Ekonomie životního prostředí na rozcestí

Masarykova univerzita Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

Ekonomie životního prostředí na rozcestí Habilitační práce (soubor prací)

Ing. Lenka Slavíková, Ph. D.

Brno, 2014

Abstrakt: Ekonomie životního prostředí prošla dynamickým procesem vývoje konkurujících si myšlenkových směrů, které přináší různá vysvětlení existujících environmentálních problémů a navrhují také jejich různá řešení. Předkládaný soubor textů na jedné straně přispívá ke zmapování tohoto vývoje, na druhé straně aplikuje metody institucionální analýzy na konkrétní environmentální problémy ve středoevropském prostoru. Habilitační práce se skládá s pěti samostatných článků publikovaných v letech 2009 – 2013. Klíčová slova: ekonomie životního prostředí; správa životního prostředí; režimy správy; veřejné statky; kolektivní statky.

Abstract: Economics of the environment went through the dynamic process of evolution of numerous paradigms bringing competing views on causes of environmental problems as well as their solutions. On one hand, the thesis contributes to theoretical and methodological discussion by mapping different school of thoughts within economics of the environment and their mutual interactions. On the other hand, it stresses the environmental governance approach and shows its application to particular environmental problems. The thesis is the compilation of five academic papers published in 2009 – 2013. Keywords: economics of the environment; environmental governance; property regimes; public goods; common-pool resources.

JEL Klasifikace: Q570, Q590, B130

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Poděkování: Za spolupráci na vědeckých projektech a dlouhodobé odborné vedení děkuji zejména prof. Ing. Jiřině Jílkové, CSc. a doc. Mgr. Tatianě Kluvánkové-Oravské, Ph.D. Dále děkuji svému manželovi za podporu, bez níž by mé další vědecké směřování nebylo možné.

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Obsah

Komentář k předloženým textům .......................................................................... 5 Bridging theories on environmental governance. insights from free market approaches and institutional ecological economics perspectives ...................... 12 From cost-benefit to institutional analysis in the economics of the environment ............................................................................................................................. 26 Kvalitativně orientované metody socioekonomického výzkumu a jejich využití v ekonomii životního prostředí............................................................................... 42 Implementing the public participation principle into water management in the czech republic – critical analysis .......................................................................... 63 From government to governance for biodiversity: the perspective of central and eastern european transition countries ................................................................ 90

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KOMENTÁŘ K PŘEDLOŽENÝM TEXTŮM

Ekonomie životního prostředí je relativně mladou oblastí aplikované ekonomie. V průběhu uplynulých padesáti let prošla dynamickým vývojem, který byl charakterizován zejména rozvíjením různých alternativních přístupů k tzv. neoklasické environmentální ekonomii hlavního proudu. Tento rozvoj byl přímo úměrný narůstajícímu společenskému významu problematiky ochrany životního prostředí, který lze zaznamenat od poloviny 20. století do současnosti. Významnými prvky vznikajících alternativ je důraz na jiné než monetární zachycení významu environmentálních statků (tj. odklon od analýz nákladů a užitků směrem k širšímu spektru analytických, často kvalitativně orientovaných metod), vyšší míra zohlednění problému vládních selhání a celkového kontextu environmentální regulace v podobě kulturních a historických specifik konkrétních regionů. Publikací komplexně postihujících myšlenkovou a metodologickou evoluci v rámci ekonomie životního prostředí není mnoho. Většina prací neobsahuje systematický přehled předpokladů, východisek a z nich vyplývajících řešení problémů ochrany životního prostředí klíčových, z ekonomie vycházejících myšlenkových směrů. Tato situace znesnadňuje orientaci mezi různými názorovými pozicemi společenských vědců a způsobuje terminologická a metodologická nedorozumění. Obtížná identifikace hranic mezi představiteli různých teoretických přístupů na jedné straně brání kritické komparaci soupeřících paradigmat, na druhé straně překáží rozvíjení vzájemných interakcí mezi přístupy a hledáním prostoru pro případnou syntézu. Předkládaný soubor textů reflektuje výše nastíněný vývoj, a to v teoretické i praktické rovině. V oblasti teorie se zabýváme základní charakteristikou a komparací soupeřících paragigmat – tj. neoklasické environmentální ekonomie, institucionální ekologické ekonomie a tržními přístupy k ochraně životního prostředí. Na základě provedených rešerší a analýz metodologického aparátu považujeme v současnosti tyto tři skupiny za klíčové, teoreticky i empiricky jasně ukotvené, což dále umožňuje jejich uchopení a zkoumání. V praktické rovině aplikujeme analytický (kvalitativně orientovaný) aparát institucionální ekologické ekonomie na vybrané problémy související se zaváděním nové regulace životního prostředí ve středoevropském prostoru.

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Jednotící myšlenkou a také cílem předkládaných textů je postihnout metodologický posun v rámci ekonomie životního prostředí, který lze stručně charakterizovat v těchto rovinách: a) od analýzy nákladů a užitků k analýze institucí, b) od kvantitativních metod ke kombinovaným (a často pouze kvalitativním) metodám analýzy, c) od vládní regulace k víceúrovňovým modelům správy veřejných a kolektivních statků životního prostředí. Z uvedeného vyplývá, že instituce jsou chápány jako významné alokační proměnné – tj. mají dopad na rozhodování jednotlivců (přírodní) zdroje zachovávat či naopak vyčerpávat. Je proto nutné jim věnovat pozornost a přizpůsobit analytický aparát tak, aby bylo možné je studovat. Hovoříme-li o institucích, stojí za zmínku, že různí autoři se inspirují jak tradičním americkým institucionalismem, tak novou institucionální ekonomií. V návaznosti na americký institucionalismus Commonse a Veblena je akcentován vliv společenských norem na preferenční škály jednotlivců. Z nové institucionální ekonomie se pak navazuje zejména na teorii transakčních nákladů (R. Coase) a koncept omezené racionality jednotlivců (O. Williamson). Často je rovněž pro vymezení pojmu „instituce“ (jakožto interních a externích společenských pravidel hry) využívána definice D. Northa. Uvedený posun je v mezinárodním kontextu silně ovlivněn vědeckým přínosem americké profesorky politických věd, Elinor Ostromové, které byla v roce 2009 udělena Nobelova cena za ekonomii.

Vymezení základních pojmů Zastřešujícího termínu ekonomie životního prostředí (economics of the environment nebo economics of the environmental protection) se zatím v českém prostředí příliš neužívá. Je to pravděpodobně dáno dosavadní absencí potřeby nalézt souhrnný název pro různé myšlenkové směry vycházející z ekonomie a zabývající se interakcí člověka s jeho životním prostředím. V mezinárodní literatuře je termín volně používán představiteli různých myšlenkových paradigmat a není definičně nijak ukotven. Pro účely této práce rozumíme ekonomií životního prostředí obecně aplikaci ekonomicko-teoretického poznání na oblast ochrany životního prostředí. Tato odnož ekonomie sleduje jednání lidí související s ochranou různých složek životního prostředí. Zabývá se řešením

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konfliktů při různé míře využívání vzácných přírodních zdrojů a vysvětluje příčiny a důsledky jednání v rámci různých typů institucionálního uspořádání. Termín ekonomie životního prostředí dále používáme vždy v souvislosti s celkovým vymezením analyzované problematiky, tj. v situacích, kdy by využití názvu konkrétního myšlenkového směru (např. environmentální ekonomie) bylo zavádějící. V jednotlivých textech je často skloňován výraz environmental governance (v češtině správa či spravovaní přírodních zdrojů). V zahraniční literatuře jde o silně akcentovaný koncept. Je možné jej definovat mnoha způsoby – např. jako státní správu se zahrnutím i jiných rozhodovacích úrovní, než jen té centrální nebo jako systém překrývajících se institucí, které zahrnují formální a neformální pravidla na lokální, národní a mezinárodní úrovni. V takovém případě se také často hovoří o víceúrovňové správě zdrojů (multilevel/polycentric governance). Klíčovým prvkem je, že místo plné decentralizace rozhodování na nejnižší samosprávní jednotky či naopak existence jediného rozhodovacího centra může koexistovat více rozhodovacích úrovní, jež jsou na sobě do jisté míry formálně nezávislé. Zkoumání konceptu v praktických souvislostech pak přínáší zjištění, že tyto komplexní rozhodovací struktury jsou často dlouhodobě schopny sladit nároky společnosti na přírodní zdroje s jejich přiměřenou ochranou. Předmětem analýzy nových přístupů v rámci ekonomie životního prostředí jsou instituce ztělesněné režimy správy (property regimes) přírodních zdrojů. Ty jsou tvořeny vlastnickými a uživatelskými právy, které je nutné postihnout v jejich provázanosti (tj. nikoliv pouze jako vlastnické tituly) a formální i faktické (neformální) podobě.

Metody analýzy Jednotlivé články obsahují kombinaci široké škály analytických metod s ohledem jejich na konkrétní cíle. V první řadě se jedná o rozsáhlé podkladové rešerše literatury doplněné o syntézu výsledků v podobě komparace jednotlivých sledovaných atributů (ty jsou prezentovány narativně a s využitím vizualizačních prvků jako jsou tabulky nebo schémata). Dále je vytvořen a aplikován analytický rámec pro hodnocení procesu účasti veřejnosti, a to s odvoláním na obdobné metody využívané v mezinárodním kontextu. Doplňkovými technikami sběru dat jsou řízené

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rozhovory s klíčovými aktéry, studium podkladových materiálů a terénní šetření v podobě přímé účasti na analyzovaných procesech. Metody zvolené v rámci jednotlivých statí jsou v mezinárodním kontextu považovány za vhodné (a často jediné možné) způsoby analýzy komplexních interakcí lidské společnosti s přírodními zdroji a institucionálních aspektů správy přírodních zdrojů. Metodám analýzy se detailněji věnujeme v další části.

Struktura práce Habilitační práce je souborem pěti samostatných článků, které byly publikovány v letech 2009 – 2013. Čtyři články byly vytvořeny kolektivem autorů, z nichž u tří je předkladatelka této práce hlavní autorkou. Podíl na autorství jednotlivých článků (v %) je uveden v rámci jednotlivých kapitol a dále ve věcné rovině upřesněn níže. Články jsou uváděny v originálním jazyce, ve kterém byly publikovány. První tři články mají spíše teoreticko-metodologický charakter, zbývající dva prezentují konkrétní výsledky realizovaného výzkumu v podmínkách České Republiky, resp. ve středoevropském kontextu. Článek Bridging theories on environmental governance: Insights from free-market approaches and institutional ecological economics perspectives vymezuje základní charakteristiky dvou alternativních přístupů k neoklasické environmentální ekonomii, uvadí jejich společné prvky a upozorňuje na jejich rozdílný metodologický základ. Vymezení jednotlivých myšlenkových směrů je provedeno pomocí odpovědí na dvě základní otázky: Jaké jsou příčiny degradace životního prostředí? Jakým způsobem je vhodné je řešit? Cílem článku je podpořit metodologickou diskusi a nastínit otázku možné syntézy soupeřících myšlenek v ochraně životního prostředí v budoucnosti. Jeho inovativnost spočívá v rozšíření spektra komparovaných přístupů a neutrálním pohledu na celou problematiku (ve většině metodologických statí dochází zpravidla k negativnímu vymezování se vůči neoklasické environmentální ekonomii z pozice tradičních ekologických ekonomů). Článek přímo navazuje na výsledky disertační práce hlavní autorky, v rámci které byly zpracovány rozsáhlé podkladové rešerše zahraniční literatury a analyzována míra interakcí mezi jednotlivými ekonomickoteoretickými přístupy. Zatímco první z příspěvků mapuje dosavadní vývoj ekonomie životního prostředí, další dva články se soustředí (a do značné míry i obhajují) metodologický posun,

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který nastává v důsledku postupného oslabování neoklasického paradigmatu. Článek From Cost-Benefit to Institutional Analysis in the Economics of the Environment se zabývá srovnáním základních prvků kvantitativního a kvalitativního výzkumu a diskutuje relevantnost obou typů zkoumání s ohledem na konkrétní analyzovaný problém. Potřeba propojení znalostní základy přírodních a společenských věd, jakož i možnost překračovat hranice ekonomie (směrem k psychologii, resp. sociologii či politologii) vytváří prostor pro interdisciplinární pojetí výzkumu v oblasti ochrany životního prostředí. Výsledkem takovýchto postupů pak může být lepší pochopení komplexních vazeb mezi lidskou společností a ekosystémy, jakož i účinnosti různých nástrojů environmentální politiky v konkrétním společenském kontextu. Článek Kvalitativně orientované metody socioekonomického výzkumu a jejich využití v ekonomii životního prostředí následně uvádí řadu příkladů praktických aplikací metod institucionální analýzy (konkrétně analytického narativu a IAD Framework, včetně popisu těchto metod) a soustředí se zejména na situace, ve kterých je kvantitativní analýza obtížná nebo by vedla k zásadnímu zploštění studovaného problému. První prakticky orientovaný članek Implementing the Public Participation Principle into Water management in the Czech Republic: A Critical Analysis je pak vhodnou ukázkou aplikace kvalitativně orientované institucionální analýzy v kontextu ČR. Analyzovaným problémem je účast veřejnosti na tvorbě vodohospodářských plánů – v obecné rovině se jedná o významný princip k posílení trasparentnosti a akceptovatelnosti regulace veřejných zdrojů prosazovaní institucionálními ekologickými ekonomy. V oblasti vodního hospodářství jde o legislativně ukotvený proces vycházející z požadavků evropských směrnic. Hodnocení účasti veřejnosti je postaveno na souboru kvalitativních kritérií, jež byla aplikována na samotný proces ve třech oblastech povodí. Klíčovým cílem provedeného výzkumu bylo ukázat, do jaké miry rozumí čeští zákonodárci a úředníci inovativním nástrojům evropské politiky a jak jsou schopni je aplikovat v praxi. Hlavním přínosem článku je sdělení, že stejný nástroj akceptovaný a fungují v západní Evropě nemusí být automaticky vhodný pro kvalitní správu zdrojů v zemích s komunistickou historií. Konečně článek From government to governance for biodiversity: the perspective of central and Eastern European transition countries se zaměřuje na institucionální změny v ochraně biodiverzity v post-socialistických evropských státech. Ukazuje, jak efekty demokratizace, decentralizace rozhodování a transpozice západoevropských standardů ochrany přírody ovlivňují institucionální prostředí nových členských zemí (Česka, Slovenska a Polska) i

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států, jež se dosud nachází vně EU (Srbska a Běloruska). Článek je komparací pěti případových studií, z nichž jedna byla zpracována autorkou předkládané habilitační práce.

Obecné závěry Cílem předkládaných statí není zavrhnout dosavadní mainstreamové (neoklasické) paradigma ani označit kvalitativně orientovaný institucionální výzkum za jediný vhodný pro analýzu environmentálních problémů. Spíše usilujeme o otevření ideologicky nezatíženého dialogu napříč jednotlivými přístupy (který v současnosti prakticky neexistuje), jehož výsledkem může být modifikace některých klíčových předpokladů či metodologických premis izolovaných směrů nebo naopak kombinace různých metod v podobě multidimenzionálního (resp. interdisciplinárního) výzkumu. Výzkum zaměřující se na kombinaci metod (tzv. mixed-method nebo methodologicaly triangulated research) – konkrétně např. oceňování statků životního prostředí a kvalitativních metod verifikujících nebo doplňujících získané závěry – je v současnosti jedním z rozvíjejících se odvětví těžících z analytického aparátu neoklasické a institucionální ekonomie, resp. sociologie. Výsledkem těchto procesů by měly být lépe cílené a více koncensuální návrhy správy přírodních zdrojů. Z dosavadních výsledků teoretické komparace vyplývá, že i zdánlivě protichůdná paradigmata – např. tržní přístupy prosazující soukromé vlastnictví přírodních zdrojů a institucionální ekologická ekonomie akcentující výhody společné (komunitní) správy zdrojů – mohou navzdory četným metodologickým odlišnostem dosáhnout dílčí shody týkající se zachování spontánné vzniklých režimů správy, v rámci nichž mají přímí uživatelé zdroje klíčový vliv na tvorbu pravidel (práv). Rovněž v novém tisíciletí silně akcentovaný koncept ekosystémových služeb (ecosystem services) a plateb za tyto služby propojuje řadu prvků různých ekonomicko-teoretických škol, jako např. neoklasickou kompenzaci pozitivních externalit, Coasovo vyjednávání mezi znečišťovatelem a poškozeným a dobrovolnou (tržní) dohodu mezi dvěma subjekty řešící konfliktní užívání konkrétního zdroje. Zastřešujícím faktorem je pak všeobecná akceptace myšlenky, že ekosystémy je pro účely socio-ekonomického výzkumu vhodnější uchopit jako „poskytovatele služeb“ a nikoliv jako komplexní entity mající nenahraditelnou vnitřní hodnotu bez ohledu na potřeby lidské společnosti. Předkládaná habilitační práce jako celek nenavrhuje žádné konečné řešení fragmentace výzkumu v rámci ekonomie životního prostředí, jež se z pohledu

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tvůrců regulace může jevit jako problematické. V dalším studiu vzájemných interakcí představitelů různých myšlenkových směrů, jakož i v aplikacích nově vznikajících konceptů v českém prostředí však spatřujeme možnost přispět ke kontinuální tvorbě vědeckého know-how v mezinárodním kontextu.

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BRIDGING THEORIES ON ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE. INSIGHTS FROM FREE MARKET APPROACHES AND INSTITUTIONAL ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES SLAVÍKOVÁ, L., KLUVÁNKOVÁ-ORAVSKÁ, T., JÍLKOVÁ, J. Bridging theories on environmental governance: Insights from free-market approaches and institutional ecological economics perspectives. Ecological Economics, 2010, roč. 69, č. 7, s. 1368–1372. ISSN 0921-8009. Podíl L. Slavíkové: 60 %

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Introduction Writing purely theoretical papers to compare thoughts on solving environmental problems within social sciences is always a tricky task, since most of the relevant scientists have something to add to this issue and it is practically impossible to cover the entire scale of thinking in the area. Still, our intention is to call attention to the separate evolution of two recent approaches, which are both very critical of mainstream neoclassical environmental economics, though they barely notice one other. These “schools” of thought are free market approaches to environmental protection (Cordato, 1997; Anderson and Leal, 2001) on the one hand and institutional ecological economics (Paavola and Adger, 2005) on the other. The goal of our paper is to stress their methodological differences and to search for potential similarities in their critique of environmental economics and solutions to environmental conflict. Within the paper we offer some new perspectives and links, but foremost we try to open the field for future discussion. Ignoring methodological debates leads to isolated evolution and extensive rivalry among the different schools. As a result, the effectiveness of particular environmental policy measures is continuously retarded as the theoretical background varies among scholars. So far, very limited interactions exist even between traditional neoclassical environmental economics and ecological economics usually containing a single critique of the neoclassical paradigm (see e.g. Bromley, 2004; Gowdy and Erickson, 2005, Vatn, 2005a; Bromley, 2008 among many others). Some authors comparing both paradigms focused on empirical analysis rather than entering methodological debates (Ma and Stern, 2006; Illge and Schwarze, 2009). A review of two key environmental economics journals – Journal of Environmental Economics and Management and Environmental and Resource Economics – over the past two decades has shown that the critique presented by ecological economists towards neoclassicism has not been reflected nor addressed much. Only some bilateral methodological debates take place beyond the pages of these core journals (see e.g. Beckenbach et al. 1999). Within this article, we briefly introduce two competing approaches to environmental control: free-market and institutional ecological economics by summing up the links to their conceptual literature sources. In the second chapter, we compare their objections to neoclassical environmental economics, stressing the differences and similarities of this critique. Finally, we map those

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rare interactions of both approaches over the past two decades and assess the potential for their possible synthesis.

Main characteristics of competing approaches The main differences between the schools of thought – free market approaches and institutional ecological economics – can be revealed by answering two questions: What is the reason for the continuing degradation of nature? What should be done to prevent it? Whereas, traditional neoclassical environmental economists would start to speak about market failures and Pigouvian taxation, representatives of alternative approaches have different answers at hand. Free market economists blame inefficient regulation and advocate the introduction of individual property rights for natural resources as a solution (Anderson, Leal, 2001; Pennington, 2005). On the other hand, institutional ecological economists ask for institutional changes, respecting the spatial fit between institutions and ecosystems, because degradation is, among other factors, caused by these misfits (Young, 2002). They also stress the need for local actor involvement in decision making (Paavola and Adger, 2005; Ostrom, 2006). It is not difficult to detect that particular views differ significantly, so within this chapter we will devote more attention to the theoretical background of these two approaches.

Institutional ecological economics Institutional ecological economists follow the basic thought of the original ecological economics regarding the neoclassical critique, interdisciplinarity and understanding the environment as a dynamic system with physical boundaries which must be respected (for an overview of these ideas see e.g. Söderbaum, 1999; Røpke, 2004; Gowdy and Erickson, 2005; Røpke, 2005 among others). They enriched the existing paradigm by focusing on the role of various institutions and actors in environmental protection following the ideas of representatives of institutional economics (especially the traditional American institutionalism of Veblen and Commons from the early 20th century). As pointed out by O. Young (2002), “institutions play more or less significant causal roles with regard to most environmental changes involving human action“ (Young, 2002, pp. 4-5). For this reason, it is necessary to see the unsustainable use of natural resources as a consequence of property and management regimes that give users poor

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incentives for protecting these resources. Institutions are understood as important determinants of human behaviour influencing individual values and preferences (Vatn, 2005a). Institutional ecological economics is characterized as an empirical and pragmatic approach to study the formal and informal rules in use (see Ostrom in Young, 2002). It helps to examine “how the attributes of environmental resources and their users create interdependence and conflicts” (Paavola and Adger, 2005, pp. 364). Empirical findings are generalized into recommendations of more sustainable institutions, according to which institutional reforms may be initiated. The important feature of this approach is the focus on local customary governance systems of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom, 2006). In particular it emphasizes that rather than fully decentralised or centralised systems, the co-existence of many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each other (poly centers) achieve better governance outcomes (Ostrom et al. 1961; Ostrom, 1997) in particular under the conditions of multilevel governance which pulls authority away from national governments and empowers supra and sub-national actors (Bache and Flinders, 2004). Representatives of the described approach have an ambivalent relation toward the state power. On the one hand, states create rules and (re)distribute use or property rights by which they regulate access to natural resources. The legitimacy for their decisions is derived from the process of democratic elections, which is not perfect, but so far the best mechanism to express the collective will of the society. On the other hand, government decision-making is burdened with government failures, which may cause degradation of publicly owned natural resources (Bromley, 1991). Therefore, the state should primarily focus on creating and defending institutions for sustainable governance. However, as pointed out by Ostrom, Young and others, there is not a single and simple institutional solution for the large variability of environmental problems (onesize-does-not-fit-all problem) (see e.g. Ostrom, 2006). The change of institutions or the design of new institutions must be done after careful mapping of a particular situation (especially knowing the ecological, economic and social characteristics of the problem) and with the use of open social dialogue (Vatn, 2005a,b). From this description it is clear that the empirical evidence is crucial to reach scientific conclusions, which are then transformed into political recommendations.

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Free market approaches to environmental protection Free-market economists dealing with environmental issues are strongly inspired by the so-called Austrian School of thinking and Public Choice economics. Both of these schools are well known as very strong opponents of government regulations and consistent promoters of the concept of government failures (Buchanan, 1969; Mises, 1998). Free market approaches include two groups of scientists – Austrian economists dealing with environmental applications of the original Austrian paradigm (currently especially W. Block and R. Cordato) and the so-called “free-market environmentalism” group represented by T. L. Anderson and the team of researchers under the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC) in Montana. Both groups defend the idea that the free market will protect nature better than environmental regulation. In other words, if we want to attain9 better environmental quality, we should rely on individual decision-making and let markets for environmental services evolve (Anderson and Leal, 2001; Pennington, 2005). The fundamental condition for the market evolution is the existence of individual property rights for environmental resources (i.e. rights are designed or their spontaneous creation is not blocked by a regulation), their long-term guarantee and free transferability (Rothbard, 1990; Stroup, 2000). Natural resources are not fundamentally public or collective goods, the assignment of individual property rights is a technical question, not a matter of principle (Cordato, 2004). The self-interest of private owners can ensure a high environmental quality of those resources, if (but only if) this quality is demanded by other people. The mechanism of supply – demand – market price can work in favour of environmental protection in the same way as it works for conventional goods and services (Block, 1990a). This implicates that if individuals in the society do not demand high quality of the environment, it is not (and it should not be) provided. The role of the state is just to guarantee evolved rights respecting the needs of local users (authors refer to the Anglo-Saxon system of common law), not to intervene into the allocation of environmental resources in the name of any public interests. The superiority of individual property rights is, according to Anderson and Leal (2001), based on the efficiency argument (property rights are an essential condition for economic prosperity and conflict prevention). Rothbard (1998) and Hoppe (2004) referred to Locke’s set of “natural laws” by which the existence of individual ownership is a priori justified.

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Differences and similarities of the neoclassical critique We have already indicated that both theoretical approaches described here strongly criticize neoclassical environmental economics. This critique generally addresses the absence of institutions, the ignorance of government failures and methodological issues. We will briefly deal with these objections one after another. We intend to show that both – free-market and institutional ecological economists – agree in principle on the first two objections, but they have significantly different views on the third point regarding the methodology.

The importance of institutions Neoclassical environmental economics reflects the existence of institutions, but due to assumptions of zero transaction and information costs it views them as neutral regarding resource allocation (they are an exogenous variable to neoclassical models). Contrarily, institutional ecological economics and freemarket approaches regard institutions as influential factors of resource allocation and use – changing institutions has significant distributional impacts, institutional structures provide individuals with incentives to either conserve or deplete scarce resources (for detailed argumentation see e.g. Pennington, 2005; Stroup, 2000 or Paavola, 2007). The supposed neutrality of institutions under zero transaction costs was attacked e.g. by Gowdy and Ericson (2005) who presented research proving that people systematically overvalue resources they already have and so they express the (irrational) aversion to their loss. Therefore, the initial allocation of resources matters. Similar arguments against allocation neutrality, dealing with the importance of so-called “psychic loss” (i.e. a subjective feeling of an individual which is not monetized through markets), were raised by W. Block during his bilateral dispute with H. Demsetz (see Block, 1977; Demsetz, 1979 and Block, 1995). Moreover, Vatn (2005b) stresses the impact institutions have on individuals’ value scales. This persuasion is derived from thoughts of traditional institutionalism and is not methodologically acceptable for free-market economists (see section 2.3).

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Neglecting government failures As pointed out earlier, neoclassical environmental economists intend to correct market failures via government intervention into price structures. Market failures (externalities and public goods) are considered to be the reasons for environmental degradation. By contrast, free-market economists declare that poor environmental quality is a result of the absence of property rights for environmental resources (e.g. due to declared public ownership) and the solution is, therefore, their introduction. Markets do not fail (since they have not been established, yet), but the state, as the main leader, fails by blocking the evolution of the property right structure due to public interest (Block, 1990a; Raeder, 1998). Numerous empirical evidence to support this position was gathered e.g. in Higgs and Close (2005) or Block (1990b). The explanation of the concept of government failures and their consequences is given, among others, by Anderson and Leal (2001). Main idea is that the state consists of individuals primarily pursuing their own self-interests (the essence of the human being in a policy arena does not change). If there are natural resources in public ownership, politicians and officials treat them as their temporary property – they take current benefits, but do not have to bear the long-term costs of their decision-making (Huffman, 1994). The protection of future generations’ interests usually does not gain the support of current voters, as long as sustainability ideas are not shared by the majority of people (Stroup and Goodman, 1992). Therefore, solving so-called market failures by simply shifting the responsibility to state administration does not bring (and over the past decades did not bring) the expected results. This view is also shared by institutional ecological economists who admit that it would be naive to ignore public choice theory conclusions. Features of rent-seeking and the interest group influence in environmental policy are analyzed e.g. by Bromley (1991). On the other hand, Vatn (2005b) stresses that it is wrong to view individuals (in both market and political arena) only as selfish entities pursuing their own interests. He says that “actions both of the individual and of the planner, in which rationality and responsibilities are involved, will be influenced by the institutions as they foster specific interests and ideas about what is a sensible or good society” (Vatn, 2005b, pp. 108). This quotation fully reflects the belief that people’s preferences and values can be influenced by the proper institutional background, which should be established based on social dialogue. The dispute over the nature of mankind brings us to the methodological issues.

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Methodological critique The methodological discussions across the theoretical approaches are complex and it is not possible to capture them entirely within this commentary. Therefore, we will focus mainly on methodological individualism (versus collectivism) and the rationality of behaviour, leaving aside different views on the theory of value and methods of analysis at this moment. A methodological critique is crucial for the identification of fundamental differences between both approaches. Firstly as a contrast to neoclassical methodological individualism the concept of methodological institutionalism is introduced by institutional ecological economists (see Vatn, 2005a,b). It combines individualism and collectivism, which are both useful for explaining elements of human actions, i.e. individual behaviour and also social features independent of individual action. Instead, free-market economists strongly insist upon the methodological individualism and criticize the neoclassical welfare theory, which analyzed categories such as “social welfare” which were not consistent with the individualistic perspective. The predetermination of individual actions by a social context is, therefore, unacceptable for them (Mises, 1998). In contrast, Vatn (2005b) qualifies the individualist perspective of the free-market approach as a specific social construct in itself. This argument is deepened by different views on the rationality of human action. A critique of neoclassical individual rationality is included in Vatn (2005a) and a new concept of social rationality, explaining altruistic actions, is introduced (Bromley, 2004; Vatn, 2005b). Free-market approaches to rationality do not share the neoclassical view of a fully informed, rational man with stable preferences, instead they insist on the purely individual concept. As stated by Mises (1998), individual human action is always rational; by judging it as “irrational” we only express our disagreement with individual’s choices. Altruistic behaviour does not disprove the fact that an individual weighs their subjective (often non-monetary) costs and benefits from particular actions. These disagreements point out the hidden difference in the subject of analysis of both theoretical approaches: Whereas free-market approaches primarily analyze human action – how people act in a world of scarcity to achieve whatever goals they pursue, institutional ecological economists intend to find mechanisms to influence individual preferences. By knowing these mechanisms, people’s goals could be changed e.g. toward greater sustainability. This brings us further to the

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question of the presence or absence of value judgments within social sciences (especially in economics) which is also surrounded by many disputes. The declared value neutrality of the Austrian school is explicitly attacked by Vatn (2005a,b) who labels the superiority of one institutional solution for all kinds of environmental degradation – private ownership – as an ideological claim. He also considers ethical questions to be a legitimate part of an economic analysis. Arguments against this so-called “green communitarian” critique were gathered by Pennington (2005) based on Hayek’s thoughts (although his polemics is addressed mainly to the position of the philosopher M. Sagoff).

Current and future interlinkages We have already pointed out that both alternatives to mainstream environmental economics agree on the fact that “institutions matter” and they both stress the existence of government failures. This can be considered as an important springboard for future synthesis, since attention is redirected from cost-benefit analysis toward optimizing property and management regimes. Governments are no longer understood as the only authorities in decision making regarding environmental governance. So far interactions or permeation of thoughts between these approaches have been rare. This conclusion is based on a literature search in core scientific journals from 1997 – 2009 (see Jílková and Slavíková, 2009 for detailed results). We have already mentioned Vatn’s explicit critique of the free-market methodology. In contrast, fragments of an institutionalistic perspective regarding robust environmental governance schemes can be detected in Yandle (2004) who refers to the spatial fit between institutions and ecosystems as being the optimal position. Further, Ostrom and their followers reached reconcilable conclusions regarding the property regime of a specific group of common-pool resources (local irrigation systems) as free-market representatives (compare Ostrom, 2006 and Anderson and Snyder, 1997). However, both analyses evolved separately and did not notice each other. It is clear that despite similarities and overlapping research agenda both approaches significantly differ in their key methodological issues. It is not our intention to seek their joint position within this paper. Rather we particularize issues which could be further explored in order to clarify differences and to bridge the existing gap. The motivation for it lies in the potential to produce a

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better, comprehensive understanding of environmental problems and the solutions put forward, although to reach applicable methodological interdisciplinarity is, generally, challenging (see the work of Klein, 1990 or recently Huutoniemi et al., 2009). Firstly, a proper understanding of the free-market (or originally Austrian) terminology must be established – specifically the concepts of human rationality, value and its theoretical position which is derived from strict methodological individualism and subjectivism and diverges from the criticized standard neoclassical paradigm (for a detailed description see Mises, 1998). The neoclassical and free-market positions are often mistaken. This approach might be compared with the more expanded concept of bounded rationality (see e.g. Furubotn and Richter, 2005), to which different critiques of neoclassical economics refer. Finally there should be an investigation as to what extent freemarket concepts complement methodological institutionalism and the social rationality of institutional ecological economics. There is a realistic potential that both the individualistic and collectivistic perspectives are relevant for explaining human interference with natural resources under different property regimes (without favoring certain institutional arrangements). Secondly, there is the problem of including or excluding environmental ethics into scientific conclusions. Instead of a neutral free-market question: How do people act?, institutional ecological economists tend to search for the answer to: How should people act? The inherent problem, with all its ethical issues, is that someone (researchers, the government, the public?) must decide what SHOULD be done, what is right. According to free-market representatives, this decision is burdened especially with (government) failures and subjective biases. However, the implementation of multi-level environmental governance within which local stakeholders play an important role in decision-making (the institutional ecological solution) might defuse these biases and failures and the free-market approach should reflect the growing evidence of successes in this field (see e.g. Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; Jordan, 2008; Koontz and Johnson, 2004 among many others). Further, free-market economists should consistently confute the above mentioned critique of their “fake” value neutrality and their theoretical arguments regarding the superiority of private ownership should be challenged by opponents of this position. Thirdly, it has not been emphasized yet that both approaches also apply different methods of analysis. Institutional ecological economists derive their conclusions largely from empirical findings contrarily free-market economists confirm

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deducted theoretical findings by empirical case studies. Whereas the conclusions of the former are usually type-specific and may be falsified by opposing empirical findings, the propositions of the latter can be challenged mainly on the theoretical ground. This must be reflected before entering disputes about a proposed solution to environmental degradation. Nevertheless, both methods may coexist and reach comparable results. Their combinations bridge the imaginary gap between the research methods of natural and social sciences.

Conclusion Within the paper we compared two recent critical alternative approaches to neoclassical environmental economics – free-market approaches and institutional ecological economics. We described their conceptual differences and searched for similarities. The main purpose of our paper was to foster dialogue on methodological issues between related theoretical approaches, which oscillate on the borders of natural and social sciences. The effort devoted to reconciling the competing paradigms, or at least clarifying disputable points, could be honored with the implementation of more consistent end effective environmental policy. It was stated that both approaches agree upon the importance of institutions in socioeconomic analysis and reflect the problem of government failures. Further, their main methodological disagreements were introduced and pathways for possible future arguments were indicated, especially regarding problems of methodological individualism versus collectivism, environmental ethics and research methods. Although, from thoughts presented here, any kind of interdisciplinary synthesis seems to be far away, fragmentary suppositions indicate that in future it might not be an impossible mission.

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Andersson, K., Ostrom, E., 2008. Analyzing Decentralized Natural Resource Governance from a Polycentric Perspective, Policy Sciences 41/1: 1-23. Bache, I., Flinders, M. (Eds.), 2004. Multi-level Governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 252 pp. Beckenbach, F., Hampicke, U., Leipert, Ch., 1999. Jahrbuch ökologische Ökonomik, Bd.1, Zwei Sichtweisen auf das Umweltproblem. Metropolis, Marburg, 480 pp. Block, W. E., 1995. Ethics, Efficiency, Coasian Property Rights, and Psychis Income: A Reply to Demsetz. The Review of Austrian Economics, 8/2: 61-125. Block, W. E. 1990a. Environmental Problems, Private Property Rights Solutions. In: Block, W. E. (Ed.): Economics and the Environment: A Reconciliation. The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, B. C., pp. 281-318. Block, W. E. (editor), 1990b. Economics and the Environment: A Reconciliation. The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, B. C., 332 pp. Block, W. E., 1977. Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1/2: 111-15. Bromley, D. W., 2008. Volitional Pragmatism. Ecological Economics, 68/1-2: 1-13. Bromley, D. W., 2004. Reconsidering Environmental Policy: Prescriptive Consequentialism and Volitional Pragmatism. Environmental and Resource Economics, 32/1: 73-99. Bromley, D. W., 1991. Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74/3: 836 – 837. Buchanan, J. M., 1969. Cost and Choice: an Inquiry in Economic Theory. Markam Publishing Co., Chicago, 120 pp. Cordato, R. E., 2004. An Austrian Theory of Environmental Economics. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 7/1: 3–16. Cordato, R. E., 1997. Market-based Environmentalism and the Free-Market – They are not the Same. The Independent Review, 1/3: 371-386. Demsetz, H., 1979. Ethics and Efficiency in Property Rights Systems. In: Rizzo (editor), Time, Uncertainty and Disequilibrium: Explorations of Austrian Themes, D. C. Heath, Lexington, pp. 97-116. Furubotn, E. G., Richter, R., 2005. Institutions and Economic Theory. University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 576 pp. Gowdy, J., Erickson, J., 2005. Ecological Economics at a Crossroads. Ecological Economics, 53/2: 17-20. Higgs, R., Close, C. P. (Eds.), 2005. Re-thinking Green – Alternatives to Environmental Bureaucracy. The Independent Institute, Oackland, 467 pp.

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Hoppe, H., 2004. The Ethics and Economics of Private Property. In: E. Colombato (editor): The Elgar Companion to The Economics of Property Rights. Edward Elgar, London. Huffman, J. L., 1994. The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands. University of Colorado Law Review, 65: 241-277. Huutoniemi, K., Klein, J. T., Bruun, H., Hukkinen, J. 2009. Analyzing interdisciplinarity: Typology and indicators. Research Policy (article in press, doi:10.1016/j.respol.2009.09.011). Illge, L., Schwarze, R., 2009. A matter of opinion—How ecological and neoclassical environmental economists think about sustainability and economics. Ecological Economics, 68/3: 594-604. Jílková, J., Slavíková, L., 2009. Ekonomie životního prostředí na rozcestí. Politická ekonomie, 5/57: 660-676. Jordan, A., 2008. The Governance of Sustainable Development: Taking Stock and Looking Forwards, Environmental Planning C: Government and Planning 26: 1733. Klein, J. T. 1990. Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory and Practice. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 331 pp. Koontz, T. M., Johnson, E. M., 2004. One Size does not Fit All: Matching Breadth of Stakeholder Participation to Watershed Group Accomplishments, Policy Sciences 37: 185-204. Ma, Ch., Stern, D. I., 2006. Environmental and ecological economics: A citation analysis. Ecological Economics, 58/3: 491-506. Mises, L., 1998. Human Action – A Treatise on Economics. Mises Institute, Auburn, 912 pp. Ostrom, E., 2006. Governing the Commons – The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. The Cambridge University Press, New York. Ostrom, E., 1999. Revisiting the Commons. Local Lessons, Global Challenges. Science, 284: 278 – 282. Ostrom, V. 1997. The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerabilities of Democracies, A Response to Tocqueville’s Challenge. Ann Abor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 360 pp. Ostrom, V., Tiebout, Ch., M., Warren, R. 1961. The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas. American Political Science Review 55: 831-842. Paavola, J., 2007. Institutions and environmental reconceptualization. Ecological Economics, 63: 93-103.

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Paavola, J., Adger, N. W., 2005. Institutional ecological economics. Ecological Economics, 53: 353-368.

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Pennington, M., 2005. Liberty, Markets, and Environmental Values – A Hayekian Defense of Free-Market Environmentalism. The Independent Review, X/1: 39-57. Raeder, L. C., 1998. Liberalism and the Common Good – A Hayekian Perspective on Communitarianism. The Independent Review, II/4: 519-535. Røpke, I., 2005. Trends in the development of ecological economics from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. Ecological Economics, 55/2: 262-290. Røpke, I., 2004. The early history of modern ecological economics. Ecological Economics 50/3-4: 293-314. Rothbard, M., 1998. The Ethics of Liberty. New York University Press, New York, 308 pp. Rothbard, M., 1990. Law, Property and Air Pollution. In. W. E. Block (Ed.): Economics and the Environment: A Reconciliation, The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, B. C., pp. 233-280. Söderbaum, P., 1999. Values, ideology and politics in ecological economics. Ecological Economics, 28/2: 161-170. Stroup, R. L., 2000. Free Riders and Collective Action Revisited. The Independent Review IV/4: 485-500. Stroup, R. L., Goodman, S. L., 1992. Property Rights, Environmental Resources and the Future. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 15: 427-441. Vatn, A., 2005a. Rationality, institutions and environmental policy. Ecological Economics, 55/2: 203-217. Vatn, A., 2005b. Institutions and the Environment. Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton. Yandle, B., 2004. Environmental turning points, institutions, and the race to the top. The Independent Review, IX/2: 211-226. Young, O. R. 2002. The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change – Fit, Interplay and Scale. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 221 pp.

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FROM COST-BENEFIT TO INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN THE ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT SLAVÍKOVÁ, L. From cost-benefit to institutional analysis in the economics of the environment. Contemporary Economics, 2013, roč. 7, č. 2, s. 67–75. ISSN 20840845.

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Introduction

Economics of the environment is a relatively young field of applied economics. During the 50 years of its existence, it has gone through a dynamic process characterized by the evolution of alternatives to mainstream neoclassical environmental economics. The mainstream view identifies market failures (such as externalities and public goods) as key causes of the environmental degradation and proposes different types of government regulations as solutions to this degradation. The monetary valuation of natural goods or environmental damages (as part of cost-benefit calculations) represents the main tool of the analysis. The subsequent evolution of competing thoughts regarding this mainstream view has been proportionate to the growing importance of environmental problems as reflected by society since the mid-20th century. Publications describing the ideological and methodological progress of different schools of thought within the economics of the environment are rather scarce. Kula (1998) addresses fragments of different approaches from medieval philosophy, via neoclassical economics to current thoughts, inspired by the sustainability movement (including various ethical and religious thoughts). Brief historical excursions are contained in environmental and ecological economics textbooks (such as Common and Stagl, 2005; Pearce and Turner, 1990), while overviews of the theoretical development within the economics of the environment are contained in proceedings of key academic papers (Hoel, 2004; Oates, 1994). The absence of a systematic overview of the competing approaches (including a comparison of their assumptions, methods and policy recommendations) complicates orientation in statements, opinions and terminology (more in Slavíková et al., 2010). Accordingly, it is not easy to identify borders among the competing schools of thought, to detect new trends and, especially, to build a dialog among economists working in this field. Still, a growing body of literature over the past two decades has made the shift from pure cost-benefit calculations to more complex institutional analyses clear (Anderson and Snyder, 1997; Young, 2002). Methods developed for the investigation of environmental problems aim to capture a broader spectrum of social features that influence human behavior (such as political and cultural aspects) and to integrate research techniques from other scientific disciplines (Poteete et al., 2010).

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The goal of the paper is to justify the importance of this methodological shift regarding the solutions to the environmental problem. Particularly, the following two questions will be addressed: What are the existing theoretical approaches within the economics of the environment? What are the new developing (often qualitative) methods of analysis and how do they help to solve the environmental problems? The comparative and descriptive methods based on extensive literature reviews are applied to map existing phenomena. Within the paper, the expression “economics of the environment” (or, alternatively, “economics of environmental protection”) is used as the general term for the application of different economic thoughts to the problem of environmental protection. The paper focuses on human behavior related to use vs. protection of natural resources, including conflict resolution under various types of institutional arrangements. The paper is comprised of three chapters. Chapter 1 addresses the classification of theoretical approaches within the economics of the environment. Chapter 2 describes the essence of the methodological shift from the cost-benefit to the institutional analysis. Finally, chapter 3 justifies the need for institutional analysis and presents some EU environmental policy evidence to support the application of heterogeneous research methods.

Fragmentation of the field – who, when and why? Based on the investigation presented in Jílková and Slavíková (2009) and Slavíková et al. (2010), three main theoretical approaches within the economics of the environment have been institutionalized, thus offering different views on environmental problems and their possible solutions. These are as follows: 

mainstream neoclassical environmental economics,



institutional ecological economics and



free market approaches to environmental protection.

These three different views are summarized in table 1. Additionally, few other minor groups or sub-groups exist, such as direct followers of Ronald Coase (i.e., applications of new institutional economics on the problem of environmental protection), natural resource economists, among others. Within the paper, their

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ideas are incorporated into the relevant dominating approaches. Furthermore, the social research that is not grounded in economics has not been addressed (thus excluding fields of environmental ethics, sociology, etc.). Minor fields of specific interdisciplinary research, e.g., economics and psychology (see Frey and Stutzer, 2007) or environmental law and economics (see Germani, 2004), have also, to a large extent, been excluded.

Table 1: Overview of positions of different theoretical schools of thought Causes of environmental problems

Solutions

Neoclassical environmental economics

Market failures

Pigouvian taxation Public provision of goods and services

Free market approaches

Government failures

Introduction of individual property rights

Institutional ecological economics

Misfits between institutions and ecosystems (wrong institutions)

Institutional changes accenting environmental governance principles

Source: author

From table 1, it is apparent that two competing approaches to the mainstream have evolved over the past two or three decades. Free market approaches refer to liberal economic theories of the Austrian schools of thought (especially economist Murray Rothbard) and, in part, the public choice school of James Buchanan. These theories stress government failure problems and emphasize the role of individual motivations to protect the self, and thay accordingly call for the introduction and protection of private ownership (see Anderson and Leal, 2001; Cordato, 2004). On the other hand, institutional ecological economics, which is a continuation of the traditional (or normative) ecological economics represented by Herman Daly and Robert Costanza, focuses on the study of mutual interactions among social and ecological systems and aims to design the proper institutions to solve the problem regarding protection vs. the use of natural resources in the long-term (Paavola, 2007; Vatn, 2005; Young, 2002). This perspective also strongly refers to the empirical research of the American political scientist Elinor Ostrom (see Ostrom, 2006; 2008).

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Both of the aforementioned alternatives to the mainstream neoclassical approach agree that “institutions matter”, and they both stress the existence of government failures, which were neglected in the neoclassical approach. However, they significantly differ in their key methodological issues, such as the understanding of human rationality, methodological individualism vs. collectivism, the role of ethics in socioeconomic research, etc. (see Slavíková et al., 2010). Nevertheless, it is clear that institutions became to be viewed as influential factors of resource allocation, and the changing of institutions has had significant distributional impacts as institutional structures provide individuals with incentives to either conserve or deplete scarce (natural) resources (Anderson and Leal, 2001; Ostrom, 2005; Paavola, 2007). This perspective is in strong contrast with the neoclassical approach that views institutions as neutral regarding resource allocation (institutions are an exogenous variable in neoclassical models) due to assumptions of zero transaction and information costs (Furubotn and Richter, 2005). Which institutions are the right ones, however, is the subject of dispute, and accordingly, the impacts of private, collective and state ownerships in combination with different management practices have been the subject of various studies (Stroup, 2000; Vatn, 2005). With respect to the institutional perspective, it is worth noting that two theoretical schools – the traditional and new institutional economics – are viable inspirations for different scientists from both alternative groups. From the traditional school, the institutional ecological economists adopted the notion of the social pre-determination of individual human preferences (as explained, e.g., by Veblen, 1899) – see, e.g., the work of Arild Vatn (2005). This belief led them to question the methodology of neoclassical environmental economics, especially with respect to its focus on methodological individualism and perfect rationality of consumers. From new institutional economics, the transaction cost theory and the concept of bounded rationality (Williamson, 1981) became the main milestones reflected in different contexts. Institutions, defined by both internal and external social rules of the game (see, e.g., North, 2005 among others) are analyzed on a theoretical (Cordato, 2004) as well as an empirical basis (Young, 2002). Fragments of consensual results among free-market and institutional ecological economists were revealed in empirical case studies by Elinor Ostrom and Terry Anderson. Both authors analyzed spontaneously evolved property regimes of local irrigation systems in the USA (Anderson and Snyder, 1997), Spain and the

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Philippines (Ostrom, 2006). In the American case, the authors described the gradual evolution of water markets based on individual water rights. In the latter case, the social cooperation in running irrigation systems proved the viability of communal ownership. However, due to the bottom-up evolution of successful institutional arrangements, the authors do not ascribe the normative value to any type of water problem solution. According to Ostrom et al. (1999), private property may be established, especially when the exclusion of others is inexpensive and when the potential owner withdraws only a small portion of the resource in use. On the other hand, free-market economist Edwin Dolan (2006) states that if there are not enough resources left in the common-pool, the further appropriation by any individual can proceed only with the consent of other users (i.e., based on social agreement). Under specific conditions, both communal and private ownership can represent the efficient alternative for the resource users providing they are free to decide on the appropriate institutional arrangement (Šíma, 2004). This partial consensus is apparent despite the fact that different research methods (empirically based vs. deductive) are used to support particular statements.

The methodological shift The identification of two novel approaches within the economics of the environment give rise to the change in the investigation focus at the scene. Instead of calculating the optimal tax or the proper monetary value of natural resources in general, a growing group of researchers began to study natural resource property regimes with the aim to design institutional reforms. For this purpose, different methods and analytical techniques are introduced. In this context, the methodological discussions include the following two key issues, which will be addressed herein: a) the position of qualitative vs. quantitative methods, b) the rationale for interdisciplinary methods.

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Words and/or numbers? Current mainstream microeconomics (from which the neoclassical environmental economics is directly derived) is, to a large extent, quantitatively oriented. This approach is illustrated by Jílková et al. (2010) as they investigate the willingness to pay for the infrastructural improvement of natural places of interest through the contingent valuation method. According to this method, interviewed people express their preference to pay for a certain public good, a good from which potential benefits are derived (and can be compared with costs of the provision). Thousands of different evaluation studies based on different valuation techniques have been published – for more, see, e.g., Journal of Environmental Economics and Management or Environmental and Resource Economics. Both journals represent the current focus of neoclassical environmental economics. However, a growing number of social scientists propose the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods with respect to the subject of analysis, where – and this must be emphasized – the methods are only MEANS and not the final GOAL of the research effort. A high level of abstraction in formal models challenges the practical applicability of these methods. On the other hand, the external validity of the qualitative analyses of case studies may be very low. The crucial point is to combine advantages of both types of methods whenever necessary (Poteete et al., 2010). Accordingly, the qualitative research is no longer in an inferior position (Hendl, 2005). Even an economic analysis can be based on interviews and desk-studies (Kornai, 2008). Furthermore, as emphasized by Poteete et al. (2010, p. 4), “No method is immune to poor applications.” Within the economics of the environment, the study of property regimes (including different types of ownership and use rights) calls for methodological flexibility. For example, when analyzing human action related to common-pool resources, the data on particular observations are scarce and are thus difficult to find and difficult to compare. The case study approach, therefore, is a possible solution (Poteete et al., 2010). To support the external validity of conclusions, two different strategies are implemented by promoters of qualitative methods. The first strategy relies on the collection of numerous case studies over time and the development of the common comparative framework necessary to analyze the studies (see the description of IAD Framework in Poteete et al., 2010). Empirically based results of a large number of case studies may verify or confute the given hypotheses. Or, as emphasized by Ostrom et al. (1999), they may even

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challenge conclusions deducted from the economic theory. This procedure is pursued by institutional ecological economists. The second strategy attempts to ground the whole research deeper into economic theory, so the empirical findings, to a large extent, support the theoretical conclusions. A small number of observations is sufficient for the illustration of a problem and its solution (see, e.g., the analytic narrative method in Bates et al., 2000). This approach is characteristic of free-market economists. The common feature of the presented analytical methods is the consistent description of the institutional background. Accordingly, any description should include a description of the actors and an understanding of their relationships, motivations, cultural and social norms, etc. The evaluation of particular situations is derived from the chosen theory, and the key moment for a researcher is the explanation of (with the proper theoretical reference) what is considered to be the effective or optimal solution and why. A good example of the qualitatively oriented institutional research is embodied in Ostrom (2006). Based on the numerous case studies of local property regimes of common-pool resources, Ostrom derived general principles of the successful governance for specified sub-groups of resources. These principles strongly refer to the self-governance undertaken directly by resource users. Later, Ostrom and her team developed the qualitative tool known as the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) to enable a better comparison of heterogeneous research within this field (see, e.g., Ostrom, 2004).

Interdisciplinarity Interdisciplinary research within the economics of the environment mainly aims at connecting the two groups of scientists to utilize the advantages of both the exact natural sciences and the socially conditioned outcomes of the social sciences. As emphasized by Berkes and Folke (1998), we must make use of both the expert knowledge of ecosystem functioning and the institutional, economic and political factors conditioning the responses of the social systems. The relationship between social and natural sciences must, therefore, be understood as equipollent, just as social (human) and ecological (biophysical) subsystems are interconnected and influenced by their mutual interactions. Adaptation of human society to the changing environment cannot be achieved by relying solely on findings of natural sciences, because any proposed measures will not be accepted without the majority of society reflecting on those findings. Conversely,

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the social sciences by themselves are not able to generate expert know-how for understanding the impacts of human society on ecosystems. In addition to the effort that aims to interconnect the research agenda of the social and natural sciences, the interdisciplinarity may also include the cooperation among different social science disciplines – the most frequent being economics and political sciences, economics and law or economics and sociology. The successful example of the first involves the incorporation of the Elinor Ostrom research into institutional ecological economics, even though her empirically grounded findings on the robustness of the communal ownership have been transferred into normative recommendations (see, e.g., Vatn, 2005). Further, different authors offer their original contribution, such as Siegers (1992, p. 544), who states that “the general framework of the rational choice theory can be used to combine the strong points of economics and sociology” or Germani (2004), who applies the general framework of the law and economics theory to environmental issues. However, as emphasized by Huutoniemi et al. (2010), developing interdisciplinary approaches is a time-consuming process, wherein achieving methodological interdisciplinarity is a significant problem. The need for interdisciplinarity, however, is promoted mainly by institutional ecological economists (see Beder, 2011). Neoclassicists together with freemarket economists argue that economics by itself is capable of giving necessary answers on how to address natural resources. Thus, the expert knowledge of natural scientists is relevant only when reflected by individuals and/or elected representatives of society.

Differences between the discussed methods – the cost-benefit and institutional analyses – are presented in the following table.

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Table 2: Cost-benefit vs. institutional analysis – overall comparison Cost-benefit Analysis

Institutional Analysis

Institutions viewed as

Neutral Static

Key variables Subject of continuous change

Human preferences

Stable Same

Vary over time Vary among people

Information

Perfect/Full

Limited

Transaction costs

Zero

Significant

Types of methods

Quantitative

Rather qualitative (combination of methods)

Source: author

Is there a need for institutional analysis? Despite its dominance, the critique of the neoclassical paradigm increases over time. Critiques emphasize that this approach was unable to realistically capture interconnections among society and ecosystems and was unable to analyze the dynamics of environmental property regimes (Bromley, 2004; Vatn, 2005). Furthermore, proposed solutions strongly rely on government decision-making that is far from efficient and is oriented toward the optimal provision of environmental quality (Anderson and Leal, 2001). Methodological and conceptual issues are also raised (see Frey, 2012; Pennington, 2005 or Slavík, 2007 for more evidence). Therefore, the neoclassical paradigm in the economics of the environment is slowly being repressed. In practical decision-making, the cost-benefit analysis is still widely used for the evaluation of particular investment projects (e.g., how to effectively decrease the eutrophication of a water reservoir or how to build an optimal flood protection measure). Through these isolated cases, however, only local problems with direct links to public subsidies can be addressed. Very often, researchers and public representatives deal only with the consequences of environmental degradation without ever addressing the real (and often complex) causes. The introduction of institutional (often qualitative and sometimes interdisciplinary) research helps to analyze problems that cannot be monetized

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(or otherwise numerically captured), such as questions regarding the influence of introduced institutional reforms (often coming from the EU) on local environmental protection, the extent of conflicts among key stakeholders that prevent potential damage mitigation caused by natural disasters and the legislative obstacles that cause serious sales problems in secondary material markets during a world crisis. The treatment of these questions is fully relevant for the resolution of the “conservation vs. use conflict”. Most often, analyses of these issues center on system performance and on stakeholder or interest group positions rather than on the functioning of an isolated policy tool, which is common in numerous neoclassical studies. Does this mean, however, that each of the approaches can be more suitable for the solution to a particular environmental problem?1 The answer is “not really.” Rather, institutional analysis, with its strong focus on real-world aspects, should be considered as a background method for the identification of an environment, its actors and their relationships with respect to all types of environmental problems. Then, if necessary, a cost-benefit approach may be applied for a specific sub-issue, such as the efficient use of public subsidies or the design of economic instruments (fees or taxes). This practice is apparent in the European water policy design as described in this chapter. The situation within the economics of the environment corresponds to the general debate in economics (as described, e.g., by Jakóbik, 2011 or Sojka, 2009). Mainstream economics should be and, to some extent, has been open to novel ideas, such as concepts of imperfect competition or bounded rationality. As emphasized, e.g., by Frey (2011, p. 21), this evolution of alternatives “does not mean that standard neoclassical economics is superfluous and a waste of effort. Quite the contrary, neoclassics is important as a background theory into which the unorthodox elements can be introduced”. In addition to the theoretical disputes within the field of science, however, policy recommendations and their applications play a key role with respect to environmental protection. As a result, we may see the combination of different tools (from different groups of scientists) rather than competition among the various techniques. A good example of this collaborative result is the EU Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), which promotes institutional changes as well as economic tools to improve the quality of European waters. On the one hand, water management should be reorganized according to hydrological (rather than

1

We thank the anonymous reviewer of the paper for this question.

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administrative) borders of river basins, which are in perfect harmony with the requirements of spatial fit between institutions and ecosystems, as promoted by Young (2002). On the other hand, water services should be priced accordingly, and it should be expected that the polluter (user) pay the principle. This refers directly to the theoretical idea of the internalization of externalities, as proposed by neoclassical environmental economists (e.g., Pearce and Turner, 1990), whereas the effect of the former measure is necessary for studying the use of the institutional analysis, as the latter tool may be perfectly designed for use with the environmental valuation techniques. Therefore, methods and techniques grounded in institutional analysis are consistent and useful instruments in socioeconomic research as they cover a large range of practices varying from case study analyses to sophisticated institutional evaluation frameworks. The specific approach within which quantitative and qualitative aspects are combined to study the effect of institutions is represented by laboratory and field experiments (see, Poteete et al., 2010, for more on this subject). Though the promoters of the institutionally oriented research gain increasing respect over time, the potential of these methods has not, as yet, been fully developed. This statement holds true especially in the post-socialist European countries, in which boards of economists tend to consistently ignore the most current evolutions in the field.

Conclusions Over the past several decades, the dynamic evolution within the economics of the environment has resulted in numerous competing paradigms offering different views on the causes of environmental degradation and on possible solutions to this degradation. Furthermore, strong criticism of the mainstream paradigm of neoclassical environmental economics has appeared, and novel research techniques accenting qualitative aspects and an interdisciplinary approach have evolved to study environmental issues. Until now, the overview of this evolution, including mutual interactions among different schools of thought, has consisted of a few fragmented publications quoted in introductory parts and has not yet been treated comprehensively. Accordingly, the application of the novel methods grounded in the institutional analysis has been scarce with respect to the Central European scale.

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Within the paper, the motivations that drove the continuous shift from the costbenefit to the institutional analysis in the environmental research were analyzed. From the described aspects of the institutional analysis, there is no doubt that the qualitative techniques and interdisciplinary research show a lower level of formalization. Therefore, the application of these techniques requires proper (unbiased) implementation by individual scientists. A verbal step-be-step explanation of the implementation is of critical importance for others as they attempt to follow the research design, the data analyses and the derived conclusions (including their reliability). The crucial step in the process is linking the research to a particular paradigm of the economic theory. Nevertheless, these aspects do not discredit the use of institutional analysis in comparison with the quantitatively oriented cost-benefit analysis. Using numbers incorrectly, however, may bring similarly false results and promote poor understanding of the description. In a certain context, the combination of different types of methods may be a suitable option to reveal how people act in different institutional, historical and cultural environments. The goal (and the future challenge) of the theoretical comparative investigation is to foster the dialogue regarding methodological issues between related theoretical approaches. The effort devoted to reconciling the competing paradigms and their methodologies could be honored with the implementation of a more consistent environmental policy in the future.

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Kula, E. (1998). History of Environmental Economic Thought. London, UK: Routledge. North, D. C. (2005). Understanding the Process of Institutional Change. Princeton, UK: Princeton University Press. Oates, W. E. (Ed.). (1994). The Economics of the Environment. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar. Ostrom, E. (1999). Private and Common Properte Rights. Encyklopedia of Law and Economics, No. 2000. Retrieved from http://encyclo.findlaw.com/2000book.pdf. Ostrom, E. (2004). Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, UK: Princeton University Press. Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, UK: Princeton University Press. Ostrom, E. (2006). Governing the Commons – The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York, NY: The Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, E. (2008). Institutions and the Environment. Economic Affairs, 28(3), 2431. Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, CH. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999). Revisiting the Commons. Local Lessons, Global Challenges. Science, 284(5412), 278 – 282. Paavola, J. (2007). Institutions and environmental reconceptualization. Ecological Economics, 63(1), 93 – 103.

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Sojka, M. (2009). Stane se institucionální ekonomie paradigmatem 21. století? [Will the institutional economy become the 21st century paradigm?] Politická ekonomie, 3, 297-304. Stroup, R. L. (2000). Free Riders and Collective Action Revisited. The Independent Review, 4(4), 485-500. Sima, J. (2004). Ekonomie a právo [Law and Economics]. Praha: Nakladatelství Oeconomica. Vatn, A. (2005). Institutions and the Environment. Northampton, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Veblen, T. B. 1899. Theory of the Leisure Class: An economic Study of the Evolution of Institutions. New York, NY: MacMillan. Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). Retrieved http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/.

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KVALITATIVNĚ ORIENTOVANÉ METODY SOCIOEKONOMICKÉHO VÝZKUMU A JEJICH VYUŽITÍ V EKONOMII ŽIVOTNÍHO PROSTŘEDÍ SLAVÍKOVÁ, L., ŠÍMOVÁ, T., SLAVÍK, J. Kvalitativně orientované metody socioekonomického výzkumu a jejich využití v ekonomii životního prostředí. Ekonomický časopis, 2011, roč. 59, č. 8, s. 823–840. ISSN 0013-3035. Podíl L. Slavíkové: 40 %

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Úvod Mezi společenskými a přírodními vědami existuje klíčový rozdíl. Je jím objekt zájmu jejich zkoumání či, lépe řečeno, podstata tohoto objektu. Přírodní vědy zkoumají věci a jevy, jež se udály v důsledku přírodních zákonů. Vědy společenské staví do centra svých výzkumů člověka – jednající bytost – a jevy, ke kterým dochází v důsledku lidského jednání. Hlavní rozdíl mezi charakteristikou zkoumaného subjektu zmíněných dvou vědních skupin pak spočívá v neexistenci účelovosti ve fyzikálních závislostech a klíčovém postavení účelu v lidských aktivitách. Zbaví-li přírodní vědy člověka vůle a nahradí jej objektem obdobných fyzikálních parametrů, pravdivost jejich závěrů neutrpí. Pokud totéž učiní věda společenská, ztrácí základní stavební kámen svých analýz a její závěry přestanou vypovídat o společenské realitě. S ohledem na popsaný rozdíl prošla ekonomie jako společenská věda od svých prvopočátků několika vývojovými fázemi. Kniha A. Smithe Bohatství národů představila člověka jako volní bytost a kladla si za cíl pochopit podstatu lidského jednání a jeho důsledky. Naproti tomu řada učebnic ekonomie hlavního proudu druhé poloviny 20. století (a z nich vycházející současná environmentální ekonomie) člověka v neoklasické tradici chápe jako postavu s dokonalými informacemi, jednající v časovém a institucionálním vakuu (viz např. Samuelson a Nordhaus, 1995; Kolstad, 2000). Tento přístup umožňuje kvantifikaci řady ekonomických vazeb, avšak v posledních dvou desetiletích je stále více kritizován pro svoji abstraktnost (Furubotn a Richter, 2005), a tudíž i omezenou vypovídací schopnost modelových řešení v situacích reálného světa (více viz např. Sojka, 2009) či konkrétně pro neschopnost nalézt účinná řešení optimální alokace vzácných přírodních zdrojů (Bromley, 2004; Slavík, 2007). Proto se paralelně rozvíjejí metody zkoumání socioekonomických jevů, jež se opět zabývají jednáním člověka v reálném, značně proměnlivém a nejistém prostředí a kladou důraz na kvalitativní (matematicky obtížně podchytitelné) faktory, jako jsou zejména vliv institucí a společenské vazby, evoluce či vnitřní myšlenkové pochody jednotlivce (Hendl, 2005; Kornai, 2008). V řadě případů mohou tyto metody postihnout existující problémy lépe než jejich matematické vyjádření. Jednou z oblastí, ve které se tyto komplexní průřezové problémy vyskytují, je interakce lidské společnosti s ekosystémy. Následující text představí dvě rozvíjené kvalitativní metody socioekonomického výzkumu – analytický narativ a institucionální analýzu – a jejich aplikace na poli ochrany životního prostředí. Cílem bude analyzovat metody, jejichž

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prostřednictvím lze zkoumat dopady institucionálních změn, případně význam různorodých existujících institucí pro jednotlivé aktéry, a které nejsou doposud v našich podmínkách hojněji využívány. Souvisejícím cílem bude porovnat postupy dotyčných metod a míru zobecnitelnosti jejich závěrů, odhalit možná úskalí jejich využití a obhájit pozici těchto metod v rámci společenskovědních disciplín (tedy zejména ekonomie, resp. ekonomie životního prostředí). Článek proto přináší deskriptivní a komparativní analýzu metod a s využitím praktických příkladů přináší argumenty ve prospěch využití kvalitativního výzkumu v ekonomii životního prostředí. Představíme aplikace metod v rámci výzkumných projektů na území České republiky a Slovenské republiky, a rovněž pak ve státech, kde jsou metody rozvíjené v podstatně větší míře a v delším časovém období. Článek má čtyři části. V první stručně objasníme podstatu analytického narativu a institucionální analýzy. Ve druhé diskutujeme některé kritické souvislosti a omezení těchto kvalitativních metod. Třetí část představuje klíčové aplikace popisovaných metod v zahraničních výzkumech. Čtvrtá pak shrnuje dosavadní aplikace metod na českých a slovenských vědeckých pracovištích a ukazuje, v jakých konkrétních souvislostech přinášejí kvalitativně orientované metody zkoumání originální poznatky.

Představení základních prvků kvalitativních metod výzkumu Kritikou metodologie neoklasického paradigmatu se od 2. poloviny 20. století zabývá postupně stále více autorů. Námitky z oblasti institucionálně orientovaných ekonomických směrů přehledně shrnují například Furubotn a Richter (2005), dále také Sojka (2009). Další skupinou kritizujících ekonomů jsou ekonomové rakouské školy (Mises, 2003; z českých např. Říkovský, 2001). Na poli ekonomie životního prostředí na tuto kritiku navazují představitelé tržních přístupů k ochraně životního prostředí na jedné straně (Anderson a Leal, 2001; Cordato, 2004) i řada institucionálních ekologických ekonomů na straně druhé (Bromley, 2004; Vatn, 2005). Předmětem kritiky je zejména absence analýzy institucí v neoklasické teorii, matematizace ekonomie jako primárně společenské vědy, přístup k racionalitě jednání jednotlivce, výklad pojmu hodnoty aj. (viz Jílková a Slavíková, 2009; Slavíková, 2009).

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Někteří autoři se v kontextu tohoto vývoje domnívají, že kvalitativní (tj. nematematický) výzkum již v současnosti nezaujímá automaticky podřadné postavení (Hendl, 2005), tj. že byla postupně přijata myšlenka, že i „ekonomická analýza může vycházet z rozhovorů“ (Kornai, 2008, s. 9) a že analytické postupy, jako pozorování, audiozáznamy či rozhovory, nejsou již výhradní doménou sociologů a psychologů. Obecnou míru akceptace tohoto názoru mezi ekonomy je obtížné prokázat, neboť nadále dochází k paralelnímu, avšak převážně striktně oddělenému rozvoji kvantitativních i kvalitativních metod v závislosti na různých centrech výzkumu či oblastech aplikace. Typickým příkladem je ekonomie životního prostředí, konkrétně problémy spojené s užíváním veřejných a kolektivních statků. V následujících částech přiblížíme postupy dvou kvalitativních metod, přičemž obě by bylo možné v obecné kategorizaci zařadit mezi kvalitativní postup využívající především případové studie, případně etnografie.2 Jedná se o analytický narativ, jenž je spojován s interdisciplinárním přístupem Petera Boettkeyho a jeho vědeckého týmu na George Mason University a Roberta Batese z Harvard University, a institucionální analýzu rozvíjenou čerstvou laureátkou Nobelovy ceny za ekonomii Elinor Ostromovou a jejími následovníky z tzv. bloomingtonské školy na Indiana University v USA. Z popisu metod bude patrné, že kvalitativní výzkum na poli ekonomie překročil hranice ryze induktivní zakotvené teorie, využívané zejména v sociologii (Strauss a Corbinova, 1999; Hendl, 2005). Výběr analytického narativu a institucionální analýzy za předmět zájmu pramení z vědeckého působení autorů článku, které probíhá v užším kontaktu se zahraničními institucemi, kde jsou dotčené metody rozvíjeny. Jde o snahu osvětlit přednosti a omezení metod, které jsou v zahraničí stále více využívané, ukázat jejich význam a jedinečný přínos k poznání v oblasti ekonomie, s důrazem na ekonomii životního prostředí. 2

Analytický narativ Analytický narativ je metodou kvalitativního výzkumu, jež využívá případové studie. Jedná se o spojení narativu (příběhu, vyprávění), zprostředkovaného ústní formou v podobě rozhovorů či písemnou formou prostřednictvím historických análů s metodami analytickými, používanými v ekonomii a politických vědách. Cílem popisované metody je propojit teorii s empirickým výzkumem, přičemž za teoretický základ řada autorů volí teorii racionální volby (Bates a kol., 1998). 2 Dalšími základními přístupy kvalitativního výzkumu je, vedle případové studie a etnografického přístupu, zakotvená teorie a fenomenologický výzkum (Hendl, 2005).

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Jednotlivé případové studie se zabývají vzájemným vztahem politiky a ekonomie v konkrétním institucionálním prostředí, zaměřují se na jednotlivce a pokoušejí se „zkoumat konkrétní, historické případy… volby jednotlivců… vysledovat posloupnost jejich jednání, rozhodování a reakcí, které vedly ke konečnému výsledku“ (Bates a kol., 1998, s. 9). Z uvedeného vyplývá, že metoda sestává ze dvou základních kroků. Nejprve jde o detailní uchopení reality zkoumané situace – tj. porozumění existujícím institucím, individuálním preferencím, vazbám mezi jednotlivci, a místním a časovým specifikům dané situace. Snahou výzkumníka je poskládat příběh, který úzce souvisí s centrem zájmu jeho výzkumu. Následuje analytická fáze, v jejímž rámci je narativ podroben analýze, jež spočívá v aplikaci teoretických konceptů a modelů. Úkolem analytických nástrojů je pomoci vědci zkoumanou situaci pochopit, vysvětlit ji a odkrýt důvody vzniklých či vznikajících problémů. Analytická fáze hledá podstatu zkoumané skutečnosti – „racionalizuje“ narativ a spojuje jeho součásti do logických souvislostí. V knize Analytic Narratives, jež je průlomovou publikací etablující tento přístup, hledají vědci, profesoři předních amerických univerzit, model teorie her, který dokáže nejlépe vysvětlit pozici „hráčů“ ve zkoumaných „příbězích“, posloupnost jejich jednání, jejich strategie a vzájemné vazby. V případě, že model situaci nevysvětlí, nebo když výzkum objeví další, dosud nezahrnuté proměnné, model je upraven anebo se hledá model nový. Analytický narativ tedy nejde ani cestou verifikace, ani falsifikace, ale, jak deklarují autoři knihy, cestou reformulace modelů (Bates a kol., 1998). Zmíněné dva kroky, tj. získávání narativu a následný rozbor s použitím analytických nástrojů, se během jednoho výzkumu mohou i několikrát opakovat. Počet opakování závisí na složitosti a časovém úseku zkoumaného jevu. Končí v okamžiku, kdy se vědec domnívá, že veškeré pro problém důležité vazby s pomocí teoretických modelů odhalil a s použitím dedukce (či modelu teorie her) dokáže vysvětlit jev, který ležel v centru zájmu jeho výzkumu. Tato domněnka může být subjektivní, avšak vědec musí být schopen předložit a obhájit jednotlivé logické kroky svého výzkumu, jakož i použité teoretické koncepty. Dle Boettkeho vyplňuje analytický narativ doposud prázdné pole v matici, která ilustruje, jaké empirické metody využívají současné společenské vědy a k jakým závěrům jsou jejich analýzy při využití zvolených postupů schopny dojít. Metody empirického výzkumu přitom dělí na čisté (clean), tj. statistické – regresní analýzy, a nečisté (dirty), jako jsou rozhovory, práce s historickými písemnostmi či etnografie. Závěry analýz jsou pak buď obecně platné, nebo naopak vypovídají

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pouze o daném problému v dané situaci, bez možnosti širší platnosti, jak ukazuje tabulka 1.

Tabulka 1: Klasifikace metod empirického výzkumu Nečistý empirický výzkum

Čistý empirický výzkum

Obecně platné závěry

ANALYTICKÝ NARATIV

Standardní ekonomická analýza (omezená optimalizace, statistická významnost)

Závěry vážící se pouze ke zkoumané problematice

Tradiční antropologické či sociologické výzkumy (společenské vlivy a kulturní analýza, případové studie a etnografie)

Statistická sociologie a politické vědy

Zdroj: Boettke (2000).

Kritická diskuse dílčích souvislostí metody se prolíná několika články jejích zastánců a odpůrců (viz např. kritické pojednání Elstera, 2000; obhajoba Boettkeho, 1998; Levi, 2004; nejnověji pak Alexandrova, 2009). Dle Elstera klade analytický narativ, resp. jeho zastánci přehnaný důraz na racionalitu jednání aktérů zkoumaného problému a ignorují jejich iracionální, emotivní pohnutky. Zároveň nedostatečně zkoumají záměry a přesvědčení jednotlivců, s kterými vedou rozhovory, neboť tyto mohou významně ovlivňovat poskytnuté výpovědi a následně výstupy výzkumu (Elster, 2000). K této kritice se připojuje i Alexandrova, podle níž nelze iracionální pohnutky, které zahrnuje do svých analýz, např. behaviorální ekonomie, popisovat formalizovanými matematickými modely (Alexandrova, 2009). Bates a kol. naopak argumentují, že hluboká, intimní znalost problematiky pramenící ať z terénních výzkumů či z pečlivého studia dobových materiálů jim dává schopnost porozumět a do narativu zahrnout motivace a názory lidí. Dokládají, že vznikají a jsou dále rozvíjeny první modely, které mapují i iracionální chování a dávají prostor k jejich využití v analytickém narativu (Bates a kol., 2000). Kromě toho, jak ukazují práce současných či bývalých členů týmu P. Boettkeho, narativ nemusí být nutně analyzován

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prostřednictvím matematických vzorců či modelů teorie her (viz např. Stringham, Boettke a Clark, 2008).

Institucionální analýza Zájem o analýzu institucí v souvislosti s poskytováním veřejných či kolektivních statků oživuje dílo M. Olsona (1971), jenž se zabývá konceptem kolektivní volby. Na jeho závěry o nutně suboptimálních výsledcích kolektivního rozhodování navazují práce E. Ostromové, J. Walkera, M. McGinnise a dalších, kteří se snaží prokázat, že vhodnou kombinací institucí, jako jsou např. vlastnická práva, pravidla užívání různých toků užitků ze zdroje, zvyky a jiné neformální vazby apod., lze překonat destruktivní individuální strategie užívání statků s charakterem „obecní pastviny“ (Ostrom a Walker, 2000). Výsledkem tohoto přístupu je teorie řízeného komunitního vlastnictví zdrojů (Ostrom a kol., 1999). Cílem analýzy je tedy důkladně popsat jednotlivé charakteristiky institucionálního uspořádání (např. režimu správy přírodních zdrojů) a následně s využitím empirických poznatků definovat principy tzv. robustních institucí – tj. institucí, které zajišťují dlouhodobé a stabilní využívání kolektivních statků (Ostrom, 1986; Ostrom a Walker, 2000; Ostrom, 2006a). Institucionální analýza prováděná Ostromovou má proto rovněž dva kroky. Prvním je popis institucionálního uspořádání tak, aby byla systémově identifikována pravidla, aktéři, jejich motivace a vzájemné vazby. Druhým krokem je aplikace postupu založeného na definici principů robustních (dobře fungujících) institucí pro určitý typ kolektivních statků. Normativním požadavkem na robustní instituce je zajištění udržitelnosti čerpání přírodních zdrojů (resp. zamezení jejich degradaci či vyčerpání v čase). Oba kroky analýzy budeme dále specifikovat.

Popis institucí Potřeba formulace rámce pro analýzu institucí vyvstala v souvislosti se snahou o standardizaci pojmů pro jednotlivé prvky široké škály institucionálních uspořádání a jejich vazeb. Navržený rámec, pro nějž se používá označení IAD Framework (Institutional Analysis and Development Framework), byl poprvé aplikován v roce 1972 v souvislosti s hodnocením vlivu politologických paradigmat na veřejnou politiku v USA a je definován jako „obecný jazyk, popisující jak pravidla hry, biofyzikální podmínky a charakteristické rysy

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uživatelských komunit, jež ovlivňují fungování akčních arén [viz dále], tj. motivace jednotlivců a z nich vyplývající následky… s využitím metody můžeme identifikovat hlavní typy strukturálních proměnných, které se do určité míry vyskytují ve všech institucionálních uspořádáních“ (Ostrom, 2006b, s. 5 a 18). Od 80. let se však tento rámec začal uplatňovat v oblasti analýz kolektivních statků, z nichž řada spadala do kategorie přírodních zdrojů. Postup navržený v rámci IAD Framework se aplikuje na hypotetické situace laboratorních experimentů (inspirovaných teorií her) i na empirická pozorování reálných režimů správy (viz např. Acheson, 2003). Logiku postupu v rámci metody ilustruje obrázek 1. Obrázek 1: Model zkoumání institucionálních vztahů (IAD Framework) Externí činitele material Biofyzikální conditions podmínky

SPOLEČENSKÁ JEDNOTKA

Interakce Geopolitické

Události Action

community faktory

situation

AktéřiActors - agenti Výstupy Pravidla Institutional factors

Zdroj: Kluvánková-Oravská (2006); v originále viz např. Ostrom (2004).

Jednotka analýzy (akční aréna) se skládá z událostí a aktérů, které jsou jejich součástí. Popis událostí umožní vysvětlit postupy aktérů a jejich vliv na výsledný stav (případně také navrhnout modifikaci těchto postupů). V rámci událostí je popsána skupina účastníků procesu, jejich role, pravomoci, informace, kontrolní mechanismy, výstupy a náklady a užitky událostí a výstupů. V případě aktérů se klade důraz na jednání jednotlivce (případně skupiny) vyplývající ze subjektivních motivací a postojů. Významný je rovněž popis externích činitelů akční arény, kde jsou v rámci pravidel vymezena např. vlastnická práva a režimy užívání přírodních zdrojů, které ovlivňují výsledky jednání aktérů apod. (detailní výklad postupu viz např. Ostrom, 2004; 2006b). V rámci laboratorních experimentů lze simulovat zavádění

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či naopak odstraňování různých pravidel (obvykle se postupuje od experimentů bez pravidel přes zavádění monitorovacích či alokačních mechanismů až ke kooperativním hrám). Vždy je však nutné vracet se k reálnému (tj. empiricky podloženému) fungování institucí.

Robustní instituce Uvedli jsme, že jako robustní jsou označovány trvanlivé a ve vztahu k udržitelnosti čerpání přírodního zdroje dobře fungující instituce. V důsledku značné variability přírodních charakteristik zdrojů (velikost, dělitelnost aj.) a historie režimů správy se autoři aplikující IAD Framework domnívají, že neexistuje jedno univerzální řešení – jeden typ institucionálního rámce, který by se dal označit za „ideální“ (Ostrom, 2006a; Paavola a Adger, 2005). Zásady fungování robustních principů jsou proto formulovány vždy pro určité typy kolektivních statků a jsou téměř výhradně založeny na empirických pozorováních. Tento induktivní přístup však neomezuje univerzální používání IAD Framework, která plní funkci obecného analytického nástroje. Nejznámějším příkladem návrhu robustních institucí je sedm principů udržitelné samosprávy drobných a relativně izolovaných kolektivních statků ve správě stabilních komunit o velikosti několika set členů (např. zavlažovací soustavy, pastviny, lesy). K těmto principům patří: a) jasné vymezení hranic přírodního zdroje, b) jasné určení vlastnických/uživatelských práv v rámci komunity, c) účast aktérů na rozhodování o změně uživatelských pravidel, d) zavedení interní kontroly dodržování pravidel, e) existující systém sankcí, f) řešení konfliktů v rámci komunity, g) absence zásahů externích institucí do uživatelských práv a jejich změn (Ostrom, 2006a).

Kritické souvislosti využívání kvalitativních metod Je zřejmé, že společným rysem obou popisovaných metod je shromažďování případových studií – tj. primárních dat v podobě pozorování, písemných pramenů a rozhovorů s klíčovými aktéry. Autoři prosazující tyto metody v menší či větší míře využívají teorie her, přičemž propojují jednání hráčů v „laboratorních“ podmínkách se situacemi reálného světa. Za hlavní rozdíl obou metod považujeme zvolený postup tvorby vědeckých závěrů. Vědci aplikující metodu

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analytického narativu hledají interpretační oporu v abstraktně-deduktivních ekonomických tvrzeních. Jejich závěry (platí-li výchozí tvrzení a je-li dodržen logický postup dedukce) jsou prezentovány jako obecně platné. Falsifikace těchto závěrů probíhá zpochybněním výchozího bodu (např. teorie racionální volby). Naopak, institucionální analýza je metodou plně využívanou pro empirickoinduktivní tvorbu vědeckých závěrů, které platí jen pro omezenou skupinu pozorování, jež splňují určité charakteristiky. Zobecnění je možné jen v rámci této skupiny (o postupech vědeckého zkoumání více viz Loužek, 1999). Jako komplikace, která brání širšímu využití popisovaných kvalitativních metod, se uvádí nízká míra, či dokonce absence formalizovaných kroků analýzy (již je následně obtížné zobecnit a dále aplikovat), a tudíž vliv subjektivních postojů vědce na průběh a závěry kvalitativní analýzy. Je osobní odpovědností každého vědce provádět výzkum nezaujatě a být schopen objasnit všechny logické kroky analýzy tak, aby mohla být replikována, resp. aby mohla být zpětně vyhodnocena správnost konečného úsudku. Usiluje-li vědec o to, aby interpretací zvolených dat dokreslil svůj subjektivní postoj ke konkrétní problematické otázce, může tak učinit s pomocí kvantitativních i kvalitativních souborů dat. V této souvislosti tedy formalismus není zárukou objektivity. Na druhé straně však případové studie logicky vždy odrážejí kulturní, historická a společenská specifika zkoumané oblasti, s čímž souvisí otázka možnosti komparace jednotlivých případových studií a analogie jejich závěrů. Kvalitativní metody zkoumání primárně hledají vysvětlení jedné, konkrétní situace nebo souboru příbuzných situací, u nichž lze odlišnosti externího prostředí nebo interní variabilitu vyhodnotit jako nevýznamné. Pokud je například za analytický nástroj v rámci analytického narativu použita teorie her, závěry vyplývající z případové studie jsou pouze závěry týkající se jednoho zkoumaného případu a jejich přenositelnost je z teoretického hlediska problematická. I přes výhrady vůči kvalitativním metodám zkoumání a jejich využití v ekonomii se stále častěji objevují názory, že kombinace kvantitativních a kvalitativních metod je nejen možná, ale dokonce žádoucí, a že je zbytečné diskutovat o jejich vzájemné nadřízenosti či podřízenosti. Obě kategorie metod disponují různou vypovídací schopností v souvislosti se snahou postihnout příčiny a důsledky lidského jednání (Hendl, 2005). Jak dále uvádí J. Kornai: „Hodnocení výzkumného projektu by nemělo vycházet z toho, jsou-li výchozí data ‚měkká‘ nebo ‚tvrdá‘, ale z toho, jsou-li tato data reprezentativní a odpovídající a výzkum byl proveden řádně“ (Kornai, 2008, s. 10).

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Aplikace metod v zahraničním výzkumu Institucionální analýza je v současné době poměrně široce užívanou metodou ve společenskovědních výzkumech, které se zabývají fungováním a významem institucí, ať již formálních (právo, psaná pravidla) či neformálních (chování, nepsaná pravidla). Je užívaná sociology, historiky, ekonomy, politickými vědci. Na poli ekonomie ji využívají hned dva nositelé Nobelovy ceny – Douglas C. North a Elinor Ostromová. Mezi první studie, které využily IAD Framework, patřila analýza poskytování bezpečnosti, později i dalších služeb v metropolitních městech. Rozsáhlý empirický výzkum přispěl k hlubšímu porozumění jevů, jež jsou charakteristické v situacích, kdy významným aktérem je lokální organizace či státní správa (např. Parks a kol., 1982). Další početná skupina studií aplikujících IAD Framework se týká zdrojů ve společném vlastnictví. Zde představuje jednu z nejvýznamnějších a nejkomplexnějších aplikací samotný výzkum autorského týmu této metody, vedený prof. Elinor Ostromovou, jež zahrnuje stovky případových studií z různých částí světa věnovaných problémům využívání kolektivních statků (lesní a vodní ekosystémy), resp. obecně dilematu společenské volby při rozhodování o těchto statcích. Klíčové výstupy včetně doporučení, které se na základě aplikace konzistentního analytického postupu podařilo odvodit, shrnuje publikace Governing the Commons – The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Ostrom, 2006a). Od devadesátých let je IAD Framework používaný k vytvoření tří databází.3 První se týká způsobů přivlastnění zdrojů a zdrojů ve společném vlastnictví, druhá zavlažovacích systémů v Nepálu a třetí lesnictví, resp. institucí, které způsobují, že někde dochází k rozsáhlé deforestaci, zatímco jinde kvalita lesů roste. Na základě empirických podkladů s odvoláním na teorii polycentrické správy (McGinnis, 2000) dochází K. Anderssonová a E. Ostromová k závěru, že např. plná decentralizace rozhodování v případě lesů oproti předpokladům nevede nutně k jejich udržitelnému využívání. Navrhují proto hybridní (tj. ani zcela decentralizované, ani striktně centralizované) systémy správy (Andersson a Ostrom, 2008). Konkrétní podoba jednotlivých doporučení se nicméně liší případ od případu a odráží specifičnost institucionálního uspořádání při řešení konkrétních komunitních problémů.

3 Výzkumná centra, podílející se na vzniku databází, se nachází například v Bolívii, Kolumbii, Indii, Ugandě a dalších státech (Ostrom, 2006b).

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IAD Framework ovlivnil i řadu studií zabývající se společenskou volbou prostřednictvím laboratorních experimentů, výzkumem socioekonomických systémů, rolí podnikatele při společné volbě či rolí institucionálních motivací při zahraniční pomoci pro donorské a přijímající země. (např. Gibbon, Williams a Ostrom, 2005) Konzistentní přehled těchto a dalších aplikací přináší Ostromová v jednom ze svých článků (Ostrom, 2006b). Rovněž autoři textů využívajících analytického narativu navazují na dílo Douglase C. Northe a zkoumají témata, jako je politické či ekonomické uspořádání, mezinárodní vztahy, chování jednotlivců na trhu při institucionálních změnách, jaké přinesl například na našem území rok 1989 (Stringham, Boettke a Clark, 2008). Instituce jsou i zde vnímány jako formální a neformální a jsou zosobněním omezení a motivací jednotlivce. Při zkoumání výstupu je právě jejich podobě přisuzován klíčový význam. Narozdíl od institucionální analýzy jde o nový metodologický přístup, aplikovaný na relativně malém množství převážně historicky orientovaných studií, nicméně jeho výsledky jsou i tak publikovány v předních vědeckých časopisech a nakladatelstvích. (např. Leeson, 2007; Coyne, 2007) Autoři, kteří metodu aplikují, se často stávají jejími spolutvůrci, neboť v průběhu výzkumu rozvíjí její potenciál, např. využitím dalších možných analytických nástrojů či překonáním dosavadních omezení. Uveďme několik konkrétních problémů, při jejichž studiu byl analytický narativ využit. Avner Greif se ve své stati zabývá středověkým institutem tzv. podestà, který sloužil k řešení kofliktů v rámci komunit a který přispíval k ekonomickému rozvoji a politické stabilitě Ženevy ve 12. století. Jeho závěry jsou významné pro vývoj teorie o vztahu mezi řešením konfliktů a politickým uspořádáním (Greif viz Bates a kol., 1998). Jean-Laurent Rosenthal zpracoval komparativní analýzu fiskálních pravomocí vládců v Anglii a Francii v 17. a 18. století. Zabýval se přitom různou podobou a změnou státních uspořádání a vztahem mezi politickou strukturou a válečným konfliktem (Rosenthal viz Bates a kol., 1998). Rovněž další autoři knihy Analytic Narratives zkoumají prostřednictvím metody analytického narativu jednu specifickou instituci v konkrétním historickém okamžiku – institucionální základ pro vládní politiky a postoje občanů k branné povinnosti ve Francii, Spojených státech a v Prusku v 19. století, dohodu o mezinárodním obchodu s kávou, nebo tzv. pravidlo rovnováhy týkající se otroctví v Americe před občanskou válkou – a její vliv na výstup. Weingast přitom odhaluje význam institucionálního základu federalismu, Bates odhaluje faktory, které jsou významné pro fungování konkurence na mezinárodních trzích (Weingast a Bates viz Bates a kol., 1998).

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Mezi další významné průkopníky metody analytického narativu patří vědci z okruhu prof. Boettkeho, přičemž každý ji využívá pro jiný tematický okruh. Edward Stringham se zaměřuje na homogenní skupiny – např. obchodníky na burzách v Londýně, Amsterdamu či České republice. Zkoumá je jako samosprávné jednotky, spolky, které se snaží odhalit takové rysy chování neznámých aktérů, na základě nichž bude možné eliminovat ať již skutečně či potenciálně nepoctivé hráče. Stringham se soustředí na kritéria vyloučení jakožto spontánně vznikající instituce umožňující společenskou součinnost, osvětluje význam reputace a opakované interakce aktérů pro dodržování kontraktů smluvními stranami. (např. Stringham, Boettke a Clark, 2008). Peter Leeson se naopak zabývá heterogenními skupinami nebo aktéry, kteří stojí vně nějaké fungující skupiny a pokouší se s ní navázat obchodní vztahy. Spíše než kritéria vyloučení zkoumá Leeson kritéria zapojení. Pomocí analytického narativu diskutuje obchod v prekoloniální Africe, středověké obchodní právo a soudobý mezinárodní obchod a hledá mechanismy, jako je signalizace a závaznost, jež pomáhají překonat přirozenou nedůvěru a dojít společenské součinnosti (Leeson, 2006). Chris Coyne zkoumá situace, kdy se společnost vzpamatovává z válečného konfliktu a hledá cestu k mírovému soužití a prosperitě. Odděluje produktivní společenský kapitál od ničivého a zkoumá instituce, které přispívají k nastolení fungující spolupráce (Coyne, 2007). Scott A. Beaulier a Robert Subrick používají metodu k vysvětlení významu institucí pro ekonomický růst Botswany (Beaulier a Subrick, 2007).

Aplikace kvalitativních metod v ekonomii životního prostředí Ekonomie životního prostředí ve své tradiční neoklasické podobě usilovala o kvantifikaci užitků spojených s využíváním (čisté) přírody, resp. nákladů souvisejících se znečištěním životního prostředí. Pokusy o převedení hodnot souvisejících s přírodními zdroji na společný peněžní základ s ostatními statky a službami do jisté míry umožnily zahrnout environmentální problematiku do prováděných cost-benefit analýz veřejných projektů. Nicméně bez ohledu na metodologické problémy nebyl tento přístup schopen realisticky uchopit vzájemnou provázanost lidské společnosti a ekosystémů, ani analyzovat dynamiku vývoje režimů správy přírodních zdrojů a jejich zpětného vlivu na motivace jednotlivců. Postupné rozšiřování využívání kvalitativních metod v této

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oblasti aplikované ekonomie proto umožňuje analyzovat problémy, jejichž peněžní (či obecně číselné) vyjádření je obtížné nebo zhola nemožné, jejichž podchycení je však plně relevantní pro řešení obecného konfliktu mezi ochranou a užíváním přírodních zdrojů. Na několika příkladech si ukážeme, o jaké problematické okruhy se jedná a do jaké míry příspívají kvalitativní metody výzkumu k jejich objasnění a nalezení vhodných řešení. Čimborová (2008) se s využitím institucionální analýzy snaží postihnout, do jaké míry ovlivňuje proces transpozice evropských směrnic ochranu biodiverzity na Slovensku. Konkrétně analyzuje, zda ochrana přírody byla před vstupem Slovenska do EU realizována v souladu s již definovanými sedmi principy udržitelné samosprávy (tj. institucemi, které Ostromová označuje za robustní), definuje odchylky od těchto principů a jejich důsledky pro správu zdroje. Následně se zabývá institucionální změnou iniciovanou evropskou legislativou (zavedení Natura 2000) a jejím dopadem na dříve popsanou robustnost režimu správy s důrazem na změnu pozice přímých uživatelů přírodních zdrojů, jež kolidují s ochranou biodiverzity (k této problematice viz dříve Chobotová, 2007). Předmětem analýzy jsou tři maloplošná chráněná území, nástrojem analýzy je popis institucionálního rámce a jeho komparace s ideální institucionální formou (závěrům Ostromové je zde přisouzena role optimálního preferovaného řešení). Výsledkem analýzy je identifikace míry shody a trendů vývoje reálné versus optimální situace. Za hlavní problémy dosavadních konfliktů ochrany biodiverzity s uživateli území označuje autorka absenci jasného vymezení vlastnických a uživatelských práv k přírodním zdrojům a neexistenci interního mechanismu řešení konfliktů v rámci komunit uživatelů. Doporučuje posílit roli lokálních komunit při rozhodování o způsobech ochrany území a na konkrétních příkladech ukazuje vhodné postupy, realizovatelné v současném slovenském institucionálním prostředí. Obdobný problém, zahrnující konflikt politiky ochrany životního prostředí a uživatelů přírodních zdrojů, řeší s využitím metody analytického narativu Urbanová a Medková (2006). Konkrétně se jedná o situaci v jihočeském regionu Třeboňsko, kde byl zaveden ochranný režim Natura 2000, jdoucí nad rámec opatření vyplývajících z dosavadní existence chráněné krajinné oblasti. Výzkum byl prováděn šest měsíců po vyhlášení ptačí oblasti Třeboňsko a mapuje především postoje zástupců rybářského průmyslu. Na základě provedených rozhovorů a studia relevantní literatury analýza ukazuje, jaký význam má institucionální prostředí pro efektivní ochranu přírody. Dílčím závěrem je, že způsob zavádění nových restrikcí na Třeboňsku nebyl dostatečně komunikován s místními podnikateli a rybáři, kteří jej vnímají negativně. Narativní metoda

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kombinovaná o komparativní analýzu obdobných politik Natura 2000 (jako např. zákon na ochranu ohrožených druhů v USA z roku 1973) odhaluje příčiny neefektivní ochrany přírodně cenných lokalit a ohrožených druhů spočívající v nedostatku motivačních prvků pro vlastníky pozemků či rybníků, na něž se regulace vztahuje. Autoři studie navrhují alternativní způsoby dosažení cílů, které si vytyčuje soustava Natura 2000, tak aby tyto nekolidovaly se zájmy vlastníků či nájemců dotčených pozemků. Důraz přitom kladou na fakt, že každý z dotčených ekonomických subjektů čelí různě vysokým nákladům spojeným s vytýčením ptačí oblasti, a na možnosti využití flexibilních řešení. Další kvalitativní analýzy institucionálního prostředí ochrany složek životního prostředí a jeho dopadů na jednání jednotlivců obsahují práce Čamrové a Hromádky (2006) a Slavíka (2009). Tyto práce se použitou argumentací blíží výše popsanému analytickému narativu racionální volby. Jejich primárním cílem však je konkrétní problematickou situaci s využitím lokálních znalostí získaných rozhovory zmapovat, nikoliv navrhnout konečné řešení problému. Čamrová a Hromádka (2006) se zabývají problémem bleskových povodní v ČR a diskutují možnosti zmírňování povodňových škod na úrovni samosprávných obcí. Varianty protipovodňových opatření jsou odvozeny přímo z rozhovorů se starosty obcí, jež tyto povodně pravidelně postihují. Autoři studie je nehodnotí, tj. nesnaží se určit optimální řešení. Za hlavní přínos studie lze označit identifikaci hlavních konfliktů mezi klíčovými aktéry (zemědělci, občany, správou vodních toků, ochránci přírody), které zvyšují zranitelnost zasahovaných území. Slavík (2009) analyzuje trh druhotných surovin, konkrétně jeho odbytovou krizi na přelomu let 2008/2009, během níž dramaticky poklesly ceny vykupovaných tříděných surovin (zejména papíru a plastů). Situace je mapována z pohledu firem zabývajících se svozem komunálního odpadu a zpracovatelů odpadu. Snahou studie je ověřit hypotézy o příčinách krize, resp. navrhnout opatření, která by v budoucnu zamezila jejímu opakování. Stejně jako v předchozím příkladu i tato analýza s využitím rozhovorů primárně usiluje o identifikaci postojů vybraných zájmových skupin. Společným rysem těchto analýz je důsledný popis institucionálního prostředí – zejména rozdělení odpovědnosti mezi jednotlivé aktéry, jejich motivací a vzájemných vazeb. Důležitou roli v takto získané mozaice hrají i názory a postoje zainteresovaných stran. Sběr dat je prováděn pomocí řízených rozhovorů s klíčovými aktéry (rozhovory se zpravidla skládají z otevřených otázek). Vyhodnocení dat je prováděno pomocí triviálního třídění výroků o sledovaném problému, přičemž autorství výroků nesmí být při prezentování výsledků analýzy

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zastřeno (nelze-li v důsledku absence nahrávek či svolení k jejich publikování citovat konkrétní osoby, musí být zřejmá alespoň příslušnost ke konkrétní zájmové skupině). Autor analýzy zůstává při vyhodnocování dat nestranný, jeho hodnocení problémové situace se opírá o zvolený ekonomicko-teoretický background, nikoliv o samotné informace získané rozhovory. Klíčovým bodem je tedy volba vhodné teorie pro vysvětlení sledovaných jevů, resp. nalezení odpovědi na otázku: Jaké je správné nebo efektivní, resp. optimální řešení? (přičemž náplň těchto abstraktních pojmů musí být autory studie jasně vymezena). Z popsaných příkladů je zřejmé, že předmětem zkoumání jednotlivých prací jsou z velké části kvalitativní jevy, probíhající ve vysoce proměnlivém institucionálním prostředí. Kvantifikace těchto jevů (jako např. dopady regulace a jejích změn na jednání jednotlivců v souvislosti s přírodními zdroji nebo socioekonomické změny probíhající v důsledku přírodních katastrof aj.) není nemožná, avšak touto cestou dojde k zachycení pouze fragmentu sledovaných problémů. Kvantitativní výzkum se totiž zaměřuje na předem definované proměnné, zabývá se pozorovatelnými jevy a poskytuje tvrdá, spolehlivá data. Výpočty navíc někdy vychází z nerealistických předpokladů a dostatečně nevysvětlují rozdíl mezi modelem a realitou. Kvalitativní analýza může vedle toho odhalit jevy významné pro kvantifikovaný jev (např. pro výskyt chráněných druhů ptactva), či dokonce identifikovat příčiny (ne)úspěchu regulačních opatření související s podobou existujícího či navrženého institucionálního rámce. Kvalitativní výzkum je svou povahou explorativní, odkrývá nové, často obtížně pozorovatelné jevy a data, jež přináší, jsou bohatá a hloubková. Existuje bezpočet výzkumných témat, jejichž cílem není ani tolik testování hypotéz prostřednictvím korelací mezi proměnnými, ale spíše porozumění událostem a procesům, které probíhají v konkrétní situaci či lokalitě. Příčinou může být nemožnost získání kvantifikovatelných dat, a tedy nutnost využití kvalitativních postupů (rozhovorů, studia textů apod.), ojedinělost, případně nestabilita zkoumaného fenoménu či zaměření na kontext, nikoli variabilitu. Tvrdíme proto, že kvalitativní metody jsou konzistentními a smysluplnými nástroji ekonomické analýzy, zaměřuje-li se tato analýza především na jednání lidí v souvislosti s poskytováním veřejných či kolektivních statků nebo přesouvá-li se pozornost od internalizace externalit k mechanismům kolektivního rozhodování a studiu robustnosti socioekologických systémů (více viz Ostrom, 2004, 2006a; Carlson a Doyle, 2002). Domníváme se, že potenciál těchto metod (i pouze jako součásti smíšeného výzkumu) není na poli ekonomie životního

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prostředí v našich podmínkách dosud využit a není ani vědeckou obcí akceptován (v kontrastu s postupnou evolucí těchto postupů v zahraničí). Udělení Nobelovy ceny za ekonomii za rok 2009 právě E. Ostromové, která využívá kvalitativní metody ke zkoumání problémů spojených se správou přírodních statků, by mohlo přispět k širšímu využívání analyzovaných metod na místních ekonomických fakultách a k dalšímu prohloubení výzkumu týkajícího se jejich aplikací.

Závěr V článku byly představeny dvě metody kvalitativního výzkumu – analytický narativ a institucionální analýza – včetně jejich pilotních aplikací v českém, resp. ve slovenském prostředí. Vzhledem k vědeckému zaměření autorů článku byla využitelnost těchto metod jako nástrojů socioekonomického výzkumu zkoumána přimárně na poli ekonomie životního prostředí. Článek si kladl za cíl vedle obhajoby významu a relevantnosti zmíněných metod přiblížit práci předních vědeckých týmů, jejichž snahou je systematizovat pravidla pro různé formy kvalitativního výzkumu, který vzhledem k omezeným možnostem matematizace individuálně rozvíjí řada společenských vědců. Hlavním cílem bylo přitom najít způsob, jak dospět k vědecky obhajitelným obecným závěrům založeným na případových studiích. Z popsaných vědeckých postupů je zřejmé, že kvalitativní metody se vyznačují nižší mírou formalizace, což klade vysoké nároky na osobu vědce provádějícího konkrétní výzkum, zejména na jeho snahu nestranně postihnout všechny aspekty analyzovaného problému. Postup analýzy, jenž zahrnuje design výzkumu, sběr dat pomocí rozhovorů a způsoby jejich vyhodnocení, musí být detailně popsán, aby bylo možné posoudit objektivitu a šíři záběru konkrétního výzkumu. Klíčovým bodem je provázání výzkumu se zvoleným ekonomicko-teoretickým paradigmatem (např. obecnou teorií racionální volby nebo efektivními, resp. robustními režimy správy přírodních zdrojů). I přes uvedené nedostatky a možné problémy spojené s aplikací kvalitativních metod se domníváme, že tyto metody jsou vzhledem k povaze zkoumaných jevů na poli ekonomie životního prostředí nezastupitelné. Jejich omezení podle našeho názoru nediskredituje jejich užívání v socioekonomickém výzkumu. Jejich

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rozvíjení by mělo nahradit neúspěšné pokusy o číselné vyjádření komplexních vazeb mezi lidskou společností a přírodou.

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ŘÍKOVSKÝ, M. (2001): Rakouská škola a její kritika standardního matematického přístupu k ekonomii. Politická ekonomie, LIIIV, č. 5, s. 717 – 734. SAMUELSON, P. A. – NORDHAUS, W. D. (1995): Ekonomie. 2. vyd. Praha: Svoboda Servis. ISBN 80-205-0494-X. SLAVÍK, J. (2009): Poplatkové systémy v obcích – rizika a příležitosti pro odpadové hospodářství. 1. vyd: Praha: IREAS. ISBN 978-80-86684-59-8. SLAVÍK, J. (2007): Neoklasická ekonomie a ochrana životního prostředí. Politická ekonomie, LV, č. 4, s. 526 – 538. SLAVÍKOVÁ, L. (2009): Komparace ekonomicko-teoretických přístupů k ochraně přírodních zdrojů ve vazbě na přírodní zdroj voda. [Disertační práce.] Praha: Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Národohospodářská fakulta, Katedra institucionální ekonomie, 141 s. SOJKA, M. (2009): Stane se institucionální ekonomie paradigmatem 21. století? Politická ekonomie, LVI, č. 3, s. 297 – 304. STRAUSS, A. – CORBINOVÁ, J. (1999): Základy kvalitativního výzkumu. Brno: Albert. ISBN 80-85834-60-X. STRINGHAM, E. (2001): The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth-century Amsterdam. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43, č. 2, s. 321 – 344. STRINGHAM, E. – BOETTKE, P. – CLARK, J. R. (2008): Are Regulations the Answer for Emerging Stock Markets? Evidence from the Czech Republic and Poland. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 48, č. 3, s. 541 – 566. URBANOVÁ, T. – MEDKOVÁ, M. (2006): Analysis of Natura 2000 in Třeboňsko Region. Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, 14, č. 3, s. 95 – 105. VATN, A. (2005): Institutions and the Environment. 1. vyd. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN 1-84376-100-9. YOUNG, O. R. (2002): The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change – Fit, Interplay and Scale. 1. vyd. Cambridge: The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-74024-9.

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IMPLEMENTING THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PRINCIPLE INTO WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC – CRITICAL ANALYSIS SLAVÍKOVÁ, L., JÍLKOVÁ, J. Implementing the Public Participation Principle into Water management in the Czech Republic: A Critical Analysis. Regional Studies, 2011, roč. 45, č. 4, s. 545–557. ISSN 0034-3404. Podíl L. Slavíkové: 70 %

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Introduction In the Czech Republic, water management (i.e. decision-making about the use of water and water protection) has always been heavily centralized. This follows from the historical political background (i.e. the management of natural resources during the communist period), but also from the general belief that water is a strategic commodity and as such it must be managed according to government priorities [MATULA, 1998]. A change in approach came with the EU Water Framework directive (No. 2000/60/EC) at the beginning of the 21st century. This directive demands the organization of water management throughout Europe according to hydrological rather than administrative borders, following the requirement of a better spatial fit between institutions and the ecosystem [YOUNG, 2002; MOSS, 2008]. Goals (water quality indicators) are given centrally by the European Commission, but tools for meeting this so-called “good water status” should be set by the river basin authorities of particular hydrological units, regardless of the political priorities of national states – i.e. fully respecting the ecosystem approach [CHAVE, 2001]. In addition to this, the public (especially local key stakeholders) should actively participate in the assembling of river basin management plans. Public hearings, seminars, round tables, consultations and other necessary forms of participation are supposed to be an integral part of the new water planning process. This process should (among other goals) assure that agreed measures to reach a good water status will be undertaken without open conflicts and delays and the water policy will become more transparent and open for local user opinions [MURO, 2006, see also BEIERLE, 1999; KASTENS and NEWIG, 2008]. These two Water Framework Directive ideas (reorganization of water management and public participation) are currently implemented into Czech legislation and practice. The first management plans are currently being developed and will come into force in 2009. It is becoming clear that Czech water bodies are mostly heavily modified regarding their morphology and pollution, so a lot of work needs to be done to reach EU good water status criteria by 2015 [POVODÍ MORAVY, 2006]. A large number of renaturalizations of small streams and other environmentally oriented measures are expected to be included into water management plans. This also requires a significant shift in the philosophy of the Czech water policy (from a rather technocratic to an ecosystem approach) which causes nationwide controversies and disagreements. Besides this the “new” river basin authorities (which were transformed from previous water

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managers – state enterprises) have problems in understanding the purpose of public participation in water management and the process itself has been poorly organized so far [IREAS, 2008]. There is great danger that public participation in the Czech Republic will not achieve the expected positive outcomes mentioned above. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the public participation process in the Czech Republic in 2003 – 2008 by testing qualitative evaluation criteria developed by ROWE and FREWER (2000). Therefore, our goal is primarily not to develop our own evaluation framework, but rather to apply one of the existing frameworks to a particular case of a post-socialist country and to present its specifics. Our hypothesis is that due to the improper legal background and no history of public participation in Czech water management, there is a great potential for the failure of the principle. The benchmark to assess the possible failure or the success is derived from recommendations of the EU guidance document on participation. Data to validate or confute the hypothesis were gathered by direct attendance at public hearings in selected Czech river basin districts and 45 interviews undertaken with key stakeholders and representatives of river basin authorities. First, we will briefly introduce the theoretical background of the public participation principle in environmental policy. Further, we would like to show how this principle was implemented into the Czech legal environment (i.e. what is the legal support for public participation in water management) and how it was practically applied at a river basin district level shortly before the final version of management plans had been introduced to the public. Our main intention is to stress the problems and controversies in understanding the public participation principle that may appear in the post-socialist countries with a brief history of democratic institutions.

Participation of the public as a part of environmental governance Over the last two decades, there has been an increasing belief among scientists dealing with environmental problems that “local governance systems are crucial to the successful implementation of sustainable management practices” [SHORT and WINTER, 1999: 613; see also OSTROM, 2006; YOUNG, 2002 and others]. By governance systems quoted authors usually mean different kinds of overlapping institutions varying from formal to informal, from local to international, etc. As

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pointed out by PAAVOLA and ADGER (2005), governance may be what governments do, but in some cases it does not necessary involve the state level. Following from this, environmental governance is widely defined “as the establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutions to resolve conflicts over environmental resources (Adger, et al., 2003; Bromley, 1989, 1991; Young, 1994a,b; see also Knight, 1992)” [PAAVOLA, 2007].4 If there are multiple authorities with overlapping jurisdictions, we speak about multilevel environmental governance. HOOGHE and MARKS (2003) distinguish two types of multilevel governance according to purpose, membership and functioning. As emphasized by Andersson and Ostrom (2008), there is increasing empirical evidence, that multilevel governance structures achieve better outcomes (regarding sustainable use of natural resources) than highly centralized systems [ANDERSSON and OSTROM, 2008; see also e.g. OSTROM, 2008; JANSSEN, ANDERIES and OSTROM, 2007]. The public participation is considered as an effective tool for involvement of non-state actors at different levels of governance (see e.g. PAAVOLA, 2007 or JORDAN, 2008 for the detailed argumentation). Throughout Europe, the allocation of environmental resources and especially water has been mostly, to date, centrally driven. National priorities such as flood protection, water accumulation or irrigation and the optimization of water pollution in the past often overcame the sustainable management of ecosystems (river basins) as a whole. Cross border problems have been shifted to countries situated downstream [ČAMROVÁ and JÍLKOVÁ, 2006]. The local stakeholders have had limited access to information and practically negligible influence or power regarding the public good – water. This description is particularly valid for the post-socialist countries (currently new Member States of the EU). Beginning in the late 70s, the European Economic Community (from 1993 European Union) started to develop an international level of the water policy focused on common pollution standards and drinking water criteria [LANZ and SCHEUER, 2000]. Supported by the current socio-environmental research results mentioned above, the new Water Framework Directive (WFD) pushes the governance stratification even further. Among other requirements, it introduces the local or regional level of water governance and emphasizes the stronger position of the 4

Some authors strictly distinguish between terms “management” and “governance”. According to Short and Winter (1999), management “refers to physical and economic management activities and the day-to-day decision-making … Governance refers to the decision-making structures, mechanisms and systems of administration which influence the operation of management systems” [SHORT and WINTER, 1999: 614]. In our paper, we do not use such a strict distinction. Both terms should be understood rather as synonyms.

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public [WFD, 2000].5 Further, the governance structures should be harmonized in all Member States, decreasing the position of the national level in favor of both the international (European) and local level. According to the WFD public participation is understood to be [WFD, 2000]: a) the participation of the general public, b) the active involvement of the key stakeholders within each river basin district. These two areas closely relate to each other, but, for the purpose of the proper performance of the participation principle, it is necessary to distinguish them. Primarily the general public must be continuously informed about the planning process and formal consultations of three documents (the timesheet, interim overview of the significant water management issues and the draft version of the river basin management plan) must take place. Moreover, active involvement gives stronger participation rights to selected stakeholders. According to WFD guidelines, it implies that “stakeholders are invited to contribute actively to the planning process by discussing issues and contributing to their solution” [GUIDANCE DOCUMENT No. 8, 2003: 11]. The crucial point is that stakeholder involvement goes far beyond the participation of the general public, although it does not automatically give them decision-making power. The exact performance of active involvement (i.e. who will be involved and how) is not specified at the EU level. It should be determined by the national legislation or by the strategy of the river basin district authorities, which are responsible for setting up new river basin management plans. According to numerous authors, there are strong arguments why the process of public participation should not be underestimated. The most frequent ones are arguments of democratic legitimacy and better conflict resolution [ROWE and FREWER, 2000; PRISCOLI, 2004; KOONTZ and JOHNSON, 2004]. There is a lack of trust and therefore also a lack of willingness to accept the measures imposed by decision-makers upon the public. As mentioned by PRISCOLI (2004: 226), “participation is a means to adapt and to make our democratic work better ... [it] is also helping to reinvent our civic cultures.” Further, CONNICK and INNES (2003) emphasize the process of learning and developing the shared understanding of a problem among participants. The argument of learning is also supported by BEIERLE (1999), who also touches upon the issue of cost5

This requirement also corresponds with the evolution in the environmental policy in general – see e.g. the goals of the Aarhus Convention or other European directives on EIA (97/11/EC), SEA (2001/42/EC) or IPPC (96/61/EC) [VIDEIRA et al., 2006].

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effectiveness of public participation. The requirement of public participation reflects the fact that planning and decision-making is not only a scientific or expert process, but primarily a political process [PRISCOLI, 2004; MURO, 2006]. It is believed that these deficits could be removed through the suggested participation process. Many scholars, therefore, express their persuasion that participation lead to better (i.e. more sustainable) environmental solutions [KOONTZ and JOHNSON, 2004; KOONTZ, 2006; KASTENS and NEWIG, 2008].

Legal support for public participation in water management in the Czech Republic As already mentioned, meeting the expected goals of the WDF (physical but also social) will be quite challenging. In Czech water management, public participation or generally involvement at the local level in decision-making is practically a new issue. This is a different situation from some “old” EU members such as France, Great Britain or the Netherlands, where the public has already spoken up within advisory councils, sounding boards or water committees [MURO, 2006]. Contrarily, in the Czech Republic (even after the fall of Communism in 1989) water management has been driven mainly from the national level. It means that water and water bodies are declared to be public property and managed by the state’s water managers. Since the national government (especially the Ministry of Agriculture) finances most investments according to the priorities of water managers, there has been very limited space for the involvement of local governments or the public [ČAMROVÁ and JÍLKOVÁ, 2006].6 The public participation principle was implemented by the Water Act (No. 254/2001 Coll.) and the subsequent decree (No. 142/2005). In accordance with Article 14 of the WFD, there is stated which documents must be commented on by the general public and how. In the Czech legislation, the difference between the roles of the general public and key stakeholders is not emphasized. Therefore, the formalized public participation only contains the provision of 6

Currently, the situation is slowly changing because of three reasons: 1) the new EU legislation introduces the multilevel governance principle, 2) the problems regarding water ecosystems must be solved outside the water channels (at the river basin scale) where property relationships are complex, 3) the environmental NGOs step up the pressure against technically oriented measures (dam constructions, river regulations, etc.) – due to the Natura 2000 sites, they can get through to Brussels when necessary. In the next text we will address the legislative changes related to the first point.

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information to the public and receiving consultations which must be dealt with officially. Higher levels of participation (involvement, cooperation etc.) are recommended in the guidelines issued by Czech ministries, but they are not obligatory for the river basin authorities. Guidelines specify who should be addressed as a key stakeholder and how he or she may participate (e.g. by delivering local knowledge within an advisory group, attending the roundtables or by direct involvement in a river basin planning commission) [MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, 2003]. River basin authorities in cooperation with regional governments must also work out the public participation strategy [MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, 2005]. Consequently, these strategies stress the active involvement of key stakeholders above the participation of the general public – e.g. in the Morava and Dyje river basin districts, the river basin authority maps groups of stakeholders (water users, mayors, NGOs, etc.) and calls them up to fulfill single planning steps, such as to collate the main water management problems or to assemble a list of potential revitalization measures. As also highlighted in strategies, the selected representative of the public has no decision-making power and does not become a member of the river basin planning commission [POVODÍ MORAVY, 2008]. It is also good to emphasize which types of participants belong to the two mentioned groups of general public and key stakeholders and what are their rights regarding water. The general public is represented by all inhabitants living in a certain river basin district as well as entrepreneurs or any other organization affecting directly or indirectly the use or protection of water in a river basin district [POVODÍ MORAVY, 2008]. As mentioned before, the water is public property, so particular representatives of the public have use rights to water (not property rights) which are limited temporally and they are not transferable. The majority of inhabitants are connected to public pipelines and sewerages, so they only pay for these services without having concrete water use rights. Water protection is undertaken by state administrators. Key stakeholders are part of the general public too, but they might defend their interests strongly within the process of the active involvement. They are organized groups and they usually have concrete water use rights (they are e.g. drinking water producers, fishermen, agriculturalist etc.) or they fight for stricter water protection (environmental NGO).

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Evaluation of the process of public participation From the background information provided it is clear that there is almost no formalized pressure on the active involvement of key stakeholders in the Czech Republic. The legislation contains only the minimum of the obligatory requirements regarding public participation in general which must also be reported by Member States to Brussels. A large space is left open for the voluntary action of river basin authorities, although the importance of the whole process is clearly articulated. In combination with the lack of any tradition in the public participation of water management, this creates a potential for failure. The goal of our field research was to verify to what extent the participation principle is truly implemented in practice.

Method To evaluate the public participation process, the construction of quantitative and qualitative indicators is necessary. Due to the growing interest in using participatory processes within environmental decision-making, a great effort exists to develop an evaluation framework to be able to differentiate “good” participation from a “bad” one. ABELSON and GAUVIN (2006) distinguish among context, process and outcome evaluation criteria, where first two categories are closely interconnected, because the process of participation is influenced by the context. Outcome criteria are considered to be the most difficult to assess, because the impact of the participation to a policy change must be determined. However, as authors point out, „if the process is found to be effective by whatever criterion it is judged against, then the outcome is likely to be ‘better’ than one that was informed by a bad process” [ABELSON and GAUVIN, 2006: 22]. Numerous theoretical studies usually introduce sets of both – process and outcome – evaluation criteria [see namely the meta-analysis of CONLEY and MOOTE, 2003 and further RAUSCHMAYER and WITTMER, 2006; WITTMER et al. 2006 or BEIERLE, 1999] and they call for their wider application. Few practical evaluations of watersheds initiatives in the US took the advantage from a large number of monitored collaboration processes and evaluated also the outcomes of the participation [LEACH, 2006; CONNICK and INNES, 2003]. On the other hand, ROWE and FREWER (2000: 3) state that “the quality of the output of any

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participation exercise is difficult to determine”, so they suggest focusing on process criteria (i.e. which aspects of the participation process are desirable). With regard to the nature of the Czech case, namely the fact that river basin management plans (the outcome of the participation) have not yet been finished, we decided to focus on process evaluation criteria frameworks. In reviewed studies, there were several approaches to this particular sub issue. The already mentioned paper by ROWE and FREWER (2000) presented system of 9 descriptive evaluation criteria which they consider to be essential for the effective public participation (the question of effectiveness is further investigated within ROWE and FREWER, 2004, the framework itself was applied on the problem of genetically modified crops by ROWE et al., 2008). Rating of criteria was done via questionnaires with participants who agreed or disagreed with offered statements. Similar approach introduced by RASCHE et al. (2006) used 6 dimensions of public participation and measured their intensity as low, medium or high using a radial diagram. Empirical data was gathered via interviews and subsequently evaluated by authors. In both cases, the set of evaluation criteria or dimensions was set up based on literature review gathering the key arguments for the “good” participation process [ROWE and FREWER, 2000; RASCHE et al., 2006]. To limit the room for normative judgments, authors of the second paper do not consider high intensity of participation as a priory good or bad, but they leave the floor open for discussions. WEBLER, TULER and KRUEGER (2001) undertook the sophisticated analysis to evaluate the quality of the participation in the forest planning by using the Q method that should also limit the influence of the subjective standpoints. This approach is based on identifying dozens of statements about the participation process from semistructured interviews with participants, which are consequently sorted and resorted by numerous stakeholders according to their importance. It is important to note that reviewed papers are far from representing the whole list of existing evaluation approaches. The issue of how to evaluate public participation is getting more urgent, as the participation principle becomes more applied and as the EU incorporates it into increasing numbers of directives and recommendations. However, as also often pointed out by many authors, there is still not a widely accepted framework for conducting such evaluations [ABELSON and GAUVIN, 2006; ROWE et al., 2008]. Therefore, there is a need to apply existing frameworks to multiple case studies to test their complexity and practicability and to define suitable methods for the data collection. Further, particular participation processes significantly differ from each other, ranking from local voluntary actions to legally binding procedures that are conducted

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nationwide. The variety of processes often requires different evaluation frameworks. Within our paper, we decided to choose one of the existing normative evaluation frameworks developed by ROWE and FREWER (2000) and to apply it on the participation process demanded by the EU Water Framework directive in the Czech Republic. It is important to emphasize that the process itself is partly standardized by the directive requirements and also that there are a set of recommendations formulated in guidance documents [see mentioned GUIDANCE DOCUMENT No. 8, 2003]. These recommendations are very well covered by the Rowe and Frewer’s set of criteria (with minor adjustments – see below). Therefore, in our case the “good” participation is not derived from participants’ or authors’ opinion, but determined by the regulator’s concept of what “should” the process look like to meet the final goal of the directive (which is the good status of all European waters by 2015). Our approach may be considered as scientifically less ambitious, because we stay within barriers set up by the European Commission. On the other hand, pre-defined normative judgments about the quality of the participation process enable us to focus more on the valuation of results. For the purpose of the evaluation, data from three (of eight) Czech river basin districts were gathered. We used standard method of in-depth interviews with stakeholders who joined the participation process in all three river basins (a total of 45 interviews with planners and key stakeholders were undertaken between June – November 2007). These data sources were complemented by the media and document analysis and on-spot observations, because the researchers also carefully monitored the public participation processes in all three river basin districts – i.e. they personally attended organized public hearings and seminars, they reviewed consultations sent to river basin authorities by the public to comment on a list of main water management problems and draft version of the river basin management plan. Since part of the participation process is standardized by the legislation, there were a large number of official publicly accessible reports. The evaluation covers the period of 2003 – 2008. Subsequently, researchers (authors of this article) evaluated gathered data according to 9 criteria listed below, where the positive answer to each question indicates the good participation process (according to European Commissions guidelines): 1. REPRESENTATIVENESS/INCLUSIVITY: represented?

Are

all

relevant

interests

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2. INDEPENDENCE: Is the participation process organized in an independent, unbiased way? 3. EARLY INVOLVEMENT/PUNCTUALITY: Is the public involved in time (in the stage when options are still open)? 4. INFLUENCE: Is it clear, how will the output of participation process influence the real policy? 5. TRANSPARENCY: Is it clearly defined as to what issues are (not) the subject of consultancy as well as who will be involved and how? Is the public aware of how the decisions are made? 6. RESOURCE ACCESIBILITY: Is information provided to everyone, willingly and understandably (in a common language)? Do potential participants have sufficient human, material and time resources to participate? 7. TASK DEFINITION: Is the nature and scope of the participation task within a participation exercise clearly defined? 8. STUCTURED DIALOGUE: Are participation exercises structured in a way that all participants have an opportunity to express their opinion? Does the final summary of the group opinion adequately reflect the extent of agreement/disagreement? 9. CONTINUITY/SOCIAL LEARNING: Is the participation long-term and continuous? Does it help to develop trust between decision-makers and the public? Criteria No. 1-7 were designed by ROWE and FREWER (2000). Criterion No. 8 was modified within the authors’ application of the evaluation framework [see ROWE et al., 2008]. The framework originally contained also cost-effectiveness criterion, which was later excluded for the difficulties to measure it [ROWE et al., 2008]. Based on the guidance document, we decided to include the “social learning” criterion within which the positive long-term impact of participation is included [GUIDANCE DOCUMENT No. 8, 2003: 14]. The criteria will be applied in the qualitative part of the analysis separately on the participation of the general public and the active involvement of key stakeholders with a stronger focus on the latter. We are aware of the fact that the planning process has not yet been entirely finished. The evaluation doe not cover the period of 2009 when final versions of river basin management plans should be approved by decisionmakers. However, no participation activities (according to timetable) are scheduled to 2009.

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It is also important to stress that participation principle is implemented into Czech water management solely due to the WFD requirements. It was not introduced before the implementation and it has not been demanded by participants themselves. Therefore, the public is now learning how to deal with it. This fact might influence results of the evaluation.

Results of the evaluation - Quantitative part The river basin districts in our focus are: the Morava, Dyje and Upper and Middle Elbe river basin. The selection of districts was determined by the location of three projects funded by the EU which were focused on the monitoring of the participation process and on the transfer of information between stakeholders and planners. According to our information, the situation in other river basin districts that were not included was not significantly different since all districts coordinated the action and exchanged knowledge. Each of the selected river basins has more than a million inhabitants (from 1.4 to 1.7 mill.) and contains about 700 – 1 400 municipalities of various sizes. Municipalities above 2 000 inhabitants comprised about 7 – 15 %, municipalities above 10 000 inhabitants only 1 – 3 % from the total number of municipalities. The area of the river basin districts varies from 9 400 to 14 700 km 2, where the Upper and Middle Elbe river basin is the largest.

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Figure 1: Selected river basin districts in the Czech Republic

Source: authors Although each river basin district has great autonomy in organizing the involvement of stakeholders, procedures are often transferred between river basin districts. We stress differences among them wherever necessary. For the quantitative evaluation we have chosen the number of comments sent by the public to the timetable, the interim overview of the significant water management issues, the draft versions of river basin management plans, the number of seminars, the heterogeneity of the planning committee members and the number of working groups which support the work of the committee. Results are presented in the following table.

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Table 1: Quantitative criteria of the public participation process (evaluation of the period 2003 – 2008) Morava

Dyje

Upper and Middle Elbe

No. of written comments received – Timetable (2006)

4

5

-

No. of written comments received – Interim Overview of Significant Water Management Issues (2007)

12

18

52

No. of written comments received – Draft Versions of River Basin Management Plans (2008)

108

70

No. of seminars

13

15

17

No. of working groups

2

2

6

Heterogeneity of the planning committee/working groups

1

1

2

(8 points maximum*) * One point is given for the representation of each of the following stakeholder groups [see Guidance Document No. 8, 2003 for justification]: a) government expert agencies, b) academic institutions, c) expert/professional groups of entrepreneurs, d) municipal representatives, e) interest NGOs (e.g. environmental), f) locally oriented NGOs, g) key land owners or agriculturists, h) key water users/withdrawals. Source: authors The stated numbers require further comments. First three indicators refer to the participation of the general public. Whoever wanted was welcome to send written comments related to documents which were posted up on web sites of river basin authorities and regional offices for a given period. Also printed instruction brochures and posters were distributed to municipal and regional offices and information on the whole process were published by local newspapers. Nevertheless, the on-line sources were considered as the main

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source of information. The comments were mainly sent by municipal representatives and environmental NGOs. River basin authorities evaluated the participation as very low (considering the total number of inhabitants). On the other hand, in the case of the timetable, it was difficult to raise a purposeful comment. In the case of water management issues, some comments referred to local issues which could have been considered as significant at the river basin district scale. Some stressed the importance of water quality improvement (eutrophication problems) or the need for the renaturisation of water channels. Draft versions of water river basin management plans in 2008 attracted the largest attention of the public, since concrete measures for 2009-2015 to solve water problems were included. About 30 % of comments were sent by municipalities and regions, 30 % by national ministries, 20 % by water users and 10 % by NGOs. For Morava and Dyje, many comments touched problems in both river basin districts which are close to each other, so water administrators decided to develop a shared list of comments. It was reported that about 80 % of comments were officially incorporated in plans. Most of the seminars were held between 2005 – 2007, which indicates about 3 – 4 meetings per year. However, it is crucial to analyze how and for whom the seminars were organized. The majority of seminars were represented by meetings at the regional offices (each river basin district touches an area of at least 5 regions) which were open to the “expert public”. The water management issues were discussed there and mostly municipal representatives attended. A few seminars (2 – 4) were organized specifically to inform the mayors of municipalities or the drinking water producers as the largest withdrawers of water in river basins. For 1 – 2 specific meetings the local and environmental NGOs were invited. In the Dyje and Morava river basin districts, NGOs also organized two seminars by themselves to learn more about the planning process and their involvement options. One seminar at each river basin district was held by our expert team. All key stakeholders including water planners were invited, although not all of them participated. From this description we can conclude, that the seminars for the public and/or stakeholders are organized irregularly and separately for different audiences. They do not have the form of roundtables where regular participants would repeatedly clarify their positions. Rather, they are organized in the form of a (sometimes publicly accessible) set of presentations made by the river basin authorities and followed by open discussions. A moderator or intermediary is missing. Representatives of stakeholder groups are invited to separate meetings. We will come back to this point in the qualitative section.

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Another option for stakeholder involvement is via working groups or planning committees. The planning committee is a joint body of the river basin administrator and representatives of the regional offices and it is responsible for the proper preparation of planning documents in a particular river basin district. It may create different working groups when necessary. As evident from table 1, there is a very low interest of planners to involve stakeholders into the committee. Only expert agencies of the state are present (e.g. the Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Inspection, etc.). A committee has about 15 – 20 members and the main argument for the exclusion of other members is to keep it manageable. In the Dyje and Morava river basin districts, 2 temporal working groups were established (for the purpose of the renaturalization measure list and the significant water management issue list). Drinking water producers were invited to participate in the latter. In the Upper and Middle Elbe river basin district, there are 6 permanent working groups for particular subbasins. One representative of environmental NGOs is a member of each working group.

Results of the evaluation - Qualitative part In the previous section, we summed up a few of the indicators that can be expressed by exact numbers. This data provided a brief overview about the frequency of particular activities. It is clear that public participation via sending comments is very low and also that the involvement of key stakeholders lacks continuity. We investigated the quality of these processes further by applying the qualitative criteria listed in the methodological part. The results are summarized in the enclosed table. They are the same for all three monitored river basin districts.

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Table 2: Qualitative criteria of the public participation process (evaluation of the period 2003 – 2008)

1.

Criteria

General public

Key stakeholders

REPRESENTATIVENESS/

●●●

○

INCLUSIVITY 2.

INDEPENDENCE

-

●

3.

EARLY INVOLVEMENT/ PUNCTUALITY

●●

●

4.

INFLUENCE

●●●

●

5.

TRANSPARENCY

●●●

●

6.

RESOURCE ACCESSIBILITY

●●

●●

7.

TASK DEFINITION

●●●

●

8.

STRUCTURED DIALOGUE

-

●

9.

CONTINUITY

○

○

Legend: ●●● … … YES, ●● … RATHER YES, ● … RATHER NO, RELEVANT

○ … NO, - NOT

Source: authors As already mentioned, the valuation (i.e what is a “good” participation process) was derived from recommendations of the European Commission. Dots in the table were assigned by authors of the article based on interview results and direct observation of the process progression. Graphical visualization was preferred to numerical assessment or high-medium-low scale. If a criterion was met (i.e. if the key question related to the criterion was answered “YES”), there are three dots in the table. If there were objection against a criteria performance, the number of dots was lowered. If a criterion was not met (answer to question is “NO”), there is an empty dot in the table. Since this is a strongly subjective approach to the evaluation, all objections against criteria performance are carefully treated within following text. The only purpose of Table 2, though, is to complement the written explanation with a clear picture. Readers should find sufficient evidence for their own judgments in the article. At first sight it is obvious that the participation of the general public is performed better than the active involvement of key stakeholders. This is mainly due to the

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legal requirements for the former which have to be met. We will comment on the evaluation results one by one. The criterion of REPRESENTATIVENESS/INCLUSIVITY is well met for the participation of the general public. As mentioned, this is because the frequency of calling up the public and the specification of the general public, are well described in the directive as well as the Czech legislation. However, only some groups of key stakeholders are regularly called to participate (e.g. municipal representatives and state agencies). Some of them (e.g. drinking water producers, NGOs) are called up sporadically and the rest of them are ignored or ignore appeals. As a result, not all of the relevant interests are included in water planning. Why is this considered a problem? We already pointed out that public participation in general should ensure the elimination of conflicts. In all the monitored river basin districts farmers and fishermen (owners or managers of ponds for fish production) were a neglected group of stakeholders. To reach a good water status of water bodies, the close cooperation of all the relevant actors at the river basin scale will be necessary in the future – in particular, farmers will have to change management practices alongside rivers and fishermen will have to treat water quality (especially nutrient concentrations) more carefully. Due to the need for renaturalizing smaller streams it will be necessary to buy agricultural land or to limit ownership rights on it. All these measures will affect the production practices of these stakeholders. If they will be united and unwilling to cooperate, strong conflicts will appear sooner or later. The criterion of INDEPENDENCE touches the issue of administrators of the participation (e.g. meetings) who should be seen as neutral. Since the participation of the general public must be organized as sending written comments, the criterion is not relevant in this case. Regarding the active involvement of key stakeholders, independence was represented very poorly, because most of meetings were organized and even chaired by members of particular interest groups (mostly planners or environmental NGO members). Since water managers (planners) are considered to be members of the “concrete lobby” by the public, their independence is seriously questioned. The only meetings which could have met the independence criterion were 3 seminars organized by our research team. The third criterion (EARLY INVOLVEMENT/PUNCTUALITY) deals with the time dimension – i.e. potential participants should be involved when the options for solving the problems are still open, so that participants can really change something. This is mostly true for the general public that is informed and that

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submitted comments, the only problem is that the number of participants is very low. Some key stakeholders (some municipal representatives, drinking water companies, some NGOs) have already been involved in consulting on significant problems or via working groups. However, the level of involvement differs significantly among particular groups and there are still important stakeholders which have not yet been activated (especially farmers and other land holders, fishermen, industrial water users or business groups and, to a large extent, also local and environmental NGOs). To meet the INFLUENCE criterion, there should be clear how different processes within which the public or key stakeholders participate influence the real decision-making. The result of the participation of the general public is the published list of received written comments and information how planners handled them. If refused, there needs to be detailed justification why. In case of key stakeholders, we must distinguish among different types of involvement. Few stakeholder groups who were invited to regular participation within advisory bodies (working group, committees) had clearly defined task to prepare and discuss. These background materials were used for setting up the draft version of the plan. However, only a very limited number of stakeholders became members of such bodies. Regarding organized public meetings, the possible influence on real decision-making was defined very poorly – e.g. the goal of the meeting was to give general information about planning and to here some opinions/inputs from those who decided to come. The TRANSPARENCY criterion directly involves the level of the information structure. In particular, for key stakeholders it is not clear what their effect on the final decisions is and also what kind of decisions will be done at the river basin district scale. Good example of this is the situation of some mayors who are afraid of future dam constructions on the territories of their municipalities. The priority of future dam construction was introduced by the national government, but surprisingly it is not an issue of river basin management plans. So the mayors raise objections against dams at the local level and they are repeatedly refused by the administration as unjustified. The means of involvement differs significantly among groups of stakeholders (some of them are part of working groups, some of them are invited for a discussion seminar, etc.). A certain fecklessness as to who, how and what to organize is apparent from the example of environmental NGOs who are quite active and also very critical of river basin authorities. In the Dyje and Morava river basin districts in 2005, NGOs were called up in writing to express their will to be involved in planning. Some of them did, but then they were not involved into any planning

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structures. Only a seminar for NGOs was organized in 2007. In the Upper and Middle Elbe river basin district, NGOs expressed their disappointment with not being included at all, so in 2007 one representative of NGOs finally became a member of each working group. The river basin authorities are afraid of extreme opinions which could slow down or block the planning process, so they compromise between encouraging the involvement of key stakeholders and the limitation of the role of selected groups (we will come back to this point later). Regarding RESOURCE ACCESIBILITY, we will focus on the two aspects: first, if participants have sufficient information, and second, what is their capacity to participate. Information is provided to everyone via the internet. Leaflets, brochures, posters, etc. are published and distributed. The river basin authorities are also willing to consult the issues via phone or in person . The big problem is the structure of the information published. As pointed out by stakeholders, many documents are not written in a common language, they contain legal formulas and hydrological expressions and some of them are quite long. Therefore, the goals of the planning (the vision) are not clear and it is time demanding to find out what should be the real impact of the public or stakeholders. The capacity (human, material, time) vary enormously among different groups of stakeholders. While public officials are usually better equipped to participate (the water planning is given a high priority), most of the water users, NGO representatives or individual members of public are lacking time to attend meetings (which were often organized during their working hours) or to study large files on the internet. The criterion of the TASK DEFINITION is very close to the question of transparency and influence, but it is rather oriented to a particular participation “procedure” (e.g. a seminar or series of meeting, etc.). Again, it is well defined in legislation how the procedure of sending written comments is organized. On the other hand, the active involvement of key stakeholders lacks the procedure description (i.e. who, when and how they will participate). During organized meetings (except working group sessions), no mechanisms were established to handle disputes or to reach the consensus. The STRUCTURED DIALOGUE criterion is also relevant only for the active involvement of stakeholders via joint meetings. Again, there were large differences between working group sessions and public meetings. Within both types, all participants have the free option to express their opinions without any limitations. However, the public meetings were not concluded by any written summary or statement gathering the position of particular stakeholders (no

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direct impact of these sessions on planning was considered by planners, so protocols were not made). As it is obvious from the participation process that is described, the criteria of CONTINUTY shows very poor performance. The participation process is fragmented and in reality it only started at the end of 2005 when the first deadline for the participation of the general public got closer. However, the key problem is that involvement at the local level, as organized now, does not help to develop trust between planners and the public. Due to the mentioned change in philosophy within the Czech water management, there are still strong tensions between representatives of the technocratic (engineering) approach and the ecosystem approach, where the river basin authorities represent the former and NGOs, the State Environmental Agency and some municipal representatives the latter. Therefore, some active groups of stakeholders are highly suspicious about the new planning process and its result. In particular environmental NGOs cannot imagine how engineers employed by the river basin authority will switch from hard technical measures to soft measures (because parallel to new water planning process some hard measures are still built). At the Morava and Dyje river basin districts, the environmental NGOs have a strong position – and to some extent, they have the capacities to develop alternative studies and suggest competitive solutions to flood protection problems. They strongly welcome the ideas brought by the WFD, but they are afraid of its pro-forma fulfillment in the Czech Republic. Evidence of the problematic procedure for them is the selective organization of key stakeholder involvement.

Reasons for the poor performance Gathering quantitative and qualitative results together we can conclude that there are serious problems regarding the public participation process in the water management of the Czech Republic in comparison with the “ideal” situation proposed by EU guidance documents. In particular the stakeholder involvement seems to be seriously underestimated. In spite of the fact that there is still one year left, we can confirm our hypothesis about the failure of the performance of the participation principle. The three main reasons for this conclusion are:  The participation process (e.g. information campaigns, organization of seminars, identification of key stakeholders) started quite late. That is why

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the number of participants is very low and the understanding of the purpose of the whole process is poor.  The involvement of key stakeholders is not organized to reconcile conflicting interests, but rather as a selective advisory process, where some groups willing to participate are excluded and other necessary groups do not attend.  The planners (river basin authorities) did not manage to gain a good image during the participation process, so there is a lack of trust regarding their intentions. What are the reasons for such defects? Based on the interviews with planners, stakeholders, we came to the following conclusions. First, there is a question of know-how. River basin authorities in general lack experience in active communication with the public. They are primarily engineers, not managers or sociologists. They (according to their words) also lack the personnel and financial capacities to organize the whole participation process, since there are many other challenging goals of the WFD (new types of monitoring, applying water status criteria, economic analysis, etc.). They do not seek out examples of good practice, they decided not to use facilitators or intermediaries. Above all they believe they do quite a good job. Secondly, there are communication failures. At the end of 2007, key stakeholders did not know much about the possible future changes towards higher water quality, therefore it was difficult for them to find out how their interests would be affected in the future. River basin authorities on the one hand gathered comments on the timetable, but on the other hand were unable to send a clear message to e.g. farmers and fishermen. This means that the obligatory (legal) requirements on public participation are fulfilled without objections, but the qualitative dimension of the process is ignored. Thirdly, coming back to the continuity issue, in the end the public (including stakeholders) do not believe that their participation can really change something. This observation is crucial and touches the very essence of the new water management according to the WFD. Mutually, if there is lack of trust and understanding of the purpose of the whole process, public participation will never be properly undertaken. In other words this means that the potential of the participation principle will not be realized.

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Conclusions Our research aims to complement an existing public participation evaluation studies related to the management of environmental resources or of water management in particular. Over past decades, this kind of analysis has been developing its own methodological background in the scholarly literature. Our intention, however, was not to develop our own evaluation framework, but rather to take one of the existing ones and to apply it to our case study. For this purpose we have chosen a normative process oriented framework created by ROWE and FREWER (2000) whose criteria (i.e. what to evaluate) are derived from the descriptive public participation literature. The benchmark for the evaluation – i.e. what is considered to be a good participation process – was not gained as usual by gathering participants opinions, but by accepting EU recommendations contained in guidance documents. Judging the reality against chosen criteria was done by authors of the article who undertook interviews and personally attended participation processes. It can be argued that this approach has severe defects – namely that it does not prevent subjective influence of researchers on the evaluation outcomes, or that EU guidance documents are not the right benchmark. Regarding the former, we have tried to describe the maximum of facts to support our conclusions, so any other person can review the evaluation on his or her own. The latter argument is difficult to handle, since in our opinion the ideal objective benchmark to evaluate public participation hardly exist. This approach just shows another possibility how to gain concrete results. Our evaluation was done in the Czech Republic, a post-socialist country, and covered the years 2003 – 2008. Three of eight river basin districts were monitored. Based on selected quantitative and qualitative criteria, the performance of the public participation was evaluated as rather poor and especially lacking the continuity. The participation of the general public showed better performance than the so-called active involvement of key stakeholders. This is mostly because of the legally anchored requirements of the former which are included both in the WFD and Czech legislation. On the other hand, stakeholder involvement is purely a qualitative process and its fulfillment is strongly dependent on the understanding, capacity and the will of regulators or planners. Due to the historical evolution, the Czech river basin authorities lack all three features for proper stakeholder involvement. As we pointed out earlier, there are many arguments raised in favor of the implementation of the public participation principle into environmental

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management. The EU requirements under WFD make this priority explicit. Despite the poor results of public participation in the Czech Republic within the first planning period, we can see at least a minor shift towards understanding the principle from the position of planners. There are also lessons learnt how to organize the whole process better for the next time to reach at least the shared understanding of water management problems and to resolve major conflicts. We believe that a properly introduced public participation principle could significantly improve the current hierarchical water management decisionmaking.

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Governance:

A

PAAVOLA, J. and ADGER, W. N. (2005) Institutional Ecological Economics, Ecological Economics 53, 353-368; POVODÍ MORAVY (2008) Strategie zapojení veřejnosti a uživatelů vody do procesu plánování pro oblast povodí Dyje, on-line: http://www.pmo.cz/2005/Strategie/Dyje/Strategie_D.doc, 11. 5. 2008; POVODÍ MORAVY (2006) Plánování v oblasti vod: Užívání vod a jeho vliv na stav vod, on-line: http://www.pmo.cz/2006/Dyje/uzivani_vod_Dy.pdf, 11. 5. 2008; PRISCOLI, J. D. (2004) What is Public Participation in Water Resources Management and Why is it Important? Water International 29/2, 221-227; RASCHE, K., KRYWKOW, J., NEWIG, J. and HARE, M. (2006) Assessing the Intensity of Participation along Six Dimensions, on-line: http://www.macaulay.ac.uk/PATHconference/outputs/PATH_abstract_3.3.3.pdf, 4. 11. 2008; RAUSCHMAYER, F. and WITTMER, H. (2006) Evaluating deliberative and analytical methods for the resolution of environmental conflicts, Land Use Policy 23(1), 108-122;

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ROWE, G., HORLICK-JONES, T., WALLS, J., POORTINGA, W. and PIDGEON, N. F. (2008) Analysis of a Normative Framework for Evaluating Public Engagement Exercises: Reliability, Validity and Limitations, Public Understanding of Science 17/4, 419-441; ROWE, G. and FREWER, L. J. (2004) Evaluating Public-Participation Exercises: A Research Agenda, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 29(4), 512-556; ROWE, G. and FREWER, L. J. (2000) Public Participation Methods: A Framework for Evaluation, Science, Technology & Human Values 25/1, 3-29; SHORT, CH. and WINTER, M. (1999) The Problem of Common Land: Towards Stakeholder Governance, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 42(5), 613-630; VIDEIRA, N., ANTUNES, P., SANTOS, R. and LOBO, G. (2006) Public and Stakeholder Participation in European Water Policy: a Critical Review of Project Evaluation Processes, European Environment 16, 19-31; WEBLER, T., TULER, S. and KRUEGER, R. (2001) What is Good Public Participation Process? Five Perspectives from the Public, Environmental Management 27/3, 435-450; WFD (2000) DIRECTIVE 2000/60/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, L 327; WITTMER, H., RAUSCHMAYER and F., KLAUER, B. (2006) How to select instruments fort he resolution of environmental conflicts? Land Use Policy 23(1), 1-9; YOUNG, H. P. (1994a) Equity: In Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. YOUNG, O. R. (2002) The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change – Fit, Interplay and Scale, Cambridge: The MIT Press; YOUNG, O. R. (1994b) International Governance: Protecting the Environment in Stateless Society. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.

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FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE FOR BIODIVERSITY: THE PERSPECTIVE OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TRANSITION COUNTRIES

KLUVÁNKOVÁ-ORAVSKÁ, T., CHOBOTOVÁ, V., BANASZAK, I., SLAVÍKOVÁ, L., TRIFUNOVOVA, S. From government to governance for biodiversity: the perspective of central and Eastern European transition countries. Environmental Policy and Governance, 2009, roč. 19, č. 3, s. 186–196. ISSN 1756-932X. Podíl L. Slavíkové: 20 %

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Introduction Among the most challenging problems of the present time is the understanding and management of complex socio-economic systems. This is particularly so in the case of governance. In European policy there is a growing interest in the promotion of shared decision making, in which interested parties not only play a role in planning but also become partially responsible for the policy outcomes (Bouwen and Taillieu, 2004). This is related to the concept of multilevel governance, which is ‘the dispersion of central government authority both vertically to actors located at other territorial levels, and horizontally, to nonstate actors’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004). This paper analyses how new approaches to natural resource and biodiversity governance at the level of the enlarged EU are changing, with emphasis on multilevel governance. The paper argues that socialistic regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which substituted the internal institutions of civic society with externally designed ones for top-down control, seriously affected the ability of the new democratic regimes to develop appropriate institutions for interactions among actors from multiple levels. The paper traces the historical development of the institutions governing natural resources and biodiversity and searches for elements of evolving multilevel governance in transition countries of CEE, where democratization and decentralization are fairly new processes. The empirical evidence was collected in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, three new EU member states where EU legislation has already been implemented, as well as countries characterized by different socialist regimes and transition histories, such as Potential Candidate Countries (Serbia) and Near Neighbours (Belarus). The analysis primarily covers the period from 1990 to the present. The data were collected using a desk study approach involving the use of secondary data such as books, governmental and non-governmental reports, reports of international programmes or organizations, press releases etc. Personal consultations in the form of semistructured interviews with key biodiversity governance representatives at national, regional or local levels were conducted where data were unclear or missing. The data were collected while focusing on the following four themes: democratization, decentralization, emergence of the market and the role of EU integration. The process of data collection was aimed at analysing the determinants, effects and processes of

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institutional change in these countries and their impact on biodiversity governance. The paper is structured into six sections, including this introduction. The theoretical concept of institutional change, in particular co-evolution of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe with relation to multilevel governance in the EU, is discussed in the following section. The evolution of environmental governance in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is the subject of the next section. The fourth section analyses the institutional rebuilding of old socialistic institutions for biodiversity governance, while the fifth section discusses the role of EU enlargement in the development of multilevel governance for biodiversity. Finally, the sixth section concludes this paper.

Institutional changes and multilevel governance in an Enlarged EU The term governance denotes new forms of regulations that differ from the traditional hierarchical activities of centralized bodies. Governance implies the involvement of various actors that are independent from a central power and operate at different levels of decision making. We are currently observing an increase in the democratic character of decision making or the transformation of traditional governments to governance. The boundaries between these two terms were well described by Rosenau (1992) when he suggested that both government and governance refer to purposive behaviour, but, while government is linked to activities backed by formal authorities, governance refers to larger processes, including informal mechanisms and multiple actors. Additionally, governance is not restricted to temporal or spatial limits and can thus travel easily across categories and disciplines, allowing it to be used for different spatial scales or for multilevel governance (Jordan, 2008). The ongoing processes of European integration and rationalization have shifted authority from national states up to European level and down to sub-national levels, with an increasing role for non-state actors. The dispersion of central governmental authority across multiple jurisdictions both vertically and horizontally is seen to be more flexible than the concentration of governance in one jurisdiction, and such a concept is known as multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Multilevel governance thus pulls authority away from national

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governments and empowers supra- and sub-national actors (Bache and Flinders, 2004).7 Vincent Ostrom (Ostrom et al., 1961) proposed a similar term, polycentric governance, which describes the co-existence of many centres of decision making that are formally independent of each other. The polycentric approach emphasizes that governance systems that manage to distribute capacities and duties across many levels will achieve better outcomes than either highly or fully decentralized systems or centralized systems. It can thus be understood as a governance system under which actors are able to organize multiple governing activities at and across different scales (Ostrom et al., 1961; Ostrom, 1997; cp. also Newig and Fritsch, 2009). Multilevel governance, so described, has four characteristics. First, decision making at all territorial levels is characterized by the increased participation of non-state actors. Second, the complexity and dynamics of actors and their networks make identification of territorial levels more difficult. Third, the role of the state is being transformed from regulator to coordinator of power and authority. Finally, the multilevel character of governance is challenging the traditional representative nature of accountability (Bache and Flinders, 2004). Governance of natural resources and biodiversity (Paavola and Adger, 2005) implies establishing compatibility between ecosystems and social systems. It involves the establishment and enforcement of governance institutions as essential links for maintaining the ability of ecological systems to support social and economic systems. Institutions for biodiversity governance can be defined as systems of established and embedded social rules that structure interactions between social and ecological systems (Hodgson, 2004). An interaction between complex social and ecological systems is understood as a process of evolution and co-evolution. Such a characterization might also describe the process of institutional change and institutional building, which is also dynamic, complex and a result of co-adaptation. A major challenge is to understand the process of building an institution for biodiversity governance that would allow the sustainable management of local, regional and global ecosystems. The connectivity pattern within and between social and ecological systems plays an important role in designing institutions for sustainable resource use (Gatzweiler and Hagedorn, 2002).

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Similarly the term condominio was introduced by Schmitter (1996) to describe dispersed overlapping domains to solve common problems for multilevel governance in the European Union.

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In the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the institutional changes undertaken in the late 1980s reflected a massive political, economic and social transformation.8 The two most important institutional changes in CEE countries were transformation and EU accession. These countries started the transformation process from very different points of development, having experienced different socialist regimes and degrees of socialistic control. Even though the transition history varies in each CEE country, the transition can generally be understood as a mixed process of top-to-bottom institutional rebuilding (new political and economic institutions implemented by international actors applied to post-socialistic institutions) and the evolution of informal rules or shared mental models. EU accession, on the other hand, can be seen as a process of legal harmonization in which the time given was not sufficient for evolution. Therefore, the main formal actors of multilevel governance in the transition countries of CEE are mostly different governmental agencies, their economic agendas or international actors and institutions created by them (Perraton and Wells, 2004). The process of institution building for sustainability in CEE is affected by the particular procedures and problems arising from the process of transforming the former political and economic system (Gatzweiler and Hagedorn, 2002). The breakdown of the command economies of CEE highlighted the problem of institutional building. The transition process in CEE was ‘jump started’, leaving an ‘institutional gap’ (Gatzweiler and Hagedorn, 2002) or ‘institutional vacuum’ (Stark, 1996; Hanisch et al., submitted) according to the literature. The western model of privatization as essential to institutional transformation was intended to be implemented instantly, ignoring the importance of the interactions within social–ecological systems and the co-evolution of old and new institutions (Chobotova, 2007). As Bromley (2000) pointed out, people believed that capitalism would appear magically from the morning mist if only the heavy hand of government would get out of the way. According to Evans (2004), such an imposing of uniform institutional blueprints based on idealized versions of western institutions could be called ‘institutional monocropping’. This oversimplified view, that transition involves the unproblematic imposition of a western blueprint, is contested, being 8

Socialism is a system of economic institutions in which the property rights to the means of production are predominantly held by the state agencies. To facilitate top down control, many internal institutions of civic society have to be replaced by externally designed, predominantly prescriptive institutions, and central planning substituted for the spontaneous coordination of market (Kasper and Streit, 1998).

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shaped by existing informal institutions and social conflicts (Gowan, 1995; Smith and Pickles, 1998) and by the persistence of routines and practices enduring from the socialistic period. Thus transformation cannot be viewed as a simple replacement but as a recombination: actors in the postsocialist context have been rebuilding institutions not on the ruins but with the ruins of communism (Stark, 1996). Transition involves not the imposition of a blueprint on a ‘blank’ social and economic space, but a reworking of the institutions of central planning (Williams and Balaz, 2002). To understand the process of institutional changes in the transition countries of CEE from centrally planned, hierarchical systems to democratic ones with market economies, we must remember that some other institutions previously existed (Chobotova, 2007) and interacted. The building of institutional arrangements for achieving suitability cannot be established easily because there was no ‘institutional free space’. The transition of CEE countries is a slow, complex and dynamic process that requires evolution, co-adaptation and learning rather than ‘shock therapy’. In our view, instead of centralized or decentralized governance systems, long enduring institutions with multitired systems of actors operating at various scales and a set of independent self-governing systems with their own centres of power can be seen as appropriate structures for addressing the needs of multilevel governance. The key question is how this recombination of institutions ‘with the ruins of communism’ influences the restructuring of hierarchical governance structures to multilevel governance ones, in which the most important features for CCE countries are the increased participation of non-state actors and the challenge posed to the traditional representative nature of accountability (Bache and Flinders, 2004).

Evolution of environmental governance in Central and Eastern European countries To be able to understand the process of institutional changes in biodiversity governance in CEE countries we have to take into consideration the influence of past and prevailing institutional factors on the durability of newly established institutions. It is important to start from the most serious environmental protection problems during socialism in these, which arose from the

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overexploitation of protected areas and the lack of environmental awareness of state officials. Under most socialistic regimes, environmental objectives were strongly supported only in legal regulations and environmental protection was primarily shaped by an ideological legacy, rooted in Marxist value theory, which aimed to manifest the principles of socialism. Marxist value theory considered labour (power) to be the source of all value, and the environment, therefore, had no intrinsic value aside from the serving of human needs. As an ‘unproductive and inefficient’ activity, environmental protection had a low priority even within protected areas. Very often, environmental protection institutions existed only formally and the absence of the market allowed states to be the only regulatory body, often resulting in a de facto open access resource regime. Intense economic activities such as tourism, timber or agriculture expanded in protected areas under state management (see e.g. Mirek, 1996; Kasprzak and Skoczylas, 1993, Kluvankova-Oravska and Chobotova, 2006). For example, the protected primeval forest Belovezhskaya Pushcha in Belarus was transformed in 1957 into a game preserve and used on an illegal basis by top party officials (Luckov et al., 1997). In most CEE countries, land was nationalized shortly after the introduction of socialistic regimes and private property did not exist. All protected areas were owned and regulated by the state with some limited resource use for citizens. One exception was Poland, where small-scale private property rights were largely respected and no massive land nationalization occurred. This was due to a combination of historical and political factors, including the danger that the communist government might have lost the support of the peasants during its early years. The transformation processes in the early 1990s, such as decentralization and structural changes in property rights, had a diversifying effect on biodiversity governance in the countries studied. In Poland, restrictions on property rights could only be introduced based on legal agreements, which entailed compensations for the landowners. Compensation programmes for landowners and the cooperation of parks’ management with local communities in Poland thus provide incentives for local actors to see protected areas as assets. In the Czech Republic, most land in national parks remained in state hands following the transformation, with most decision-making authority allocated to park management officials. This was because the territories of many current national parks, especially the Sumava and Podyji National Parks, are located in

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border regions, from which the German population was displaced after the Second World War and which were subsequently used by the Czechoslovak army. The continuity of both human settlement and historical property rights was therefore interrupted (Mikšíček, 2007). In the Slovak Republic (after the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993), land privatization was fully implemented but with the absence of appropriate institutions for market operation. Thus protected areas have a diversified ownership structure but no appropriate incentives, such as effective compensation for loss of opportunities for income generation by private and municipal owners, to encourage sustainable behaviour from non-state owners. Decisions within the park are also influenced by the multiple ownership conditions. At present, biodiversity governance in Slovakia is subordinated to regional administrations and a centralized state nature conservancy (in contrast to other Central European countries, such as the Czech Republic and Poland, where decision making in nature conservation is undertaken by the respective park administration). The park administration acts as an advisory body to the respective authority, but has no actual power. The lack of legal authority for park administrators to monitor and sanction activities within the parks sometimes leads to illegal behaviour by tourists and local inhabitants as well as ignorance of the rules. The development of Belarus and Serbia was rather backward. The transition initiated in the early 1990s was interrupted by the emergence of authoritarian leaders and, in Serbia, also by war. This had serious implications for environmental protection. In Belarus, for example, the interruption of land reform after the election of Alexander Lukashenko as president in 1994 and the subsequent subordination of national parks’ administration, together with all other national estates, under the presidential administration resulted in massive overexploitation of forest, land and minerals, with a serious impact on biodiversity. In Serbia, difficulties with the identification of land parcels and the absence of suitable proofs of pre-communist ownership caused land reformation to be delayed until 2006. Particular to Serbia is that natural resource governance is decentralized among various types of organization, usually public enterprises (Todic´, 2005).

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Institutional rebuilding in transition Countries of CEE The decentralization of previously hierarchical and centralized governance can be seen as a predominantly top down oriented process, in most cases heavily influenced by external political forces or factors. The time given to rebuild institutions from the socialist period or to build new institutions has not been adequate. Thus a basic question to address in this section is how the pre-existing institutions and organizational heritage of postsocialistic regimes in CEE affect the evolution of the new democratic regimes, particularly the multilevel governance of biodiversity. We shall concentrate on the key institutional barriers and mention some positive examples of institutional rebuilding. A good mechanism for effective communication and interaction between actors from various decision-making levels does not exist in CEE countries, as democratization and decentralization are new processes. An example of the large conflicts in recent years is the dispersion of competencies and forest management practices among state agencies. Such a conflict can be seen in the Czech Sumava National Park, where park administration has competence over both biodiversity protection and forest management (Správa NP a CHKO Sumava, 2006), resulting in a conflict of interest between protection and economic use. In the Slovak High Tatras National Park, the former park authority was divided between the state forests, managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, and biodiversity management, which is controlled by the Slovak Ministry for the Environment. As the division of competences between these two governmental bodies has never been decided, a constant tension between them exists and has been increasing. A catastrophic windstorm in 2004, which affected a large part of the forest ecosystem, resulted in enormous pressure to reconsider the size of the core zone and the implementation of intensive forest practices by State Forests in two nature reserves designated as NATURA 2000 sites. The main argument for this change was that there was a considerable risk of bark beetle outbreak, which could potentially damage neighbouring forests that were not under the full protection regime as well. As a result the EU launched infringement proceedings against the Slovak government for potential violation of the Habitats Directive and reconsideration of the park’s NP status according to IUCN standards. In Serbia, biodiversity governance is subject to state–public partnerships;9 however, post-socialistic influence and lack of democracy results in institutional 9

Management of protected areas is done by public enterprises.

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mismatch. The structure in place is largely based on informal institutions and therefore the influence of powerful groups with links to former and present political elites. An alarming example is the large-scale ski resort constructed by the Serbian government with the support of international capacities in the Stara Planina Mountains, which violated six national acts and affected the largest protected area in Serbia with potential biodiversity effects on the whole Balkan Peninsula. The biodiversity of Stara Planina is represented by a number of ecosystems and species under international protection, e.g. the Ramsar site of peat meadows, nine species on the World and 42 on the European Red List of Endangered Species or a total of more than 100 species protected by various national regulations. Socialist influence still persists in the exclusion of non-state actors from decision making. National parks in most cases find ways to establish a dialogue with local communities, but environmental NGOs are often perceived by them as ‘orthodox’ and are not involved in consultations or in real decision making (Okraska and Szymczuk, 2004). The exclusion of non-state actors from biodiversity governance is particularly significant in Near Neighbouring Countries. In Belarus, there are no formal communication or cooperation channels between national park administrators, local governments and environmental NGOs. Most tourist facilities are located within the national parks and are run by the parks’ administration, which is subordinated directly to the Management Department of the President, operating on annual business plans. Management and protection plans, in contrast, are developed only every ten years. The institutional mismatch between post-socialistic and new institutions is still prevalent, resulting in coordination problems between actors, as documented by the mismatch between inter-governmental agencies over forest and biodiversity governance in the Czech Republic and Slovakia or by the exclusion of various examples of non-state actors from public dialogue. The lack of institutions for actors’ interaction and effective governance, such as a collective choice mechanism, sanctioning and monitoring, can be cited as key aspects of this. Such findings are comparable with other regions with short democratic histories, such as community forest studies in developing countries (Andersson, 2003). It has been documented that, even though the legal and financial conditions of the decentralized forestry regimes in Bolivia were favourable, institutional and socioeconomic barriers, such as free riding, weak monitoring and sanctioning, still persisted. The motivation of local politicians and decentralization combined with

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democratization were seen as effective drivers of institutional consolidation (Andersson, 2003). There are also positive experiences of multi-actor interactions. In Poland, elements of multi-actor interaction are derived from a long tradition of market structures that, in small scale, remained even during the socialist period. In the Czech Republic, the existence of networks of actors (NGOs, interests groups etc.) and various consultation mechanisms for non-state actors, such as state and NGO partnerships, are due to the effect of historically determined informal civic movements. The most visible example was in the Czech Switzerland National Park, where the national park administration initiated the foundation of a nonprofit organization intended for cooperation and communication with municipalities, NGOs and other non-state actors.10 A new formal institution in Polish and Czech biodiversity governance is the National Park Council,11 which acts as an advisory body to the park administration for all important management processes (especially zoning, management planning, visiting rules, forest management, land-use plans etc). The membership of the national park scientific councils aims to achieve the representation of non-state actors, such as scientists, environmental organizations and local government representatives in the decision-making process. These structures are seen as an accelerator of cross-scale interactions. In Poland, the establishment of all major protection areas has to be consulted and agreed upon with the local authorities (Legislation: 16 April, 2004, art. 10). In Slovakia, where biodiversity governance is subordinated to regional and central state authority, the Association of Municipalities operating in some parks can be considered to be a new multilevel institution. For example, in Slovensky raj NP, such an association is called the ‘Microregion’ and includes the voluntary membership of municipalities around the park. The Microregion supports nature conservation, cultural activities and traditional crafts and cooperates in the provision of tourism services. Any decision made within the Microregion is based on a consensus among all the members. The park administration is also a member and can interact with non-state actors and be better informed about the activities planned within the national park. This assures at least informal cooperation in the decision-making process and biodiversity governance. 10

This organization, Ceské Svycarsko, o.p.s., attempts to integrate the interests of the state administration, municipalities and NGOs. Its common activities include the preparation and coordination of the Integrated Protection of Ecosystems in Czech Switzerland project, the running of the Information Centre of the National Park etc. (Správa NP a CHKO Sumava, 2006). 11 In Poland, National Park Councils also functioned before the transformation, but primarily for scientific reasons only

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Multilevel governance elements existed in most CEE biodiversity governance structures prior to the transition. In Poland and Slovakia, hierarchical elements still dominate. In Slovakia, the additional absence of appropriate incentives to encourage sustainable behaviour by non-state owners results in the expansion of unsustainable economic activities (Kluvankova–Oravska and Chobotova, 2006). In the Czech Republic, the jurisdiction is a combination of the general and the task specific with a relatively high degree of self-organization. The transfer of knowledge and institutions across the full scale remains uncertain for all countries in our paper.

The role of EU Enlargement The primary legal framework for the present biodiversity policy at the EU level is formed from the Habitats and Birds Directives. The Habitats Directive provides for the creation of a European network of special areas of conservation (SACs) with European priority habitat types and species, which is also known as NATURA 2000. Implementation has been connected with various problems and conflicts in both old and new member states (see e.g. Alphandery´ and Fortier, 2001; Gibbs et al., 2007; Hiedanpää, 2002; Krott et al., 2000; Paavola, 2004; Rauschmayer et al., 2009; Stoll-Kleemann, 2001), which are also well documented by Paavola et al. (2009). In the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe that joined the EU in 2004 and 2006, NATURA 2000 was an example of an entirely new institution placed into post-socialistic governance structures. As documented in the previous section, the largest problem area seems to be the cooperation of various actors. The Habitats and Birds Directives leave the public consultation stage to each member state (Article 6 of the Habitats Directive), which allows for countryspecific solutions to be implemented depending on the particular country’s practices and the state of democratic decision making. In most new member states, the critical factors influencing implementation were a weak history of participatory governance, including absence of a collective choice mechanism, conflict resolution and a lack of responsibility for the coordination of resources under the common regime. In some cases, non-state actors became part of governance consultation, for example, the NGOs in the High Tatras and Sumava National Parks, but not decision making.

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The Habitats Directive was designed to integrate economic, social and environmental dimensions at the EU level, but delegated the task of promulgating procedures for designating sites for the NATURA 2000 network to the member states. Member states followed the (mainly environmental) orientation of the directive and designated sites on the basis of scientific criteria and existing scientific information without consulting local landowners, civic groups or others who were affected by site designation and thus could not see in NATURA 2000 any economic or social interests (Article 8 of the Habitats Directive). The designation of SACs upon scientific criteria increased even more the overall frustration of non-state land owners in the new member states, as their aversion to following biodiversity protection stemmed from the absence of proper market incentives to do so. Compensation schemes and their monitoring require cooperation between many government units and interest groups, which has not yet evolved in new member states; consequently, NATURA 2000 was very often understood as a restrictive measure for nature conservation. In Poland, for example, an attempt to increase the NATURA 2000 areas was opposed by the Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who declared that ‘NATURA 2000 has expanded so much that it is practically impossible to build anything’. Mistakes also occurred in the process of SAC designation (Article 3 Annexes I and II etc). Most new member states reported that some areas were so designated without a detailed knowledge of what was in them, and some local governments were against the establishment of the sites (Banaszak et al., 2008) because they were fully excluded from consultations. The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia all reported more difficulties with the designation and management of NATURA 2000 sites at areas not previously protected (Weigle and Kiczynska, 2003). The reason most likely is derived from the fact, that in contrast to old sites, which were already covered by national networks managed by professional bodies, the management of new sites was given to local governments and community forest owners, who are newly established bodies and who often lack professional skills not only in nature conservation but also in coordination and management, as well as a sense of responsibility. To stimulate the active engagement of actors in the management of SACs in new member states will require more assistance. Positive examples from the ‘LIFE’ programme, the EU’s financial instrument for supporting environmental and nature conservation, can provide inspiration.

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The designation of SACs sites was thus contentious (Young et al., 2007) and in most new member states resulted in the preparation of ‘shadow lists’ by NGOs. The immediate reason for these conflicts was the top-down and non-inclusive site designation process. Despite the serious difficulties with NATURA 2000 implementation described in this paper, there are several positive aspects. The Habitats Directive provides incentives for the internalization of consultations with non-state actors in the decision-making process. Similarly, EU monitoring of compliance is seen as an incentive for the evolution of an internal monitoring and sanctioning mechanism, as seen for example in the case of forest management in the Slovak High Tatras NP. Other examples of designating NATURA 2000 sites catalysed regional development (WWF Polska, 2008). Such a situation can be observed in the area covered by the Barycz Valley Network in Poland. The inhabitants recognize and utilize benefits from the NATURA 2000 network, such as wide-scale free promotion of the region, development of environmentally friendly tourism and agri-tourism and development of a label for local products (Antoniewicz, 2006). Moreover, NATURA 2000 improved access to information and encouraged public participation, particularly at the local level. Proposals for the NATURA 2000 sites are required to be consulted with local governments, and other protection plans such as national nature reserves, landscape parks or forest management plans, should also be considered (Nowacki, 2006). In summary, EU integration, particularly the implementation of NATURA 2000, can contribute to the development of multilevel governance, especially by stimulating multi-actor interactions, monitoring and sanctioning as documented in Poland, and in the Czech and Slovak Republics. In Belarus and Serbia the effect of the EU has been mediated through external financial schemes such TACIS and INTERREG. Monitoring and sanctions applied to these programmes provide certain incentives to follow rules. Nevertheless, most international programmes are time specific and are carried out by outside experts who are not aware of local circumstances. Thus the EU provides very little influence for institutional changes in countries, jurisdictions and informal institutions. This is exacerbated by the hierarchical governance systems arising from the authoritarian political systems of Serbia and Belarus.

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Conclusions Multilevel governance in CEE countries can be characterized by a prevailing hierarchical structure arising from a limited tradition of decentralization and selfgovernment, lower public awareness and institutional co-evolution, rapidly affected by transformation and integration processes. The situation varies from country to country, depending on historical determinants such as the role of property regimes or existence of formal collective choice mechanisms prior to or during socialism. These aspects determine the overall effectiveness of institutional changes undertaken to transform post-socialist governance structures into the hybrid systems that are common in European democracies. Based on empirical evidence from the countries studied, we might conclude that the mismatch between the old hierarchical institutions developed under socialism and the new institutions introduced during the transition process still persists and is visible, as illustrated in our paper over the forest management conflicts between state actors in Slovakia and the Czech Republic or by the exclusion of non-state actors from public consultations and decision making. Examples of natural resource and biodiversity overexploitation by large-scale state actors in Belarus and Serbia also provide evidence that decentralization and democracy are key aspects of effective multilevel governance and a sustainable economy. EU integration has been found to be a key driving force for changes and synchronization in the governance of natural resources. In Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic the implementation of NATURA 2000 brought some changes, especially that the management of sites must be negotiated with non-state owners and that compliance is driven by EU monitoring. In Belarus and Serbia, the effect of the EU is determined by its external support, which is limited to international assistance. In both countries, state executives remain pivotal actors as authoritarian regimes prevent institutional reform, especially the re-distribution of power to supra- and sub-national actors. Decentralization, together with the increasing role of non-state actors, results in cross-scale coordination and information management problems in most countries. This was especially seen during the designation of NATURA 2000 sites. The emergence of multilevel governance in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated the absence of any accountability mechanisms, particularly for non-representative participants, such as non-state actors.

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Evidence from our study, also shown in this issue by Paavola et al., indicates that a complex, multilevel governance framework characterized by multiple-actor interaction is prone to create tensions and dynamics of its own, but that this is not necessarily a disadvantage. The appearance of new institutions operating at multiple levels and involving a multitude of groups of actors, such as the National Park Councils in Poland and the Czech Republic, is an example of emerging elements of evolving multilevel governance in transition countries of CEE.

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