Hungarian Military Theories of Armoured Warfare
The 1930’s, the era of active military policy Tamás Baltavári ZMNE
In the early 1930’s the paralyzing effect of the world crisis seemed to be gradually decrease.
By the easing of the economic aggravation armies were able to tear gradually
bigger parts from the budgets, and this was even dictated by the increase of the international tension. Hitler’s rising into power led to the complete failure of the Versailles Treaties, and generated the remobilization of then losers. By this time the Soviet heavy industry – due to the forced industrialization – had reached the level which that permitted of the mobilization of the Red Army. During the great military exercises of 1934-35, strategic level military operations were performed with armoured troops and with thousands of airdrops. 1 Wehrmacht had also gone through sudden development. In this case the the theory of war movement established by the French and the British was perfectly put into practice. After 3 years of experimentation, by 1936, 3 armoured divisions were parts of the army.2 The importance of the armoured vehicle was acknowledged by all European nations, as fa as possible, accumulated great amount of it. The Hungarian Military Review of 1935 reported the following datas: France: 4,000 – 6,000 armoured vehicles (mainly war products) England: 6,000 armoured vehicles Soviet Union: 5,000 – 10,000 armoured vehicles Poland: 6,000 armoured vehicles (!) Belgium: 200 armoured vehicles Czecho-slovakia: 200 armoured vehicles (!) 1 2
Gosztonyi: Vörös Hadsereg . Zrínyi. Bp.1990.322.o. Guderian, Heinz: Vigyázat! Páncélosok! Bp. 148.o.
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The two other rivals of Hungary, Jugoslavia and Romania also possessed nearly 100-100 armoured vehicles. Local wars happenning in the second half of the decade provided rich experiences for military analysts. The war in Abessinia and the frontier incidents in Asia were not appropriate for the deployment of armoured vehicles in large numbers, although Italy’s loss of Etiopian small tanks was insinuating. To the great surprise for those who insisted on the necessity of armoured vehicles occured during the Spanish Civil War. In two years time, belligerents deployed thousands of tanks (mainly Russain, Italian and German types). The most famous battles were fought at Jamara, Brihuega, Brunete and, at the end of war, in Catalonia, but long-term results nowhere were shown up.3 The total failure of tanks points to the fact that since the world war the development of armoured vehicles surpassed that of the tanks, and that after centuries of competititon firearms had stolen the march on armour. Nevertheless, this conception is partially true. Anti-armour weapons were truly efficient in the middle of the decade, however, their construction and deployment left much to be desired. The spectacular success of the early anti-armour systems were only due to the fact that the tanks of the begillerents were commanded by a tactic even worse: without weighting, scattered into small number of units, without taking features of the ground into consideration, and – as dictated by politics – hurried. This fact escaped the attention of military analysts, except that of the German supreme command. I reckon, at the beginning of the war mainly this caused that Poland and the Western States were waiting for the German attack with effortless defensive security. The power of resistance paralyzed the generals’ mentality that had been active and offensive before. This way of thinking and the French example stimulated the states of the Little Entente to build static defences at their borders. Jugoslavia and Romania mainly built defences at the Hungarian borders, while Czecho-slovakia raised fortifications in its whole territory – expending huge amount of money - that all collapsed in the lightning war.4 For Hungary, purchasing tanks meant not only financial problem, but also political and economical. Since the supreme command knew that purchasing tanks from abroad was impossible due to the protest of the neighbouring countries, they took the possibilities of 3
Beevor A.: A spanyol polgárháború. Bp. Európa, 2002.
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HL.: Kalocsay: Uo.62.o.
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home producing into consideration. The fulfilment of this, owing to the unpreparedness of the Hungarian military industry, run into serious difficulties, not even mentioning that because of the small number of tanks and the greatness of investment, producing would have been uneconomical. Views about motorized units were reflected in the new Hungarian Army organizing decree of October,1932. The Hungarian royal ’honvéd’ motorized unit was established into the subordination of which belonged to a motorized gunner company, a motorcyle troop, a light tank company (with out-of-date Fiat and Carden Loyd types), an armoured vehicle company and two motorized artillery battery.5 The ’honvéd’ motorized unit was actually taken as the core of a motorized higher unit. In 1933 there was a sudden change in the hopeless situation, as Italians made a bid for their Fiat Ansaldo type light tank of 3 tons. According to the suggestion of the Military Engineeringdefence Technology, the Ansalds were brought into service in the Hungarian Army, named 35M. light tank in 1935, and 150 were ordered from Torino. This covered the Hungarian Army’s light tank demands, however, the purchase of the so-called ’breakthrough tanks’ that were meant to be the spine of future armoured units, caused further problems. Since not being possible to smuggle tanks of this size – evading the Entente’s control- into the country, and none of the known foreign types met the requirements of the Hungarian government, the supreme command supported home producing. This is how Hungary’s first and sole home developed V4 light tank was came into existence. According to the plans of Miklós Straussler works went on from 1934 to 1938 in the factory of Manfréd Weiss. The version finished in 1938 met all the requirements of the Hungarian Army, and what is more, its ability of being run on wheels and the ability of swimming made it uniquely universal. 6 However, it was never brought into service, since by 1938 there was no objection to foreign purchase. In the era of open mobilization the Hungarian supreme command favoured the Sweedish purchase, Mávag and Ganz factories bought the rights of production of the L-60 type light tank. The Ministry of Defence ordered 80 of the accepted light tank, renamed 38M. Toldi, and also started the producing of the armoured car named Csaba. Into the order of battle of 1st October 1939, there was an armoured car company and a light tank company brought into service beside the small tank companies of the two armoured mounted brigade.7 5 6
7
Bonhardt-Sárhidai-Winkler: A Magyar Királyi Honvédség fegyverzete. Bp. Zrínyi, 16. o. Bombay-Gyarmati-Turcsányi: Harckocsik 1916-tól napjainkig. Bp. Zrínyi 71. o. Bonhardt-Sárhidai-Winkler: A Magyar Királyi Honvédség fegyverzete. Bp. Zrínyi, 19. o.
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The guns of the artillery at the beginnig of the 1930’s were mainly world war contruction, and received up-to-date, so-called ’Göring’ guns of 10,5 centimetres only at the end of the decade. At the starting of the Program of Győr artillery had already included 129 batteries (37 of which were power-towed) and 7 measuring companies,8 although their supplying with anti-tank grenades was still not done. However, the efficiency of anti-tank grenades type 1934/35M was competent not even against light tanks. Bullets of 7,5 and 8 cms calibers stroke through the 20-30 mms thick armour only from 100 metres securely.9 Definitly armour breaking cannon was accepted to use in 1937 in the infantry. This was the famous Rheinmetall 36M 37mms armour breaking gun that though stand its ground at the beginnig of the war, still turned out to be of no effect at the Eastern front against the Russain middle-size tanks.10 By this time the debate was over the establishing of the new branch of service supperted by the supreme command. From the 1930’s the German effect was determinant both in the supreme command and the technical literature, while the Soviet military theorists’ work on the deep military operations – although being published in the military press as short news – had no real effect on the constructors of the Hungarian theory. Studies and articles about the organizing of armoured and mobile units multiplied in the Hungarian Military Review. Particularly increased the number of those, who supported organization and tactical theories of the German type, nevertheless, as a result of the Spanish events, a lack of confidence was shown in Hungary as well. However, this lack of confidence is an optimistic attitude. The apparent failure of tanks against the power of defence calmed down the Hungarian army mainly consisted of infantry. European countries made every effort to prevent set fronts coming into existence. That was the primal aim of each states’ military policy, since this was the only way to avoid human and financial loss similar to that of World War I, and the revolutions caused by them. Those countries that had rich resources and the market of their source of raw materials did not depend on the world market and had human resources guaranteed, could afford lingering and 8
Szanati: Uo. 76.o. Kovács Vilmos: A magyar tábori tüzérség által a második világháború során alkalmazott tüzérségi lőszerek HT 1996. 2. 5. o. 10 Kovács-Lugosi-Nagy-Sárhidai: Tábori tüzérség. Bp. Zrínyi 1988. 303. o. 9
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devastating wars since being able to reproduce the aching loss. These particulars made the born of ’financial’ and ’mass’ cultures of strategics possible.11 It was unquestionable for Germany and Hungary that keeping up mobile war was the only way to win.12 The dynamism of war, the attainment of rapid decesions called for the use of armoured branch of service most effective in breaking static defence. At the beginning of 1930’s in the general debate over armoured vehicles the main question was not the reason for existence of tanks but the way of using them. The English experiments of the 1920’s with armoured divisions seemed to be episodical. As everyone thought, if Fuller’s thesises fall short of military expectations, there would have been no reason considering them in the future. It was taken as a dogma that tanks are barely tactical-level weapons and the strategy of war must be based on the traditional branches of service, primarily on infantry. According to the tactical regulations of 1929: ’ the world war proved the old truth again that battles and combats are decided by the infantry.’13 Thus the infantryman is the subject of the mobile war, while tanks’ task is to cover the continuous moving of the infantry. Károly Gerbert summed up the co-operation of the infantry and the armoured vehicles as the following: ’concisely, infantry attacks as long as not get stuck. Then we put tanks into action to give a push to the infantry’s attack and make it active again. That will happen several times, because the experience shows that the infantry gets stuck time after time’.14 Thus tank is a subsidiary branch of service that gets the infantry through the enemy’s line of defence just like the engineering corps helps the light troops cross the river: ’my primarily impression is that the tactics of armoured vehicles has improved nothing at all since the world war. The only difference I see is that modern tanks are pulled ahead for a longer distance by own resources and deployed without circuitous preparing at the place of the decesion in daytime’.15 Gerbert agreed the general view that without considering the tactical level defence against armoured vehicles, victory would be unimaginable in future wars. He expounded his 11
Magyarország a második világháborúban. Szerk: Ravasz István Bp Zrínyi 1996 135. o. Csejkovics Károly: A jövő hadviselése és annak eszközei. MKK, 1926. 1. 23. o. 13 Harcászati Szabályzat (H.Sz.) I. rész: Harcászati elvek. Bp. Pallas 1929. 1. 3.§ 14 Gerbert Károly: A harckocsi összműködése a tobbi fegyvernemekkel. MKSZ 1931. 4. 14. o. 15 Gerbert Károly: A harckocsi összműködése a tobbi fegyvernemekkel. MKSZ 1931. 4. 20. o. 12
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theory about modern anti-armour military. He ranked anti-armour weapons into three classes after the English model: machine guns of 13-20 mms calibers fireing with steel cored ammunition, machine guns over of 20 mms calibers, and armour breaking batteries over 37 mms. He imagined their adaption as the following: fire machines are behind the main line staged in depth. The defence line of one regiment recquires at least 12 weapons, but this is still not enough for the beating off an weighting tank attack. Hidden, steady weapons cause a maximum loss of 50%, therefore there is a need for focusing heavy weapons from other units to the endangered frontline immediately. As a result, Gerbert feels it necessary to motorize these fire equipments.16 The other deficiency of defence is that infantry no longer possesses light, portable anti-armour weapons though in the main defence line and in the outpost chain the main tank attack would be against them. Maj. Ernő Csipkés considers ’the infantry’s most serious problem’ is to be the lack of the weapons of the anti-armour combat. Hence the tank attack hits this branch of service firstly and breaks ’the moral power’ if there is no other way to defend themselves than hiding in the trenches and hoping that the heavy weapons destroy the tanks before those could cross over them. According to him, the fighter must be given efficient equipment so as to be able to defend himself, to avoid the moral collapse and – as the result of the panic – the total defeat. This is the reason why there is need for the acception for use of new infantry weapons, primarily that of the anti-armour heavy riffle which – supplemented by hand-grenades and mortars – would be able to ease the light troops’ distress deriving from the hopeless situation.17 Lieutenant colonel Ede Sill also urged because of psychological reasons that infantrymen should possess the type of weapon that enables them to protect themselves against monsters.18 On the other hand, other officers started from the fact that under no circumstances the mobility of the infantry can be reduced. According to them, it would not be advisable to burden the infantrymen’s equipment that is already heavy enough. 19 In Maj. László Kéler’s response to these theories argued that it is no use of a first line riffle divison of a mobile, 16
Gerbert Károly: Páncéloscsapatok és motorizált erők alkalmazása MKSZ 1934. 5. 34. o.
17
Csipkés Ernő: A gyalogság legégetőbb problémája. MKSZ 1933. 10.260.o. Sill Ede: A gyalogság korszerű nehézfegyverei és azok tűzvezetése. MKSZ 1934. 9.72.o. 19 Baranyi Károly: A gyalogság harcproblémája és felszerelése. MKSZ 1936. 11.54.o. 18
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attacking infantry if they have to beat off the attack of armoured vehicles without anti-armour weapons, spiritually paralyzed.20 In Gerbert’s opinion aversion is the hardest during the time of moving, hence the moving divisions’ anti-armour firearm system is not supplied with self-propelled, always ready-to-fight guns. Therefore, ’in the case of aversion the main point is to create a defence line as soon as possible so as to withstand the onslaught in a standing position. Deep infantry or mixed marching columns can create such line most quickly into the side, therefore tank offensives are most likely to come from ahead or partly ahead.21 Against tanks attacking from ahead the marching infantry protects itself with scattering, its free wings are covered by the deploying of the reserve. After attacks of this kind, the army rather choose marching at night, however, the author says that the mobility of units is likely to stay paralyzed for a long time. From the middle 1930’s mainly due to the effect of the German military development, theories concerning tanks had changed. More and more agreed Guderian’s conception of armoured motorized divisions and of their tactical usage. Even Gerbert and Károly Bernola started to change their minds considering the link between tanks and mobile war. Gerbert was looking for the solution, how it would be possible to ensure the continuous attack of tanks. He hold that tanks could take the task of moving from the infantry, since had reached that technical level that had not been enough to military operations before. Now they have to solve the problem, how the fighting infantry could follow armoured vehicles through long distances: ’ there must be a link that bridges over the gap both in place and time. This link can be the deploying of motorized divisions.’22 So Gerbert agreed Guderian’s view about motorized infantry. In his opinion, riflemen would follow the tanks on armoured cars, destroy or take captive the units of the enemy left behind by the tanks and occupy lands had already been captured while the rest of the infantry arrives. Bernola saw the development similarly: ’while in the world war tanks’ mission was to generate moving, according to the signs, in future war it will be the upholding of moving’.23 Antal Náray hold nearly the same and described the importance of the new weapon as the 20 21
22 23
Kéler László: A gyalogság korszerű nehézfegyverei és annak tűzvezetése. MKSZ 1934. 8.85.o. Gerbert Károly: Páncélos csapatok és motorizált erők alkalmazása. MKSZ 1934. 5. 42. o. Gerbert Károly: Gyalogság és harckocsi összműködése. MKSZ 1935. 3. 29. o. Bernola Károly: Harkocsifeladatok. MKSZ 1933. 6. 17. o.
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following: ’With its ability to move on road, ground and water it would have the tactical moving on ground in the distant future.’24 Bernola thought that out of all tank types, light tanks were the best for modern moving fight, while took heavy tanks simply as breakthrough weapons. At the same time, had the problem in view that establishing the number of tanks for this kind of war is a hard task not only for Hungary, but for the Great Powers as well. ’Yet the question is not that clear at the beginning of war. Since producing is highly expensive, continuous technical development and the armies’ constant rivalry in quality, does not allow any of the states to commit themselves to one type and deploy it. Tank is a modern weapon of war and none of the countries would expose itself to join the war without the most up-to-date weapon. Therefore could happen, that at the beginning of war tanks will be present in restricted number in relation to later times in which military industry will be determinent’.25 The pre-classic era of tanks’ is closed by the insinuating finishing words of Gerbert’s article: ’considering all this I have the feeling that in all the branches of warfare, including organizing the army, we are at the verge of basic change’.26 Of coarse we still have some stagnant-minded officers that propagated the faultiness of motorization. Perhaps due to their world war persuasion, or probably just in order to contuoue their rearguard action. Cavalry lieutenant colonel Géza Erlich tried to make an impression on his contemporaries by one-sidedly asserting the weakness of machines. ’Wonder, would a motorized division has been able to take the task of Budienni27 type mounted army? What they would have done without supply and logistics for weeks? Would they have been able to keep the efficiancy of the motorized divison in a land poor of roads and swampy?’28 As opposed to him, László Horváth took the possibility of the usage of armoured vehicles as individual branch of service. He was convinced that the motorized armoured divisions made by Fuller could take the old role of cavalry, since their military operation mobility made it possible to do so. In his opinion, the reason for the fact that the branch of 24
Náray Antal: A korszerű honvédelem kérdései. Politika és hadvezetés. Pallas. Bp.,1933. 185.o. Bernola Károly: Harkocsifeladatok. MKSZ 1933. 6. 20. o. 26 Gerbert:Károly: Gyalogság és harckocsi összműködése. MKSZ 1935. 3. 39. o. 25
27 28
Bugyonnij soviet cavalry general, the most successful commander in the 1921-22 polish-soviet war Erlich Géza: Melyik a jelenkor legfontosabb fegyverneme? MKSZ, 1935. 9. 250. o.
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service just becoming independent could not force the decision on military operation level, is not the level of the quality of tank technology, but the organization and communication. He insisted that because of running difficulties the armoured unit could only be limited in size, and brigade would be the biggest deployable unit. Army and divison level breakthrough and combat, the final strike could not be the task of armoured vehicles, but destroying communicational, military and infrastructural centres left back by the enemy and disturbing supplies.29 This power would not be enough for final victory, whereas András Hadik’s mounted army neither could force peace upon the Prussain. However, Horváth carefully studied the possibility of defence against motorized armoured divisions. Ahead of his time, and declared with exuberant optimism that a wellorganised defence would easily beat off the attack. ’ A disciplined unit supplied with proper anti-armour weapons will be able to beat off tank attacks in most cases, since there are men sitting in those tanks, whose nerves are overburdened due to the bad sight, the great noise, shaking and especially the uncertainty of being closed into a narrow place. Even during the world war the the major part of the attacking tanks was successfully destroyed even with primitive anti-armour weapons, therefore today it still more has to succeed.’30
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