THE RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION A CRITICAL APPROACH

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THE RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION – A CRITICAL APPROACH


Budapest, 2003

Készítette: Félegyházi Csaba


Table of Contents 1. Introduction……….…………………………………………………………5 2. Precedents to the European Convention…………………………………...7 2.1 The reforms of the 90s and the failures of the Amsterdam Treaty….……………………..7 2.2 The Treaty of Nice, and the successful reforms…………………….…………………….11 2.2.1 The problems of the institutional system before Nice……….…………………..11 2.2.2 The successes of the Treaty of Nice – reforms in the institutional system............12 2.2.3 Conclusions and ‘Nice leftovers’..........................................................................16 2.3 Beyond Nice – the provisions of the Laeken Declaration…………………………….….17 2.4 The setting-up of the European Convention………………………………………….…..19 2.5 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………….…20

3. A critical analysis of the results of the working groups………………….23 3.1 Introduction…..…………..……………………………………………………………….23 3.2 The working group on subsidiarity……………………………………………………….24 3.3 The working group on the Charter of Fundamental Rights………………………………26 3.4 The working group on legal personality………………………………………………….28 3.5 The working group on the role of national parliaments…………………………………..30 3.6 The working group on complementary competences…………………………………….32 3.7 The working group on economic governance…………………………………………….34 3.8 The working group on external action……………………………………………………35 3.9 The working group on defence…………………………………………………………...38 3.10 The working group on simplification of legal instruments……………………………...40 3.11 The working group on area of freedom, security and justice…………………………...42


3.12 The working group on social Europe……………………………………………………44 3.13 Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………...45

4. Feedback on the results of the Convention……………………………….47 4.1 A short summary of the draft Constitutional Treaty with some critical reflections……...47 4.2 Criticisms by ‘EU players’……………………………………………………………….53 4.3 Positions of Member States on the results of the Convention…………………………....58 4.3.1 The four big EU Member States………………………………………………..58 4.3.2 The Benelux countries…………………………………………………………..61 4.3.3 Four highly developed, but small Member States……………………………...61 4.3.4 Four less developed Member States…………………………………………....62 4.3.5 The priorities and criticisms of some accession countries……………………..64 4.4 Opinions from the civil sector – NGOs and other players……………………………….65 4.5 The show must go on – the final decisions left for the IGC……………………………..68

5. Final Conclusions…………………………………………………………..71 Annexes………………………………………………………………………..73 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………..84



1, Introduction The draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Union is said to bring one of the most significant reforms of the modern history of European integration. This is clearly shown by the huge work the Convention has done. The forum for the discussion of questions related to the draft Constitutional Treaty created not only a debate among its members, but between European political and non-political institutions, political scientists and research institutions. This debate lasted for more than a year, which foreshadows the complexity and the hardships of drafting the Constitutional Treaty. Just to show you, how the work of the convention was perceived by its President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, I would like to recall some of his thoughts from his introductory and final speeches before the Convention. In his introductory speech1 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing defined the Convention as a body who can either ‘fail to provide a system, which is both effective and clear to the public’, or develop a ‘concept, which can bring unity to the continent and respect to its diversity’. Giscard d’Estaing saw the work of the Convention rather black or white. In his interpretation the European integration can only face the challenges of the 21st century if a new constitutional treaty is successfully drafted (by the Convention) and accepted (at the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference). His concept is even more underlined by his final speech2 at the Thessaloniki Council, he described the document as the milestone, ‘which represents an important step forward in the construction of Europe and will enable the enlarged Europe of the 21st century to operate on solid foundations’. Everybody speaks about the significance and the possible success of the future Constitutional Treaty, but looking at its development it is clear that no consensus could be brought which really satisfies the interest of the people of Europe. In my dissertation I am going to investigate the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty and the process of its development from a critical point of view. In this paper I would like to look at the work of the Convention and the draft Constitutional Treaty from a new 1

Introductory speech by President Valéry Giscard D’Estaing to the Convention on the future of Europe, 28/02/2002 source:http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/1.pdf 2 Oral report presented by Valéry Giscard D’Estaing at the Thessaloniki council, 20/06/2003, source: http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/9604.pdf


approach, in which I would reveal the main deficiencies of the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty. I would like to support my arguments by summarising many of the criticisms and contributions (opinions and amendments) added to each of the articles of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Furthermore, I will show what the results of the debate on the future of Europe are that were criticised the most. In the first section I will investigate how the European integration came to the idea of making a constitution. This will be presented through the research of the preceding reforms, their success or failure. During my research I would like to put emphasis on the question, whether the European Union needs a new reform? In the second part I would like to critically analyse the results of each working group. After the short presentation of their results, I will investigate whether the results of the working groups really reflect the interest of the EU and the public. An important aspect here is again to reveal the deficiencies. In the third section I am going to have a look at all the criticisms, opinions and comments that give a feedback on the draft Constitutional Treaty. From all these opinions we can learn a lot about the weaknesses of this treaty. In this part I will look at the most important questions (articles) of the draft Constitutional Treaty. This research will be done by contrasting criticisms. I will contrast the position of the nations, (existing an accession countries) the EU institutions, NGOs, citizens and other thinkers and add my own position. My aim is to evaluate the feedback on the draft Treaty, revealing the different interests at the EU, Member State and ‘social’ level. At the end of this chapter I will give an overview of the discussions at the Intergovernmental Conference, thus investigating the present and the possible future of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. It is clear now that my dissertation focuses on the most important questions: What interests do the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty serve? In what extent are they beneficial for the EU as a whole, for the Member States, and finally for us, people? Among these, I will pay special attention to the interest of citizens.


2, Precedents to the European Convention 2.1

The reforms of the 90s and the failures of the Amsterdam Treaty

The creation of the European Union was set as an aim as early as 1957 in the preamble of the Rome Treaty. Therefore it is very interesting that the Union itself was only established in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. Although the Luxemburg and Copenhagen Conferences of 1970 and 1973 opened the series of cooperative discussions among Community member states, the deepening of the integration was very much hindered by the scepticism of the 1970s. It is understandable since the economic crises of the 1970s slowed down economic integration. Due to the oil crisis of 1973-74, for example, some trade quotas were newly introduced, and voluntary export restrictions reappeared. Even the abolition of national subventions lasted as long as 1984. The Single European Act3 meant a significant change in the process of integration. The paper aimed the creation of a single market until 31st December 1992. The main achievements of the Single European Act were the clear definition of policy aims through which the physical (border guards), monetary (taxation policies, budgetary issues) and technical (national standards) barriers to a single market could be abolished. The creation of a single European market meant a huge increase in the Community ‘acquis’, which made the

3

Handbook of the European Union, Z. Horvath p. 37-39


accession more difficult to new entrants. With these reforms the Single European Act was able to provide a basis for the creation of the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created a new economic and political system and political structure: the European Union4. The reform achieved results mainly on the area of economic integration. Agreement in the questions concerning economic integration proved to be much easier than in the area of political integration. The economic integration was well prepared by the Single European Act, so an inevitable task was to create a monetary union. The treaty set as an aim to establish the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. Concerning the issues of political integration, the treaty established the two intergovernmental pillars5, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home affairs. The establishment of these two policies was said to be a milestone in the deepening of the integration. However we have to notice here, that these two policies remained intergovernmental, so practically they meant a stronger cooperation between member states, but no community level decision-making. Finally, we can say that the Maastricht Treaty was successful in establishing an economic community and prospected the establishment of a monetary union6. It widened the integration to new areas like transport, environment, R+D or culture, but some key policies7 still remained at an intergovernmental level. The integration in economic and monetary terms seemed to be successfully reformed, but further integration of other policies were needed, to achieve a federalist union8. In the mid 90s the European Union was not able to make further steps towards a deeper integration. In many of the countries, the people resisted the idea of creating a common currency (therefore, as I mentioned, some Member States were given the opt-out), so the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was not without barriers. The introduction of the 4

We have to mention here, that the name ‘European Union’ does not mean that the EU has a legal entity, therefore we regard it as a politically created name. The concept of the EU as a legal entity appears now in the draft Constitutional Treaty. Practically the three Communities remained, only their name changed 5 In the 3 pillar system the 1st pillar is the EC, which is a policy at community level 6 Although it couldn’t have established a monetary union if no exclusion possibility had been given to UK, Denmark and Sweden 7 E.g. defence policy 8 The European integration has always been making small steps towards a federalist union. The waves of reforms resulted in the closer integration of Member States by raising some of the national policies to community level. There are of course countries, which are keen to keep as much policies at national level as possible. Characteristic ‘eurosceptic’ countries are the UK, Denmark, Sweden (rejection of monetary Union) and some of the smaller countries (Spain, Ireland, Portugal) since they are afraid that federalism means a loss of their power in the European decision-making. The countries that are most devoted to a federalist Europe are mainly Germany and the Benelux states.


monetary system was bound to certain criteria. Due to the recession of the mi 90s, Member States found it very hard to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, therefore the voices of scepticism became stronger within the Union. Reforms were needed though, because the world economic and political trend created the following challenges for the European Union: -

the globalisation process created even more competitive international markets, on which the countries of the European Union didn’t have enough weight separately to influence world trade processes

-

the accession of new members was in vision, by the mid 90s some CEE countries already applied for membership9

These two challenges are in strong relation, since the enlargement of the European Union surely results in the increase of the Union’s economic and political weight. Therefore the latter challenge is the key issue during the reforms after the mid 90s. What changes did the European Union need to be prepared for the accession of 10 new countries? First of all it needs a modified institutional system, a new budgetary planning and a clear definition of the role of national parliaments and competences in the European Union. The European policy makers believed at this point that the European Union - which now faced more duties and challenges than ever before - won’t be able to function without the reform of the decision-making system. The increasing number of Member States seemed to make it very hard to reach a consensus in key questions. Below, there is a summary of the most important problems of the Maastricht Treaty that made the call of the next Intergovernmental Conference inevitable10: -

In the 2nd and 3rd pillar, the Treaty did not create the sufficient initiative mechanisms needed for the creation of policies, furthermore the integration in these policies needed to be strengthened.

-

The 1st pillar struggled with some practical questions, like the reform of the Common Agricultural policy

9

Hungary and Poland in 1994, the Baltic states and Slovakia in 1995 and Slovenia and the Czech Republic in 1996


-

A budgetary revision was needed to be able to implement the planned reforms

-

The Union had to be brought closer to the people

-

The institutional and decision-making system had to be reformed For combating all these challenges, the delegates of Member Stats tried to reach a

decision on the 6th Intergovernmental Conference that started in Turin in March 1996. The talks lasted as long as June 1997, when finally the Member States signed the Amsterdam Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty can be evaluated as one of the least effective reforms of the European integration. Many of the questions and problems of institutional reform and enlargement were postponed or remained unsolved. Only few results11 can be mentioned, such as changes in the CFSP. Its greatest achievement was the implementation of qualified majority voting in the General Affairs Council when adopting common positions, common strategies and joint actions in the CFSP. Furthermore it introduced the possibility of constructive abstention, which means a nation shall not join each action in the CFSP on a mandatory basis, if it is not against the action it can simply deny participation, without blocking its implementation. Another achievement in the CFSP is the creation of the position of the High Representative. It does not mean the appointment of a new person, but the extension of the role of the SecretaryGeneral of the European Council. The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, assists the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties12. This change extended the work of the formerly bureaucratic Secretary-General, but it meant multiple tasks as well, and therefore the question can be raised whether a single position would have resulted in a more effective international representation. Other achievements were on the area of Justice and Home Affairs13, but the real key issue, the reform of the decision-making remained almost untouched. Some reforms 10

A comparison of the Intergovernmental Conferences : Agnes Lux www.konfoderaciok.hu/mszeib/diakok/otdk.htm , 06.10.2003. 11 The Amsterdam Treaty (article J) : http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/amsterdam.html 06.10.2003 12 The Amsterdam Treaty – Article J16 13 Bringing border guard, immigration and refugee policies on a community level


were made though, such as the slight extension of QMV and the extension of European Parliament’s right of initiative14. The Amsterdam Treaty also attempted to make the Treaties of the European integration more comprehensible to the public by re-numbering its articles. The Amsterdam Treaty should have solved three institutional questions15 in order to create the sufficient system of decision-making for the enlargement. -

the significant extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the European Council16

-

re-weighting the number of votes in the Council

-

defining the composition and size of the European Commission Basically the Amsterdam Treaty failed to prepare the institutional system of the

European Union for the enlargement process. As a summary for this period we can say, that the 90s brought significant changes in the development of the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty was successful in creating the economic union and prospecting the monetary union, but the enlargement process brought further challenges. The accession of 12 new member states created the need for the reform of the whole EU institutional system (which was initially planned for 6 Member States). The EU wanted to successfully initiate these reforms at the 6th Intergovernmental Conference, but the most important questions remained unsolved. The challenges of enlargement had to be solved by further reforms.

2.2 2.2.1

The Treaty of Nice, and the successful reforms The problems of the institutional system before Nice One of the problems related to the enlargement was the problem of inefficient system

of voting within the European Council. With 27 countries the Council would be paralysed to 14 15

With the extension of the co-decision process Handbook of the European Union, Z. Horvath p. 47.


function because of the long time needed to reach a consensus. Analysts were afraid, that the content of political decisions would be also less meaningful after the negotiation process between the Member States. An alternative solution could be the extension of QMV in the Council. But this solution raised further questions. For a QMV that is democratic and represents the will of the majority of Europeans based on population size, the votes had to be re-weighted. The weights of votes did not truly reflect the population difference between member states17. Theoretically, with the enlargement it could happen that based on the population of Member States a minority representation would accept legislations within the Council. On the other hand, with the introduction of QMV the small nations feared that they would lose their power in European decision-making. The other two institutional bodies of the EU had to be reformed as well. The European Commission had 20 members, with 2-2 representatives from greater and 1-1 from smaller nations. With the enlargement the system would have lost one of its attributes: either it would exceed the size of 20 or not all the Member States would be represented. The Commission is already characterised by criticisms as ineffective, because the tasks are not equally weighted among the 20 commissioners. Two arguments can be mentioned in this question. The expansion of the size of the Commission would result in the decrease of its effectiveness. In the rotation system not all nations would be represented, which is protested by smaller nations. (And accession countries) Basically there were three main questions left over from Amsterdam concerning the European Commission: -

the composition and size of the Commission

-

the internal reorganisation of the Commission

-

the role of the President of the Commission

The Treaty of Nice also had the task to increase the number of seats in the European Parliament for 27 nations. The Amsterdam Treaty set 700 as the total number of representatives, and the 7th IGC had the duty to divide the seats in the Parliament among the 27 Member States. 16

Hereafter: the Council E.g. Portugal had a population of about 10 million with 5 votes, Germany 80 million with 10 votes, the ratios of 1/2 and 1/8 are not harmonised

17


2.2.2

The successes of the Treaty of Nice – reforms in the institutional system18 The Treaty of Nice brought several reforms reshaping the institutional bodies of the

EU. It fulfilled a great amount of duties needed for the preparation of the enlargement. The duties mentioned above are not directly related to the enlargement, and the Treaty of Nice didn’t influence the outcome of the enlargement process. These reforms had to be made to avoid institutional problems in a larger Europe. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION One of these duties was to solve the three problems related to the European Commission mentioned above. The Treaty of Nice finally decided on the idea of one commissioner for each Member State, with the remark that the rotation system should be developed in the future. This means, that if the number of Member States exceeds 27, the Council will have to introduce the system of rotation. Thus the number of Commissioners shall be less than 27. The Treaty of Nice also strengthened the powers of the President. The President gained the right to define the organisation of the Commission. The President received the power to divide the different tasks among the commissioners and determine their competences. According to the reforms he/she can appoint the vice-Presidents with the approval of the Commission or can propose the dismissal of Commission members. The last significant success of the Treaty in this area was the application of QMV in the Council when appointing the President of the Commission. This means that the nations will lose their right of veto. QMV will be applied also to the appointment of Commission members19. THE COUNCIL OF THE EU

18

Treaty of Nice europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm , The important provisions of the Treaty of Nice, L.Sinka – Z. Horvath, Európai Tükör, 2001/2-3, 19 QMV in the Council + the approval of the President of the Commission and the European Parliament is needed


We already saw some evidences for the extension of QMV in the Council in the previous paragraph. Besides the extension of QMV the re-weighting of votes was needed, which proved to be the most difficult question of the 7th IGC due to the clash of national interests. The point of the new system (starting on 1. January 2005.) is that it re-weights the number of votes to better reflect the population differences among Member States. It means a broadening of votes. (see Annex 1). from the scale 2-10 to the scale of 3-29 (in an EU with 27 members). This extends the gap between smaller and large members, because of their population differences. The new system is surely in favour of large countries20, which was (and is) resisted by many smaller countries. The total number of votes increases from 82 to 169 in the EU-15 and to 345 in the EU-27 to enable the flexibility of division of votes. Furthermore, in the decisions where QMV is applied, and the proposal is initiated by the Commission, the support of more than a half of the Member States is enough to accept the decision. Otherwise a 2/3 majority is needed. The Treaty of Nice also created the possibility for nations to check whether QMV reaches a 62% representation of the EU population. If not, the council cannot adopt the legislation or bring a decision21. The new voting system of the Council seems to be successful in creating the framework for the institutional system of the EU-27, although the voting system became complicated which is contrary to the principles laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty (the transparency of legislation). There were some disputes about the maximum percentage of votes for QMV. For example the declaration in the Treaty of Nice and the accession treaties differ in the number of vote for QMV. The first one defines a number of 255 from 345, the latter 258/345. The Treaty of Nice prospected the increase of QMV limit to a maximum of 74.3%. The expansion of this limit is not welcome by many federalist politicians, because they think it strengthens the nations’ bargaining power. This was just a short overview of the changes, but the system created by the Treaty of Nice is much more complicated, and extends the scope of this dissertation. The reforms prepare the decision-making system in the Council for an enlarged EU. However there is uncertainty about the time of the 2nd round of enlargement. The weight of votes is not defined 20

Namely: Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain, Poland This is and advantage for Germany, because she has 17% of the EU population. Together with two other large EU countries, she is available to block decisions

21


for the case, if the 1st round of enlargement occurs before 2005. (which is the case now) Another question is whether the extension of QMV voting limit and the conditions of blocking really help or hinder the decision-making. These surely create a possibility for nations to intervene in the decision-making, but in my opinion the creation of the new voting system still strengthens the effectiveness of the decision-making of the Council. This step wasn’t as revolutionary as expected, but I think small steps are needed to reach a result. (and this is true for the institutional reforms as well). EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT The size of the European Parliament had to be reshaped to be convenient for the decision-making with 27 Member States. For the preparation of a larger EU the seats had to be re-distributed so, that the total number of seats will have only a small increase. Therefore the countries had to surrender some of their existing seats for the newcomers. The division of seats within the Parliament was a tool to compensate those countries, which weren’t satisfied when the Council votes were decided. Germany (as the only country) could therefore retain her 99 seats in the Parliament. Belgium and Portugal, who protested against the great number of Council votes for the Netherlands and Spain, received 2-2 extra seats as compensation. With these negotiations finally the size of the Parliament for the EU-27 exceeded the initial 700 defined in the Amsterdam Treaty, and ended up in 732 (see Annex 2). The new system could be applied for the period starting after the enlargement (so from 2009). For the ‘transition’ period of 2004-2009 the number of representatives will be equal for the existing members with those defined in the Treaty of Nice, for the new members with the number defined in the accession treaties. For this period it could happen that the number of representatives won’t reach 732. In this case the Council decides upon the corrections. The main problem of this system could be that it defines the size of the parliament for 27 countries, but it is unpredictable when the 2nd round of the enlargement process will be ended. For the preceding periods the number of seats in the Parliament is not fixed in the Treaty of Nice, therefore it is going to vary. This surely confuses the transparency of the parliamentary decision-making. But in general, the Treaty of Nice solved the main institutional questions related to the Parliament.


OTHER ACHIEVMENTS IN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS Besides the reforms on the three key institutional bodies, the Treaty of Nice achieved significant changes in other areas of decision-making. Several changes were made in the structure of the Court of Justice. The Treaty of Nice modified the number of jurors in the Court on a ‘1 juror from 1 nation’ basis. The Treaty of Nice extended the competences of the Court of Auditors and created the Grand Chamber for the most important cases. It also established the High Courts. The treaty of Nice re-shaped the number of delegates in the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions. It maximised their number in 350 and divided the seats for 27 nations (see Annexes 3/4) REFORMS ON DECISION-MAKING The Treaty of Nice has extended QMV onto 30 areas22 of which 23 came into effect immediately with the ratification of the Treaty. In some articles the Treaty of Nice applies QMV for certain paragraphs, and not for the article as whole. In justice and home affairs questions of the first pillar the Treaty of Nice re-strengthened the extension of QMV for the policies of immigration and judicial cooperation. Many nations attempted to postpone the starting date of the application of the QMV, but on the area of the cohesion policy, for example the ‘triumvirate’ of Spain, Greece and Portugal could reach that QMV will be applied only from the budgetary period starting in 2014. The extension of QMV failed on the areas of social policy, taxation policy and was semi-successful in trade policies. We can say, that the extension of QMV happened on many areas, however its general application for most of the policies failed. The federalists wanted to abolish the status quo. The Treaty of Nice couldn’t provide a solution to fulfil their

22

Based on the number of articles covered by the modification


expectations, but came significantly close to it. Mainly the decisions on extension depended on the possibility of consensus. The extension of co-decision failed to the great disappointment of the European Parliament. Co-decision was introduced to only 7 new areas (e.g. agriculture and trade policies). A significant reform was the reform on ‘closer cooperation’. The concept meant that the nations more integrated could start cooperation on a certain policy area. The idea has been resisted by several Member States, because they were afraid that the faster integration of a group within the EU could lead to a huge integration gap. Previously to the Treaty of Nice the possibility of such cooperation was hindered by strict rules23 The Treaty of Nice: -

abolished unanimity when deciding on ‘closer cooperation’

-

defined the number of nations (8) that can start such a cooperation

-

defined the conditions of starting a cooperation

-

decided on the extension the concept of ‘closer cooperation’ to the CFSP24

2.2.3. Conclusions and ‘Nice leftovers’ In general, we can say, that the Treaty of Nice could basically answer the challenges provided by the enlargement of the European Union. Most of the questions on institutional reforms were solved and practically the organisation of the EU became technically prepared for the enlargement. For the solution of questions not answered in the Treaty of Nice a new IGC was planned in 2004. The questions that need to be discussed at the 2004 IGC are.

23

-

the competences of the nations and the EU

-

the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights

-

the simplification of the Treaties

-

the role of national parliaments

E.g. more than half of the Member States needed for a cooperation, unanimity when voting on a cooperation The Treaty of Nice declared, that no military or defence policies should be taken under the scope of ‘closer cooperation’

24


Practically the discussion of these questions won’t hinder the 2004 enlargement of the EU. The EU is ‘set’ for the 1st round of enlargement. This raises the question why the creation of a new constitution is so urgent. In this section I put emphasis on the achievements of the Treaty of Nice to make the reader see, that there is a need for a constitution, but not primarily for solving the challenges of the enlargement. These questions are well covered by the Treaty of Nice, so the creation of the Constitutional Treaty has other purposes.

Beyond Nice – the provisions of the Laeken Declaration

2.3

The debates on the 7th Intergovernmental Conference showed that the discussions about the reforms of the European Union could end up in a very fierce political fight between the Member States. Many of the politicians were surprised by what happened at the IGC and they called for a ’deeper and wider debate about the future development of the European Union’. They stated that ’the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies, in cooperation with the Commission and involving the European Parliament, will encourage wide-ranging discussions with all interested parties; representatives of national Parliaments and all those reflecting public opinion; political, economic and university circles, representatives of civil society, etc.25’ This meant a more open discussion of the questions on the future of the European Union. According to this new concept, the final decision is still made by the IGC of 2004, but the preceding discussion will be Europe-wide. This is a very democratic approach and in my opinion a step to bring the European Union closer to the people. Three steps of debate were planned by the Declaration: -

1st period of discussion initiated by the EU and ended by the Laeken summit

-

2nd period of discussion, the preparation of the 8th IGC

-

3rd period of discussion, the 8th IGC

The Laeken summit of December 2001 had a key role in setting up the organisational framework of the IGC, and the preparation discussions. The leading politicians of the 25

Declaration on the future of the Union to be included in the final act of the Conference, http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/declaration_en.pdf , 12.10.2003


European Union made their final statement in the Laeken Declaration26. They decided on the basic questions on the future of the EU. The Declaration only raised the questions, but didn’t draw alternatives to answer them. The Declaration defines 3 main areas in which the European Union shall move forward27: -

making the EU more democratic

-

conducting the values of the EU on a global level

-

satisfying the needs of the citizens

The topics of discussions proposed by the Laeken Declaration continued on the basis of the Declaration of the Nice Treaty. The four topics proposed by the Laeken Declaration are: 1, the division of competences within the EU 2, the simplification of legal instruments 3, the increase of effectiveness, democracy and transparency in the EU 4, the preparation of a Constitution for the European people All these questions are closely interrelated. Just to mention one example, the simplification of the Treaties28, thus the simplification of legal instruments result in a greater transparency of the operation of the EU. In our discussion we should pay special attention to the fourth point. The other three questions raise many issues that are dealt with in a constitution. Many of these points are included in national constitutions as well, for example we can find evidences, such as the definition of legal instruments in the 3rd part of the Hungarian Constitution29. However some Member States protested against the nomenclature ‘constitution’ since they believe a constitution can exist only on the national level. The question is interesting, whether the planned European Constitution carries the characteristics of a constitution or not.

26

The Laeken Declaration : http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm 13.10.2003. And these points are key aspects of my research of the draft Constitutional Treaty 28 The Treaties = the Treaty of Rome, the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice laying down the legal basis of the existence and operation of the European integration 29 Constitution of the Republic of Hungary : http://www.mkogy.hu/alkotmany/alkotm.htm 13.10.2003. 27


However, my dissertation focuses on the provisions, so a constitutional law analysis would go beyond the scope of this dissertation. The Laeken Declaration said the focus should be on the simplification of existing treaties. The legal basis provided by the Treaties seemed to be too complicated30, thus not comprehensible to the European citizen. The other reason mentioned by the Laeken Declaration was the inefficiency of the Treaties. The plan for developing a constitution raised several questions among the Members of the European Council. Some examples are mentioned below: -

Does the European Union need a constitution or just a Treaty summarising and simplifying the existing treaties?

-

What are the aims of the changes in such a constitution?

-

Is it necessary to include the charter of Fundamental Rights in the European constitution?

Many of the ‘eurosceptics’ feared, that a constitution would be a huge push to the direction of federalism. Indeed the idea of developing a constitution would give national characteristics to an international community.

2.4

The setting-up of the European Convention The Laeken Declaration aimed to set up a forum for the debates on the questions

concerning the future of the European Union. This was the second time31 the European Union decided upon using this form of debate. The European Convention became the greatest discussion forum in the history of European integration. According to the Declaration the Convention consisted of:

30

-

a President (Valéry Giscard D’Estaing)

-

two vice-Presidents (Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene),

-

1 representative from each of the governments of the 15 Member States,

As a result of repeated amendments When finalising the Maastrcht Treaty the representatives of the Council, the European Parliament and the national parliaments held a 1-week-long discussion. This was the first time in the EU (EC at that time) that debates ran in a convention.

31


-

2 representatives from each national parliament of the 15 Member States,

-

16 representatives from the European Parliament,

-

2 delegates of the European Commission

-

1 government and 2 parliament representatives from all of the 13 accession countries

This gives a number of 105, but this is even larger with the deputy representatives. Other organisations could delegate observers. Three members of the Economic and Social Committee, 6 members of the Committee of Regions, 3 members of the social partners and the European Ombudsman could be present at the sessions of the Convention. The Praesidium, which was the primary initiative body of the discussions, consisted of 13 members, among them the President and the vice-Presidents.

The operation of the

Convention started on 1. March 2002. and lasted until the 10. July 2003. At the beginning of the debates the Convention decided on its agenda. The Convention's proceedings32 comprised three

phases:

1, A listening phase: identification of the expectations and needs of the Member States, their governments and parliaments and the needs of the whole society. This phase lasted until June 2002. 2, A deliberating phase: comparison of the various opinions put forward and assessment of their implications and consequences. The second phase lasted until autumn 2002. 3, A proposing phase: synthesis and drafting of proposals. This was the longest phase. At the end of the third phase the European Convention presented the final draft Constitutional Treaty to the European Council in Thessaloniki. I don’t want to waste much time on the structure and working phases of the European Convention. This has already been presented by many documents and dissertations in the past. What is interesting from the critical aspect is to have a look at the results of the working groups of the Convention. I would like to put greater emphasis on what has been done instead of answering the question 32

http://european-convention.eu.int


how has it been done. The draft Constitutional Treaty was the final result of the European Convention. In the latter parts of this dissertation I would like to focus on the draft Constitutional Treaty and its preparation process.

2.5

Conclusions In this first section I had the intention to show and evaluate the reforms of beginning

from the 1990s. The purpose for this research was to show the reader the results and deficiencies of previous reforms to answer the question whether a constitution is needed or not. Of course we could find evidence for and against the need for a constitutional treaty. Below I summarised both groups of arguments that were revealed to me during my research: ARGUMENTS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE REFORMS CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY -

Europe needs a new direction that points beyond a simple institutional transformation

-

The Charter of Fundamental Rights should be incorporated in the basic ‘treaty’ of the European Union

-

The previous reforms failed to keep to the concept of transparency

-

The previous reforms could not bring the European Union closer to its citizens

-

The simplification of existing treaties is inevitable

-

A constitution is needed for Europe for increasing democracy, strengthening the global role of the EU and satisfying the needs of its citizens

-

A constitution would strengthen the European consciousness, therefore it is a key step towards a federal EU

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF THE REFORMS CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY -

the preparation for the enlargement is done by the Treaty of Nice, the European Union is ready to face the challenges of globalisation and enlargement, thus there is no need for further reforms


-

a constitution would result in the decrease of national sovereignty of the EU member States

-

a constitution would not represent the interests of the European people, but the interests of the European political actors, thus it is against the democratic values of the European Union

My dissertation uses two ways of critical research. In the first part I attempted to collect evidences for/against the necessity of the reforms proposed by the Convention. So the question was whether there is a need for a new reform from the EU’s point of view. The answer was supported with evidences found in previous reforms. The decision is already made and the draft Constitutional Treaty is finalised. In the latter sections of my paper I will focus on the document itself, the debate on it and all the topics included in the draft. In the next section I am going to analyse the results of the working groups. Now I will broaden my aspects of research. In the first section I focused on the interest of the EU, but from now on, I am going to focus on the interest of the EU and the people living in the EU. My questions will be the following: Was the result of the working group a good basis for the draft Treaty or the questions remained open? Are the results in line with democracy and people’s interest? Do they give a framework for a stronger Europe?


3, A critical analysis of the results of the working groups (WGs)33 3.1 Introduction The European Convention set up 11 working groups to provide a basis for the debates in the Convention in 11 different areas. The proposals of the working groups worked basically as the framework for the draft Constitutional Treaty. The working groups went in depth into subjects, which would have been too difficult to discuss on plenary sessions34. The establishment of the working groups happened in three phases. In the first phase, six working groups were set up in the following topics: I.

Subsidiarity

II.

Charter of Fundamental Rights

III.

Legal personality

IV.

National parliaments

V.

Complementary competences

VI.

Economic Governance

These six working groups finished their work in September-October 2002. These WGs dealt with key questions that provide a basis for further discussion. In the second phase, the Convention set up four new working groups, which discussed the following topics. VII.

External Action

VIII.

Defence

IX.

Simplification

X.

Freedom, security and justice

-------------------------------------------XI.

33 34

Social Europe

Basic information on working groups : http://european-convention.eu.int/doc_wg.asp?lang=EN 14.10.2003. Though in some cases the discussion was left to the plenary sessions of the Convention


As you can see, these four discussion topics may bring results in more specified policy areas, like Justice and Home Affairs or the CFSP. The second phase working groups finished their work in December 2002. The last working group on social issues continued its work until the beginning of 2003. In the following the subject of research will be the results of each working group. I will critically look at the results, whether they provide a good basis for the Convention’s final proposals. Firstly I am going to summarize shortly the results of the working groups and then I will investigate the key issues that raised the greatest debates in the European Convention. The extent of debates is in itself a criticism of the proposals.

3.2 The working group on subsidiarity PROPOSALS

The basic task of the working group on subsidiarity was the definition of community and national competences and the assurance of the greatest effectiveness in legislation. The proposals of the working group are built on three subjects: -

the application and recognition of the principle of subsidiarity in the preparation phase of legislative procedure

-

the setting-up of a political ‘early alert system’ aimed at the increased participation of national parliaments in the control of the application (ex-ante system)

-

the possibility for national parliaments to apply to the European Court of Justice if concerns emerge on the application of the principle of subsidiarity (ex-post system)

According to the views of the working group, the principle of subsidiarity could be applied the best in the early phases of legislation. The Commission could have key role in the supervision of this principle right at the initiation of proposals. Furthermore, the working group initiated that a Mr/Mrs Subsidiarity should be appointed within the Commission, who would be responsible for supervising subsidiarity. This proposal was not even voted upon within the working group. The remarks of Slavko Gaber, Slovenian Member of the European


Convention truly reflect the reasons, namely that the creation of this position would mean a duplication of functions. The principle of subsidiarity should be applied by each of the Commissioners35. For the early alert system the working group proposed to provide the possibility for national parliaments to give an opinion on the application of the principle of subsidiarity in EU legislation proposals. In this case the national parliaments would be informed on the proposals the same time as the European institutions. If more than 1/3 of the nations had concerns about the legislative proposal, the Commission would have to revise it. It is important that protest can be made only on the application of the principle of subsidiarity, not on the content of the legislative proposal itself. This would create an ex-ante supervisory mechanism. The working group proposed that a nation should have the possibility to turn to the Court of Justice, if it considers that the legislation accepted is against the principle of subsidiarity. The Committee of Regions would have the right to bring a case to the Court of Justice in the same case. DEBATES There were huge debates in the Convention on the proposal of this working group. First of all the ex-ante alert system was criticised. Many of the members agreed on the system itself, but protested against the proposed mechanism. Many feared that the national parliaments would use their right of opinion to plead at the Court of Justice later on. Many of the representatives doubted the relevance of the 1/3 ‘revision limit’. Some members protested against the right of national parliaments to turn to the European Court of Justice when they think the principle of subsidiarity was hurt. Furthermore the majority didn’t like the idea that regional parliaments could do the same. As you see, the debate on the principle of subsidiarity revealed many deficiencies of the proposal. In my opinion the greatest danger in the ex-ante and ex-post system is that Member States are going to use this supervisory power to block certain legislative proposals 35

Letter by Mr. Slavko Gaber Member of the European Convention- Remarks on the WD "First Proposals for the Conclusions." , http://european-convention.eu.int/dynadoc.asp?lang=EN&Content=WGI 16.10.2003.


or at least hinder them by applying to the European Court of Justice. The 1/3 ratio of protesting nations needed is quite low, therefore it would give too much power to a small group of Member States. Some members would strengthen the role of national parliaments. Jens Peter Bonde, member of the Convention would extend the power of national parliaments to be able to ‘adopt the legal base of any community legislation’36 The debates about the principle of subsidiarity were still open at this point. In my opinion the application of the principle is healthy for the citizens of the EU, since the policies could be implemented more effectively. The Member States could form policies according to their local conditions and with greater effectiveness. However, a healthy balance should be kept in the ex-ante system, not allowing nations to frequently block decision, because it would lead to a paralysed legislation system that is disadvantageous for both the EU and its people. Finally, three issues were left for further discussion: -

whether the two chambers of a two-chambered parliament should be informed at the same time in an ex-ante supervisory system

-

the number of protests needed for a revision by the Commission

-

whether the ‘early alert mechanism’ should be linked with the ex-ante mechanism

3.3 The working group on the Charter of Fundamental Rights PROPOSALS The question was not whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be incorporated in the Constitutional Treaty, but the way this should be done. The other issue was the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights. The basic opinion of the working group was that the Charter itself is designed to be incorporated in a later ‘constitution-like’ treaty37. However, some concerns were made about the inclusion of the

36

Contribution to the proposals for Conclusions, Jens peter Bonde, 05.09. 2002., Brussels http://europeanconvention.eu.int/dynadoc.asp?lang=EN&Content=WGI 19.10.2003. 37 Of course many points should be modified with the incorporation


Charter in the Constitutional Treaty. The following criticisms were summarised by Johann Schoo, Director in the Legal Service of the European Parliament38: - the Charter contains fundamental rights which do not fall within the EU's area of competence; - the Charter contains provisions which appear in a different form in the treaty or in the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights); - the general clauses of the Charter are not sufficient to enable the latter to be incorporated into the treaties. The working group decided finally to incorporate the Charter in the Treaty as a whole, in a separate chapter. The working group proposed that the text of the Charter should not be modified. The incorporation of the Charter should not alter the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States. The articles of the Charter should be in full correspondence with the articles of the Treaties on fundamental rights. Furthermore, the working group proposed to modify some of the horizontal articles of the Charter. The modification of horizontal articles (Articles 51 and 52) was inevitable, since they didn’t cover all the rights included in the Charter. The working group created the legal condition for the accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). According to this the Council would vote on the accession with unanimity. The use of unanimity is interesting in the light of the wide extension of QMV. Of course, the accession to the ECHR would not mean an accession to the Council of Europe as well. This working group left some issues as ‘leftovers’ for the European Convention for further discussion. Generally we could say that after the working group has finished its work, the questions with which they had dealt were agreed upon, but some issues were not dealt with39. This is surely a criticism of the work of the WG. However, if we consider the interests of EU citizens, the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the accession to the European Convention on Human Rights

38

Speech of Mr. Johann Schoo, Director in the Legal Service of the EP before the WG 2, 23 July 2002 http://european-convention.eu.int/dynadoc.asp?lang=EN&Content=WGII 19.10.2003. 39 Like the possibility of individual legal remedy, some modifications of the Charter, etc.


means the inclusion of human rights in the ‘fundamental treaty’ of the European Union, which is inevitable for the creation of the European consciousness and unity. DEBATES On the plenary session of 31 October 2002 the Convention discussed the issue of the incorporation of the Charter in the Constitutional Treaty. Some supported the idea of incorporating the Charter through an appropriate reference made to it in an article of the Constitutional Treaty and, as some added, annexing or attaching it to the Treaty as a separate legal document. A minority supported the idea of ‘indirect reference’ that is making the Charter legally binding without giving it a constitutional status. There were some debates about keeping the preamble of the Charter and setting it as the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty. Concerning the accession to the ECHR the only question was whether the accession should be legally binding with the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, or the decision should be left to the European institutions. Some members even expressed reservations about the accession to the ECHR. They underlined that this would carry the risk of the extension of the competences of the EU and would undermine the operation of the court of Justice.

3.4 The working group on legal personality PROPOSALS

The working group had to investigate the consequences and effects of creating a legal personality to the European Union. Two questions emerged: whether the new legal personality should unite and replace the existing legal personalities of the EU (European Communities and Euratom), or just emerge as a legal personality supplementing the existing ones. The first version was hugely supported. The members argued that otherwise the signing of international agreements would be very complicated. The new legal personality would also take over the liabilities of existing legal personalities. The working group’s opinion was to unite the treaties establishing the European Communities and the Euratom as well. This would


mean a simplification of existing Treaties. The working group would support a new Treaty that consists of two parts: -

a part that would contain provisions of constitutional nature (both the new ones and the ones taken from the earlier treaties

-

a part that would unite and transform all the provisions of the previous treaties not contained by the first part – mainly policies

The working group stated that the creation of the legal personality of the European Union would not directly affect the three-pillar system of the European Union. They added though that the existing three-pillar system would be obsolete and overcomplicated. For the conduction of international agreements the working group proposed that the new Constitutional Treaty should appoint a sole responsible person. The Council should be the only body authorising the initiation of international negotiations. In certain cases40 the ‘double representation’ by the Council and the Commission shall be applied. Modifying Article 2441 of the Treaty establishing the European Union was the next key issue of the working group. With the creation of the legal personality the national ratification processes would become senseless, so the working group proposed to abolish the paragraphs of the Article on the right of national ratification of international agreements. Concerning the external representation of the European Union the working group proposed the creation of a single delegation in all external affairs42. This should create a united appearance in external policy. DEBATES The issue of legal personality was discussed on the plenary session on 3-4 October 2002. Generally, the report achieved great consensus among the members of the Convention. Concerning the creation of the legal personality of the European Union in an explicit way, (by substituting the existing legal personalities) many members highlighted that with a single

40

Where the agreement or contract reaches through more pillars Valid for 2nd and 3rd pillar agreements: the Article defines the right of Member States of national ratification process before an international agreement becomes obligatory for the European Union. 42 Previously e.g. the Presidency was authorised for external representation in CFSP 41


legal personality the Union's actions would be more visible and effective on the international stage. This would also contribute to encouraging citizens to identify more closely with the Union. During the debates it was stressed that the fact that the Union would have a single legal personality leads to greater effectiveness in its external actions. However, some members of the Convention insisted that CFSP matters should remain fully intergovernmental. Concerning the Union’s representation in international organisations most of the members supported that the EU should speak ‘with one voice’43. However, some stressed that always having a single voice may not be healthy. They say that thus it is harder to reach common positions. Generally, we can say, that a high level of consensus could be reached in this area. The reasons are the following. The creation of a legal personality substituting existing legal personalities would simplify international agreements, legislative framework and the existing treaties. It would also strengthen the global representation of the European Union. The great consensus shows us that the work of the WG on legal personality was excellent and the Convention members were devoted to create the new legal personality for the European Union.

3.5 The working group on the role of national parliaments PROPOSALS

The working group had 9 meetings between June and October 2002, and presented its results at the plenary session of the Convention on 28 October. The tasks of the working group were based around three subjects: 1, the role of national parliaments in the control over the national governments and over their position in the Council 2, the role of national parliaments in the control over the application of the principle of subsidiarity 3, the role of multilateral systems that include national parliaments

43

That would mean a single representation


The general view was to include a special part in the Constitutional Treaty that would regulate the role national parliaments in the EU’s activities. For greater transparency, the working group proposed that most of the Council meetings should be public and the European Parliament and national parliaments receive the reports on these meetings in 10 days. The members of the working group agreed that the national parliaments could play the greatest role by supervising the activities of national governments. They also stated, that their control over the governments varies form nation to nation and is defined by the national constitutions. Therefore they didn’t want to develop a regulation at the EU level. The aim of the working group was to find ‘a best practice’ to provide a guideline for the Member States. The control of national parliaments is effective when they receive quality information on time, they have the possibility to present their position, there are regular auditions of ministers after the Council meetings, the permanent parliamentary committees are involved in the control and they have the proper personnel. Furthermore the members of the working group agreed that the strengthening of the inter-parliamentary flow of information is needed. According to the working group, the provision44 that the national parliaments should receive the proposals six weeks before a Council decision should be strengthened. They think national parliaments should receive proposals the same time as national governments. In the issue of subsidiarity the working group agreed that national parliaments have key role by means of auditing the ministers negotiating in the Council. Most of the members rejected the creation of permanent or ad hoc committees to supervise the principle of subsidiarity. The think there should be a ‘process-based’ supervision. The revision of legislation would look like the following.

In the proposed mechanism the national

parliaments would do an research on the principle of subsidiarity both in the initiation phase and sometimes in the decision phase as well (if the text of the proposal has been altered). The working group would accelerate the exchange of information via the multilateral European network of national parliaments. They could hardly imagine the creation of a new institution in the multilateral system, because it would make European institutional relations even more complicated. They proposed to apply regularly the Convention as a discussion

44

Laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty


forum. They supported the strengthening of the COSAC45. According to their proposal the COSAC could invite members of European institutions to report on certain issues. DEBATES Concerning the ‘best practice’ for parliaments to give government representatives a negotiating mandate, some members of the Convention supported that the best practice should leave space for nations to move. So, they insisted on the flexibility of this guideline. Others though emphasized the necessity of a stricter general guideline. The debates went on in the issue of the role of the COSAC. Some members supported the argument of the working group that the strengthening of this forum would increase the role of national parliaments in the EU decision-making system. Some denied the importance of the COSAC. However most of the members agreed that the creation of a new institution representing the national parliaments would make the institutional system too complex. The debates on the principle of subsidiarity are discussed in section 3.2. Generally, the strengthening of the role of national parliaments means the strengthening of democracy in the European Union. In the politics of a country the issues discussed at government or parliamentary level often has different outcomes. The different parties see political questions form different aspects46, therefore the strengthening of the role of national parliaments means the strengthening of a body with mixed or even contrary interests. A parliamentary position is probably more objective than a governmental one and serves the interest of the citizens better. The supervision of parliaments over governments should be made as effective as possible, but should fit into the political system of each Member state. Since the members’ political systems are various, the supervisory mechanism should be flexible as well. Generally the information provided to national parliaments results in a great variety of feedbacks, (e.g. for the Council) which should be helpful to represent the will of Member States when developing a certain policy. It surely gives a broader picture to European decision-makers. 45

Conference of Community and European Affairs Comittee


3.6 The working group on complementary competences PROPOSALS

The working group had the task to make a clear separation of community and national competences, focusing on the issue of complementary competences, where we can find no clear definitions. The clear definition of competences is important for the EU. Due to the complex system of national and community competences legal disputes can emerge. For a well-working system of implementing policies, the clear definition of competences is needed. The complementary competences are: ’areas where Member States have not transferred any of their own competences to the EU, but have endowed the EU with certain powers to complement, coordinate or assist internal activities of the Member States’47. The working group’s position was that the nomenclature does not represent well the relation of EU and national competences on these areas, therefore it should be changed to ‘supporting measures’. I think this definition is even worse, since we are not talking about measures, but competences. The working group proposed to reserve a separate title for this issue in the Constitutional Treaty, in which the provisions for the definition of competences, the three categories of EU competencies and the conditions of acting (for the EU) would be contained. The members thought the nomenclature in the Treaty establishing the EU (EU Treaty). ‘an even closer Union’ suggests that the Union takes away competences from the Member States. They proposed therefore to change this definition as well. The working group defined the policies where ‘supporting measures’ shall be applied. These are: social policy, employment, education, culture, health, trans-European networks, industry and R+D. The working group would clarify the basic elements of national identity defined in the EU Treaty.

46

Mostly according to their own aims or interests Defined in working document 28 of the Working Group on Complementary Competences http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/wd5/3156.pdf 23.10.2003.

47

:


Members agreed to keep Article 308. of the Treaty establishing the European Communities48, but they insisted on setting the Parliament’s agreement as a condition before acting. The working group furthermore proposed the possibility of revoking the measures accepted by QMV. DEBATES The report of the working group did not give much satisfaction to the members of the Convention. The report was discussed at the plenary session of 13 November 2002. The members of the Convention were one with me concerning the nomenclature ‘supporting measures’. They thought the name does not refer to the areas of policies where the subject competences shall be applied. They were against the idea of changing the definition ‘an even closer Union’ since it refers to the people, not the competences. Everyone agreed on the inclusion of a separate title on complementary competences in the Constitutional Treaty. However many opposed the inclusion of some policies, like social policy or R+D. In my opinion, coordination by the EU in these issues can be helpful either if we are talking about financial help or just a simple coordination. R+D projects are international in many occasions, so putting it into the areas of complementary competences seems to be quite right. With regard to article 308 of the EC Treaty there was broad consensus of retaining this flexibility clause. A strong preference was on the strengthening of the European parliaments’ position. Thus the decisions brought in the occasions defined by the article would better represent the interests of Europeans.

48

The article says: ‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal form the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.’ EC Treaty http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ec_cons_treaty_en.pdf , 25.10.2003.


3.7 The working group on economic governance PROPOSALS The working group on economic governance submitted the smallest package of results to the European Convention. There are no real significant reforms in the report. With the commencing of the EMU a functioning monetary system started. Most of the politicians don’t see the point in making decisive changes to the existing system. The working group stated, that the existing division of competences (that the monetary policy is at community level, but the fiscal policy is at national level) is satisfying and should be retained. The working group supported that the European Central Bank should remain politically independent, but has to be made more transparent. Furthermore, the coordination of economic policies should be focusing on social and economic community aims. The devotion to these aims should be included in the new Constitutional Treaty. The coordination of economic, social, budgetary and employment policies should be strengthened between the Member States. The harmonisation of economic policies should be based on the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs). The initial warning of nations and the application of the guidelines should belong to the competences of the Commission. The working group proposed the strengthening of the ‘Eurogroup’, which is an unofficial discussion forum for EMU members. Furthermore, the working group decided that the Stability and Development pact should not be included in the new constitutional Treaty, since it is a political tool, not a provision. The working group and the Convention left three unsolved questions. In the question of budgetary deficit, many nations have the position that the Commission should give a ‘first warning’ to nations exceeding the deficit limit. The working group was not successful in closing this debate. Further discussion was needed in the issue of Council voting and taxation policies. The question here is the implementation of QMV. The issues related to the method of open coordination will be discussed in the section on the working group on simplification. The reforms here, are really just a slight modifications of existing economic coordination. The further strengthening of the coordination between Member States is


positive from the aspect of creating an economically stable integration. The closer cooperation in economic, social and budgetary policies could provide better practices for the struggling Member States. DEBATES There was great consensus about the existing competences and the inclusion of social objectives of the European Union in the new Constitutional Treaty. The inclusion of social objectives strengthens the social policy that is surely for the benefit of European citizens. Many members of the Convention agreed on the strengthening of the coordinating competence of the Commission. They welcomed the idea of ‘initial warning’ mechanism in the application of BEPGs, but many resisted the idea of ‘first warning’ when there is excessive deficit of nations. It is understandable, since the interest of the European Union would be the maintenance of an economically stable community. However some nations can’t provide results that are good enough to satisfy all of the EU’s monetary criteria49. The real big issue is the international representation of the EMU. The problem is that the enlarged EU would be made up of countries that will not be members of the EMU at least in the near future. But for example with the strengthening of the ‘Eurogroup’ these hardships could be overcome.

3.8 The working group on external action The VII. Working group dealt with one of the most important questions, the external actions of the European Union. From the aspect of the external representation, this is a key issue. PROPOSALS The working group prepared a great number of reforms. The basic principles of the reforms are the single representation of the European Union, the simplification of institutional 49

That is why members of the EMU are not obliged to satisfy all criteria, they only have to get close to the fiscal criteria set in Madrid in 1995


issues and the extension of community competences. I will discuss only the most important ones. Consensus could be reached on the insertion of a separate part on external relations in the new Constitutional Treaty. The working group proposed the extension of the principles of the EU Treaty50 to the external policy. Therefore the EU would focus on the maintenance of these principles in other countries. The working group set the aims of the external policy as well. The principles and aims would be included in the new Constitutional Treaty. The most important proposal was the proposal on the merging of EU foreign policy and external relations of the Community. The first one is intergovernmental, the latter one is a community competence. The proposal would unite the positions of the Mr. CFSP (secretarygeneral of the Council) and the Commissioner for External Relations. The new position would be called ‘European External Representative’ (EER). According to the plans, the EER would be appointed by the Council and would have a seat in the Commission51. He would have the sole initiator in CFSP affairs. He would be the single person representing the EU abroad. The creation of this position simplifies considerably the institutional system of the EU and strengthens its global representation. However doubts may appear here, whether the extension of the powers of such a position would drive the EU away from the path of democratic development. In my opinion the strong position of a single person could be replaced by a delegation of permanent representatives, who would be appointed by the Council, with the approval of the Parliament. The working group proposed the setting up of the External Action Council, which would be chaired by Mr. CFSP. Furthermore, the proposal aimed at the development of a new office, the European External Action Service, which would be composed of DG External Relations officials, Council Secretariat officials and staff seconded from national diplomatic services. The delegations of the Commission would be transformed into embassies. This is also a step that empowers the European Union with institutions that are originally characteristic to a nation.

50

‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States…..The Union shall respect fundamental rights… The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States….’ Maastricht Treaty : http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html 12.10.2003. 51 According to the plans the most suitable person would be the vice-President of the Commission


A new legislative instrument was proposed. The Commission and Mr. CFSP could present a ‘joint initiative’ that should be adopted by QMV if it is a second pillar issue. They thought a provision that allows the Council to decide on the extension of QMV is needed. The working group would further extend the application of QMV in the areas of trade policy. The working group agreed that the structure of the development policy should be reformed as well. The development funds should be concentrated and issued to EU the competences. The European Development Fund should be integrated to the EU’s central budget. That would result in a more affective allocation of development resources. The expansion of CFSP budget was regarded as inevitable. Furthermore the working group proposed that Mr. CFSP should have the right to map resources onto actions within the CFSP. The last significant proposal was to have EU representation in international organisations. Generally the report of the working group provided significant and dynamic reforms to the issue of External Actions. DEBATES The first split of opinions was in defining the roles of the High Representative (Mr. CFSP). Many said that the position of the High Representative is not compatible with chairing the Council of External Actions. They would appoint a different person with this task. I support this opinion, since I think that the High Representative is already empowered with many tasks. Several speakers considered that both functions of High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations should be merged into the Commission. Some of them questioned the option set out in the recommendations of the Group, which provided for the exercise of both functions by one person: others could accept it as an interim step. Several other speakers preferred this option and considered that it had the advantage of respecting the specific arrangements for different policy areas, whilst at the same time ensuring overall coherence. A great number of speakers thought that the two functions should remain distinct, only the cooperation should be stronger between them.


The reforms proposed by the working group should bring real changes to the external policy of the European Union. In my opinion the two functions of High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations should be merged. However, the tasks should be carried out by a group of more people. That is why I support the idea of bringing the tasks under one body that is composed of 3-5 persons. Anyway a united global representation of the EU will strengthen its power in external relations.

3.9 The working group on defence The question of defence is a very sensitive one that has caused the most significant splits within the European Union52. The solutions of defence questions were strongly related to some reforms proposed by the working group on external action. PROPOSALS The proposals of the working group were prepared in four topics, basically. The first of these is crisis management. The working group proposed the extension of Petersberg Tasks53. The new duties would be prevention of conflicts, joint action in the removal of weapons, providing military assistance and advice, stabilisation after the conflict is over and mutual help against the threat of terrorism. The proposal said, the Political and Security Committee should bring the decisions on defence, instead of the Council. According to the working group the position of the High Representative would be further extended. He would have the right of initiation in crisis management issues. He would be responsible for the coordination of civil and military dimensions during a military operation. In emergency cases he might bring decisions on his

52

Just to mention the failure of the principle ‘one voice of Europe’ in military issues in relation with the recent War in Iraq 53 Originally peace-keeping, humanitarian and rescue tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management


own. These duties further strengthen his position. In my opinion the competencies of the High Representative are too extensive. The proposal would provide a stronger cooperation in military training. A very important reform reinforced by the working group is to use of constructive abstention54 in military questions. The working group was not one in the question of extending the possibility of ‘closer cooperation’ to defence questions. The working group tried to answer the threats of the 21st century. They proposed stronger cooperation of both civil and military bodies to prevent terrorism. This would be created also by the insertion of a solidarity clause in the new Constitutional Treaty, which would state the mutual help in case of terrorism. There were debates within the working group on the idea of collective defence. Many resisted this idea and pointed out, that this question should be solved within the NATO. As a compromise the working group provided the possibility to create groups of ‘closer cooperation’ for collective defence purposes. The working group proposed some major ideas on the improvement of capacity and institutional system. The main idea is to set up the European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency that would work and coordinate the development of weaponry and military research. It would operate on an intergovernmental basis. There was a proposal for setting up the Council of Defence Ministers. This council would monitor the military commitments of nations and would adjust capacity building to criteria set by international agreements. The Council of Defence Ministers would meet the Council for ‘External Actions’ in issues of external military action. Some members were though for the existing system. (the 2 councils meet under the Council of General Affairs and External Relations) The last proposal of the working group was to strengthen the position of the EP. Thus the EP would be able to give opinion on operations and to accept decisions. DEBATES

54

That was already proposed in the Treaty of Amsterdam


In discussion, there was widespread support for the results of the group's work, with many speakers fully endorsing the recommendations in the report. Many welcomed that the proposals of the working group do not lead the EU towards a way of a military alliance. I would argue with this opinion, since I believe a stronger global representation could be reached via a separate and strong policy on all policy areas, including defence as well. I think the EU should form an own army to defend itself and maintain only links with the NATO. However, I have to admit that it is very hard to harmonise the position of EU members in this question. Many of the speakers welcomed the flexibility introduced in the decision-making in defence questions. Some, however regarded a possibility of constructive abstention as divisive. A number of speakers supported the idea to establish collective defence for the countries, who wished so. A great part resisted the inclusion of the provisions of Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty55. On the strengthening of the role of the European parliament some of the speakers expressed the need of an EP approval before the commencing of a military operation. In my opinion this would be a healthy step. The European Parliament should have more power in this area, therefore the proposal of the working group should be extended with the EP’s right of approval.

3.10 The working group on simplification of legislative instruments and procedures Among all of the working groups, the working group on simplification of legislative instruments and procedures dealt with one of the most important issues. This was making the legislative instruments and procedures of the European Union more simple and transparent.

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Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty: ‘If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.’ http://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm 28.10.2003.


Previously, the legal procedures of the EU were so complicated that even specialists of EU law found it quite hard to understand them. PROPOSALS The working group attempted to provide solutions basically to two questions. One was the means to decrease the number of legal procedures, and the other to simplify existing legislative instruments. The working group - beyond decreasing the number of legislative instruments from 15 to 6 - proposed to develop some new categories for existing legislative instruments, and some new nomenclatures that reflect the scope of the legal tool better: -

Regulations and Directives would become laws and framework laws, and some Decisions (mainly in complementary competences) would become laws as well – binding legislative instruments

-

Decisions and Regulations would become binding non-legislative instruments

-

Recommendations and Opinions would become non-binding instruments

The usage of nomenclatures for binding legislative instruments would become compulsory. "Non-standard" acts (conclusions, Resolutions, communications, etc.) would be retained, in the interests of flexibility, but they would be used only where there was no provision for recourse to a formal act. The working group had recommended that the existence of the open method of coordination56 should be recognised in the Constitutional Treaty, whilst specifying that this mode of concerted action by Member States could not supplant Union action in areas where competence lay with the Union. The working group’s proposal would create a new legislative hierarchy. According to this, there should be legislative acts, ‘delegated’ acts and implementing acts. The ‘delegated acts’ would focus the legislator to delegate practical aspects of legislation into the executive competences. The proposal would simplify legislative procedures. It focused on 5 types of legislative procedures. The most important changes were the following: 56

That contains the coordinated acting of member States beyond the competences delegated to the EU


-

co-decision procedure: extension of QMV, general extension of the co-decision procedure (except for some areas that where autonomous decision should be brought)

-

cooperation procedure: would be abolished and split into co-decision and consultation procedures

-

consent: would only be applicable to ratify international agreements

-

consultation procedure: would be limited to procedures not belonging to the codecision procedure

-

budgetary procedure: existing authorities should be kept, Council would be responsible for the resources, Parliament for the expenditure, a simplified co-decision procedure should be applied when defining the annual budget, removal of distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure

Finally the working group proposed to make the Council’s discussions on legislative issues public. This provision is a key step in developing a transparency of legislation. DEBATES The European Convention discussed the report of the working group on the plenary session in early December 2002. All speakers supported the radical cut of the number of legislative instruments and procedures. In my opinion the radical simplification really makes the decision-making more transparent and understandable, even for the EU citizen57. Some members wanted to introduce a new type of legislative instrument. The so-called ‘organic-law’ would be stronger than a ‘simple’ law, but would have less power than a constitution. The opinions were contrary on the creation of ‘delegated acts’. Many wanted to clarify how these differed from implementing acts. A broad consensus was on the extension of codecision to the adoption of legislative acts. Some stressed however that exceptions are needed, especially on those areas that are sensitive to certain Member States58. Some wanted to abolish the decision procedure of unanimity, even for CFSP matters. In my opinion, unanimity should be abolished without exceptions. On sensitive areas, I would recommend 57

Of course it depends on the level of education


the use of super qualified majority. In such questions, the Member States of the EU should be one, but generally unanimity shall be abolished. In CFSP issues the idea of constructive abstention seems to be a sound compromise. Many speakers resisted the idea of the removal of distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. They said it would mean that the Council would no longer have effect on the agricultural expenditure, which is a very sensitive area.

3.11 The working group on the area of freedom, security and justice PROPOSALS The working group on the area of freedom, security and justice proposed several reforms of legislative kind. It simplified the procedures and instruments for maintaining such an area. There were two main bunches of proposals. The first one was on the development of a community legal basis for better coordination and harmonised policies. Thus the legislation belonging now to the third pillar would be covered based on a community framework. The other group was the group of proposals on operative activities. The working group had the opinion that he current pillar structure should be abolished and the provisions on the area of freedom, security and justice should be incorporated in a single chapter of the Treaty. The reforms of legal procedures basically divided and simplified the legal background on many areas. The proposals would create a common legal basis for the following policies: refugees, immigration, visas, external defence of the border and civil legal cases. Furthermore, the proposals would extend qualified majority voting and the co-decision process to these areas. On the area of law enforcement and criminal cooperation the reform of the legislative instruments was urged. The working group would introduce the mutual acceptance of court decisions. In their opinion, common legal basis should be created for criminal law. The legal basis should be developed for closer international police cooperation. Furthermore the

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E.g. social affairs, taxation or agriculture were classified as sensitive areas


criminal legal procedures should be simplified and QMV and co-decision procedures shall be applied. The working group stated that operative cooperation lacks effectiveness, transparency and accountability. The working group would reform the Council by separating its legislative and executive function on this area. Concerning the external defence of borders, the members of the working group expressed their determination to establish a community border guard body on the long run. The proposals would strengthen the Europol and would delegate it under the supervision of the Parliament, the Council and the Court of Justice. In horizontal questions the working group supported the strengthening of evaluation and monitoring mechanisms and the closer integration of national parliaments into European criminal policies. DEBATES A great majority of speakers were satisfied with the proposals of the working group. Generally, most of the members agreed on the proposals, there were only a few suggestions for slight changes. Many members insisted on accepting common standards in criminal matters so as to provide a good basis for creating a stronger judicial cooperation. There were some disputes on the extension of QMV and the co-decision procedure to currently third pillar issues. Some members wanted to totally abolish unanimous decisions, others had reservations on the extension of the co-decision procedure. I think the compromise of the Convention is suitable. Thus, QMV shall be general with a few exceptions. Some members underlined the importance of external relations in JHA issues. It is interesting that many of the speakers wanted to limit the jurisdiction of the Court on internal security measures for the advantage of national authorities. Some of the members wanted to empower the Europol with operational and research rights on the whole area of Member States. I think this shall be the next step in the long run. Many welcomed (including me) the control of the European Parliament over the Europol.

3.12 The working group on social Europe


This is the last working group invoked by the European Convention, but had the most important issue from a social point of view. The European Union should focus on social policies, because it is one of the issues that are most felt by its people. Unfortunately, the working group on social Europe did not propose too many reforms, it mainly focused on strengthening the social values of the Union. PROPOSALS The working group first defined the social values and aims of the European Union. The working group proposed to add the values of social justice, solidarity and equality, in particular equality between men and women. Furthermore, the inclusion of the following social aims were proposed: full employment, social justice, social peace, sustainable development, economic, social and territorial cohesion, social market economy, quality of work, lifelong learning, social inclusion, a high degree of social protection, equality between men and women, children's rights, a high level of public health and efficient and high quality social services and services of general interest. There was great consensus about competences in social issues. The working group proposed the extension of QMV onto the area of social policies. It would strengthen the EU’s role on the areas of health and education. The proposal included the insertion of ‘open method of coordination’ (see page 42) in the new Constitutional Treaty. It would be effective on areas, like R+D, education or social protection. Moreover the working group added that these open coordination between nations should be regulated59. The WG proposed to extend QMV to three areas, where unanimity existed previously. These areas are: protection of employees with expired contract, collective protection and occupation conditions for third country citizens. An important proposal is to define the role of social partners. Fortunately, the European Union tends to notify social organisations more and more about the processes inside 59

Previously, there were ad hoc procedures


the Union. The working group recommended the stronger harmonisation of social and economic aims. The Council would be responsible for this issue. DEBATES Generally, there were few debates only on social issues. Some dispute was over the inclusion of the open method of coordination in the new Constitutional Treaty. The speakers argued that the open method of coordination would weaken community aims for a joint policy implementation. The most debates were on the area of the extension of QMV to areas where unanimity was the method of decision-making. All other proposals were generally welcome by members. In my opinion the working group did a good job in setting the main aims and objectives for social policies. However, I miss the inclusion of concrete reforms. The extension of QMV is mainly a decisionmaking reform, but not directly a social policy issue. Anyway, those changes proposed by the WG are surely for the greater effectiveness of social policies and thus for the better situation of European employees and citizens. I particularly welcome the proposal on social partners. In my opinion, sometimes they represent the needs of people better than people themselves. (e.g. see polls)

3.13. Conclusions In the second part of my dissertation I focused on the work of the eleven working groups. The evaluation of the reforms proposed by these experts can be seen from many sides. We found repeated evidences that a single reform has both many supporters and many opponents. The reader can see that my remarks and evaluations therefore cannot be objective and can easily be argued. What I was focusing on is to reveal some of the mistakes contained in the proposals of the working groups, and to emphasize those recommendations that have the greatest benefit for the EU and its citizens. Just as a revision I would like to list as examples, some of the key problems revealed in the proposals. Of course the evaluation of these is always subjective:


1, national parliaments may use the alert mechanism on the issue of subsidiarity to block legislation 2, too many tasks and responsibility is delegated to the High Representative 3, the proposals on complementary competences did not reach the aim of transparency 4, there is no practical evidence for the will to improve social policies 5, the proposals on defence still maintain a weak military cooperation in the EU 6, unanimity was not generally abolished (e.g. defence issues) Generally, there are great benefits carried in the proposals of the working groups. The results are various, since some were highly debated, some contained only a few reforms and some were accepted by the Convention with minor debates. Of course, the proposals were discussed and transformed before they were inserted to form the articles of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Although these proposals were changed and formed as time went on, practically they provide the framework for the draft Constitutional Treaty. They contain most of the key issues. In the latter part of my dissertation discussion I am going to focus on the draft Constitutional Treaty itself. I will critically analyse it by contrasting the various ‘feedbacks’ from EU institutions, Member States and representatives of the social sector.


4, Feedbacks on the results of the Convention 4.1 A short summary of the draft Constitutional Treaty with some critical reflections After more, than 15 months of work, the European Convention accepted the final draft of the new Constitutional Treaty. Many proposals of the Working Groups remained unchanged, but some were further developed during the discussions. In the following I would like to summarise the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty60, as an introduction to a deeper critical analysis. Of course, a detailed presentation of the Draft would go beyond the scope of my dissertation (the Draft is more than 260 pages), but firstly I will summarise the reforms of it, thematically. A framework for the new Constitutional Treaty can be found in Annex 5. I won’t go through the articles of the treaty, but I will discuss areas of reforms that mostly cover the working fields of the Working Groups. My summary will add some insights related to the most important questions. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES Generally, the institutional changes of the new Constitutional Treaty are quite significant. However, facing major challenges will still remain a question of political will. The Draft deals with institutional questions in Title IV of Part 1, but of course many policy areas are touched by these changes. The strengthening of the European Parliament is a clear target. This is enforced by the extension of the co-decision process to 35 new areas. The present system relying on a six-month rotating presidency of the European Council would be abandoned. Instead, the European Council would elect its President for two and a half years.

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A reader-friendly version of the draft Constitutional Treaty, prepared by Jens-Peter Bonde, www.bonde.com 05.11.2003.


The idea of permanent presidency is believed to take the word from smaller member states. From 2009 onward, the Commission would be composed of its President, the minister for foreign affairs (who will be the vice-President) and 13 Commissioners selected by virtue of a system of equal rotation between the Member States. Thus it becomes more simple and transparent, but nations would not be permanently represented. Concerning the Council of Ministers, the Draft enshrines the formation of the Foreign Affairs Council, but fails to really develop a ‘legislative’ council61. The number of votes for the EU 25 can be found in Annex 7. QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING Article I-24 defines qualified majority voting. According to paragraph 1, QMV should consist of the simple majority of Member States, representing at least 60% of the population of the European Union. This approach is trying to satisfy both the interest of the bigger and smaller Member States. When the Constitution does not require the European Council or the Council of Ministers to act on the basis of a Commission proposal, the majority of Member States shall be 2/3. The determination of QMV is simplified in the Constitutional Treaty, related to the provisions of the nice Treaty. The introduction of the ‘super qualified majority62’ is a very good proposal to replace unanimity on politically sensitive areas. The provisions of the Draft would take effect on 1 November 2009, after the EP elections. The new Constitutional Treaty extends QMV onto a number of policy areas. However, in some sensitive policy areas, unanimity is still required. For example, the provisions prepared by the Convention failed to extend QMV for the CFSP decisions incorporating defence matters. An important provision is the so-called ‘Pasarelle-clause’ which allows Member States to decide unanimously on the extension of QMV to areas where unanimous decision is needed. LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES The Convention could reach great success in cutting back the number of legislative instruments and procedures. As mentioned in section 3.10, the number of instruments was reduced to 6. The instrument of ‘organic law’ was planned to be included in the new instruments. Finally, it was left out. The Draft introduces the ‘delegated regulations’ to

61

The Legislative and General Affairs Council has legislative functions, but the clear separation of legislative and executive power within the Legislative and General Affairs Council was not reached by the Draft 62 E.g. the Council of Ministers acts by a majority of four-fifths of its members when adopting a European decision


supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a law or framework law. The legislative procedures also match the requirement of simplification. The Treaty eliminates the cooperation procedure and co-decision procedure becomes the rule. This provision significantly increases the role of the EP. The Commission has been successful to preserve its right of legislative initiative, except for the issues of judicial cooperation, in criminal matters and police cooperation. Here, the quarter of the Member States may initiate decisions in parallel to the Commission’s initiative. SUBSIDIARITY AND COMPETENCES The draft Constitutional Treaty defined the application of the principle of subsidiarity, and a new competence area. The exclusive and shared competences would be complemented with the so-called ‘supporting, coordinating or complementary actions’. As the planned nomenclature reveals, the EU is still unsure about the name of this group of competences. The policy areas in the Draft where supplementary action would be applied are: industry, health, education, youth and sport, culture and civil protection. The application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is subject to a new monitoring system described in a Protocol attached to the Constitutional Treaty. The system of ex-ante and ex-post supervision enables national parliaments to object to the application of the principle of subsidiarity. The objection of one-third of national parliaments is needed. Unicameral parliaments have two votes and each chamber of the bicameral parliaments has one-one vote. The system provides great possibility of legislative blocks due to the clash of political interests. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS The Charter of Fundamental Rights was incorporated in the constitutional Treaty. Furthermore it projects the accession to the European Convention of Human Rights. Thus the fundamental rights for EU citizens will be legally provided in the core Treaty of the European Union. The text of the Charter is fully reproduced in the Treaty except for some changes in horizontal articles that enhance legal certainty and clarity on some of the more difficult questions. Most of the provisions repeat what is already established in the Charter text. Article III-266.4 ensures for EU citizens an easier access to the Court of Justice. Though, the big issue is the incorporation itself. Thus the Charter will have legal power.


EXTERNAL ACTION The articles on external action are grouped together in Title V. The aims of external policy include strengthening multilateral cooperation (especially via the UN framework) and good global governance, sustainable development, free trade, conflict prevention and eradicating poverty. The Convention accepted the proposal of the Working Group on External Action for the promotion of an External Representative. The representative will have multiple tasks, described in section 3.8 of my dissertation. Common Strategies and Joint Actions will be replaced by Decisions that commit Member States to follow the agreed EU policy. Unanimity still remains a general rule, but abstention will be possible. If more than 1/3 of the countries abstain, the proposal fails. With 25 plus Member States, the retention of the veto in CFSP will be a recipe for weakness and inaction. The Petersberg tasks are extended in the Draft Constitutional Treaty (see section 3.9). Member States with more improved military capacity may enter into such cooperation. In defence questions, great emphasis is put on the fight against terrorism. New monitoring and coordinating institutions are set up. Expenditures on military budget will be charged to the European Union. With its new legal personality the EU will be able to sign international agreements. The EU is keen to look for the possibility of individual representation in international organisations. The issue of external affairs still remains a sensitive question. Here, you can see that the provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty retain e.g. the defence policy as a strong cooperation of nations. However, there is still no sign of the Members States being willing to share sovereignty in this sensitive area. JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS Important progress has been made on the area of Justice and Home Affairs, since the third pillar disappears, the same legal instruments apply to all policies, QMV is extended to a wide range of policies, judicial control is improved and new legal bases are established that bring simplicity and clarity. Mutual recognition of judicial decisions is introduced in the


Treaty. A strengthening of operational cooperation is foreseen. The new Constitutional Treaty gives new legal basis to the Europol and Eurojust. The Commission retains its right of initiative. However, the draft Treaty gives the right to initiate legislation to one quarter of the Member States in the areas covered by judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. This is the last ‘third pillar leftover’. In this part the will for creating an EU border guard is expressed, however the “gradual establishment of an integrated management of external border control” looks to be a weak expression that is not powerful enough. In the criminal cooperation issue, a harmonisation of criminal law seems to have started. According to the provisions of the Treaty, European procedural standards will be developed. Although the Convention was charged with the development of the entire external dimension of JHA, only the external aspect of asylum policy is highlighted through the incorporation of the concept of partnership and cooperation with third countries with a view to improving the management of migratory flows. ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE An important provision of the Treaty in this issue is the special competence developed for economic and employment matters. According to the text, the Union ‘shall adopt measures to ensure coordination of the economic [and employment] policies of the Member States, in particular by adopting broad guidelines for these policies63. The Union’s coordinating power is weakly expressed in the text. Social justice was set as a value in the article on the aims of the Union in developing a market economy. The Convention accepted the proposed system of warning initiated by the Commission when there is excessive deficit of a Member State. The Council cannot amend the text of the warning. This strengthens the position of the Commission and the power of the EU over Member States. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines were only slightly changed. The text sets that the finance Ministers of the Euro zone countries should meet regularly. Thus a separate body will emerge to represent the Euro zone countries. In the issue of tax harmonisation, no progress could be reached.

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Article I-14 of the draft constitutional Treaty


EU FINANCES The finance is a very sensitive area, therefore the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty had to be cautious, but effective. The Convention has significantly simplified the procedures for accepting the annual budget. The new financial framework is called ‘multiannual financial framework’. The basic guidelines of the MFF are contained in article I-54. The annual budget shall comply with the multi-annual financial framework. The first MFF after the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty shall be adopted unanimously. In my opinion qualified majority could be applied in this issue as well. The EU plans to introduce QMV in this area only around 2013, which makes budgetary decisions less effective for 10 more years. There are some controversies in the definition of the role of the European Parliament. According to the provisions of the Treaty, a ‘European law of the Council’ lays down the MFF (no legislative procedure is mentioned!). This seems to be in contradiction with article I-19, which states that “the European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, enact legislation, and exercise the budgetary function”. The provisions related to the new annual budget will make the budget more transparent. In budgetary decisions the EP has the last word, because it can either amend or reject non-satisfactory proposals. However, some expenditure is still decided without its approval. There was no progress on the Union’s own resources. The existence of the practically non-existing own resources is re-stated in the Treaty. The instrument known as ‘own resources decision’ still remains a subject of unanimity, which is a great constraint. GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS The Union that will emerge from the Constitutional Treaty will be very different from the present one. The Constitutional Treaty will abolish the European Community and the European Union, only to recreate a new ‘European Union’ with a single legal personality and a unified set of legal instruments. The Treaty incorporates two major innovations: the repeal of the previous Treaties and the introduction of the Convention for the revision of the future Constitutional Treaty. The treaty will be accepted by the unanimous ratification of Member States, and will repeal existing Treaties. The Treaty won’t enter into force, if a small


minority rejects it. This may cause great problems with in the EU-25, since the IGC in Rome already revealed that some Member States are quite opposite to the provisions of the Treaty. However, the European Union stated that if there are some problems of ratification in a minority less than 20% of Member States, the European Council will act to work out a solution.

In the following I will provide a broad picture of the different opinions on the draft Constitutional Treaty. Some of these reactions gave the basis for the negotiations at the ongoing IGC in Rome. My research starts form the EU level (reactions of EU bodies), and ends up at the individual level. I will try to reveal those points, which proved to be unsatisfactory for the commenting parties. The aim of this approach is to give a criticism by seeing all sides of the coin. Furthermore I am going to add my individual approach to the opinions presented.

4.2 Criticisms of ‘EU players’ As you will see below, European institutions widely welcomed the results of the Convention. There are some general concerns, however, and this reveals the points, where the IGC might bring up new results. Of course everyone approaches the questions quite subjectively, but there are many common points debated. PROBLEM AREAS FOR THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL64

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The constitutional reform of the Union – a strategy for the Italian Presidency – Instituto Affari Internazionali – Rome, 27-28 June, 2003


The Italian Institution for Foreign Affairs presented its study as a strategy paper that the Italian Presidency should adopt. The strategy paper ‘congratulates’ to the achievements of the Convention. They see some very impressive development in the reforms. The greatest achievements, according to the paper are: the constitutional recognition of EU citizens’ rights, the simplification of the instruments and of the procedures, the creation of the supremacy of the EU law, the institutional renewal, the adoption of the ‘double majority’ for the QMV, the extension of co-decision and the introduction of flexibility methods in CFSP decisions. However, the study reveals some critical points of the draft Constitutional Treaty. One opinion was that the proposals failed to carry out the general extension of qualified majority voting. In their opinion, the application of the unanimity rule on areas, such as taxation, social issues and foreign and security policy is a serious block to effectiveness. The treaty-revision procedures mentioned in the Draft are ineffective too, since an amendment requires the ratification of all member states. I support this approach so that amendments wouldn’t need to be decided unanimously (but e.g. by a ‘super qualified majority’). According to the strategy paper, the Commission will have a more limited role in economic governance and economic coordination. I would like to add that the Commission is even lobbying now during the IGC discussions not to cut back its power so drastically. REACTIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION65 The primary criticism from the European Commission was on the organisation and functions of the Commission. They strongly disagree with the new system of ‘rotating’ positions in a Commission with 15 members. The Commission is in favour of equal representation of every Member State. This would, of course strengthen the role of the Commission, however it is doubtful, whether 25 positions are needed in the EU’s ‘government’. My opinion is, that a Commission of 15 is more efficient from an EU perspective, however from a national perspective it is not democratic. Here, any of the choices 65

Opinion of the Commission, pursuant to Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Conference of representatives of the Member States’ governments convened to revise the Treaties http://www.ciginfo.net/demain/en/main2.htm 08.11.2003.


would slightly hurt the principles of EU reforms. Therefore, a decision is very difficult to make. I would support the cut in the number, since the application of equal permanent representation would result in an oversized Commission in the long run. The Commission agrees with the previous opinion to reduce the number of areas where unanimity is still applied. The Commission supports a more flexible treaty-revision system. They point out that there are some imprecise or contradictory wordings in the Treaty, which should be a consistent document. The Commission found some crucial points in the issues on economic governance as well. The draft Constitution's provisions on the Union’s economic and monetary policy need to be improved further, in particular by giving the Commission a right of proposal for the preparation of the broad economic-policy guidelines. The Commission is not satisfied with policy reforms. In their opinion, the reforms on policy areas except for the area of freedom, security and justice are roughly reproducing existing EC provisions. This is right in a way, but the question arises: To what extent did each policy area need a reform? In my opinion the sensitive areas, like defence or taxation remained too rigid. The Commission suggests that the ineligibility of policy reforms is a further reason to develop a more flexible treaty-revision system. COMMENTS FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT66 The European Parliament was more satisfied with the provisions of the Treaty. However, the EP believes that the election of the President of the European Council cannot solve in itself all the current problems of the functioning of this Institution and could entail unforeseeable consequences on the institutional balance of the Union. Therefore, the role of the President must be strictly limited to that of a chair in order to avoid possible conflicts with the President of the Commission. The Parliament believes that in the draft Constitutional Treaty there is a lack of further consolidation of economic and social cohesion policy, closer coordination of Member States economic policies in view of effective economic governance, and a more explicit integration of environmental aspects in all EU policies. I would particularly emphasise the environmental aspect, since it is a fundamental issue, such as


human rights. They emphasise on the further extension of QMV too. The Parliament believes that the draft Constitutional Treaty represents the will of the people of the EU. If we look at the results of the Draft in general, we can say, that the simplification and democratisation, the greater transparency of policies and the inclusion of human rights are clear signs of this. In some specific areas though, we can say that citizens are not recognised at all67. The Parliament regrets that ratification from all MSs is needed for further amendments of the Treaty. REFLECTIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK The Council requested the ECB to provide an opinion to the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Most of their concerns are related to the terminology of the text. They have, of course a financial approach to the Treaty. They miss the determination to price stability when the aims of the European Union concerning economic growth are mentioned. They suggest a reference to ‘non-inflationary growth as mentioned in the EC Treaty. The ECB found it controversial that the provisions on the ECB are put under Title IV dealing with European Institutions, however in Article I-18, where the institutions are listed, the ECB is not mentioned. Generally, the ECB welcomes the reforms, especially the strengthening of the Eurogroup. SUGGESTIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN68 The European Ombudsman, Nikiforos Diamandouros presented the position of European Ombudsmen in April 2003. This is a position paper made during the debates in the Convention, but I included it, because its views relevant in representing the interests of citizens. They proposed the EU not to accede only to the ECHR, but to other international agreements for the protection of Human Rights. I agree, this would strengthen the EU’s 66

Report on the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and the European Parliament's opinion on the convening of the Intergovernmental Conference, European Parliament, 10 September 2003 http://www.ciginfo.net/demain/en/main2.htm 08.11.2003. 67 E.g. unanimity in economic and social cohesion policy social


commitment to Human Rights, however I don’t really see the point of the practical use of further accessions. The Ombudsman proposed furthermore the creation of a comprehensive system of judicial and non-judicial remedies. In my opinion the judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters satisfies the will of ombudsmen. They finally called on the EU to facilitate the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU to the actions of the institutions of the Union and of the Member States when applying Union law.

VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMITTEE (EESC)69

The EESC generally welcomed the provisions of the draft Treaty and recommended that the IGC in Rome should not upset the balance in provisions provided by consensus in the European Convention. However, the Committee pointed out that there are several areas where the Treaty needs amendment. They suggest that more efficient provisions should be adopted to coordinate the economic and social policies. The greatest problem in my opinion here is the lack of QMV in decisions over social policies. The EESC suggested the extension of the democratic scope of the EU’s economic, social and monetary policies with a greater involvement of the European Parliament and EESC. Indeed, these areas are in the competences of the Council of Ministers, the European Commission except for some minor cases70. Furthermore, the Committee urges the creation of a more consistent and effective foreign and security policy. The CFSP is still weak, although Europe can now have one voice in foreign policy issues. As long as unanimity exists, this policy area cannot be effective enough. Furthermore the EESC urges on expanding the mandatory fields of consultation of the EESC to cover the common asylum and immigration policy, application of the principle 68

Resolution adopted by the national ombudsmen and similar bodies of the Members States of the EU, meeting at their fourth seminar, held in Athens , 7-8 April 2003. http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00699en03.pdf 13.11.2003. 69 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee addressed to the 2003 Intergovernmental Conference http://www.ces.eu.int/pages/en/home.asp 13.11.2003. 70 E.g. in economic policy issues the President of the Council of Ministersmay be invited to appear before the competent committee of the European Parliament if the Council of Ministers has made its recommendations public


of non-discrimination, and culture, and acknowledging the role of civil society organisations in implementing the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, granting the EESC the right of appeal to the Court of Justice. Last, but not least the EESC calls for the precision of the provisions for putting into practice the principle of participatory democracy, like a greater expression to civil dialogue. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE OF REGIONS (CoR)71 As other institutions generally, the CoR expects the IGC to extend its consulting competence to areas, which have a direct local and regional impact to include agriculture, state aids and services of general interest, research and development, industry and immigration, social protection and security and justice. I think is a healthy idea, since the Committee is more competent to coordinate regional issues. The CoR insists on making the Treaty more consistent. It also calls for the right of regional ministers to attend Council meetings. Rightly, the Committee insists on the inclusion of interregional cooperation in Part III of the Treaty and giving provisions on giving financial support for these programs. The CoR widely supports the Convention as a forum for preparation of IGCs in the future. They recommend making all proposals for the amendment of the Treaty public. Generally these last two thoughts fit into my individual expectations on a democratic Union. SUMMARY As you can see, there are some major ‘black spots’ in the draft constitutional Treaty even from the EU institutions’ point of view. Generally, everyone says that the Treaty serves the interest of the EU and all of its citizens, but practically many areas are revealed by their comments, where there is a lack of reforms or a bad use of them. Let’s see, what the greatest concerns of the European institutions are: 71

QMV is not applied in many policy areas

Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 9 October 2003 on the CoR proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth091003_en.pdf 15.11.2003.


-

Unanimous decision shall be brought on further amendment of the Treaty

-

The coordination of economic growth and social policies is not effective

-

A permanent presidency of the Council may harm the institutional balance within the Union

-

Decision-making in the CFSP remained rigid

-

On most policy areas the reforms are not significant

4.3 Positions of Member States on the results of the Convention In this section I will refer to various positions of Member States and acceding countries before the Intergovernmental Conference in Rome. The countries joining the EU in 2004 can participate in the Conference as full members. I will have a less detailed overview of the opinions of Member States, because they put less emphasis on people’s interests. The discussion won’t include all the Member States one by one. I would like to highlight just the most important views and criticisms, and a very general summary of the Member States’ reactions. 4.3.1 The 4 big EU Member States GERMANY- FRANCE The reaction of the German government is crucially important, since their opinion gives the word of the biggest Member State with a population of 80 million. The German government generally praised the results of the draft Constitutional Treaty. The governments lead by Gerhard Schröder is well-known for its devotion to the European Union. The overall positive assessment of the results of the Convention has been shared by most of the political forces and the major opposition party at the federal level – the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) – also agreed with the results reached. At some point in the negotiations, the Germans


were dissatisfied with their 29 votes in the Council72, but finally they were compensated with 99 seats in the European Parliament. Some criticism came from Edmund Stoiber, leader of the Christian Social Democratic (CSU), who described it as a reform that had failed to establish a proper division of competences and a necessary re-transferral of tasks to the national level. He also missed the inclusion of Christian values. In my opinion this ‘eurosceptic’ view insists on the minimisation of EU competences, which is not healthy for creating a closer integration. The German government warmly welcomed the close co-operation Germany had established with France especially since the autumn of 2002. The French government and the President of the Republic have on several occasions expressed their general satisfaction with the outcome of the Convention. Indeed, the Convention accepted most of the French proposals, particularly those regarding the Union’s institutional structure. There is a certain disappointment about the French government’s failure to find support for its proposals on economic governance and coordination within the Euro zone. During the debates the two countries made significant common contributions to CFSP and defence issues. The Franco-German contributions aimed at making a more flexible decision-making in these issues (the extension of QMV) and a stronger cooperation in military capacity building. They made a common declaration on ESDP together with Belgium and Luxembourg. In this they expressed their devotion to the creation of the European Security and Defence Union (ESDU), which would provide a closer cooperation of mutual assistance in case of any threat, a common military capacity building and a development of common military positions73. UNITED KINGDOM The government was satisfied with the outcome. It has been able to prevent the extension of QMV to CFSP and tax policy and has obtained the institutionalisation of the role of national parliaments and the establishment of a permanent President of the European

72 73

The same number of votes as for the UK, France and Italy Which is especially important after the split of positions concerning the war in Iraq


Council – all these being core demands of the UK government. I would argue with the usefulness of some of these proposals. The prevention of the extension of QMV to CFSP issues is a great constraint to the decision-making in external action. The permanent President of Council might strengthen the bigger Member States and undermines the power of smaller Member States. The main problem with the perception of the UK is that the UK government pays the highest attention to ‘what does Britain get out of this’ rather than on ‘what Europe gets out of this’. The government has some reservations74 for the IGC in Rome: -

the structure of a single Treaty should be kept only, if it does not mean special arrangements for CFSP and some parts of JHA.

-

The legal personality should not mean the loss of national representation (and rights for the UK in international organisations

-

unanimity should remain for Treaty change; and in other areas of vital national interest such as tax, social security, defence, key areas of criminal procedural law and the system of own resources

-

An ESDP should be created while maintaining the NATO as a primary military organisation

As you can see, the British approach is quite an ’intergovernmental’ one, and is based mainly on their own national interests. This approach carries lots of blocks to effective EU policy-making, however they proved to be successful to include these proposals in the draft Constitutional Treaty. ITALY The Italians expressed, they were so satisfied with the results the Convention had achieved that the Intergovernmental Conference should not change the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty in a substantial way. They welcomed the strengthening of the European Parliament and that a balance between the three primary institutions could be maintained. Even the centre-left opposition welcomed the results of the Convention. They emphasised that an even closer integration should be created and the role of national 74

A Constitutional Treaty for the EU: The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 2003 http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth010903_en.pdf 16.11.2003.


parliaments should be less significant. This is a ‘federal’ approach, and in my opinion the results of the Convention are a compromise between this and e.g. the UK’s approach. There were no more important concerns or contributions from Italian side. 4.3.2 The Benelux countries Like the four ‘big’ Member states above, the Benelux countries were hugely supporting the key provisions prepared by the Convention. Together with the countries mentioned above they are the ones who don’t want to imply significant changes on the draft Constitutional Treaty. In the following I would like to reveal some of their minor concerns. Belgium was not happy that the European Parliament can elect the President of the Commission only after the candidates were appointed by the European Council. They imagined a greater role of the EP in this issue. In my opinion the election system proposed by the draft Constitutional Treaty is a sound approach, and there is no need to alter the proposed system. They found it regrettable that the European Council will become a distinct institution. The Netherlands requests the involvement of the European Parliament in electing the President of the Commission too. The government also wishes to see qualified majority voting in areas currently requiring unanimity (including social policy, subject to maintaining financial balance and the trade in services), but would like unanimity to be kept in the area of judicial cooperation and on financial issues. Furthermore, the Netherlands is keen to maintain equality among Member States. The interesting fact is that the planned composition of the Commission (after 2009) and the permanent presidency of the Council are somehow contrary to this will. The Dutch government stated that they want equal access to the office of President of the European Council. Luxembourg generally welcomed the provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty. 4.3.3 Four highly developed, but small EU Member States


Here, I would like to put Sweden, Denmark Finland and Austria in one group, because of their highly developed economies. These four countries can be described as countries with few concerns, however it is important to highlight their comments and criticisms. In Sweden, the government supports the idea of full-time presidency, however there were great debates in the Swedish parliament on these issues. Everyone from the opposition was against the proposal, and I can indeed understand their reservations. Further concerns were raised in relation with the extension of QMV to more policy areas. Denmark announced its opinion only in Danish. However in some press releases they emphasised their satisfaction. They also supported the extension of QMV. The interesting fact about Denmark is that they got opt-out in CFSP and defence policies. Finland was more critical on certain issues. Finland does not consider the Convention’s solution on EU institutions balanced. It finds problematic also the possibility for a smaller group of countries to form a "core group" in defence. The Finnish government wants qualified majority decision-making to be further increased over and above what was defined in the Convention’s proposal. In security questions Finland is on the unanimity side and wants to keep the policy on international level. It criticised the planned composition of the Commission, since they are originally for equality among Member States. As being very sensitive to environmental questions, Finland put strong emphasis on environmental aims. The Austrian government’s reaction to the European Constitutional Treaty has been rather lukewarm. Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel welcomed the results but at the same time asked that improvements should be made at the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference on several issues, including keeping the principle of one commissioner for every member state, the rotating presidency of the European Council and the extension of qualified majority voting to CFSP. As you can see, Austria has a quite healthy approach based on the principle of equality, which I hugely support. 4.3.4 Four ‘less developed’ small EU Member States


The least developed countries, like Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal can be put into one group not only because they are vulnerable to policy changes, but also because they are ‘small’ countries in both size and population. The Irish foreign minister presented its remarks in July 200375. This reveals some of Ireland’s contributions. The Irish government wants to go beyond the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty. They support the further development of cross-order fight against crime. They joined the countries that would further extend QMV. However they would retain unanimity on sensitive areas, such as the ESDP. The Irish are not happy about the composition of the Commission, however they see the positions of non-voting Commissioners as a feasible solution. I would argue, because I think a commissioner is a full member only if s/he has a voting right. In relation with the reforms, the Irish government calls on the more effective solution of global environmental, health and social problems by improving these policies and development funds. In relation of the Foreign Minister of the European Union the Irish foreign expressed that ‘it will not be possible for one person on his or her own to simultaneously represent the Union's many interests across the entire world’76. They suggested appointing deputy ministers with regional responsibilities. I entirely agree with this approach. Greece has always been keen on the deeper integration of the European Union. They were holding the presidency during a great part of the Convention debates and have always been totally in favour of the resulting compromises. The Spanish government has very interesting views on certain reforms. Concerning the competences, prime minister, José María Aznar expressed that the question should not be what competences the EU shall have, but how it could flexibly cooperate with Member States to make policies more effective through a ‘cooperation’ of competences77. The approach is citizen oriented, and it is a sound argument. That is why they especially welcomed the insertion of areas, where ‘supporting measures’ are taken by the EU. Spain is not happy, that much debate was on the election of the President of the Commission instead of the 75

National Forum on Europe, 3 July 2003, Outcome of European Convention Remarks by Brian Cowen TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/speech/sp151003_en.pdf 16.11.2003.

76

National Forum on Europe, 3 July 2003, Outcome of European Convention Remarks by Brian Cowen TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs, page 6, paragraph 5, line 4 http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/speech/sp151003_en.pdf 16.11.2003. 77 José María Aznar, 9 October 2001, Brussels


effectiveness of the Commission. They welcome the system of rotation, but fear that thus equality between Member States would be distorted. Spain is very keen on strengthening the powers of national parliaments, they even suggested the inclusion of a Charter of National Parliaments in the draft Constitutional Treaty. Spain insists on the inclusion of Christian values into the Treaty and rejects the system of double majority voting. Furthermore, they want to retain the division of votes as laid down in the Treaty of Nice. In Portugal, the perception of the Draft is positive. Beyond this overall positive reception there is a general concern, shared by the whole political spectrum that provisions of the draft Constitution concerning institutional matters strengthen the bigger countries’ powers and jeopardise the principle of equality between Member States. Similarly to Spain, they believe in an unbreakable relation in the NATO, but urges the strengthening of military cooperation. Portugal seeks equality as other smaller Member States. In general, this is characteristic to their opinion. 4.3.5 The positions and criticisms of some accession countries In the following I would like to investigate the critical edge in the positions of some important Member States. Generally, accession countries are more dissatisfied with the provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty. I believe the reason for this is that they still put more emphasis on their national interests (although some from the EU-15 do the same) than on the aims of the European Union. Practically they have less intention to a compromise, since they are not very much used to it. Poland will be one of the key players in the EU-25 with its population over 40 million. The Polish made a joint statement together with the Spanish, insisting on the inclusion of Christian values in the draft Constitutional Treaty. Giving a spiritual, Christian dimension to the European Union would add to the binding joints of cohesion, but in my opinion it is offensive to people of other religion and so it should not be included as a basic value. The Polish government also wants a more flexible coexistence of competences and refuses the re-nationalisation of existing EU competences (which was actually avoided in the draft Constitutional Treaty). Poland particularly believes in a greater Europe through fast enlargement, and wants this to be ‘materialised in the Draft’. Poland furthermore rejects the


system of double majority voting, since it works against such a big-sized country. They want to retain the division of votes as laid down in the Treaty of Nice. Hungary has added some very interesting reflections on the draft Constitutional Treaty. As many ‘small’ nations, Hungary supports the idea of equal representation of nations in the European Commission. The government regards the proposal of the Draft as not satisfactory in extending democratic values. They say, the presidency of the Council should be created in a democratic way, too. The Hungarian government therefore proposed (in January 2003) an alternative of a ‘4 nations team presidency’ which is a compromise, but was rejected. The Hungarians insist on changing the proposed majority ratios78 for double majority voting. The Hungarians would increase the ratio of nations needed for a decision within the QMV from 50% to 60%, clearly in favour of smaller Member States. (more votes needed for a decision) The Hungarians criticised the ration for ‘closer cooperation’. They believe that this should be increased from 1/3 of the MSs to half. The proposal would make it harder to create a ‘closer cooperation’, which can be more effective, but can easily make a distance between Member States. Most characteristically Hungary insists on the inclusion of the collective rights for minorities, which can be explained with its largest ration of minorities living in neighbouring countries. Other smaller accession states have common concerns in questions already mentioned above. I won’t investigate them in detail, just to list the common criticisms relate to the composition of the Commission, the presidency of the European Council and the extension of QMV (the protection of the right to veto!). SUMMARY If we take a look at the criticisms of Member States and accession countries, it is clearly visible that there are two groups of countries. In the first group there are the countries who would accept the draft Constitutional Treaty without significant changes. These countries are Germany, France, Italy, the Benelux countries and the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Greece. A second level of countries generally welcomed the Draft, but would amend some of its points. These are countries, like Austria, Finland, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. The accession 78

1/2 of Member States and 3/5 of the population


states mainly belong to the second group. This means that serious negotiations can be expected at the Intergovernmental Conference in Rome. As we see the ‘amending’ side consists of more countries, but the other side consists of countries with greater political power. A consensus should be brought at the IGC, but looking at the starting point this will be a very hard job. The greatest concerns of nations relate generally to: -

the extension of QMV

-

the composition of the Commission

-

the presidency of the Council

-

‘double’ qualified majority voting

-

CFSP issues

4.4 Opinions from the civil sector – NGOs and other players The opinions of NGOs are important in the way, that they are a ‘mirror’ to the European politicians (and to all of us) that reflects the interests of people, rather than a ‘compass’ directing the policies of the EU. These organisations have key role, since they are closer to the people of the European Union (most of the time they represent their interests) and have a better knowledge about European policies. Therefore NGOs represent the critical side with much more relevant criticisms, than the members of the society themselves. That is why I won’t discuss citizen surveys in this dissertation. Of course these organisations have sometimes a radical approach to European policies, but some relevant examples of these opinions may reveal some very important deficiencies of the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty. I will give some common ideas without defining all sources. A very important criticism is related to the executive powers of the European Union. Most of the analysts from the civil side believe that the Commission representing Europe, and the Council representing the nations shall be clearly distinguished in competences. They believe that the existence of two Presidents and the mixed executive powers of the two bodies is rather confusing and lacks transparency. Making the Commission a two-tier body adds further confusion to their existing concerns. They are unhappy, because the President who will run the European Council where government leaders meet and set overall


EU strategy, will be appointed behind closed doors by the leaders themselves. This is certainly jeopardising the principle of transparency. Sadly, we have to admit, that although many innovative provisions were made in the new draft Constitutional Treaty to increase transparency, some major decision processes like the one above still remain behind closed doors. In their declaration79 the Trade Unions summarised their criticisms. They claim that a clearer distinction between EU and Member States’ competences need to be made. Furthermore the tasks of the European Institutions should be expressed more clearly. They ask that the principle of unanimity in the field of social, fiscal and environmental issues be abandoned. They argue for an extension of QMV to the social field, as is already the case for the deregulation and competition field. They express that though services of general interest will be withdrawn from competition rules, there has been too little improvement on the social plan. They say that although there have been some reforms80 the democratisation of the European Union is still incomplete. A very important issue that they miss is the effective policy for equal opportunities of workers. They believe that QMV should be extended on this policy area as well. The international green NGOs also presented their opinion in an assessment paper81. They claim that while social inclusion was certainly an important item for the Convention, environment, health and food safety received hardly any attention. Indeed, the Convention did not focus on the sustainable development as much as the weight of the problem would have demanded. They ask how should the people feel closer to the EU when the focus is on the composition of the institutions, not on their everyday life, i.e. transport, social issues, stipulating employment environmental issues or research. This is a very good and important point which raises the question whether bringing the Union closer to its citizens have to be a top-down or rather a bottom-up process. I don’t think that citizens want very much to be involved in high-level decision making. They see only the results of effective policy and certainly they don’t bother about the source that much. Of course, to be effective at local level the EU has to solve its problems in the decision-making. However, certainly more 79

Opinion of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions ont he draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 10 July 2003 http://europa.eu.int/futurum/analyse/index_en.htm 18.11.2003. 80 E.g. election of the President of the Commission by the European Parliament 81 Towards a green Constitution – greening the European Conventon proposal, August 2003, ’The green eight’ http://europa.eu.int/futurum/analyse/index_en.htm 18.11.2003.


efforts should be put into issues that are really tangible to people. I totally agree with the view of the ‘green eight’82 and I think the Convention made a critical mistake in bringing the people closer to the Union. They propose the elimination of unanimity on all relevant area of environmental protection (agriculture, transport, research, Single Market, etc.) and the inclusion of a separate section on sustainable development. They are understandably worried about the integration of the Euratom Treaty into the draft Constitutional Treaty, which would give nuclear energy a preferential financial and institutional legal framework. Representatives of the civil society made further claims83 to the coming Intergovernmental Conference. They call the IGC to change the existing draft text. They say modifications must aim at promoting democracy, transparency, European citizenship and the social bond, by widening the number of fields where qualified majority applies in lieu of the unanimity i.e. the right of veto, which so often generates blocking and inefficiency. They are not happy that after a transparent debate in the Convention the IGC (behind closed doors) has the last word. They insist on the distinction of euro zone countries so, that on the level of all the institutions, a distinction is established between the decisions and the votes that relate to the euro zone and those which relate to the zone apart from the single currency. Some of the criticisms prospect that the reforms of the draft Constitutional Treaty will not be effective enough, because the enlargement will have more impacts on the EU than planned. They say that the Convention has not dealt with the future, but with the problems of the present (or at least the near future). Indeed, there was little attention paid to long-term problems, therefore I believe that the text will and shall be amended in the future. They stress that with an EU of 25 members, not all countries is going to participate in every project, therefore the possibility of opt-out shall be improved for greater effectiveness. This is contrary to some politicians’ view. Giving many opt-outs should accelerate the development of the EU (shorter negotiations) but gears an unbalanced development within the community.

SUMMARY

82

The Green Eight: Bird Life, Climate Action Europe, Friends of Earth, Friends of Nature, Greenpeace, WWF, European Environmental Bureau, European Federation for Transport and Environment 83 Message to the Intergovernmental Conference – Permanent forum of Civil Society, 25 September 2003 http://europa.eu.int/futurum/analyse/index_en.htm 18.11.2003.


The criticisms from the civil organisations are sometimes too radical. However they have a key role in representing the interest of people. I would like to put emphasis on two significant claims from the summary above. Firstly, the Convention focused rather on high-level policy making and principles instead of problems tangible to the citizens of Europe and secondly that these policies should be more effective. (e.g. via extension of QMV to social/environmental areas) The draft Constitutional Treaty should be revised in the light of these ideas to fulfil the imagination of EU politicians to bring the EU closer to its people.

4.5 The show must go on – the final decision is left for the IGC The European Convention has brought a historical result in putting together a new draft Constitutional Treaty for Europe. The draft is a framework, but I strongly believe that some elements will be added and also taken away during the final negotiations. Hopefully these changes will only strengthen the interest of people, but it is more easily imaginable that the interest of governments will prevail to the disadvantage of European citizens84. In the following I am going to highlight the recent developments on the IGC in Rome. At the starting point of the negotiations is that there were basically two sides. Approximately 10 nations, with the leadership of the ‘big ones’ want to conserve the proposals of the Convention in its existing form. The others, among them many new members, want to amend the Treaty. The key areas of debate are: -

the size of the Commission

- double majority voting - constraint on national veto - presidency of the Council - revision of the Constitution

84

Based on the general idea that national interest does not represent people’s interests effectively, from: Kell-e alkotmány az Európai Uniónak?, Casper Einem, Európai Szemle, 2001/2


An important dividing line is that the big nations want shorter discussions the smaller ones want a good Treaty rather than a fast one. The bigger nations argued at the IGC that the Convention has already discussed the questions long enough, so why should the IGC discuss it any further. Smaller Member States however want to defend their sovereignty and equality. Approximately one month has passed since the beginning of the Intergovernmental Conference, but no significant step forward has been made in any of the issues mentioned above. In the first month of the IGC, the tendency was that the dividing line between the two parties strengthened further. The Member States expressed their positions in the first few weeks, but there was no sign of bringing together the opposite interests. Let’s see how certain issues stand at this moment85. The Italian Presidency tries to get some overview of the attitude of nations towards the issues listed in the previous page. Therefore, in the IGC meetings questionnaires are distributed among the delegations on the issues. Up to now86 these questionnaires were touching the issues of rotating council presidency, minister of foreign affairs, composition of the Commission, qualified majority voting and defence (only yesterday). The talks are going on the ministerial and heads of state level. The talks are rather perceived right now as a step backwards (e.g by the European Commission87), since no progress is made in the sensitive areas. Meanwhile ‘alliances’ are formed, which tears the discussing parties even more apart. Sweden and Finland joined their efforts to support EU security policy. Germany and France is planning to form a Union actually by merging their foreign and defence policies and cooperating in education and economy issues. I am not sure however, how this effort complies with the proposed legislative constrains on ‘closer cooperation’. Until now, seven countries of have already declared that they will certainly hold a referendum in their country. It is certainly true that the citizens’ will must be accepted. These are: Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Germany does not intend to hold a referendum (although it has the largest population), the

85

19 November 2003 19 November 2003 87 Speech of Michel Barnier, representative of the Commission at the IGC in Brussels, http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/03/520|0|RAPID&lg=FR; 19.11.2003. 86


others are undecided. It is expected that around half of the countries will hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. There are some working documents already presented in relation to the sensitive areas. However, the discussions are so unsure at this point that presenting the content of them would not be relevant in the light of the outcome. A very regrettable feature of these discussions is that they are dealing again with very sophisticated and circuitous institutional and decisionmaking questions that are very intangible to the people of Europe. Furthermore, this kind of struggle, between the nations for better position within the EU, clearly represented by the IGC is not for the well-being for either the EU or its citizens88. Therefore we can conclude that the end of the debate over the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is not visible at the moment. Right now the opinion of the sceptic ones seems to be underlined by the negotiations IGC, namely that the Conference rather sets back the establishment of a constitution for Europe.

88

And in this sense I support the view of ’big nations’ to avoid an endless debate


5, Final conclusions In my dissertation my aim was to give a ‘balance’ on the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe with special attention on the criticisms. The Draft provides the basis for the EU to move onwards on the way of development. In my point of view, for making future improvements more efficient, we have to find what we did wrong in previous ones. The dissertation is an attempt to reflect on these mistakes by using both objective and subjective sources. Thus my attempt was to investigate a historical reform from many points of view, including my own. The Convention has had to resolve, or accommodate, a number of similar tensions. Tensions between the left and the right, in social and economic matters; between those who want eventually to see a federal Europe and those who emphasise the continuing centrality of the nation state; between big and small, on some institutional issues; between advocates of a much more rapidly integrated and distinct foreign and defence policy, and those who wish to proceed more carefully. Furthermore the results have to correspond with the principles of transparency and efficiency, and they shall bring the EU closer to its citizens. A spectrum of views is inevitable in any healthy, open and representative political debate. The draft Constitutional Treaty is a compromise which tries to balance this range of competing and conflicting demands. For the European Union the provisions could mean a great step forward to achieve a more significant global position. The extension of QMV means a greater effectiveness in decision-making. The single international representation via the Foreign Minister makes a clearer appearance of the EU at the international level. The creation of a legal personality opens the way for the EU to act more efficiently in international agreements. All these examples prove that the reforms are positively changing the EU’s position in global policy. The legislative mechanism of the EU is also improved by the provisions in institutional and decision-making areas. A great mistake however was the lack of focus on global issues, such as sustainable environment. All in all, we can say, that the deficiencies form an EU point of view are more like ‘lacking improvement’ than a step back form the existing


situation. All I want to emphasise here is that the Convention could have provided better results, but those ones already provided are still bringing the EU forward. Although many institutional questions were settled by the Treaty of Nice, these had to be clarified. The introduction of a new package of reforms was inevitable. The draft Constitutional Treaty gave a compromise that could satisfy all players in the debate. Indeed, that is what happened. The parties are generally satisfied with 90% of the provisions contained in the Draft. The problem areas are the remaining 10%. In these, there are institutional questions, questions about the restriction of national veto and the extension of the system of qualified majority voting and issues concerning the future amendment of the Treaty. In the intergovernmental debate the dispute over these questions clearly gives evidence that the provisions on these fields worked out by the Convention failed to satisfy a great majority of nations. But these are only the concerns of the Member States. Although they are the ones determining the direction of European policy we have to bear in mind what the provisions of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe mean for the citizens of the European Union. The incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is a very big step towards creating a ‘social Europe’. The provisions of simplification and transparency are quite effective to provide a clear picture for the objective observer. However, in my opinion people don’t really want to know about the way they will be affected, but they want to feel the improvements in their everyday life. Therefore I really believe that a stronger social, environmental and health dimension should have been added to the draft Constitutional Treaty. Although the aims and objectives of social, environmental, etc. policies are mentioned, there is no visible reform to support policy effectiveness on these areas. Generally, there are some problem areas where the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe could be improved. In my dissertation I highlighted these points using a wide range of critical approaches. The reason for this is that I believe there is no better place to see a problem from, than from everywhere.


ANNEX 1 VOTES IN THE COUNCIL AS LAID DOWN IN THE TREATY OF NICE

source: Teaty of Nice, europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm


ANNEX 2 VOTES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS LAID DOWN IN THE TREATY OF NICE



ANNEX 3 VOTES IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMITTEE AS LAID DOWN IN THE TREATY OF NICE



ANNEX 4 VOTES IN THE COMMITTEE OF REGIONS AS LAID DOWN IN THE TREATY OF NICE



ANNEX 5 PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY - FRAMEWORK A. TABLE OF CONTENTS PREAMBLE PART ONE: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE Title I: Definition and objectives of the Union Article 1: Creation of the [European Community, European Union, United States of Europe, United Europe] 1 Article 2: Values Article 3: Objectives Article 4: Legal personality Title II: Union citizenship and fundamental rights Article 5: Citizenship of the Union Article 6: Charter of Fundamental Rights 1 References to "Union" would be replaced throughout the text by "European Community", "European Union", United States of Europe" or "United Europe", if it were decided to change the Union's name.

Title III: Union competences and actions Article 7: Fundamental principles: conferred competence, subsidiarity, proportionality. Article 8: Respect for fundamental principles: the limits of conferred competence. Monitoring subsidiarity and proportionality. Primacy of Community law. Evolution over time. Article 9: Categories of competences: definition. Article 10: Exclusive competences. Article 11: Shared competences. Article 12: Areas for supporting action. Article 13: Common foreign and security policy; common defence policy; policy on police matters and crime. Title IV: Union institutions


Article 14: The institutional structure common to actions conducted by the Union and to those conducted jointly by the Member States within the Union framework. Article 15: European Council: composition, role, missions. Article 15 bis Presidency of the European Council. Article 16: European Parliament: composition, attributions. Article 17: Council: composition, attributions. Article 17 bis Presidency of the Council. Article 18: Commission: composition; attributions (sole power of proposal). Article 18 bis Presidency of the Commission. Article 19: Congress of the Peoples of Europe. Article 20: Court of Justice. Article 21: Court of Auditors. Article 22: European Central Bank. Article 23: The Union's advisory bodies. Title V: Implementation of Union action Article 24: The instruments of the Union: e.g. European laws, framework laws, European decisions (precise list to reflect the conclusions of Working Group IX). Article 25: Legislative procedures: adoption of laws and framework laws. Article 26: Procedures for the adoption of decisions. Article 27: Procedures for the adoption of implementing measures. Article 28: Procedures for implementing supporting actions (including programmes), and monitoring them. Article 29: Common foreign and security policy. Article 30: Common defence policy. Article 31: Policy on police matters and crime. Article 32: Enhanced cooperation. Title VI: The democratic life of the Union Article 33: The principle of democratic equality among Union citizens. Article 34: The principle of participatory democracy.


Article 35: Uniform electoral law for European Parliament elections. Article 36: Transparency of the Union's legislative debates. Article 37: Voting rules in Union institutions. Implementation of the possibility of "constructive abstention", and its consequences. Title VII: Union finances Article 38: The Union's resources. Article 39: The principle of budgetary balance. Article 40: The Union's budgetary procedure. Title VIII: Union action in the world Article 41: The external representation of the Union. Title IX: The Union and its immediate environment Article 42: Privileged relations between the Union and neighbouring States. Title X: Union Membership Article 43: A Union open to all the European States which strictly respect its values and fundamental rights and accept its rules of operation. Article 44: Procedure for accession to the Union. Article 45: Suspension of Union membership rights. Article 46: Withdrawal from the Union. PART TWO: UNION POLICIES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION This part would contain the legal bases. For each area it should specify the type of competence (Title III) and the acts and procedures (Title V) to be applied, in line with what is decided for Part I. Technical amendments will be necessary to ensure that Part II correctly matches Part I. A. POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTION A1. INTERNAL MARKET I. Free movement of persons and services 1. Workers;


2. Freedom of establishment; 3. Freedom to provide services; 4. Visas, asylum and immigration and other policies related to the movement of persons. II. Free movement of goods 1. Customs union; 2. Prohibition of quantitative restrictions. III. Capital and payments IV. Harmonisation of legislation. A2. ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY A3. POLICIES IN OTHER SPECIFIC AREAS I. Competition rules II. Social policy III. Economic and social cohesion IV. Agriculture and fisheries V. Environment VI. Consumer protection VII. Transport VII. Trans-European networks IX. R and D. A4. INTERNAL SECURITY Policy on police matters, and against crime A5. AREAS WHERE THE UNION MAY TAKE SUPPORTING ACTION I. Employment II. Public health III. Industry IV. Culture V. Education, professional training, youth


B. EXTERNAL ACTION I. Commercial policy II. Development cooperation III. External aspects of policies covered in Chapters A1 to A4 IV. Common foreign and security policy 1. Foreign policy 2. Crisis management V. The conclusion of international agreements C. DEFENCE D. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE UNION Institutional and procedural provisions; budgetary provisions. 1 PART THREE: GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS Last Title: Repeal of previous treaties. Legal continuity in relation to the European Community and the European Union. Territorial application Protocols Revision procedures Adoption, ratification, and entry into force Duration Languages. The extent of the institutional and procedural provisions in this (2nd) Part will depend on the degree of detail in Part 1. One could also envisage that such provisions in this Part would deal only with inter-institutional procedures: provisions concerning arrangements internal to the institutions could be set out in Protocols.

1

Source: http://www.europa-web.de


ANNEX 7 NUMBER OF VOTES IN THE EP AND THE COUNCIL AS LAID DOWN IN THE DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE Member State

Votes

in

the

Seats in the EP

Council Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden United Kingdom EU 25

12 12 7 29 4 12 27 29 7 29 4 4 7 4 12 3 13 10 27 12 4 7 7 10 29 321

24 24 14 99 6 24 54 78 13 78 6 9 13 6 24 5 27 18 54 24 7 14 14 19 78 732

Source: Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, http://europeanconvention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf


Bibliography BOOKS: Az Európai Integráció Alalpszerződései, Fazekas Judit, KJK Kerszöv Kft., 2002 Európai integrációs alapismeretek, Blahó András, Aula Kiadó, 2002, p. 1-74 Kézikönyv az Európai Unióról, Horváth Zoltán, Magyar Országgyűlés, 2002, p. 21-49 STUDIES: What’s in a Convention? Process and substance in the project of European constitutionbuilding, Jo Shaw, June 2003, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna Positions of 10 Central and Eastern European countries on EU institutional reforms, Université catholique de Louvain, June 2003 EU Constitutional Reform - Priorities or the Italian Presidency, Rome, June 2003 The draft Constitutional Treaty – An assessment, The EPC Convention Team, 3.7.2003 Towards a green Constitution – greening the European Conventon proposal, August 2003, ’The green eight’ Opinion of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions on the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 10 July 2003 A kormányközi konferenciák összehasonlító perspektívában, Lux Ágnes, 2002 október Az Európai Konvent első konkrét eredményei, Horváth-Sinka, Európai Tükör, 2002/5 p. 138153 Az Európai Konvent hat munkacsoportjának jelentése, Horváth-Sinka, Európai Tükör, 2003/1 p. 146-172 Az Európai Konvent külügyi, védelmi és szociális munkacsoportjainak jelentései, HorváthSinka, Európai Tükör, 2003/2 p. 131-146 Kell-e alkotmány az Európai Uniónak?, Caspar Einem, Európai Szemle 2001/2, p. 29-41


Az Európai Konvent és Magyarország helye az integrációban, Gordos Árpád-Ódor Bálint, Európai Tükör, 2003/3 p. 35-59 Az EU jövőjéről folyó vita Laeken után, Horváth-Sinka, Európai Tükör, 2002/1-2 Az Európai Konvent alkotmánytervezete, Vida Krisztina, VKI 168. szám, 2003 szeptember A Nizzai Szerződés fontosabb rendelkezései, Horváth-Sinka, Európai Tükör, 2002/2-3 Milyen EU-ba érkezünk? Az Európai Unió Nizza után és újabb reformok előtt, Pete Nándor, a Magyar Köztársaság Külügyminisztériuma ARTICLES: Népszabadság: Dolgoznak az EU alkotmányának tervezetén?, 2002. június 13. Néppárti javaslat az EU alkotmányára, 2002. július 1. Uniós állampolgárság? Elkészült az EU alkotmányos alaptörvényének tervezete, 2002. október 30. EU-Konvent: egyenjogúsági igény Kedvezően fogadták a magyar indítványokat, 2003. február 12. Részben egyesült államok: Elkészült az EU-alkotmány tervezete – Jó lehet, mert senkinek sem jó, 2003. február 17. Közös javaslat az új EU-elnökségre: Brüsszel szerint problematikus Berlin és Párizs indítványa, 2003. január 16. Valódi előrehaladás az EU-konventben, 2003. január 6. EU: kicsik a nagyok ellen, 2002. június 7. Demokratikus hiány az EU-ban, 2002. május 23. Figyelő: Elsőbálozók, Gyévai Zoltán, 2003. október 2-8.


Bruxinfo: Az EU-alkotmánytervezet legfontosabb pontjai, 2002. 10. 31.

INTERNET European Convention, http://european-convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN Debate, opinions on the Future of Europe, http://europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm The Laeken Declaration, http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/contrib/cont001201_en.pdf. The Treaty of Nice, europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm The Treaty of Amsterdam, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/amsterdam.html Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian Republic, www.kulugyminiszterium.hu European Parliament http://www.europarl.eu.int/europe2004/index_en.htm European Union www.europa.eu.int ...and all other links referred to at the bottom of the pages

THE RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION A CRITICAL APPROACH

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