A COMUNIDADE CRIATIVA

A COMUNIDADE CRIATIVA Local Empowerment through a multi-purpose building for the lower income community of

São Paulo

A COMUNIDADE CRIATIVA

Cover image: A spontaneous infill enriching the city of São Paulo. (Osterland)

Maria Piels - M.Sc Architecture Professors: Robert J. Nottrot (Architecture) Ir. Frank Koopman (Building Technology) Ir. Alexander G. Vollebregt (Research) October 2013

‘Everyone dreams of a decent home. Millions of Brazilian families are far from it. Resources exist. Leave things as they are cost much more for the whole society. Let us therefore make this dream a reality.’ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

A COMUNIDADE CRIATIVA Local Empowerment through a multi-purpose building for the lower income community of

São Paulo

Delft University of Technology - Explore Lab Graduation Studio

services are being used extensively. During the night the center deflates and there is no sensation of safety. Housing organizations have started to squat abandoned buildings. The organization helps a group of people who want to live in the center but have no means to enter the housing market. They are fighting for housing. However, they are denouncing the real-estate speculation and the discrepancy of compliance. The group normally gets evicted. The abandoned buildings versus the unsafe sensation of the center are two problems which could complement each other. The main involved stakeholders are the inhabitants of housing, the municipality and real-estate investors. The entire situation has been researched and a response has been given.

ABSTRACT On one hand, São Paulo is in desperate need of popular housing for the lower classes. Real-estate investors are not focusing on the lower classes. On the other hand the city has a lot of abandoned buildings, for several reasons. A large amount of the abandoned buildings are situated in the city center. The unoccupied buildings contribute in the sensation of not feeling safe during the night. During the day the center and its abundant 6

The report starts with a theoretical background. The current situation and the history of the battle for the city center has been taken under a loop. It starts with the description of the development of history and architecture of São Paulo city from 1549 until today. Then the migration within the city is being discussed, with a focus on the allocation of the poorest and their way of living from the “casa p rópria” to the “cortiҫos” in the center. Followed by the economic, political & social context for popular housing in São Paulo city. Then a description and the outcomes of the participatory action research that has been done is described. It describes the set-up of the research. Followed by the statements of stakeholders on six different themes: function of the historic city center, local empowerment, responsibility popular housing: government or private investors, buying versus renting, sensation of safety in the city center and communal living. To be able to transcode all the theory into design, a framework has been created. Environmental aspects of the city are being described as well as the new vernacular architecture of the region. The three target groups of the situation are being compared to each other on the capacities and their needs in relation to the city center. A building in the center of the city has been selected as an example for this project. That project is able to fit the capacities and needs of the three main target groups. An integrated strategic (social and political) and spatial design has been created for this project, of which its qualities strengthen each other. It answers the different aspects of the research.

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II

CONTENTS III

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FRAMEWORK [p.68] A: LOCAL CONTEXT [p.70] 01 Environment [p.71] 1.1 Local weather patterns 1.2 The soil of the plot 1.3 Sensation of safety 1.4 Sidewalks versus cars/buildings 02 The new vernacular architecture [p.77] B: TARGET GROUPS [p.80] 01 Inhabitants [p.81] 1.1 Capacities & needs for the role of the city center 1.2 Demographics 1.3 Spaces for common use 02 Municipality [p.87] 2.1 Capacities & needs for the role of the city center 2.2 Guidelines 03 Real-Estate investors [p.87] 3.1 Capacities & needs for the role of the city center C: EXISTING BUILDING [p.88] 01 Plans & description [p.89] BREEDING GROUND FOR OPPORTUNITIES [p.92] A: STRATEGIC RESPONSE [p.94] 01 Social response [p.95] 1.1 Local empowerment 1.2 Social sustainability 1.3 Organizational design: Life cycle 9

IV

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02 Political response [p.97] 2.1 Public Private Partnership 2.2 Strategic design: Functioning for the stakeholders IS THIS THE ANSWER? [p.100] A: REFLECTION [p.102] 01 My process and challenges [p.103] 02 Relation between research and design [p.107] 03 The relationship between the project and the wider social context [p.109] B: RECOMMENDATIONS [p.110] SOURCES [p.112] APPENDIX [p.120] 01 The Origins of Popular Housing in São Paulo – Government intervention in Popular Housing in the period from 1930 to 1954 [p.121]

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INTRODUCTION

A NOTE ON RECENT EVENTS In June this year, Brazil was struck by an outbreak of mass protests, seemingly out of the blue. Its cause was the brutal police action against demonstrators disagreeing with the rise in bus fares. It provoked the solidarity of others and resulted into more than a million marchers onto the streets, on subsequent nights. Starting in the two biggest cities: São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, spreading to the rest of Brazil.1 The timing could not have been any better, knowing all eyes were set on Brazil during the FIFA Confederations Cup, 1

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Unknown (September 2013). Grounded. [e-article] Available at: <www.economist.com/news/special -report/21586667-having-cometantalisingly-close-taking-brazilhas-stalled-helen-joyce-explains> [Consulted on October 15th 2013].

that was held in that same month. The demonstrations overshadowed the preparations of the upcoming 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil. The situation is urgent, since even the so beloved football for Brazilians, has become a target for protestors. Too much money is claimed to be spent on the World Cup, while expenditure on public spending is being shortened. Only the higher class seems to have economic advantages of the event while the lower classes are being socially excluded. [See image 1]. How did Brazil drop the ball? We have been hearing about its growing economy, its upcoming lower middle-class, its prosperity and its web of possibilities. Therefore the question remains; what was the tipping point? Image 1: March against the social exclusion of the 2014 FIFA Worldcup (Own image) 13

Four years ago the Economist put a picture of the statue of Christ the Redeemer ascending like a rocket from Rio de Janeiro's Corcovado mountain. This September, the tables had turned, they released an article about the downfall of Brazil.2 [See image 2]. The economy, which had been stabilized in the mid-1990's, accelerated under the president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the early 2000's and had its strongest growth in a quarter century in 2010. At that time Brazil was also awarded both the 2014 FIFA 2

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Unknown (September 2013). Has Brazil blown it? [e-article] Available at: <www.economist.com/news/leaders /21586833-stagnant-economybloated-state-and-mass-protestsmean-dilma-rousseff-must-changecourse-has> [Consulted on September 30th 2013].

Worldcup and 2016 Olympics. In that time of flourishment, Lula persuaded voters to vote for Dilma Roussef. Ever since, the country's economy has gone back. Voters have lost faith in the country's growing economy. They claim that Brazil has done far too little to reform its government and its public spending in the boom years. The middle has grown, but nothing has been done for this growing group. Problems have been accumulating over generations. Dilma has been unable to tackle the problems and also has been scaring away private investors. Precisely the group that is so urgently needed for the restabilization of the country. The demonstrations of June triggered previously unseen rage about the current government. Rage about the rising inflation, high taxes, poor public services,

political corruption. That is not all, one of the most recent issues is the fight for better pay for teachers and affordable housing.3 The issue will remain unresolved, until the government announces changes. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE I had previously noticed the struggle for housing during my two stays in Brazil. During that time I worked with an organization called 'Um Teto para Meu País' (a Roof for my Country). We built better quality houses in the slums of the city of São Paulo.[See image 3]. A 3 Unknown (October 2013). Some clashes after peaceful Brazil protests. [e-article] Available at: <www.aljazeera.com/news/america s/2013/10/some-clashes-afterpeaceful-brazil-protests2013101611825354486.html> [Consulted on October 16th 2013].

beautiful project in the outskirts of São Paulo but it's not enough to answer the country's housing problem. The current solution is not working either. Building large scale projects in the outskirts of the city do not work for most house seekers. A group of students and I built a house for Batata. She told me that she had to travel six hours a day just to get to work and back home. Basically leaving her kids at home the entire day while relying on her oldest daughter of twelve to watch over the other five children. Batata used to live in the city centre. She had to move away because she could not afford the apartment anymore after she separated from her husband. She was forced to move to the favelas because that was the only solution she could think of. She felt like she did not have a choice. There are many

others like Batata and her family, who do not live on the outskirts of the city of Sao Paulo by choice. While Batata and her family search for a way out of the favelas the housing organization might already have a solution. PROBLEM STATEMENT On one hand, São Paulo is in desperate need of housing. The São Paulo Social Network of Justice and Human Rights says there are a estimated 15,000 homeless people in the city. There are many thousands more unable to afford decent housing outside the favelas, where approximately two million people live. On the other hand, according to the UN, the city has 39,289 abandoned

Image 2: The downfall of Brazil (Friedel)

Image 3: Building better quality houses in a favela of São Paulo (Osterland) 15

buildings.4 The proportion of unoccupied dwelling compared to the number of people without decent housing is a reflection of the social injustice and inequalities. This situation is similar in other cities in Brazil. According to Raquel Rolnik, secretary of urban programs in the Ministry of Cities, there is a shortage of around seven million units for housing. Meanwhile the total number of unoccupied apartments and houses amounts to nearly five million.5 [see figure 1]. There is a conflict between the social value of habitation and its commercial value for real estate speculation. The two different 4

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Phillips, Tom (2006). Brazil's roofless reclaim the cities. [e-article] Available at: <www.theguardian.com/world/200 6/jan/23/brazil.uknews1> [Consulted in October 2012].

problems seem to be able to complement each other. The problem of the one gives the opportunity to answer the other. Housing organizations like MDM have grabbed that opportunity. These movements are reclaiming buildings for people without decent housing, including the homeless and low-income workers, many of whom are active in the informal economy. Unfortunately the squatting usually ends up in eviction when the owner reclaims his property to revitalize as a cause of real-estate speculation. RESEARCH QUESTION A solution for all stakeholders has not been found thus far. Would that even be possible? What kind 5 Rolnik, Raquel (2012). [e-article] Available at: <www.raquelrolnik.wordpress.com /> [Consulted in October 2012].

of response would be best suited to address this situation? Several architectures have addressed the problem, also in other countries where the same problem occurs. The architectures of the interdisciplinary design studio ‘Urban Think Tank’ for example, who stated: 'Why should the poor live in slums if there are empty offices in the city'.6 An answer lies in the positive approach to the situation. Therefore the following main question was asked:

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McGuirk, Justin (2012). [e-article] Available at:<www.dezeen.com/2012/09/01/w hy-should-the-poor-live-in-theslums-if-there-are-empty-officetowers-in-the-city-asks-justinmcguirk/> [Consulted in September 2012].

Can the housing shortage of the lowest income group and the situation of the abandoned buildings in the city center of São Paulo complement each other, through a strategic and spatial design? By looking at the case-study of “Rua Sete de Abril 351”. The case-study is a squatted building in the city centre of São Paulo which is in process of expropriation by the city government to be transformed into popular housing. METHODOLOGY The history of migration within and popular housing in the city were analyzed through literature. A second part of the research has been done through a more in depth participatory action research approach, focusing on the opinions of different stakeholders. Topics that have been addressed are the

function of the historic city centre, local empowerment, responsibility of popular housing, buying versus renting, sensation of safety in the city centre and communal living. A framework of information has been created to be able to answer the main question and to translate the information into a design. OUTPUTS The response to the main question came in the form of an integrated strategic and spatial design. Additionally, reflection on the process, challenges, the relation between research and design and the relationship between the project and the wider social context were performed to conclude the project.

Figure 1: The number of unoccupied apartments cover 70% of the shortage of units for housing in Brazil 17

Image 4: The historic city center of São Paulo. (Sosa, Ramiro J.)

I THE BATTLE FOR THE CENTER 18

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01 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CITY OF SAO PAULO: HISTORY AND ARCHITECTURE FROM 1549 UNTIL TODAY

A: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 20

1.1 The history of São Paulo São Paulo was founded in 1549 by Jesuits. The city was used as a base for exploration of the hinterland. In the then colonial Brazil, São Paulo was not the most important city. In the north-east (Bahia and Pernambuco) money was earned off of sugar plantations. In the mines of Minas Gerais gold was delved. Rio de Janeiro was the capital, where the entire royal court lived at the time. For three centuries, São Paulo was no more than what it was in 1549: a tiny town with a large hinterland that was almost as large as six times the Netherlands. The town was situated only eighty kilometres away from the cost of the port of Santos.

The city changed due to the cultivation of coffee. In the nineteenth century coffee plantations were founded, starting in Rio de Janeiro. That is how it also reached São Paulo, where the hinterland got filled with the coffee plantations. The town developed itself as the capital of coffee, due to two main reasons. First, the British had built a railway from the port of Santos to São Paulo and from there in five straight lines into the hinterland. As a result, São Paulo played a central role in the network of connections of the coffee plantations. Second, due to the large number of migrants arriving from Europe and Japan, who could provide the labor on the plantations that was omitted due to the abolition of slavery (1888). This resulted into an increase of the population of 35,000 to 250,000 from 1800 to 1900. The

population then increased once again from 2,4 to 19,9 million inhabitants from 1950 to 2004 according to UN-HABITAT.7 The wealthy coffee barons lived in the city and built magnificent palaces on Avenida Paulista. That avenue became a symbol of their wealth and power. São Paulo started to adapt to the Brazilian industrialisation, thanks to the presence of money and migrants. In addition, the construction of hydropower plants in which the height difference between São Paulo and the coast was utilized helped the city acquire cheap energy. Rio de Janeiro was still the capital of the country but São Paulo was the most important city for industry. The industry particularly got 7 Davis, Mike (2007). Planet of Slums. New York: Verso, p. 4. 21

important for Brazil during World War II. An import substituting industry got constructed immediately after the sudden stop of import of products. President Kubitschek decided to establish the automotive industry in São Paulo after the war in 1960, which was a crucial decision. Consequently, São Paulo became the most important city in Brazil, also due to the growth of the population, São Paulo’s economic significance and later even because of the cultural facilities. São Paulo became the heart of the Brazilian economy. One hundred years after the coffee period and the start of the industrialization São Paulo had significantly changed. The former industrial areas were outdated and many factories disappeared. Other economic activities took their place and the population has since reasonably stabilized. 22

The growth is still there but it has partially shifted to the hinterland. The poor quality of life, congestion and violence in the city have played a role in the regressed growth. The cities that flourished in the past because of the coffee plantations are now developing themselves as centers of industry, trade and services in Brazil. The city and the hinterland of São Paulo has become the main consumer market of Brazil. There are more traces of history to be found in the city, mostly from the last century. Buildings in the old city centre can be found together in a variety of sizes and styles. Factories, stations, residential complexes and other buildings from the industrial era are scattered throughout the city. Many classic examples of modern Brazilian architecture have been realized in São Paulo, by great

architectures as Niemeyer and Lina Bo Bardi. Many buildings and areas are being protected by the heritage of the municipality, the state and the empire. These historic buildings and structures still have a specific meaning for the city today. As Meurs explains: ‘The railway zone and parts of the city center are in disrepair and awaiting rediscovery. On the edge of the factory zone and the wealthier neighborhoods projects of reuse have been realized, which have drawn attention internationally, like the leisure factory of Lina Bo Bardi and the establishment of a concert hall in an old train station. In the rich parts of the city mainly public buildings are being maintained and restored lovingly. However, the economic pressure usually tends to ruthless renewal, which fits the character of the

city.’8 A good example is Avenida Paulista that used to be a wide green lane with magnificent palaces of the wealthy coffee barons a hundred years ago. Only a few buildings were left standing but Avenida Paulista's modern skyscrapers and museums is still an iconic element of the status of the city. São Paulo has a tradition to look ahead, develop new areas and leave obsolete zones as they are. The above information is based on a text of Paul Meurs. 9 1.2 Architecture in São Paulo The Brazilian modern architecture with its origins mainly from Rio de Janeiro is world renowned since 8

Meurs, Paul et al. (2009). Brazil Contemporary. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers, p. 72.

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Meurs, Paul et al, Idem, p. 66-75.

1940. A group of architects was working in Rio de Janeiro, led by Lúcio Costa and Oscar Niemeyer. The latter was given the responsiblity for the construction of the capital Brasialia in the late fifties. In that same period architects who were immigrants with an European education were working in São Paulo. Some important names were among them, like: Gregori Warchavchik (from Russia), Lukjan Korngold (from Poland), Franz Heep (from Czech Republic), Rino Levi, Lina Bo Bardi (from Italy) and Jacques Pilon (from France). Some important names of architects were trained at the Polytechnic School of São Paulo are: Oswaldo Bratke and João Vilanova Artigas. This mix of backgrounds of the designers in the city led to the development of an architecture that became known as the “Linha Paulista” (Paulista flow). The

different cultural backgrounds fused into one regional architecture. The “Linha Paulista” was related to the architecture of Rio de Janeiro (“Linha Carioca”). There are many links between the architects from both cities. Niemeyer built a lot in São Paulo for example. Both buildings could have been found in other countries, like the white modernist villas from the sixties, as well as special buildings that were made specifically for the city can be found in São Paulo. This is because of the development of the city in the mid twentieth century whereby specific tasks were created. As Meurs explains for example: ‘The former building culture in São Paulo is characterized by compact urbanization, massive architecture

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and sturdy construction.10 The growth of the city went so fast, that the development of the infrastructure has not kept pace. That is how around the central city a belt of suburbs grew, where no proper infrastructure and facilities such as schools, healthcare and parks were present. The prosperity of the city was located in the central area until the seventies,. This area did contain good facilities. Unlike in Europe, a concentrated wealth and a scattered poverty arose in São Paulo. Which will be discussed later in this report. Sixty years ago, architects in São Paulo were developing concepts for what we know now as “multiple space use”. The neighborhoods that were developed had tremendous quality. Luxurious

apartments were able to compete with the villa neighborhoods were built in neighborhoods like Higienópolis and at Avenida Paulista. Meurs explains the following: ‘The strength of these living environments lies not so much in a single exceptional project, but in the quality of large numbers. Street after street, the houses are spacious, have sleek facades and common areas and playgrounds are organically connected to the public space. Nowadays these districts belong to the few areas in the city with an architectural coherence.’11 In the center and along the big avenues also stacks of successively shopping streets, cars and living neighborhoods arose. Shopping streets within building blocks of up to five shopping streets built above each

10 Meurs, Paul et al, Idem, p. 76.

11 Meurs, Paul et al, Idem, p. 76.

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other with escalators and voids, were the precedents of the shopping mall of today. The parking of cars also went in a special way. There was little room for parking garages with ramps downtown. Therefore high closed parking silos where cars were being parked with a automatic lift system were placed. The best known example of a complete neighborhood, a typical Paulista typology for a residential building, is COPAN by Niemeyer. COPAN consists of thirty floors with many different types and sizes of apartments, with several layers underneath with shops, offices, restaurants and a cinema. A park with recreational facilities for the residents has been made sometimes on the roof of the substructure.

of an architecture that did not only focus on large numbers but also was not afraid of the big gesture. ‘The building tradition of São Paulo stands out in engineering ingenuity, which sometimes shifted to architectural exhibitionism. At these moments, the will to make impressive spans or large overhangs started to dominate the solutions. Large sizes, rough materialization and refined detailing were typical. Such buildings inserted themselves in the scale of the metropolis, while the finishing and elegant routes and ramps also connected to a human scale. 12 In addition, the architecture in São Paulo tended to be made inward-oriented, thus making the building turn his back to public space and making a

sanctuary inside. Architect Guilherme Wisnik described the following: ‘The architecture from the outside might be a set of “blind facades”. But inside, it might bring in some of the “attributes of the external environment” – water, gardens, and sunlight – thus internalizing a sense of the country’s natural landscape.’13 An architecture faculty of the University of São Paulo was founded in the sixties. João Vilanova Artigas played a prominent role. He believed in project education with a strong political and ideological basis. During the dictatorship (19641984) architecture became isolated. Consequently, the

following occurred as Williams describes: ‘The second half of the 1960s was a period of immense political and cultural turmoil in Brazil in which a remarkable number of architects found themselves in direct opposition to the government.’14 A Brazilian version of the modernism education arose in schools, focused on teaching only an aesthetic language of form without social engagement. Only after the dictatorship, in the eighties, the situation started to change and a next generation arose that had been able to orient well both on the Brazilian as on the foreign architecture. To this day Artigas’ thoughts were again of major influence on the new generation designers.

The projects that were built had a large scale, as a result of the rapid growth of the city, and were part

12 Meurs, Paul et al (2009). Brazil Contemporary. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers, blz. 84.

13 Williams, Richard J. (2009). Brazil - Modern Architectures in History. London: Reaktion Books, p. 137.

14 Williams, Richard J., Idem, p. 133. 25

As Meurs mentions, the style of the “Linha Paulista” is reflected in projects of today: ‘In the emphasis on construction, detailing and sometimes social engagement.’15 The social aspect of architecture can mainly be found in housing projects. ‘Instead of mega projects there is being sought for customization, for example by improving slums, leaving the residents help building themselves (mutirão) or giving them technical The current support.’16 architecture is a repetition of what occurred fifty years ago: from growth to finding a balance in the city. Special solutions are required in the area of sustainability, quality of life, public space and historical layering.

The above information is based on a text by Paul Meurs17, unless stated otherwise.

The government has not succeeded to meet the high demand for housing of the working class, to limit property speculation or to fight illegal land use.18 This led to the lowest class moving away from the central belt over and over again. The result was the emergence of slums. As mentioned before, this can be seen as a concentrated wealth and a

15 Meurs, Paul et al, Idem, p. 86. 16 Meurs, Paul et al, Idem, p. 86. 26

02 MIGRATION IN THE CITY OF SAO PAULO: THE ALLOCATION OF THE POOREST

17 Meurs, Paul et al, Idem, p. 76-89.

18 Lkjlk Apuzzo, Gian Matteo (2001). Coping with informality and illegality in human settlements in developing cities. [e-article] Available at: <www.ucl.ac.uk/dpuprojects/drivers_urb_change/urb_e conomy/pdf_infor_econo/ESFN_A ERUS_Apuzzo_Urban %20communities.pdf> [Consulted on July 5th 2012], p. 2.

scattered poverty that was present in São Paulo. How did the allocation of the poorest take place with regard to the allocation of the rich in the past? How has the process of displacement of the poorest slowly occurred? In political scientist James Holstons' book “Insurgent Citizenship” is explained how the allocation of the poorest in the city has occurred.19 The text below is based on this information, unless stated otherwise. 2.1 The upper and lower class living fairly close together There has been a time when the upper and lower class lived relatively close to each other. 19 Holston, James (2008). Insurgent Citizenship - Disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 155-161.

However, there were three general characteristics of the home that kept them separated from each other: the location, property ownership and the type of home. Elites lived on higher laying land, away from overflowing rivers and their disease-carrying mosquitoes. In neighborhoods along Avenida Paulista (such as Jardim Paulista and Jardim América) and in neighborhoods that were developed towards the west (such as Pacaebú and Higienópolis, which literally means hygienic city). The working class stayed in lower laying neighborhoods along the rivers Tietê en Tamanduatéi and in neighborhoods along the rails, which connected the city's first industrial zones with each other (in Barra Funda, Belém, Bom Retiro, Brás, Moóca, and Pari). Home ownership contributed to an even larger class seperation. In 1920, the year of 27

the first systematic data on home ownership in the city, only nineteen percent of the Paulistanos owned their own home. The rest rented their home.20 The wealthy class and the small middle class lived in their own family home, some of which were large. While nearly all workers rented rooms in homes, these rooms are known as “cortiҫos”. A small boy from a family of immigrants, has given the following description of a “cortiҫo” in 1926, in which he describes the layout and the poverty of a “cortiҫo”: ‘Real human hornet nests, spread out 20 Bonduki, Nabil Georges (1994). Origens da habitação social no Brasil. [e-boek] Available at:<www.ufpel.edu.br/faurb/progra u/documentos/artigo1habitacaosocial.pdf> [Consulted on July 4th 2012], p. 713. 28

over the whole of lower Moóca, Brás, Pari, Belémzin [...] Each door led to an immense corridor which had ten, twenty rooms in a row, where families piled up in filthy tenements. The size of our room was three by four meters and in it, six people – my parents, my two young sisters, my grandmother, and I – slept, ate, talked, did everything, except relieve ourselves. The latrine was right at the end of the corridor, shared by eight other families who lived there. Near it, at the end of the corridor, was the kitchen where my mother cooked with three other women. Each had a coal stove in a three by three meter area. Five women shared the kitchen next to it in the same way. So this was a fortress for nine families: one room each, one latrine, and two collective

kitchens.’21 A number of skilled workers was able to rent a familyrow home, also known as “vilas operárias”. These homes were built by factory owners as a means to attract and retain the best workers. Normally the family, including the kids, of these privileged workers also worked in the same factory. The threat of eviction of the entire family, due to indiscipline of one of the family members, was an effective strategy to keep everyone disciplined. 2.2 The "casa própria" in the periphery for the working class The chaos and the reduction of quality of the city got the target of those who argued for a “scientific management” of the community during the rise of the early industrialization in São Paulo. The city’s progressive elite21 Holston, James, Idem, p. 159.

planners, economists, engineers, architects, public health specialists, sociologists, criminologists, demographers, directors and industrialists- came together to promote the so-called rational organization of production, labor and the city itself. The research of one, produced research for another. An example that Holston quotes: ‘For example, they tackled the polemical question of whether the government should establish a national minimum wage as a means to increase productivity. To determine what expenses such as wage had to cover, they investigated the actual living conditions of the working classes. To promote their concept of scientific social management, they founded institutes and task forces, sponsored research, publications, and conferences, and formulated legislative initiatives and public

policy. Their most important organizations in these efforts were IDORT (the Institute for the Rational Organization of Labor), founded in 1931 under the leadership of entrepreneur Roberto Simonsen, and the Institute of Engineering. Active throughout the 1930s and 1940s, both institutes identified workingclass housing as the key issue at the intersection of their principal concerns: to expand industrial production by creating a mass consumer market, discipline the “dangerous classes” to produce more qualified and “adjusted” workers, and reshape São Paulo to become the setting of a healthy modern society. In their view, existing housing was the problem and new housing the means to these ends.’22 22 Holston, James (2008). Insurgent Citizenship - Disjunctions of

The villain in almost every diagnosis was the unsafe residential neighborhood of the working class. Inhuman living conditions were the cause of crime, disease and immorality. The neighborhood generated unhappy, undisciplined and unproductive workers that were susceptible to the propaganda of class struggle and communism due to all these matters. This limited consumption to far below levels needed for industrial expansion. The proposed solution was unanimous: get rid of the “cortiҫo” and lead the population that lives there to freestanding family homes of which they will become the owner themselves. Several articles were published by a group called democracy and modernity in Brazil. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 159. 29

IDORT’s Task Force, led by entrepreneur Roberto Simonsen and the institute of building engineering. This Task Force focused on economic housing. The residential building they envisioned was a house with seven rooms, which would be the ideal “casa própria” (own house) for the modern Brazilian working class family. It consisted of three bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen, a bathroom and a veranda. Advocates argued that this design would embody a separation and rationalization of functions and genders. This would retain the good morals of the family and the house would be a real sanctuary where the character of the nation would be molded. The house was labeled as hygienic, educational, economic, popular, consumer-based, occupied by the owner, single family and freestanding. It would embody 30

discipline, shape characters, domesticate employees and anchor a reliable supply of reliable labor. If the “cortiҫos” in the center were being considered to produce social marginality, then the “casa própria” in the periphery would be creating social normality. Home ownership was important for the project of social management of the Task Force according to Simonsen. IDORT had proved that after the expenditure on rent and food, the working poor had about nothing left. A shift of renting to ownership of a property, which did have to be well funded, would reduce household expenditure and make it predictable and would lead to an increase of the disposable income. The result would raise the standards of living for the workers. The changes would retain a rich internal market, necessary

to expand industrial production. In addition, a new living standard of hygiene and morality would be saved. The key to such progress was to develop a consumer market, which was focused on the residential building and household goods. Simonsen did indicate to his experts, that despite of private initiative that could contribute, the problem of mass housing would have no solution without decisive state intervention. This is discussed in depth in appendix I. The planning experts proposed to divide São Paulo according to a new pattern of separation: the workers would have to leave to the hinterland, while the wealthier classes would stay in a renovated city center. A transport specialist of the Task Force explained why this pattern would be natural: ‘The middle and upper classes have “an intense social life [that] is incompatible with living far from

the centers of urban life because the problem of transportation makes coming to the center two, three, or more times a day impossible. […]Free of the poor, the center can be redeveloped with condominium apartment buildings for the middle class. Presumably, the rich will remain in their mansions.23 The transport expert advised to revitalize the railways in the suburbs and to cluster the workers homes around the railway stations. This was done because the poor were repressed to the suburbs and there was no traffic there. Thus the poorest population was forced to leave the city center, 23 Holston, James (2008). Insurgent Citizenship - Disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 161.

making space for the wealthier, as Holston explains: ‘The peripheralization of Brazilian cities put the poor in the peripheries and left the rich in the center. This residential segregation got established in São Paulo in the 1940s and 1950s, with the growth of the first ring of periphery neighborhoods, such as Vila Maria, Vila Guilherme, and Vila Prudente. These neighborhoods arose just beyond the old downtown (primarily Sé and Santa Ifigênia) and the first industrial areas (Barra Funda, Bom Retiro, Belémn Moóca, and Pari). As we shall see, this periphery became the only possible place to live for new emigrants arriving in São Paulo after the working classes got expelled from their homes in the more central areas. After this pattern of peripheral settlement for the poor became established, the first ring filled up, its

conditions improved, and it became unaffordable for the next wave of migrants. These new settlers were forced to make more distant peripheries their home.24 This is also discussed more in appendix I. This pattern of centrifugal arrangement continued for four decades. The maximum of the inequalities between the center and the periphery was reached during the period of the greatest territorial expansion (1960-1980). Yet every time, the next ring of the periphery got improved. As a result people were forced to settle further again. Thus the location of the periphery was always moving, but the characteristics were reserved: poverty, illegality and rapid but insecure settlement and urbanization. According to Holston it is a place for the poor that despite of seeming to be poor 24 Holston, James, Idem, p. 155. 31

in the first place, will improve due to self-construction and political mobilization.25

2.3 Retreat to the city center Even though the bulk of the poorest population is residing in the suburbs. More and more people choose to live in the center. Because of the presence of public services and equipment and the proximity to job opportunities.26 According to the supervisor of popular housing in the center, of the municipal secretary of housing (SEHAB) of the city of São Paulo, there are 3 different groups of people living in the center with 25 Holston, James, Idem, p. 155-156. 26 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012]. 32

poor living conditions.27 SEHAB orders these three different groups in need of help in the following order of priority to help: the group from the few “favelas” (slums) in the center, followed by the group from the “cortiҫos” and concluded by the group of people that have invaded abandoned buildings. The group of people who have invaded abandoned buildings have SEHAB’s last priority, because the other groups usually have a greater condition of risk, where health conditions are much worse than in an occupied building. SEHAB knows bases its priority on the experience from now invaded buildings they had entered themselves before they were invaded. So it is not a question of importance of groups being helped 27 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012].

or SEHAB’s willingness to help, but a question of priority of the people in need. Thus priority puts the group of people who invade buildings at the bottom of the list of groups that will receive help. While this group is growing rapidly at the moment and getting more attention from the outside world. What is going on exactly with the occupied buildings in the city center will be discussed more in depth later on.

03 ECONOMIC, POLITICAL & SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR POPULAR HOUSING IN THE CITY OF SAO PAULO Not being able to afford descent housing is one problem. But it is not the problem of the building owners of the abandoned buildings. Why should they have anything to do with the solution? Other relevant questions are: how did the center get so deflated? What is the current state of the real-estate market? What are the city governments programs that have been used to solve the problem? And what has the response of the occupying movements been? 3.1 The deflation of the city center ‘The center has to expand as the population that it serves increases. This expansion clashes into the thin neighborhoods that

surrounded the center, determining the displacement of its inhabitants to new ‘exclusive’ residential areas, providentially developed by property developers. The residential ring that surrounds the center depreciates, and gets occupied by inferior services: nightlife and prostitution venues, second class hotels, guesthouses, “cortiços”, and marginal. The involvement of the main center for an area in social decay creates conditions for the real estate speculation that offers central services of the new city area of expansion. This leads to the ‘new center’ in contrast to ‘old center’.28 The conflicts in the center are reflections of different factors, one 28 Kowarick, Lúcio (1975), A Lógica da Desordem in São Paulo 1975: crescimento e pobreza.

of them being residential evacuation which has already been mentioned earlier. Helou explains that since 1970 the center got deflated to half of its inhabitants, because of more new growing economic poles localizing it selves in the south-west quadrant.29 Here you could find the greatest concentration of income and infrastructure, such as roads, culture and recreation areas and schools. According to Ramos, this constant shifting of centralities in the southwest quadrant is promoted by the State by directing a large part of public investments in these areas.30 The core of the 29 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Ocupa Centro Ocupa São João. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, p. 13-16. 30 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Idem, p. 13. 33

formation of the city was the historic center. The center existed of the old center Sé and the new center República. It was the main economic pole of São Paulo until 1960. After which it moved to Avenida Paulista consolidating itself as the new financial center. In the mid 50’s, Avenida Paulista already arose as a new sector for attraction of investments, due to the reformulation of the center for the control of vertical integration. Generating a reduction of developments in the central area due to the dimensioning and cost of land. Consequently, new sub centers were formed such as Brás, Lapa, Pinheiros, Campos Elíseos, Higienópolis, Consolação, Bela Vista, Liberdade, Santa Ifigênia, Barra Funda, Vila Buarque, Cerqueira, Paraíso and Jardim Paulista. Thus, the new axes of attraction became Avenida Paulista, rua da Consolação and 34

rua Augusta which directed the occupation of the new center of the neighborhood of República. According to Bomfim, another factor that contributed to the shifting to the southwest was the transfer of public organs to the southwest: to Ibirapuera Park and the neighborhood Morumbi. In addition, the major roads that had been made in the 60’s in the center turned into the passage of cars and public transport to other areas, saturating the road network.31 The economic functions in the center had been redefined, because of the easy access and various end points of bus lines on squares and terminals in the center. With the inauguration of two subway lines later on, the area got more popular

again. While at the same time, at Avenida Paulista and its surroundings consolidated its economic hegemony with corporate headquarters and large banks. Becoming the service center for high-income population that was settled there. Already in 1980 and 1990 when new road works moved southwest, real estate investments for the upper sector shifted again, to Avenida Faria Lima. At the moment the financial center is located at Berrini and Marginal Pinheiros. This shifting of the economic center can be seen in [figure 2]. According to José, only five percent of the headquarters of banks remained in the Center.32 These shifts of centrality had their effect on the center that fell into decay due to increase of empty buildings. It

31 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Idem, p. 14.

32 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Idem, p. 14.

centro

consolação/ bela vista paulista faria lima

jardins

marginal pinheiros

berrini

Figure 2: Shifting of the economic center (Helou)

35

became the center for the lower class again, condensing fleeting, informal or illegal networks and activities in space. Thus for the Paulistano elite and mainstream media the center was seen as a degraded, marginal, dirty and dangerous place. This process did not mean a setback in terms of jobs in the center, just a reorganization of activities and prompted an economic deflation.33 Another important factor in the process of popularization of the center and its street trading was the phenomenon of shopping centers, which contributed to the consolidation of an expanded center and to the slowdown of real-estate investors in the center. The shops in the center had to adjust to lower purchasing power of its public. This also attracted

street vendors, better known as “camelôs”.

33 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Idem, p. 14.

34 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Idem, p. 16.

36

Data of the subway in 1997 show us that during the day the fluctuating population of the historic city center amounted two million people. Due to this high density and the daily change of the economic situation of the population public space becomes an alternative for obtaining income. It is estimated that this area had 6000 street vendors. At the same time data of IBGE of 2000 show us that the neighborhood of Sé had twentysix percent and the neighborhood of República had twenty-two percent of the vacancy of dwellings.34 Because of the decrease of the number of residents in the central area, there

is an enormous difference in use of the infrastructure during the day and the night after the commercial hours. During the day there is an intense circulation of people of four hundred percent of what the infrastructure can handle. Bomfim estimates that about seventy-five percent of the constructed area in the center has a commercial or service use and the rest is residential. 35 While the population of the city has grown again, the population of the center does not keep up, while that is the place where all the infrastructure is located already. In the period of 1980-2000 they city’s population grew with twenty-two percent (two million people), the population of center had decreased with thirty percent (180 thousand 35 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Idem, p. 16.

inhabitants). At that moment neighborhoods in the periphery were expanding with more than two thousand percent (one million inhabitants). 36 While in São Paulo the city center contains sixty percent of the job offer, not even ten percent of the inhabitant of the city live there, 37 this can be seen in [figure 3]. According to Bomfim, the demand for homes in the center in 2002 was made by people of low and middle income but they are not able to pay the rent or buy an apartment. The higher class is more interested in richer parts of the city. The demand for homes in the center had an increase of forty percent, 36 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Idem, p. 16. 37 Kohara, Luiz (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 10th 2012].

while the demand for commercial property fell with sixty percent. According to Lopez it is still too expensive for the middle and lowincome group to buy or rent an apartment on their own, because the buildings that were left abandoned were mostly apartments from the upper class and commercial buildings. And when one would be able to buy an apartment, the space might not be suited for these new times, also because of the lack of parking spaces. 38 According to the Census of 2010, the centers population increased again by sixteen percent due to the return of public and private investments, which have turned their attention to the area, but diverted it from the attention that the housing movements are 38 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012].

craving.39 So the current real-estate market is not helping. What does the current real-estate market have to do with the situation?

39 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Idem, p. 16. 37

Figure 3.1: Density of jobs (Helou)

38

Figure 3.2: Density of population (Helou)

3.2 Economic: Current state realestate market and its consequences on the city The current involvement of the real-estate market in the center of São Paulo has been described by Whitaker in the introduction of the book: A Batalha pelo centro de São Paulo.40 He explains that the center of São Paulo is now the territory of desire of political, economic and real-estate elites of the city. These same elites and their public and private investments abandoned the center, as explained earlier. They have to clean up the degradation caused by their own lack of investments. They blame half of the degradation on the poorest that occupy the center. Either because 40 Souza, Felipe Francisco de (2011), A Batalha pelo centro de São Paulo. São Paulo: Paulo’s Editoria, p. 716.

of the ease of access that favored popular commerce driving away the high income sectors or because of decades of abandonment the center received the outcasts of the society. The center has a new calling since the approval of the City Statute in 2001. Thanks to the desire of rehabilitating hundreds of abandoned buildings for low-income housing because there is a significant housing shortage in the city. Rehabilitating these buildings left abandoned is possible because they do not fulfill their social function and this is illegal by law. According to Whitaker it is indeed incomprehensible and illegal keeping abandoned buildings that have water, sewage, electricity, garbage collection and other benefits borne by society as a whole, while hundreds of thousands paulistanos are homeless. ‘It is precisely this

reasoning that the housing movements for some years now have initiated occupations of these buildings, transforming them in improvised dwellings, to denounce the injustice of the situation and force the conversion of the buildings. The city is above all, the space of social disputes.’41 A study of Silva of 2008 shows us that there were 158 empty buildings in the center of São Paulo, of which 68 were totally abandoned and the rest only had their ground floor occupied. The study also shows that only a small part is of residential use. Twenty-four are for purely residential use and another four are for mixed use (residential and offices) and the rest was for commercial use.42 How could this have happened? 41 Souza, Felipe Francisco de (2011), Idem, p. 11. 39

According to Whitaker, in a capitalist society and even more in a patrimonial society, the property is sacred, even more then the right to housing for all that has also been stated in the law.43 Even if it is the property of empty buildings that have been unused and abandoned for decades, even if they are buildings with millions of dollars in tax debt, even then the judge rarely takes longer than a few hours to determine the repossession of property reviled. Another reason for the abandonment of a building can be because it was an “Apart Hotel”, 42 Silva, Helena Menna Barreto et al (2009), Tributos imobiliários e imóveis vazios no centro de São Paulo. São Paulo, p. 17. 43 Souza, Felipe Francisco de (2011), A Batalha pelo centro de São Paulo. São Paulo: Paulo’s Editoria, p. 11. 40

as the supervisor of popular housing in the center, of the municipal secretary of housing (SEHAB) of the city of São Paulo explains. ‘In the ‘70 there was a civil constructing boom. Hundreds of “Apart Hotels” were built, old type of flats. And the “Apart Hotel” market fell apart. The “Apart Hotel” has a juridical situation that is very bad for those who wants to sell it. An apartment building with 100 apartments would have 100 documents of ownership. The “Apart Hotels” of the ‘70 were made with only one document of ownership for all apartments. Those old flats do not attend the current legislation. The owners of the flats of “Apart Hotels” cannot sell their apartments because there is just one document.’44 Even when the 44 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th

buildings are occupied with households with elderly children that have nowhere to live; nothing is more sacred in Brazil than realestate. In addition Whitaker explains that in the logic of patrimonialism, the effectiveness of the law generally tends only to one side. For example with mansions that took parts of the public city, in that case the law would go against the property, even though also in this case we can speak about illegal occupations. The city government cannot do anything against the decision of a judge, as the supervisor of popular housing in the center, of the municipal secretary of housing (SEHAB) of the city of São Paulo explains. In Brazil there are three different 2012].

abilities: executive, judicial and legislative. These three are independent; they cannot interfere with each other. The municipality cannot call a judge to tell them what to do. Therefore, when a judge decides for repossession, the city government has to obey this sentence of a judge because of their ability, not because it is what they want. In addition, the judge will order the city government to help reintegrate the possession.45

the city. The center of São Paulo that had been abandoned before now returned to seduce the housing market. Unfortunately, the presence of the population that actually use the city center, like the poor residents, the “camelôs”, and the homeless do not fit with the recovery ideas of the region that the real-estate capital. This capital wants to do anything to give back the old grandeur of the center.46

Since the Brazilian economy entered its current virtuous cycle, the city began to grow more and more towards all sides, vacant land for new property investments got cooled and as a consequence a speculative bubble launched into space for the real-estate prices of

The distribution of the launchings in the period of 1993-2003 tell the story The center for investments for the upper class is seen by private investors. [See figure 4.1], and the space for the middle class is spread out a bit more, [see figure 4.2]. The distribution of launchings for the lower class has

45 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012].

46 Souza, Felipe Francisco de (2011), Idem, p. 12.

been done with public investments, and is spread out to the suburbs of the city, [see figure 4.3]. Looking at the number of launchings that have been done by private and public developers, we see that most launchings have been done for the middle-class with a number of 2212 units, followed by the upper class with a number of 3926 units and concluded by the lower class with only 163 launchings47, [see figure 5.1]. Even though more units have been realized for the middle class, most money has been spent on the upper class as can be seen in [figure 5.2]. Something

47 Marques, Eduardo (2005), São Paulo – Segregação, Pobreza e Desugualdades Socias. São Paulo: Editoria Senac, p. 225. 41

*Middle income: 2212 launchings, aver *High income: 3926 launchings, averag *Public: 163 launchings, average of 61m

Average value of launchings by developer (1985-2003) (Source: Marques, Eduardo 2005)

Value released by type of developer (1985-2003) (Source: Marques, Eduardo 2005)

Figure 5.1: Value released by type of developer 1985-2003 (Marques)

Real-estate market São Paulo

Private launchings launchings for middle for middle incomeincome Private launchings launchings for middle for middle income Public launchings launchings Public launchings byfor coorperatiby coorperatiFigure Private 4.1: Private launchings for upper Figure 4.2:Private Private launchings for income Figure 4.3: Public (1993-2003) (1993-2003) (1993-2003) (1993-2003) ons(1993-2003) ons(1993-2003) Private launchings for middle income Private launchings for middle income Public launchings by coorperaticlass 1993-2003 (Marques) middle class 1993-2003 (Marques) lower class (Marques) (Source: (Source: Marques, Marques, Eduardo Eduardo 2005) 2005) 42 (Source: (Source: Marques, Marques, Eduardo Eduardo 2005) 2005) (Source: (Source: Marques, Marques, Eduardo Eduardo 2005) 2005) (1993-2003) (Source: Marques, Eduardo 2005)

(1993-2003) (Source: Marques, Eduardo 2005)

ons(1993-2003) (Source: Marques, Eduardo 2005)

*Middle income: 2212 launchings, ave income: 3926 launchings, avera Figure*High 5.2: Average value of launchings by developer 1985-2003 (Marques) 43 *Public: 163 launchings, average of 61 Average value of launchings by developer (1985-2003) (Source: Marques, Eduardo 2005)

that has changed is the area of the apartments that have been realized that now lay way closer to each other, where a upper class apartment has an area of 106 m2, that of a middle class apartment 83 m2, and that of a lower class apartment 61 m2. The average prices of the realized apartments did differ a lot, respectively an average price of R$421,000, an average price of R$222,000 and an average price of R$76,000.48 Looking at the situation the question can arise what urban tools can do against in this situation. ‘The term “urban tool” refers to the set of actions that the government is legally supported to do to intervene in urban dynamics and forms of use and occupation of land, regulating and controlling or directing them. Zoning laws, 48 Marques, Eduardo (2005), Idem, p. 225. 44

master plans, tax incentives, standards, and tax collections are examples of instruments. In summary, urban tools would be the instruments that the government would have to play their role in determining and controlling urban dynamics.’49 According to Whitaker the effectiveness of its application in Brazil faces a difficult challenge. The urban tools emerged and consolidated in Europe under the Welfare State. But now we are living in an open economy, which reduces the power of the state and increases the autonomy of the capital. Also the environment in which the urban tools emerged are way different than the current Brazilian reality.50 Especially now when the center is getting all the attention by the 49 Souza, Felipe Francisco de (2011), A Batalha pelo centro de São Paulo. São Paulo: Paulo’s Editoria, p. 12.

market and state again and for example world renowned star architects are building in the center, the challenge is getting even bigger. A whole new section could be dedicated to this, which would go too far for the scope of this research. More on government intervention will be discussed later on in this report. What can already be said according to Whitaker51, is that the strong public investments in the center right now in spite of the seemingly good intentions of revitalization have the character of gentrification: the expulsion of the original residents and its

50 Souza, Felipe Francisco de (2011), Idem, p. 13. 51 Souza, Felipe Francisco de (2011), Idem, p. 15.

replacement by residents of a new and higher economic profile. 3.3 Political: Governments involvement – management of Gilberto Kassab (2006-2012) During the management that has recently come to its end, three different important measures have been taken: the reintroduction of the housing subsidy under the name of “Parceria Social”, the revitalization program “Nova Luz”, and the project “Renova SP Centro” that got initiated in 2010. Apart from the city governments involvement, another project has been important and not only for São Paulo: “Minha Casa Minha Vida”. “Parceria Social” is a housing subsidy that is meant for families that earn up to three times the minimum salary (3 SM), who live in risk areas, temporary shelters or in areas that have been

expropriated by the city government. The program provides help in the form of a subsidy for rent for a period of thirty months, worth R$300 a month. The program’s success made the public ministry have to make a order of priority of whom to attend. Requesting subsidies for big families or mothers who have temporarily lost the custody of their children because of inadequate housing. Followed by cases of families with retired seniors or seniors with unpaid work. The great advantage of the “Parceria Social” goes beyond the payment of the subsidy. It is a program that aims to develop the spirit of citizenship. The contract requires certain things from the families such as providing all personal documentation of children over 18 years, proof of attendance in class of school-aged children, and in cases of pregnant

women they will get prenatal care.52 The Project “Nova Luz” is a project in the neighborhood Luz, located in the center of the city. It involves the housing issue of the center. The city government has made a detailed zoning plan that will revitalize the area. Several properties in the center are being declared being of public utility for the urbanization of the plan, catalyzing a process of urban development for the rest of the center. Several star architects have 52 Pombo, Por Luiz Rocha (2010), Em um ano, Parceria Social atende 1,012 famílias e ganha indicação do Ministério Público. [E-article] Available at: <www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/s ecretarias/habitacao/noticias/? p=20403> [Consulted on April 13th 2012]. 45

Uso anterior been invited to design public buildings, such as Companhia de Danca by Herzog & de Meuron, [see image 5]. It currently undergoes intense debate for several reasons; one of these being that already 1115 families got evicted out of their houses because of the plan.53 According to an engineer of a local NGO, revitalization projects like “Nova Luz” do not search for social inclusion. The strategy is to find devastated areas, clean them, and leave them open for the real estate sector to enter, for the private sector.54

The project “Renova SP Centro” searches to increase the number of housing in the center through the rehabilitation of underutilized buildings. In [figure 6] you can see how this project relates to “Nova Luz”. The objectives of the program are retaining urban space, boosting the central area, and promoting greater access to housing and providing greater social integration.55 The center would be a center for arts, a welcoming center, a historical center, a service center and a center of integration.56 The city government has bought 53

53 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Ocupa Centro Ocupa São João. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, p. 42.

55 Leite, Ricardo Pereira (unknown), Programa de Habitação e Requalificação Urbana no Centro. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo, p. 36-37.

54 Kohara, Luiz (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 19th 2012]. 46

56 Leite, Ricardo Pereira (unknown), Idem, p. 84.

buildings to transform into “HIS” (Habitação de Interesse Social = Social Housing), for households that earn up to 6 SM. More than half of the selected buildings had a commercial-service use in the past, followed by residential buildings and at last hotels, [see figure 7]. Out of these 53 buildings, only one is being renovated for a target group that is not being accepted by the housing movements57: a building for retired artists on the corner of two very important avenues in the city, Avenida Ipiranga and Avenida São João, [see image 6]. Now that the city government has changed again, we will have to see if the

Integração com outros Programas

Figure 7: Previous functions (COHAB SP)

Governments involvement in the city of São Paulo Management of Gilberto Kassab (2006-2012) Project ‘Nova Luz’: * Is going through an intense debate * Involves the housing issue for the centre

57 Edinalva, Franca (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 12th 2012].

Companhia de Danca, Herzog & de Meuron

Image 5: Companhia de Danca by Herzog & de Meuron (Unknown)

“Renova Centro” * Declares several properties being of public utility “Nova Luz” for the urbanization plan of ‘Nova Luz’

Figure 6: Relation Nova Luz to 53

Image 6: Palacete das Artistas

* buildings Catalyzing a process of urban development for SP) Renova SP Centro (COHAB the rest of the centre

(COHAB SP)

* 1.115 families evicted

47

renovation of these 53 buildings will actually be fulfilled, as we have learned from our history (as explained in appendix I), that is always shifting government is a problem for the implementation of policies. With “HIS” a unit would be either be sold on the market for a maximum price of R$32,300 in conditions for accessible payments for the population that earns up to 6 SM or renting the place from the municipality as we know here as social housing, never getting to be owner of the unit.58 An example of costs for residents is given by the supervisor of popular housing in the center of “SEHAB” of the city of São Paulo59. In their “HIS” program they are building for the lower class. The costs of a reform 58 Suplicy, Marta (2004). Decreto N◦44.667, DE 26 DE ABRIL DE 2004. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo, p.19. 48

for the public organ costs R$80,000-120,000, depending the reform. A poor family will pay R$10,000-15,000 after 30 years of financing. The rest will be money the government has to pay. The families just pays 1/3 of what they borrow to buy the house with. The other option they have is renting out social housing, as mentioned above. That is a cheaper rent than normal. An apartment on the market like the ones they make would cost around R$1000-1200. With the social housing system, you would pay R$100-200 per month. A side note that he adds to the story: ‘There are other things as well. Here in the center we have a vacancy of 6% on the residential market. Which is very low. There has been American research. A 59 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012].

healthy percentage would be 8% of vacancy. Lower than this the price of the apartments will be very high. Above this the apartments disvalue. It is a basic law of economy. One square meter here in the center right now costs a lot in this 6% vacancy situation. Maybe if we could increase this percentage of vacancy, the prices will decrease and the disadvantaged families will be able to buy houses here in the center. But now that I am buying 53 buildings, I am decreasing the vacancy. I am helping in making the prices even higher. Our mechanism to help these poorest people is not 100% correct yet. We are resolving a problem, but at the same time we are increasing prices, decreasing vacancy. On the other hand, the center of São Paulo has the highest density of the city. Here you have an average of 10,000 inhabitants per square

kilometer, within one of the highest densities of the city of São Paulo. This percentage of 6% would is very high in number: 6,000 empty buildings. We would need 10,000 empty buildings for the prices to decrease so those people would have better accessibility on the market. But when that happens, when we would have 10,000 empty buildings, the newspapers and the television would be saying there are a lot of empty buildings and the municipality does not do anything against it. So I think the question is: How to bring vacancy to the market and increase vacancy at the same time to have more accessible prices? Increasing the vacancy, without having all these ugly buildings falling apart in the center. How do you do this? I think it is wonderful we are reforming these 53 buildings, but at the same time I am thinking,

maybe we should not reform these buildings. Maybe we should take a small house, demolish it and make a residential tower. And leave the empty buildings empty. The owner will go and sell his building in time. When I will make more vacancy his price will not increase, but will decrease. I think we will have to make more residential towers in the center. Maybe we need to increase the density of the city center of Sao Paulo.’60 A very popular program nowadays is “Minha Casa Minha Vida” (My House My Life). This is a federal government program that has been launched in March 2009 and has given many Brazilian families the opportunity of homeownership, by collaboration with the Federal 60 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012].

Bank who gives loans to families who will pay it back over a longer period of time. The program had the aim to warm up the activity of the civil construction as an answer to the global economic crisis of 2009, according to Whitaker.61 Two years after the launch of the program, one million units had already been contracted of which the greatest part attended households that earned between 3 and 10 SM, but was meant to attend 0 to 10 SM. Numbers show us that the recent Brazilian realestate production was boosted by the program involving important public resources. Next to the potential of the program, it also has several problems, such as bad 61 Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette (2012), Produzir Casas ou construir Cidades? – Desafios para um novo Brasil Urbano. São Paulo: FUPAM, p. 39. 49

56

architectural and urban quality, small housing units, building neighborhoods from scratch and scarcely serving the group that earns 0-3 SM. The program did not include renovation until now and has been developing in rural areas. 3.4 Social: The response of the occupying movements Housing movements have started to occupy abandoned buidings in the center since 1997, as a tool for dialigue with the government or protest agains housing policies or their ineffectiveness.62 Since then these abandoned buildings are being discussed. Making a national habitation policy for this area with infrastructure already ready, had supposed to be impossible until 62 Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Ocupa Centro Ocupa São João. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, p. 7. 50

then because of the high costs. While, according to an engineer of a local NGO, there were enough studies that showed the cost that had to be made to make new infrastructure. Both costs of the city government.63 In [figure 8] you can see an overview of the occupations by housing movements that have been done from 1997 until October 2012. The housing movements are the main popular movements in the city nowadays. They have a great power to attract notice and to mobilize, using varied repertoires of action that differ from occupations of public buildings to participation in institutional spaces.64

63 Kohara, Luiz (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 19th 2012].

57

According to a coordinator of a housing movement, the occupation is not just about a fight for housing. ‘We occupy buildings that have been abandoned for more than 10 years. It is not just about occupying and the fight for housing. It is also about denouncing the real estate speculation. There are rules, how the city has to organize, and it seems these rules and laws have been forgotten. For us, it is possible to occupy the city. In a same way that the city already was 20 years ago, when the center was for the workers and they lived

64 Kowarick, Lúcio and Marques, Eduardo (2011). São Paulo: Novos Percursos e Atores – Sociedade, Cultura e Política. São Paulo: Editora 34, p. 238. Figure 8: Overview of the occupations by housing movements that have been done from 1997 until October 2012 (Helou)

51

in that same center.’65 The people are fighting housing with selfmanagement and urban reform. The members of the movement are people who come from all parts of the city. They want to live in the center, but there are not a lot of empty places, so they do not see what else they could do. They want to live in the center for several reasons. In the city center you have all facilities, all the infrastructure, schools and hospitals. Right now just one class seems to have the right to what the center has to offer. And the rest lives at the edge of the city. Another reason is being able to live close to work, not having to spend a large part of the day traveling to work and back hom e. As mentioned in the above quote, the 65 Neves, Nilda (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 28th 2012]. 52

members believe that the city center has to be inhabited by the workers. When occupying a building the movement expects for the city government to help them to expropriate a building of its owner and make housing for its members that are occupying. Especially when the movement finds out a building is already in the process of expropriation and will be “HIS”. The city government turns its back to the movements, for two reasons. The first is one already mentioned before. The city government knows the situation in the occupations is a lot better than for example in “cortiҫos” and “favelas”, and therefore does not gives priority in attendance. The second reason is because the city government knows the housing movements have a very political reason to occupy so city goverment tries to

keep itself a bit distant from them.66 I have visited several occupied buildings of one particular housing movement (MDM) in the city center. I got to understand what the coordinator meant by not just taking over a building, but permanently occupying it. Members that lived in the buildings had to always make clear where they would be at what time, [see image 7]. In this way, the movement could secure always having people in the building. The inhabitants work in shifts for several tasks in the building, such as the watchmen and cooking for all the people in the building as can be seen in [image 8]. Group 66 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012].

meetings were organized to keep everything organized.

Image 7: Schedules inhabitants (Own image)

Image 8: Cooking (Own image)

53

I have been on a fieldtrip in the period of November 15th until December 12th 2012. Partially to get a better general idea of the current situation. Mainly to understand the point of view and ideas of different stakeholders. The most important conclusions of the five different stakeholders is being discussed in this chapter. Some more information can be found in appendix II. 01 OVERVIEW STAKEHOLDERS

B: PARTICAPATORY ACTION RESEARCH 54

INVOLVED

The five main stakeholders and their relation to each other in the current situation can be seen in [figure 9]. These are housing movements and their inhabitants, the city government, private investors, architects and NGO’s. Several topics have been discussed. The exact functions and descriptions of the people that

represent a certain stakeholder are the following: • Housing movements and their inhabitants: Coordinator of MDM (Movement for the right to housing).67 • City government: The head of Habi-Centro – supervisor of popular housing (“SEHAB”).68 • Real estate investor: Architect of a middle class real-estate investor named Centro Vivo.69 • Architect: One of the two main architects of a big Brazilian Architecture office named Brasil Arquitetura, which has worked

with different favelas and is working on social housing projects in the center together with the municipality.70 • NGO: engineer of NGO Gaspar Garcia.71 Two extra voices in the description below are from: • University: Professor of Architecture and Urbanism of the University of São Paulo who is also an architect, urban planner and an economist.72

67 Neves, Nilda (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 28th 2012].

70 Fanucci, Francisco (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 3d 2012].

68 Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012].

69 Adriana (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 4th 2012].

71 Kohara, Luiz (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 19th 2012]. 72Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 28th 2012]. 55

• Middle class vendor: He has his own small computer electronics shop.73

73Feitosa, João (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 4th 2012]. 56

02 STATEMENTS STAKEHOLDERS DIFFERENT THEMES

Figure 9: Current relation stakeholders (Own figure)

OF ON

2.1 Function of the historic city center According to the groups above there are still several functions missing in the center. The housing movement sees a need for social care spaces (for people of the street for example and qualification for work) and educational spaces. The private real estate investor believes the only thing that is missing in housing. Inhabitants who are members of the housing movement say there is a need for elementary schools and public functions accessible to the lowest class. The NGO points out that the center misses more accessible leisure spaces, not only cultural ones. Especially leisure spaces for collective use. The center also misses activities at night, like

schools and universities which are open until late or commercial areas that do function until later at night. In addition, there is no space to play for kids. And the last thing that is missing is better illumination. Walking around in the city center myself, I also feel there is no green space and accessible leisure space.

2.2 Local empowerment University: Giving these people the opportunity to live in the center, where the job opportunities are, is already self-empowering people.

So there are all these missing functions, of what the different stakeholders would like to see in the center. This has to do with how they would like there center to be like. Next to this it is important to understand what the different stakeholders can add to the center and what they need and desire. The three most important stakeholders were the housing movements/inhabitants, the private investors and the city government.

I totally agree with the notion that giving people the opportunity to live in the center is already selfempowering, but I do not believe that this is enough. You should give these people the opportunity, for those who want to, to shift from informal work to setting up an own small business. Something that organically happens in favela’s, [see image 9]. São Paulo can be seen as a design melting pot, [see figure 10]. The article in the figure explains that moment a Brazilian would earn enough

Housing movement: We need educational spaces, for qualification for work. Empowerment is important.

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money they like to have handcraft articles from abroad, while there is so much to get in Brazil itself. There is a lot of talent and beautiful products are being made. I feel there could be a connection between these handcrafted products and self-empowerment. 2.3 Responsibility popular housing: government or private investors? City government: Here in Brazil, we have just started to work with “PPP” (Public Private Partnership). It is a federal law, every state or municipality can make their own rules for “PPP”. The most famous example of a form of “PPP” is Minha Casa Minha Vida. At the moment we as “SEHAB”, are working with “PPP” for the first time. We still have to monitor it. In the future, we need to im prove our mechanisms. In my opinion, we need the market to solve the 58

problems of the city. We cannot think anymore that the public organ has to solve the problems. Do not rely on the city to solve its problems; it is a responsibility of all of us together. The 100,000 public employees can not take care of 11,000,000 inhabitants. That is not possible. We do keep having a role, because we have the possibility of expropriating an abandoned building. The private sector has to have incentives, like paying less for urban property tax. Housing movement: The private sector is never going to make housing for us; it is not profitable for them. Therefore it is the responsibility of the government. With subsidies, like “Minha Casa Minha Vida” and its financing, but this project has not set ground in the city yet. We need help from a public bank, we want public politics for housing in the city of

São Paulo. In addition, the government has to give incentives for the private investors, also for trade and for work. Architect: “PPP” is the best idea. It is a mechanism that has not been used yet. Our investor wanted to buy an entire block from the municipality, who expropriated the entire area, and in return the entire project had to have a social interest. It is good for the investor, because he knows everything is available and he is buying it for the real price, which is cheap. In return, he will make a certain number of social housing units. The project did not get the chance for approval yet, because one of the buildings was squatted. The state does not have the investment capacity proportional to the size of the problem. “PPP” combines two things: private investment

goes with public benefit. This could improve the entire area. Real estate investor: The municipality can encourage these type of activities in the center. All infrastructure is ready. The center has to be an occupied area. It is a pity for the city if you do not do anything. If you do, it valorizes the city, and it increases the quality of life for the people who live in the center. Incentives could be a sense of paying fewer taxes. Not taking too long to analyze a project proposal, just debureaucratizing would already be a big help. On the other hand the private sector cannot wait for the public sector. What will be whose responsibility? In the end nobody will do anything.

buildings that got reformed for social housing since 2000. We have some buildings that have been done by Caixa (federal bank) and some from the municipality. “PPP” is still a very big challenge. Look at “Minha Casa Minha Vida”. The market attends the group that earns 5 and higher times the minimum salary. While the biggest shortage is that of the group of 0-5 times the minimum salary, more than 90% of the habitation shortage is in this group, while it is not lucrative to invest in this group. Our state got very privatized. The private sector sees the government as a possibility to gain money.

Grocerie store in a favela

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Image 9: Grocerie store in a favela (Osterland)

Professor (Universit Architect, in Politica Planning

“Giving the centre, whe self-empow

My opinio

NGO: We have had different experiences of abandoned Figure 10: Sao Paulo Design Melting Pot (Hopkins) 59 Article Design Meltin Pot São Paulo (http://www.craftcouncil.org/magazine/article/sao-paolo-design-melting-pot

Giving the to setting u

The private sector sees these projects as profit, not as social project. So in the end I would think the best would be the responsibility of the state with the participation of private investors. I believe, as the city government mentioned, problems like this should be solved by the city. Therefore, the participation of the private sector is important. It has to be made appealing to invest in these type of projects, also giving enough profit. This would be healthy for the real-estate market. The government should have a role sending the private sector in the right direction, for the security of the future inhabitants. Financing is another important factor when discussing responsibilities. Real estate investor: We buy old buildings in the center of the city, 60

from different owners. We prefer the entire building is from only one owner. We can only buy buildings at a fixed max price, and we know how much the reform approximately is going to be. The price has to be low. Then we transform the building, we do not change the function, and almost never change the floor plans. Because we cannot wait too long for our return, and when we change something in the building we have to deal with the regulations and approval time of the municipality. We cannot do a project for, for example, two years. Next to the building, we also change a bit of the direct surroundings. We make housing for the lower and middle income class. With financement of Caixa Economica Federal (federal bank). There is no help from the municipality. We sell a bit below the normal prices out there. So

normally on the first day, we sell all our apartments. Evert apartment to another owner. We do make profit. When we sell, Caixa pays the entire price to us at once. Sometimes we do want to do a reform, to make better apartments. We do have the money to do that. However, we cannot wait for approval for the reform. We cannot stop the money flow. Our exterior and interior of the apartments is simple. Nevertheless, everything inside is of very good quality: piper, electricity. We do miss good specialists, a technical team on site. There is a huge building boom and we do not have enough staff.

financing of a federal bank. This is most interesting for the group of 6-10 (already high-medium). This group of 6-10 would be interested to live in a reformed building. Not higher than that, because the old buildings do not fit the new era with cars and parking space. For a real estate investor it is only possible to attend to lower income groups when they get subsidized by the government, so the investor can get a quick return. Right now with the help of the federal bank, the high medium income group is being attended to. This should be changed to make it possible for private investors to build for the lowest income group as well.

NGO: The group that earns 0-3x the minimum salary can only live in the center with a public subsidy. Investors are not interested in them. Everything above, can buy something with the help of

2.4 Buying versus renting City government: It is very likely that the lower class is only able to rent (that of 0-6 times the minimum salary which is

R$670,95 = €249,56). The middle class is able to buy. Therefore, our renting apartments are for 0-6 times the minimum salary. We have a culture and habit in Brazil to have property. However, explaining to the lower class that they would have to pay for 30 years is a long period. They cannot think too far ahead. People in the middle class people want to buy and people in the lower class want to rent. We have 800 apartments in the center in social rent and they are all full. Therefore, we believe if we could do more and they would be full. Housing movement: Being able to live is the most important. We do not defend the Brazilian question of owning a house. We are not pro buying especially. So renting or buying, that is not the question.

Member housing movement: It does not matter if you would sell or rent out the apartment, it will be sold on for a higher price anyhow. With renting, the key would be sold and with buying, it will be sold on to a next person for a higher price. Real estate investor: For us, only selling is possible, for a quick return. Middle class vendor: I have two houses that are my property. One apartment here in the center, of 209m2. When I bought it, it had a value of R$270,000. Now, 3 years later, it has a value of R$500,000. I also have a house in ‘Zona Leste’ that I let out. I live in the apartment in the center, it is close to my work, I come here by car. I bought the apartment with the help of financing by the bank. I paid a bit, they paid the rest. I 61

believe it is important to buy a house, it is an always appreciating investment. Renting is paying money that vanishes. Moreover, you have no security, if the owner wants you out, you have to leave, because it is his property.

that will give you a lot of gain. In addition, if you want to private sector to participate, as discussed earlier, the only possibility is selling. Since prices on the realestate market are too high, financial help is needed.

NGO: Social security used to be a big factor for buying. People did not have retirement. Another thing is the idea of the “casa própria”. Almost 90% of the upper and lower class are owner of their own home. The middle class does rent. In the center, you have the biggest percentage of people who pay rent: about 45%.

Maintenance has to do with the decision as well.

Listening to the inhabitants we can understand that we can have no influence in what will happen to an apartment after it has been sold or let out. What is important, is the security of inhabitants and being able to make an investment 62

City government: we are responsible for social housing. If a person lives in an apartment which is not their property they do not care about taking good care of it. In addition, the usage of water, regardless of how many people use it, is a cost for us. However, as for the apartments we sell, it is not our property anymore so the new owners are responsible to pay for the maintenance. There has not been concrete research yet why in some cases, people do not seem to

be able to do their maintenance and in other cases, they do. Housing movement: We already had problems of people who bought houses, that had to keep on paying the house and the maintenance every month, but it turned out to be too expensive. Therefore, maintenance is difficult for people to pay. NGO: Maintenance is very difficult for the low-income group. When you have social housing, housing that is not people's property, people do not take responsibility of it. That is why participation, before housing, is very important, for when people actually live there and they feel closer to the entire program. We have seen this in former projects. So, maintenance has proved to be a difficult issue. I believe the people

who live on the property should do maintenance; it is too high of a cost for the city government to take care of it when it is not their property. As the NGO mentions, these people have to be involved during the set-up of a project, to make people care more about their “own” results. In addition, solutions should be taken into account that require less maintenance while designing and will therefore be cheaper for inhabitants to maintain.

Housing movements: People come in the center to stay for their entire lives. Not 100% of them, we do not know this exactly.

Another factor is the period of time people would live at a place. City government: Of the 12,000 families that live in “cortiҫos” not more than 30% of them have lived here for 10, 20 or 30 years or more. The rest has lived here for a shorter period. Most of them come here, go to another place, come back again and that cyle continues.

An NGO, who has worked with the low-income group is in my opinion the person who knows the best what the reality of the people who live in the center is. He is aware of the lived space as Lefebvre calles it.74 People might have the

Inhabitants: We are in the center for a long term stay. NGO: People live in the center for the long term. People in the “cortiҫos” for example, said they wanted to stay there to get a better life and leave, but they stayed their entire life.

74Vollebregt, Alexander G. (unknown). Hidden Places, Hidden Powers. Delft: Space Lab, p. 4.

intention to stay for a short while, but they end up staying for a long time. 2.5 Sensation of safety in the city center City government: Statistically the historic center is as safe as the other areas in the center. The problem is the sensation of insecurity that is bigger there. Something significant is that the area is empty at night. Some blocks in the center have people who use drugs and homeless. In addition, of the 12,000 homeless people of the center, 10.000 live in the historic center of the city. So all these things make the feeling of insecurity bigger, but it does not mean the center is actually insecure. Housing movement: Violence is a big problem. Especially because of 63

this abandonment of center.

the city

Inhabitants: Do not go on the streets at night or you will be assaulted. NGO: It is safe, but in some areas at night, you do not feel safe. There is not a lot of life at night. Extra lighting could make a difference. Even though numbers show us that the historic center is not more unsafe than other areas in the center, the sensation of unsafety is higher there, according to several stakeholders. Therefore, safety has to take a significant role while designing. 2.6 Communal living Housing movement: We as a movement are pleading for a 64

community within the building, with common spaces. We need these common spaces. We have meetings and we all have similar problems, therefore we should think about each other, we should stay strong together. You cannot have a proper diner if you know your neighbor was not able to buy anything to eat. We have a lot of individualism when we start occupying a building, because people come in alone and do not know each other. Even after the conquest of a home, the continuity of the movement is important. We will still have to fight for housing for other families, to organize residents in the building and still fight for our rights.

does not want to have common spaces and all the rules that come with it. He wants his privacy and freedom. However, we do want spaces for communal use.

Inhabitants: As long as we are in this situation of occupation, nobody has a problem with sharing. However, when a person becomes the owner of his house, he

Communal living can only be reached through a participational approach.

The opinion of a coordinator of a housing movement differs of that of the people who are actually members of the movement. In such a way that the members will want to have their freedom. Therefore, in the designing of apartment buildings, common spaces are important but privacy of an apartment maybe even more. In addition space should be made for people to be able to come together, discuss their problems and fight for their rights.

City government: We have not made the decision yet to work with a participatory approach for the 53 buildings we are working on. We did not chose the families yet. Of the 53 buildings, we have 11 in expropriation. However, we only have 13 in work, on which we started working just now. These works will probably finish at the end of next year, just 13 buildings: 90 apartments. We have not yet decided how we will chose the families. We did not work with a participatory approach, like in the favelas. A person who lives in a “cortiҫo” in the center does not feel part of the community of its “cortiҫo”. They feel part of the community of the center. I understand a participatory approach is important. However, right now I could not imagine how I will do meetings with the community of the center to decide

how the building should be. Moreover, these buildings are old and big, they have high ceilings, and every area in these buildings is very big. The apartments have already been made and should just be reformed. A lot of them also have heritage restrictions. Housing movement: Flexibility is important. It is very important to know who the people are who are going to live there and how they would like to live. You have to talk to the people, this is fundamental, before you are going to build anything. Architect: All apartments are pretty inflexible as well as they are often all the same. We show our designs to future inhabitants and make small alterations. However, the designs are based on the capacity of payment of these people, not of the necessity and

wishes that the people have. The life they will have will be much better than in the place they lived before. We do not need to listen to them, we know. NGO: Flexibility is the result of a participatory result. The results have been much better. Work with groups in the center. ‘A participatory design can be defined as an approach that attempts to engage everyone in the process to ensure that the designed product or service meets his or her needs. The participatory approach ensures that everyone in the community including women and children can be empowered to transform their environment..’75 The answers above shows us that 75 Sinha, Sumita (2012). Architecture – for Rapid Change and Scarce Resources. New York: Routledge, p. 175. 65

the 53 buildings of the city government of the “Renova SP Centro” project have not taken any participatory approach in account. While we do know this is important and highly appreciated by future inhabitants who are the most important persons in the entire cycle, so it should be taken into consideration while designing. An example of a project that worked out well with a participatory approach is Heliópolis by Ruy Ohtake, which started out as a color scheme on the facades and developed into a residential project, to the satisfaction of the inhabitants, [see image 10].

Engineer/researcher Engineer/researcher NGO NGO Gaspar Gaspar Centre for Human Rights Centre for Human Rights

Colour schemes schemes by by Ruy Ruy Ohtake Ohtake Colour

Image 10.1: Colour schemes by Ruy “Flexibility is “Flexibility is the the result result of of a a participati participati Ohtake (Unknown)

approach. approach. The The results results of of these these cases cases h h much better. You have to work much better. You have to work with with gr gr center.” center.”

Image 10.2: Residentail Heliopolis by Ruy Ohtake (Ribeiro) 66

67 Residential Heliópolis Heliópolis by by Ruy Ruy Ohtake Ohtake Residential

Image 11: A common family for the Creative Community (Own image)

II FRAMEWORK 68

69

01 ENVIRONMENT There are a few environmental characteristics that can be taken into account while designing: climate, pollution, the soil of the plot, sensation of safety and the pedestrian versus the car/building. 1.1 Local weather patterns There are four different weather patterns to take in regard while designing: wind, rain & humidity and sun.

A: LOCAL CONTEXT 70

The wind comes from the South or South-East about 50% of the time

at the location.76 This wind can be used for cross ventilation, as is necessary for the health of habitation according to Whitaker: ‘Openings on opposite walls facilitate the renewal of air and favors the thermal comfort. The dimension and orientation of the openings must be adequate to allow the air flow in the environments’77, [see figure 11]. Due to cost regulations, these openings haven’t always been big enough in Vernacular architecture 76WeatherOnline (unknown). Winddirection (January 2002 - December 2012). [E-document] Available at: [Consulted on April 2nd 2013].

Figure 11: Cross ventilation (Whitaker) 77Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette (2012), Produzir Casas ou construir Cidades? – Desafios para um novo Brasil Urbano. São Paulo: FUPAM, p. 94. 71

to let cross ventilation work. The openings of most windows are below code requirements of one fifth of the floor area. 78 So letting air in is favorable but the air has to be regulated. This can be done naturally,79 [see figure 12]. Whitaker also mentions how a ventilated roof can facilitate the renewal of air and provide greater thermal comfort in the warmer bioclimatic zones,80 [see figure 13]. São Paulo has an average low temperature of 16◦ and an average high temperature of 28◦. 1303mm 78Kowaltowski, Doris C.C.K. and Labaki, Lucila C. (1996). The Missing Attributes of the New Vernacular: A Brazilian Example. Campinas: UNICAMP, p. 18. 79Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette, Idem, p. 80. 80Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette, Idem, p. 94. 72

of rainfall falls per year, which makes it a tropical dry region. The high temperatures and high average monthly relative humidity levels of between 74-80% make the environment corrosive. Storms with heavy rain are mainly between November and February.81 Designing with the sun works differently than in Europe. In regard to the heat and the orientation, [see figure 14]. The sun rises in the east, goes northwards, and sets in the west. ‘While in Europe or the US, one may need thick, double walls to keep the cold and the rain out of the home; in Brazil you'll need light, thin walls that do not store the sun's heat and allow the home to cool off quickly in the evening. 81Houska, Catherine (unknown). Case study 08: São Paulo Building Exterior. Germany: IMOA, p. 2.

[...] Instead of the traditional south-south-west orientation; in Brazil the orientation to the East is most popular as it captures the morning sun but avoids the late afternoon sun to heat up the house.’82 Pollution São Paulo has been identified as an extremely severe corrosion environment by the International Molybdenum Association (IMOA). This is the most severe rating that can be assigned to an environment. On one hand because of air pollution by industrial and motor vehicle emissions. On the other hand because of acid rain. As an 82BrazilStates (unknown). Construction costs in Brazil. ). [Earticle] Available at: [Consulted on April 2nd 2013].

effect of this pollution, high typical ambient temperatures and humidity corrosion accelerates. This has to be taken into consideration while designing. Rough finishes and horizontal surfaces retain rainwater longer providing more time for the rain to evaporate. This increases surface concentrations of acid and prolonged surface wetness extends the time period in which corrosion can occur. Also, there are fewer deposits of corrosion on smooth surfaces. 83

83Houska, Catherine, Idem, p. 1-2.

Figure 13: Ventilated roof (Whitaker)

Figure 12: Naturally regulated air (Whitaker)

Figure 14: Orentiation of the sun (Own figure) 73

1.2 The soil of the plot The general soil in São Paulo consists of red-yellow clay, as measured by the director of geosciences of the ministry of planning, budget and management of Rio de Janeiro.84 No sample of the soil of the exact location has been taken. There are two different indicators that can help figuring out what would be possible on the plot. First, a soil sample has been taken 7,5 km from the lot at the city university, close to the bank of the river Pinheiros. The conclusion was that the foundation poles were put in deep. The water level was very undeep (-2m). 85 Therefore, building deep will get more expensive. A second indicator is a building at a just 500 m distant from the lot: Praça das 84Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (2001). Mapa de Solos do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE. 74

Artes by Brasil Arquitetura, [see figure 15]. The two underground floors of garage are possible. Although it does not mention anything about the costs and the efforts of digging two floors deep. 1.3 Sensation of safety The sensation of safety is a very subjective matter. [Figure 16] is based on my own experience. During daytime, all streets around the designated design area feel safe. This is the result of crowded streets during the day. The situation changes around twilight, just after closing time of the shops. This is also the result of the amount of people on the streets: less crowded in the smaller streets

and parks than before. When it gets darker it also gets more difficult to see what is going on around you. The main streets feel safe at night because of the good lightning, opposed to the poor lightning in the smaller streets. Streets with bars also felt safe because of larger crowds present. This led to two conclusions. In order to increase the sensation of safety it is necessary to provice the street with proper lightning and bring life to the streets. Soil of the plot The general soil in São Paulo consists of red-yellow clay. Experience: foundation poles Reference: Praça das Artes 500 m away

85Campos, Iberê M. (unknown). [Earticle] Available at: [Consulted on April 2nd 2013].

Figure 15: Section Praça das Artes (Brasil Arquitetura)

Section Praça das Artes – Brasil Arquitetura

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Daytime

Figure 16: Sensation of safety (Own image) safe

unsafe

Twilight

At night

Sensation of safety

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1.4 Sidewalks versus cars/buildings The pedestrians in the city of São Paulo have almost no space to manoeuvre. The large amount of space that cars and buildings take in compared to the pedestrians can be seen in [figure 17]. The pedestrians are being suppressed. Walking around in the city makes that evident. More space for pedestrians is necessary.

02 THE NEW VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURES Kellet is describing the new vernacular as the regional selfbuilt homes, as we can see in [image 12]. This opposed the traditional vernacular that is seen as the traditional building practice where new structures are being built with old techniques, repeating dwelling types based on an old model with few technological changes. 86 A large part of the local housing production in Brazil is self-built. ‘According to Brazilian data, around 60% of the local housing production is self-built (Gois, 86Kowaltowski, Doris C.C.K. et al (unknown). Tradition and Self-Built Houses: Cutural Significance and Environmental Quality of Building Cars/buildings vs pedestrian Elements, the Case of Campinas, 35/70 Brazil. Campinas: UNICAMP, p. 3-4.

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Figure 17: Sidewalks vs cars/buildings (Own image)

1996). The income level of the urban self-builders in Brazil lies between 3 to 10 minimum salaries.’87 The studies that have been done are based on data of Campinas, a city with approximately one million inhabitants, one hundred kilometers from São Paulo. The city is strongly influenced by the industrialization trends of the region. There is a distinct self-built housing manifestation in the state of São Paulo, specifically in the region of Campinas. The new vernacular homes of the low income population has the following distinguished characteristics 88: • Ritualistic elements and strong symbolisms are not present. 87Kowaltowski, Doris C.C.K. et al, Idem, p. 1.

• Only the front and back spaces have natural light and ventilation. Unlit and unventilated internal rooms serve as private sleeping quarters. • Room sizes are generous, compared to local government plans. Internal sleeping alcoves are minuscule. • Service spaces are not part of the main house, but located in the back of the lot if possible. • Room area is generous. The function determines room sizes: living room- 14 m2, bedrooms12m2, kitchens- 13 m2, and bathroom- 4 m2. The total house area averages 65 m2. • When an addition is made to the house, it usually had these 88Kowaltowski, Doris C.C.K. and Labaki, Lucila C. (1996). The Missing Attributes of the New Vernacular: A Brazilian Example. Campinas: UNICAMP, p. 6-8. 77

functions: car port, third bedroom, second bathroom, specific eating nook. • Local natural materials are being used due to the abundant presence of clay in Brazil.

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The new vernacular (regional self built houses)

Image 12: New Vernacular Architecture (Osterland)

* Ritualistic elements and strong symbolisms are not present. * Only the front and back spaces have natural light and ventilation. Unlit and unventilated internal rooms serve as private sleeping quarters * Room sizes are generous. Internal sleeping alcoves are minuscule. * Service spaces are not part of the main house, but located in the back of the lot. * Room area is generous. Function determines room sizes: livingroom14 m2, bedrooms- 12m2, kitchens13 m2, and bathroom- 4 m2. The total house area averages 65 m2. * Addition to the house: carport, 3rd bedroom, 2nd bathroom, specific eating nook. *Local natural materials: clay. 36/70

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01 INHABITANTS 1.1 Capacities & needs for the role of the city center [See figure 18].

B: TARGET GROUPS

The role of t

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Figure 18: The role of the city center for 3 stakeholders (Own figure)

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Number of household members

89Rousseff, Dilma et al (2012), Decreto N◦7872, DE 26 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2012i. [E-document] Available at: http://www.normaslegais.com.br/legisl acao/decreto-7872-2012.htm [Consulted on April 2nd 2013]. 82

90Santos, André Luiz Teixera dos et al (2002). Laboratório de Projeto: Integrado e participativo para requalificação de cortiço. São Paulo: FAUUSP, p. 73.

Number of family members The research of FAU-USP shows that the people living in the squatted building had an average number of members per household of 2,85. [Figure 19] shows us that about 50% of the households existed of 1-2 members and the other 50% of the households existed of 3 or more members. When using these data for the project, the focus was on the 50% of the households that consist of 3 or more members for several reasons. First, keeping data of the municipality in mind: In 2000 the average number of members per household, where the head of the

household earned up to 5 SM, was 3,75. 91 This group lays within the target group. Secondly, because of the standard of required area per inhabitant. At the moment there is none. However, more than 20 years ago the standard used by the National Housing Bank was a minimal area per inhabitant of 12m2. 92 This apartment can household up to 4 members, making optimal use of the 50m2 given by the municipality as a maximum of surface for one apartment. It will fit again with the average number of members per household of 3,75. 91Prefeitura do Municipio de São Paulo (2003). Plano Municipal de Habitação 3. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo, p 21. 92Magalhães, Fernanda et al (2012). Slum Upgrading – Lessons Learned from Brazil. Washington: InterAmerican Development Bank, p. 37.

Age: [Figure 20] shows that 41% of the population of the squatted building on rua do Ouvidor, was between 0-18 years old, 56% was between 19-55 years old, and 3% was 56 years old and above. The head of the households is mostly between 26-55 years old, namely 78% of them. They are the ones earning the money, paying for the basic needs of the household, so the apartments should be built for them. Based on this example, the conclusion can be drawn that a big part of the inhabitants wanting to live in this type of vertical dwelling have children. Even though the existing living environment does not suit for PRODUCED BY AN AUTODESK EDUCATIONAL PRODUCT

The following characteristics will be used: - Number of family members - Age - Salary - Feeling of collectiveness - Spaces for common use

In 2000 the average number of members p Figure 19: Number of household members where the head of the househo (Ownhousehold, image) PRODUCED BY AN AUTODESK EDUCATIONAL PRODUCT

earned up to 5 SM, was 3,75.

National Housing Bank: a minimal area per Age inhabitant of 12m2.

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Obviously, this is not the first time someone is looking into the situation. The faculty of Architecture and Urbanism of the University of São Paulo (FAU-

USP) has done a research and design project in 2002 90. In the scope of the project they researched the situation in a squatted building in the center of São Paulo, where people had started to reside. In addition to the research they projected a new residential project in the existing building so the people already residing there would be able to live there under better conditions. They also did a broad survey on the people residing in the squatted building. A sample of the composition of people wanting to live in flats in the city center can be used as my target group. Next to the information gained through the interviews.

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1.2 Demographics Focus will be on the lowest income group since they have the biggest need for housing in São Paulo. These people earn up to 6 SM. The minimum salary is R$678 per month89,which is equal to €262. Apart from this fact, the people who will live in the same building will be different. How does one cope with this? Do you want to predict the behavior of future, unknown inhabitants?

Figure 20: Age (Own image) 41% squatted building on rua do83Ouvidor

between 0-18 years old, 56%: between 19-5 years old, and 3%: 56 years old and above.

children at all, as I noticed during my two visits of the squatted buildings. So the design will be concentrated on children as well. Thus, the total design will be aimed for an inhabitant in the age range of 0-55 years old with special attention for children. Salary: The majority of households in the squatted building at rua Ouvidor earned up to 3 SM, namely 50,6%. The group that earned up to 6 SM is 75,3%. Just 24,7% of the total earned 6 SM or more. This is in line with the guidelines for HIS of serving households that earn up to 6 SM. 1.3 Spaces for common use The need for collectiveness has been valued differently on various levels: organizational and spatial.

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The following is said on the organization level. People were still squatting buildings and fighting for their right to housing at the time of the FAU-USP's study. According to the rules of the squatting movements you are obliged to visit all the collective organized meetings in the building. 95,9% of the inhabitants of the building primarily visited these meetings to discuss cleaning and surveillance.93 The inhabitants said to consider the continuity of the movement to be important, even after the conquest of housing: 63,3% because they see the need to fight for housing for other families, 24,4% for the conquest of other benefits, and 12,3% for the

organizing of the residents in the building.94 Also the coordinator of MDM stresses that collectiveness is very important, even after the conquest of housing. To still fight for their rights and to be able to support each other.95 It can’t be predicted with certainty if this will really stay the same after the conquest of housing. However, it is highly probable. This probability can be taken into account by making multifunctional spaces for collectiveness in the design.

93Santos, André Luiz Teixera dos et al (2002). Laboratório de Projeto: Integrado e participativo para requalificação de cortiço. São Paulo: FAUUSP, p. 79.

94Santos, André Luiz Teixera dos et al, Idem, p. 78.

It is another story on the spatial level. After the conquest of housing, the willingness of sharing spaces will be gone, According to the coordinator of a MDM

95Neves, Nilda (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 28th 2012].

building. When you own your own house, you would not want to share collective spaces like a bathroom, kitchen and living room.96 Based on these results a conclusion on the need for collectiveness on both the organizational as on the spatial level can be drawn. Common spaces are not desired within the single housing unit. Then again, they are desired on the building level. Which kind of spaces are desired will be described in the following paragraph. Spaces for collective use When the inhabitants of rua do Ouvidor where questioned what type of function had their priority 96 Rosa, André Luiz (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 10th 2012].

for common use, they answered the following: - 68,5% asked for a crèche for common use - 20,5% asked for a community center for meetings and parties - 11% asked for something else (a learning center for adults, spaces for sewing and art, space for prayer, laundry space and space for kids to play) In addition, a large majority of the inhabitants (80,8%) wished for a common workspace. In the households different types of professional activities were registered: crafts, repair of electronic devices, laundry for

others, recycling, woodwork, sales, among other. 97 When the inhabitants of the two squatted buildings were asked the same question; they answered the following: - crèches are around here enough - there is a need for elementary schools - space for kids to play is necessary - working space/ space to start an own business would be nice Consequently, space for a crèche will not be necessary as a primer function of a space. It could come in handy as an additional function of a space. Space for kids to play will be necessary. Working space/space to start an own 97Santos, André Luiz Teixera dos et al (2002). Laboratório de Projeto: Integrado e participativo para requalificação de cortiço. São Paulo: FAUUSP, p. 79. 85

business is not a must but in the light of empowerment it could be a way to empower these people and help create a small economy. If the spaces to start an own business do not work out, the spaces should be able to transform into educational spaces, a function that is being wished as well.

02 MUNICIPALITY 2.1 Capacities & needs for the role of the city center [See figure 18]. 2.2 Guidelines The design will have its starting point at the HIS program of the Municipality of the city of São Paulo. As mentioned before, this program is aimed to serve the group of people that earn up to 6 SM. The group has not been lucrative for the private sector to invest in, while more than 90% of the shortage of habitation is in this group.98 Therefore, I will be using the 5 realistic guidelines on the housing unit of the HIS

98Kohara, Luiz (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 10th 2012]. 86

program, described in the HIS Decree of 2004 99: I - Maximum equal area is equal to 50,00m2. II - Only 1 sanitary space, sanitary parts may be placed in separate areas. III - Minimum height for the kitchen, bathroom and service area is 2,30m. IV - Minimum height for the other compartments is 2,40m. V - A maximum of 1 parking space.

03 REAL-ESTATE INVESTOR [See figure 18].

In addition to guideline V, nobody in the group of people that earn up to 6 SM can afford a car, according to the coordinator of MDM.100 99 Suplicy, Marta (2004). Decreto N◦44.667, DE 26 DE ABRIL DE 2004. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo, p.19.

100 Neves, Nilda (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 28th 2012]. 87

01 PLANS & DESCRIPTION

C: EXISTING BUILDING 88

The existing building dates from 1994 and is the property of a private owner, [see image 13]. It is situated at “rua Sete de Abril 351”, a street full of stores and restaurants. It is a side road of the very busy “Avenida Ipiranga”, and close to the metro stop “Republica”, [see figure 21]. Only a part of the plot is built on, the back yard is being used for parking. The city government is in the process of expropriation the building because the building does not serve social function. The building has been abandoned except for the ground floor, where a beauty salon, a milk shake store, an accessories and presents store and a sportswear store still remain. The upper floors were of residential use. A housing movement started to occupy the building in November 2012. They

are still there but there is a threat of eviction. An evaluation by the city government was done in March 2010.101 The buildings main construction is in good shape, it has no vices. The building is made of a concrete column structure. The window frames are made of wood and they are in bad condition. There are shutters in front of the windows, which are also in bad condition. The external finish and the inner walls are made of mortar. The hydraulic and electrical installations are in bad shape. Plans and sections of the building can be seen in [figure 22].

101Pianheri, Jorge Alberto (2010). Vistoria rua Sete de Abril, 355. São Paulo: COHAB-SP.

Image 13: Facade building rua Sete de Abril 351 (Municipality of São Paulo)89

Figure 21: Surroundings

90 II FRAMEWORK Existing building

(Own image) Selected area

CHOICE FOR LOCATION 19/42

Figure 22: Drawings municipality- increase and reform of an apartment building - 1955 (Municipality of São Paulo)

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Image 14: A spatial design for the Creative Community (Own image)

III BREEDING GROUND FOR OPPORTUNITIES 92

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01 SOCIAL RESPONSE 1.1 Local empowerment To be described later.

A: STRATEGIC RESPONSE 94

1.2 Social sustainability As mentioned in the theoretical background, the opportunity to come and live in the community should be given to people who want to shift from informal work to setting up their own small business. Accordingly, small shops will be set up on the ground floor. Social sustainability is the ability of a community to develop processes and structures which not only meet the needs of its current members but also support the ability of future generations to maintain a healthy community. Social sustainability cannot be created simply through the physical design of the community, according to Hancock. ‘Physical design cannot ensure that

individuals, families and communities will lead environmentally sustainable lifestyles, although it can help to make such environmentally sustainable choices easier. While there is much that can be done on the "design" of the soft infrastructure of the community to ensure its social sustainability, the physical design of the community can make it either easier or more difficult for communities to be socially sustainable. Thus there is a vital need to integrate the physical and social design of communities if we are to create communities that are both environmentally and socially

sustainable.’ 102 Special attention has been paid for the design in adaptability and maintenance of the project. This also goes for the occurrence of meetings within the community. 1.3 Organizational design: life cycle [Figure 23] shows different possible life cycles for the inhabitants. Basically, the figure shows that a person that enters the community can go in any direction he or she wishes. Different life cycles were taken into account since the behavior of an individual cannot 102Hancock, Trevor (unknown). Social sustainability - The “soft infrastructure” of a Healthy Community. [e-article] Available at: [Consulted on April 2nd 2013]. 95

be predicted. In [figure 23] a person who makes his way into the community will be able to buy an apartment and/or a shop. Either for a short or long term. A person might want to leave the community for several reasons. Some of which are stated in the scheme, like leave to expand their shop or leave for a bigger apartment.

02 POLITICAL RESPONSE

2.2 Strategic design: Functioning for the stakeholders [Figure 24] shows how the envisioned project functions for the stakeholders. It looks a lot like a “PPP” structure but it has some differences.

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Life cycle inhabitants PRODUCED BY AN AUTODESK EDUCATIONAL PRODUCT

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2.1 Public Private Partnership To be described later.

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Figure 23: Lyfe cycle inhabitants (Own figure)

The municipality will react to dealing with the situation of unused buildings in the city centre in the way explained in part A.

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I. They are the only stakeholder that has the power to expropriate a building and buy it from an owner for the actual nonspeculated price. They will put it on the market for the real price instead of exploiting it. It comes with the condition of certain rules

for the plot. As a result they will have fulfilled their duty. Whatever will be exploited, a certain number of dwellings for the lowest income group has to be realized. Plus a program that creates an economy for the same group, keeping in mind the certain needs of the specific area. Specific research for every single case is necessary. Selling the building on the free market, with these conditions, will give the municipality several benefits. The benefit of being able to attend a larger group of those who are in need of a dwelling. Something they could never reach with their own financial means. The second benefit is contributing to the economy of the city. The third and last benefit is a contribution to the city in space and function. The private realestate investor also has his own benefits. He is able to buy a top location building for the

inexpensive non-speculated price. On top of that he gets the chance to exploit a program that will give him profit. The private investor will start exploiting dwellings and workplaces/shops for the group of 0 up to 6 SM. Along with the creation of parking spaces for rent. He will sell the dwellings and workplaces/shops by means of the Federal Bank, as was the case with ‘Minha Casa Minha Vida’. This will give the investor their desirable quick return. The parking spaces are a valuable extra. It will ensure long term revenues on the grounds of the prime location. The current use of the plot shows there is indeed need for the function of parking spots. The new owners of the dwellings and workplaces/shops will start to create their home. Their own space 97

will empower them and in return create a vibrant new place for the city. PRODUCED BY AN AUTODESK EDUCATIONAL PRODUCT

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Functioning for the stakeholders

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Figure 24: Functioning for the Stakeholders (Own figure)

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IV IS THIS THE ANSWER? 101

01 MY PROCESS CHALLENGES

A: REFLECTION

AND

My entire project was done under the graduation studio Explore Lab at Architecture Faculty in the TU Delft. Explore Lab is a studio where students research and design driven by their fascination. It encourages you to use any type of research method to reach your answers. Using empirical research in the studio was not an exception. It made me, in combination with the unconstrained ideas of my research mentor, very free in choosing my methodology. The main part of my research has been the fieldwork I conducted in one of the first months of my project. I’d like to explain how the experience of doing the fieldwork has been for me. Going on this field trip felt like one deep jump in a black hole. I had

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an idea about the situation and about the exact questions I wanted to ask, based on assumptions I made after reading about the topic. I had an idea about which type of stakeholders I wanted to talk to but I did not know who exactly to speak with. After speaking to people like my research mentor, who has a lot of experience in doing field work in tropical countries, I decided that the best way to arrange all the interviews was to just go to São Paulo and get in contact with people there. I had already made contacts from my first visit to Brazil. Those contacts sent me to other parties. In retrospect, I could have contacted these professors before arriving in São Paulo because most of them do have a planning method like in Europe. Which goes so far as to say they are used to

planning days and/or weeks ahead. However, it was definitely a good idea to wait to contact the other contacts. Another important aspect is not just simply contacting people but also referring to the contacts who referred you to them. Then, when you have arranged the meetings, you are not there yet. Meetings will be cancelled and rescheduled. Make sure you have other options ready to get the information you need, for example through other contacts. I went to a lot of events, since the topic is very current, and met people in person there who helped me with my research. In my spare time, I was able to call and email new people and assimilate the research work already. I did not plan enough time in São Paulo for contacting people and assimilating my research work. I did change my 103

attitude towards making time for contacting during my stay there. Unfortunately, there was not enough time to assimilate all the work and that is a pity. When things are new and fresh in your head they take less time to process, especially when you handle with it the same day. It also took a lot of my ‘design’ time back in Holland. I did write down some summaries and most important points of my interviews, so that helped me to be more concrete with the following interviews. Beforehand I read about the situation in São Paulo but there was so much more to read. I can look at it in two ways. On one hand it is a bad thing I did not read more beforehand, because I could have been more concrete in asking questions. I also could have done other things like workshops, since I would have already 104

understood the situation better. On the other hand, it is a good thing I did not read more beforehand, because now I had a much more open mind when talking to different stakeholders and coming up with a solution. Taking the opinion of a single person instead of that written in books about them. I look at the solution in a more positive way. I did wish I had at least another month in São Paulo because after a month I really just got in the right circuit of people I could talk to. In the end, working with the information I did get, I had enough to work with. Which is something that also took me a while to be okay with, for there is so much more out there. That does not mean I should stop reading about the topic, for my comprehension on the topic is far from complete yet. Towards the

end of my project, I went to a presentation of a Brazilian woman who had done a PhD that touched similar topics as my project. After the presentation we talked and it struck me once again, this time harder than before, that my answer to the situation, is just one of many possible answers. In addition, specialists might not agree to this certain answer, as a result of the bad experiences they have seen or the own understanding they have created. That does not mean my answer is a bad one per se, since it is wellfounded on the understanding I have created for myself. At least it is a fresh answer to the situation. I believe that is most important. In regards to the information I got out of people during my interviews, I noticed people were very open to me. I was alone, and definitely undecided (in the way I

introduced myself) from a far away country. And harsh but true, the fact that I have African roots and look like I could have been a Brazilian, really helped me get closer to the inhabitants of the former abandoned buildings. I think it is also important to dress in a specific way to every single interview. From the inhabitants, to a real-estate office, to a congress, to an architecture office. I have encountered a lot of problems during my fieldwork. The entire outcome of the project might have changed if two main issues were not present. The first problem was that I have not been able to speak to real-estate investors of the higher segment. So my response for the situation will definitely be more in favor of all the other parties I did speak to. The second problem occurred when I was asking questions to

inhabitants of the squatted buildings. It was not possible to get the answers I was hoping for on how they would like to live. People were just thinking about ‘surviving’ and their basic needs. They were thinking about having a roof over their heads instead of a possible special living environment. It would have required another type of questioning for the inhabitants to get these answers, maybe in a workshop. Since I had to divide my time wisely, I decided to look for this information in books. The most important journey I made has to do with the understanding of the situation with squatted buildings. On one hand it far to say that people who do not experience the cruelty of the fight for housing tend to romanticize the situation. Talking about informality as the new trend. Informal towers seem very

interesting, it is the situation that has occurred. Informality is not the desire of the people living in these towers. It is just a step toward their definite station in life, merely a transition. On the other hand, when asking people about how they would like to live, they won’t think other than just ‘surviving’. So that is where we as architects can jump in, as imaginators of an amazing living structure. In my research I switched from an informal tower to a community in a building. Another important note was on self-empowerment. Is selfempowerment not something you already facilitate when offering housing in the center? You could argue that providing living space in the area where all the job offers are, is already self-empowering the lower class enough. But for me there could be more. What about education? Or the opportunity to 105

get out of the circle of informal labor?

02 RELATION BETWEEN RESEARCH AND DESIGN Does my design give an answer to my research and main research question?: ’Can the housing shortage of the lowest income group and the situation of the abandoned buildings in the city center of São Paulo complement each other, through a strategic and spatial design? By looking at the casestudy of “Rua Sete de Abril 351”.’ The answer I have given is just one of many that could be given, as explained before. My research has especially shown that the strategic design is very important next to the spatial one. My spatial design does not answer my research in all aspects. I have observed a separated relation between the three main

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stakeholders: low income workers, real-estate investors and the municipality. The new strategic situation I have created lets different stakeholders work together, as can be seen in the figure below. Answering to the needs of all and working with the situation of the abandoned buildings in the center. The municipality gets apartments that fit their standards so they can fulfill their duty and in addition they create a saver, more revitalized city. The real-estate investors get a fast short term return and in addition a long term return. The low income workers get a house and in addition the possibility to buy a workshop. Then there is the answering to the needs of the current inhabitants. When they were asked what function was missing; their main answer was not ‘workshops’. I did

create workshops in my design because it strongly supports the idea of local empowerment of the group I am building for. This idea of local empowerment is the idea I want to carry out. Imagining the design would actually be executed, I do realize that the workshops I have designed might not be wanted. I have left that possibility open in the way I designed my workshops in the center. By leaving a very open load bearing construction, walls can be taken out. Or without even taking out the walls, the complex in the middle can be used as a school with the workshop units being used as classrooms and the open theater in the middle as the auditorium. The idea of local empowerment also comes back in the financing of the apartments that will be people's own property and investment. 107

The unpredictability of people is something that also was an issue when designing. My research showed you cannot predict how people who will buy a workshop or apartment will behave. Therefore I have kept the apartments very adaptive. The only fixed factors are the toilet and kitchen. The same goes for the workshop units, where the only fixed factors are the toilet, the pipe shaft, and the entrance (which strokes with the façade coherency of the project). Another main aspect of the design is working with the climate and materials. I have been able to use local materials that work well with the tropical dry season. Materials that don’t need a lot of maintenance, which has shown to be an issue in previous projects. Also main decisions in shape in design were important, creating enough shadow places, and not letting the sun to be able to 108

directly heat spaces through facades or roofs. One might argue that the precise detailing and a somewhat special material will cost more than just designing basic. This is true but then again using the material has a higher value. Research has shown us that projects of popular housing with more 'design details' have been more satisfying for its users. Also, I am not only designing popular housing. I am designing a vibrant place that will be an addition to the city. The better it looks the more people it will attract. The final main aspect of my design is the creating of community, which is also not predictable, only desirable. Therefore spaces have been created for people to come together and do the activities they wished for in my research. The main element in my design is the theater, which will stimulate

people to come together and still be able to fight for their rights. As previousl mentioned in my research. The fight will not end when having accomplished a house.

03 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROJECT AND THE WIDER SOCIAL CONTEXT I believe this project has a large amount of value in a larger social and scientific framework in three different ways. First, the common current situation of revitalization of former vibrant areas have been abandoned. What to do in a situation like that? How can Architecture and Urbanism facilitate a good solution? How can this solution also include an answer for housing of the poor? Why should this be like that? We are standing at the beginning of this process, not just in Brazil, but also in other areas in the world, from India to the Netherlands. Secondly, because next to the spatial scale, the social and

political scale have been included. Since these two scales are definitely part of the situation and I believe the three scales together have to be seen as a whole to come with good solutions. Working with huge social problems is the future of good Architecture if you ask me. In this project the scales are well explained and are related to each other. Third, because of the chosen method to do the research. A big part of my research was shaped in doing interviews with the different stakeholders involved. With the intention of understanding the situation better, but also to lighten all sides of the story first hand. I have already heard the curiosity of the stakeholders about what others have said about certain issues. What I would have liked was to trigger bringing the different stakeholders in dialogue,

but I could not accomplish this in the short amount of time I was there. At least I triggered different stakeholders in reading about each others insights. It is very important to email my final report to all the people I spoke with. It will give them a new and fresh insight on the situation, from an architectural point of view. Also for me, to hopefully get some responses on the project (research and design).

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There are two main aspects that are important to take into account when going on with a likewise research. One main aspect is on an spatial design level and the other is on a strategic design level.

B: RECOMMENDATIONS

Comparing top-down and bottomup approaches. In which ways would the users be very much involved in the set-up the project?

There should be some order in spatially designing within these empty buildings or even choosing with which buildings to work. What are the empty buildings we are talking about? Should we only work with residential buildings, or also with commercial buildings? Which buildings would be suitable to be transformed into which function? This would be a very interesting scheme to figure out for for example a PhD. Work with characteristics of the building. On a strategic design level it would be very interesting to analyze different set-ups of relations between the involved stakeholders.

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Text • Adriana (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 4th 2012]. • Apuzzo, Gian Matteo (2001). Coping with informality and illegality in human settlements in developing cities. [e-article] Available at: [Consulted on July 5th 2012].

SOURCES

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• Bonduki, Nabil Georges (1994). Origens da habitação social no Brasil. [e-boek] Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012].

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• Fanucci, Francisco (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 3d 2012]. • Feitosa, João (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 4th 2012]. • Hancock, Trevor (unknown). Social sustainability - The “soft infrastructure” of a Healthy Community. [e-article] Available at: [Consulted on April 2nd 2013]. • Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Ocupa Centro Ocupa São João. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo. • Holston, James (2008). Insurgent Citizenship - Disjunctions of democracy and modernity in Brazil. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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• Houska, Catherine (unknown). Case study 08: São Paulo Building Exterior. Germany: IMOA. • Kohara, Luiz (2012). Interview. [Conducted on December 10th 2012]. • Kowaltowski, Doris C.C.K. and Labaki, Lucila C. (1996). The Missing Attributes of the New Vernacular: A Brazilian Example. Campinas: UNICAMP. • Kowaltowski, Doris C.C.K. et al (unknown). Tradition and SelfBuilt Houses: Cutural Significance and Environmental Quality of Building Elements, the Case of Campinas, Brazil. Campinas: UNICAMP. • Kowarick, Lúcio (1975), A Lógica da Desordem in São Paulo 1975: crescimento e pobreza. 114

• Kowarick, Lúcio and Marques, Eduardo (2011). São Paulo: Novos Percursos e Atores – Sociedade, Cultura e Política. São Paulo: Editora 34. • Leite, Ricardo Pereira (unknown), Programa de Habitação e Requalificação Urbana no Centro. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo.

• McGuirk, Justin (2012). [earticle] Available at: <www.dezeen.com/2012/09/01/why -should-the-poor-live-in-the-slumsif-there-are-empty-office-towersin-the-city-asks-justin-mcguirk/> [Consulted in September 2012]. • Meurs, Paul et al. (2009). Brazil Contemporary. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers.

• Lopez, Alonso (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 27th 2012].

• Neves, Nilda (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 28th 2012].

• Magalhães, Fernanda et al (2012). Slum Upgrading – Lessons Learned from Brazil. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank.

• Phillips, Tom (2006). Brazil's roofless reclaim the cities. [e-article] Available at: <www.theguardian.com/world/200 6/jan/23/brazil.uknews1> [Consulted in October 2012]. • Pianheri, Jorge Alberto (2010). Vistoria rua Sete de Abril, 355. São Paulo: COHAB-SP.

• Marques, Eduardo (2005), São Paulo – Segregação, Pobreza e Desugualdades Socias. São Paulo: Editoria Senac.

• Pombo, Por Luiz Rocha (2010), Em um ano, Parceria Social atende 1,012 famílias e ganha indicação do Ministério Público. [E-article] Available at: [Consulted on April 13th 2012]. • Prefeitura do Municipio de São Paulo (2003). Plano Municipal de Habitação 3. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo. • Rolnik, Raquel (2012). [e-article] Available at: <www.raquelrolnik.wordpress.com /> [Consulted in October 2012]. • Rosa, André Luiz (2012). Interviw. [Conducted on December 10th 2012]. • Rousseff, Dilma et al (2012), Decreto N◦7872, DE 26 DE

DEZEMBRO DE 2012i. [Edocument] Available at: http://www.normaslegais.com.br/le gislacao/decreto-7872-2012.htm [Consulted on April 2nd 2013]. • Santos, André Luiz Teixera dos et al (2002). Laboratório de Projeto: Integrado e participativo para requalificação de cortiço. São Paulo: FAUUSP. • Silva, Helena Menna Barreto et al (2009), Tributos imobiliários e imóveis vazios no centro de São Paulo. São Paulo. • Sinha, Sumita (2012). Architecture – for Rapid Change and Scarce Resources. New York: Routledge. • Souza, Felipe Francisco de (2011), A Batalha pelo centro de São Paulo. São Paulo: Paulo’s Editoria.

• Suplicy, Marta (2004). Decreto N◦44.667, DE 26 DE ABRIL DE 2004. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo. • Vollebregt, Alexander G. (unknown). Hidden Places, Hidden Powers. Delft: Space Lab. • Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette (2012). Interview. [Conducted on November 28th 2012]. • Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette (2012), Produzir Casas ou construir Cidades? – Desafios para um novo Brasil Urbano. São Paulo: FUPAM. • WeatherOnline (unknown). Wind-direction (January 2002 - December 2012). [Edocument] Available at:
=samk®ION=0021&LAND= BZ&ART=WDR&R=310&NORE GION=1&LEVEL=162&LANG=e n&MOD=tab> [Consulted on April 2nd 2013]. • Williams, Richard J (2009). Brazil - Modern Architectures in History. London: Reaktion Books. • Unknown (September 2013). Grounded. [e-article] Available at:<www.economist.com/news/spec ial-report/21586667-having-cometantalisingly-close-taking-brazilhas-stalled-helen-joyce-explains> [Consulted on October 15th 2013]. • Unknown (September 2013). Has Brazil blown it? [e-article] Available at: <www.economist.com/news/leaders /21586833-stagnant-economybloated-state-and-mass-protestsmean-dilma-rousseff-must-changecourse-has> [Consulted on September 30th 2013]. 116

• Unknown (October 2013). Some clashes after peaceful Brazil protests. [e-article] Available at: <www.aljazeera.com/news/america s/2013/10/some-clashes-afterpeaceful-brazil-protests2013101611825354486.html> [Conducted on October 16th 2013].

Images • Cover image: Osterland, Elissa. Private collection. • Image 1: Own image (December 2012). • Image 2: Friedel, Michael (September 2013). Brazil's future: Has Brazil blown it? [e-image] Available at: [Consulted on October 1st 2013]. • Image 3: Osterland, Elissa (October 2013). Private collection. • Image 4: Sosa, Ramiro J. (unknown). Centro Historico - Sao Paulo. [e-image] Available at:
miro-j-sosa/5044514555/> [Consulted in October 2012]. • Image 5: Unknown (January 2011). Herzog & de Meuron. [eimage] Available at: [Consulted in October 2012]. • Image 6: COHAB SP (Unknown), Presentation Renova Centro. São Paulo: Municipality of São Paulo, Habitation. Page 52. • Image 7: Own image (December 2012). • Image 8: Own image (December 2012). • Image 9: Osterland, Elissa (October 2013). Private collection.

Habitacional Heliópolis. Housing Project, São Paulo, Brazil. [e-image] Available at: [Consulted in January 2013].

• Image 12: Osterland, Elissa (October 2013). Private collection. • Image 13: Municipality of São Paulo (September 2012). • Image 14: Own image.

• Image 10.2: Ribeiro, Marjorie (August 2012). “O Urbanismo e a arquitetura podem contribuir para uma cidade mais igualitaria”, Ruy Ohtake. [e-image] Available at: [Consulted in January 2013]. • Image 11: Own image (December 2012).

• Image 10.1: Unknown (January 2012). Ruy Ohtake: Conjunto 117

Figures • Figure 1: Own figure (October 2013) • Figure 2: Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Ocupa Centro Ocupa São João. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo. Page 15. • Figure 3.1: Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Ocupa Centro Ocupa São João. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo. Page 23. • Figure 3.2: Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Ocupa Centro Ocupa São João. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo. Page 23. • Figure 4.1: Marques, Eduardo (2005), São Paulo – Segregação, Pobreza e Desugualdades Socias. 118

São Paulo: Editoria Senac. Page 231. • Figure 4.2: Marques, Eduardo (2005), São Paulo – Segregação, Pobreza e Desugualdades Socias. São Paulo: Editoria Senac. Page 232. • Figure 4.3: Marques, Eduardo (2005), São Paulo – Segregação, Pobreza e Desugualdades Socias. São Paulo: Editoria Senac. Page 233. • Figure 5.1: Marques, Eduardo (2005), São Paulo – Segregação, Pobreza e Desugualdades Socias. São Paulo: Editoria Senac. Page 226. • Figure 5.2: Marques, Eduardo (2005), São Paulo – Segregação, Pobreza e Desugualdades Socias. São Paulo: Editoria Senac. Page 225.

• Figure 6: COHAB SP (Unknown), Presentation Renova Centro. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo, Habitacão. Page 42. • Figure 7: COHAB SP (Unknown), Presentation Renova Centro. São Paulo: Prefeitura de São Paulo, Habitacão. Page 46. • Figure 8: Helou, Tânia Nascimento (2012), Ocupa Centro Ocupa São João. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo. Page 56-57. • Figure 9: Own figure. • Figure 10: Hopkins, Martha (November 2012). Sao Paulo: Design Melting Pot. [e-image] Available at: [Consulted in January 2013].

• Figure 11: Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette (2012), Produzir Casas ou construir Cidades? – Desafios para um novo Brasil Urbano. São Paulo: FUPAM. Page 94.

arquitetura/51228f7ab3fc4b2f6500 00ba> [Conducted in May 2013]. • Figure 16: Own figure. • Figure 17: Own figure.

• Figure 12: Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette (2012), Produzir Casas ou construir Cidades? – Desafios para um novo Brasil Urbano. São Paulo: FUPAM. Page 80.

• Figure 18: Own figure. • Figure 19: Own figure. • Figure 20: Own figure.

• Figure 13: Whitaker Ferreira, João Sette (2012), Produzir Casas ou construir Cidades? – Desafios para um novo Brasil Urbano. São Paulo: FUPAM. Page 94.

• Figure 21: Own figure. • Figure 22: Municipality of São Paulo (November 1955).

• Figure 14: Own figure.

• Figure 23: Own figure.

• Figure 15: Helm, Joanna (2013). Praça das Artes / Brasil Arquitetura. [e-image] Available at:
• Figure 24: Own figure.

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I - The origins of Popular Housing in São PauloGovernment intervention in Popular Housing in the period from 1930 to 1954

APPENDIX

120

Nabil Georges Bonduki is een architect die veel geschreven heeft over sociale woningbouw in voornamelijk Rio de Janeiro en São Paulo. Volgens hem wordt het huisvestingsprobleem van Brazilië door de staat en de samenleving op vooral gezien als een sociale kwestie en beleid wat wordt gevoerd is nog altijd in een beginnende fase. Vandaar ook de gevolgen die in het vorige hoofdstuk zijn uitgelegd. Toch heeft de staat door de jaren heen iets kunnen betekenen als het gaat om huisvesting voor de arbeidersklasse. Waar ligt de basis van dit huisvestingsbeleid? Bij het toelichten van de oorsprong van overheidsinterventie bij sociale woningbouw in São

Paulo zal ik vooral ingaan op de periode dat Vargas president was, van 1930-1954. Daarnaast zal het effect van deze interventie op woningbouw oplossingen en toegang tot land in São Paulo worden behandeld. Onderstaande informatie is, tenzij anders aangegeven, gebaseerd op een tekst van Bonduki.103 De Braziliaanse overheid grijpt voor het eerst in, in zowel het productieproces van woningbouw als in de huursector, voorheen lag dit in de handen van de vrije markt sector. Deze nieuwe houding van de overheid op woningbouw was deel van een veel bredere strategie van Vargas. Vargas wilde de vorming en 103Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012],p.711-732.

versterking van een maatschappij van kapitalistische en stedelijk industriële aard stimuleren. Hij geloofde dat daarbij een sterke overheidsinterventie in alle gebieden van economische activiteit nodig was. Er werden maatregelen genomen die volgens Bonduki over het algemeen leken te doelen op het verzekeren van betere woonomstandigheden en van het stedelijke leven van de arbeiders. Een aspect waar in de officiële propaganda altijd naar gestreefd werd. De maatregelen die waren genomen door Vargas en zijn volgelingen, waren erop gericht om de relaties tussen arbeid en kapitaal te reguleren en de arbeidsvoorwaarden van de stedelijke arbeiders te verdedigen. Acties die voor de dictator het beeld creëerde van ‘vader van de armen’.104 104Bonduki,NabilGeorges,Idem ,p.711-712. 121

3.1 Housing in the Old Republic (1889-1930) De initiatieven van de regering van de Oude republiek om woningbouw te produceren of om de residentiële huurmarkt te reguleren zijn vrijwel nihil geweest. Trouw aan het heersende liberalisme, begunstigde de staat de private productie en weigerde direct ingrijpen in de bouw van woningen voor de werknemers. Zo werden de inspanningen van de staat beperkt tot onderdrukking van meer ernstige zaken van ongezondheid, via gezondheidswetgeving, het optreden van de politie en de toekenning van belastingvrijstellingen (die in de eerste plaats ten goede kwamen van de eigenaren van huurwoningen). Het doel van de private sector in de bouw was vooral het terugwinnen van inkomsten van de investering in de 122

bouw of aankoop van huurwoningen. De structuur van de Braziliaanse economie was voornamelijk gericht op agrarisch export. In de steden had deze structuur sterke overwicht over de handel op de productie van woningen. Gezien het lage vermogen om nieuwe groeiende investeringen in de industrie op te vangen, was de business van huizen verhuren een veilige en uitstekende manier om geld te besparen met beschikbare middelen in de stedelijke economie, sterk aangespoord door de uitbreiding van de agrarische export activiteit. In een tijd van enorme groei van de Braziliaanse steden, in het bijzonder in het zuidoosten, voornamelijk in São Paulo en Rio de Janeiro waar een sterk aandeel buitenlanders immigreerden, was de waardering van ontroerend goed geaccentueerd. Daarnaast vormde

het een belangrijke investeringsoptie voor het behouden van de waarde, bij het ontbreken van een kapitaalmarkt. São Paulo, in het bijzonder als koffiestad en als ontvanger van een intense stroom van immigranten (de stad groeide van 40,000 inwoners in 1886 tot 260,000 inwoners in 1900 en 580,000 in 1920), werd gekenmerkt door een superdynamisch vastgoedproces. Met sterke stedelijke wildgroei en een enorme overwaardering van de gronden, het land en de gebouwen. In een paar jaar, waren boerderijen met landelijke kenmerken gebundeld en getransformeerd in het zwaar bezette stedelijke gebied. En dus garandeerden investeringen in ontroerend goed, naast winstgevendheid van huurwoningen, ook een reserve van waarde. In deze context is de intense productie van woningbouw

uitgevoerd door de private huurmarkt onstaan. In São Paulo werden in 1920 slechts negentien procent van de gebouwen bewoond door de eigenaren, die grotendeels de overhand hadden bij het bepalen van de huur als een fundamentele vorm van toegang tot huisvesting. Aangezien de meeste van de gebouwen, “cortiços” waren, bezet door meer dan één arbeidersfamilie, kan worden geconcludeerd dat bijna 90% van de bevolking van de stad (arbeiders klasse en middenklasse)huurder was. Dit als gevolg van het ontbreken van een financieringsmechanisme voor de aankoop van een eigen huis. Hierdoor konden een soort stedelijke renteniers een grote diversiteit aan woningbouwoplossingen voor verhuur voor verschillende maatschappelijke segmenten en

inkomensgroepen realiseren. Aanleiding gevend tot een reeks van typologieën die het landschap van de stad in de eerste decennia van de eeuw markeerden, toen het huis van de arbeider zich vlakbij de industriële zone bevond, zoals in het vorige hoofdstuk als is uitgelegd. Zo verschijnen tal van oplossingen voor woonhuizen, waarvan de meeste proberen op grond- en hulpstoffen te besparen door te dupliceren en door de afwezigheid van vrije ruimte vanaf de kavelgrens, elk ontworpen voor een capaciteit van de betaling van de huur. Het woongebouw moest perfect functioneren. Er werd gebouwd voor de arbeidersklasse, met elkaar opvolgende kleine ongezonde woningen of kamers langs een corridor, zonder hydraulische installatie. En er werd gebouwd voor een middenklasse die zich verrijkte. Voor het werden

fatsoenlijke rijtjeshuizen in speciale steden of privé-straten gemaakt die blokken doorboord hadden om het gebruik van dure grond te verhogen, betwist door enorme woningbouwspeculatie. Het nijpende tekort aan woningen wat aan het begin van de Republiek was ontstaan, was kwantitatief overwonnen. Deze relatieve balans tussen aanbod en vraag van huisvesting werd echter bewerkstelligd door de productie of aanpassing van betaalbare huisvesting van kleine ongezonde cellen van verkleinde ruimtes en slechte woonomstandigheden, algemeen aangeduid als sloppenwijken. De hoogte van de huur was in deze periode bijna altijd het resultaat van vrije onderhandeling tussen de huurder en de verhuurder. Ook bij reproductie van werk kwam de overheid niet te pas. Het burgerlijke wetboek, wat 123

de kwestie reguleerde, richtte de “regel van absoluut eigendom” op waarin bij private contracten geen enkele vorm van regulatie voor het vaststellen van huren werd vastgesteld. Alleen tijdens de korte periode tussen 1921-1927, is er een amper effectieve huur wet geweest. Hierin werden huurprijzen bevroren, als een reactie op de huisvestingscrisis en overdreven verhoging van de waardes gegenereerd toen het niveau van de bouw bijna tot nul gedaald was tijdens de oorlog. Het bevriezen van de huren was vastgesteld, maar omdat de wet geen uitzettingen van huurders verbood, konden de verhuurders aan de wet ontsnappen om de

124

huurprijzen te blijven herstellen.105 Zonder de bescherming van de staat, bleef het vaststellen van de waarde van de huur het belangrijkste conflict tussen huurders en verhuurders en de belangrijkste kwestie die volksbewegingen deed mobiliseren rond de kwestie van huisvesting. Er was weliswaar een grote invloed van het anarchisme in de arbeidsbewegingen, waarbij de houding van een niet betrokken overheid op het gebied van huisvesting de juiste houding was in de toen heersende liberale periode. Toch verwachtte de bevolking meer verantwoordelijkheid op het gebied van huisvesting van de

overheid. Maar de overheid zag het niet als zijn verantwoordelijkheid. Toch zagen ze het huisvestingsprobleem in en hebben een aantal kleine projecten opgezet die niet goed werkten, onder andere in Rio de Janeiro en Recife. De eerste groep huizen gebouwd door de Braziliaanse overheid waren 120 woningen aan de Avenida Salvador de Sá (Rio de Janeiro) in 1906 door de het federale district van de stad. Het district stond zwaar onder druk van de huisvestingsiris door het slopen van duizenden woningen voor de opening van de Avenida Central. Een ander voorbeeld is de constructie in Recife in 1926 van veertig woningen voor de stichting van het huis van de arbeiders. 105Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda Deze stichting was een agentschap habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available van de deelstaatregering van at: [Consulted on als doel het bouwen van kleine July 4th 2012],p.713. woningen voor de huisvesting van

de armen door een lagere huur, lijkt het volgens Bonduki de eerste publieke stichting in het land te zijn geweest wat speciaal ontstaan is voor de productie van huisvesting met een sociaal karakter. In diezelfde tijd werd van overheidsinterventie in woningproductie in São Paulo alleen nog maar gesproken in het gemeentehuis, op initiatief van burgemeester Pires do Rio. De conclusie was dat de overheid geen huizen mag bouwen voor de arbeiders, omdat dit de private productie ontmoedigt. De commissie van initiatieven om het huisvestingsprobleem aan te pakken gaf het volgende aan: ‘De commissie is van mening dat ze de uiterste omzichtigheid in de directe actie van de overheid in de bouw van sociale woningen moet adviseren, in een poging om met alle middelen tot haar beschikking het private aan te moedigen. [...]

Laten er geen illusies zijn. In de huidige staat van onze sociale, politieke en economische organisatie, is de constructie van betaalbare woningen door de overheid rechtstreeks of via bedrijven verre van een oplossing, het is juist een oorzaak van de verslechtering van de huidige situatie. Alleen al de aankondiging dat de overheid een paar duizend woningen zal gaan aanbieden tegen vaste prijzen en huren zal genoeg zijn om privé kapitaal af te weren wat jaarlijks gebruikt worden in de bouw. […] De overheid zou geen woningen voor de arbeiders moeten produceren, maar individuen moeten aanmoedigen om te investeren.’106 106Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012],p.715.

De visie van dit rapport, die wijst in de richting van toekenning van gunsten aan de private initiatieven, zodat zij goedkopere woningen kunnen produceren en daardoor lagere huren aan kunnen bieden, is overheersend in het hele land. Het geldt als algemene logica voor de liberale staat van de Oude Republiek. De ideale oplossing die werd gezien, na tal van prikkels van de overheid te hebben ontvangen, was de promotie van “vilas operárias” door de industrie om als huisvesting te dienen voor hun werknemers. Deze “vilas operárias” waren clusters van woningen gebouwd door de industrieën om voor lage huren of zelf gratis aan te bieden aan hun werknemers, vlakbij de industrieën. Deze initiatieven hadden een grote impact in verschillende Braziliaanse steden, aangezien ze de eerste grote woningbouw initiatieven waren die 125

gebouwd werden in het land. Het moest fatsoenlijke huisvesting garanderen, zonder de ongezondheid van de “cortiços”, waarbij geen interventie van de overheid nodig was en waarbij nog steeds een ideologische, politieke en morele controle van de werknemers was. Een voorbeeld van een model wat zo gerealiseerd is, is Vila Maria Zelia in Sõo Paulo. Dit was een complete wijk met een school, kinderdagverblijf, kerk, winkel en recreatie hal. Een wijk zoals Vila Maria Zelia is een uitzondering. Er zijn maar een paar bedrijven geweest die fatsoenlijke “vilas operárias” hebben gebouwd en verhuurd voor lagere prijzen. Er waren vooral bedrijven die woningen bouwden met alleen als doen om de essentiële werknemers bij zich te houden, waardoor maar een klein aantal van de werknemers werden geholpen. Veel bedrijven hebben, 126

net zoals elke andere investeerder zou hebben gedaan, gezocht naar een manier om meer winst te maken net zoals bij de gewone huurwoningen. Dit was de algemene logica voor sociale woningbouw tijdens de Oude Republiek.107

begon langzaam aan te veranderen na 1930. Er werden nieuwe condities gecreëerd die stedelijk industriële activiteiten centraal stelden in de Braziliaanse economie. De basis van de politieke steun van het nieuwe regime moest aangepast worden door de integratie van nieuwe 3.2 The beginning of government sociale sectoren. Gedreven door de intervention noodzaak om politieke macht te Er kan worden gezegd dat de legitimeren, wat dus gebeurde revolutie van de jaren dertig een vanaf de revolutie van de jaren revolutie heeft gemarkeerd voor de dertig, heeft Vargas een oplossing interventie van de overheid in de voor een nieuw type compromis economie en regulatie van het moeten bedenken, omdat geen van kapitaal en arbeidsverhoudingen. de groepen van de macht (zoals de De overheid was eerder slechts een middenklasse en luitenanten) de vertegenwoordiger van belangen basis konden vormen van de van de agro-export economie, dit legitieme staat. Zo is er in de Braziliaanse geschiedenis een nieuw personage ontstaan: de 107Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available stedelijke massa’s die garant staan at: [Consulted on Braziliaanse staat. Op deze manier July 4th 2012],p.716. gelegitimeerd en zwevend boven

alle andere klassen, wat betekende dat ze open stond voor alle soorten druk zonder zich uitsluitend ondergeschikt te maken aan de onmiddellijke doelstellingen van één van hen, kon de Braziliaanse staat van na de jaren dertig een economische en sociale politiek creëren die ondanks dat ze soms discontinue en tegenstrijdig was, een aantal goed gedefinieerde karakteristieken kon presenteren. Als onderdeel van deze karakteristieken, werd het noodzakelijk een beleid te bevorderen wat gericht was op de arbeiders, om een compromis met de massa’s te kunnen sluiten. Er moesten economische ontwikkelingen gebaseerd op industrie gemaakt worden en er moesten loonkosten voor de ondernemingen worden berekend, iets wat eerder aan de vrije markt werd overgelaten. Het was het begin van een lange reeks

interventies voor de arbeiders door Vargas. Volgens Bonduki had het overheidsingrijpen bij woningbouw twee effecten: het regime legitiemer maken en meer kapitaal kunnen maken in de stedelijke sector door het verminderen van de kosten van de reproductie van de arbeidskracht. Aangezien woningbouw altijd al een grote last is geweest en een te groot probleem om te worden opgelost door de stedelijke arbeidersklasse (omdat huur altijd een groot deel van het salaris wegnam), werd het ontstaan van een woningbouw productie programma en een huur beschermingsbeleid door de overheid goed geaccepteerd door de stedelijke massa’s. Bovendien liet het een regering zien die bezorgd was om de levensomstandigheden van de zwakste

bevolkingsgroepen.108 3.3 The beginning of the idea of popular housing in Brazil De regering van Vargas had geen coördinerende en samenhangend woningbeleid kunnen formuleren. Daarnaast ontstond er geen gezamenlijke actie tussen verschillende organisaties en ministeries die zich met de kwestie bemoeiden. De oprichting van de sociale woningbouw in 1946, als reactie op de huisvestingscrisis ontstaan in de periode na de oorlog, was volgens Bonduki paradoxaal het beste voorbeeld van het gebrek aan beleid. Het beleid kondigde grote doelen aan: financiering, woningen, infrastructuur, sanering, een bouwmateriaal industrie en training van technisch personeel van gemeenten. Het beleid was 108Bonduki,NabilGeorges,Idem ,blz.716. 127

echter nog erg fragiel, had geen goede middelen om te gebruiken, geen goede samenwerking met andere organisaties die zich met de kwestie bezig hielden en had vooral geen goed gecoördineerde actie om het huisvestingsprobleem op te lossen. Overheidsinterventie was is deze periode nog geautomatiseerd en werd niet serieus genomen en kon daarom nog niet goed functioneren in zijn beleid. Dat kwam vooral door politieke strijd en het niet goed benadrukken van het thema binnen de overheid en door geen goede centralisatie van de implementatie door de IAPs (Institutes of Retirement and Pensions) die het geld verschaften. Door de grote weerstand van de IAPs en het einde van het regime van Vargas in 1945 - die de huisvestingscrisis volgens Bonduki voornamelijk wilde aanpakken om de bevolking voor zich te winnen – 128

kwam het idee om een nationaal woningbouw beleid te maken tot een eind. Het beleid was niet gelukt, maar het had er wel voor gezorgd dat de Braziliaanse staat inzag dat ze de verplichting had om het serieuze probleem van de dakloosheid aan te pakken. De IAPs waren niet specifiek opgericht mo het huisvestingsprobleem aan te pakken, maar gewone sociale zekerheid instituten die hun geldbronnen moesten investeren in fondsen voor sociale zekerheid. Brazilië was in een periode aangekomen waarin de bevolking steeds meer geloofde dat er overheidsinterventie nodig was om het probleem van woningbouw voor de werknemers aan te pakken, in plaats van alleen private interventie. Dankzij de groei van inzichten van de overheid, bedrijven, en het academisch oogpunt, waarbij duidelijk werd

dat grootschalig woningen maken door de privé sector onmogelijk was, begon de overheid gespreide initiatieven van interventie te nemen, in reactie op de ernst van het probleem. Het laat goed zien hoe de populistische overheden en hun beleid werkten, met hun gevoeligheid om vraagstukken die grote invloeden hebben op het leven van de arbeider aan te pakken, zoals de hoogte van de huur. De Braziliaanse overheid zag het huisvestingsprobleem volgens Bonduki dus als een sociaal vraagstuk, de maatregelen die echter werden getroffen waren onverbonden met elkaar, aangezien ze van verschillende organisaties en politieke belangen afkomstig waren. Het resultaat was een gebrek aan een gecentraliseerd beleid en een lappendeken van interventies als uitkomst. Ondanks dat de overheidsinterventies nog niet goed werkten, laat het wel

concrete actie zien wat het idee creëerde van sociale woningbouw in Brazilië. Een paar van de belangrijkste maatregelen die toen werden geïmplementeerd, zoals de wet op huurprijzen, hadden een veel bredere economische strategie van de overheid dan alleen de bescherming en garantie van huisvesting voor de arbeiders. Daarnaast was de implementatie gekoppeld aan beslissingen genomen onder de economische ministeries, waardoor de integratie van de implementatie in een unieke strategie van het huisvestingsbeleid werd belemmerd.109

109Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012],p.717-719.

3.4 The law on rents from 1942 De wet op huurprijzen uit 1942, die een bevriezing van locatieve waarden vaststelde en de relatie tussen huisbazen en huurders reguleerde, was een maatregel van enorme omvang en had enorme consequenties in de productie, distributie en consumptie van huisvesting. Het was een maatregel van grote economische en maatschappelijke impact waarbij het absolute recht op eigendom werd geschorst. Dat kon alleen maar gebeuren omdat de huisvesting werd gezien als een speciale markt, waarbij het sociale belang groter was dan de marktwerking. De visie voor sociale woningbouw in Brazilië werd hierdoor versterkt. Het bevriezen van de huren was een van de maatregelen die werd genomen door de populistische staat. Het is volgens Bonduki lastig om te zien of deze maatregel

deel was van het economische beleid of dat het nodig was om meer ondersteuning van de bevolking te krijgen. Beiden doelen werden beschreven in de strategie van de overheid. In het begin van de jaren veertig was het grootste deel van de middenklasse huurder. Aangezien huur een groot deel van de maandelijkse vaste lasten was, had de bevriezing van de huren een grote invloed voor de stedelijke bevolking. Daarnaast waren de index voor levenskosten en de inflatie waren enorm gestegen in 1938, waardoor de fundamenten van het regime werden uitgebreid. De overheid probeerde volgens Bonduki echter altijd de verdediging van de volkseconomie te overwaarderen, terwijl het maar één van de doelen van de wet was die ook een instrument van de economische politiek was. Voor het bevriezen van de huurprijzen werd door de overheid steeds onterecht 129

gesproken van een oneerlijke verhoging van de huren. Hiervan was eigenlijk geen sprake geweest, tussen 1937 en 1942, net voor de bevriezing van de huurprijzen, was de verhoging van de kosten voor wonen het laagste geweest vergeleken met andere volksconsumptie, zoals voedingskosten. Toch was er volgens Bonduki een verklaring nodig voor de drastische interventie als huurprijs controle. De analyse gedaan op het nationale ontwikkelingsbeleid in Brazilië, welke was geïmplementeerd door Vargas, verhult andere belangrijke aspecten die het officiële beleid van huurprijzen (die de nominale huurprijzen tussen 1942 en 1964 hebben vastgelegd) kunnen uitleggen. Bonduki gelooft dat de wet ook was ingesteld om het proces van industrialisatie, wat niet automatisch werkte, op gang 130

te brengen. De bevriezing van de huurprijzen in 1942 en de periode erna had als effect dat in een periode van inflatie het investeren in nieuwe huurwoningen geheel ongunstig was. Waardoor de verkoop van huurwoningen werd geforceerd, als een manier om het kapitaal te herstellen wat gedevalueerd was door de verouderde huurprijzen. De bevriezing van de huurprijzen was ook één van de maatregelen om de kosten van reproductie van de beroepsbevolking te verlagen om het niveau van accumulatie van kapitalistische ondernemingen de verhogen, zonder de leefomstandigheden van de werknemers sterk te verlagen. Dit alles om industriële groei te verbeteren. In die zin diende de wet van de huurovereenkomst uitzonderlijk in het economische ontwikkelingsmodel, ofwel om middelen naar de industriële sector

te leiden, ofwel door het bijdragen aan de verlaging van de waarde van arbeidskracht en de lonen.110 3.5 The impact of the law on rents De gevolgen van de wet op de huurprijzen op het productieproces van huisvesting waren erg groot en genereerden schaarsheid in woningen. Het liet zien dat sociaal ingrijpen in woningmarkt niet altijd positief uitpakt. De privé sector, vooral de grote investeerders, produceerde minder huurwoningen, waardoor er een drastisch tekort aan woningen in de grote steden ontstond. Dat terwijl er in de jaren veertig een enorme migratie van het platteland naar de steden was, 110Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012],p.719-721.

vanwege de nieuwe economische condities (vooral industriële groei). Volgens Bonduki was dit de oorzaak van een huisvestingscrisis. Het vaststellen van lokale huren was vooral voordelig voor degenen die al een woning huurden. Dit voordeel was echter relatief: aan de ene kant verhoogde het loon op basis berekeningen van de vastgestelde huren, maar aan de andere kant probeerden de woning eigenaren op allerlei mogelijke manieren het inkomen van hun huurwoningen te verhogen of hun woning terug te winnen, om zo het volledige eigendomsrecht terug te krijgen. Het meest effectieve van de woningeigenaren was om de verhuurders te verdrijven, zodat ze een nieuwe, veel hogere huurprijzen konden instellen. Dit was mogelijk door het te lage aanbod van huurwoningen in de steden in de jaren na de oorlog. De uitzetting van de verhuurders was

in deze tijd het grootste probleem wat er was. Arbeiders die wel huurden en in goed uitgeruste buurten dicht bij lokale werkegelegenheid wilden wonen, werden uitgebuit. Dit huisvestingsprobleem van de traditionele arbeidersklasse buurten kwam voor in São Paulo en andere belangrijke steden in Brazilië. De overheid zorgde dus voor meer betaalbare huisvesting in São Paulo, maar tegelijkertijd verliet de private sector de huisvestingsmarkt voor lage inkomens en veranderde het perifere patroon van stedelijke groei waarbij de bewoner zijn eigen woning maakte, zoals in hoofdstuk 2 al aangegeven. Bonduki geeft aan dat een geschatte tien procent van de Paulistanen in de periode van de huisvestingscrisis tussen 1945 en 1948 uit hun huis zijn gezet. Dit grote aandeel is te verklaren door de formele en de

informele mechanismen die toen van toepassing waren op de huurmarkt. Eén mechanisme is dus de wet op huurprijzen uit 1942 geweest, waarbij alle huurprijzen werden vastgesteld op de waarde van december 1941. Waardoor de woning eigenaren hun inkomens zagen dalen in een economie die met inflatie werd geteisterd. Er waren geen legale instrumenten om de huur te verhogen en dus werden huurders uit hun woning gezet. Waarop de huren werden verhoogd voor nieuwe huurders, de toewijzing van woningen werd veranderd of het gebouw werd gerenoveerd. De huren die werden verhoogd werden in één keer veel verhoogd, omdat er al rekening werd gehouden met de komende jaren waarin de huur niet omhoog kon. De wet zorgde voor een schijnbare zekerheid voor de huurders en de relatie tussen huurders en verhuurders 131

verslechterde, waarbij verhuurders constant zochten naar trucs en mazen om de wet te ontlopen, zelfs de wetten op uitzetting. Dit was mogelijk omdat het maatschappelijke kwestie over de zaak controversieel was. Als reactie hebben huurders zichzelf georganiseerd in de “Alliance of Solidarity and Protection of Tenants”, ze groeiden in 1946 uit tot 5,000 leden. Met hetzelfde doel verenigden ook eigenaren zich. De situatie van uitzettingen bleef jaren aanhouden en de situatie voor de eigenaren werd steeds moeilijker. Ontroerend goed speculatie en stijgende ontroerend goedrijzen, vooral in de centrale gebieden, verergerden de situatie. Zo werd er in São Paulo tijdens tussen 1935 en 1945 door burgemeester Prestes Maia een plan van lanen in de stad gecreëerd in de centrale zones, om deze weer te vitaliseren. Hierdoor steeg de 132

waarde van de woningen in deze zones, waar tot die tijd vooral de armere bevolking woonde. Soortgelijke processen speelden zich af in andere Braziliaanse steden, onder andere in Rio de Janeiro en Recife. Deze ingrepen in de oude stad, die samengingen met een intens proces van verticalisatie was de trend van een nieuwe vastgoedontwikkeling sector. Ze kregen krediet van de eerder genoemde IAPs. Het enorme verschil tussen de waarde van de grond en de huur van een oud gebouw, was een van de belangrijkste oorzaken die hebben geleid tot eigenaren die hun oude huurders afschudden door middel van daadwerkelijke sloop van het gebouw, om een versneld proces van verticale integratie te faciliteren. De effecten van de wet op de huurovereenkomst waren erg sterk. De gevolgen waren ook zichtbaar in het algemene proces

van transformatie van de huisvestingsoplossingen in São Paulo. Met name door steeds meer “casas próprias” die door de arbeiders zelf werden gemaakt, als een oplossing tegen de ineenstorting van de sociale woningbouw door renteniers.111 3.6 Origin of the housing by the State De populistische regering nam ook andere initiatieven op het gebied van sociale huisvesting, namelijk de eerste grootschalige productie van huisvesting door de staat. Dit deden ze in 1937 door de oprichting van bouw portefeuilles voor de IAPs. Daarna werd de ‘Fundação da Casa Popular’ 111Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012],p.721-724.

(Stichting van de betaalbare woning) in 1946 opgericht. De staatsproductie van huisvesting voor de arbeiders was de officiële erkenning dat het huisvesting probleem niet zou worden opgelost door private initiatieven alleen. De bemoeienis van de staat werd niet meer, zoals in de jaren dertig gezien als oneerlijke concurrentie voor de particuliere ondernemingen. Vanaf het regime van Vargas werd de algemene opinie steeds meer dat staatsinterventie essentieel was om het huisvestingsprobleem op te lossen. De grote beleggers waren al geleidelijk opgehouden te investeren in de productie van huurhuizen, zoals veel werd gedaan in de Oude Republiek. Toen leverde het nog een hoge winstgevendheid en veiligheid op. Naarmate de economie groeide en industriële investeringmogelijkheden werden

gediversifieerd tijdens de tweede helft van de jaren dertig en vooral tijdens de jaren veertig, werd het voor mensen die kapitaal hadden minder interessant om betaalbare woningbouw te realiseren. Het is duidelijk dat de bevriezing van de huurprijzen dit proces benadrukt (het was ook één van de intenties van de wet op de huurprijzen), zodat de overheid een lege ruimte in de woningbouwmarkt kon invullen in plaats van concurreren met de private sector. Bovendien werd de bouwsector geïnteresseerd in het ontvangen van publieke fondsen, door de geleidelijke vermindering van de particuliere investeringen, een situatie die tot de dag van vandaag voortduurt. De ontwikkeling van het concept van sociale woningbouw, gedefinieerd als een sector van economische activiteit waarbij staatsinterventie essentieel is, was dus belangrijk voor de bouwsector.

De grootse staatsinterventie in de woningbouw, door mannen als Roberto Simonsen, een van oorsprong zakelijk leider in de bouwsector, werd volgens Bonduki misschien gegenereerd door de eerdere genoemde belangen, in plaats van de veronderstelde maatschappelijk zorg. De creatie van bouw portefeuilles van de IAPs creëerde een mechanisme waarbij bij de enorme toestroom van geld naar de IAPs, het geld dat geen onmiddellijk doel had, naar de woningbouw kon toestromen. Niet alleen naar sociale woningbouw, maar ook naar vastgoedontwikkeling voor middenklassen. Het geld wat verzameld werd voor de pensioenfondsen kwam van verplichte storting van bedrijven en arbeiders. Met betrekking tot de FCP (Fundação da Casa Popular) is de kwestie wat complexer. De bouwindustrie zag de oprichting 133

van deze stichting als een super agent voor sociale woningbouw. De bouwindustrie was bang dat ze hun inkomsten monopoliseerden, inclusief de inkomsten van de IAPs en bij het aanvullen van het tekort bouwmaterialen, vooral cement. Waardoor het voor de private vastgoedontwikkelaars moeilijk werd woningen te bouwen voor de middenklasse. Zowel de IAPs als de FCP hadden als doel woningbouw mogelijk te maken, er was echter een essentieel verschil tussen de twee. De IAPs hadden als hoofddoel het pensioen van de leden te verzekeren, de functie van het bouwen was het secundaire doel, ook als een manier om winstgevendheid te waarborgen van de reserves van de instituten. Zo geeft ook Bosma aan hoe sociale stabiliteit verkregen kan worden uit huisvesting: ‘In the industrial Age, people no longer 134

build their own homes; in need of shelter, they must turn to the housing market. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the dwelling is a disposable product, like a car. On the contrary, the whole system of mortages and marketing has always been aimed at an inflationproof investment and long-term financing and provides, therefore, a certain degree of social stability.’112 De FCP had als enige doel het ontwikkelen van huisvesting voor de lage inkomens. De IAPs werden geconfronteerd met het lage rendement op investeringen in sociale woningen. Dit resulteerde in een enorm debat over de relevantie van deze investeringen, waarbij de reserves die nodig waren voor de betalingen van pensioenen verloren zouden

kunnen gaan. Uiteindelijk resulteerde dit debat in een aanzienlijke vermindering van de productie van sociale woningbouw door de IAPs, vooral na 1954. Ondanks protesten van vakbonden, politici en de pers, kozen de IAPs geleidelijk voor het bijna uitsluitend investeren in woningbouw voor de middenklasse met een hoge winstgevendheid. De inkomsten van de FCP waren beperkt. Het idee was dat de unie geld naar de FCP leidt door een heffing van één procent op alle vastgoedtransacties. Maar dit werd voorkomen door de regio’s. Daarnaast heeft de oppositie van de IAPs voorkomen dat de reserves van de IAPs voor de FCP werd gebruikt. De magere resultaten van de FCP weerspiegelt dit tekort. Ten slotte heeft de 112Bosm a,Koosetal.(2000).Housingforthe afwezigheid van strenge sociale M illions.John Habraken and theSAR (1960-2000). criteria om de terugwinning van de Rotterdam :NAIPublishers,p.17. investeringen te garanderen (in een

tijd van inflatie), de capaciteit van deze organismen om op te kunnen treden verminderd en uiteindelijk ook voorkomen. Hoewel de kwantitatieve uitdrukking van de productie van de organismen verminderd was, is het aandeel niet te verwaarlozen. Vooral in de meest actieve periode van de bouw portefeuilles van de IAPs (1946-1950) was de woningbouwproductie door de staat zeer significant. In Rio de Janeiro kwam het neer op 25 procent van alle ontroerend goed licenties tijdens deze periode. Waar volgens Bonduki wel rekening mee moet worden gehouden, is dat vóór deze initiatieven van de overheid er zo goed als niets gebouwd werd op het gebied van sociale woningbouw. Daarnaast waren er, in tegenstelling tot wat er in 1964 gebeurde met het ontstaan van BNH (Banco Nacional de Habitaҫao ofwel Nationonale

Bank voor huisvesting), er geen verplichte betalingen of belastingen specifiek gericht op de financiering van woningbouw geheven. Dit was wel het geval is bij FGTS (Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço ofwel het Braziliaanse pensioen fonds). Dus de productie van meer dan 140,000 woningen voor bijna één miljoen bewoners in grote steden door de IAPs en FCP alleen al, is daarom niet als teleurstellend te zien volgens Bonduki. Hij geeft aan dat zelfs zonder in te gaan op de kwalitatieve aspecten, er gezegd kan worden dat in de populistische periode de kwestie van huisvesting door de samenleving werd gezien

als een verantwoordelijkheid van de overheid.113 3.7 The quality of housing by the IAPs In tegenstelling tot de FCP, wat niets in São Paulo bouwde, hebben de IAPs wel kwaliteit in hun interventies kunnen afleveren. Ze vertegenwoordigden een gezicht wat bijna onbekend is van de moderne architectuur in Brazilië. Ze waren pioniers in organisaties die door de overheid werden gepromoot. Na 1964 gebeurde er van alles. Anders dan bij de BNH, waren veel van de woningen door de IAPs gerealiseerd in een gebied van verstedelijking wat al geconsolideerd was in die tijd. De 113Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012],p.724-726. 135

woningen hadden afmetingen die in overeenstemming kwamen met de behoeften van een werkende familie en ze waren vernieuwd vanuit een architectonisch en stedenbouwkundig oogpunt, waarbij verschillende rationalistische grondbeginselen werden toegepast en waarbij het concept van betaalbare huisvesting was toegepast. Dit alles met een grote invloed vanuit de volkshuisvesting in Europa uit die tijd, met sterke binding aan de moderne beweging waarbij oplossingen voor massaproductie werden bedacht en waarbij sociale voorzieningen in de clusters werden geïncorporeerd. Een aantal belangrijke aspecten van de woningbouw volgens Bonduki: * De introductie van gestandaardiseerde appartementenblokken voor meerdere families, van 136

verschillende verdiepingen, wat nieuw was voor de behuizing van productie arbeiders in Brazilië. Eerder werden verschillende typologieën gebouwd op basis van eengezinswoningen. * De introductie van verschillende oplossingen in het repertoire van de moderne architectuur, zoals kolommen, rationele en cartesiaanse plattegronden, het gebruik van het dak voor recreatieve activiteiten, de gevels vrijmaken van allerlei ornamentiek etc. *De kwaliteit, sterkte en de grootte van de gebouwde appartementen en huizen. De woningen waren ruim, goed gedetailleerd en zorgvuldig geconstrueerd. *De uitstekende resultaten op het gebied van ontwerp en constructie is ook te danken aan de participatie van architecten, die

actief hebben deelgenomen aan de ondernemingen. Een ander belangrijk veranderd aspect is volgens Bonduki de toegang tot de woning. Eerder werd eigenbezit gestimuleerd. Nu was dat anders, de sociale woningen werden verhuurd aan leden en bleven in het bezit van de IAPs. Dit was een gevolg van de bureaucratie van de IAPs, die mede-eigendom noodzakelijk achtten om uitputting van hun reserves te voorkomen. Hierdoor is deels de drang van de IAPs voor kwaliteit en duurzaamheid van de woonclusters te verklaren. In een land met hoge inflatie en een wet van huurprijzen wat huurverhogingen voorkwam, was de waarde verkregen uit de huur niet significant genoeg. Ook de leningen die werden gegeven om een huis te kopen of bouwen van de “casa própria” met

terugbetaling in vaste termijnen leverden een verwaarloosbaar rendement op de investeringen op, waardoor de reserves van de instituten kleiner werden. Onder deze omstandigheden was het verkrijgen van een woning of lening om een woning te kopen van de instituten, een voorrecht wat door het Ministerie van Arbeid was ontwikkeld waar de IAPs en FCP onder stonden. Doordat de instituten de investeringen die de afgelopen jaren waren gemaakt niet kon terug winnen, stopten ze met het bouwen van betaalbare woningbouw. Ze begonnen zich op meer winstgevende sectoren te richten. De IAPs hebben een belangrijke rol gespeeld in het financieren van corporaties die woningen verkochten aan de midden- en hogere klassen. Waardoor ze het renovatie- en vernieuwingsproces in de centrale gebieden in grote Braziliaanse

steden mogelijk maakten. De instituten hebben zich niet breed uitgewijd over het aantal eenheden wat is gefinancierd voor de middenklasse. Mede hierdoor werd de gedane sociale investering in twijfel getrokken door de vakbonden en de publieke opinie. Hierdoor werd een volledige beoordeling van de omvang van deze interventie voorkomen. Naast de stedelijke en architectonische relevantie van de projecten die mogelijk waren gemaakt door de IAPs, was het belang van de publieke actie het op gang brengen van een proces voor de productie van staat gesponsorde huisvesting. Dit toonde aan de ene kant op propagandistische wijze een overheid die de huisvestingscrisis wilde verzachten en tegelijkertijd voorbeeldige kwaliteitsnormen wilde vaststellen. Aan de andere kant markeert deze interventie van de overheid symbolisch het

moment dat de noodzakelijke last om het huisvestingsprobleem op te lossen wel degelijk bij de staat ligt. In het bijzonder, gezien de onvoldoende uitdrukking van deze productie, bij de arbeiders zelf.114 3.8 The absence of state intervention De wet op huurprijzen is niet alléén verantwoordelijk geweest voor de huisvestingscrisis van de jaren veertig. Volgens Bonduki zijn er twee belangrijke andere oorzaken geweest . Allereerst het verschuiven van de verantwoordelijkheid van betaalbare woningbouw van de private sector, naar de arbeiders en de overheid. Daarnaast door de 114Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012],p.726-729. 137

opkomst van nieuwe vormen van ontroerend goed projecten, zoals kantoorgebouwen en appartementen bedoeld voor verkoop aan bedrijven en mensen met hogere inkomens. De wet op huurprijzen was een instrument om dit transformatieproces in goede banen te laten lopen. Zoals al eerder aangegeven, was de situatie voor al behuisde arbeiders, die uitzetting waren ontlopen, niet verslechterd. Voor de nieuwe immigranten in São Paulo was het vinden van een betaalbare woning onmogelijk. Zo ontstonden er nieuwe huisvestingsalternatieven gebaseerd op de significante vermindering of zelfs verdwijning van periodieke betalingen voor behuizing: de sloppenwijk (“favela”) en de zelfgemaakte “casa própria” in perifere nederzettingen zonder stedelijke infrastructuur. De eerste 138

sloppenwijk van São Paulo en de toename van sloppenwijken in Rio de Janeiro vinden precies op het moment van de huisvestingscrisis plaats, in de vroege jaren veertig. Ze bezetten openbaar terrein en vangen uitgezette gezinnen, immigranten en nieuwkomers op. In tegenstelling tot in Rio de Janeiro, breiden de sloppenwijken pas op grote schaal in de jaren zeventig uit. Zowel als gevolg van sociale uitsluiting, als van het feit dat het alternatieve “casa própria” in perifere nederzettingen uitvoerbaar werd. Deze huisvestingsoplossing werd toen als beste gezien als antwoord op het proces van industriële expansie van São Paulo. De constructie van laag kostend woningbezit werd algemeen gezien als de beste manier voor huisvesting zonder een salaris verhoging te verwachten en het eigendom bij de arbeiders te houden. Waardoor er betere

stabiliteit aan het economische en politieke systeem werd gegeven. Het grote probleem was echter om toegang tot het terrein zelf in staat te stellen, zowel fysiek als financieel, waarbij de arbeiders grote offers moesten maken om zonder steun hun huis te bouwen. De wet van 1938, die de verwerving van land in termijnen regelde en garanties gaf aan de koper van het stuk land, was één van de belangrijke elementen in de uitbreiding van het perifere patroon als alternatief van volkshuisvesting. Tot dan toe was er nog geen grondmarkt specifiek voor volkshuisvesting. Deze grondmarkt zorgt sinds de jaren dertig voor aanmoediging voor arbeiders om hun eigen woning te maken, zo lag er bij aankoop van het stuk land al bouwmateriaal klaar. De enorme uitbreiding van de capaciteit van ontwikkelbaar gebied in São Paulo, maakte heel

lage prijzen voor de aankoop van percelen in afgelegen zones en pionierbezettingszones. De grootste problemen van deze nieuwe huisvestingsoplossing waren het gebrek aan transport en infrastructuur en moeilijkheden samengaand met het productieproces. Deze problemen vormden uiteindelijk niet onoverkomelijke obstakels voor de uitbreiding, doordat er totaal geen alternatieven voor uitbreiding werden geboden. De aspiratie van het bezitten van een huis, was uiteindelijk alleen maar mogelijk door zulke opofferingen. Zo zijn er tussen 1940 en 1950 ongeveer 100,000 nieuwe huizen gebouwd in São Paulo, gegroeid van 25 procent tot 37,5 procent van het aandeel van de totale huishoudens in de stad. De overheidinterventie bleef dit keer, in tegenstelling tot de kwestie van huur, bij het verzekeren van toegang tot het

eigendom aan de kopers van kavels. Het afwezige openbare bestuur laat volgens Bonduki lijken alsof er een akkoord was voor de uitbreiding van dit type volkshuisvesting als enige manier om te huisvestingscrisis te overwinnen. Zowel in de periferie als in de sloppenwijken was het idee van sociale woningbouw zo aanwezig. Niet als een positieve actie, maar als een excuus om elk type huisvesting te aanvaarden, omdat het de enige echte manier was om het probleem van het gebrek aan huisvesting aan te pakken.115

115Bonduki,NabilGeorges(1994).Origensda habitação socialno Brasil.[e-boek]Available at: [Consulted on July 4th 2012],p.729-730. 139