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The Relationship Between the Catholic Church and the Communist Party in Hungary, 1945-1948 Balázs Czetz

University of Miskolc

Abstract This chapter describes the relationship and the confrontation between the Roman Catholic Church and the Communist Party at the beginning of the so-called Rákosi system. Since its foundation, the Hungarian Catholic Church has constituted an integral part of state history. It had a strong economic, social and cultural influence on Hungary (e.g. it was the biggest land owner until the land redistribution of 1945, and maintained 63 per cent of the elementary schools). After 1945, the relationship between churches and the state became a fundamental issue in Hungarian political life. The leaders who treated atheism as an everyday political issue considered the struggle against religion to be an important goal and began to attack the churches (especially the Catholics) as soon as possible. At the end of this process (1950-51) the schools owned by the churches were nationalised, holy orders were banned, the Priests for Peace movement was established and a forced agreement was signed between the state and the Catholic Church. A totalitárius rendszerek közös jellemzője, hogy az egyházakat is, és a vallásukat szabadon gyakorolni akaró hívőket is ellenségeiknek tekintik. Ámbár a katolikus egyházat a második világháború alatt jelentős személyi és anyagi veszteségek érték, ettől függetlenül a társadalomra gyakorolt hatása nem csökkent. Magyarországon a fordulat évében egyedül a katolikus egyház rendelkezett olyan társadalmi befolyással, amely már az államhatalom számára is konkurenciát jelentett. Az egyházi intézmények, egyesületek olyan funkciót töltöttek be, amelyre nagy szüksége volt a háború pusztításait követően az országnak, velük szemben a hívők (és nem hívők) részéről is komoly elvárások fogalmazódtak meg. A korszakban a lakosság túlnyomó többsége – mintegy háromnegyede – ehhez a valláshoz tartozott. Mellette a kisegyházak, szekták semmilyen tekintetben nem jelentettek konkurenciát a kommunista pártnak, arról nem is beszélve, hogy ezeket akár rendőri, akár adminisztratív intézkedésekkel könnyedén “kordában lehetett tartani”. A protestáns felekezetek, részint nemzeti egyházak voltak, s mint ilyenek nem rendelkeztek egyetemes központtal, így könnyebben lehetett rájuk kényszeríteni a kommunista párt akaratát. Ezzel szemben a magyarországi katolikus egyház 1945 után nem közvetlenül, hanem az Apostoli Szentszéken keresztül szabályozta viszonyát az államhatalommal, amely a kommunista Religion, Intelligence and Power in the Cold War

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párt számára elfogadhatatlan volt. Nem elhanyagolható tényező a katolikus egyháznak az oktatási, kulturális életben elfoglalt pozíciója, valamint az, hogy az egyház vagyona (az 1945-ös földosztás “veszteségei” után is) 1948-ban még mindig jelentősnek számított. A kommunista párt éppen ezért az egyházakban – különösen a római katolikus egyházban – jelentős konkurenciát látott és minden lehetőséget megragadott, hogy ellehetetlenítse őket. Az államhatalom a jól ismert és bevált módszert alkalmazva lépésről lépésre lehetetlenítette el az egyházakat, mindvégig hangsúlyozva az állam és az egyház szétválasztásának szükségességét. A kisebb tömegbázissal rendelkező protestáns felekezetek 1948 őszén kénytelenek voltak tárgyalóasztalhoz ülni és megegyezni a hatalommal. Nem kerülhették ezt el az izraeliták sem, akik 1948 decemberében kényszerültek rá, hogy elfogadják a kormány által diktált feltételeket. Ezeket a folyamatokat azonban megelőzte a Parlament által 1948. június 16-án az iskolák államosításáról szóló törvény elfogadása. Több mint 4500 iskolát – zömében katolikust – vettek állami tulajdonba. A kibontakozó kampány és ellenkampány megosztotta az ország lakosságát, ebben a túlfűtött hangulatban a Pócspetrin történt tragédia jó ürügyet szolgáltatott az államosítás mielőbbi lebonyolításához. A vallás- és közoktatásügyi miniszter ugyan ígéretet tett arra, hogy a kötelező vallásoktatást az állam továbbra is fenntartja, ennek ellenére 1949. szeptember 6-án az Elnöki Tanács 1949. évi 5. számú törvényerejű rendelete a hitoktatást fakultatívvá tette. Mindezek mellett az egyházakkal és főleg a katolikus felekezettel szemben fokozódott a kommunista propaganda. Különösen Mindszenty József ellen folytatott a párt aktív lejárató kampányt. A hercegprímás személye már régóta szálka volt a kommunista hatalom szemében. Mindszenty az ottawai Mária Világkongresszus után határozta el a magyar Boldogasszony Év megrendezését. A püspöki karral egyeztetve a Mária Év megnyitását 1947. augusztus 15-ére tűzték ki, melyre Esztergomban került sor. A szentévet hivatalosan 1948. december 8-án zárták le. A kommunista vezetés a zarándoklatokat folyamatosan figyelemmel követte, nem egy esetben zavarta, sőt igyekezett azokat megakadályozni. 1948 szeptemberében Celldömölkön karhatalommal próbálták a zarándokokat távol tartani a várostól száj- és körömfájás járványra hivatkozva. Az év folyamán a katolikus egyház elleni támadások egyre erősödtek, sőt mind inkább konkretizálódott a kommunisták ellenségképe is. Mindszenty József egyre inkább a támadások kereszttűzébe került. A magyarországi katolikus egyház első embereként az államhatalom – kezdetben burkoltan majd mind nyíltabban – a klerikális reakció elleni harc jegyében őt kiáltotta ki bűnbaknak. Csakúgy ahogy az iskolák államosításának előkészítése során tették, most is a közvélemény „megdolgozásával” indult a Mindszenty ellenes akció. Az országos és helyi pártsajtókban egyre nyíltabban bírálták a hercegprímást és ugyanezt tették a párt és az állam elsőilletve másodvonalbeli szereplői is. Alapos előkészítés után 1948 karácsonyán került sor a letartóztatására, majd a következő évben egy koncepciós per során életfogytiglani börtönbüntetésre ítélték. Az események, amelyek a kommunista párt és a katolikus egyház szembenállását jellemezték, 1948 második felében felgyorsultak, és mindinkább határozott formát öltöttek.

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Az osztályharc tovább “éleződött”, fő célpontja pedig a polgári társadalom ekkorra szinte egyedüli letéteményese a katolikus egyház lett. Mindezeken túl a párt vezetése az egyház elleni harcot összekapcsolta a jómódú parasztság elleni támadással. A korabeli retorika kedvenc fordulatává vált a “klerikális reakció palástja mögé bújó kulák” kifejezés. A hatalmas nyomás hatására a püspöki kar képtelen volt tovább halogatni a tárgyalásokat, amelyek 1950 júniusában indultak meg, és az augusztus 30-ai megegyezéssel zárultak. Ez a kierőszakolt megegyezés az egyházvezetők, a papság és a hívők számára is súlyos csalódással járt. A megígértekkel szemben csupán nyolc iskolát kapott vissza a katolikus egyház, sőt a szerzetesrendeket is feloszlatták. Az egyezményből kiolvasható az az állami elképzelés, hogy a katolikus egyház 18 év alatt fokozatosan el fog sorvadni, így azon túl állami támogatásra nem lesz szüksége. A megegyezés negatívumai ellenére a papság körében bizakodó hangulat lett úrrá. Remélték, hogy az állam részéről csökkenni fog a zaklatás, és a továbbiakban lehetőségük lesz a normális életre. A fordulat évétől kezdődően a klérus elleni támadás erősödött, amely az 1950 augusztusában aláírt megállapodás után sem csökkent. Az Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal felállításával a felekezetek mozgástere tovább szűkült. Mindszenty után Grősz Józsefet is letartóztatták és elítélték, vele együtt számos püspök került házi őrizetbe. A vagyonától, oktatási intézményeitől és karizmatikus vezetőitől megfosztott Magyarországi Katolikus Egyházra súlyos és viszontagságos évek vártak.

Introduction From its foundation, the Hungarian Catholic Church constituted an integral part of state history. This chapter examines the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Communist Party in the post-war years – a period in which the new powers determined themselves as Marxist (which was equivalent to atheist), and placed the separation of state and church on the agenda. However, the Stalinist dictatorship did not intend this separation to make the church autonomous, but rather to influence churches’ and pastors’ activities as the first step towards the final – although not stated directly – dissolution of churches and religion. Essentially, Marx’s statement about religion determines the relationship between the Communist Party and religion. According to Marx, religion is nothing else than superstition originating from ignorance, the opium of masses which the exploiting class uses to dull the despair people feel over misery in the present world by promises of a non-existent happiness beyond the grave1. Lenin went further than this: “Religion is one of the forms of spiritual oppression which everywhere weighs down heavily upon the masses of the people, over burdened by their perpetual work for others, by want and isolation2.” Four years later, his affirmation was worded even more strongly: “We must combat religion, that is the ABC of all materialism, and consequently of Marxism3.” After 1945, the relationship between churches and the state became a fundamental issue in Hungarian political life, especially since Hungary had, like its northern, eastern and southern neighbours, become part of the Soviet sphere of interest as the result of the Religion, Intelligence and Power in the Cold War

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military-political situation after the Second World War. Stalin summarized his goals after the war as follows: “This war is different than the old ones; the one that occupies a territory, forces its own social system on it as well4.” In terms of the rate and degree of sovietization in Hungary, at first the Soviet leadership assumed that a period of transition would be necessary. The Hungarian Communists of Moscow, who were aware of Stalin’s ideas, decided in the autumn of 1944 that unlike the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, they would not strive for the immediate realization of Communism, but would try to adjust to Stalin’s conception. They tried to endow the developing new system with a national and democratic character in order to obtain support from the larger masses. As a result of this, the party’s chosen name was the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) (instead of the Party of Hungarian Communists), the redistribution of land was supported and the national colours appeared in their symbols next to the colour red. For similar reasons, they decided, at least in the beginning, that opposition parties could take part in the rebuilding of the state. Stalin chose Mátyás Rákosi as primary leader5. Rákosi’s background was a guarantee of his loyalty towards Moscow. Ernő Gerő, József Révai and Mihály Farkas were also part of the higher echelons of leadership. The ideology of the Communist Party made it supremely important to gain control over culture and the creative intelligentsia. The regime saw itself as the source of all cultural and other assets in society. Every social, cultural or educational phenomenon became a political issue or underwent extreme politicization.

Religious denominations

Census 1910 population: 18 264 533




Roman Catholic

9 010 305 (49.3%)

5 634 103 (64.9%)

6 122 583 (65.7%)

6 240 427 (67.8%)

Greek Catholic

2 007 916 (11.0%)

201 093 (2.3%)

233 672 (2.5%)

248 355 (2.7%)

Lutheran

2 333 979 (12.8%)

39 839 (0.5%)

38 321 (0.4%)

36 010 (0.4%)

Orthodox

1 306 684 (7.1%)

534 065 (6.1%)

557 647 (6.0%)

482 152 (5.2%)

Reformed

2 603 381 (14.3%)

1 813 162 (20.9%)

1 934 892 (20.8%)

2 014 707 (21.9%)

Unitarian

74 296 (0.4%)

6266 (0.1%)

8465 (0.1%)

9447 (0.1%)

Jewish

911 229 (5.0%)

444 567 (5.1%)

400 980 (4.3%)

138 862 (1.5%)

Source: M. Balogh, J. Gergely, Egyházak az újkori Magyarországon 1790-1992, Budapest 1996. p. 170.


171

During the war, the Catholic Church also suffered significant losses but aside from this, its impact on society had not decreased. The churches in Hungary possessed great social prestige in the 20th century. They were also important forces in various social fields, such as education and childcare, charitable work, medical care, and local cultural activity. Examining the distribution of religion in the state’s population, the Catholic character of the 20th century had not altered in spite of all the adverse change. Until 1949 the number of Catholics in the state increased – although by just a few percent.

First

surprise: land reform

Jusztinián Serédi, Prince Primate, head of the Hungarian Catholic Church since 1927, died on 29 March 1945. The Pope appointed József Mindszenty, Bishop of Veszprém, as the Archbishop of Esztergom. The Provisional National Government noted the decision and greeted the head of the Hungarian Catholic Church with a telegramme when he took the Archbishop’s seat in Esztergom in October 19456. The Provisional National Government’s decree on land reform, accepted on 17 March 1945, caused a fundamental change in the life of the Catholic Church. The decree’s aim was to find a solution for agricultural reform, which had been necessary for a long time. According to the decree (which later became law) the size of the available territory was 5.6 million “hold”, out of which 3.2 million “hold” (58%) were distributed among the 642.000 land claimants7. Large and medium-size landed properties ceased to exist. Instead small landed properties of on average 5 “hold” were established. According to the 1935 survey, the landed properties of the Catholic Church were 862.700 “hold”, 765.684 “hold” of which were redistributed during the land reform8. Bishops, religious orders, and seminaries could keep 100 “hold” while the parishes could only keep 309. The redistribution of land fundamentally shook the financial base of the Catholic Church. Thereafter, the maintenance of the church and church institutions was the task of the believers and the state10. Significant changes also took place in the field of diplomatic relations. Under Soviet pressure, Archbishop Angelo Rotta, the papal legate, had to leave Hungary at the beginning of April 1945 and therefore the diplomatic relationship with the Holy See ended. Rotta had remained in his post and tried to help those persecuted after the Hungarian Nazis’ takeover. By doing so, he acknowledged the Szálasi government and had to leave because of the decision of the Allied Control Commission (actually the Soviets). According to Rotta, Voroshilov explained the withdrawal of his diplomatic status as a result of Hungary becoming part of the zone occupied by the Soviet Union. As the Soviets did not have diplomatic relations with the Vatican, Rotta had to leave as well. Later, the Communists tried to utilize this fact to their advantage, assuming – and remarking with good reason – that it was easier to bring the Catholics to their knees when they were isolated from Rome11. The first parliamentary election after the war was held on 4 November 1945. The result was the formation of a coalition government under the leadership of the Smallholders’ Party12. Of the entitled voters, 92.4 % took part in the election. The Smallholders’ Party Religion, Intelligence and Power in the Cold War

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acquired 57.03% of the votes while the Communist Party reached 16.95%13. Under the distribution of ministerial portfolios, both the Communists and the Social Democrats got three each. Communists directed the Ministry of the Interior and the policy that ensued later14. The declaration of the state form was one of the first decisions made by Parliament. The Republic of Hungary was announced on 1 February 1946. The Parliament accepted a similarly determinative law in February 1946, when the legislation on providing penal-law protection for the democratic system of government and Republic was passed. In accordance with this law, anyone who united against the Republic or carried on propaganda connected to such opposition, committed a crime and could expect a penalty. Considering that the police state security and the courts at this time were under Communist influence, the use of this law started the dissolution of Christian organizations and, subsequently, of civil parties.

The

dissolution of

Catholic

organizations

The left-wing press accused Catholic organizations of conspiring in schools and with the Smallholders’ Party. According to tried and tested methods, ‘fascist’ leaflets, newspapers and weapons appeared, which the ‘conspirators’ used to try to counter the new democracy and the Red Army. Countless innocent people fell victim to invented charges. Beyond weakening the Smallholders’ Party, the Communists attacked the Catholic Church, too. Priests in particular were accused of leading and planning organizations. Szaléz Kiss, a Franciscan priest, was a victim of such a process and was executed along with his three young associates. The Hungarian authorities did not risk a public trial as there was no incriminating evidence or confessions against the tortured Szaléz Kiss. Therefore they gave him to the Soviets, who sentenced him to death and executed him. “Heckling campaigns” against Catholic organizations intensified in the press and reached a peak in the middle of June 1946. The shooting of two soldiers and of István Pénzes in Budapest were presented by the Soviet and the Hungarian authorities in such a way that Pénzes seemed to have committed the murders15. Contradictory accounts appeared in the press but all emphasized that Pénzes was either a scout or a KALOT [National Body of Catholic Agricultural Youth Societies] member16. It is likely that the destiny of church organizations had already been decided but this case served as a good excuse to dismantle them. The Communists made it clear to the media that organizations whose members “murder Soviet soldiers” could no longer operate in the state. László Rajk, Minister of Interior, began the dissolution of the Catholic organizations in July 194617. As a first step, all organizations were placed under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior, which ordered a review of all organizations and only subsequently made decisions about the withdrawal or re-issuing of operational permits. According to the decree, approximately 1500 organizations were dismantled. The social base of the Catholic Church was shaken by this decree. Furthermore, the suppression of Catholic-minded education through the dissolution of organizations which were popular among young people was an obvious target for Communist lead-


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ers. In vain, Mindszenty protested to the Prime Minister18. Attacks against Catholics continued, and in addition to the show trials and the dissolution of organizations, everyday worship became more and more difficult. For example, the national Corpus Christi procession was not authorized on its regular route but only on minor roads. The Communist power, which became stronger and stronger, still considered the Catholic Church to be one of its main enemies. One of the most important reasons for this was that the Catholic Church, with Pope Pius XII at its head, pledged itself to the civil democracy that had won the war. The Pope stated repeatedly that the Church supported the civil democratic world with the United States at its head19. In the Communist states this was considered to be an alliance with imperialism and the Catholic Church was considered as part of the enemy camp. Aside from this, Rákosi and his fellow leaders were aware that only the Catholic Church had a social influence in Hungary that could compete with the state authority. The religious institutions and organizations had performed functions that the state needed after the devastation of the war. The believers and the non-believers developed serious expectations of the religious institutions and organizations. The role of the church as a cultural mediator was indisputable – as it is today – which is why the strengthening Communist powers were suspicious and kept all church activities under a close watch. The small churches and sects were not rivals to the Communist Party and not even the police or administrative measures could keep a tight rein on them. The Protestant denominations were partly national churches, and as such did not have general centres. As a result, they could more easily be forced to submit to the will of the Communist Party. On the other hand, the Hungarian Catholic Church did not directly regulate its relationship with the state government except through the Holy See, which was unacceptable to the Communist Party20. The educational and cultural position of the Catholic Church was immense. Its property was still considered significant even after the losses in the land redistribution in 1945. Precisely for this reason the Communist Party saw significant rivalry from the churches – especially the Roman Catholic Church – and seized every single opportunity to wreck them. After the aggressive dissolution of church organizations, Communist power turned against schools that were still in religious hands. Negative remarks appeared in leftwing papers, the schools were accused of low-level education and of an antidemocratic mentality. The issue of optional religious education and revision of religious textbooks appeared on the agenda as the first step21. The issue was raised – on the suggestion of the Communists – by the Smallholders’ Party. It suggested the repeal of compulsory religious education and the introduction of consistent textbooks. Because of protests by the bishops’ conference and the religious masses, Parliament did not discuss the issue. The left-wing thought the time for the separation of the churches had not yet arrived, especially since parliamentary elections were to take place late in the summer of 1947. The Communists wanted to gain overwhelming victory in those elections, so they felt the need to win over the masses – including the religious. They were again disappointed by the elections (which were marred by electoral fraud), held on 31 August. They manReligion, Intelligence and Power in the Cold War

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aged to increase their vote only from 17% to 22%. At the same time, the number of votes for the Smallholders’ Party decreased from 57% to 15%. In total, the left-wing parties reached 45%, the Smallholders’ Party and succession parties 50%22. Setting aside the tactics of a gradual assumption of authority, as the Soviet-American rivalry intensified, Stalin decided to accelerate sovietization. At a meeting held in connection with the establishment of Cominform in September 1947, the area’s Communist leaders were informed that the aim was now for the earliest possible finalization of sovietization23. In accordance with this, the tactics of the Hungarian Communists changed. This affected their relationship with the churches.

The Marian Year The other important event of 1947 was the opening of the Marian Year. Mindszenty decided on the organization of the Hungarian Marian Year after the international Marian Congress in Ottawa in May. The opening of Marian Year was set for 15 August 1947 and took place in Esztergom. The holy year officially closed on 8 December 1948. The Prince Primate attended the Marian days’ programmes and made speeches in front of large crowds on numerous occasions over the course of the year. The Communists found provocation in the public appearances of the Prince Primate and therefore did everything to limit them. Beyond the administrative hindrances (they did not allow the processions on public domains, hindered the usage of loudspeakers needed for public address, etc.), they tried to keep the believers away from the events with invented excuses. A typical example of this is the case in Celldömölk where they tried to send thousands of people away on the grounds of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Naturally they did not always succeed in disturbing the course of programmes and keeping the masses away. When they were unsuccessful, the local Communist leaders tried – bearing in mind the instructions of their superiors – to collect as much information as possible about the Marian days’ events. After long negotiations, the diocesan pilgrimage was held in association with the consecration of the pilgrimage and high altar in Bodajk in Fejér county on 25 and 26 September 1948. The Prince Primate participated in the event and, along with Archbishop Shvoy, gave a speech. The county’s party leadership could not prevent the festival, which was a tradition hundreds of years old, but did warn the priests of the area in advance that they would be held personally responsible for any disturbances during the procession. Party propagandists were continuously present at the events which lasted for two days. More than 500 activists closely followed the believers in the mass of twenty to thirty thousand people. The Prince Primate’s speech received particular attention. Two activists hidden in the crowd took shorthand notes of Mindszenty’s words24. Besides the XXXIV Eucharistic World Congress held in Budapest in 1938, the Marian Year was the most important religious event of the 20th century in the history of the church. Altogether 4.6 million people participated in the programmes, masses, and pilgrimages during the course of the year despite all the efforts of the Communist pow-


175

ers25. However, the year 1947 brought changes to the already shaken financial situation of the Catholic Church. The differences between the accepted and acknowledged denominations disappeared in terms of a law (no. XXXIII) passed at the end of that year. In accordance with this law, the benefits of the Catholic Church ended. One of the most serious consequences of this was the termination of the practice of handling state taxes together with church taxes. The Catholic Church now had to take care of the collection of the latter.

The

nationalization of schools

Adjusting to Soviet expectations, Communist propaganda against the church increased at the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948. Rákosi emphasized more openly that the time for dissolution had come26. He had already determined this when in January 1948, in his report to the officials of the Hungarian Communist Party (HCP), he said that most of the enemies of the Hungarian nation were hiding under the cloak of the Catholic Church: “finally, the settlement of the relationship between the church and national Republic is among this year’s tasks of democracy”27. Rákosi’s speech was an open declaration of war and it was obvious to the audience – although he did not say it explicitly in his speech – that the “dissolution” would happen in 1948. However, the Protestants were the first target. Using subversion and intimidation, the Communists tried to limit the operation and the state’s relationship with Protestants through the framing of an agreement. During 1948, agreements with all historical churches and denominations, except the Catholic Church, came into being. The Hungarian Reformed Church had already started negotiations on 21 May and signed an agreement with the Hungarian Republic on 7 October. In this agreement, the state would pay contributions – decreasing over time – for twenty years. After that time, the Reformed Church could keep four theological colleges and four grammar schools. The representatives of the Hungarian Unitarian Church signed the agreement on the same day. The leaders of the Jewish denomination signed the forced agreement on 7 December, while the representatives of the Hungarian Lutheran Church did so on 14 December.28 Only the Catholic Church now had an unsettled relationship with the state, which already considered the Catholic Church as its ‘main enemy’. Beyond the compromise with the other denominations, Catholics confronted serious new trials in 1948. József Révai made it absolutely clear in a speech in December 1947 that education was the task of the state, especially as the church-run schools were maintained by the state29. It became obvious from his speech that the next target of Communist campaigning would be the denominational schools. The left-wing press published writings on the poor level of education and bad provision of church-run schools. Agitators visited the communities and tried to induce the population to support the state control of schools30. Aside from higher standards of education, they promised better conditions, higher teacher wages, and career possibilities. The priests and teachers of course tried to convince the masses that secularisation was unnecessary. They emphaReligion, Intelligence and Power in the Cold War

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sized that it would be another step towards the state power becoming totalitarian. The planned secularisation and the heckling campaign around it divided the population. It was in this tense situation that the tragedy happened in Pócspetri, as a consequence of which the state suspended the negotiations and settled the issue using force31. Schools were nationalized by law in June 1948. A total of 4597 schools – 3094 of which were Catholic – were taken from the churches countrywide32.

The

target is

Mindszenty

József Mindszenty consistently represented the interests of the church in its dispute with the state. The upper clergy stood by him, although sometimes hesitantly. That is why the Communist Party aimed to disrupt the prelacy using intrigue, hoping that it could create distrust among the irresolute priests and prelacy. In achieving its target, it could rely on the lower echelons of the party and loyal Communist members from the public administration. Before Christmas 1948, parish clerks personally requested the priests and clergymen in the territory of Fejér county to take the side of democracy during the ceremonial sermon in terms of “struggle against clerical reaction”. The result, recorded in the report of the Föispán [head of the county administration] on the last day of the year that 30 Catholic and 31 Reformed priests (out of 136 priests of 99 communities of the county) acceded the “request” and “favoured the results of people’s democracy”. At the same time two Catholic priests categorically refused the request and “made statements against democracy”. Fifty-seven Catholic and 17 Reformed priests refused the request, mostly because they had to avoid politics in the pulpit33. Although most of the Catholic priests opposed directly or indirectly the ever stronger Communist power, there were those who supported it. Dénes Szittyay, priest of Bakonykúti, sympathised openly with the Communist leadership and stated this at every possible opportunity34. He received a letter from the Communist Party in 1945 thanking him “as a Hungarian freedom-fighter, understanding the spirit of nowadays”. The party secretary of Fejér county was “seized with special emotion” when he read in the secretary of Mór district’s report that Szittyay “asked for God’s blessing for the work of the Communist Party”. Following this, the priest continued to defend the Communist Party, “spoke for the Communists in services” and was willing to make speeches at HCP meetings. The priest strongly agitated in favour of the Communist Party ahead of the 1947 elections. He was even candidate of the county. Finally in April 1948, a countrywide scandal arose around him. During László Rajk’s visit, Szittyay handed bread to the Minister of the Interior and greeted him as a member of a party that had made the land redistribution possible. During the meeting, the priest took a seat on the platform among the representatives of the Workers’ Party, Smallholders’ Party and Peasants’ Party. Following this – having enough of his political appearances – Lajos Shvoy, bishop of the county, forbade Szittyay to practice the clerical profession. The bishop was thereupon attacked extensively by the local and national press, and portrayed as somebody hounding a simple priest of the nation.


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The secretary of the county contacted the central leadership of the party on the ejected priest’s behalf and suggested that he “should quickly be placed as a language teacher in a secondary school”35. The higher leaders of the party turned out to be more generous than this, and Szittyay became ministerial counsellor at the Ministry of Religion and Education36. Rákosi wrote about this in his memoirs: We immediately assisted Dénes Szittay [correctly: Szittyay], brought him to Budapest, employed him straight away, ensured that his suspension was not discouraging to the other democratic parties, but on the contrary, everybody involved should see that democracy does not allow its believers to be persecuted within the church37.

A very important step in the strengthening of the Communist Party was the Congress of the HCP IV and the SDP XXXVII held on 12 June 1948, where the merger of the two parties was declared, establishing the Hungarian Workers’ Party. The attacks against the Catholic Church became stronger during the year; moreover the Communists’ image of the enemy had become more concrete. József Mindszenty was more frequently caught in the crossfire of the attacks. The state made him, as the head of the Catholic Church, the scapegoat in the struggle against clerical reaction – at first implicitly and later more explicitly. As had been done with the preparation of the school nationalization, action was initiated against Mindszenty by “making the public opinion work hard.” The Prince Primate was more and more openly criticized in the local and national party press, the first and second rank leaders of the party and the state did the same. Rákosi turned against Mindszenty openly in his speech in Miskolc in August and stated that “the present leaders of the Catholic Church are attracted to the old reaction38.” Demonstrations against the Prince Primate were increasingly organized, ‘reader letters’ appeared in the press day after day demand Mindszenty’s removal. Mindszenty was aware of the Communists’ intentions. He did not question his arrest or his sentence in a show trial. He was prepared for the trial after the arrest of his secretary (András Zoltán) in November. In one of his notes, he wrote that he would not resign from the archiepiscopal function under any circumstances, and would not make a confession. If he acted to the contrary, it would be the result of duress39. The political police arrested him on 26 December 1948; the Minister of the Interior ( János Kádár) announced the result of the police investigation three days later, which formed the basis of later accusations. Trial and sentence took place in February 1949. The events that characterized the opposition between the Communist Party and the Catholic Church gathered momentum in the second half of 1948. Using tried and tested methods, the state power wrecked the churches step by step, emphasizing all the while the necessity for the separation of state and church. The class struggle was now accentuated; and the Catholic Church, being almost the only civil institution in society at that time, became the main target. Beyond this, the leadership of the party connected the struggle against the church with attacks against the prosperous peasantry. The expression “kulak hidden under the cloak of clerical reaction” became a favourite rhetorical phrase of the period. The attacks against clergy increased from the year of Religion, Intelligence and Power in the Cold War

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Balázs Czetz

the change (1948), and against expectations, did not decrease significantly after the signing of the agreement between the state and the Catholic Church in August 1950. In this agreement the government guaranteed Catholics complete freedom of worship. Six boys’ grammar schools, two girls’ grammar schools and three Catholic orders were allowed to continue their work. The Catholic bishops expressed their support for the political system of the People’s Republic of Hungary in the agreement. But the struggle against clerical reaction continued, drastic restrictions on freedom of religion and worship were imposed, and the orders were banned. In June 1951 Archbishop József Grősz was arrested and one month later, the Catholic bishops swore an oath of allegiance to the constitution of the People’s Republic of Hungary. In May 1951 the State Office for Church Affairs was established and state control over the denominations became total. A struggle between political power and religious culture had, for the time being at least, been resolved in favour of the former.

Notes 1

K. Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in On Religion http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm.

2

http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/SR05.html.

3

http://www.marx2mao.com/Lenin/APR09.html.

4

D. Milovan, Conversations with Stalin, New York 1962, p. 114.

5

Mátyás Rákosi 9 March 1892 – 5 February 1971. During the period of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, he was the People’s Commissar of Social Production. He participated in the fight against Czech intervention for the Red Army and was the national commander of the Red Guard. After the Hungarian Soviet Republic collapsed, he emigrated to Austria, and then went to the Soviet Union. He returned home at the end of 1924, was arrested in September 1925 and sentenced to eight-and-a-half years in prison. After serving this sentence, he was not released and he was again prosecuted for the activities as the People’s Commissar under the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The international protest movement saved his life, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. At the behest of the Soviet government, he was extradited to the Soviet Union in exchange for the return of some honvéd regimental banners from the 1848-9 Hungarian War of Independence. He returned to Hungary in January 1945, and became the General Secretary of the HCP. After the merging of the HCP and SDP, he became the General Secretary of the HWP, and later its First Secretary. He was President of the Council of Ministers. He was dismissed as First Secretary at the Central Committee meeting of 1-2 July 1956 and expelled from the Political Committee. He departed to the Soviet Union and lived there for the rest of his life.

6

J. Gergely, A politikai katolicizmus Magyarországon 1890-1950, Budapest 1977, p. 239.

7

1 cadastral hold = 1600 “négyszögöl” (1 négyszögöl = 38.3 square feet) = 0.575 hectare.

8

According to other data, the church had 1.006.311 “hold” land in 1935 and 825.247 “hold” of it was redistributed. Gergely, A politikai cit., p. 294.

9

There were exceptions: Lajos Shvoy, Bishop of Székesfehérvár was allowed land up to 300 “hold” because of his outstanding achievements in “the national resistance and fight against Germans”, according to the 15th paragraph of the decree 600/1945 ME. This meant that the provision and support of approximately 6000 clergymen, 12.000 teachers, 3000 churches, 1500 parishes, 200 social institutions, 2000 pensioners and thousands of people fell to the believers and state. Gergely, A politikai cit., p. 238.

10


179

All eastern European Communist states (except Romania) broke off relations with the Holy See until 1949. 12 Independent Smallholders’, Peasants’ and Civil Party. 13 The Social Democratic Party gained 17.41% while the National Peasants’ Party gained 6.38% of the votes. 14 L. Izsák, A Political History of Hungary 1944-1990, Budapest 2002, p. 64. 15 There are a lot of contradictions about the events still today. Issues 9-10 of História (1998) present the memories of an eyewitness. 16 National Body of Catholic Agrarian Youth. Two Jesuits began to organize the movement in 1935. The movement reached the height of its popularity in the 1940s. 17 László Rajk (1909–1949) Communist politician, member of the illegal Communist party before 1945. He participated in the Spanish Civil War where he was seriously injured. He was arrested and interned in August 1941, released in September 1944 and taken into custody by the Hungarian Nazis. He was Minister of the Interior between March 1946 and August 1948, and Minister of Foreign Affairs till June 1949. He was sentenced to death in a show trial and executed. He was rehabilitated in 1955. 18 J. Mindszenty, Emlékirataim, Budapest 1989, pp. 135-139. 19 The Pope took much more radical steps than this. The Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office announced provisions condemning Communism on 1 July 1949. According to the Congregation, next to excommunication, people were forbidden to join, be attracted to the Communist Party, or spread and read Communist doctrine. 20 J. Gergely, 1948 és az egyházak Magyarországon, in “Fordulat a világban és Magyarországon 19471948” Budapest 2000, p. 141. 21 The Catholic Church could use its own textbooks approved by the state. 22 Izsák, A Political History cit., p. 112. 23 The Information Bureau of Communist and Workers’ Parties was established in Szklarska Poreba in Poland between 22 and 27 September 1947. József Révai and Mihály Farkas represented Hungary. 24 Regarding the events, see: B. Czetz, A katolikus egyház és a kommunista párt viszonya Fejér megyében 1948, in Jelenkortörténet útjai I. Politika és társadalom, Miskolc 2006. 25 Mindszenty, Emlékirataim, cit. pp. 194–201. 26 See Cs. Szabó (ed.), Egyházügyi hangulat-jelentések 1951, 1953, Budapest 2000, p. 32. 27 M. Rákosi, Válogatott beszédek és cikkek, Budapest 1952, pp. 266-267. 28 Szabó (ed.), Egyházügyi, cit. p. 33. The text of the agreement: Fejér County Archives (FCA) HWP 9. fond 198 ö. e. 29 I. Mészáros, Mindszenty és Ortutay, Budapest 1989, p. 108. 30 Part of the speech given at the uniting conference of working parties of Fejér county on 23 May 1948: “Our children have to get better and stronger education than we did. […] Negotiations with the churches have started, but illegal activities against school secularization have begun as well by some Catholic leaders. Our aim is not violence. Our ambitions are not directed against religious and ethical education, but against past ethics of capitalists and large estates. We do not want the old-fashioned character of religious schools to remain, as it does not exist in capitalist states anymore.” FCA HCP 2. fond 1/14. ö. e. 31 A policeman who was trying to restrain believers protesting against school secularization was killed by his own weapon on 3 July 1948. The priest who was declared to have been the instigator of the reprisal was sentenced to life imprisonment, while the clerk was accused of murder and executed. 32 As an example, 58 national schools and 98 primary schools were nationalized in the diocese of Székesfehérvár. The number of denominational teachers was 446, and there were 21,234 students. Three monastic grammar schools, two monastic teacher-training colleges, 21 nursery schools (with 28 nursery11

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33

34

35

38 36 37

39

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school teachers), six hostels (with 850 residents) and one apprentice hostel (with 50 residents) were also nationalized. The report of the Föispán of Fejér county to the Minister of the Interior, 31 December 1948, FCA Föispán’s confidential records XXI. 1/a. Dénes Szittyay (1887-1957) joined the Jesuit order in 1904, was ordained in 1918. A layman priest since 1924, he was in the service of Fejér county from 1925. Az MKP Fejér Megyei Bizottságának levele a Központi Vezetőség Értelmiségi Osztályának. 1948. április 22. FCA HCP 2. fond 48. ö. e. M. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések 1940-1956, Budapest 1997, pp. 516-517, 711. Ibid., p. 517. Id., A dolgozó parasztság a szövetkezet útján, in Építjük a nép országát, Budapest 1949, p. 312. Rákosi spoke openly about the Socialist transformation of agriculture in this speech. Mindszenty, Emlékirataim, cit. p. 228.

Bibliography Balogh S., Jakab S., The History of Hungary After the Second World War, 1944-1980, Budapest 1988. Bozsóky G., Lukács L., Az elnyomatásból a szabadságba. Az egyház Magyarországon, 1945-2001, Budapest 2005. Berdyaev N., The Origin of Russian Communism, Michigan 1969. Czetz B., The Organization History of the Hungarian Workers’ Party in Fejér County from the Establishment to the Second Congress, in 5th International Conference of PhD Students, Miskolc 2005. Djilas Milovan, Conversations with Stalin, New York 1962. Gergely J., 1948 és az egyházak Magyarországon, in Fordulat a világban és Magyarországon 1947-1949, Budapest 2000. Id., A katolikus egyház Magyarországon 1944-1971, Budapest 1985. Id., A katolikus egyház története Magyarországon, 1919-1945, Budapest 1997. Id., A politikai katolicizmus Magyarországon 1890-1950, Budapest 1977. Hoensch J., A History of Modern Hungary, 1867-1986, London 1988. Izsák L., A Political History of Hungary 1944-1990, Budapest 2002. Mészáros I., Mindszenty és Ortutay, Budapest 1989. Mindszenty J., Emlékirataim, Budapest 1989. Mózessy G. (ed.), Inter Arma 1944-1945. Források a Székesfehérvári Egyházmegye Történetéből II, Székesfehérvár 2002. Id. (ed.), Shvoy Lajos, Önéletrajz. Források a Székesfehérvári Egyházmegye Történetéből I, Székesfehérvár 2002. Orbán J. Gy., Katolikus papok békemozgalma Magyarországon, 1950-1956, Budapest 2001. Pál J., Békepapok, katolikus békepapok Magyarországon, 1950-1989, Budapest 1995. Rákosi M., A dolgozó parasztság a szövetkezet útján, in Rákosi M., Építjük a nép országát, Budapest 1949. Id., Válogatott beszédek és cikkek, Budapest 1952. Id., Visszaemlékezések 1940-1956, Budapest 1997. Szabó Cs. (ed.), Egyházügyi hangulat-jelentések 1951, 1953, Budapest 2000.

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