking to achieve a strong retail-market presence throughout Europe. In the foreseeable future, there will be no global player offering the entire range of financial products and services throughout Europe, not to mention world-wide. For the timebeing, this is definitely true for retail banking . Achieving a comprehensive presence in retail business on a European scale is unrealistic due to the existing close-knit branch networks. Buying into an already overbanked environment may prove to be a costly and burdensome exercise. Moreover, there are obstacles which are difficult to overcome such as cultural barriers and customer loyalty.
However, a strong international presence in wholesale banking - for instance in securities, money and forex trading, plus derivatives, or corporate finance - as well as in asset management - is a goal that can be realised. For a bank Iike Deutsche, it is imperative given our clients' growing international activities. The decisive aspect for asset management is that, besides institutional investors, wealthy private individuals are increasingly looking across national borders. Even though the trend towards globalization is by no means as pronounced in private banking as it is in corporate banking, international private banking is nonetheless one of the areas that look set to expand strongly in the coming years. The introduction of the European currency may trigger an almost revolutionary turnaround in private banking.
6
As a result of the approaching European Monetary Union, the banks are faced with completely new challenges. And these are being taken up. Only through pooling its resources will Europe be in a position to successfully hold its own in a fiercely competitive global environment. A focusing of energies will, however, only be effective provided this community, this single-currency area, establishes a reputation for stability. And this implies both political and, perhaps more importantly, economie stability.
It is against this background that the banks - and of course Deutsche Bank as well - need to assume responsibility as the advocates of price stability. A European currency which does not offer the same stability as the D-Mark is not a viable alternative. But since l'm convinced that such a stable currency can indeed be established - provided the convergence criteria are met - l, for one, am commitled to monetary union. I would emphasise, however, that in observing these convergence criteria ali strictly adhere to both the letter and spirit of the Maastricht Agreement. In this sense, I fully support Mr Waigel's concept of a "stability contract" for European Monetary Union. This will add substantial credibility to the project.
One of the rules in the transition to monetary union is keeping competition neutral nationally and internationally. For this reason, the slowest cannot determine the speed. Competition between Europe's financial centres has already increased considerably. This will continue in a larger area with a single currency. This should not lead to established systems being thrown overboard. Nevertheless, it is legitimate and, in a democratic system, vital to also take a hard look at tried and tested procedures. There's no law which says that what was good in the past will remain so in future. But again, no proven systems should be dismantled without the provision of clear and comprehensible reasons and improvements.
7
For the German banks, for ali banks in Europe, the framework will change as a result of monetary union. Dollar f1uctuations will no longer be able to send tremors through the European Monetary System. A weakened dollar will affect ali European Monetary Union countries equally. Countries not participating in the monetary union from its start will be under pressure maybe even stronger than before - to continue their stability oriented policies. To make it through the open door of the club as soon as possible requires one thing: to apply policies at least as solid as those in the core countries. Convergence is the magic word for these countries. And it might be useful to support their efforts by a new version of the ERM.
A common European currency will result in a market of a considerably larger weight vis-a-vis the American and Japanese markets. This is particularly true far the European bond and equity markets. On the one hand, it is much easier far international investors to become involved in a large and Iiquid market, since they can be sure of getting a fair price. On the other hand, smaller national European markets, which have been neglected by international investors up to now, will no longer be isolated owing to their increasing integration into the core European market. They, too, will profit from the better liquidity. At the same time the multitude of rules and fee structures will be simplified and made transparent, increasing the incentive to become active on this market. Growth potential, previously limited owing to European currency uncertainties, will also be enhanced . And, finally, a sensible diversification of investment portfolios will create more weight for the European market.
One currency in a common trading area makes economie sense. This does not mean, however, trying to balance political deficits with economie means. I am convinced that the European currency will be a hard one.
8
The independence of the European Centrai Bank has been ensured, and its responsibility towards stability has been clearly defined. Countries qualifying for monetary union have long been following a thoraugh and trustworthy stability policy. There is every reason to believe that they will continue such policies.The serious efforts being made in Belgium,.for instance, deserve our respect.
The Eurapean Monetary Union will change the international monetary system. The D-Mark, presently the second reserve currency, will be wrapped up in the Eurapean currency. The European Economie and Monetary Union's economie weight in the likely initial core is more than twice as large as Germany's. The European currency's role vis-a-vts the other two main currencies - the US dollar and the yen - will strengthen dramatically. One should, however, not attach too much hope to the monetary union bringing stability to exchange rates. Whileit will, of course, eliminate ali speculation among its members, the relationship between the yen and the dollar shows that exchange rates fluctuate when the perceptions of economie development and policies, even of larger areas, create their own laws and priorities.
There is no doubt that European Monetary Union represents progress for Europe. The process of integration has meanwhile reached such an advanced stage that to curtail it now would cause a great deal of damage. A failure of the Maastricht Agreement would mean more than just a step back to where we were in 1991. For Europe, and indeed for the world, it would have grave consequences.
Apart fram the economie issues, the debate on Eurapean integration must always be seen against the background of a lasting peace for the old con-
9
tinent. This has been so since the end of the Second War. Touching the political aspect of integration of course means that we have to talk about the whole Europe not just a part of il. We should not limit our view to the countries already being member of the "European Club". We need a convincing blueprint far the integration of the east into the Europe of tomorrow. This has to be both visionary and realistic. That is quite ambitious. On our way to "felix Europa" we should be aware of Karl Popper's warning that the desire to make people happy is perhaps the most dangerous of ali political ideals. Trying too hard to create heaven on earth may lead to the advent of hell.
LIGUE EUROPEENNE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE - L.E.C.E. EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - E.L.E.C.
HILMAR KOPPER SPOKESMAN OF THE BOARD OF MANAGING DIRECTORS OF DEUTSCHE BANK
"THE ROLE OF THE BANKS IN THE NEW EUROPE"
LECTURE GIVEN AT THE INVITATION OF EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
Brussels, November 24, 1995
Rue de Namur 2 - 1000 BR UXELLES Association internationale à but s ci e n t ifi q u e (L o i beige du 2 5 octobre 1919) T él. : 32 (2) 512 20 89· F a x: 3 2 (2) 511 16 lO
1
Ladies and Gentlemen, I don't wish to speculate about whether, when and with whom monetary union will come into being.
Since the signing of the Maastricht Agreement, the goal of European Monetary Union has been the subject of debate largely from the vantage point of economie policy. This debate tended to be theoretical and quickly subsided. Six months ago a mantle of silence was stili hanging over this topic. This was one of the reasons why the European Commission published its Green Book dealing with the concrete problems associated with the switch to a single currency. Since then no one can complain that this matter has not been given a thorough airing in the public arena. Two weeks ago the EMI issued its report on "the changeover to the single currency". I fully subscribe to the rationale of Baron Lamfalussy that we need a strong beginning and a strong end and the market to decide on the time in between.
The German banks are committed to the goal of Monetary Union. The shades of commitment vary however. This is perfectly understandable bearing in mind the banks' differing interests. It goes without saying that Deutsche Bank harbours different expectations to those held e.g. by a Raiffeisenbank in rural Bavaria. The impact of this development on the latter bank will hardly be the same as in our case. I do understand that smaller banking institutions need backup facilities in respect to the conversion process of currencies. However, it seems to be necessary to keep in mind that these supportive actions do not distort competition among banks.
The European banking market will undergo irrevocable change. It is difficult to assess, however, not only what changes will take piace but also to what degree and how rapidly they will impact on the market. If we only
2
look back ten years no one could have foreseen events taking the course they have done. The liberalised markets have substantially altered the banking landscape - and an end to this development is stili not in sight. The internationalisation, g/obalization and at the same time concentration of banking business are progressing at break-neck speed. The concentration process is following a two-stage pattern. The first often bui/ds on national mergers. The second and more seldom event is a cross-border merger. With a single currency, the latter could very well occur more frequently.
There's no doubt that in a united Europe, banks will continue to exercise their traditional function as managers of the monetary economy. In the future too, money will need its protagonist in order to fu/fil its functions as a means of payment, as a unit of account and as astore of value. This will a/ways be the banks' role. They are the brokers between capitai supply and demando But when we talk of banks in a future Europe, we should always be aware of how unpredictable the p/ay of forces has become in our operating environment.
In spite of the uncertainties involved, what are our expectations when we go to bat for monetary union? The most unequivocal and at the same time most non-committal answer is: We expect to get something out of it. And these advantages need to be substantial and lasting since Deutsche Sank alone is likely to incur switch-over costs amounting to some hundred million D-Marks. On top of this, we stand to lose certain areas of business and income. A good part of intra-European forex business and the associated currency exchange will disappear altogether. Whether the new currency will result in higher trading volumes against Dollar and Yen remains to be seen. Conversions on European cross-border transfers will disappear.
3
When we nevertheless champion the cause of monetary union we do so for the advantages we will derive strategically. The globalization of the financial markets is an irrevocable fact. Only the big boys will survive in the global banking markets. It is very difficult to learn how to swim when you have to practise in the bath tub instead of a spacious swimming pool. It is the monetary union in Europe which will create the domestic environment the big-Ieague banks require to go about their international business efficiently. This process will undoubtedly be accompanied by a wave of mergers similar to that we are presently witnessing in the United States. A likely further result will be a shift in the emphasis of banking business.
I stili regard the universal bank of the Swiss or German type to be an ideai vehicle. One of its strengths is the spreading of risk through the various types of business and revenue it generates. This balancing function is a force for stability in the banking sector. The world-wide trend towards universai banking is characteristic of the banking sector's development over the past few years. But it should also be noted that universal banks themselves are subject to constant change. The signs are that classical commerciai banking will diminish in significance compared with investment banking. A growing variety and complexity of needs continue to cali for greater specialisation.
Europe needs banks to drive forward the process of structural change. As far back as the Middle Ages economie progress was contingent upon the money and banking sector. That has remained the case until this very day. Banks are - if I may say so - the agents of the monetary economy. Formerly, their role was seen as a broker function between lenders and borrowers. Essentially today, it is no longer solely a matter of liquidity and maturity transformation, but rather of risk transformation. Sanks are more
4
and more risk brokers. At the same time, however, they are also risk takers in an economy. And on top of this, they are corporate advisors and facilitators in ali financial matters. They can also take on the role of pioneers in opening up new markets. The time-honoured rule that banks follow their local clients abroad no longer holds good. In many regions, it is the banks who now lead the way.
In the corporate banking segment, customer requirements have long ago moved beyond national markets. Internationally active companies expect their banks to assist them in ali business dealings, domestic and foreign, and to offer a comprehensive product range. They no longer ask for standardised products only, but look for tailor-made solutions satisfying their individuai needs as issuer, borrower or investor. While providing capitai - debt or equity - used to be one of the banks' centrai tasks as well as one of their major sources of income, institutional investors have meanwhile joined the banks as other large suppliers of loans and equity. Those who supply funds, and those who frequently demand capitai co-operate directly in the money and capitai markets without using banks as financial mediators. That is why we talk about securitization and disintermediation.
This development has for some time now resulted in fiercer competition. To be present internationally - in ali major financial centres - with a broad range of products requires substantial investment in technology and staff, and this implies high costs. At the same time margins have considerably decreased due to overcapacity. A recent McKinsey study concludes that only a few banks will have a chance to perform the role of a truly global player in this area. As an alternative to the global approach they suggest a "niche strategy", Le. focusing on certain segments. Each bank must decide which of these strategies makes the most sense for itself in order to
5
remain competitive in an international environment. In this context, a decisive factor will be the individuai bank's size. The McKinsey paper gets to the heart of it: "European players must aggressively define their own role, or it will be defined for them".
As for us, we are not seeking to achieve a strong retail-market presence throughout Europe. In the foreseeable future, there will be no global player offering the entire range of financial products and services throughout Europe, not to mention world-wide. For the time being, this is definitely true for retail banking. Achieving a comprehensive presence in retail business on a European scale is unrealistic due to the existing close-knit branch networks. Buying into an already overbanked environment may prove to be a costly and burdensome exercise. Moreover, there are obstacles which are difficult to overcome such as cultural barriers and customer loyalty.
However, a strong international presence in wholesale banking - for instance in securities, money and forex trading, plus derivatives, or corporate finance - as well as in asset management - is a goal that can be realised. For a bank like Deutsche, it is imperative given our clients' growing international activities. The decisive aspect for asset management is that, besides institutional investors, wealthy private individuals are increasingly looking across national borders. Even though the trend towards globalization is by no means as pronounced in private banking as it is in corporate banking, international private banking is nonetheless one of the areas that look set to expand strongly in the coming years. The introduction of the European currency may trigger an almost revolutionary turnaround in private banking.
6
As a result of the approaching European Monetary Union, the banks are faced with completely new challenges. And these are being taken up. Only through pooling its resources will Europe be in a position to successfully hold its own in a fierce/y competitive global environment. A focusing of energies will, however, only be effective provided this community, this sing/e-currency area, establishes a reputation for stability. And this implies both political and, perhaps more importantly, economic stability.
It is against this background that the banks - and of course Deutsche Sank as well - need to assume responsibility as the advocates of price stability. A European currency which does not offer the same stability as the D-Mark is not a viable alternative. But since l'm convinced that such a stable currency can indeed be established - provided the convergence criteri a are met -I, for one, am committed to monetary union. I wou/d emphasise, however, that in observing these convergence criteria ali strictly adhere to both the letter and spirit of the Maastricht Agreement. In this sense, I fully support Mr Waigel's concept of a "stability contract" for European Monetary Union. This will add substantial credibility to the project.
One of the rules in the transition to monetary union is keeping competition neutral nationally and internationally. For this reason, the slowest cannot determine the speed. Competition between Europe's financial centres has already increased considerably. This will continue in a larger area with a single currency. This should not lead to established systems being thrown overboard. Nevertheless, it is legitimate and, in a democratic system, vital to also take a hard look at tried and tested procedures. There's no law which says that what was good in the past will remain so in future. But again, no proven systems should be dismantled without the provision of clear and comprehensible reasons and improvements.
7
For the German banks, for ali banks in Europe, the framework will change as a result of monetary union. Dollar f1uctuations will no longer be able to send tremors through the European Monetary System. A weakened dollar will affect ali European Monetary Union countries equally. Countries not participating in the monetary union from its start will be under pressure maybe even stronger than before - to continue their stability oriented policies. To make it through the open door of the club as soon as possible requires one thing: to apply policies at least as solid as those in the core countries. Convergence is the magic word for these countries. And it might be useful to support their efforts by a new version of the ERM.
A common European currency will result in a market of a considerably larger weight vis-a-vis the American and Japanese markets. This is particularly true for the European bond and equity markets. On the one hand, it is much easier for international investors to become involved in a large and Iiquid market, since they can be sure of getting a fair price. On the other hand, smaller national European markets, which have been neglected by international investors up to now, will no longer be isolated owing to their increasing integration into the core European market. They, too, will profit from the better liquidity. At the same time the multitude of rules and fee structures will be simplified and made transparent, increasing the incentive to become active on this market. Growth potential, previously limited owing to European currency uncertainties, will also be enhanced. And, finally, a sensible diversification of investment porttolios will create more weight for the European market.
One currency in a common trading area makes economie sense. This does not mean, however, trying to balance politicaI deficits with economic means. I am convinced that the European currency will be a hard one.
8
The independence of the European Centrai Bank has been ensured, and its responsibility towards stability has been clearly defined. Countries qualifying for monetary union have long been following a thorough and trustworthy stability policy. There is every reason to believe that they will continue such policies.The serious efforts being made in Belgium,.for instance, deserve our respect.
The European Monetary Union will change the international monetary system. The D-Mark, presently the second reserve currency, will be wrapped up in the European currency. The European Economie and Monetary Union's economie weight in the likely initial core is more than twice as large as Germany's. The European currency's role vis-à-vis the other two main currencies - the US dollar and the yen - will strengthen dramatically. One should, however, not attach too much hope to the monetary union bringing stability to exchange rates. While it will, of course, eliminate ali speculation among its members, the relationship between the yen and the dollar shows that exchange rates f1uctuate when the perceptions of economie development and policies, even of larger areas, create their own laws and priorities.
There is no doubt that European Monetary Union represents progress for Europe. The process of integration has meanwhile reached such an advanced stage that to curtail it now would cause a great deal of damage. A failure of the Maastricht Agreement would mean more than just a step back to where we were in 1991. For Europe, and indeed for the world, it would have grave consequences.
Apart from the economie issues, the debate on European integration must always be seen against the background of a lasting peace for the old con-
