Deterrence, Defense, Arms Race, Security Dilemma, Arms Control, and the Balance of Power
Iwan Sulistyo
Deterrence? • Deterrence à membuat pelbagai ancaman militer yang digunakan untuk mencegah aktor lain melakukan 4ndakan agresif. • Deterrence berupaya menghen4kan segala 4ndakan yang 4dak dikehendaki sebelum terjadi. Prof. Barry Buzan Guru Besar (Emeritus) Ilmu HI, • Konsep deterrence mencakup denial London School of Economics (penyangkalan) dan retalia;on and Poli4cal Science (LSE), (pembalasan). the U.K. h=p://www.en.ism.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/ et_temp/BarryB-22880_200x200.jpg
Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International 2 Relations, MacMillan Press, London, 1987, p. 136.
Deterrence?
• Deterrence strategy à menghen4kan pihak lawan dari penggunaan kekuatan pertama kali yang dilakukannya, bukan menggagalkan suatu serangan setelah serangan itu terjadi. (Buzan, p. 140.) • Prinsip dasar yang sederhana dari deterrence à “one actor prevents another from taking some ac3on by raising the la7er’s fear of the consequences that will ensue.” (Buzan, p. 163.) 3
• Selain deterrence, ada juga konsep defense dan offense. • Terdapat perdebatan dalam pemahaman tentang defense dan deterrence. (Buzan, p. 135) 4
Offense, Deterrence, Defense? • “Offensive opera;ons are ac3ons in which a state uses force to a7ack another state’s military or nonmilitary assets to conquer its territory or compel compliance with policy direc3ves (impose Karen Ruth Adams, associate professor of poli4cal science its will on the other at the University of Montana, state).” the U.S. h=p://grizalum.org/imx/Events/charterday/2015/ BioPhotos/KarenAdams.jpg
K.R. Adams, ‘Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance’, International Security, Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.
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Defense? • Defensive opera;ons à “ac3ons in which a state uses force against another state’s military assets to repel and limit damage from that state’s a7acks to retain control of its territory and avoid having the other state impose its will upon it.” (Adams, p. 53)
K.R. Adams, ‘Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance’, International Security, Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.
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Deterrence?
• Deterrent opera;ons à “ac3ons in which a state prepares to use force or demonstrate its ability to use force to a7ack another state’s nonmilitary assets to deter that state from a7acking it or to deter it from further a7acks once a war has begun.” (Adams, p. 53.) K.R. Adams, ‘Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance’, International Security, Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.
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• Deterrence à “keeping an opponent from doing something by threat of punishment or by possessing capabili3es the adversary knows will block or deny any such a7empt.” • Extended deterrence à “threats designed to deter and protect other countries from an a7ack by a common enemy.” • Defense à “programs and capabili3es designed to repel or deter an enemy a7ack.” • War figh;ng à “the applica3on of violence to achieve one’s poli3cal and military objec3ves.” P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 308.
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Mutual Assured Destruc
• “a nuclear deterrence doctrine that aims to avoid war by reciprocal threat of punishment through an unacceptable level of destruc4on.” P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 312.
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Minimum or Finite Deterrence?
• “a doctrine in which a state maintains a rela4vely small number of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruc4on for use in making deterrence threat.” P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 309.
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Force Posture?
“numbers, types, loca4ons, and other qualita4ve factors concerning a state’s military forces.” P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 312.
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Arms Race?
John Herz, a scholar
of interna4onal rela4ons and law, City College of New York. h=p://rzv039.rz.tu-bs.de/isw/sandra/ lexikon/cmsimpleplus/images/ herz_john_klein.jpg
• Di dalam lingkungan internasional yang sifatnya anarkis, tercipta rasa saling takut antarnegara-bangsa karena adanya pemahaman yang keliru. • Dengan kondisi saling curiga itu, dimensi security menjadi prioritas utama sehingga 4ap-4ap negara-bangsa akan berusaha meraih serta memperkuat keamanan dengan cara meningkatkan military expenditure (belanja militer)-nya. • Selain itu, upaya agar kian unggul dari segi kemampuan militer juga 4dak dapat dilepaskan.
J.H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157-158. Lihat juga J.H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 231.
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Arms Race? • Alhasil, terjadilah perlombaan senjata antarnegara-bangsa. Dengan kata lain, manakala suatu negara mencoba meningkatkan kekuatan militernya, maka negara yang lain, secepat itu pula, juga akan berupaya melakukan hal yang sama. (Herz, p. 231) • Dengan demikian, pada kondisi inilah 4ap negara terjebak di dalam suatu dilema, yang kemudian disebut sebagai dilema keamanan berupa perlombaan senjata (arms racing). (Herz, p. 231) J.H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157-158. Lihat juga J.H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 231.
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Arms race? • Perlombaan senjata à merupakan implikasi dari perkembangan teknologi militer dalam HI. (Buzan, p. 69)
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Arms race? • Perlombaan senjata adalah suatu kondisi yang abnormal, terutama dalam kaitan antara aspek refleksi negara atas persaingan/kompe4si secara poli4k dan aspek perasaan saling takut terhadap potensi kekuatan militer negara lain. (Buzan, p. 70) • Di 44k ini, persoalan yang muncul adalah bagaimana membedakan kondisi yang abnormal ini dari norma perilaku self-defense di bawah suatu struktur yang anarkis? Alhasil, batasan antara normal dan abnormal pun menjadi suatu konsep yang ambigu. (Buzan, p. 70)
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Arms race?
• Arms dynamic (dinamika persenjataan) menjadi terminologi yang digunakan dalam menggambarkan keseluruhan rangkaian tekanan yang menyebabkan 4ap negara-bangsa membangun kekuatan militer, termasuk mengubah jumlah ataupun mutunya. (Buzan, p.73) 16
Arms race? • Di dalam is4lah ‘arms dynamic’ terkandung aspek arms race dan maintenance of the military status quo (gambaran kondisi yang normal dari dinamika persenjataan, yang juga dapat bereskalasi menjadi perlombaan senjata), yang berbeda dari segi derajatnya. (Buzan, pp. 73-74) 17
Arms Race Game (Prisoners’ Dilemma)
(Paul D. Williams, p. 47) 18
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Tiga Model di dalam Arms Race • Dalam perlombaan senjata, ada 3 model yang saling melengkapi yang dapat menjelaskan proses suatu negara dalam meningkatkan kekuatan angkatan bersenjatanya:
1. Model aksi-reaksi; 2. Model struktur domes4k; dan 3. Model impera4f teknologis (Buzan, p. 74)
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1. Model Aksi-Reaksi • Negara-negara mengupayakan penguatan persenjataan mereka karena persepsi ancaman yang dirasakan dari negara lain. Dengan kata lain, model ini menjelaskan bahwa faktor eksternal sebuah negara adalah pendorong utama dari dinamika persenjataan. (Buzan, pp. 74-76).
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Security Dilemma • Prak4s, kondisi seper4 demikian akan memunculkan apa yang kemudian disebut sebagai security dilemma karena 4ap negarabangsa 4dak mudah mengambil langkahlangkah dalam meningkatkan kekuatannya tanpa membuat negara lain merasa kurang aman. • Konsep security dilemma pertama kali dibangun oleh para pemikir seper4 Herbert Bu=erfield, John Herz, dan Robert Jervis.
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Prof. Shiping Tang, Guru Besar pada School of Interna4onal Rela4ons and Public Affairs (SIRPA), Fudan Univeristy, Shanghai, China, menelaah dan kemudian memetakan dengan cukup baik perbandingan konsep security dilemma yang dikemukakan oleh ke4ga pemikir tersebut à Lihat selengkapnya paparan S. Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, pp. 33-96.
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Model Aksi-Reaksi (lanjutan) • Karena model ini terlihat sederhana, tetapi rumit dalam implementasinya, maka di tengah kesulitan dalam upaya mengiden4fikasi hal yang sangat spesifik dari proses aksi-reaksi, Buzan memberikan anjuran dengan melakukan beberapa tahapan yang patut digunakan. (Buzan, p. 84) 24
• Di bagian awal, bisa memulainya dengan menguji idiom (ungkapan) dari aksi-reaksi. Ar4nya, jenis-jenis aksi atau 4ndakan yang dilakukan oleh negara dalam proses. • Kemudian, variabel-variabel dalam pola respon yang dapat diiden4fikasi, terutama: magnitude (besaran atau ukuran), ;ming (pilihan waktu), dan awareness (kesadaran) dari para aktor yang terlibat di dalam proses.
– Magnitude à proporsi reaksi apa yang menunjang untuk memicu terjadinya aksi; – Timing à kecepatan dan urutan interaksi; – Awareness à sejauh mana pihak yang terlibat dalam proses menyadari dampak satu dengan yang lain, dan apakah mereka mengatur perilaku mereka sendiri. (Buzan, p. 84) 25
• Selain ke4ga variabel tadi, hal lain yang 4dak dapat dilepaskan ialah aspek mo
• Idiom-idiom dalam aksi-reaksi – apakah terkait ekonomi dan poli4k atau bahkan militer – dapat terlihat dalam pelbagai bentuk, misalnya perbedaan sistem persenjataan, atau sistem perlengkapan seper4 an4-kapal selam, an4-pesawat tempur atau sistem an4-misil versus kapal selam, serta pengebom dan misil. • Variabel-variabel yang dianalisis ini pun lebih rumit daripada model dasarnya. (Buzan, pp. 79-80 and 82-84) 27
2. Model Struktur Domes
3. Model Impera
Balance of Power? • Sebuah konsep kunci di dalam paradigma realis yang secara umum menunjukkan suatu kondisi ataupun kecenderungan yang seimbang antarnegara. • Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), Part 4. • P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, 3rd edn,.(New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), p. 44.
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• Namun, konsep balance of power ini masih sangat luas. • Ada is4lah lain, yakni ‘strategic stability’, yang menggambarkan perimbangan kekuatan antarnegara dengan lebih jelas. • Is4lah strategic stability ini sendiri memang berlatar-belakang Perang Dingin antara dua kekuatan adidaya, AS dan Uni Soviet, di mana yang menjadi fokus telaah adalah senjata nuklir.
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Strategic Stability
h=p://www.reading.ac.uk/web/ Mul4mediaFiles/spirs-staff-colingray.jpg
Colin Gray, Guru Besar Hubungan Internasional dan Kajian Strategis pada University of Reading, the U.K.
“Strategic stability, regarded technically strictly in military terms, was deemed to reside in a context where neither side could secure a major advantage by striking first. In the contemporary jargon of defence analysis, a stable context was one in which the first-strike bonus was low or negligible. Such a context was said to be ‘crisis stable’. The most popular thesis in the West was that strategic stability was ensured by the mutual ability of the superpowers to inflict unacceptable damage upon each other in any and all circumstances. This strategic – perhaps an3-strategic – condi3on came to be known as mutual assured destruc3on (MAD). The roles of society were to pay for the nuclear armed forces and to serve uncomplainingly as hostage to the prudent and sober behavior of its poli3cal leaders.”
C.S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 213.
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Threats “The threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are real. The possibility that terrorists might acquire and use nuclear weapons is an urgent and poten4ally catastrophic challenge to global security. There is bipar4san agreement in the United States that the biological threat is a significant concern. And while chemical weapons receive significantly less a=en4on, the historical record shows that they are, by far, the most widely used and widely proliferated weapons of mass destruc4on.” h=p://www.n4.org/threats/ 33
Anarchy? • “The absence of poli4cal authority. Interna4onal poli4cs or the interna4onal system is said to be anarchic as there is no world government — no central or superordinate authority over states, which retain their sovereign rights.” • “In a world characterized by anarchy, there is no world government or central authority, much less one with the necessary power to constrain states or other organized groups from using force or engaging in warfare. In such a world, some states may choose to use force to achieve their objec4ves. When these ac4ons confront other states, armed conflict may be the result.”
P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 298.
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• Di dalam kondisi yang anarkis, 4ap4ap negara-bangsa akan terus berupaya memperkuat power-nya dengan mempertangguh persenjataannya, baik dari segi kualitas maupun kuan4tas. • Kondisi tersebut memunculkan perlombaan senjata dan security dilema. 35
• Pertanyaan yang muncul kemudian: Bagaimana mengendalikan perilaku agresif yang tanpa batas tersebut? à Mekanisme disarmament dan arms control
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Disarmament • “Disarmament is the most direct – and in a sense the crudest – response to the problem of military means. Its logic is that since weapons create the problem, the solu4on is to get rid of them. This logic can be applied to all weapons – general and complete disarmament (GCD) – or to specific categories of weapons deemed to be par4cularly dangerous, such as nuclear bombs and biological warfare agents. It can be applied unilaterally or mul4laterally, and can involve par4al or complete elimina4on of the specified type(s) of weapon. The concept refers both to the process by which military capabili4es are reduced, and to the end condi4on of being disarmed.” (Buzan, p. 237) 37
Arms Control • “Like disarmament, arms control is also concerned with the impact of technology on the arms dynamic and deterrence strategies. Although it shares this root, arms control is less ambi4ous and more sophis4cated than disarmament. It differs fundamentally from disarmament in the principles that govern its approach to the problem of military means.” (Buzan, p. 252) • “The ul4mate objec4ve of disarmament is to render arms racing and deterrence both unnecessary and impossible.” (Buzan, p. 252) 38
Arms Control and Disarmament Ada yang menyederhanakan kedua konsep tersebut dengan pemahaman bahwa: 1. Arms control à mengurangi, membatasi, mengendalikan persenjataan 4dak secara menyeluruh. 2. Disarmament à mengurangi secara total/ keseluruhan. • Kedua cara di atas biasanya dilakukan lewat trea;es atau regimes (perjanjian/kesepakatan atau rezim) oleh dua atau lebih negara/aliansi.
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Pelbagai trea;es atau regimes yang berkaitan dengan arms control dan disarmament • Biological Weapons – Mul4lateral • Conven3on on the Prohibi3on of the Development, Produc3on and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) • Protocol for the Prohibi3on of the Use in War of Asphyxia3ng, Poisonous, or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)
h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
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Pelbagai trea;es atau regimes yang berkaitan dengan arms control dan disarmament • Chemical Weapons – Bilateral • India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons
– Mul4lateral • Conven3on on the Prohibi3on of the Development, Produc3on, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruc3on (CWC)
– Regional • Mendoza Agreement h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
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Pelbagai trea;es atau regimes yang berkaitan dengan arms control dan disarmament • Conven4onal Weapons – Mul4lateral
• Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) • Treaty on Conven3onal Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) • Treaty on Open Skies
• Nuclear Safety – Mul4lateral
• Conven3on on Nuclear Safety • Conven3on on the Physical Protec3on of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) • Joint Conven3on on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioac3ve Waste Management h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
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Pelbagai trea;es atau regimes yang berkaitan dengan arms control dan disarmament • Nuclear Weapons – Bilateral
• India-Pakistan Non-A7ack Agreement • Joint Declara3on of South and North Korea on the Denucleariza3on of the Korean Peninsula • Lahore Declara3on • Strategic Arms Limita3on Talks (SALT I) • Strategic Arms Limita3on Talks (SALT II) • Strategic Offensive Reduc3ons Treaty (SORT) • Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federa3on on Measures for the Further Reduc3on and Limita3on of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) • Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive Reduc3ons (START I) • Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive Reduc3ons (START II) • Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimina3on of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (INF Treaty) • Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE Treaty) • Treaty on the Limita3on of An3-Ballis3c Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) • US-DPRK Agreed Framework h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
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Contoh trea;es atau regimes yang berkaitan dengan arms control dan disarmament • Nuclear Weapons – Mul4lateral
• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) • Interna3onal Conven3on on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism • Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Par3al Test Ban Treaty) (PTBT) • Treaty on the Non-Prolifera3on of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) • Treaty on the Prohibi3on of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruc3on on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty) • African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) • Antarc3c Treaty • Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ) • Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia • Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty (Bangkok Treaty) • South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty of Rarotonga • Treaty for the Prohibi3on of Nuclear Weapons in La3n America and the Caribbean (LANWFZ) (Tlatelolco Treaty) h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
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Contoh trea;es atau regimes yang berkaitan dengan arms control dan disarmament • Nuclear Weapons – Proposed Mul
h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
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Pelbagai trea;es atau regimes yang berkaitan dengan arms control dan disarmament • Space Arms Control – Mul4lateral • Agreement Governing the Ac3vi3es of States on the Moon and Other Celes3al Bodies (Moon Agreement) • Conven3on on the Registra3on of Objects Launched in Outer Space (Launch Registra3on Conven3on) • Treaty on Principles Governing the Ac3vi3es of States in the Explora3on and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes3al Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)
h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/
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ARMS DYNAMIC • • • • • • •
disarmament arms control arms reduc4on arms maintenance military moderniza4on arms build up arms race 47
Arms Dynamic • Disarmament • Arms control • Arms reduc4on • Arms maintenance • Military moderniza4on • Arms build up • Arms race
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“Trust, but verify”
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Data?
• Data apa yang lazim dijadikan sebagai rujukan/bahan analisis atau riset tentang militer/ pertahanan, perimbangan kekuatan militer, serta pelbagai isu strategis lainnya? 50
IISS
(the Interna
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h=p://www.sipri.org/
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