Where the Sun Does Not Shine Barriers to Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion in the Netherlands
Bob Alberts 5747082
[email protected] Tel. 0647193113 Universiteit van Amsterdam Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences MSc Political Science Research Project: The Political Economy of Energy Supervisor: Dr. Mehdi P. Amineh Second reader: Daniel Scholten
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Map of the Netherlands
Source: Nations online, Political Map of the Netherlands, 2009.
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Table of Content List of tables List of Abbreviations Acknowledgement Abstract
Chapter 1 1.1. 1.2.
1.3. 1.4.
7 8 9 10
Introduction
Introduction Theoretical Framework 1. Energy Scarcity 2. Consumer and Corporate Social Responsibility 3. Barriers to Entry 4. Brandz Model of Perceptions 5. Subpolitics 6. Theoretical summary Data Gathering Methods and Analysis Organisation of the Work
11 13 14 17 20 21 22 22 24 25
Chapter 2: Current Energy Situation 2.1. 2.2. 2.2.1.
Introduction Demand Induced Scarcity World energy consumption 1. The effects of population growth 2. The effects of economic growth 3. The effects of technological progress 2.2.2. Dutch energy consumption 1. The effects of population growth 2. The effects of economic growth 3. The effects of technological progress 2.3. Supply induced scarcity 1. Fossil fuels 2. Nuclear Energy 3. Renewable energy 4. Combining Supply and Demand 2.4. Structural Scarcity 2.5. Conclusion
27 28 28 30 32 33 35 36 37 38 39 39 42 43 46 47 47
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Chapter 3 Policy 3.1. 3.2.
3.3. 3.4.
Dutch Government and Renewable Energy
Introduction Potential Roles of the Government in Renewable Energy 1. Government Monopoly 2. Structuring the Market 3. Participating in the Market The Specific Role of the Dutch Government Conclusion
48 48 49 50 52 53 55
Chapter 4 Corporate Social Responsibility and Renewable Energy Diffusion 4.1. 4.2.
4.3.
4.4. 4.5.
Introduction The Dutch Electricity Market 1. Distribution Network Operators 2. Electricity Suppliers 3. Electricity Producers 4. The strategic disadvantage for renewable energy Dutch Policy and Regulations 1. Shifts in policy 2. The SDE Mechanism 3. The inefficient green energy certificate market The Profitability of Renewable Energy Conclusion
56 57 57 58 59 61 63 64 65 67 70 72
Chapter 5 Consumer Social Responsibility and Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion 5.1. 5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5. 5.6.
Introduction Perceptions 1. Consumer Social Responsibility 2. Photovoltaic Energy Perceptions 3. Renewable Energy Perceptions Government Policy and Regulation 1. Shifting subsidy mechanisms 2. Green Energy Certificates 3. The Mechanism of Salderen Subpolitics 1. Suppliers 2. NGOs and solar panel installation companies 3. Distribution network operators. Profitability Conclusion
73 75 76 79 80 81 81 82 83 85 85 87 87 89 90
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Bibliography 1. Books 2. Scientific Articles 3. Online resources 4. Interviews
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94 94 94 95 97
Appendices Appenix I Interview Peter Segaar 2011(Dutch) Appenix II Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011(Dutch) Appenix III Interview Michael Lenzen 2011(Dutch) Appenix IV Interview Anne Sypkens Smit 2011(Dutch) Appenix V Interview Michiel Hillenius 2011(Dutch) Appenix VI Interview Job Swens 2011(Dutch) Appenix VII Survey Perceptions on Solar Panels
98 104 110 115 119 124 126
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Table of Figures
Figure 1.1. Theoretical Model
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Figure 2.1. World Primary Energy Demand Figure 2.2. World Energy Consumption by Sector Figure 2.3. World Energy Consumption 2007 Figure 2.4. The World’s Rising Population Figure 2.5. World Population Growth Figure 2.6. 2010-11 Growth Variables Figure 2.7. Dutch Electricity Consumption Figure 2.8. Dutch Population Growth Figure 2.10. Real GDP per Capita in the Netherlands Figure 2.11. Global Oil Reserves in 2009 Figure 2.12. Global Natural Gas Reserves in 2009 Figure 2.13. Global Coal Reserves in 2009 Figure 2.14. Global Uranium Reserves in 2009 Figure 2.15. Renewable Energy in the Netherlands in 2008 Figure 2.16. Percentage Renewable Energy in the Netherlands in 2008 Figure 2.17. Accumulated Photovoltaic Capacity in the Netherlands Figure 2.18. European Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion
29 29 30 31 32 33 35 36 37 40 40 41 42 44 44 45 45
Figure 3.1. Expected prices for green energy certificates in Belgium
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Figure 4.1. Connections per Dutch Gridmaintainer in 2009 Figure 4.2. Market Share of the Three Biggest energy Suppliers 2009 Figure 4.3. Percentage Renewable and Conventional Energy Producers Figure 4.4. Electricity Prices Figure 4.5. Green Energy Certificates in the Netherlands Figure 4.6. Origins of Imported Certificates Figure 4.7. Prices of Wind Energy per KWH Figure 4.8. Solar Module Prices per Wattpeak
58 59 61 66 68 69 70 71
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List of Abbreviations BP CBS CEO CO2 DNO EOS EPR EU GDP GvO IMF IEA MEP MER Mtoe NGO NMa OECD OPEC PJ PV SDE SDE+ USSR UN UNICEF W KW MW GW Wp KWp MWp KWH MWH GWH TWH
British Petroleum, an Oil Producer Centraal Bureau van de Statistiek Chief Executive Officer Carbon dioxide, a green house gas Distribution network operators Energie Onderzoek Subsidie Energiepremieregeling, a subsidy European Union Gross Domestic Product Garantie van Oorsprong, a certificate International Monetary Fund International Energy Agency Milieukwaliteit Energie production, a subsidy Milieu effect rapportage, the basis for a licence Million tonne oil equivalent Non-Governmental Organisation Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation of Pretoleum Exporting Countries Pentajoule Programma Verantwoordelijke Subsidie Duurzame Energie, a subsidy Subsidie Duurzame Energie voor hoge capaciteit, a future subsidy United Socialist Sovjets of Russia United Nations United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund Watt Kilowatt Megawatt Gigawatt Wattpeak Kilowattpeak Megawattpeak Kilowatthour Megawatthour Gigawatthour Terrawatthour
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Acknowledgement The reason I started studying political science was that during my high school years the first energy price spikes started to appear, the war on Iraq took place, which was, in the media, characterised as a war over oil reserves, and Robert Newman preformed his hilarious show “The history of oil”, satirising historical international energy relations and asking attention for the concept of peak oil. This made me highly interested in how political and social institutions would deal with energy scarcity and I believed studying political science could show me how they would. Unfortunately I was able to get my bachelor’s degree without ever hearing the words “energy scarcity” leave any of my professors’ lips. I was therefore very glad that Professor Mehdi Amineh offered this research project which discussed the basic theories surrounding the political economy of energy and which introduced me to the Dutch energy sector. I would also like to thank him for his support and guidance in the process of writing this thesis. I would furthermore give special thanks to Niels Schoorlemmer, who was kind enough to take the time to give me a general introduction to photovoltaic energy from the private photovoltaic energy producer’s point of view, as well as taking the time to have an interview. I would also like to thank Peter Segaar, Job Swens, Anne Sypkens Smit, Michael Lenzen and Michiel Hillenius for taking the time to answer my questions. Lastly I want to thank Laura Sebastian, my proof-reader, for navigating me past all the standard pitfalls Dutch people face when they pretend that they are proficient in English.
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Abstract: The economic successes and prosperity of the Netherlands and the western world have been heavily dependent upon the availability of cheap and abundant energy. In the 21st century, however, we face the challenge of rapidly depleting fossil fuel reserves. This problem becomes even more eminent when one considers the growing demands in energy from developing nations that are showing high rates of population and economic growth. The challenge of energy scarcity could be met by the diffusion of renewable energy, but the Netherlands have lagged behind in comparison with its European neighbours. Especially in photovoltaic energy, the Netherlands have a significant lower production capacity than its direct neighbours Germany and Belgium. This thesis seeks to answer the question of what the barriers to photovoltaic energy diffusion are. It takes both the perspective of the corporation investing in renewable energy and the perspective of the individual buying a solar panel. It concludes that corporations do not invest as much as they could in renewable energy because of ever-shifting Dutch subsidy mechanisms and because the market in green electricity certificates is inefficient. Demand for green energy is unreliable because consumers associate renewable energy with environmentalism. Supply of certificates heavily outweighs demand because of the import of cheap foreign green energy certificates. It also concludes that most individuals don’t buy solar panels because they link them to environmentalism, rather than energy security and because of ever-shifting subsidy mechanisms coupled with an inefficient mechanism of salderen and corporate bullying.
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Chapter 1 1.1.
Introduction
Introduction Today, on this very day, there is an affordable technology available, which can
make the average household self-sufficient in its energy consumption. A technology that can generate independence from big energy corporations and that can grant the average household with a sense of autonomy in matters relating to energy. A technology that can guarantee household access to electricity during blackouts, that can decrease the size of electricity bills and that gives households the opportunity to significantly contribute to saving the environment. This technology, although not as cheap as some would desire, is well within the purchasing capabilities of the average family and this technology is called solar panels. Unfortunately, the diffusion of photovoltaic energy, that is to say the amount of solar panels installed and the amount of energy generated by those solar panels, has lagged behind in the Netherlands. Whereas in 2009 Germany’s installed solar panels could generate a capacity of 9830 MWp, and Belgium’s a capacity of 363 MWp, the Netherlands number of solar panels only generated 62 MWp. 1 This is particularly interesting because the international energy market has of late been gaining more and more political significance. Energy prices have become extremely volatile. The oil price, for example, spiked in May 2008 to about 130 Dollars per Barrel, only to fall back to about 40 Dollars a barrel in November of the same year. This volatility might have different causes. The economic rise of developing nations such as China, Brazil and India may have significantly increased the demand of conventional sources of energy, such as oil, natural gas and coal. The production in new oil fields might have been disappointing as the domestic situation of certain oil producing nations might have hindered the supply of oil. Whatever the specific cause, high levels of price volatility have caused many nations to wonder how they will secure the supply of energy and how they will remove the thread of economic decline. The Dutch government and The European Union have therefore been developing policies to secure sources of energy. These policies include the liberalisation of the energy market, development of new nuclear plants and a set of
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Europe’s Energy Portal: http://www.energy.eu/#renewable 8-4-2011
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stimulation mechanisms for renewable energy. The aim of these policies is to create a more heterogeneous mix of sources of energy, thereby eliminating dependency of a limited amount of sources, reducing risk and therefore increasing energy security. The Netherlands currently are in the advantageous position of being a natural gas producer themselves, which creates a higher level of security of supply than nations without fossil fuel reserves. Being a natural gas producer, however, doesn’t save the Netherlands from the spikes in energy prices and the dangers of future energy scarcity. The creation of energy security should not be seen as only the role of the state. To a certain extent individual citizens have a responsibility to create their own energy security. This is possible through the purchasing of solar panels, which allow individual citizens to become small producers of renewable energy. By becoming small producers of renewable energy they can hugely decrease their dependency on external sources of energy, thus creating a high level of energy security for themselves. In short, the rising political significance of energy makes the question why the Netherlands are lagging in photovoltaic energy diffusion all the more relevant. Certain factors in the Netherlands must be keeping individual citizens from purchasing solar panels and generating photovoltaic energy. Most conditions for photovoltaic energy diffusion can be presumed to be similar between Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. As neighbouring European countries they have similar prices of solar panels, experience the same volatility in energy prices and live under comparable environmental conditions. Under these comparable conditions it is interesting to study what factors hold back Dutch consumptions of photovoltaic energy. The aim of my thesis will be figure out why the Dutch diffusion of photovoltaic energy is lagging behind. To find an answer to that question I need to develop an understanding of how the Dutch energy sector functions and which barriers and opportunities it creates for renewable energies in general and photovoltaic energy specifically. The research question of this thesis is therefore: What are the barriers to the diffusion of photo-voltaic energy in the Netherlands?
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To answer this research question we will have to answer a number of supporting questions. These questions include the questions “what is the current energy situation in the Netherlands and the World?”, “What are the potential and actual roles of governments in Renewable energy diffusion.”,“How are Dutch renewable energy policy and profitability of renewable energy creating barriers of entry from the corporate energy sector?” and “How are Dutch renewable energy policy, profitability of photovoltaic energy, subpolitics and consumer perceptions creating barriers of entry from photovoltaic energy diffusion for individual citizens?” 1.2.
Theoretical Framework
In this section we will review relevant theories, that may help us to better understand photovoltaic energy diffusion and its barriers and thus to answer our research question. We will first have a discussion about the important theories concerning energy scarcity. Then we continue with a discussion on consumer and corporate responsibility. Subsequently we will talk about barriers to entry, which will be followed by the Brandz model on how to understand perceptions. Lastly, we will discuss subpolitics. At the end of this paragraph we will combine these theories into a coherent theoretical framework on how energy scarcity leads to photovoltaic energy diffusion. It is important to understand that the combination of these theories will help us to identify the barriers to photovoltaic energy diffusion, which are the focus of this thesis. It is not meant as model, that is to be tested, that measures the relationship between energy scarcity and renewable energy diffusion, or photovoltaic energy diffusion in particular. Such relation would be tautological, because energy scarcity an sich is the lack of energy diffusion of all kinds. If we follow the assumption in this thesis that energy scarcity in itself is undesirable, than the natural reaction to energy scarcity is to strive for an optimal combination of the diffusion of all types of energy. While energy scarcity makes the question of lagging photovoltaic energy diffusion and the related barriers enormously relevant, it should in no way be seen as the main focus of this thesis and could easily be replaced by other major social issues such as the environment, unreliable energy corporations or unacceptably high electricity prices. We do not expect these other problems to be very eminent problems as of yet. This would make the question of barriers to photovoltaic energy an 13
insufficiently relevant to dedicate a thesis to it. Energy scarcity, as we will see in chapter two, is an eminent current and future threat which answering the main question of this thesis relevant. This theoretical framework will help us to identify the actors and mechanisms involved the process of photovoltaic energy diffusion and will therefore help us to identify barriers that are currently blocking the diffusion of photovoltaic energy.
1.2.1. Energy Scarcity
One of the leading concepts in this thesis is energy scarcity. Energy scarcity signifies a situation in which demand for energy is larger than the (direct) supply of energy. This raises a set of interesting questions concerning distribution, social sideeffects and politics. How does one determine who deserves access to energy when there is only a fixed amount available? How does one minimise the harm done to those who are deprived access to energy? What can a government and a society do to minimise scarcity? In short, energy scarcity generates a lot of discussion and activity. To map energy scarcity we will use the energy scarcity model by Amineh and Houweling (2007: 374-377), which divides energy scarcity into three subcategories: demand-induced, supply-induced and structural scarcity. Demand-induced and supply-induced scarcity practically cannot be divided. The question whether there is too much demand can only be answered when adequate demand is benchmarked to a certain level of energy supply. Likewise a certain level of energy supply can only be adequate when benchmarked to a certain energy demand. It is, however, necessary to artificially divide demand-induced and supply-induced scarcity to make meaningful remarks on the changes in an energy situation. Demand-induced scarcity is a subcategory that assumes an unchanging energy supply. When the level of supply does not change, but the demand for energy does increase, this creates a scarcity of energy. Three factors increase the demand for energy: population growth, rising domestic income and technological change. Population growth increases the demand for energy, when people maintain their level of energy consumption, because there will be more people consuming the same amount of energy, therefore there is more demand. Rising domestic income, usually measured by GDP per capita, means that the average person in a country has more money to spend. This new wealth allows them to consume products and use 14
equipment that they weren’t able to afford before. The consumption and use of these new products will increase the amount of energy the average person consumes, thus increasing demand. Technological change increases demand, because technological innovation will make older technology more affordable, therefore increasing their proliferation in less wealthy countries. Apart from increasing energy consumption in less wealthy countries, this proliferation decreases the political and economic hegemony of wealthier countries. To maintain their hegemony, wealthier countries need to innovate technologically and adopt more technological equipments, thus consuming more energy. Supply-induced scarcity is a subcategory that assumes an unchanging demand for energy. Energy scarcity is thus born out of a dwindling supply of energy. This may be because reserves have been depleted or because extraction is more difficult and involves higher costs. Supply-induced scarcity is generally associated with volatile pricing, because of investment speculation. Structural scarcity is a subcategory that assumes that factual demand and supply of energy are not the only things that determine scarcity as institutional actors might deliberately create energy shortages. Such actions include cartels such as OPEC reducing production, major powers limiting the supply of energy to an enemy for strategic reasons and wars and civil wars, which harm the security of energy supply.
Now that we understand how to indicate energy scarcity, it is important to look to what energy scarcity means on a political level. Gurr (1985) tells us, in his article The Political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic decline that energy scarcity has three subsequent consequences. These three consequences show us why it is far more important to avoid energy scarcity, than to avoid, for example, a sugar scarcity. Firstly there are the economic consequences of scarcity, which in themselves are political in nature because they decide the level of access ordinary citizens have to essential life commodities such as food, housing and everyday household appliances. Energy scarcity will make it harder for companies to produce these items, therefore increasing price and reducing access of those with smaller wallets. Gurr mentions that the rapidity of the increase of scarcity has an enormous effect on the ability of societies to cope with scarcity. If a decline in energy supply is slow, businesses may find additional ways to produce essential life commodities, while a rapid decline 15
disables the development of alternatives. In rapid decline, the profitability of alternatives starts to fall before actual production of alternatives has started. A Second consequence is group hostility and domestic conflicts. The limits to or lack of access to essential life commodities will create the perception of hardness within the general population and will make the call for government intervention in the form of price regulation and wealth distribution. Governments are however under similar pressures from international and domestic financial elites to financial austerity. Government spending must be limited to make financial funds available in the private sector. Thus, this aggravates domestic relations and leads to conflicts. Lastly democratic government becomes impossible. The most apparent examples of successful democracies all had a (nearly) continuously growing economy, which meant that civilians knew that in the future they would most likely be better off. Responsibility for how well off they were was entirely their own. Without a growing economy, however, people are locked into social classes. In the future they will at best be as well off as they are now. The best way to increase the wealth of your class is through government intervention. Without economic growth, one class can only gain by another class losing. In a democracy, different classes will be represented by different parties, who will have no basis for cooperation or compromise.
Understanding the political consequences of energy scarcity means that we have to understand possible remedies to scarcity. Mackay (2008: 218 - 241) discusses the opportunities several sources of energy offer in the provision of energy security in his work Sustainable Energy without the hot air. In this work he argues for inclusive measures. Governments and societies should not only strive for security of supply, they should also try to limit their consumption to sustainable measures and increase the efficiency in the provision of essential services and production of essential commodities. Cutbacks in energy consumption are thus inevitable. To secure supply of energy Mackay argues for a diverse mix of energy. Reliance on fossil fuels should be limited because they are guaranteed to run out, but overdependence on either nuclear or renewable energy is not a proper alternative. A mix of different sources is necessary, regardless of their advantages and disadvantages. The call for this mix makes it imperative to include alternative sources of energy in an analysis of the current energy situation. Mackay does not, however, indicate which actors should take the responsibility in attaining this diverse mix. 16
1.2.2. Consumer and Corporate Social Responsibility
In the last paragraph we have established that energy scarcity will have undesirable effects on economy, society and democracy. In this paragraph we will discuss the actors that may take responsibility for avoiding those undesirable effects. We will begin by having a brief look at government monopoly of the energy sector. Then we will look at corporate social responsibility. After that we will have a look at the responsibility of individual consumers and lastly we will bring those together.
The most apparent actor that should take responsibility for energy scarcity is the government. Energy scarcity is a problem that concerns the whole of society and has a direct effect on main governmental duties, such as providing security and subsistence. The way governments may take responsibility is, however, counterproductive. Full government responsibility in case of energy security would entail nationalising the energy sector, thus creating a government monopoly. Government monopolies are, however, hugely inefficient. They are deprived of all market incentives, because they have no competitors and no longer need to make a profit, because they can now be financed by taxes. Without these market incentives the energy sector is not stimulated to innovate (Fisher 1985: 412-416). For the energy sector in particular this would mean subtle changes in energy prices and would not constitute a shift towards new sources of energy, because the sector will mainly be occupied with securing supply, rather than securing the cheapest supply. The absence of this subtle shift will hinder the diffusion of renewable energy. Because governments know the inefficiency of government monopolies they generally avoid the measure, opting instead for regulations and subsidies to stimulate sustainability. It should, nevertheless, be mentioned that government policy, subsidies and regulations shape markets and the incentives for corporations and individuals in those markets to take social responsibility. These policies, subsidies and regulations still leave the largest chunk of responsibility with corporations and individual consumers. We should therefore have a better look at corporate and consumer social responsibility.
Corporate social responsibility may refer to two things. It may refer to empirical responsibility, that is, corporations taking responsibility for social problems 17
and it may refer to normative responsibility, that is, corporations being held responsible for social problems through legislation. We will mainly focus on the first form of responsibility. Corporate social responsibility is the responsibility corporations have to make decisions to avoid practices that have negative social consequences, even when these practices are more profitable than the alternatives and there are no government regulations forcing this corporation to avoid these practices. It does not refer to corporations buying off the negative consequences of their practices by supporting unrelated charities (Carroll 1999: 271-272). A casino that gives a part of its profits to UNICEF is not a socially responsible corporation. A casino that denies gambling addicts access is a socially responsible corporation. This responsibility exists because corporations have a large influence on the opportunities and means of ordinary citizens. Davis’s iron law of influence states that the social responsibility of businesses should be equal to their social power (Carroll 1999: 271). There are three apparent motivations for corporate social responsibility. The first is intrinsic motivation, a CEO of a company feels strongly about a certain social problem. The second finds its grounds in public relations. NGOs may contend a certain issue. To stay out of the bad graces of the NGO and remain a respectable company in the eyes of the public, corporations may act responsibly. An example of this is the relative absence of child labour in big brands. Lastly there is profitability, a corporation may act responsibly because there is a group of socially responsible consumers who are currently not consuming the irresponsible brands. An example of this is make up that has not been tested on animals (Baron 2001: 9-10). In the case of energy scarcity the main way of taking responsibility is producing renewable energy. The problem with renewable energy is that costs of renewable energy fall after the first moving corporation invests in it. Other corporations may thus profit from one company’s initial investment, thus making investment unattractive. A socially responsible energy company would invest in the production of renewable energy.
Next to Corporate social responsibility is consumer social responsibility. This concept is exchangeable with concepts such as ethnic consumers, consumer citizenship, political consumerism and politicised markets. The basis of consumer social responsibility lies in the idea that consumers have certain social concerns and as 18
rational autonomous consumers use their decisions to purchase one brand rather than another as a “vote” to address that concern and create better social outcomes (Caruana & Crane 2006: 1496-1497). In practice consumer social responsibility means that consumers abandon a product that might be lower of price or higher of quality for a product that they regard as a just product. The reason that consumers take responsibility is because they feel that the political body is failing to bring about social justice and that they themselves have to act to remove social injustice. These injustices can be domestic or international. The perception of injustice differs between consumers. Some take responsibility because they don’t want dirty hand from consuming products that cause social injustice. They don’t want to feel responsible for the social injustices. Others will take responsibility because they want to signify to others that they are socially responsible people. Responsible consumption is a measure of non-materialistic self-expression. A last group consumes responsibly because they believe that lack of consumption will incentivise wrongdoing businesses to stop creating injustice by switching to more ethical business practices (Micheletti et al. 2009: Pp X-XI, 5-9).
We have established that empirical corporate and consumer responsibility exists and has certain causes. This, however, does not give any tangible answers to how energy scarcity should be avoided and who must bear the largest chunk of responsibility for it. We need a normative concept of the division of social responsibility. In the field of environmental studies, such debate already exists. Models from this debate discuss whether producers (corporations) or consumers should be held responsible for CO2 emissions. The principles behind these models can also be used to determine responsibility in energy scarcity. Some models assume full producer responsibility, because they create scarcity-increasing products, and some assume full consumer responsibility, because consumers keep buying scarcityincreasing products. The problem with those approaches is that the contributions to scarcity from the non-responsible party should be zero in order to truly be unaccountable for the problems. Therefore responsibility for scarcity must be shared. A large chunk of responsibility lies with consumers because they chose to consume scarcity-increasing products, but an evenly large chunk of responsibility lies with corporations because they structure the abilities for consumers to consume scarcityincreasing products (Lenzen et al. 2007: 31-32) 19
1.2.3. Barriers to Entry
Barriers to entry refer to phenomena in the organisation of a market that make it harder for new businesses to enter an industry. A high amount of barriers lessen the competitiveness of an industry, which may not only lead to higher prices for consumers, but may ward off innovation in that industry, thus robbing society as a whole of a higher standard of welfare (Weizsäcker 1980: 398-401). While barriers of entry should not be seen as a catch all term for all obstacles to renewable energy diffusion, we will regard renewable energy producers and individual solar energy producers as actors who are trying to enter the Dutch energy market and experience some barriers. The framework of barriers to entry will furthermore help us to structure research in a manner that may make other (non-entry) barriers evident. There are a number of standard barriers to entry; we will discuss the ones that are relevant to the diffusion of renewable energy. The most apparent barrier is profitability. Many studies point out that some markets are advantageous for incumbents because of high initial investments, economies of scale or abilities for product differentiation. These elements may make entering an industry less profitable which means that new businesses will have a hard time finding funds to finance entering new markets. A second well-known barrier is government regulation. Government regulations, such as requiring a licence to enter, may create a bureaucratic workload that makes entering a new market harder, less appealing and less profitable, which will be in the advantage of incumbent companies. A third barrier is consumer perceptions. New entrants may have to deal with an extensive marketing budget from an incumbent which leaves consumers to hold specific associations with a particular brand rather than with the product. Furthermore consumers may hold negative perceptions concerning an element of new business’s practices, which will stop them from buying from new businesses. An example of this is Europe’s distaste for genetically modified food. This makes it harder to enter an industry. Lastly there is a cluster of barriers, which we summarise as subpolitics. Broadly speaking this means that social movements, NGOs or business clusters have organised markets in a way that makes entering an industry harder. A clear example is contracts between incumbents and supplying companies in which supplying companies can only supply to incumbents. (Demsetz 1982: Pp 49-55)
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The barriers of entry model applies to renewable and photovoltaic energy in the Netherlands, because the big energy supplying companies are not the same as the energy producing companies. Renewable energy is thus produced by independent smaller energy companies who sell their energy to energy supplying companies. Even households who feed back photovoltaic energy into the grid are, in fact, “energy producing companies”. Small renewable energy producers thus have to compete with producers of conventional energy.
1.2.4. Brandz Model of Perceptions
Consumer perceptions have a great deal of influence on consumer decisions to purchase solar panels or at least to purchase renewable energy over conventional electricity. This is because the rational actor assumption does not fly. In this assumption consumers are seen as rational actors, using information that is available to them to create an optimal situation for themselves. (Macnaghten & Urry 1998: 217218). Were this assumption true, then there would be a higher diffusion of photovoltaic and renewable energy in the Netherlands. To understand consumer perceptions we will use the Brandz model, however, this model was developed to apply to specific brands rather than to products. This should not be a problem, because brands are defined as “a name, term, sign symbol or a combination of these, that identifies the maker or seller of a product”. The term solar panels is a collective term that refers to a set of makers of one product type. The Brandz model of perceptions assumes five subsequent steps. Each step increasing the likelihood that consumers will consume the product of which you are researching the perceptions. These steps are Presence, Relevance, Performance, Advantage and Bonding. Presence refers to the fact that consumers know of the products or brands existence and how to obtain it. Relevance refers to the level to which consumers associate a certain product or brand with things they find desirable or advantageous. Performance refers to the level to which the product or brand is actually able to deliver those desirable or advantageous things. Advantage refers to the level to which a product or brand is higher in quality or in features than comparable products or brands. Bonding, doesn’t apply to products, but refers to an emotional identification consumers may hold with one brand. (Kotler & Keller 2009: 276- 281) 21
1.2.5. Subpolitics Subpolitcs refers to decisions that are made by actors outside of the political body, such as social movements, NGOs and business clusters, and that influence and structure the opportunities and choices of normal citizens. Because these decisions are made outside of the political body they are not democratically legitimised and can have adverse effects on normal citizens. Subpolitics exists because techno-economic innovations can create social and economic opportunities and increases in welfare quicker and more efficiently than political regulation can. This means that governments will always be behind on regulation, but also that governments will always allow certain space for subpolitics, because subpolitics is a by-product of an increase in social and economic welfare (Beck 1992: 187-198). 1.2.6. Theoretical summary In figure 1.1 we see a theoretical model of how conventional energy scarcity will lead to photovoltaic energy diffusion. It should not be understood as a model to be test the causal relationship between energy scarcity and renewable energy diffusion, or photovoltaic energy diffusion in particular. It should be seen as a tool to identify the barriers to photovoltaic energy diffusion. As you can see below, conventional energy scarcity will cause a number of economical, social and political problems, which will be solved by consumers or corporations in the energy sector taking responsibility. The willingness to invest in photovoltaic energy by consumers is structured by their perception and the profitability of solar panels and by the government regulations and policy and subpolitics surrounding individual energy generation. These factors may also trigger them to instead buy green energy from energy corporations. The level of availability of green energy is determined by the profitability of green energy and the government policy regulations regarding green energy. Corporations can also generate green energy using photovoltaic instruments, therefore increasing photovoltaic energy diffusion. If however they choose to use other renewable technologies, including nuclear power, they will lessen the energy scarcity and therefore reduce the perceived need by individual consumers to purchase solar panels, thus lessening photovoltaic energy diffusion. It ought to be repeated that government policy and regulations should not only be seen as small interventions in the energy market, but also as a manner in which the energy market is structured. 22
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1.3.
Data Gathering Methods and Analysis
This thesis will use a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods. Both methods are necessary to answer the research question because different types of data are necessary to answer subquestions. Some of these subquestions are more concerned with data of statistical nature and therefore require quantitative methods, while others are more concerned with mechanisms that create barriers and opportunities and therefore require more qualitative methods. The types of data I will be using fall into three categories: primary sources, secondary sources and interviews. The primary sources constitute government documents on Dutch energy transition policy and reports from various organisations on energy scarcity and energy transition. These government policy documents will be analysed qualitatively by using a content analysis method, and reports on data related to energy scarcity, such as facts and figures on demographics of the World and Dutch population, on fossil fuels and on renewable energy. The demographic facts and figures about the world and Dutch population will be attained from the UN Human Developmental report 2009 and the Dutch Central bureau of Statistics annual demographic report 20052009. The facts and figures concerning fossil fuel will be gathered via reports on oil consumption prospects from oil companies, such as the BP Statistical review of world energy 2010 and from the International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2009.
The facts and figures on renewable energy will be gathered from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics Renewable energy in The Netherlands 2008 and the websites of the European energy portal, Solarbuzz.com and Wind-Energy-the-Facts.com. These reports and websites will grant us with the information we need to quantify energy scarcity and energy transition. Lastly these reports and websites will allow us to gain an understanding of how profitable photovoltaic energy is and this will also be analysed quantitatively. Interviews will consist of a structured interview and a number of semistructured interviews. The structured interview will be held with train travellers, pubvisitors and Dutch students, aimed to map general perceptions about sustainability and solar panels in the Netherlands. This will be analysed quantitatively establishing which category of perceptions are most predominant in the Netherlands. The semi-structured interviews are concerned with mapping which energy transition policies are out there, at evaluating the effectiveness of transition policy and 24
at mapping subpolitics and the barriers and opportunities that it creates. These interviews will be analysed quantitatively using content analysis methods. Proposed interviews include: a. Interview with Peter Segaar, a Dutch Renewable Energy Journalist. b. Interview with Niels Schoorlemmer, Secretary of Zonnestroomproducenten Vereninging. c Interview with a Anne Sypkens Smit, Communications employee at EnergieNederland, which is the Dutch Energy Sector Lobbying organisation. d. Interview with Michael Lenzen, policy employee at CertiQ. e. Interviews with Michiel Hillenius, adviser at Agentschap NL. f. Interview with Job Swens, Joining Objectives for Sustainable World Energy Solutions. Secondary literature, such as described in the literature review, will be used to provide additional insights into government policy, perceptions, profitability and subpolitics. 1.4.
Organisation of the work This thesis will consist of five chapters. This first chapter gave a theoretical
overview. In the following chapter we will discuss the energy situation in the world and the Netherlands. This is necessary to determine to what extend there is energy scarcity and subsequently to determine whether the question of a lagging dutch photovoltaic energy diffusion is relevant. The Resource Scarcity model will be applied to comprehend the energy situation. This model will firstly be applied to conventional sources of energy such as oil, natural gas and coal. Thereafter it will be applied to renewable sources of energy, ranging from renewable energy in general to photovoltaic energy in particular.. The third will examine which roles governments can take to stimulate the diffusion of renewable and photovoltaic energy and which role the dutch government has taken. This analysis will be complemented with a brief history of renewable energy in the Netherlands In the fourth chapter we will take a closer look at the forms Corporate Social Responsibility may take under Energy Scarcity. We will therefore discuss the institutional network in the Netherlands surrounding renewable energy and will 25
discuss developments in profitability, government regulations, consumer perceptions and subpolitics which are linked to renewable energy. We will also briefly discuss how the developments concerning renewable energy in general affect photovoltaic energy in particular. In the fifth chapter we will discuss the forms consumer social responsibility takes in cases of energy security and we will see photovoltaic energy plays a large role in that kind of responsibility. First we will discuss the role of photovoltaic energy in the Dutch electricity sector. Secondly we will discuss the developments in the barriers and opportunities for photovoltaic energy diffusion that are created by changes in profitability, government regulations, consumer perceptions and subpolitics. In the sixth and last chapter we will bring everything together and answer to research question of this thesis.
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Chapter 2 2.1.
Current Energy Situation
Introduction In this chapter we will discuss the current energy situation. It will determine
whether or not there is energy scarcity, which would make the question of a lagging dutch photovoltaic energy diffusion relevant. Otherwise this chapter adds little to photovoltaic energy diffusion. The current energy situation will be described using the energy scarcity model (Amineh & Houweling 2007) as discussed in section 1.2.1. For a complete understanding of the current energy situations, we will need to take a look at the global energy situation in general as well as the Dutch energy situation in particular. Dedicating a chapter to discussing the current energy situation is important because it spells out the challenges of current and future energy scarcity. Energy scarcity might be considered as a widely known problem, it is nevertheless important to quantify this problem to be able to be specific about what the challenge to the Dutch energy sector is. Low levels of energy scarcity namely indicate a less urgent necessity for the diffusion of renewable energy, and thus a smaller challenge. Likewise it is important to see how this challenge has already been met in the past by the Dutch government. The particular problems with renewable and photovoltaic energy diffusion will be dealt with in the next two chapters. In this chapter we will first look at demand induced scarcity, taking a look at consumption both on the global and on the domestic level. Then we will go on to describe supply induced scarcity. We will define three sources of energy, namely fossil fuels, nuclear energy and renewable energy. All of these will be discussed at both the global and domestic level. In this section we will also discuss Dutch energy policy. Lastly we will look at structural scarcity to see what other factors are influencing the energy supply to the Netherlands.
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2.2.
Demand Induced Scarcity
In section 1.2.1. we already discussed how a higher demand for energy, which translates to a higher consumption of energy, can contribute significantly to energy scarcity. In this paragraph we will first discuss the effects of population growth, economic growth and technological progress on world energy demand and consumption. We will then turn to the domestic level and give an overview of developments in Dutch energy consumption.
2.2.1. World energy consumption
To understand the current world consumption of energy we have to discuss three elements of that consumption. We first need to discuss what resources are used to produce the amount of energy that is currently consumed, and thereby give clarity on the growth of energy consumption over the last decades. Then we will have a look at how consumption of energy is spread over several sectors. Lastly we will have a brief discussion about the geographical division of world consumption.
Figure 2.1 shows us the composition of energy consumption from 1980 to 2030. It is taken from the IEA Energy outlook 2009, measuring consumption in Mtoe (Million tonne oil equivalent, or approximately 11,667 TWH), and therefore signifies the global level of energy consumption in 2007. The world consumption in 2007 was 12013 Mtoe or approximately 140 TWH. The cumulative energy consumption in the last two decades equals the cumulative energy consumption from the industrial revolution up to 1990. The largest chunk of the consumed energy, 81 per cent, is generated from fossil fuels. The IEA predicts that even though the amount of energy produced from alternative sources such as hydro-, nuclear and renewable energy will grow, the proportion of energy consumption generated by fossil fuels will remain the largest, still approximately 80 per cent (IEA Energy Outlook 2009: 74-75).
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Figure 2.2 shows us how energy is divided between several sectors. As we can see, the major sectors are transportation, industrial and residential consumption. Industrial and residential consumption of energy generally consists of the generation of power and heat. The generation of power and heat, together with transportation constituted 57 per cent of consumption in 2007 and is expected to constitute 62 per cent in 2030. The figure clearly shows high levels of dependence on fossil fuels in the transportation sector (IEA Energy Outlook 2009: 79).
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Figure 2.3 shows us the geographical division of energy consumption. It clearly shows us that in 2007 about 49 per cent is consumed by countries in North America or Europe. In 1980, however, North America and Europe consumed about 67 per cent of the world consumption. This decrease in proportion of consumption has no grounds to suggest a decrease in actual consumption by North American or European states, instead the actual consumption of energy and consequently the proportion of consumption of, Asian states has drastically grown. In 1980 Asian countries consumed about 21 per cent of world energy, while in 2007 this had grown to 36.15 per cent. IEA projections expect Asia’s consumption to grow to about 44% of world consumption in 2030 (IEA Energy Outlook 2009: 76).
2.2.1.1
The effects of population growth on world energy consumption
Energy scarcity can be caused by a rise in demand for energy, as discussed in section 1.2.1. There are three general causes for a rise in demand: population growth, rise in GDP and technological progress. In this section we will focus on population growth. As mentioned earlier, demand for energy and supply of energy are hard to separate from each other, for a clear understanding of scarcity it is, however, more helpful to analyse them separately. In this paragraph we will assume that the personal consumption of energy per person will stay stable, just as their standards of living will. 30
Figure 2.4 shows that the world population is expected to grow by 29 per cent, from 6.9 billion in 2010 to 8.9 million in 2050. The figure further shows us that most of the population growth is expected in Asia and Africa, while Europe, North America and Oceania are showing a decline. Figure 2.5 shows us the rate of population growth, which has rapidly declined for developed countries, in North America, Europe and Oceania, and is slowly beginning to decline for the developing world, expecting to hit the replacement rate around 2025. Even though the rate of population growth is slowing down in Central and South America and Asia, they are still above the replacement rate, therefore their populations are still growing (UN Human Developmental Rapport 2009: 74-75, 184-188). The Scarcity model assumes that growth in population does not influence the personal level of consumption or personal standard of living. Therefore a bigger world population equals higher world consumption. Higher consumption under the same level of supply will constitute current and future energy scarcity.
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2.2.1.2.
The effects of economic growth on world energy consumption
The second factor that increases demand according to the scarcity model (Amineh & Houweling 2007) is a rise in the GDP per capita, also known as a rise in the standard of living. A rise in a standard of living can only be accomplished by a rise in consumption. Namely, if a country’s GDP per capita rises, but the increased wealth is not consumed, then the standard of living remains the same. Higher levels of consumption require higher levels of production, thus a higher level of energy is used. Since we cannot directly measure a rise in standards of living, we have to settle for the indirect indicator of rises in GDP per capita, described in purchasing power parity. When we take a look at figure 2.6 we see that Asia shows a remarkable average growth of about seven per cent annually. This growth is mainly attributed to the recent economic rise of China and India, although the contributions of other industrial Asian nations such as Japan, Korea, Thailand and Indonesia should not be overlooked. Africa and the Middle East and North Africa, show an average growth of five per cent, and Latin America and the former USSR nations show an average growth of four per cent annually. Developed countries in Europe and North America show average growth rates of two and three per cent annually. Strong growth rates are
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expected from developing nations until they catch up with developed countries’ standards of living (IMF WEO2011: 62). The economic development of developing nations and the related rise in standards of living will create a high demand for energy. When we assume the same level of energy production this amounts to energy scarcity
2.2.1.3.
The effects of technological progress on world energy consumption
It would be standard practice to follow the analysis underlying the energy scarcity model (Amineh & Houweling 2007), which emphasises sequential industrialisation as a process that increases demand for energy. Sequential industrialisation, in short, is the process in which the industrialisation of one country challenges its neighbour countries to also industrialise in order to keep up economically. This proliferation of industrialisation increases the demand for energy. In this thesis, however, we will see sequential industrialisation as a consequence of the fact that technological innovation makes older technologies available for lower prices. When a core state industrialises, or innovates technologically, it is able to produce products at a lower price than domestic and international competitors. Exporting products is, however, only profitable when a set of other products of equal value is imported, otherwise the currency of an importing country will fall in value and exporters will no longer be able to sell their products abroad. Importing countries can produce attractive goods by buying productive but outdated machines and technologies at lower prices than the more advanced, state of the art products and thus have something to balance the budget. 33
Innovation of products also makes older versions of comparable products more easily available for countries with low levels of GDP per capita. New technologies are normally discovered and in early stages applied in countries with high levels of GDP per capita. In the early stage the costs of these products are rather high, for example in the case of cell phones. Bit by bit more technological progress is made in producing products cheaper and making them more efficient and of higher quality. The drop in prices on its own makes them more available to people with smaller incomes, but when you add increases in efficiency and quality this creates a stock of outdated low efficiency, low quality products that can be produced more cheaply than the products of higher quality. These products are appealing to low income countries and have markets there. Cell phones that use digital networks, without cameras, black and white displays and monotonous ring tones used to have high prices in Europe and North America in the first decade of the 21st century, after the two transitions from digital networks to high Speed IP data networks and from high speed IP data networks to All-IP networks, digital network cell phones have become the cheapest version available on European markets and have a high level of market penetration in China (57 per cent of population owning a cell phone in 2008), Latin America (32 per cent in 2006) and Africa (60 per cent in 2009) (Prahalad & Hammond 2002: 3-7; Aker 2010: 220-223). The falling prices that technological progress thus creates, can make older technologies available to low income countries, which increases their consumption of energy. Important to add is that this does not require them to gain a higher level of GDP per capita or their population to grow, which are phenomena that are indirectly related to the process of sequential industrial relation. A country can gain a high level of energy consumption, without a rise of GDP or population growth, if technology falls in price. Energy scarcity is thus created by the proliferation of older technologies such as cell phones and cars in low income countries and the future higher level availability to these countries of products that are currently only reserved for rich countries.
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2.2.2.
Dutch energy consumption
The Netherlands consumed 123 TWH of electricity in 2008. This covers a large fraction of the Dutch energy consumption, but excludes consumption for transportation and in some cases heating this amounts to 750 TWH (2702 PJ ) in total. As shown in figure 2.7, nearly 90 per cent of the Dutch electricity consumption in 2008 came from fossil fuels. About 4 per cent (CBS Renewable Energy in The Netherlands 2009: 11) was generated by nuclear power plants, and then in 2008 about7.5 per cent was generated from renewable sources, such as biomass, hydro-, wind and Solar Power. The percentage of renewable energy of total energy consumption adds up to 3.4 per cent in 2008 (CBS Renewable Energy in The Netherlands 2008). In 2010 the Netherlands reached 9% of renewable energy in its electrical consumption. (European Energy Portal 2011)
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2.2.2.1
The effects of population growth on Dutch energy consumption
Just like world demand for energy is increased by population growth, Dutch energy demand is increased by population growth. Assuming a stable level of consumption and a stable standard of living level, consumption will grow when the population grows. Figure 2.8 shows us four scenarios for the size of the Dutch population in 2050. The Global Economy Scenario predicts a population of 20,3 million people in 2050, under the conditions of a strong global economy and a less generous welfare state. The Strong Europe Scenario predicts a population of 19,2 million people in 2050. There will be slow economic growth combined with an unchanged welfare state. The Transatlantic Market Scenario predicts 16.8 million people. It assumes big differences between rich and poor. Lastly the Regional Communities Scenario predicts a decline in population from about 16 Million in 2000 to 15.1 million people in 2005 as it assumes a maintained welfare state and low levels of economic growth. (CBS de Nederlandse Economie: 67)
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2.2.2.2.
The effects of economic growth on Dutch energy consumption
The Netherlands is generally regarded as a high income country. No analyst would expect sudden high rates of economic growth, combined with higher levels of energy consumption. Instead the Dutch economy has in the past grown by two per cent per year and is expected to keep on growing at that rate. There is the apparent exception of the 2008 financial crisis. This crisis has dented economic growth in 2008 and 2009, but this dent is not expected to have long-term implications for the Dutch economy (CBS De Nederlandse Economie 2010: 16). This two per cent growth is still significant. It means that the expendable income of the average Dutch person grows annually. This growth can translate into an increase in general consumption, for example buying more food at the grocery store, and it can translate into specific consumption, usually of new or more expensive goods or services, for example holidays. General consumption increases energy consumption because more products have to be produced, which requires energy. Specific consumption increases energy consumption because energy is consumed for reasons it wasn’t consumed for earlier. A big difference between the 1990 and 2010 Dutch standard of living is that air travel for holidays is more common, requiring high levels of kerosene consumption, whereas in 1990 families would have gone on an affordable domestic holiday. (CBS Consumentenprijs Index 2010: 14)
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2.2.2.3.
The effects of technological progress on Dutch energy consumption
Technological progress has had a profound influence on the Dutch energy consumption. Advances in technology have driven down the prices of many small electrical devices and made those electrical devices commonplace in the Dutch household. These devices include cell phones, audio-players, laptops and computers, water boilers and DVD-players and recorders. More households nowadays have these appliances, which means that they are consuming energy in ways that they weren’t consuming energy earlier. Therefore electricity consumption has risen. Many of these devices are also heavily “leaking” electricity. Televisions and personal computers are equipped with a standby function, which consumes energy even when devices are not being used to perform the tasks they are designed for. Another way of “leaking” energy is that increased battery capacities of mobile phones and laptops allows people to consume energy even in moments when people couldn’t consume before, leading to more indirect, but still more consumption. Lastly there is Jevons Paradox, which states that more efficient use of resources will increase the consumption of that resource rather than decrease it (Polimeni et al. 2008: IX-X). If an appliance or machine can use a resource more efficiently, people would expect the consumption of energy to fall because there is less energy needed to get the same result. Consumption will actually rise, because the price of using the appliance would have fallen and people will be able to get more benefits out of it for the same price. Examples of this are cell phones and cars. Current cell phone batteries could last for a month if linked up with an old digital network quality telephone. Instead of using energy efficiently and charging phones but once a month, Dutch consumers use cell phones in all sorts of ways, for example to play music, to play games, to take photographs or even to browse the internet. These activities cost energy and thus reduce battery span of modern cell phones to the standard one week. Similarly, cars can be designed to travel fifty kilometres per litre of petrol. For most Dutch consumers this efficiency is sacrificed for radio, cruise control and air-conditioning.
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2.3.
Supply induced scarcity
We have established that one source of current and future energy scarcity is a rising demand for energy. During that evaluation we assumed an unchanging supply of energy. In this section we will turn the coin around, and assume a stable demand of energy to examine future supply. We will first have a look at energy supply from fossil fuels, then we will have a look at energy supply from nuclear energy and lastly we will turn to renewable energy. Fossil fuels and nuclear sources of energy will be examined on the global level because they both depend on resources that are not renewable and are spread throughout the world. For renewable energy we will focus on the Netherlands, because renewable energy will most likely be generated locally.
2.3.1.
Fossil fuels
As shown in figure 2.7. fossil fuels, which include oil, coal and natural gas, compose about 90 per cent of the Dutch electricity consumption. Fossil fuels are a non-renewable source of energy, which means that one day all of the fossil fuel reserves will most likely be consumed. The known stock of fossil fuels, as shown in figures 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13, is not stable and we are constantly discovering new reserves of fossil fuels. This doesn’t mean that fossil fuel reserves are endless. With every discovered fossil fuel reserve, it gets harder to discover new reserves. In 2009 our proven oil reserves added up to 1333.1 Billion Barrels and our gas reserves added up to 187,49 trillion cubic metres. In 2009 our coal reserves added up to 826 billion tonnes. Oil reserves are mainly located in the Middle East. Gas reserves are spread over Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East. Coal reserves are spread over Europe, Eurasia, Asia and North-America. (BP statistical review of world energy 2010: 7, 23, 33) Reserves in themselves don’t have any value to energy scarcity. Production has to be determined in order to determine whether or not there is energy scarcity. In 2009 our production of oil was 81,9 million barrels per day (BP statistical review of world energy 2010: pp 8, 24, 34), our gas production was 2987.0 billion cubic meters annually and our coal production was 3408.6 million tonnes oil equivalent annually. At this rate of production, ignoring the fact that production has steadily been growing over the past years to match consumption, our oil reserves can supply us with oil for 39
another 16 years, our gas reserves for another 61 years and our coal reserves for another 242 years.
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There are several reasons to assume these back of the envelope calculations are inaccurate. First of all, it falsely assumes that different types of oil, of natural gas and of coal are interchangeable. Coal and gas are clearly not interchangeable in all possible application, but even different types of coal, for example low nitrogenholding coal and high-nitrogen holding coal, are not suitable for every possible coal application. Secondly production will most likely match consumption and consumption is expected to rise, as discussed in section 2.2. Lastly there is the concept of peak oil, which states that producing oil has a bell curve of ease: it is hard to extract the first part, the middle part is easily extracted and the extracting the last part gets hard and requires a lot of investment. (Bardi 2009: 323-324) This means that countries might not be able to produce as much oil as it would like, thereby mismatching supply and demand and increasing energy scarcity. Lastly there is the false assumption that the Netherlands is safe from energy scarcity, because it has its own gas reserves. While these reserves have made energy scarcity as of yet less prominent in the Netherlands than to non-gas producing countries, it does not save the Netherlands from future scarcity. Dutch natural gas reserves add up to 1416 billion cubic meters of natural gas. Dutch natural gas consumption adds up to reserves 48,6 billion cubic meters per year. This would leave 41
us with approximately 29 years of natural gas consumption from domestic sources, while global reserves are expected to be depleted in 61 years. Dutch natural gas will thus be long consumed before the international reserves are depleted. (BP statistical review of world energy 2010: 22-24)
2.3.2.
Nuclear Energy
Another important source of non-renewable energy is nuclear energy. Nuclear energy is generated by enriching and then splitting the nuclear core of uranium atoms. Figure 2.14 shows us that Australia holds the largest reserves by far. The total world uranium reserves as measured in 2009 amounts to 5,404,000 tonnes. Our production in 2009 amounted to 50,572 (OECD Uranium 2009: 24-27). A back of the envelope calculation would thus give about 107 years of nuclear energy, if world consumption would remain at the current level where it only accounts for about 5,9 per cent of world energy production. A more likely scenario is nuclear energy slowly replacing fossil fuels, thus constituting an earlier depletion of uranium reserves.
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2.3.3.
Renewable energy
Now that we have determined that in the future, non-renewable sources of energy will run out, it is important to determine how they can be replaced. In 2010, 9 per cent of the electricity was generated from renewable sources. Figure 2.15 shows us that most that energy is produced by windmills, both on shore and off shore (47.35%) or by co-firing bio-mass in coal based power plants (51,09%). Hydro-power has a low contribution in the Netherlands because the Netherlands has no mountains which could provide for the water reservoirs that power hydro-power turbines. The reason for the low contribution of solar energy to Dutch electricity production is the topic of this thesis. In figure 2.16 it is shown how the contribution of renewable energy to Dutch electricity grew from 2.5 per cent in 2000 to 7.5 per cent in 2008. Figure 3.17 shows the installed capacity for solar energy in the Netherlands. Most solar energy, 58.3 MWp of capacity, is generated by households or companies with solar panels. The second group are households that are not connected to the energy grid. Lastly, a small contribution of 4.3 MWp is generated by companies generating solar energy to feed into the energy grid. Figure 2.18 shows us how the Netherlands is lagging behind on other, comparable European countries in the diffusion of photovoltaic energy in 2008. Belgium photovoltaic energy diffusion has risen to 363 MWp in 2010 (European energy Portal 2010).
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2.3.4.
Combining Supply and Demand
If we, then combine the details we gained about energy supply and energy demand, do we than find relevant levels of energy scarcity? The presence of subsidies in the dutch energy sector might (falsely) be seen as the absence of current energy scarcity. These subsidies may seem to indicate that energy prices haven’t risen high enough. The direct effect of energy scarcity would be the rise of energy prices. As long as the costs per KWH of fossil fuels are far below the costs of renewable energy, in other words in the absence of grid parity, it would presumably mean that energy scarcity would not be urgent enough to constitute a real danger. At the moment renewable energy could be produced at competitive KWH cost, renewable energy diffusion will automatically reduce energy scarcity. This process is known as grid parity (Bhandari & Stadler 2009: 1636). This assumption is false for several reasons. First of all, supply side scarcity does not lead to a gradual growth in price, but volatile changes in price (Amineh & Houweling 2007: 375). Volatile prices do form a stable basis on which renewable energy with fixed costs can easily compete. Secondly the pace of price growth during energy scarcity is not fixed. It may be slow but may also be rapid (Gurr 1985: 53). The paradox here is that construction of renewable energy generating facilities costs energy, which means that the ability to generate renewable energy depends upon the price and availability of conventional energy. Lastly the economic costs of energy are not the same as the social costs of energy. Apart from environmental concerns which exist loosely from concerns over grid parity price, the parity price might be socially undesirable because it reduces the access of ordinary civilians to essential life commodities such as food, medicine and housing, because the price of these essential life commodities is dependent upon the price of energy (Gurr 1985: 55). Even in the absence of grid parity, we may assume that a rising international domestic demand for energy in combination with the dwindling of the stock of conventional energy sources, indicate a scarcity of energy, that currently influences, may it be only in small amounts, the opportunities and choices of the average citizen. The data presented in this chapter certainly indicate a future scarcity of energy that must be taken into account.
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2.4.
Structural Scarcity
Structural scarcity refers to scarcity that has been created by the major international actors that affect the availability of oil. These events or actions temporarily make oil supplies unavailable to countries that have a demand for them. These actions or events include oil cartels, North African revolutions and the military intervention in Iraq. Structural scarcity is relevant for the diffusion of photovoltaic energy because as the price spikes it might generate the incentive for individual civilians to seek the energy security of their own solar panels. Unfortunately major powers have now created strategic oil reserves to counter act price spikes in energy, thereby removing the incentive of energy security as a reason to purchase solar panels. 2.5
Conclusion
This chapter gave an overview of current and future energy scarcity and thereby emphasised the relevance of the thesis. At the demand induced scarcity level we saw that consumption is expected to rise due to world population growth and growth in standards of living in Asia, Latin America and Africa. We also saw that technological innovation made energy consuming devices available to low income countries also increasing consumption. On the Dutch level we saw that energy demand will also rise due to population growth and growth in the standards of living. Furthermore consumption has grown because the Dutch are using new energy consuming devices. On the supply level we saw that, at current levels of consumptions our oil supplies will run out in 16 years, our gas reserves in 61 years, our coal reserves in 242 years and our Uranium reserves in 107 years. These calculations do not take into consideration that there are different types of each resource within each resource category that cannot be interchangeably used. We also saw a slow but gradual growth in Dutch renewable energy consumption, which was at 9 per cent in 2010. We then concluded that the combination of energy supply and demand indiced energy scarcity, even in the absense of grid parity. At the structural level we saw that political events and strategic oil reserves may both incentivise and inhibit the diffusion of renewable and photovoltaic energy. 47
Chapter 3 Dutch Government and Renewable Energy Policy 3.1.
Introduction This chapter is the first one to dive into the actual question of which barriers to
renewable and photovoltaic energy diffusion there are. It will answer the question which actions a government could potentially take to stimulate renewable and photovoltaic energy diffusion. The fourth and fifth chapter analyse how arrangements, actors and institutions in the current market may prove to hinder the diffusion of renewable and photovoltaic energy. In other words they analyse how actually present factors might influence diffusion. This chapter discuss different roles a government might take and how those roles influence diffusion. In other words, this chapter analyses how the absence of potentially present diffusion stimulating institutions may limit the amount of renewable and photovoltaic energy diffusion. We will first look at the three potential roles a government can take and how those roles affect diffusion. We will then look at what role the Dutch government has actually taken. This chapter will only focus on Dutch renewable energy policy. Dutch (general) energy policy will not be discussed in this chapter. Particular segment of Dutch energy policy will be discussed in chapter four and five, but only when these segments influence the actions of corporations or consumers relating to renewable energy. 3.2.
Potential Roles of the Government in Renewable Energy In this section we will analyse how the three main roles governments can take
in renewable energy can take specific forms and how these forms may influence photovoltaic and renewable energy diffusion. We will discuss the government monopoly role, market-structuring role and the market participation role. Monopoly refers to a situation in which the government doesn’t use markets to reach goals in renewable energy diffusion. The market structuring role sees the government as the actor that creates the conditions under which a government functions, thus being able to create favourable conditions for renewable energy diffusion. In the market participation role renewable energy diffusion goals are achieved by free market mechanisms. The government only participates in the market by creating demand and granting subsidies 48
3.2.1. Government Monopoly
As stated above, government monopoly refers to a role taken by the government in which it doesn’t rely on free market mechanisms to reach certain goals in renewable energy diffusion. The government monopoly role can be practiced in a number of different ways. The first one is an absolute monopoly, as discussed in section 1.2.2. in this case a government just nationalises all of the energy sector and dictates a certain percentage of energy production to come from renewable energy. This form is highly undesirable because it generally generates a lot of market inefficiencies. The second form is government ownership of energy companies. In this form the government allows different companies to compete in the energy sector, thus avoiding market inefficiencies, national and local governments are, however, the major shareholders in energy companies and can therefore demand from CEO’s running these companies that they act in the public interest and they can therefore demand an certain percentage of renewable energy production. Interestingly enough this form of monopoly was standard practice in the Dutch energy sector until 2008 (Kunneke & Fens 2007). Local governments as major shareholders used this position to check if the actions of energy companies were in line with the common interest. To deal with energy scarcity the EU urged the Dutch government to privatise the energy sector, in order to enable mergers in European energy companies which would allow for economies of scale (EU Green Paper 2006). Furthermore EnergieNederland, the lobbying organisation of the Dutch government has often pushed for market liberalisation because this represents one of the few common interests of its diverse members (Interview EnergieNederland 2011). The last form government monopoly can take is one in which a lack of renewable energy production is penalised. This form does not require governments to actually own energy companies, governments can simply legislate that companies will be fined or loose their licences if a certain percentage of renewable energy production isn’t met. A clear example of this is the hybride leveringsverplichting (obligation for hybrid energy supply) for energy supplying companies, that EnergyNederland is currently proposing but hasn’t been turned into actual policy yet (Interview EnergieNederland 2011).
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All these forms of the government monopoly role share the common feature that the government sets a certain level of renewable energy production that energy suppliers and producers have to achieve. The pitfall of depending on government monopoly for renewable and photovoltaic energy diffusion is that governments are elected democratically and therefore depend upon the opinion of the electoral majority for their policies. As we will show in section 5.2.3, the general Dutch population may not be willing to demand energy companies to produce a certain level of renewable energy. They do not see the eminent relevance of renewable energy and believe that high levels of diffusion are currently being attained without government dictates.
3.2.2. Structuring the market
Governments are in every possible scenario involved in structuring the market. There are, however, different ways a government can be involved in structuring the energy market in a way that in beneficial for renewable energy. The Dutch government is currently involved in the most basic way of structuring the energy market. It has basic laws defining the actors and institutions involved in the energy sector and their duties to one another. An important example of this is that Dutch energy suppliers need green energy certificates generated by CertiQ to be legally able to call their electricity green energy. The government furthermore grants licences to energy supplying companies and institutionalised NMa Energiekamer as regulator of the energy market that checks if companies follow the rules laid down in law. The NMa Energiekamer does not have a specific function that deals with the promotion of renewable energy. Apart from this basic way of structuring the energy market, which amounts to creating clarity and which isn’t particularly successful because Dutch energy law is often ambiguous as we will see in sections 5.3 and 5.4, and the Dutch government doesn’t structure the market in a way that is beneficial to the diffusion of renewable energy. It leaves most responsibility for diffusion with corporations and consumers (Interview CertiQ 2011; Interview Agentschap NL 2011; Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011) The German and Belgium governments do structure the market in a way that is beneficial for renewable energy diffusion. Germany does this by legislating a “feed-in Tariff” and Belgium by creating an artificial shortage on the Green energy certificate market. Germany introduced the Stromeinspeisegesetz in 1991 and expended this 50
policy measure with the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz in 2000. Both of these laws forced energy supplying companies to buy renewable energy for a fixed price. These prices would annually be set, would match the costs of production spread over 20 years and would be granted for the next coming years for producers who started production in that year. This created a reliable market for renewable energy producers, removed endless individual bargaining with supplier companies and gave them the ability to make stable financial plans for the next twenty years. It also made it interesting for individual households with solar panels to feed back electricity into the grid. This feeding back would be repaid with the fix tariff, rather than the average price for conventional energy. This scenario is in contrast with the Netherlands, in which renewable energy producers have to individually negotiate a price for their renewable energy that needs to be competitive with conventional energy and have a hard time making long term financial plans because of energy prices which change annually (Bechberger & Reiche 2004; Interview Peter Segaar 2011). In Belgium renewable energy diffusion is stimulated by creating an artificial shortage of green energy certificates. Belgium has closed of its green energy certificate market from the import of foreign certificates. Unlike the Netherlands where a market mechanism determine the price of green energy certificates, In Belgium the CREG (Belgian Regulator electricity and natural gas) sets the prices of energy certificates, a price that producers will receive for the following twenty of fifteen years. This price is determined on the difference between the actual level of renewable energy diffusion and the target level of renewable energy diffusion in 2020. the price for these certificates is indirectly paid by the average Belgian consumer. As the level of renewable energy diffusion in Belgium rises, the prices for certificates fall. Figure 3.1. shows us how prices for renewable energy are expected to fall over the coming years. The prices for Belgian energy certificates are remarkably high compared to Dutch prices. In the Dutch free market mechanism the price for an one MWH green energy certificate is about forty Euros, while in Belgian certificates fetch the currently fetch the price of 330 Euros for a comparable certificate. This higher price stimulates people to buy solar panels or companies to produce renewable energy and therefore explains, in part, the difference in photovoltaic energy diffusion between the Netherlands and Belgium. The Netherlands does not create an artificial shortage of renewable energy certificates and let free market mechanism determine the level of renewable energy diffusion (Creg.be; Interview Peter Segaar 2011). 51
3.2.3. Participating in the market
The last role, which is mostly practised by the Dutch government is one in which the government participates in the market for renewable energy. This participation might be by subsidising renewable energy production, by purchasing renewable energy itself and by creating awareness. The Dutch government has had several subsidy mechanisms as will be discussed in paragraph 3.3. Furthermore the Dutch government subsidises several environmental NGOs and often has projects to generate awareness about sustainability. This awareness on sustainability, pitifully, doesn’t focus on renewable energy consumption, but using electricity more conscientious and efficient (Interview Agentschap NL 2011).
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3.3.
The Specific Role of the Dutch Government
To understand the effects of Dutch government policy on renewable and photovoltaic energy diffusion it is not enough to just focus on the different roles the government could or could not have played. It is important to give an historical overview of what government policy goals have been, what measures were used to achieve them and how those measures effected renewable energy diffusion. That will be the focus of this section. The earliest form of Dutch renewable energy policy started with the third energy white paper (1995), which stated the policy goal to produce 10% of energy from renewable sources by 2020. Under Cabinet Balkende IV (2007-2010) this was raised to an energy production which was 20% renewable, to have a 20% increase in energy efficiency and 20% CO2 Reduction by 2020. In late 2010 the Dutch government reversed its policy to 14% production from renewable sources, which still conforms to the EU 2007 guidelines. Alongside this was the liberalisation of the electricity market and the split between electricity suppliers and distribution network operators, which also follows the EU guideline for the creation of an internal European electricity market. (Interview Agentschap NL 2011). There were a number of policy instruments to attain this policy goal, whether it was 10%, 20% or 14%. These policy measures include the liberalisation of the energy market in 2008, the publications of green energy certificates, tax breaks and subsidies. From 1995 to 2003 government subsidies were mainly available for making houses more energy efficient. Furthermore the government gave out and still gives out the EOS-subsidy, a subsidy for research concerning renewable energy technology. Furthermore there was a tax-break in the energy tax allowing companies to sell renewable energy at about the same price as conventional energy. This tax break was ended due to the rapid growth in green energy consumers, which often had been supplied by untaxed foreign renewable energy, because of a lack of Dutch renewable energy capacity (Verbong & Geels 2006: 1032). In 2001 Groenstroomcertificaten BV, (later Certiq) was created to grant green energy certificates to producers of green energy to guarantee the origin of energy and create a reliable energy market in the Netherlands. Belgium’s policy was similar, but they restricted the green energy market to domestic green energy, and thus were able to stimulate green energy by creating an artificial shortage of certificates. This 53
Belgian shortage stimulated the Belgian diffusion of renewable energy. This will be analysed more deeply in section 3.4. In 2003 the EPR (Energiepremieregeling) was introduced, which was a subsidy for energy efficiency and solar panel installations, which was financed by a specific government budget,. This budget was heavily overrun by the amount of applications and in 2003 the number of renewable energy installations doubled. This meant the end of the EPR in October of the same year. In late 2003 it would be replaced by the MEP (milieukwaliteit elektriciteitproductie) regulation, which aimed at financing the unprofitable upper margin of renewable energy production. It was financed by charging every household a standard fee for grid connection, which would together compose the MEP budget. The MEP, unlike the EPR, annually fixed a subsidy for particular types of energy generations based on the cost of generations and similar to the German feed-in tariff, this subsidy would be paid from the MEP budget. The generation from renewable energy rose so significantly that it cost more than the MEP Budget could provide for. In 2006 the government decided to axe the MEP regulation. From 2006 to 2008 there were no new government subsidies for renewable energy. In 2008 the SDE (stimulering duurzame energie) subsidy was introduced. Like the MEP it was aimed at financing the unprofitable upper margin. It was not financed by the consumer but by the government and had a limitation on the number of applications it was able to accept. In 2008 it was not open to corporations, only to individual citizens who wanted to generate their own energy with a windmill or solar panels. In that year the SDE went over budget but served 100% of its applicants, in 2009 it severed 50% of its civil applicants and one out of thirty corporate applicants, in 2010 it severed 25% of its civil applicants and one out of 260 corporate applicants. In 2011 it was axed, and waits to be replaced by the SDE+ subsidy, which only focuses on financing new high capacity renewable energy installations (Job Swens 2011). In 2008 the Dutch energy market was liberalised, a process that had been in preparation since 2006. Electricity companies were split between electricity suppliers and distribution network operators. This broke the natural monopoly that the biggest energy companies in the Netherlands: Nuon, Essent, Delta and Eneco had in certain regions and allowed new electricity supplying companies to enter the market. This was done to increase competition, thereby sparking innovation in the Energy sector. It
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would also allow big international energy companies to enter the Dutch market, therefore creating an internal European energy market (Kunneke & Fens 2007).
To determine the value of these policies for renewable energy diffusion we must look back at section 2.3.3. We will find figure 2.16 shows us the development of renewable energy as a percentage of total energy generation. We see that up to 2003, before real subsidies for the generation of renewable energy were available, there was only a very moderate amount of diffusion of renewable energy, about three per cent of total electricity generation. This is best explained by the number of hydro-electricity facilities in the Netherlands which have remained rather stable over the years and small prestige projects with renewable energy. In 2004 we see an enormous spike in generation, from about 3 per cent of generation to about 4.5 per cent. This can best be explained by the introduction of the EPR subsidy - even though the biggest amount of EPR subsidy went to housing isolation. We see another spike in 2005 and 2006, up to 6 and 6,5 per cent of production, most likely at the grace of the MEP regulation. In 2007, with the end of the MEP regulation we see a dip back to 6 per cent, which can either be explained by the closing down of now unprofitable green energy generation facilities or by a rise in generic electricity generation which was not met by a rise in green energy generation. This dip can in either case be explained by the removal of the MEP regulation. In 2008 and 2009, with the introduction of the SDE subsidy the renewable energy percentage of electricity grew to 7,5 and 9 per cent. 3.4.
Conclusion This chapter analysed which actions governments might take to stimulate the
diffusion of renewable and photovoltaic energy. We classified three roles a government could take. In the government monopoly role we saw that governments set standards, but these standards are ultimately dependent upon the willingness of the electoral majority. In the market structuring role we saw that the Dutch government only did the very basics of structuring a market, unlike Germany and Belgium which structured the market in a beneficial way for renewable energy diffusion. We saw that the Dutch government mostly practiced the market participation role. In this role it created awareness for sustainability, introduced ever-shifting subsidy mechanisms and liberalised the energy market to create more potential for competition. 55
Chapter 4
Corporate Social Responsibility and
Renewable Energy Diffusion 4.1.
Introduction
In the last chapter we examined the current energy situation to understand current and future energy scarcity. If we follow the assumption that energy scarcity is undesirable, and thus needs to be dealt with, we will arrive at the question of which actors can take responsibility in creating a more diverse energy mix and an optimal diffusion of different types of energy. As discussed in section 1.2.2, the main actors that can take responsibility for a more diverse energy mix are corporations and consumers. It should be mentioned that governments do play an active role in shaping the markets in which these corporations and consumers act and in shaping the incentives in these markets for corporations and consumers to take responsibility. They, nevertheless, leave the largest chunk of responsibility with consumers and corporations. Therefore corporations will be the focus of this chapter and consumers the focus of the next chapter. This chapter seeks to answer the question “which barriers to renewable and photovoltaic energy diffusion corporations face”. It will both focus on why new producers of renewable energy have barriers while entering the electricity market and what keeps incumbents from investing in photovoltaic energy. To describe the barriers corporations face we will first give a description of how the Dutch electricity market functions and which actors are involved. We will also see how this puts renewable energy producers at a strategic disadvantage. We will then have a look at how government regulations influence the profitability of renewable energy and the incentives to invest in renewable energy. Finally we will evaluate the ways in which renewable and photovoltaic energy may be profitable to entering and incumbent companies. In this paragraph photovoltaic energy is generally regarded as just another form of renewable energy, which means that lines of argumentation about renewable energy in general will also be taken to apply to photovoltaic energy in particular.
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4.2.
The Dutch Electricity Market
In this section we will firstly discuss which actors are active in the Dutch energy market and how they relate to one another. We will then discuss how this structure might make it harder for new entrants on the Dutch energy market. The Dutch electricity market is a closed market which knows three major players: Distribution network operators (DNOs), Electricity suppliers and Electricity producers. Minor players, who are only indirectly involved, such as consumers, upstream fuel suppliers, such as Shell and producers of electricity generating equipment, will not explicitly be discussed.
4.2.1. Distribution Network Operators
DNOs maintain and operate the electricity grid. Grid-maintenance entails connecting houses to the energy grid, to which a DNO is legally obligated and matching electricity supply with electricity demand. The Dutch high voltage grid is maintained by the Tennet, a government owned organisation that is known as the national “programmaverantwoordelijke (PV)”. If one supplier is supplying more electricity to consumers than it is receiving from its contracted producers, this might create a temporary mismatch in the grid, meaning that the grid won’t be able to deliver the standard voltage to Amperage ratios. As the national PV, Tennet has the ability to temporarily raise electricity prices, which will make using excess production capacity for some suppliers interesting, thus solving the temporary mismatch and restoring voltage to amperage ratios. The costs of this operation are then charged to the supplier that was supplying more energy than it was receiving. (Interview Agentschap NL 2011) Apart from the national high voltage grid, there are regional low voltage grids, maintained by local distribution network operators, shown in figure 41. Regional DNOs have a natural monopoly in their region, which means that consumers do not have the ability to switch between DNOs. About 86 per cent of all grid connections are maintained by the three biggest DNOs, Liander, Enexis and Stedin, which used to be connected to the three biggest suppliers, Nuon, Essent and Eneco respectively, but have been separated in 2007 to make competition on price in the electricity market possible. (NMa Energie Kamer Monitor Kleinverbruikersmarkten 2009) 57
4.2.2. Electricity Suppliers
Electricity suppliers are organisations that buy electricity from producers and sell it to consumers using the energy grid. It is, of course, impossible to track where a certain bit of electricity came from and where it ended up which means that suppliers generally do not supply electricity to consumers themselves, but rather supply to the grid and have to account for the fact that the consumption of their contracted consumers equals the amount of energy of their contracted producers. To accomplish this each supplier is legally required to have its own PV which matches internal supply to demand. Becoming an Energy Supplier is not open to any company, but requires a licence from the “Directie toezicht Energie”, which is the “NMa Energiekamer”. This is a government agency which checks the legality of the activities of all actors in the Dutch energy sector. Licences recognise suppliers as entities that are PVs, and thus allow suppliers to decide which actors are allowed to add or extract energy from the grid. Some electricity suppliers function without a licence. This is possible because they are either daughter organisations of a supplier that has a licence and therefore don’t have a PV, or because they are a consumer collective which buys electricity in bulk from a supplier, which means they don’t have a PV either. Licences are only 58
granted when potential suppliers show sufficient financial, organisational and technical capabilities (Staatsblad 2003 207; Interview Agentschap NL 2011). In 2009 the Netherlands had 32 Electricity Supplying companies with a licence, of which the three biggest companies Nuon, Essent and Eneco combined held 80 per cent of the market share as shown in figure 4.2 (NMa energiekamer Monitor kleinverbruikersmarkten 2009: 31-33).
4.2.3. Electricity Producers
Electricity producers are organisations that operate electricity generating installations and supply that electricity to the grid. Producers only supply energy to the grid when they have the consent of a PV. In the Netherlands there are corporations which produce energy in large scale without being clearly bound to one supplier, such as Intergen, which has a generating capacity of 1245 MW. Intergen gets access to the grid directly from the PV of Tennet, because it is able to generate electricity in a large scale, which makes it easy for Tennet to account for its effect on the balance between 59
supply and demand. Installations with smaller capacities, such as wind parks or hydro-plans will not gain access from Tennet and will need the fiat of the PV at an Energy supplier. Originally, following the 1989 Energy law, suppliers and producers were not supposed to be part of the same corporations. This separation was supposed to enable competition amongst producers, hence creating incentives for more efficient generations of energy. Unfortunately the 1989 Energy Law still had a clause that allowed suppliers to own small energy facilities, to enable them to generate extra electricity in times of peak demand. Suppliers abused this clause to set up joint ventures, which in practice allowed them to own most of the production capacity they used. There are some independent energy producing companies but most producers are a part of energy supplying companies (Interview Agentschap NL 2011; Verbong & Geels 2007: 1029-1030). In 2009 there were 167 electricity producers active in the electricity market. 55 per cent of these producers generated electricity from renewable sources, as shown in figure 4.3. This is not to say that 55 per cent of all Dutch electricity comes from renewable soruces. A wind park, existing out of two windmills, produces four to six MW. That park is counted as one producer. A nuclear power plant is, however, also counted as one producer, even though it has a far higher capacity. The Dutch nuclear plantin Borssele, for example, produces four hundred and eighty MW. (NMA energiekamer Monitor kleinverbruikersmarkten 2009: 33) Most of the generating capacity is owned by the larger suppliers. In 2008 the total Dutch electricity generating capacity was about 18,7 GW. Electrabel owns 25% of the generating capacity, which accounts to 4647 MW. Eneco only owns 4 percent which has a capacity of 805 Mw. Nuon has a capacity of 3.123 which accounts to 17% of the national capacity and Essent has a capacity of 5143 Mw, which is 28 % of the national capacity. This means that only 26% of production is either owned by a minor supplier or not structurally independent of suppliers. There is therefore no real competition in the generation of electricity (NMa Energiekamer Monitor Groothandelsmarkten 2009: 59).
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4.2.4. The strategic disadvantage for renewable energy in this market framework
The above described market framework limits the diffusion of renewable energy. The diffusion of renewable energy always has to do with the production of electricity from renewable sources. Actors who would like to generate renewable energy can either become electricity producers, or take the combined role of producer and supplier. This latter case is unlikely because it enormously increases the workload of the actor. In addition to his normal duties as supplier he would also have to take responsibility of attaining enough technical, financial and organisational competencies to function as a supplier and he would have to secure enough consumers to match his expected production, which would be a lot of work. The administrational load of completing a business plan from this combined role does not weigh up against the initial disadvantages of dependency on an incumbent supplier. A renewable energy producer also runs into structural problems. Firstly he runs into the problems of gaining an M.E.R. licence, which details the effects the construction of an electricity generating installation will have on the local environment and the surrounding region. M.E.R. licences can be used by city councils to deny the constructions of windmill parks, because the local population finds windmills ugly. Furthermore, Governments have usually dedicated particular plots of land in cities and rural areas to particular sectors. There are for example agricultural regions, industrial regions, wildlife regions. Often local governments might deny the construction of renewable energy generating facilities, because the planned location is 61
dedicated to a particular sector that is not reconcilable with the generation of energy. The designation of specific areas is a particular barrier to big solar energy installations. Unlike windmills, solar energy installations cannot be installed on top of land that might at the same time be used for other activities, such as grazing or growing crops. Therefore the Netherlands only has two big photovoltaic energy plants, one is Ecopark Waalwijk with a capacity of 700 KWp, the other is the Floriade building in Vijfhuizen, which has a capacity of 2,3 MWp. (Interview Peter Segaar 2011, Interview Agentschap NL 2011) Secondly, producers run into the problem of their dependency on suppliers. Without the consent of a PV at a supplier, producers will not gain access to the grid and will therefore be unable to exploit their investment in a renewable energy generation installation. Producers can deal with two different types of suppliers. There are the suppliers with a large market share who generally own their own production facilities, Eneco is an remarkable exception, or the smaller suppliers who do not. Bigger suppliers have a vested interest in getting the most revenue out of their own conventional plants. This means that suppliers won’t buy renewable energy from a producer as this could mean limiting the amount of energy they are allowed to produce with their own conventional plants. Smaller suppliers face the problem that they only have a limited amount of consumers. They also experience a relatively higher danger of customers switching suppliers than the big supplying companies do. Because supply and demand of energy has to be matched by their PV, smaller suppliers are not able to invest in the construction of new renewable plants, because this might create a mismatch between their supply and demand. Especially when a number of customers have the potential to leave this supplier, it is wiser to buy conventional electricity from various sources in varying amounts than to buy a fixed amount of renewable energy from one fixed source. A third set of problems, on which the rest of this chapter will elaborate, are the conditions under which the purchase of renewable energy by suppliers is likely. The first condition would be that the renewable energy could be sold to the supplier for the same cost as conventional energy. This is the case for all the renewable energy plants that receive government subsidy. As noted in section 3.3, the numbers of subsidies that were granted are limited. Therefore the diffusion of renewable energy, under the conditions of comparable price, is limited to the amount of subsidies that were granted. Furthermore, there is a high level of uncertainty in the granting of subsidies 62
which may have negative effects on renewable energy diffusion. This will further be discussed in section 4.3.1. and section 4.3.2. A second condition for purchase might be serving a market segment that consists of consumers who are willing to pay more for renewable energy. In this case renewable energy could be sold at the actual price of production, thus surpassing the barrier that was created by the limited amount of subsidy. Unfortunately the current market in green electricity is inefficient. Consumers expend about forty euros per MWH extra, that is about one hundred and forty euros for the average 3.5 MWH consuming family annually. This price does not cover the difference in cost between renewable energy and conventional energy which thereby discourages the diffusion of renewable energy. This will be further examined in sections 4.3.3, 4.4 and 5.2. The last condition for purchase is gaining the prestige of being the greenest and the internal motivations corporations might have to be green. The supplier Greenchoice has a marketing campaign that characterises it as 100% green, and Eneco proudly became supplier with the biggest renewable energy generating capacity in 2006. Prestige in itself, unfortunately, isn’t enough reason to invest in green energy. Currently corporations can gain the prestige of being green by either buying energy from subsidised installations or by abusing an inefficient market in green energy certificates. Prestige is therefore not a predictable or stable ground for renewable energy diffusion. One would expect NGOs to pressure suppliers to take more environmentally friendly action. After many futile efforts of trying to convince governments and corporations, NGOs are now directing their energy towards consumers - trying to inform them and trying to make environmentally friendly purchases such as solar panels more affordable (Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011). 4.3
Dutch Policy and Regulations
In this section we will examine the effects of policy measures on the diffusion of renewable energy diffusion. We will first discus the effects of the frequent shift in subsidy mechanisms on the willingness to invest. We will then specifically look at the negative effects of the SDE on the ability to build a financial plan for the construction of a renewable energy installation and lastly we will look at why the Dutch green energy certificate market is inefficient. 63
4.3.1. Shifts in policy
The Netherlands have seen a high level of volatility in the subsidy mechanism for renewable energy production, as we discussed in section 2.3.4. We went from a tax break between 1995 and 2003 to EPR in 2003, to MEP 2003 to 2006, then there was a void of subsidy mechanisms between 2006 and 2008, followed by an evershifting and more lottery-like SDE from 2008 to 2010, only to finally arrive at the in 2011 SDE+, which only granted subsidy to high capacity renewable energy installations. All these policies had a difference in the way they were financed, the level of subsidy one received and the access a potential producer had to these subsidies (Interview Job Swens 2011). This volatility has deterred many potential producers from taking the initiative of actually attempting to construct a new renewable energy generating installation (Interview Peter Segaar 2011). A high level of volatility in subsidy mechanisms means that it is harder for potential producers to understand what the current subsidy mechanism is, understand how profitable it is and it undermines the confidence that the subsidy mechanism will still be around once the potential producer starts to make a business plan. Subsidy mechanisms can be so complex that only specialised lawyers know how to attain them, which explains why most renewable installations are owned by big supplying companies with their own lawyers. Furthermore it undermines the producer’s confidence in the ability to generate the necessary returns on their investments. Producers are therefore less willing to invest, which means that many potential producers have not even bothered with attempting to get a subsidy. Secondly, many potential producers who did attempt to get a subsidy but did not receive it stopped trying to become a producer (Interview Peter Segaar 2011). If some producers receive subsidy and can therefore produce at prices comparable to those of conventional energy, then it is producers that do not receive a subsidy and therefore cannot produce at prices comparable to those of conventional energy that are uncompetitive. This means that they will not be likely to sell their energy and therefore make no returns on their investments. Most likely they will not even be able to find a PV that is willing to allow them access to the energy grid to supply their energy. Municipal and Provincial subsidies have similar limitations on the number of granted subsidies, making them lottery-like, and are often only available for limited 64
amounts of time. They therefore create a similar level of uncertainty with producers. In short, a high volatility in subsidy policy simply breaks the willingness of potential producers to take a risk and make a renewable energy generating installation work. The absence of that willingness is the true barrier to diffusion.
4.3.2. The SDE Mechanism
The specific mechanism of SDE subsidy was also problematic. Apart from the fact that subsidy mechanisms make non-subsidized production less competitive and thus limits diffusion to the amount of subsidies granted, the SDE subsidy made it hard to make investments in renewable energy generation profitable. The SDE subsidy was the product of years of trying to minimise the budget for subsidies, while actually having a subsidy mechanism. This SDE subsidy thus had a mechanism that gave accepted producers an advance on their subsidy in the beginning of the year. The actual subsidy is calculated by Dutch ministry of economic affairs. It first calculates a basic tariff based on your costs divided over 15 years. They then calculate an “average” electricity price for that year. This average is controversial, because prices in the electricity market are not shaped according to a standard bell curve but show high levels of fluctuation. Prices depend heavily upon the specific supplier. The three biggest suppliers are cheaper than an exclusively green supplier, such as Greenchoice, but far more expensive than a supplier that buys cheap electricity internationally and competes on price, such as De Nederlandse Energiemaatschappij. Nonetheless, this average, which may be above or below the price the supplier paid the producer for the generated electricity, is then subtracted from the basic tariff, as well as other potential sources of income. At the end of the year when the ministry publishes the average price for that year, the actual subsidy is calculated and producers have to either return the excess of their advance or will receive the difference between their advance and the subsidy. This creates a high level of uncertainty about the subsidy producers will receive, unlike the German feed in tariff, in which producers know the exact price for their electricity at the beginning of the year (Interview Peter Segaar 2011).
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The problem is that producers who would receive subsidy now have a hard time accounting for the returns they will receive on their investments, they only know the level of subsidy they will receive after all the costs have been made and the year is done. Another problem is that the “average” electricity price has become more volatile over the years because the price of fossil fuels has become more volatile as shown in figure 4.4. This makes accounting even more difficult, because it makes the basic tariff unpredictable. This high level financial planning makes it hard even for most accepted companies to make production profitable and therefore is a barrier to diffusion. In times of high price volatility within conventional energy it is not particularly wise to tie the subsidy for its alternative, renewable energy, to this volatile price.
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4.3.3. The Inefficient Green Energy Certificate Market
The Dutch green energy certificate market is inefficient. This is a barrier to diffusion because green energy certificates are the means that could make unsubsidised renewable energy generation competitive. Green energy certificates, or more specifically “guarantees of origin” (GvOs), are the only legal ground on which suppliers are allowed to call a percentage of the electricity they supply green. GvOs are assigned by CertiQ, the Dutch energy certificate organisation, to producers on the basis of the data received from DNOs, when they produce solar, wind, hydro or biomass energy. Producers do not receive these certificates. Certificates must be voluntarily given to a dealer in certificates. Usually these dealers are energy supplying companies. Trade between dealers to gain the desired amount of green energy certificates is possible (Interview CertiQ 2011). In an efficient green energy certificate market, there would only be as many GvOs as there is renewable electricity generated. Consumer demand for the green energy and thus for the limited amount of GvOs would raise the price of GvOs to one that would equal the difference between conventional energy and renewable energy generation cost. This would make it profitable for supplying companies to invest in renewable energy, in order to obtain more certificates and either serve their own demand or sell the certificates to other suppliers. When GvOs are in short supply because not enough renewable energy is generated, the price of these certificates would be above the price difference of renewable energy generation and suppliers would have a lot of incentives to invest in renewable energy. The market is, unfortunately, inefficient. In section 5.2.1, we will discuss how demand for green energy might be suboptimal, in this section we will look at how supply is suboptimal. The biggest threat to market efficiency is the ability of certificate dealers to import certificates from foreign renewable energy producers. More than half of all GvOs in the Netherlands are imported as shown in figure 4.5. The Blue line indicates the amount of imported certificates, the green line the domestically generated certificates and the red line the total number of certificates in the Netherlands. Theoretically this may seem acceptable. If a German producer produces renewable energy and wants to sell this on the Dutch market for the price it would cost him to produce renewable energy this would be a legitimate action. As Renewable electricity would only be consumed once, the location of its production is 67
irrelevant. If this German producer would be cheaper, theoretically speaking, then he is a more efficient producer and his competition will give Dutch renewable producers an incentive to produce more efficiently. In short, certificate import assumes no difference between German and Dutch renewable energy (Interview CertiQ 2011). Unfortunately there is a significant difference between foreign and domestic renewable energy. Countries like Norway, Italy, France, Spain and Germany have large hydro-electric plants, with which the Netherlands cannot compete because the Netherlands does not have mountains (European Energy Portal). Apart from that, many of these countries just like the Netherlands don’t have a functioning certificate market. In the case of Norway, our biggest source of certificates according to figure 4.6, this is because almost all electricity is generated by hydro-power, which means that the population by default assumes that their energy is green. Countries without a functioning certificate market can therefore print certificates for which there is no domestic demand. These certificates are then sold to Dutch certificate dealers for about 40 Euros per MWH and thus flood the Dutch certificate market, driving down the price of green energy (Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011; Interview CertiQ 2011).
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It is important to note that renewable energy in this case is doubly accounted for. Norwegian people assume they consume renewable energy because they generate renewable energy. Dutch people assume they consume renewable energy because they now own the certificates, without which the Norwegian people are theoretically consuming conventional energy. Renewable energy is thus consumed twice, once factually in Norway, and once theoretically in the Netherlands. This means Dutch consumers of green energy are currently not consuming green energy, they are paying for conventional energy that through loopholes in the system undeservedly is named green energy. The low price of imported certificates means that Dutch electricity suppliers can deliver using the label of green electricity, even though the greenness of this electricity might practically already have been consumed by Norwegian consumers. It thus allows suppliers to undeservingly call conventional energy green energy. This limits the size of actual renewable energy generation. The Dutch certificate market, in short, is inefficient because it is flooded by cheap foreign certificates, which don’t reliably represent renewable energy. This means that the price of GvOs does not match the costs of renewable energy production, thus limiting renewable energy diffusion. But what if imported certificates did not exist? Would the price then match the cost of renewable energy production? We would like to concede that certificates, in a situation without foreign certificates, would have prices closer to their actual value. Two obstacles remain. The first is renewable energy generation from biomass. In the current situation about 51 per cent of the renewable energy in the Netherlands is generated from biomass, as shown in Figure 2.15. This energy generated from biomass might be renewable, but it currently 69
isn’t sustainable. Currently, within the Netherlands there are no Biomass-only power plants, which means that the capacity of renewable energy generated by biomass is created by adding a certain percentage of biomass to the amount of coal burned in coal plants. Coal plants are by definition a way of producing conventional unsustainable energy. As long as there are no biomass specific plants, biomass should not receive certificates, because mixed plants are not a sustainable solution. Mixed plants would also keep the price of green energy certificates undesirably low (Interview Peter Segaar 2011). The other obstacle is subsidised installations, which can produce at prices comparable to conventional energy and therefore would drive the prices of certificates down. 4.4
The Profitability of Renewable Energy
In this section we will discuss how renewable energy in particular is currently an uncompetitive alternative for conventional energy. In this section we will not account for Dutch energy tax, because that tax applies to all forms of corporately sold electricity. The cost of producing one MWH from conventional energy sources is 3050 Euros. A popular renewable energy source is co-firing biomass in coal plants. While the coast of coal firing is 900 Euros per KW, the additional cost of biomass firing is 50-300 euros. Co-firing does not create extra capacity, but only displaces coal as a source, which means that the costs should be seen as additional, rather than as 70
replacing the price of coal (Baxter 2005: 1296). Costs for Biomass per MWH renewable energy lie between 32 and 67 Euros. It must be noted that the costs of generating energy in biomass-only plants are significantly higher. Costs for wind power in medium wind zones such as the Netherlands is between 70 and 60 Euros per MWH for the cheaper turbines and 90 and 75 Euros for the more expensive turbines, as shown in figure 4.7 (wind-energy-the-facts.org). Photovoltaic energy has of late dropped enormously in price as shown in figure 4.8. Currently the price per MWH for photovoltaic energy is still about 250 Euros for the sunniest locations, around the equator or in North Africa and the price is still high for the Netherlands. Photovoltaic energy is therefore highly uncompetitive with other sources or renewable energy, let alone conventional energy (Solarbuzz.com). Hydro-electric power differs widely in
price as in high capacity it has lower prices than conventional energy. A big limitation to competitive hydro-electric power is that one needs big water reservoirs, the types of which can best be created in mountainous areas. Location thus limits the diffusion of competitive hydro-electric power. Renewable energy is generally speaking uncompetitive with conventional energy. In the past chapter we analysed how the Netherlands has a restrictive set of subsidy mechanisms and how the green energy certificate market is inefficient, therefore robbing potential renewable energy producers of the ability to be competitive and limiting the diffusion of renewable energy. 71
4.5.
Conclusion
In this chapter we set out to examine what keeps incumbent suppliers from purchasing renewable energy and new producers from producing renewable energy. We saw that renewable energy is generally not competitive. We further saw that there is a high level of dependence new producers will have on suppliers which limits their ability to sell energy. This is because small suppliers are problematic customers due to their small and volatile clientele and big suppliers usually own their own conventional energy production facilities and dislike to cannibalise their own production. We also saw that a lot of shifts in subsidy mechanisms confused producers and required them to develop inhuman feats of financial planning. It also limited the amount of competitive renewable energy to the limited number of subsidies that were granted. Lastly we saw that the green energy certificate market was inefficient. On the demand side consumers held the unreliable perception that renewable energy is mainly linked to the environment, creating uncertain demand. On the supply side we saw that unjustly cheap international certificates flooded the market. This inefficient certificate market hinders the ability to produce unsubsidised renewable energy and sell it to a market segment of consumers who desire renewable energy. The fact that unsubsidised renewable energy is uncompetitive bars new producers from producing renewable energy and stops suppliers from having a demand for renewable energy.
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Chapter 5 Consumer Social Responsibility and Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion 5.1.
Introduction In this chapter we will examine consumer social responsibility in dealing with
energy scarcity and other reasons to purchase solar panels. This chapter will focus on photovoltaic energy diffusion. There are other renewable sources of energy which individuals might use to generate energy themselves, such as windmills and small hydro-electric generators. These options are, however, only available to the minority of consumers. Not everyone has the good fortune of living next to a river or a stream, which is necessary for a hydro-electric generator, and not everyone lives in an area where they have the space and the wind speed to build a windmill. Nearly every house has a rooftop on which solar panels can be placed, which means photovoltaic energy is available to most electricity consumers. Apart from this practical consideration, there are several more reasons why photovoltaic energy takes such a prominent role in this thesis. Privately generated photovoltaic energy might be the only means the average civilian has to ensure himself of enough energy to run his household in a time of energy crisis. In times of energy crisis, where demand for energy outweighs supply of energy by far, corporately generated energy will most likely be rationed, and priority will most likely be given to energy consumption by industry, thus limiting the amount available for household consumption. Solar panels create a level of energy independence that can guarantee a sufficient level of individual energy supply for household consumption. The level of energy available for household consumption can greatly influence the standard of living, the chances and the opportunities specific civilians might have. Therefore (private) photovoltaic energy diffusion is an issue that carries more weight than renewable energy diffusion in general. Photovoltaic energy diffusion has also a positive side effect for the Dutch energy situation as a whole. When consumers buy solar panels and start to notice how much energy they generate and how much they consume, they become more aware of their consumption and tend to waste less energy (Interview Peter Segaar 2011). People without solar panels, who do not generate their own energy, usually take energy for granted. The only moment they care about their consumption is when the electricity bill arrives and they generally have a lot of standards to benchmark their 73
consumption on. When people take solar panels, they start to realise energy isn’t a given and has to be generated somewhere. They may also get the feeling that if they consume more energy then they generated, then they are consuming more than is due to them. Henceforth they start to eliminate wasteful consumption, such as leaving television on standby mode. Higher levels of photovoltaic energy diffusion would thus not only raise the amount of renewable energy generated, but also bring down the amount of grid energy consumed. The Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS) estimates that there are about twenty thousand people with solar panels in the Netherlands, these estimates are highly questionable and the real number is expected to be more around sixty thousand solar panel installations. People with solar panels fall into two groups: They are young and idealistic people, who want to help the environment; or they are older men who have had a technological education and are interested in the technology. In this chapter we seek to answer the question of what bars consumers from buying solar panels and generating photovoltaic energy. In section 1.2.2 we discussed the origins of consumers taking social responsibility. We stated that consumer social responsibility was expressed by them refraining from purchasing products of lower cost or higher quality to contribute to solving issues that they felt were insufficiently met by their governments. To understand the barriers we should thus see to what extent the perception of government failure to address issues of the environment or energy scarcity are present within the Netherlands or we should examine how the perception of photovoltaic energy profitability is influenced. We will first examine the perceptions that Dutch people have about solar panels and photovoltaic energy. We will then continue to discuss government policy and regulations and how they influence purchasing behaviour. We will then examine how corporations and NGO’s influence the decision to purchase solar panels. Lastly we will discuss how profitable solar panels are to individuals.
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5.2.
Consumer Perceptions
In this section we will examine how current perceptions on solar panels bar the general Dutch population from practicing consumer social responsibility by purchasing solar panels. Furthermore, it will be examined how perceptions, not taking consumer social responsibility taking into account, encourage or discourage the purchase of solar panels. Lastly we will examine perceptions on renewable energy in general and how those perceptions may block the purchase of solar panels. For this thesis a survey was conducted within 197 Dutch train commuters, bar visitors or students. These respondents were presented with twelve questions about solar panels based on the Brandz model, discussed in section 1.2.4. This model has five elements: Presence, Relevance, Performance, Advantage and Bonding. The complete structure and evaluation of this survey, as well as an evaluation of the ability to infer the findings of this survey to the Dutch population in general, can be seen in Appendix VII of this thesis. The survey was designed to measure whether or not the general dutch population felt a consumer social responsibility to purchase solar panels. Consumer social responsibility finds it basis in the perception that governments insufficiently address a certain problem in society. In our survey we did not measure the perception of insufficient government action directly. Such questions did not fit into the Brandz model framework and any such question, when concerning environmental or energy problems, could not be specific and clear without being leading. The statement “I believe the government does enough to secure supply of energy” is just as much leading up to a positive answer as the statement “I believe the government doesn’t do enough to ensure diffusion of renewable energy” is leading up to a negative statement. Therefore we refrained from questions that directly measure satisfaction with government action. The questions we did ask followed the four elements of the Brandz model. The first question was on presence and showed us that the Dutch population in general knows that solar panels can be used to generate electricity. After that every element had three categories, directly following on from the second element of relevance. These categories indicate why solar panels might be relevant to people. These categories were: The environment, energy security and cost reduction. The answers showed that most Dutch people see solar panels as a way to help the environment, a 75
significant amount of people see them as a means of creating energy security, even though a bigger and significant amount of people are neutral on a link between solar panels and energy security. Opinions on price are heavily divided with only a significant amount of people being neutral about seeing solar panels as a means of lowering the electricity bill. The questions on performance indicate that most people believe that solar panels are an effective way to help the environment, and an ineffective way to generate electricity at low prices. Most people were neutral on the effectiveness to create energy security, a smaller yet significant amount believe it effectively secured supply of energy. The questions about advantage indicate whether or not people believe that nothing is more effective to reach one of the goals specified under relevance than solar panels. Most people agreed or heavily agreed that solar panels are the best way to guarantee energy security. People disagreed or were neutral on the claim that solar panels were the best way to save the environment. Two comparable significant amounts of people agreed and disagreed on the claim that solar panels were the best way to reduce the electricity bill. Two additional questions were added, one polling the willingness to purchase solar panels in time of energy crisis, which most people agreed and highly agreed upon. The other polled the sentiment that even without solar panels people feel that they currently do enough to save the environment, which most people agreed and highly agreed upon (Appendix VII).
5.2.1. Consumer Social Responsibility Do the results of this survey confirm or deny the basis for consumer social responsibility in the general Dutch population. The survey questions indicate that most people in the Netherlands do not perceive an insufficiency in government action, even though it might be argued that factually that insufficiency is there. Such perceived insufficiency is the basis for consumers undertaking social responsibility. There are two issues in which there could be a social aspect where government action might be deemed insufficient and consumers thus may take social responsibility: The environment and future energy security. For the first issue, the environment, the survey indicates firstly that solar panels are not seen as the solution of choice for most people to contribute to solving environmental problems. In fact, most people indicate that they believe they already do enough for the environment without having solar panels. In short, people don’t 76
think buying solar panels is the best way to be socially responsible. These attitudes do not encourage social responsibility taking in the form of buying solar panels. Raising more awareness about the environment will not automatically translate to more photovoltaic energy diffusion. To increase diffusion one must demonstrate how buying solar panels might contribute significantly to saving the environment, as well as discrediting misguided ways to contribute to the environment, for example expressing how the green energy certificate market is inefficient, which makes buying green energy an insufficient contribution. If we then turn to the issue of future energy crisis, we see that is can in potential offer a strong foundation for consumer social responsibility taking. This is confirmed by the high level of willingness to purchase solar panels in hypothetical times of energy crisis. However, when we take this attitude in combination with the relatively small amount of agreement on energy security as a relevant goal for solar panels indicates most people don’t see future energy scarcity as an eminent problem which they need to tackle. Future energy scarcity is, however, a genuine issue, as discussed in chapter two, and the Dutch government takes insufficient action to avoid it, as shown in chapter three and four. The general Dutch population is thus unaware of the problem of future energy scarcity. This lack of awareness undermines a possible sentiment under the general Dutch population that the government isn’t doing enough to fight energy scarcity and thus undermines consumers being obliged to take social responsibility. This lack of awareness only applies to the general population. A minority of people might be sufficiently informed and might take social responsibility in tackling future energy scarcity. Raising awareness about energy scarcity will most likely increase the photovoltaic energy diffusion. When we take the attitudes to these two issues in consideration it might be assumed that the perception that renewable energy is all about renewable energy, instead of energy security, limits the willingness to pay the required amount of money for unsubsidised renewable energy and limits renewable energy diffusion. These attitudes are confirmed by the high agreement on relevance in renewability and lower agreement on relevance in energy security. We will discuss this within the dimension of the Brandz model. The Brandz model, as described in section 1.2.4 has five steps. Presence, Relevance, Performance, Advantage and Bonding. Of these steps only relevance and advantage are appropriate to discuss in this section. Relevance in the case of 77
renewable energy is the answer to the question “What does green energy do for me?”. When people link renewable energy to environmental concerns, the answer is consuming renewable energy will reduce CO2 emissions. This means that in an undetermined time in the future there will be a high level of biodiversity, less malaria and hunger in countries around the equator and no rising temperatures or sea levels. While most people find it desirable to accomplish these goals, the direct urgency for an individual himself to invest is lacking and therefore creates a smaller psychological need for that person to actually buy green energy. Were people to link renewable energy to energy security, the answer to the same question would be that renewable energy will guarantee that the fridge will work when oil runs out in the near future. This has a direct benefit for the consumer and therefore makes it more likely that he will invest. It is, nevertheless, understandable that a government wouldn’t want their people to think that energy, the foundation of any economy, was running out. Trust in the economy is one of the most important drivers for economic growth (Zak & Knacks). The Brandz element Advantage in renewable energy diffusion is the answer to the question “Nothing else will contribute as much to saving the environment?” or the question “Nothing else will guarantee energy security in the future? The first answer is no, there are comparable alternatives such as more efficient use of current electricity, Nuclear electricity and CO2 storage underground. More importantly, consumers generally feel that they sufficiently contribute to the environment by doing small things, like buying more energy efficient light bulbs and insulating their houses. Many people who think of themselves as environmentally aware, still leave computers and televisions on standby mode, leave unused appliances plugged in which leaks energy, take unnecessarily long showers, and heat their homes in the winter to temperatures higher than summer time temperatures and leave their heating on while airing (Bartieux :27-29). The answer to the energy security question is that nuclear energy might beat it, but in the end is dependent upon a limited supply of uranium and raises a lot of issues with radioactive waste. Another option would be nuclear fusion, which is a technology that is still in development and therefore cannot be relied upon. Therefore nothing beats renewable energy in creating energy security. Because linking renewable energy to environmental concerns scores bad on relevance and advantage, consumers don’t feel an urgency to purchase green energy and are therefore less willing to pay a higher price. This unwillingness to pay a higher price 78
means that suppliers don’t have a reliable demand, which would generate their returns on investments in renewable energy. They therefore have a diminished incentive to invest in renewable energy. In short the perceived link between renewable energy and the environment is a barrier to the diffusion of renewable energy.
5.2.2. Photovoltaic Energy Perceptions The general Dutch population isn’t sufficiently aware of the problems of future energy scarcity and the environment, which undermines their discontent about insufficient government action on these issues. This means there is no consumer social responsibility within the general population, which limits diffusion. In the rest of the chapter we will evaluate how certain perceptions might harm the other motivations for purchasing solar panels, namely profitability and personal interest. Our survey shows us that most people do not see solar panels as way to reduce the electricity bill and they believe that relative investments in solar panels are currently too high for the returns they generate, although a relevant fraction does agree that it might be an effective way to reduce the electricity bill (Appendix VII). This indicates that the general Dutch population does not believe solar panels are profitable. Whether or not this is true will be discussed in section 5.5. Other reasons why people may refrain from buying solar panels is that they fear the administrative requirements are too confusing and that they believe the technology to be complicated, and in some cases unreliable, this believe about complexity is affirmed by the actions of environmental NGOs and Solar panel installing companies, as will be discussed in section 5.4.2. In actuality the technology is simple and reliable. Lastly people falsely believe that solar panels are integrated in the roof, which makes them believe that investing in solar panels is only profitable if they are not planning to move. In the Netherlands the average family moves every seven years which, under the false believe of an integrated panel, would make purchasing a solar panel unprofitable. In actuality solar panels can be detached from roofs and, about which the general population doesn’t worry, there have been a handful of reported cases in which solar panels actually got stolen (Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011; Interview Peter Segaar 2011 )
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5.2.3. Renewable Energy Perceptions Another factor that limits photovoltaic energy diffusion is the perception of renewable energy diffusion or a distortion of the concept of sustainability. Consumption of renewable grid energy decreases the diffusion of photovoltaic energy, because it involves less hassle than photovoltaic energy consumption. Consumers of photovoltaic energy need to be producers of photovoltaic energy at the same time. The rest of this chapter will not discuss the “photovoltaic energy consumer” because it does not exist. The photovoltaic energy consumer is the photovoltaic energy producer. This section will focus on the perception of renewable energy diffusion as a barrier to photovoltaic energy diffusion. In 2008 39 per cent of the Dutch consumers had contracts with energy suppliers stating that they would like to receive green electricity. In the same year only 7,5 per cent of Dutch electricity was generated from renewable sources. The origin of this absurdity was explained in section 4.3.3, which indicated that the dutch green energy certificate market was inefficient and foreign certificates could cheaply be imported (NMa Energiekamer monitor kleinverbruikersmarkten 2009: 19; Interview Certiq 2011). Over thirty per cent of Dutch consumers believe to be consuming renewable energy and thus believe to be contributing to helping the environment. As analysed in section 4.3.3, this is not the case because the renewable energy these consumers are consuming is actually double consumed, which means that they are paying for renewable energy but are actually consuming conventional energy. A survey by the NMa Energiekamer showed that 33 per cent of the Dutch consumers would be consuming green energy if the price would rise with ten Euros monthly (NMa Energiekamer monitor kleinverbruikersmarkten 2009: 19). This seems to indicate that this Thirty per cent of Dutch consumers might consider purchasing solar panels if suppliers were only allowed to have as many green energy contracts as the amount of renewable energy generated in the Netherlands. Photovoltaic energy, as we will see in section 5.5, is affordable. In short, renewable energy might be promoted vigorously by electricity supplying companies and government, but in the end the majority of green electricity sold is not truly green electricity, this false perception of renewable energy consumptions limits photovoltaic energy diffusion. In section 5.4.1. we will discuss how suppliers similarly distort the concept of sustainability. 80
5.3.
Government Policy and Regulation
In this section we will discuss how shifting subsidy mechanisms, the Dutch green energy certificate market and the process of salderen negatively influences the profitability of solar panels and the willingness of civilians to purchase solar panels. Families with solar panels are in Dutch law regarded as electricity producers. They are in law therefore treated as normal producers, but they have a different relationship to their suppliers.
5.3.1. Shifting subsidy mechanisms
In the Netherlands people are not prone to investing in renewable energy when there is no subsidy available for such investments (Interview Peter Segaar 2011). This behaviour may have two origins. The first is that subsidy may be seen as a signal that the product is unprofitable when it is unsubsidised. The second is that people may already have applied for a subsidy and have been denied a subsidy, or were planning to apply for subsidy but figured out that subsidies will most likely be unavailable to them. In this case people have anticipated on receiving a subsidy or they may feel entitled to a subsidy and have been disappointed by not receiving a subsidy. This disappointment can encourage people to abandon the project altogether, even though the investment might still deliver acceptable returns. In practice we see that both origins of the behaviour may be met by shifts in subsidy mechanisms. People are generally aware that there have been subsidies on solar panels available from the national government, provinces and municipalities. As discussed in Sections 4.3.1 and 3.3, the subsidy mechanisms have shifted heavily over the years and have been very lottery-like, there are also a lot of legal ambiguities which make it harder to actually qualify for a subsidy. This lack of certainty about the availability of subsidies is a barrier for many people to purchase solar panels. Without subsidy Solar Panels are a sizeable investment, for which it is unclear how long it will take for the investment to pay off. Most people feel secure in consuming energy from the grid and therefore don’t feel the need to invest a lot of money in solar panels (Interview Peter Segaar 2011; Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011).
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5.3.2. Green Energy Certificates
In section 4.3.2 we discussed how the current green energy certificate market is inefficient, making it a barrier to renewable energy diffusion in general, but even if it was an efficient market families with solar panels would still not get their due out of green energy certificates. The green energy certificates are not something the general population worries about when purchasing solar panels. It is, nevertheless, something that can profoundly influence the profitability of purchasing solar panels. Families with solar panels are treated by CertiQ as just another producer of renewable energy. This means that they don’t receive green energy certificates themselves but have to voluntarily hand the certificates over to a certificate dealer of choice (Interview CertiQ 2011; Interview Peter Segaar 2011; Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011). Unlike normal electricity producers, who can negotiate over the price they will get for their electricity and may ask to be compensated in price of the value of certificates delivered, families with solar panels are bound to the mechanism of salderen, as discussed in section 5.3.3, which does not include price negotiations. These families are not compensated for the value of their green energy certificates. In the current arrangement they do not only voluntarily give up their certificates, they also give them away for free. If families would receive compensation for their green energy certificates, they would receive four cents per KWH fed back to the energy grid, this would increase the returns of solar panels, and decrease the time it takes to get back the investment on a solar panel. In short, if people were compensated, solar panels would be more profitable and more people would purchase solar panels. It might be argued that energy supplying organisations have the right not to compensate families with solar panels for their certificates, because they are obligated by law to accept the energy that these families feed into the grid. They cannot refuse the supply of this energy and their PV may therefore have a harder time matching supply to demand. We do not believe this is the case. These families are delivering a product, electricity. In any market situation in which it is harder to distribute a product, in this case due to government regulations, the distributer of the product still has to pay the producer when the product is sold to consumers. The distributer might pay the producer a lower price than he pays producers of products that are distributed and sold more easily, but he still owes the producer an honest proportion of the price 82
he got for the product. Suppliers would thus be justified in giving these families a lower price for their certificates than the market price, but they are not justified in not compensating these families at all.
5.3.3. The Mechanism of Salderen
Unlike corporate producers of renewable energy, families with solar panels do not negotiate the price for the electricity they feed back into the grid. This saves the average family a lot of trouble negotiating and makes it impossible for energy supplying companies to reject the energy generated by these families. There is still a mechanism which compensates families for the energy they have fed back into the grid. This mechanism is called salderen. Salderen applies to every person who generates energy without being a corporate energy producer. It applies to people with solar panels as well as people with a windmill who use those windmills mainly for private consumption. The mechanism of salderen has two steps. The first step concerns the first three thousand or five thousand KWH that is fed back into the grid. For this energy the full electricity price of that specific producer, always consisting of both the production cost, energy tax and fixed service costs, has to be paid to the families that feed back energy. This price currently is about 22 cents. Suppliers usually subtract the amount owed to families from the electricity bill. Most photovoltaic energy is produced during the day, fed into the grid, and later during the night energy is consumed from the grid. This supply of photovoltaic energy is subtracted from the consumption of grid energy on the electricity bill. The second step is when families feed back more than the three or five thousand KWH limit. Usually families don’t consume more than this amount of energy and suppliers than have to pay energy supplying families a reasonable compensiation fee, the“terugleververgoeding”. The NMa Energiekamer determines what a reasonable “terugleververgoeding” is, but usually it comes down to the generation price of conventional energy. Most families only have a 1,4 KWP solar panel, which means they only produce between 0,94 and 1,36 MWH per year, let alone feed such amount back. Most solar energy producers don’t surpass the three or five thousand KWH limit (Interview Agentschap NL 2011; Solarbuzz.com).
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In theory the mechanism of Salderen should be a proper compensation mechanism. It only runs into trouble in three key areas. Firstly it is sometimes hard to measure the amount of energy that was fed back into the grid. Secondly the Dutch energy law is often vague and leaves a lot of loopholes for energy suppliers. Lastly there is the problem of double accounting of energy prices. The first problem is that most electricity meters in Dutch households are only designed for feeding energy into the household, and not for feeding energy back into the grid. Many families with solar panels have an old Ferraris meter. This meter doesn’t properly measure the amount of energy that was fed back into the energy grid and therefore makes the process of salderen impossible. DNOs offer meters that can calculate the amount of energy that was fed back into the grid. People do not always know that you have to apply for those meters, and DNOs sometimes ark rather high installation costs for these meters (Interview Peter Segaar 2011; Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011). The second problem is that the law is sometimes unclear. For example the law does not specify whether or not suppliers have to pay photovoltaic energy producing families when they produce more energy than they consume, hence having a zero euro electricity bill, but do not break the three or five thousand KWH limit. Some suppliers do pay in this situation, others do not. There is also a lack of clarity about the amount to pay as some suppliers do not include the energy tax in salderen and get away with it (Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011). Lastly there are problems with double accounting. Currently many Dutch consumers have a double-tariff contract, in which energy is cheaper at night than during the day. Feed-back meters generally do not show which of these tariffs was in place while feeding energy into the grid. This might sound absurd, but the mechanism of salderen does not only apply to solar panels, but to privately owned windmills as well, and night tariffs also apply during the weekends. Suppliers therefore have the ability to either pay back the lowest tariff, an average of the two tariffs or the highest tariff for fed back energy. While this situation is already incredibly complex, many green NGOs fear that with the introduction of the Smart meter, an undefined future meter that measures “everything”, suppliers will start to introduce ever more complex “energy bundles”. Energy bundles are contracts that offer a complex set of tariffs for certain periods of the day that are tailor-made to specific energy consumption patterns. A big family consumes more than a small one does. A household in a big 84
city consumes differently from a household in the countryside. People who only live in their house consume differently from people who also work at home. The smart meter can in all likelihood offer these specific consumers specific energy bundles which reduce their electricity bills. These bundles, however, make it nearly impossible for photovoltaic energy producing households to calculate what amount they are supposed to subtract from their bill according to the mechanism of salderen. Thus making it impossible to determine how profitable a solar panel will be. (Interview Peter Segaar 2011; Niels Schoorlemmer 2011) 5.4. Subpolitics
In this section we will discuss how the conduct of non-government actors may influence and structure the opportunities for photovoltaic energy diffusion. We will first talk about how energy supplying companies try to misrepresent what it means to be sustainable and their relationship to photovoltaic energy producers that do not consume grid energy. We will then turn to the public relations actions of Renewable NGO’s and solar panel installation companies. Finally we will talk about the role of DNOs.
5.4.1. Suppliers
Photovoltaic energy producing households have a very warped relationship with their energy suppliers. They are only allowed to supply their energy to their suppliers, but at the same time their supplier is their direct competitor. When households generate their own electricity, especially when they produce more then they consume, suppliers are unable to sell energy to these households. Suppliers thus have a reason to try and discourage private photovoltaic energy diffusion. The friendly way they discourage private photovoltaic energy diffusion is by misrepresenting the concept of sustainable energy. A proper concept of sustainable energy focuses on eliminating fossil fuels from the electricity generation process. Energy suppliers, however, generate most of their renewable energy by co-firing biofuels in coal power plants. This is not a sustainable option because these plants still need a large proportion of fossil fuels to function. Bio-fuels don’t incinerate in the same way as fossil fuels and would need bio-fuel-only plants to constitute a real 85
contribution to sustainable energy. Co-firing is simply a way of distracting the public from the fact that fossil fuels are still the most prominent source of energy, and still produce a lot of CO2. Co-firing is forbidden in Germany. Similarly suppliers like to use combined heat and power plants and claim that the gains in efficiency in those plants outweighs investment in renewable alternatives such as windmills and solar panels. Heat that used to be dumped directly into the surrounding environment is now sold as heat to households. Suppliers like to present this as a sustainable innovation which would otherwise require a high number of solar panels and windmills. While we applaud the advances in energy efficiency, we do not regard these as sustainable alternatives. Combined heat and power plants rely heavily on fossil fuels and therefore do not constitute a sustainable contribution to the Dutch energy supply (Interview Peter Segaar 2011; Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011) But why is such misrepresentation of sustainability influencing photovoltaic energy diffusion? This misrepresentation undermines the consumer taking social responsibility because it lulls the general Dutch public into the false sense of security that the problems with the environment and energy scarcity, if not dealt with by government, are being dealt with by Dutch energy suppliers. Furthermore, even if consumers stand up and try to take social responsibility, instead of delivering them sustainable green energy it is misleading them with imported certificates and certificates based on co-fired bio-fuels. So far, this has been the friendly way of limiting private photovoltaic energy generation. The less friendly way that has been practiced in the past, but luckily is applied in diminishing amounts, is simply suing private photovoltaic energy generating households that produce more than they consume for fraud. These households show negative meter ratings, which in earlier eras, before renewable energy, would indicate that people would be manipulating the meters, for example by laying magnets on top of the meters to stop them from functioning. It creates a lot of stress for photovoltaic energy generating households to prove that in fact they are not defrauding the suppliers. If people from these households communicate with other people about being sued for fraud, then this propagates the perception that solar panels are not easy and normal, but technologically complex and an administrative maze. This perception will discourage people from purchasing solar panels (Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011).
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5.4.2. NGOs and solar panel installation companies
In general, the work of environmental NGOs is praiseworthy as they are informing the public and trying to make solar panels more accessible to people by reducing the cost. Large scale projects have a public relations risk though. They may generate interest within the Dutch population for solar panels by being prominent in national media, but simultaneously these actions might harm the public opinion if these prominent projects run into difficulties. This happened in the early 2000s with the “Greenpeace Sun Power Actie”, it made solar panels available to the Dutch public for the first time. After a while the technology appeared not to be fully in order. The inverters seemed to be malfunctioning. This confirmed the prejudice that the technology was new and under developed and alienated the general public from solar panels. In 2010 and 2011 there was the project “Wij Willen Zon” which imported enough solar panels for a thousand people from China at reduced cost. It is having a lot of media success, but in the hypothetical case that for some reason Chinese solar panels mismatch with the Dutch electricity household electricity grid, this project will delay the acceptance of solar panels by the general public for a few more years (Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011). Similarly the “Wij Willen Zon” project has cost most solar panel installation companies a lot of potential customers. To express their frustration about this the employees of these companies (usually they are one man companies) have posted very negative comments on the project, and by extension on photovoltaic energy, on online forums specialising in renewable energy. Every Google search about solar panels in Dutch is likely to bring interested consumers to such forums and this might dissuade them from purchasing solar panels (Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011).
5.4.3. Distribution network operators.
Historically DNOs have been a limiting factor to photovoltaic energy diffusion because they were only taking high capacity energy generation into account and didn’t understand how electricity could be flowing from consumers back into the grid. This caused a lot of administrative chaos, which negatively affected consumers that generated photovoltaic energy.
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Nowadays DNOs have a better understanding of the role of photovoltaic energy in the Dutch energy sector, administrate it effectively and also act proactively, by informing people who purchase solar panels about the implications and by offering the ability to install new meters that can measure the amount of energy that was fed back into the grid (Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011). 5.5. Profitability
In this section we will evaluate how profitable solar panels are and how this profitability influences the diffusion of solar panels. We will first discuss what the opportunities are for earning back the investment one made in solar panels. We will then discuss more in depth how long it takes to earn back the cost for a solar panel. Lastly we will discuss the decision to purchase solar panels in relation to its profitability. There are three ways to earn back the investment one makes into solar panels. The first one is by simply not consuming grid energy because one is generating energy himself. The second is the mechanism of salderen. And the last one is being compensated for green energy certificates. If one receives a subsidy for solar panels then the initial investment is smaller and therefore the period of time taken to earn back the money is smaller. In this paragraph we will focus on unsubsidised solar panels because only a limited amount of people receive a subsidy. The first way of earning back the investment unquestionably takes place is when people with solar panels consume less grid energy. The second way, salderen, may show some problems, as discussed in section 5.3.3. In this section we are going to assume that everything is in order with the mechanism of salderen and people are able to save an amount on their electricity bill that equals the price of 0.94 to 1.36 MWH grid energy consumption. The third way, being compensated for green energy certificates, as discussed in section 5.3.2 is currently not functioning in the Netherlands. In Belgium private photovoltaic energy generating households received 33 cents per KWH in January 2011 because of an efficient green energy certificate market in which private producers are compensated.
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We then turn to the earning back period in more detail. As noted in section 4.4 and figure 4.8 the price of solar panels has been falling. In 2011 the price of an average solar panel of 1,4 KWp, which produces between 0.94 and 1.36 MWH per year, is approximately four thousand Euros (Solarbuzz.com). The big advantage of the salderen mechanism for earning back the investment in solar panels is that it doesn’t only pay back the five cent production price of conventional energy, but the whole energy price of about 22 cents, which includes energy tax and fixed service charge. This means that this solar panel can earn money back at the rate of 207 and 299 Euros annually. The expected earning back period is thus between 13 or 19 years. Most solar panel producers guarantee efficient energy output for 25 years (Solarbuzz.com). After that period the efficiency of the panels will slowly fall. This means that currently purchasing a solar panel will deliver at least 12 to 6 years of free energy. Solar panels are therefore always profitable. One would expect people to invest in solar panels, especially because many people associate solar panels with the environment and energy security. The problem is that solar panels are a rather big initial investment, (about four thousand Euros), which most people don’t simply have lying around. The average dutch (modaal) income was 33 thousand Euros annually, that’s 2.75 thousand Euros monthly. People may be prone to short term bias. Possible gains from solar panels will only be attained 13 to 19 years in the future. These gains are so emotionally distant for people that they don’t seem to matter. Meanwhile electricity can be consumed at acceptable prices from the grid. There is no urgency in switching to photovoltaic energy. People have a timeframe in mind in which they want to earn back their investment, and the current earning back period is still larger than the preferred timeframe. Especially when one takes into consideration the false perception that solar panels are integrated in rooftops and the average moving rate in the Netherlands is seven years, a period of 13 to 19 years would be considered too long. So even though an investment in solar panels is a profitable investment, it is not considered worthwhile investing more than a month salary to receive free energy over ten years in the future (Interview Peter Segaar 2011; Interview Niels Schoorlemmer 2011).
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5.6
Conclusion
In this chapter we answered the question of what kept normal families from purchasing solar panels. We saw that the general Dutch population does not believe that there is a problem within energy supply or that the government takes insufficient action in dealing with environmental problems, and even if there was such insufficiency, purchasing solar panels is not perceived as the best way to contribute to the environment. Corporations also undermine the perception that there are problems of the environment and energy security by misrepresenting the concept of sustainability. This undermines the potential of consumers taking social responsibility. The other motivation for purchasing solar panels is profitability or personal interest. We can say, in practice, that purchasing a solar panel is always a profitable investment and can generate up to twelve to six years of free energy. This free energy, however, is only generated in the future and generally doesn’t return the financing within a preferred investment timeframe, which makes it less appealing for the general public. There may also be some problems with receiving the due amount of compensation because of outdated meters and double electricity tariffs. Furthermore, solar panels are perceived as technologically complex and administratively demanding. People are therefore reluctant to purchase solar panels, because they believe it will entail a lot of unnecessary hassle. Grid energy is available at acceptable prices and there is no urgency to switch to photovoltaic energy.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis set out to answer the question “What are the barriers to photovoltaic energy diffusion in the Netherlands?”. It started out by building a theoretical framework that saw photovoltaic energy as a way to address conventional energy scarcity and avoid general energy scarcity from occurring, which would cause a number of economic, social and political problems. It then set out to identify corporations and consumers as the actors bearing most responsibility for photovoltaic energy diffusion and analysed the barriers these two actors encounter. These barriers had been categorised as either relating to profitability, perceptions, government policy and regulations or sub-politics. To find barriers to photovoltaic energy diffusion we used a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods, including a literature study, a survey and a number of interviews. In the second chapter, we learned about current and future energy scarcity. At the demand induced scarcity level we saw that consumption is expected to rise due to world population growth and growth in standards of living in Asia, Latin America and Africa. We also saw that technological innovation made energy consuming devices available to low income countries which also increases consumption. On the Dutch level we saw that energy demand will also rise due to population increase and growth in the standards of living. Furthermore consumption has grown because the Dutch are using new energy consuming devices. On the supply level we saw that, at current levels of consumption our oil supplies will run out in 16 years, our gas reserves in 61 years, our coal reserves in 242 years and our Uranium reserves in 107 years. We also saw a slow but gradual growth in Dutch renewable energy consumption, which was at 9 per cent in 2010. We also discussed how the absence of grid parity, which necessitates subsidies, is not an indicator of the absence of energy scarcity. Then we truly dove into the barriers to photovoltaic and renewable energy diffusion. We were introduced to the three roles a government could take: Government Monopoly in which a government dictates a level of renewable energy diffusion to be met and which finds its barriers in the wishes of the electoral majority. The market structuring role, which was only used by the government on a very basic level, unlike Germany and Belgium, which deliberately structure the energy market to 91
encourage the diffusion or renewable energy. Lastly we were introduced to the 2008 Dutch energy market liberalisation and the volatile Dutch subsidy policy measures in the market participation role. We then turned to corporate social responsibility in the third chapter, which answers the question of what keeps incumbent suppliers from purchasing renewable energy and new producers from producing renewable energy. We saw that renewable energy is generally not competitive. We further saw that there is a high level of dependence new producers will have to suppliers which limits their ability to sell energy. This is because small suppliers are problematic customers due to their small and volatile clientele and big suppliers usually own their own conventional energy production facilities and dislike to cannibalise their own production. We also saw that a lot of shifts in subsidy mechanisms confused producers and required them to develop inhuman feats of financial planning. It also limited the amount of competitive renewable energy to the limited number of subsidies that were granted. Lastly we saw that the green energy certificate market was inefficient. On the demand side consumers held the unreliable perception that renewable energy is mainly linked to the environment, creating uncertain demand. On the supply side we saw that unjustly cheap international certificates flooded the market. This inefficient certificate market hinders the ability to produce unsubsidised renewable energy and sell it to a market segment of consumers who desire renewable energy. The fact that unsubsidised renewable energy is uncompetitive bars new producers from producing renewable energy and stops suppliers from having a demand for renewable energy. We finally turned to consumers in the fourth chapter, which answered the question of what kept normal families from purchasing solar panels. We saw that the general Dutch population does not believe that there is a problem within energy supply or that the government takes insufficient action in dealing with environmental problems, and even if there was such insufficiency, purchasing solar panels is not perceived as the best way to contribute to the environment. Corporations also undermine the perception that there are problems regarding the environment and energy security by misrepresenting the concept of sustainability. This undermines the potential number of consumers taking social responsibility. The other motivation for purchasing solar panels is profitability or personal interest. We can say, in practice, that purchasing a solar panel is always a profitable investment and can generate up to twelve to six years of free energy. This free energy, 92
however, is only generated in the future and generally doesn’t return the financing within a preferred investment timeframe, which makes it less appealing for the general public. There may also be some problems with receiving the due amount of compensation because of outdated meters and double electricity tariffs. Furthermore, solar panels are perceived as technologically complex and administratively demanding. People are therefore reluctant to purchase solar panels at a price higher than a month salary, because they believe it will entail a lot of unnecessary hassle. Grid energy is available at acceptable prices and there is no urgency to switch to photovoltaic energy.
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BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007 + 2010 accessed on 9-5-2011 http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6848&contentId=7033471 CBS De Nederlandse economie 2009 accessed on 2-5-2011 http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/4ADD0E71-5345-46FE-989EEE6C93F6705F/0/2009p19pub.pdf CBS Renewable energy in The Netherlands 2008 accessed on 4-5-2011 http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/7984173F-4BFF-4DAC-A9C0DBA2B4BBDDC0/0/2008c90pub.pdf 95
CBS Consumten Prijs Index 2010 accessed on 9-5-20011 http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/2A7E1052-0D66-492A-9829A5AB252403C6/0/cpimicrodata.pdf CertiQ Jaarverslag 2010 accessed on 22 May 2011 http://www.certiq.nl/Images/CertiQ%202010%20Jaarverslag%20definitieve%20versi e_tcm27-20051.pdf European Energy Portal accessed on 4-5-2011 http://www.energy.eu/ EU renewable energy Roadmap accesed on 18-05-2011 http://www.erec.org/fileadmin/erec_docs/Documents/Publications/Renewable_Energy _Technology_Roadmap.pdf IEA World Energy Outlook 2009 accessed on 1-5-2011 http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/WEO2009.pdf IMF World Economic Outlook 2010 accessed on 4-5-2011 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf NMa Energiekamer Monitor Kleinverbruikersmarkten 2009 accessed on 16-05-2011 http://energiekamer.nl/images/Retailmonitor%202009%20defintief_tcm7-134348.pdf Nma Energiekamer Monitor Grootverhandelsmarkten 2009 accessed on 16-05-2011 http://energiekamer.nl/images/Monitor%20groothandelsmarkten%202010_tcm7143891.pdf OECD Uranium 2009 Resources, Production and Demand accessed on 8-5-2011 http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2006/uranium_resources.html UN Human Developmental Report 2009 accessed on 4-5-2011 http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf The Solar Buzz accessed on 23-05-2011 http://solarbuzz.com/facts-and-figures/retail-price-environment/module-prices Staatsblad 2003 207 accessed on 16-05-2011 http://www.energiekamer.nl/images/12_14397_tcm7-3993.pdf Commisie voor de regulatie van de electriciteits en gasmarkt http://www.creg.be/nl/greenelec4.html Accessed on 08-06-2011 Wind Energy The Facts accessed on 23-05-2011 http://www.wind-energy-the-facts.org/en/part-3-economics-of-wind-power/chapter-1cost-of-on-land-wind-power/the-cost-of-energy-generated-by-wind-power.html
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4. Interviews Segaar, P. (2011), Interview on Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion, Interviewed By Alberts, B.J.L. 28-04-2011 (Peter Segaar is a dutch freelance journalist who specialises in renewable energy) Schoorlemmer, N. (2011) Interview on Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion, Interviewed By Alberts, B.J.L. 12-05-2011 (Niels Schoorlemmer, is secretary at the NGO Zonnestroomproducentenvereniging, an organisation that defends the interests of Private photovoltaic energy producers) Lenzen, M. (2011), Interview on Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion, Interviewed By Alberts, B.J.L. 12-05-2011 (Michael Lenzen is policy employee at CertiQ, the organisation that operates the Dutch green energy certificate market) Sypkens Smit, A. (2011), Interview on Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion, Interviewed By Alberts, B.J.L. 12-05-2011 (Anne Sypkens Smit is an communications employee at EnergieNederland, the Dutch energy sector lobbying organisation) Hillenius, M. (2011), Interview on Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion, Interviewed By Alberts, B.J.L. 18-05-2011 (Michiel Hillenius is an adviser at Agentschap NL, an government agency that applies dutch regulations and enacts policy projects in several policy areas including energy) Swens, J. (2011), Interview on Photovoltaic Energy Diffusion, Interviewed By Alberts, B.J.L. 19-05-2011 (Job Swens is the President of Joining Objectives for Sustainable World Energy Solutions, an NGO that contributes to renewable energy diffusion)
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Appendix I Interview met Peter Segaar, Dutch Freelance Journalist on Renewable Energy 28-04-2010 Bob: Wat zijn de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen op het gebied van zonne-energie de laatste tijd?
Peter: De belangrijkste ontwikkeling is de constante kostenreductie en dat komt voornamelijk door de Deutsche erneuerbare energien gesetz. Er is een markt gecreëerd, waardoor er nu partijen zijn die er brood in zagen gaan opschalen. Er is even een bottleneck geweest in silicium toevoer, wat de basisstof is. De meeste zonnepanelen worden gemaakt uit cellen. Die bestaan uit silicium, eigenlijk gewoon zand. Daar heeft het in Duitsland even wat vertraging opgeleverd, doordat door de groei in vraag de productie opgeschaald dient te worden en het verfijnen van silicium is eigenlijk een heel ruw chemisch proces, daarvoor heb je grote fabrieken nodig en die bouw je niet zo even. Dat doe je alleen als er echt potentie is voor echte afzet mogelijkheden, dat duurde even voordat die schakel even opwas geschaald en toen dat is gebeurt toen is door de… heel ingewikkeld proces met allerlei stappen, al die stappen kunnen door verschillende bedrijven gedaan worden, al zoeken bedrijven naar verticale integratie, om afzetmogelijkheden te generenen, maar ook om de kostenontwikkeling in de hele keten om laag te krijgen. Al die processen en spelers hebben in de afgelopen 5 jaar enorme vooruitgangen gemaakt in het opschalen van elke stap van het proces, waardoor het eindproduct alsmaar goedkoper wordt.
Bob: Door de kosten reductie worden panelen steeds rendabeler voor zowel individuen als voor energiebedrijven?
Peter: tot nu toe is het een gesubsidieerde sector. De wijze waarop het kopen van zonnepanelen of het produceren van zonnestroom wordt ondersteund kan enorm verschillen. En juist in de uitvoeringswijze van de ondersteuning de wijze, de betrouwbaar en voorspelbaar, op basis daarvan bloeien marken, of storten ze in. Duitsland is een voorbeeld van heel betrouwbare ondersteuning. Zeker als alle stroom die je op het netwerk zet altijd afgenomen moet worden omdat het allemaal in de wet is geregeld, wat absolute zekerheid is. Een groot contrast is Nederland waarbij er 98
vrijwel niets in de wet geregeld is en er totale onzekerheid is over de opbrengsten, er heel slecht gemonitord, en er totale chaos bestaat. Er bestaat geen vast invoeringstarief waardoor opbrengsten onzeker zijn. In Duitsland kan je precies berekenen, aan de hand van een tarief, wat ik de komende 20 jaar kan verwachten. Een simpel sommetje en je financiële plan is klaar. Daar gaan dan nog onderhoudskosten vanaf, maar je snapt wat ik bedoel.
Bob: betreft dit gezinnen met een zonnepaneel of energie producerende bedrijven?
Peter: Iedereen, Er zijn verschillende tarieven voor verschillende grotes installaties. In Duitsland ligt dat al vanaf het begin af vast. 0 tot 3000 KWp is daar de kleinste stap, in Nederland word dat al als heel groot gezien, daarna 3 MWp tot 100 MWp 100 tot 1000 Mwp en alles wat er boven zit. Er is geen enkele begrenzing in Duitsland, in Nederland stikt het van de begrenzingen. Elk segment heeft zijn eigen kostenplaatje, maar elk segment heeft voordeel van die continue kostenreductie en vaste tarieven. In Nederland zijn er geen vaste tarieven wat financiële onzekerheid schept in elk segment.
Bob: kunt U een aantal voorbeelden geven van de beperkingen die Nederland oplegt?
Peter: Alles moet van te voeren bekend zijn, er is dus een budget. en daar mag geen cent over heen. Dus er is een absurde loterij, want er komen tienduizend aanvragen en aan en er mogen er maar 42 honderd gegeven worden, dus je bent totaal onzeker over het feit of je subsidie ontvangt, en dan hebben wij in nederland de aard dat als er geen subsidie te ontvangen is, dan hoeft het ook niet. Gelukkig beginnen we daar langszaam van af te komen omdat het zo onzeker is dat mensen het op kleine schaal beginnen te doen.
Bob: kunt U een klein overzichtje geven van de stimulerende en beperkende overheids maatregels ten opzichte van zonne energie?
Peter: SDE, die voor de kleine cathegorie is afgeschaft, en de grote kathegorie dat is dan 15 KWp – 100 KWp, voor het buitenland is dat klein, dat noemen wij dan groot, want meer dan 100 mag niet, gaat door. Het feit dat er een subsidie is, is stimulerend. 99
Helaas is de subsidie afhankelijk van de zogenaamde gemiddelde prijs in de markt, maar dat betaald niemand, contracten kunen enorm verschillen. Je kan een grijs tarief hebben of een energie piraat tarief die zich moet ingevechten in de markt. De gemiddelde prijs, hoe die wordt berekend is nooit gepublicieerd door Economische Zaken. Er is een voorlopig tarief, dat weet je niet van te voren. Maar dat is niet het definitieve subsidie bedrag. De basis prijs zijn de vermeende kosten over 15 jaar. Je begint al met een onzekerheid van de basisprijs wordt een correctie afgetrokken, de gemiddelde prijs in de markt die nog moet komen, en er zijn nog meer correctie mogelijkheden. Zoals C02 emissie certificaten en groenstroom certificaten, wanneer die waarde zouden krijgen, nu nul, mischien zouden ze in de toekomst ook bij kunnen dragen aan een verminderdering in subsidie, in Belgie krijg je nu 33 cent per KWH. Dat zijn nu nog onzekerheden, maar het kunnen verminderingen worden. En dan het volgende jaar, 1 april, als de gemiddelde prijzen van vorige jaar door EZ bekent zijn gemaakt dan weet je wat de definitieve subsidie voor energie had moeten zijn geweest. Alleen dat al is complete waanzijn. Alleen bedrijven met juristen. Maar het veranderd elk jaar, en we hebben extreem volatiele energieprijzen. Al die subsidies dat is een jungle. Daar kom je als burger zonder jurist niet uit. Waardoor alle subsidies naar grote bedrijven gaan. Kleine bedrijven zijn niet eens meer subsidable. Voor grote bedrijven staat alles nog wel open. Alleen moet je 15 cent per kwh kunnen produceren anders maak je geen schijn vna kans. Je kan in nederland dus alleen salderen. Er is geen enkele garantie dat er het salderen in de nederlandse wet blijft staan. Op het moment dat grote groepen nederlanders gaan salderen, is dat voor energiebedrijven niet houdbaar omdat zij meer moeten afdragen dan binnen krijgen.
Bob: spefieke gericht op gezinnen, wat belemmert nederlandse gezinnen om een zonnen paneel te nemen?
Peter: het is gedoe, onduidleijk en onzekerheid en er worden leugens verteld, ondanks het feit dat veel mensen zich ervan bewust zijn dat het steeds goedkoper wordt.je gaat niet zomaar duizenden euros uitgeven, bij het gemiddelde publiek is dat het feit. Natuurlijk, als je over de langertermijn wil en kan kijken, dan verdien je je investering altijd terug de vraag is over hoe lang termijn.Veel mensen komen er achter dat het heel leuk is, bijvoorbeeld om je electriciteitsmeter terug zien te draaien. En dat alleen al kan, bij de buurman, dat begint interessant te worden. Als je alleen een paneel op je 100
dak legt gebeurt er niets, maar een teruglopende meter of een rekening veranderd wel wat. Dat is een hele leuke positieve ontwikkeling, mensen met zonnenpalenen in huis halen worden bewustere consumenten van energie, en dat levert besparingen in stroom op. Mensen zonder panelen denken vaak “het komt toch wel uit het net en het kost toch geen stroom.”
Bob: Denkt U dat groene bedrijfjes met websites het gebruik van zonnepalenen bevorderen door kennis beschikbaar te maken?
Peter: is het de goede kennis? Sommige claims worden niet onderbouwd of zijn juist totaal niet waar. Sommige (zonnepaneel) leveranciers tonen graphieken waarin een gelogen kilowattuur prijs in zit aangegeven omdat daar wel de energie belasting in zit, maar niet de teruggafe energiebelasting post die ook iedereen ontvangt. Daarnaast extrapoleren ze de prijs standaard omhoog, terwijl dat geen zekerheid is. Hierdoor scheppen zij een verkeerd beeld over de terugbetaaltijd. Dat soort verhalen mogen niet in de openbaarheid komen, maar komen dat helaas wel. Het probleem dat je alleen geld terug kan krijgen via de saldeer maatregel, die gigantisch slecht is geregeld. Je behoort terug te krijgen wat je levert aan het energienet, wat volautomatisch het net op gaat, dat mag je aftrekken van je afnamen. Dat gaat voor dezelfde prijs als normale stroom, op het moment van het tarief dat dan geld, mensen met het tariefmeter dat mensen met een dubbeltarief salderen dus ook voor dubbel tarief. En als je in een negatieve meterstand hebt, dan wordt je in nederland door energiebedrijven behandeld als crinineel.
Bob: wat doen energie bedrijven dan om zonnepanelen bij gezinnen te verhinderen of stimuleren?
Peter: het liefste stoken grote energiebedrijven biomassa bij in een kolencentralen, wat in duitsland verboden is omdat het geen hernieuwbare energie centrale is. Dit zorgt niet voor een houdtbare opwekking van hernieuwbare stroom. Daarnaast is er enorm discours over duurzame energie dat eigenlijk neerkomt op rest energie, warmte die eerst gedumpt werd in de oosterpolder hier, daar kon je nooit op schaatsen, die wordt nu door verkocht, en daarvan wordt gezegt dat het duurzaam is, en duurzamer 101
dan 55 zonnenpanelen, maar dat is niet waar want het komt uit eindige voorraden kolen. Gascentrales zijn de meest efficiente centralens, maar daardoor niet groener. Over Zonnepanelen zijn ze heel dubbel. Ze verkopen allemaal zonnenpanelen. Maar ze willen dolgraag weten wat je terugleverd want zodra ze dat weten kunnen ze gaan manupileren met tarieven. En dat is het grote probleem van de slimme meter, een meter die “alles” meet. Een apparaat waar veel mee mogelijk is, maar ook veel gevaren aan zitten. Zodra je zo’n ding in huis hebt kan een leverancier alles van je teweten komen aan opwek en afnamen en variabelen tarieven in kan stellen om zo een zonnestroomproducent zo min mogelijk terug te betalen. Het rare is dat zonnepanelen peiklast verdrijvende stroom op wekken. Midden op de dag, als zonnenpanelen de meeste energie op wekken, wordt ook de meeste energie gebruikt. Zonder zonnenpanelen moeten bedrijven extra bijstoken om aan die vraag te voldoen en daarom kunnen ze om meer geld vragen. Zonnenpanelen maken dat niet meer mogelijk. Door een slimme meter kunnen ze de ware waarde van zonne piekstroomenergie bedekken en onderwaarderen met rare tarieven.
Bob: hoe werken energieprijzen dan precies?
Peter: Er zijn drie componenten, de kale KWH prijs, de energie belasting, de bestaat uit btw over de KWh prijs, de echte energie belasting en weer btw over de energiebelasting en teslotte vastrechten zoals transportkosten en servicekosten leverancier, die betaal je aan de leverancier maar gaan door naar de netwerkbeheerder. Dat is het grootste geheim waar de meeste journalisten nog niet achter zijn, de kale Kwh prijs is een marginaal deel van de kosten. Woekeraars vragen hoge vastrecht levering.
Bob: hoe verhouden Zonnenpaneelhouders zich tot netwerkbeheerders?
Peter: Die is er sinds 1 januari niet meer omdat het kapiciteitskosten in leven geroepen is. Een wijziging van een ministeriele regeling, wat geen wet is maar een schimmig aanpasbaar document. Daar stond eerst op de de vastrechten transportkosten in kwh geregeld moesten worden, daar is toen een h-tje van afgesloopt waardoor het ineens capaciteit van aansluiting werden. En dit soort operaties worden door de juristen van energienNederland, de branchorganisatie, uitgebroed. 102
Bob: zijn er nog andere stimulerende regels?
Peter: Certiq geeft groenstroomcertificaten uit, die je als zonnestroomcertificaten gratis weg moet geven aan een leverancier naar keuze. Je hebt er dus geen flikker aan. Daarnaast zijn ze in nederland niets waard. In belgie zijn ze 31 cent per KWH waard, die je als zonnestroomproducent in belgie gewoon kan innen. Er zijn ook gemeente en provincie en gemeente subsidies, maar meestal zijn dat plotselinge projectjes die gepaard gaan met gigantische onzekerheid. Zo heb je in volendam nu een regeling dan een hand vol mensen 4 euro per Kwp ontvangen. Dat is natuurlijk belachelijk.
Bob: Zijn er in nederland “zonnestroom parken”
Peter: niet echt, het krijgen van vergunningen is een ramp. Het enige park dat we hebben is ecopark waalwijk, dat is een zonnestroom park van 700 KWp, voor nederland een , ergens in de rimbu op een dak bij hoofddorp bij vijfhuizen staat een instalatie 2,3 MW. Er zijn enorm veel beperkingen op waar je een zonnenpanelenpark zou kunnen neerlegen, vergunningen is een enorm probleem.
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Appendix II Interview Niels Schoorlemmer, Secretaris zonnenstroomproducenten vereniging 12-05-2010 Bob: Wat zijn de huidige ontwikkelingen op het gebied van zonne-energie in Nederland?
Niels: eigenlijk zie je tot nu toe heel langszaam is gegaan met zonne energie in nederland, in die trant dat er maar weinig instalaties zijn in nederland. Dat heeft veel te maken met wisselend overheidbeleid en het feit dat panelen duurder in de aanschaf zijn geweest. Een meer recentere ontwikkeling is dat door de duitsers en in de kielzog van duitsbeleid, die een eentarief beleid hebben ontwikkeld, waardoor er grote vraag is ontwikkeld voor zonnepanelen en productie in duitsland en china opgeschaald kon worden waardoor panelen alsmaar goedkoper zijn geworden. Vooral in de laatste twee jaar. Daarnaast zijn er ook nog rendementsverbeteringen, dat zijn slechts tienden van procenten per jaar, maar dat speeld ook mee. Je ziet dus dat panelen de afgelopen twee jaar enorm in prijs gedaald zijn.
Bob: heeft U daar grafieken van?
Niels: Ja die kan ik je toesturen, maar die is ook te vinden op Solarbuzz.com
Bob: hoeveel zonne panelen/ instalaties zijn er in nederland
Niels: dat is moeilijk te zeggen, aangezien de plaatsing van panelen in nederland niet geregistreed wordt. De enigste manieren om het te meten zijn ofwel steekproeven die het CBS onder installateurs houdt, maarja er zijn instalateurs die nooit door CBS benaderd zijn. Dan kan je dus ook moeilijk komen tot een echt gemiddelde installaties per installateur. Daarnaast subsidiebeschikingen, de SDE. Alle installaties die geen subsidie ontvangen of die niet door nederlandse installateurs geplaatst worden, die worden niet meegerekend. Cijfers zijn dus heel onbetrouwbaar, uit mijn hoofd denk ik dat het iets van twintigduizend was. Maar daar moet je mij niet op vastpinnen. Ik gok eigenlijk op het twee of drievoudige
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Bob: Wie zijn de mensen met zonnestroomproducenten? Hoe zou U uw gemiddelde lid characteriseren.
Niels: er zijn twee verschillen, ik denk niet dat onze vereniging een hele goede afspiegelingen. Ik hoor veel van instalateurs dat de laatste jaren er steeds meer jonge mensen zijn die zonnepanelen kopen, wat opmerkelijk is. Het is toch een hele investering. Daar moet je maar net de middelen voor hebben. Dus steed meer jongeren vanuit idealisme. Onze vereniging bestaat vooral uit mensen van het eerste uur, rond het jaar 2000. de eerste consumenten die echt gingen terugleveren, problemen ondervonden, en daarom is onze vereniging opgericht. Ze ondervonden de tegenwerking van instanties en daarvoor is onze vereniging opgericht. Het zijn vooral mannen van 50 plus, bijna allemaal mannen, technische geinteresseert, echte doe het zelvers. Ze hebben twee dingen die samenkomen, interesse in techniek en een idealisme. Op basis van hun idealen, een schonere wereld. Vaker ook hoger opgeleid.
Bob: Waarom denkt U dat het gemiddelde nederlandse gezin geen zonnepaneel neemt?
Niels: De allerbelangrijkste reden is onbekendheid met de techniek, dat is de allerbelangrijkste reden. Mensen hebben geen idee hoe het werkt. Ze denken dat je een accu moet hebben. Ze denken dat het heel ingewikkeld is, high tech. Ja dat is een grote barriere, de techniek en de onbekendheid met techniek. In werkelijkheid is het redelijk eenvoudig. Een andere barriere is dat de gemiddelde verhuisduur zeven jaar is, het terugverdienen duurt een hele tijd, en een lange tijd heeft altijd de onzekerheid of het blijft werken, of je hem wel mee kan nemen naar het volgende huis. Een andere barriere is toch de financien, de aanschafprijs is nogsteeds relatief hoog, en je hebt een bepaalde onzekerheid of je die investering terugverdient.
Bob: Hoe bevorderen de activiteiten van organisaties zoals urgenda, julliezelf en de branchorganisatie HollandSolar de mogelijkheden ter verspreiding van zonneenergie?
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Niels: Nou, allereerst door telkens aandacht te vragen voor het duitse systeem, dus vooral gericht op de overheid. Tot voor kort was het vooral gericht op de overheid, want het is een politieke keuze om zonne-energie wel of niet te steunen. Veel minder Co2 uitstoot, opwekking bij de bron dus minder energieverlies, dus hoog energetisch rendement, en je empowered mensen door zelf hun stroom op te wekken, zelfbeschikking over de prijzen. Om die reden zijn er allerlei collectieve voordelen. Daar is een verandering in gekomen doordat de overheid juist de afgelopen 15 jaar aan het liberaliseren is geweest, waardoor de collectieve belangen een minder grote rol zijn gaan spelen. Je ziet dus een terugtredende overheid, de overheid wil er steeds minder mee bezigzijn. En je ziet dus de laatste jaren dat de branch organisatie en andere organisaties zich steeds meer gaan richten op voorlichting, aan de ene kant. Gewoon burges laten zien hoe het werkt. Dat het een kwestie van een keuze is, en dan nu de solar days van holland solar een aantal andere organisaties en bedrijven, waarbij mensen thuis welkom zijn om te zien hoe een zonne-installatie werkt, dat het helemaal niet moeilijk is. Daar speelt de overheid een rol in, dat faciliteren ze, niet met geld maar op een andere manier. Daarnaast zijn er allemaal initiatieven om de koop van panelen zo goedkoop mogelijk systemen kan aankopen. Zoals bijvoorbeeld wij willen zon van urgenda, waarbij massaal panelen ingekocht worden om te zorgen voor een zo laag mogelijke prijs, waar de overheid niet bij komt kijken. Natuurlijk is dat alleen mogelijk gemaakt door het duitse beleid.
Bob: Iets confronterendere vraag. Hoe bevorderen de activiteiten van diezelfde organisaties mogelijkheden ter verspreiding van zonne-energie
Niels: Er zijn in het verleden dingen misgegaan.zoals bij iedere technologie heeft deze technologie kinderziektes, en het allereerste project, de sunpower actie van greenpeace, daarbij werden in grote aantallen zonnenpanelen verkocht. Daarbij bleken de omvormers niet te werken, en moesten die omvormers teruggeroepen worden. Dat heeft veel schade gedaan aan het imago van zonne-energie. Mensen hadden het idee dat de technologie nog niet rijk was, het faalt en er zijn risico’s aan verbonden. Onlangs worden er nog risico’s genomen in het stimuleren van zonne-energie. Nu heb je de actie van wij willen zon, die breed uitgemeten in de media is geweest. Dat is ook goed geweest voor de sector. Er zit toch weer een risico in. Als daarbij iets misgaat, panelen blijken niet goed te zijn, dan kan je ervan uitgaan dat dat ook breed 106
wordt uitgemeten in de media en schade doet aan het imago. Je hebt partijen die daar, niet altijd terecht, gelijk bovenop zitten. Er gaat altijd wel iets mis. Als je structurele klachten hebt, dan moet je actie ondernemen en het naar buiten brengen, maar slechts bij een klacht niet. Een ander probleem is jaloesie. Er zijn veel installateurs, dat zijn er ongeveer 350, dus dat zijn er eigenlijk teveel. Er is moordende concurrentie want de vraag is niet zo groot. En installateurs gaan onderling modder gooien. Dat doen ze op publieke fora, en dat zorgt weer voor schade aan het imago. En ook in het kader van de wij willen zon actie is er veel kritiek geweest van installateurs. Initiatieven worden zwart gemaakt en elkaar zwart maken. Dat is toch ook wel een belemmerende factor.
Bob: Hoe bevorderen de activiteiten van leveranciers en netwerkbeheerders de verspreiding van zonne-energie?
Niels: Er zijn netbeheerders die fatsoenlijk reageren op het feit dat mensen terugleveren aan het net. Wat ze in eerdere jaren hebben gedaan is vooral reageren erop. Dus het overviel ze een beetje. Bij netbeheerders overviel het ze een beetje. Dus het enige dat ze deden is reageren. Je ziet nu een omslag dat ze proactiever aan de slag gaan, dat ze bijvoorbeeld mensen gaan voorlichten, zorgen dat er in de helpdesk ook mensen zitten met kennis over zonne-energie zitten, veel mensen hebben daar geen kaas van gegeten. Zelf zijn ze ook actief bezig met zonne-energie te integreren in het net, veel beter dan in het verleden. Ze denken na over de toekomstDat hele verhaal van slimme netten. Wat zich vertaalt naar minder problemen voor consumenten. Energie leveranciers, zie je een duidelijke scheiding, tussen de oude grote drie leveranciers, eneco, essent en nuon en de nieuwere bedrijven, zoals greenchoice, die zich volledig richten op groene energie. Die bedrijven profieleren zich ook op zonneenergie. Die nieuwe bedrijven leveren soms extra service op zonne-energie. ze geven kortingen of ze werken beter mee met salderen. Tja, je ziet daar dus verschillen in. De grote bedrijven hebben in het verleden zonnepanelen geleverd, dat hebben ze na een tijdje weer opgepakt, zo installeren ze wel maar verder niet veel.
Bob: Hoe bevorderen de activiteiten van leveranciers en netwerkbeheerders de verspreiding van zonne-energie?
107
Niels: tot voorkort waren netwerk beheerders echt een belemmerende factor, die zijn van oudsher gewend om te werken met grote producenten, van die grote kolencentrales. Ze waren niet echt toegericht op individuele burgers die ook stroom terug gingen leveren. Dus er ging van alles mis in de administratie. Niet voor bereid op het feit dat iemand een negatieve meterstand konden opleveren. Dus mensen kregen niet de stroomprijs terug waar zij recht op hadden. Per wet was het wel geregeld, maar in praktijk kwam daar niet veel van de grond. De wet is helaas vaag geformuleerd en laat veel open. Het zegt bijvoorbeeld niet hoe je meter er uit moet zien of hoe er omgaan moet worden met een dubbel telwerk. Dat was heel erg belemmerd. Dat wordt steeds minder. Wat een belemmering kan worden is de invoering van de slimme meter, omdat energiebedrijven hier allerlei bundels mee kunnen aanbieden. Wat je nu bij telefonie ziet. Vroeger had je een tarief dus kon je makkelijk bereken wat het ging kosten. Hoe meer keuze je hebt hoe moelijker het wordt om dingen te bereken. Men verliest het overzicht. het salderen zo ingewikkeld wordt dat niemand er meer een snars van begrijpt. Investeringsbeslissingen worden steeds ingewikkelder. Leveranciers is een ander verhaal. Leveranciers hebben een bepaald belang, jij bent afnemer van een leverancier, als jij niet afneemt omdat jij zelf stroom opwekt, dan ben je eigenlijk de grootste concurrent. Ik vergelijk het altijd met handel in wiet. Je mag een beetje stroom opwekken voor eigen gebruik, maar je mag het niet verkopen. Wiet is een gesloten markt, je mag het niet verkopen, je mag zelf wel vijf planten hebben. Als jij dus vier planten gebruikt en er een wilt verkopen, dan moet jij dus bij een dealer zijn, maar die dealer wilt ook aan jou verkopen, dus dan heb je een probleem. Bij je leverancier moet je verplicht aan je leverancier leveren, maar het is ook je grootste concurrent in de wet wat je niet kan salderen, ofwel omdat je een negatief verbruik hebt, ofwel omdat je boven de 3000 kwh grens komt, daar moet je een redelijk tarief voor krijgen. Maarja, wat is een redelijk tarief, zeker voor je grootste concurrent. Dat stoort veel mensen. Veel mensen willen dus een saldeer systeem zonder plafond.
Bob: Hoe zat het dan met onterechte beschuldingen van fraude?
Niels: dat heeft alles te maken met de meterstanden. Als jij ineens een negatieve meterstand hebt, en de leverancier weet niet dat jij een paneel hebt, dan is dat raar. 108
Heb jij met magneten lopen klooien? Heb jij de verzegeling verbroken? Dat leidt tot verdachte situaties. Daar zijn mensen agressief door benaderd door leveranciers benaderd of ze waren aan het frauderen?
Bob: Zijn groenstroomcertificaten een efficiente markt in nederland en hoe passen zonnestroomproducenten in die markt?
Niels: dat is een hele absurde situatie. Garanties van oorsprong, groenstroomcertificaten, die worden afgegeven voor alle groene stroom die in nederland geproduceerd wordt. Dus je voor biogassen in op het net, je krijgt een certificaat, je maakt stroom met wkk dan krijg je een certificaat, wind energie krijg je een certificaat. Je krijgt een bewijs van groenheid, en dat vertegenwoordigd een waarde. In praktijk is er geen schaarste dus zijn die certificaten geen fluit waard. Pas bij kunstmatige schaarste wordt het pas interessant. Je kan ze nu uit het buitenland importeren, dus bijvoorbeeld uit noorwegen, waar 70 procent van alle stroom uit waterkracht centrales komt. Zonnestroom is eigenlijk heel weinig. Het rare van groenstroom is dat als particulier, als je groenestroom produceert, dan krijg wel certificaten van Certiq, maar om erin te handelen moet je een licentie hebben en die was duur, dus als particulier kreeg je een vraag aan wie je je certificaten wilt afstaan. In praktijk zijn ze niet veel waard.
Bob: In nederland heb je een vergunning nodig om stroom te mogen produceren, dus ook als je een windpark wilt beginnen. Weet jij wat de voorwaarden daarvoor zijn?
Niels: de enige voorwaarde die ik ken is dat het geen congestie mag veroorzaken, een soort van filevorming op het netwerk. Dat wordt bijgehouden door netwerkbeheerders.
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Appendix III Interview met Michael Lenzen, Beleidsmedewerker CertiQ, 12 Mei 2011 Bob:
Wat doet CertiQ als organisatie?
ML:
CertiQ heeft als missie het certificeren van milieubewust opgewekte
elektriciteit om zodoende een bijdrage te leveren aan de wettelijke taak van Tennet om de milieukwaliteit van de elektriciteitsvoorziening in Nederland te bevorderen. Daarom geeft CertiQ verschillende soorten certificaten uit. Voor jou zijn waarschijnlijk de garanties van oorsprong het belangrijkst. Aan elektriciteit kun je niet zien op welke manier die is geproduceerd. De certificaten van CertiQ zijn bedoeld om dit onderscheid te kunnen maken. Een producent van elektriciteit kan zijn elektriciteitsproductie bij CertiQ laten certificeren. Producenten kiezen hier meestal voor als zij duurzame elektriciteit opwekken. Certificaten bewijzen dat elektriciteit op een duurzame manier is opgewekt. Bob:
Hoe worden jullie activiteiten bekostigd?
ML:
Ook al is Tennet een volledige dochterorganisatie van Tennet, de
netwerkbeheerder, worden de kosten van CertiQ gedragen door de deelnemers aan het certificatensysteem. CertiQ werkt op kostendekkende basis. Bob: Wat voor certificaten geeft CertiQ uit en waarom heeft nederland deze certificaten nodig? ML:
CertiQ geeft verschillende soorten certificaten uit. In het algemeen worden de
certificaten van CertiQ gebruikt om aan te tonen dat elektriciteit op een bepaalde manier is opgewekt. De verschillende certificaten hebben bovendien elk hun specifieke functie. Het eerste type certificaten is de Garantie van Oorsprong. In Nederland GvO's zijn het enige bewijs dat een energieleverancier duurzame elektriciteit levert aan zijn klanten, de eindverbruikers. Dit is wettelijk zo bepaald. Energieleveranciers zijn verplicht om door middel van een stroometiket op de eindafrekening aan eindverbruikers te laten zien welke stroom geleverd wordt. In dit etiket mag alleen groene stroom worden vermeld als de energieleverancier GvO's heeft. GvO's worden 110
in Nederland ook gebruikt om subsidie te verkrijgen. Producenten kunnen voor hun duurzame elektriciteitsproductie subsidie krijgen. In het verleden was dat de MEPsubsidie, nu is dat de SDE. GvO’s worden uitgegeven voor groenestroom en voor warmtekrachtkoppeling (WKK). Groenestroomcertificaten worden uitgegeven voor alle electriciteit die opgewekt is uit Zon, Wind, Water en Biomassa. WKK Certificaten worden uitgegeven voor centrales waarin Warmte en Energie tergelijkertijd opgewekt worden waardoor zij een beter rendement hebben. Verder geeft CertiQ Renewable Energy Certificate System (RECS-) certificaten uit, die de internationale equivalent zijn van GvO’s zijn en daardoor internationale handel in groenestroom mogelijk maakt met landen die aangesloten zijn aan het RECS. Daarnaast geeft CertiQ Etiquetteringscertificaten uit. Leveranciers zijn verplicht op de eindrekening te laten zien welke stroom geleverd is. Dit geld niet allen voor groene stroom maar ook voor andere typen stroom. Deze andere typen stroom worden door etiquetteringscertificaten gelabeld. Tenslotte zijn er certificaten voor eigen gebruik. Deze zijn vergelijkbaar voor groenestroomcertificaten, alleen dan voor stroom die door producenten zelf geconsumeerd wordt. Soms zijn deze certificaten toch nodig om subsidie te ontvangen. Certificaten voor eigen gebruik zijn niet verhandelbaar. Bob:
Hoe bevorderen de activiteiten van CertiQ de mogelijkheden ter verspreiding
van Hernieuwbare energie in Nederland? ML:
Zoals al eerder aangegeven, wij geven de GvO’s uit. De GvO’s zijn de enige
wettelijke grond waarop een leverancier mag beweren groene stroom te leveren. Producenten geven een certificaathandelaar aan die hun certificaten dienen te ontvangen. Deze certificaten worden in 10.000 Megawattuur (MWh), 1.000, 100, 10 en 1 MWh uitgegeven. GvO’s zijn in nederland tot een jaar na uitgave geldig. Deze transparantie bevorderd de verspreiding van herniewbare energie. Bob:
Hoe belemmeren de activiteiten van CertiQ de mogelijkheden ter verspreiding
van Hernieuwbare energie in Nederland
111
ML:
De activiteiten van CertiQ zijn bedoeld om de verspreiding van hernieuwbare
energie in Nederland op transparante en betrouwbare wijze inzichtelijk te maken en de markt te faciliteren. Deze activiteit is gebaseerd op een Europese verplichting (richtlijn 2009/28) en alszodanig geïmplementeerd in nationale wet- en regelgeving. Het is op geen enkele manier de taak van Certiq om de verspreiding van hernieuwbare energie in de weg te staan. Bob:
Kan de manier waarop jullie nu de markt inzichtelijk trachten te maken de
verspreiding van groene energie in de weg staan? ML:
Die vraag is aan de toezichthouder (NMa). CertiQ voert slechts het
nederlandse beleid op basis van de Eropese verplichtingen uit. Bob:
Welke Actoren zijn betrokken bij de Nederlandse certificatenmarkt en hoe
verhouden ze tot elkaar? in andere woorden, hoe werkt de certificaten markt? ML:
Er zijn een handvol belangrijke actoren. Er zijn producenten, netwerk
beheerders, handelaren, aggregators en de deelnemers raad. Een producent is een organisatie of persoon die een installatie in gebruik heeft waarmee elektriciteit wordt opgewekt. Deze ‘groene’ producenten wekken elektriciteit op met een installatie voor duurzaam opgewekte elektriciteit of een WKK-installatie. Zij leveren deze stroom aan het elektriciteitsnet of aan andere installaties. Voor deze productie geeft CertiQ Garanties van Oorsprong en WKKcertificaten uit. De producent kan zijn certificaten alleen overdragen aan een handelaar. Ook kan hij subsidie aanvragen die op basis van de certificaten wordt uitgekeerd. De netbeheerder heeft twee taken in het certificeringsproces. In de eerste plaats keurt de netbeheerder de installatie van de producent. Hij beoordeelt of er sprake is van een installatie die duurzame of WKK-elektriciteit produceert als Garanties van Oorsprong worden aangevraagd. Ook beoordeelt de netbeheerder of er op een eenduidige manier kan worden gemeten hoeveel elektriciteit geproduceerd wordt. Deze controle gebeurt meestal administratief maar mag ook fysiek worden gedaan. De tweede taak van de netbeheerder is een periodiek terugkerende taak.Nadat
112
een installatie is ingeschreven stuurt de netbeheerder de hoeveelheid gemeten elektriciteit, de meetwaarden, maandelijks door naar CertiQ met gebruikmaking van de unieke EAN code. De EAN code geeft aan welk bedrijf of huis aangesloten is op het net. Op basis van deze periodieke hoeveelheden worden de certificaten uitgegeven. Onder een handelaar verstaan we bij CertiQ een organisatie of een persoon die handelt in certificaten. Handelaren kopen de geproduceerde elektriciteit van producenten. Deze elektriciteit wordt omgezet in certificaten en op de certificatenrekening van de handelaar bijgeboekt. De handelaar kan zelf bepalen wat hij doet met de certificaten. Hij kan ze inzetten als bewijs dat hij duurzame elektriciteit heeft geleverd aan zijn klanten. Hij kan de certificaten ook doorverkopen aan andere handelaren. Import en export van certificaten is mogelijk. CertiQ registreert de bij- en afboekingen op de certificatenrekening. De handelaar is de enige partij in het systeem die de certificaten ook daadwerkelijk (digitaal) ontvangt. Iedere persoon of organisatie kan zich bij CertiQ als handelaar laten registreren. Veel handelaren zijn ook energieleverancier. Een aggregator is een tussenpersoon tussen een producent en een handelaar. Een aggregator kan meetwaarden van producenten toewijzen aan verschillende handelaren. Verder kan een aggregator aan CertiQ doorgeven welke percentages van de meetwaarden van een producent duurzaam zijn opgewekt. Dit laatste is alleen van belang bij biomassa-installaties. De Deelnemersraad heeft de taak de belangen van de deelnemers aan het certificatensysteem te vertegenwoordigen. Voor een optimale afstemming op de wensen van haar participanten heeft CertiQ de Deelnemersraad opgericht. In de Deelnemersraad zitten producenten, handelaren (ook buitenlandse handelaren die in Nederland opereren) en vertegenwoordigers van een aantal grote energieleveranciers. Bij het opstellen van haar jaarplan houdt CertiQ nadrukkelijk rekening met de adviezen van de raad. Bob:
Wat is de Plek van afzonderlijke gezinnen met zonnenpanelen op hun dak in
de certificaten markt? ontvangen zij certificaten?
113
ML:
Nee , zij worden behandeld als normale producenten. Dit betekent dat zij een
handelaar moeten aangeven die hun certificaten ontvangt. Vaak kiezen ze dan voor hun energieleverancier. Deze handelaar ontvangt dan de certificaten voor de elektriciteit die zij produceren. Bob:
Is de Nederlandse certificaten markt efficient?
ML:
CertiQ beheert het certificatensysteem maar beschikt niet over financiële
transactiegegevens. De vraag of de markt efficiënt functioneert is aan de toezichthouder (NMa). Bob: De reden dat ik het vraag is omdat mijn andere bronnen aangeven dan de markt zeer inefficient is omdat er te veel groenstroomcertificaten goedkoop uit het buitenland geïmporteerd worden. Wilt U daar niet op reageren? ML:
Daar wil ik wel op reageren. De Europese regelgeving stelt dat er
internationale handel in certificaten mogelijk moet zijn, dus wij kunnen niet zomaar de markt sluiten voor buitenlandse certificaten. Bovendien moeten we dat niet willen. Er is in nederland meer vraag voor groene stroom dan dat er groene stroom opgewekt wordt. In een afgesloten markt moeten we ofwel veel mensen teleurstellen, ofwel moet de prijs voor groenestroomcertificaten ver boven de 40 Euro per MWH van nu stijgen. Buitenlandse groene stroom is net zo goed groene stroom als nederlandse groene stroom, het maakt niet uit in welk land het opgewekt is. Bob: Hoeveel procent van de certificaten op de nederlandse certificaten mark is uit et buitenland geimporteerd? ML: Het exacte percentage fluctueerd nogal Pagina 17 van ons Jaarverslag 2010 geeft daarvan een goed beeld. Over het algemeen wordt meer dan de helft van alle certificaten uit het buitenland geimporteerd. Bob: Welke barrieres schept CertiQ voor de import van buitenlandsecertificaten. CertiQ schept geen barrières maar faciliteert de mogelijkheid om buitenlandse certificaten te importeren via een gecontroleerd, transparant en betrouwbaar systeem, op basis van door de overheid geïntroduceerde spelregels. 114
Appendix IV Interview met De Heer Anne Sypkens Smit van EnergieNederland op 12-05-2010 Bob: Wat doel EnergieNederland als organisatie? A.S.S.: EnergieNederland is de branchorganisatie van energie producenten, leveranciers en retailers. De organisatie vertegenwoordigt de belangen van deze energiebedrijven in relatie tot hun gezamelijke stakeholders (politiek Den Haag en Brussel, consumentenorganisaties, milieu-organisaties, VNO/NCW, et cetera).
Bob: Wie vertegenwoordigd Energie-Nederland Specifiek? EnergieProducenten, Energie leverancies of energie consumenten? A.S.S.: Energie-Nederland vertegenwoordigd de energie producenten (elektriciteitsproducenten), energie-levaranciers en - retailers, zowel van electriciteit en van gas en warmte. Dit is allemaal de aanbod kant van de markt. Consumenten worden niet vertegenwoordigd door Energie-Nederland maar door consumentenorganisaties. Grote upstream partijen zoals Shell of de NAM maken geen deel uit van de leden van Energie-Nederland. Bob: hoe maakt U de balans tussen de belangen van bijvoorbeeld producenten en leveranciers, deze kunnen namelijk tegengesteld zijn? A.S.S.: Gekeken wordt naar de gemeenschappelijke belangen. De belangen van de leden zijn op veel terreinen niet tegengesteld. Bovendien zijn veel grote bedrijven zowel producent , als leverancier, als retailer. In het geval van tegenstellingen worden, bijvoorbeeld als monoretail bedrijven een andere opvatting hebben dan monoproducenten, problemen opgelost door discussie en uitwisseling van argumenten. Daarbij accepteren leden van elkaar dat rekening moet worden gehouden met minderheidsstandpunten en wederzijdse belangen. Richtinggevend zijn een aantal uitgangspunten van de vereniging. De vereniging is voor marktwerking, Europese integratie van de Europese energiemarkt en verduurzaming. Bob: De reden dat ik het vraag is omdat ik mij heb laten vertellen dat groene energie vaker opgewekt wordt door kleine individuele bedrijven die dan afhankelijk zijn van grotere leveranciers
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A.S.S.: Alle grote bedrijven produceren ook groene energie (zonne-energie, windenergie en/of biomassa). Waar het gaat om zonne-energie zijn met name Eneco en Delta actief (zie de link die ik je al stuurde). Ook zijn er kleiner spelers zoals Greenchoice (retailbedrijf) die in die richting activiteiten hebben. Voor alle spelers geldt dat zij ook kijken naar het rendement van hun activiteiten. Dit is afhankelijk van waar zij in de keten actief zijn (productie van zonnecellen, productie van stroom of alleen retail/verkoop), het stimuleringskader (regulering, subsidie) en praktische mogelijkheden (locaties en vergunningen). Er is niet automatisch sprake van een belangenverschil tussen de bedrijven; allen willen een gezond investeringsklimaat voor de productie van energie, niet in de laatste plaats voor duurzame energie..
Bob: Wat is de mening van Energie-Nederland over de huidige ontwikkelingen in de Nederlandse energie markt? A.S.S.: Energie-Nederland is voor een hybride leverings verplichting. Subsidies hebben zeker effect, maar zijn vaak wisselvallig (politiek heeft moeite een robuust syteem in de lucht te houden; subsidies uit de overheidspot zijn onderhevig aan politieke voorkeuren en gevoelig voor financiële problemen van de overheid) en daarom op de lange termijn niet houdbaar (het gaat de overheid op termijn teveel kosten) . Een hybride leeringsverplichting, zie het document dat ik je al stuurde, geeft energiebedrijven een constante marktconforme prikkel om een deel groene stroom te produceren en te leveren, waardoor dit systeem efficiënter is en meer marktconform. Nieuwe (dure) ontwikkelingen blijven deels afhankelijk van subsidies, maar dit kan worden ingebouwd in het systeem.
Bob: Hoe bevorderen de activiteiten van Energie-Nederland zelf de mogelijkheiden voor verspreiding van hernieuwbare energie? A.S.S.: Energie-Nederland neemt het beleid van de Nederlandse en Europese overheid als uitgangspunt. Daarnaast neemt zij als uitgangspunt de doelen die de grote energiebedrijven hebben geformuleerd voor 2050. De Europese grote energie bedrijven zijn het eens over de doelen voor 2050 die voornamelijk duurzaam zijn (doelstelling: is CO2 neutraal in 2050, deels door duurzame opwekking, deels door CO-2 vrije productie anderszins, deels door CCS en energiebesparing). Het is de taak van de vereniging om de overheid te adviseren hoe ze de randvoorwaarden kunnen scheppen om die doeleinden te kunnen behalen. De branche wil hierover zoveel 116
mogelijk concrete afspraken maken met de overheid.
Bob: Dus Energie-Nederland heeft geen eigen projecten om groene stroom te produceren? A.S.S.: Nee, wij zijn een branchorganisatie. Dat betekent dat onze leden bepalen wat wij moeten doen. Zij vragen van de brancheorganisatie er aan bij te dragen dat de overheid hen in staat stelt rendabel in (duurzame) energie activiteiten te investeren. Onze leden sporen ons aan ruimte te scheppen voor groene energie en dat te promoten. Het is niet onze taak om onze leden te zeggen wat zij moeten doen. Wel bemiddelt de vereniging tussen de landelijke overheid en de sector als geheel om te komen tot samenwerking.
Bob: Hoe belemmeren de activiteiten van Energie-Nederland zelf de mogelijkheiden voor verspreiding van hernieuwbare energie?
A.S.S.: Tja daar wordt wisselend over gedacht. Wij zijn een divers gezelschap. Onze leden hebben verschillende verantwoordelijkheden en strategiën. Een van onze leden is Greenchoice, en een ander is Atoomstroom, daarnaast zijn er leden die zich bezighouden met decentrale warmte en leden die zich bezighouden met kolenvermogen, dus er zijn verschillende visies onder onze leden. Om daar een consensus tussen de krijgen is ons standpunt dat partijen vrij (moeten) zijn hun eigen keuzes te maken ten aanzien van de brandstofmix en kiezen wij ervoor er voor te pleiten om de markt open te laten, omdat de markt zorgt voor een efficiente verdeling. Er zijn echter actoren in de maatschappij die meer dirigisme willen om hoge mate van duurzaamheid af te dwingen. Indien dit een rechtstreeks ingrijpen betekent van energieproducenten tenaanzien van de keuzes die zij willen maken ten aanzien van hun energie-productiepark, vinden wij dat inefficiënt. Een dergelijke partij kan ons zien als een belemmering omdat wij dan een andere opvatting hebben over hoe de markt inelkaar hoort te zitten. Wij zien de vrije markt (plus duidelijke eisen aan de uiteindelijke levering van de stroom) als de meest realitsiche wijze om een redelijke balans te houden tussen schone stroom en betaalbare stroom.
Bob: Wat is de mening van Energie-Nederland over de plaats van de Individuele 117
Zonnestroomproducent ( dat wil zeggen het gezin met een zonnepaneel op het dak) in de nederlandse energie sector. A.S.S. Wij vinden het prima dat mensen zelf stroom op wekken. Er is echter nu een discussie gaande over hoezeer zij belastingloos stroom mogen terugleveren aan het net of mogen verkopen aan hun buurman. Wij zien dit als een politieke vraag, die wij niet kunnen oplossen. Wij zien wel dat, zoals kamerlid Samson voorsteld, een hoge grens van teruglevering kan zorgen voor scheefgroei in de markt. Als ik met mijn zonnepaneel belastingloos energie kan verkopen aan mijn buurman, is dat oneerlijk voor een bedrijf als Delta, die met de zelfde middelen energie opwekt en wel belasting aan diezelfde consument in rekening moet brengen. Wij denken dat dit tot scheefgroei in de markt kan zorgen en hogere maten van inefficientie. Dit voordeel van individuele producten kan leiden tot meer bewustzijn over groene stroom, maar wij denken dat een scheefgegroeide markt een groter probleem is. (het is aan de politiek om aan te wijzen welke grens gehanteerd moet worden voor de saldering/”levering”aan de buurman.) Het oplossen van dit probleem is voornamelijk politiek. Wij kunnen hier wel over adviseren (wat zijn de gevolgen van aatregelen), maar wij kunnen het niet oplossen, daar hebben wij de middelen (= wetgeving) niet voor.
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Appendix V Interview met Michiel Hillenius, adviseur van Agentschap NL afdeling Energy 18-5-2011 Bob: Wat doet Agentschap NL als Organisatie?
MH: Dat is wel een heel uitgebreide vraag! Wij zijn actief op meerdere gebieden en voeren daarbinnen meerdere projecten uit.
Bob: Ik bedoel wat is de Doelstelling, de Missie van Agentschap NL?
MH: Agentschap NL is onderdeel van het ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie. Het maakt zelf geen beleid, maar voert programma’s uit voor 23 opdrachtgevers, verdeeld over 8 verschillende departementen en 15 overige opdrachtgevers zoals decentrale overheden en de Europese Unie.
Bob: Wat zijn de huidige Beleidsprojecten van de Nederlandse overheid?
MH: Het doel van dit kabinet is 14 procent groene stroom in 2020. Om dat te bereiken hebben we de SDE, wat een subsidie is die gericht is op het financieren van de onrendable top. Dit doen ze door de opbrengsten van energieverkoop aan te vullen tot een basistarief. Het subsidie bedrag van de SDE wordt elkaar aangepast. De SDE wordt nu heroverwogen en wordt waarschijnlijk teruggeschroeft zodat er alleen subsidies worden gegeven aan projecten met een hoge capaciteit. Daarnaast is is er de Energie Inversteringsaftrek (EIA), een belastig voordeel voor investeringen in Energiebesparende techniek of duurzame energie. Deze geld echter niet alleen voor duurzame energie maar voor alle inversteringen in energie
Bob: Hoe zit het dan met salderen?
MH: Dat is geen overheidsproject dat uitgevoerd wordt door Agentschap NL, maar een overheidsregel over hoe energieleveranciers particulieren die stroom aan het net leveren behoort te compenseren. 119
Bob: Kunt U daar iets meer over vertellen?
MH: Tja, uhm. Mensen met een Zonnepaneel of boeren bedrijven met een windmolen leveren stroom aan het net terug. Omdat zij geen officiele producenten zijn dienen zij op een andere manier gecompenseert te worden. Even kijken hoe het zat. Er is een platfond van 3000 of 5000 KWH dat teruggeleverd kan worden. Als een particulier dus onder dat platfond produceert, wacht nee, teruglevert aan het net. Vaak wordt geproduceerde stroom direct door particulieren gebruikt dus die wordt niet meegeteld, het gaat dus om terugleveren. Maar goed als je dus onder het platfond blijft dien je van de leverancier waarbij je staat ingeschreven het vaste stroom tarief te ontvangen. Dat is dus niet alleen het de opwekprijs maar ook de energiebelasting en het vastrecht energielevering. Meestal wordt dat dan weggestreept tegen de energie die particulieren nog van het net afnemen om zo de rekening kleiner te maken. Boven het platfond zijn leveranciers verplicht om een redelijke terugleververgoeding te betalen, wat gemonitord wordt door de Directie Toezicht Energie en meestal neerkomt op de gemiddelde electriciteit opwekkosten die rond de 6 cent per KWH liggen.
Bob: Om terug te komen op mijn eerder vraag Hoe efficient zijn voormalige en huidige programmas om de doelstellingen te halen?
MH: Tja de doelstelling is 14 procent van de energie, dus electriciteit en andere energie, in 2020 uit hernieuwbare bronnen te winnen. We zitten nu op 4 procent dus we hebben nog een lange weg te gaan.
Bob: Wat zijn de veranderingen in beleid in de laatste 10 Jaar?
MH: Uhm ja, we hebben een hele rits van projecten gehad met betrekking tot hernieuwbare energie. De belangrijkste is waarschijnlijk de MEP. Die is aan zijn eigen succes ten onder gegaan in 2006. Hij was gericht op het subsidieren van grotere instalaties. De SDE had meer plaats en aandacht voor photovoltaisch, waar jou scriptie over gaat.
Bob: Kunt U specifieker zijn over de verschillende projecten?
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MH: Daarvoor kun je beter contact op nemen met Job Swens, ik zal je zijn gegevens zo geven. Hij heeft de afgelopen tien jaar hier gewerkt en is altijd actief bezig geweest met duurzame energie.
Bob: Welke actoren zijn berokken bij de nedlerandse energie markt en hoe verhouden ze zich onderling? In andere woorden, Hoe werkt de nederlandse energie markt?
MH: Dat is wel een heel uitgebreide vraag, ik weet niet of Agentschap NL daar het juiste aanspreekpunt voor is. Misschien kan je het beter bij de Directie Toezicht energie vragen, die hebben daar meer gedetaileerde kennis over.
Bob: Ik denk dat de informatie die U mij kunt geven voldoende is
MH: Goed dan, Je hebt Producenten, Leveranciers en sinds kort netwerkbeheerders. Netwerkbeheerders zijn het simpelst, die zorgen gewoon dat huizen op het energie net zijn aangesloten en zorgen dat de spanning op het net klopt. Er zijn een aantal regionale netwerkbeheerders die zich bezig houden met de kleinverbruikers, dat zijn Liander, Enexis en Stedin. Daarnaast heb je nog de landelijke hoogspanningsnet beheerder, TenneT, die ook de nationale Programma verantwoordelijke is, wat betekend dat TenneT ervoor moet zorgen dat de invoer van stroom op het hoogspanningsnet gelijk moet zijn aan de uitvoer. Deze netwerkbeheerders bestaan pas sinds het opsplitsen van de energiebedrijven. Daarnaast heb je leveranciers, in theorie kopen die energie van producenten en verkopen ze die aan consumenten. Iedere leverancier heeft een vergunning nodig en een eigen Programma verantwoordelijke die de electriciteitsinvoer van dat bedrijf in balans brengt met de uitvoer. Als een bedrijf te weinig electriciteit invoert, worden andere bedrijven aangespoort om tijdelijk meer stroom in te voeren en worden de kosten verhaald op het bedrijf dat te weinig invoert. Tenslotte zijn er de producenten. In theorie zouden dit onafhankelijke bedrijven zijn. In praktijk zijn producenten gewoon het bezit van de grotere energieleveranciers. Producenten mogen slechts energie leveren aan het net als zij toestemming hebben van een programmaverantwoordelijke van een leverancier. Dit is om te verkomen dat er teveel energie wordt geleverd. In het geval van hoge capaciteit, zoals 121
kolencentrales, kan ook de toestemming van Tennet direct worden gevraagt en kan een energiebedrijf in onderhandeling gaan met meerdere leveranciers. Kleine producten zoals windparken zijn echter meestal gebonden aan een leverancier.
Bob: Aan welke criteria moeten bedrijven voldoen om stroom te mogen produceren en te leveren aan het electriciteitsnetwerk? hoe krijgt met een producenten vergunning?
MH: als leverancier heb je gewoon een vergunning nodig. Die vergunning steld je dan in staat om een programmaverantwoordelijke in te stellen die energiekoopt en verkoopt. Deze vergunning wordt alleen uitgegeven als een bedrijf kan aantonen dat hij voldoende Financiele, organisatorische en technische competenties heeft.
Bob: En hoe zit het dan met Producenten, hebben die een vergunning nodig om te mogen leveren?
MH: Wat je natuurlijk veel ziet is dat electriciteitsproducten een omgevingsvergunning nodig hebben, of om speficieker te zijn een Milieu effect rapportage vergunning moeten hebben voordat zij energie kunnen opwekken. Dat geld ook voor duurzame bedrijven. Zo’n milieu effect rapportage houdt niet alleen rekening met het milieu, maar ook met de leefomgeving en dergelijke. De MEP vergunning is zodoende vaker gebruikt door bewoners om windmolen parken te verbieden. Jou scriptie gaat meer over photovoltaisch, daarbij hebben ze meer last van bestemmingsplannen. In nederland mag je niet zomaar op een veld een zonnenpark bouwen, vaak is die grond dan al gereserveerd voor landbouw of industrie en voldoet photovoltaische opwekking dus niet aan het bestemmingsplan.
Bob: Maar heb je een vergunning nodig om stroom op te mogen wekken?
MH: Nee, daar heb je geen vergunning voor nodig. Je hebt echter wel de toestemming nodig van een Programmaverantwoordelijke van een leverancier. Die leverancier kan jou alleen toestemming geven wanneer hij genoeg vraag heeft voor jou stroom.
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Bob: Wat zijn de effecten van decentrale opwekking voor het electriciteitsnetwerk? is er een limiet aan decentrale opwekking van hernieuwbare energie dat het electriciteitsnetwerk aankan?
MH: tja daar wordt nu onderzoek naar gedaan, en daar is die hele discussie over slimme netten nu natuurlijk gaande over. Op zich hoeft decentrale opwekking geen probleem te zijn, teminste voor windmolens niet, omdat het direct het hoogspanningsnet op gaat, wat wel tegen een stootje kan. Verder is redelijk makkelijk te voorzien wanneer er veel wind staat en kun je dus rekening houden met andere spanning en compenseren. Photovoltaisch is wel een ander verhaal, op zich hoeft het geen probleem te zijn, er zijn op dit moment te weinig zonnenpanelen en zonnepanelen hebben een de lage capaciteit om een bedreiging te vormen voor de kleingebruikersnetten. Maar in het geval dat je een hele wijk met zonnepanelen zou hebben zouden ze op een zonnige dag het net kunnen overladen en plat kunnen leggen. Het echte probleem ligt niet bij zonnenpanelen, die kan je inrekenen, het probleem ligt eerder bij het opladen van electrische autos. Als je drie electrische autos in een wijk hebt kunnen die in korte tijd zoveel stroom trekken dat het hele net plat ligt. Het opladen van electrische autos kan je veel moeilijker voorspellen en meerekenen.
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Appendix VI Interview Job Swens, Joining Objectives for Sustainable World Energy Solutions 19-05-2011 Bob: Wat zijn de veranderingen in de doelstellingen van de overheid op het gebied van Duurzame Energie en Energie Transitie?
Job: Dit weet ik niet zo één, twee, drie uit mijn hoofd. Voor de specifieke details moet je op het internet kijken. Wel weet ik dat er de 20/20/20 doelstelling was. Dit hield in dat er werd nagestreven om 20 procent groene energie te gebruiken, 20 procent CO2 reductie en 20 procent vermindering in algemene energieconsumptie in het jaar 2020. Dit is onlangs, eind 2010 of begin 2011, in ieder geval onder Verhagen, teruggeschroeft naar 14% groene energie in 2020 conform EU regelgeving. Bob: Wat zijn de veranderingen in Beleid de afgelopen tien jaar?
Job: Beleid, uhm, dat weet ik niet echt, of bedoel je Beleidsinstrumenten? Bob: Ja Beleidsinstrumenten
Job: Oh, oke. We hadden eerst de EPR, de Energie Premie Regeling, die in 2003 werd ingesteld en hetzelfde jaar weer werd ingetrokken. Er zijn in dat jaar net zoveel installaties opgesteld als alle installaties van de jaren daarvoor bij elkaar. Deze ging ten onder aan zijn populariteit, er werden veel meer aanvragen gedaan dan dat er budget voor was. hij werd vervangen door de MEP, Milieukwaliteit Elektriciteit productie van eind 2003 tot 2006. Hierin werden per jaar de tarieven voor de verschillende soorten van productie vastgesteld, op basis van een berekening van de onrendabele top en werdt bekosting door een heffing per energie-aansluiting, dus aan de consument. Deze ging ook ten onder zijn eigen succes. Tussen 2006 en 2008 was er geen subsidiebeleid en in 2008 werd de SDE, Stimulering Duurzame energie, geintroduceerd, die zich ook richt op het financiëren van de onrendabele top. Hierbij worden de kosten betaald door de overheid en is het aantal toeweizingen beperkt. Binnen de SDE zijn er ook enorme verschuivingen doorgevoerd, in 2008 werd 100 procent van de particuliere aanvragen toegekend, bedrijven konden in dat jaar geen aanvraag doen. Er was dat jaar sprake van budget overschrijding, die uiteindelijk toch 124
door de overheid werd goedgekeurd waardoor alle aanvragen vervuld konden worden. In 2009 werd 50 procent van de particuliere aanvragen vervuld en één op de dertig bedrijfsaanvragen. In 2010 werd 25% van de particuliere aanvragen aanvaard en en één in de 260 bedrijfsaanvragen. In 2011 werd de SDE afgeschaft en wordt waarschijnlijk vervangen door de SDE plus die zich alleen richt op grootschalige duurzame projecten die een hoog productiecapaciteit hebben.
Bob: Hoe effectief waren deze subsidieprogramma’s?
Job: Tja, op eerste gezicht hebben ze een averechts effect gehad. De insteek die particulieren en bedrijven toen hadden was dat ze duurzame energie moesten produceren omdat hun buurman het ook had, het toch door de overheid gesubsidieerd werd en ze het dus maar moesten nemen. Het feit dat subsidies onzeker zijn geworden doordat er hele periodes waren waarin er geen subsidie beschikbaar was en omdat de SDE een loterij is geworden heeft veel producenten afgeschrokken. Zonder subsidie waren zij niet bereid te investeren in duurzame energie. Wat men wel moet begrijpen is dat de producenten die alleen wilden produceren wanneer er subsidie was, niet waren de actoren die het juiste enthousiasme hadden om bij te dragen aan duurzame energie en energie efficiency, onder het huidige beleid zien we dat er meer actoren zijn die investeren in duurzame energie omdat ze bij willen dragen aan een duurzame toekomst en zij voegen dus oko meer toe aan het scheppen van een duurzame toekomst.
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Appendix VII Survey Perceptions on Solar Panels For this thesis we conducted a survey amongst 193 Dutch train travellers, bar visitors and students. To make sure the survey represented the Dutch population in general, and not just the high educated section of the population, we took care to visit bars that are usually visited by people with lower levels of educations and spent some time on less popular train tracks. A hole in the ability to infer the findings of this survey to the perceptions of the general Dutch population is that the survey did not contact people who drive to their work by car and never visit bars. The aim of this survey was to map the perceptions of the general Dutch populations on solar panels in accordance with the Brandz model of perceptions, which knows five elements: Presence, Relevance, Performance, Advantage and Bonding. With the findings we want to answer the question whether there is basis for consumer social responsibility amongst the general Dutch population. It is furthermore expected to give us insights in general perceptions on solar panels and how those relate to the willingness of the general population to purchase them. The perceptions of insufficient government action are not directly measured in this survey, because they would always be leading. Instead twelve questions were formulated in accordance with the Brandz model. The first one measures Presence, the next three measure Relevance, the fourth to sixth measure Performance, the seventh to tenth measure Advantage and the last two measure Bonding. The questions were in Dutch and were follow here below, the English translations of them can be found later in the appendix. 1. Ik vind zonnepanelen een geschikte manier om electiciteit op te wekker. 2. Ik zie zonnepanelen vooral als een manier om te zorgen voor een langere electriciteitsrekening. 3. Ik zie zonnepanelen vooral als een manier om mijzelf te verzekeren van toegang tot electriciteit. 4. Ik zie zonnepanelen vooral als een manier om bij te dragen aan het milieu. 5. Ik denk dat de kosten van zonnepanelen op dit moment te hoog zijn voor de besparingen op de energie rekening die zij opleveren. 6. Ik denk dat zonnepanelen zorgen voor een zeker toegang tot electriciteit. 7. Ik zie zonnepanelen als een effiënte manier zijn om het milieu te beschermen. 8. Ik denk dat zonnepanelen de beste manier zijn om te zorgen voor een lagere electriciteitsrekening, beter dan alle andere manieren. 9. Ik zie zonnepanelen als de beste manier is om mijzelf te verzekeren van toegang tot electriciteit, beter dan alle andere manieren. 10. In het geval van een toekomstige energiecrisis, zoals een langdurig olie tekort, zou ik zeker een zonnepaneel kopen.
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11. Ik denk dat zonnepanelen de beste manier zijn om het milieu te beschermen, beter dan alle andere manieren. 12. Ik vind dat ik voldoende voor het milieu doe, ookal heb ik geen zonnepaneel
To say anything meaningful about the results of we will need to calculate whether the found number of respondents for a particular response in a particular question differs significantly from the expected number of respondents. For this we will use three measures of significance, 10%, 5% and 1%, as is standard practice in social sciences. We will calculate the values per cell by using confidence intervals of proportions. To find the expected number of respondents per answer we just divided the number of respondents by the number of answers. Another option would have been to structure the number of expected respondents in accordance with a bell curve. We didn’t do this because we couldn’t find a methodological framework for such a structure and because it runs the risk of making the fully agree and fully disagree answers significant to easily.
The H0 would be that there is no unilateral public perception, meaning that every cell would be filled by a proportion not outside of the Confidence interval around 0,2 proportion. Leading to a number of correspondents of the total per question times the proportion. The H1 would indicate a broadly carried public perception CI(0,10): 0,2 ± 1.645 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 197) = 0.154 – 0.246 CI(0,05): 0,2 ± 1.960 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 197) = 0.145 – 0.255 CI(0,01): 0,2 ± 2,576 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 197) = 0.128 – 0.272 CI(0,10): 0,2 ± 1.645 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 168) = 0.149 - 0.251 CI(0,05): 0,2 ± 1.960 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 168) = 0.139 - 0.261 CI(0,01): 0,2 ± 2,576 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 168) = 0.120 - 0.280 CI(0,10): 0,2 ± 1.645 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 191) = 0.152 - 0,248 CI(0,05): 0,2 ± 1.960 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 191) = 0.143 - 0.257 CI(0,01): 0,2 ± 2,576 * (0.2 * 0.8/ 191) = 0.125 - 0.275
(30 - 48) (29 - 50) (25 - 53) (25 - 42) (23 - 44) (20 - 47) (29 - 47) (27 - 49) (24 - 53)
In the following tables only the positive significant deviations have been marked, to avoid a cluttering of marks of significance. * = significant at α = 0.1, ** = significant at α = 0.05, *** = significant at α = 0.01
127
1. I believe Solar Panels are an appropriate way to generate electricity. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
4
15
64***
89***
26
197
This first question aimed at measuring whether or not people know about the existence of solar panels, the presence. A significant proportion of the respondents answered the question Neutral. We believe this is due to the awkward frasing the question. Seeing how presence will always lead to statement that are truisms, this awkwardness could not be avoided. 2. I see solar panels most of all as a means of lowering the electricity bill. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
31
42
50**
46
28
197
We then turned to Relevance, for which we defined three categories: cost, energy security and the environment. This question measured cost as relevant motivation to buy solar panels. Except neutral and Fully agree, none of the outcomes differ significantly from the confidence interval fully agree only differs one point for interval. This indicates that the general Dutch population has no clearcut opinion on cost as motivation to buy solar panels. 3. I see solar panels most of all as a means to secure supply of electricity. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
10
31
62***
49*
45
197
This questions whether energy security is a proper reason to buy solar panels. A significant proportion agrees, a higher proportion is neutral. This indicates that people may not perceive a current problem with energy supply 4. I see solar panels most of all as a means to help the environment. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
7
12
35
92***
51**
197
128
Agree and Fully agree are both highly significant, which indicates that most people associate solar panels with the environment. 5. I think the possible savings on the electricity bills don’t add up to the current cost of solar panels. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
0
7
35
50*
105***
197
Question five indicates that most people don’t believe that solar panels are currently profitable. This undermines cost as a motivation for buying solar panels. 6. I think solar panels truly guarantee access to electricity. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
10
31
62***
49*
45
197
Interestingly question six has the exact same answers as question four. This means that the formulation of the sentence does not clearly make a difference between relevance and performance. It may also indicate, as in the case of question five, that the perceived performance of a product might affect whether or not people see it as a legitimate motivation to purchase solar panels. 7. I think solar panels are an efficient way to protect the environment. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
34
18
15
87***
54***
197
Most people see solar panels as a good way to contribute to saving the environment. This underlines the statement made under question six that performance might drive the perception of relevance. 8. I see solar panels as the best way to reduce my electricity bill. Better than all the other ways. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
30
56***
22
58***
31
197 129
Question eight is the first question concerning advantage. Interestingly there are two significant proportions that agree and disagree on the statement. I think the disagreement find its basis in the premise whether or not solar panels are profitable. In the hypothetical case that they are profitable, they are the best way to reduce bills. The proportion that agrees might agree on the basis on this hypothetical, while the disagreeing proportion might not accept the hypothetical and argue from a “factual” basis. 9. I see solar panels as the best way to guarantee myself of access to electricity. Better than all the other ways. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
48*
26
7
64***
52**
197
Question nine shows high levels of agreement on solar panels as the best way to guarantee energy security. This is interesting, since there is a far lower level of agreement on the effectiveness (performance) of solar panels to guarantee energy supply. It may indicate that solar panels are seen as the only way of securing private energy supply. However since there is no perception of energy scarcity, this private supply of energy seems to be unnecessary. 10. In the case of a future energy crisis, I would certainly purchase a solar panel. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
4
12
41
63***
48***
168
Question ten, which measures bonding, affirms the theory that people vote high on advantage but lower on relevance and performance because they do not currently perceive energy scarcity. In case of energy scarcity most people agree that they would purchase solar panels.
130
11. I see solar panels as the best way as the best way to save the environment. Better than all the other ways. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
2
67***
60***
46
22
197
In a certain manner the inverse of energy security, environmental concerns rank high on relevance and performance, on advantage they are, however, lacking. This means that people accept that there is a problem with the environment and that solar panels can contribute to solving the problem, but that purchasing solar panels is not perceived as the best way to contribute to saving the environment. Other ways of contributing, for example by buying cheap green energy from suppliers, may be perceived as more effective. 12. I believe I do enough to help the environment, even though I don’t have a solar panel. Fully Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Fully Agree
Total
31
36
22
49**
53***
191
Question twelve measures bonding in inverse by asking if people believe they do enough for the environment without buying solar panels. In the case of bonding, people would answer negatively. Many people feel like other actions to help the environment, which they currently undertake are sufficient contributions.
131
