2014

Obsah / Content – Rexter 02/2014 ČLÁNKY / ARTICLES

CzechDefence League v kontextu antidžihádistického hnutí Czech Defence League in the Context of Counter-Jihad Movement

1

David Mrva

Is Israeli-Palestinian Conflict a Clash of Civilization? Samuel P. Huntington’s Theory Challenged.

20

Eva Taterová, Samuel Antwi Darkwah

Enemies among us: The anti-elitist and xenophobic discourses in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

42

Alena Kluknavská

Economic recources of Kadyrov´s regime Tomáš Šmíd

72

RECENZE / REVIEWS

Mareš, M., Výborný, J.: Militantní demokracie ve střední Evropě Michal Ševčík

Kraus, J. Íránský státní terorismus. Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, Brno, 2014. Martin Doleček

87

92

Rexter – časopis pro výzkum radikalismu, extremismu a terorismu Vydání: 02/2014| Více na www.rexter.cz

Czech Defence League v kontextu antidžihádistického hnutí Czech Defence League in the Context of Counter-Jihad Movement

Autor: David Mrva Email:[email protected]

Abstrakt This paper focuses on the czech group called Czech Defence League. The group is analyzed in the light of extremism theory and is compared with the broader couter-jihad movement. While we can see some local specifics of this group determined by different situation concerning the muslim population in the Czech Republic, Czech Defence League is in most respects typical counter-jihad group. Also, an approach of Czech Ministry of the Interior towards the CZDL is examined as an example of czech militant democracy.

Klíčová slova Czech Defence League, English Defence League, European Counter-Jihad Movement, new far right, islamophobia, CZDL, EDL, ECJM

1 Úvod Tato práce se věnuje české skupině Czech Defence League (CZDL). Toto občanské sdružení se svým názvem a projevy hlásí k širšímu hnutí, které můžeme 1


označit jako antidžihádistické hnutí1, za jehož hlavního a zároveň průkopnického představitele lze označit britskou English Defence League. Toto hnutí nabírá na významu v posledních letech a má své zástupce i v ČR, z nichž nejvýznamnější je právě CZDL. I přes relativně nízký význam této problematiky v ČR je zajímavé se podívat právě na tuto organizaci a její česká specifika a porovnat ji z hlediska mezinárodního kontextu. V práci bude zmíněn i postup Ministerstva vnitra České republiky, jakožto jediného zástupce české militantní demokracie, který nějakým způsobem existenci CZDL reflektuje. Důležitou součástí práce bude i zhodnocení této organizace z hlediska extremismu a termínu islamofobie. Cíle práce tedy jsou popis CZDL a její zhodnocení z hlediska extremismu obecně i tak, jak extremismus pojímá MVČR. A dále takézákladní zhodnocení této organizace z hlediska mezinárodního kontextu. V první části dojde k terminologickému vymezení, následně bude přestaveno antidžihádistické hnutí a CZDL. Na konci bude představen postup MVČR v rámci zpráv o extremismu.

2 Extremismus, islamofobie 2.1 Extremismus Extremismus lze vnímat jako něco, co stojí mimo rámec demokratického zřízení. Základní vlastnosti demokratického zřízení je možné charakterizovat Dahlovým konceptem polyarchie, což je systém, kde boj o vliv, moc a pozice je vykonáván mírovými prostředky. Pro tento systém je typická pluralita soutěžících politických stran a zájmových hnutí, institucionální mechanismy pro řešení sporů mezi majoritou a minoritou (volby, parlament atd.), mechanismy proti porušování práv jednotlivců vládou, možnost participace na politických záležitostech (svoboda slova, sdružování 1

Counter-Jihad Movement.

2


a shromažďování) a mechanismus kontroly moci mezi státními institucemi (Dahl 1971 via Backes 2007). Extremismus v tomto pojetí tedy míří k opaku výše uvedeného, tedy monokracii. Extremistické zřízení je takové, které netoleruje odlišné názory, neumožňuje participaci na vládě odlišným skupinám a je založeno na prosazování vlády jedné zájmové skupiny (srov. Backes 2007). Extremismus však není možné vnímat jako něco jednotného, ale spíše jako široký pojem zahrnující několik extremismů. Základním rozlišením extremismu může být jeho zasazení do pravolevého spektra politických ideologií a tedy rozlišení mezi pravicovým a levicovým extremismem. Sofistikovanější koncept nabízí Backes (2007), který pracuje s trojdimenzionální sférou politického extremismu s třemi osami (obr 1). Jde o osy definované následujícími póly: anarchie – totalitářství, extrémní rovnostářství – antirovnostářství a teokracie – nepřátelství vůči náboženství. Oblast demokracie je definována hranicí, která je v jisté vzdálenosti od středu. Za touto hranicí již jde o extremismus. Střed je tedy ideálním typem demokracie a systém, který by svými charakteristikami byl od středu vzdálený tak, že by překročil jistou mez, již není demokratický, ale extremistický. V kontextu této práce je podstatná především osa teokracie – nepřátelství vůči náboženství.

3


Obr. 1: Formy politického extremismu na trojdimenzionální sféře

Zdroj: Backes 2007: on-line text. V tuto chvíli máme obecně vymezenou problematiku extremismu a je možné přejít ke konkrétní pracovní definici, kterou používá Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, jež je také v současné době jediným představitelem české militantní demokracie, který nějakým způsobem na skupinu CZDL reaguje a do určité míry monitoruje její činnost. MVČR používá pro svoji činnost tuto pracovní definici: „Pojmem extremismus jsou označovány vyhraněné ideologické postoje, které

vybočují z ústavních, zákonných norem, vyznačují se prvky netolerance a útočí proti základním demokratickým ústavním principům, jak jsou definovány v českém ústavním pořádku. Mezi tyto principy patří: ·

úcta k právům a svobodám člověka a občana (čl. 1 Ústavy), 4


·

svrchovaný, jednotný a demokratický právní stát (čl. 1 Ústavy),

·

nezměnitelnost podstatných náležitostí demokratického právního státu (čl. 9 odst. 2 Ústavy),

·

svrchovanost lidu (čl. 2 Ústavy),

·

volná soutěž politických stran respektujících základní demokratické principy a odmítajících násilí jako prostředek k prosazování svých zájmů (čl. 5 Ústavy),

·

ochrana menšin při rozhodování většiny (čl. 6 Ústavy),

·

svoboda

a

rovnost

lidí

v

důstojnosti

a

právech,

nezadatelnost,

nezcizitelnost, nepromlčitelnost a nezrušitelnost základních práv a svobod bez rozdílu pohlaví, rasy, barvy pleti, jazyka, víry a náboženství, politického nebo jiného smýšlení, národního a sociálního původu, příslušnosti k národnosti nebo etnické menšině, majetku, rodu nebo jiného postavení (čl. 1, čl. 3 Listiny základních práv a svobod).“ (Portál MVČR 2010: on-line text, druhé zvýraznění autor) Výše uvedená definice odkazuje k českému ústavnímu pořádku jako výchozímu bodu pro hodnocení toho, co je a není extremismus. Pro potřeby této práce je klíčový poslední bod odkazující na práva, která se týkají víry a náboženství. V českém ústavním zřízení jsou tato práva ošetřena v Listině základních práv a svobod. MVČR se v souvislosti s náboženskými právy ve své pracovní definici odkazuje na článek 3 LZPS. Podrobněji jsou však tato práva formulována v čl. 15 odst. 1 LZPS: „Svoboda myšlení, svědomí a náboženského vyznání je zaručena. Každý má právo změnit své náboženství nebo víru anebo být bez náboženského vyznání.“

5


A pak také v čl. 16 LZPS: „(1) Každý má právo svobodně projevovat své náboženství nebo víru buď sám nebo společně s jinými, soukromě nebo veřejně, bohoslužbou, vyučováním, náboženskými úkony nebo zachováváním obřadu. (2) Církve a náboženské společnosti spravují své záležitosti, zejména ustavují své orgány, ustanovují své duchovní a zřizují řeholní a jiné církevní instituce nezávisle na státních orgánech. (3) Zákon stanoví podmínky vyučování náboženství na státních školách. (4) Výkon těchto práv může být omezen zákonem, jde-li o opatření v demokratické společnosti nezbytná pro ochranu veřejné bezpečnosti a pořádku, zdraví a mravnosti nebo práv a svobod druhých.“

2.2 Islamofobie Termín islamofobie není zcela nový a v různých významech existoval od roku 1925. V kontextu, ve kterém je dnes užíván a který je relevantní pro tuto práci, se používá zhruba od konce osmdesátých let. Je otázkou, zda se dá vystopovat autor tohoto termínu v současném významu, nicméně se dá říct, že jde o termín, kterým muslimové (oběti islamofobie) začali označovat postoj nemuslimů k nim (Allen 2010). Koncept islamofobie je dle Allena (2010) poměrně komplikovaný, není dokonale konceptualizován a jeho nejednotné užívání vede k pochybnostem, do jaké míry jde o koncept s reálným základem a jak moc je jeho užívání konzistentní. Je možné se ptát, zda není vhodné mluvit o více islamofobiích. Nebo zda je islamofobie zaměřená proti

6


muslimům (tedy lidem) či proti islámu (tedy náboženství) 2. Islamofobie je tedy vysoce problematický koncept, kterému chybí jednotná definice. Pro účely této práce bude zvolena definice Marka Čejky, která je pro potřeby této prácedostačující. Čejka (2010: on-line text) za islamofobii v základu považuje „předsudky, obavy, případně i nenávist k islámu a muslimům“.

3 Antidžihádistické hnutí Za hlavního představitele tohoto myšlenkového proudu lze označit English Defence League (EDL), proto jí bude věnována zvláštní pozornost. Na to naváže část věnující se širšímu hnutí působícímu v Evropě, které je organizací English Defence League silně ovlivňováno.

3.1 English Defence League EDL je organizací, která hrála a dodnes hraje významnou roli ve formování nového ideologického proudu, který se označuje jako antidžihádistické hnutí a který velice rychle nabral na popularitě po celém světě (především na Západě) po útocích 11. září a následujících útocích Al-Káidy v západní Evropě. Vznik organizace EDL se datuje k 27. červnu 2009. Podnětem k jejímu založení byla dlouhodobá situace ve městě Luton. Osmnáct procent obyvatel tohoto města byli muslimové. Po roce 2001 se objevily zprávy, že tři mladíci z Lutonu odcestovali do Afghánistánu, aby se připojili k Talibánu. Tato zpráva vyvolala obavy z reakce skupiny fanoušků místního fotbalového klubu. V čele této skupiny byl Tommy Robinson, jehož jméno později posloužilo jako pseudonym zakladatele EDL. Situace v Lutonu byla v té době velmi napjatá. Pro pochopení kontextu vzniku EDL je vhodné uvést, že oblast Lutonu byla označována jako ohnisko islámského radikalismu.

V

březnu 2009 místní

V tomto kontextu tedy někteří autoři preferují termíny jako antiislamismus nebo antimuslimismus (Allen 2010).

2

7


islamistická skupina nepřátelsky přivítala navrátivší se válečné veterány z Afghánistánu, kteří slavnostně pochodovali Lutonem, demonstrací a urážlivými hesly na plakátech. Na to většinový dav reagoval také velmi nepřátelsky a došlo ke střetu s onou asi dvacetičlennou skupinou islamistů. Mezi účastníky byli i někteří pozdější zakládající členové EDL. Tento incident motivoval několik patriotických hnutí ke společné participaci na demonstraci v Lutonu. Mezi hlavní organizace patřilyMarch of England a Welsch Defence League. V Lutonu došlo k sérii demonstrací, celá iniciativa byla hodně aktivní i na Facebooku a vše nakonec vyústilo ve vznik nového uskupení EDL (Copsey 2010). Jak uvádí Copsey (2010: 9) „původ EDL neleží na etablované nebo tradiční krajní pravici

(BNF,

NF)3,

ale

v několika

předtím

existujících

ultra

patriotických

‚antidžihádistických‘ organizacích, které se vyvinuly zevnitř fotbalové neformální subkultury během posledních let.“ Fotbalová subkultura, ze které EDL vychází, je typická selektivním rasismem, kdy toleruje lidi černé pleti (především díky černým fotbalistům v Premier League), ale je velmi rasistická vůči asiatům z jižní Asie, které všechny označuje jako Pakistánce4. Jde především o sociální hnutí, které jako hlavní nástroj používá masovou mobilizaci nebo hrozbu touto mobilizací. Její vznik je typickým příkladem tzv. kumulativního extremismu, kdy jeden typ extremismu (v tomto případě islamistický) způsobí společenskou polarizaci a vznik dalšího extremismu (Copsey 2010). Někteří autoři zdůrazňují jistou kontinuitu (ideologickou i personální) ve vývoji antidžihádismu v Británii. Především to, že EDL ve své podstatě navazuje na předchozí nárůst antidžihádismu a islamofobie v agendě Britské národní strany (BNP) a někteří členové BNP měli později jistý podíl na vzniku EDL(Meleagrou-Hitchens, Brun 2013). I přesto je takové pojetí značně problematické, jelikož EDL je v mnoha směrech v opozici vůči BNP. BNP je klasická krajněpravicová strana se svojí ultranacionalistickou 3

British National Party (BNP), National Front (NF).

8


a ultrakonzervativní agendou. EDL se od všech ostatních krajněpravicových proudů distancuje, a naopak zdůrazňuje svoji roli při sjednocení všech proti společnému nepříteli, kterým je islám. Tímto způsobem do sebe může začlenit a oslovit velice odlišné skupiny, jako jsou různá jinak diskriminovaná etnika a skupiny, včetně obětí tradiční krajní pravice, jako jsou černoši, Židé, homosexuálové atd. (Garland, Treadwell 2012). Podobně to pojímá i Allen, podle kterého EDL „udržuje ideologickou premisu, která je diskriminační, ale zároveň přitahuje typicky diskriminované“ (Allen 2011: 294). Na druhé straně i poslední vývoj v čele EDL naznačuje, že jistý (a pravděpodobně rostoucí) počet jejích příznivců je profilem podobný spíše tradiční krajní pravici a k EDL tito jedinci tíhnou díky jejímu úspěchu a schopnosti oslovit široké spektrum populace. V září 2013 rezignovali zakladatel a předseda Tommi Robbinson5 a druhý muž EDL Kevin Caroll z důvodu nárůstu extremismu v EDL, a to včetně nárůstu neonacistů mezi příznivci organizace (Quinn, Siddique 2013).

3.2 Evropské antidžihádistické hnutí EDL je organizace, která inspirovala mnoho podobných subjektů po celém světě. V poslední době existuje snaha koordinovat činnost v rámci evropského prostoru. Projevem tohoto jevu je například Memorandum porozumění, které je publikováno na stránkách EDL pod hlavičkou European Defence Leagues(Portál EDL 2013). V odborné literatuře se pro tento jev používá výraz Evropské antidžihádistické hnutí6 (ECJM). Jde o velmi volně organizované hnutí sdružující politické strany a sympatizující skupiny, využívající internet k vytvoření koherentního evropského proudu (MeleagrouHitchens, Brun 2013). Hovorově v originále „Pakis“. Vlastním jménem Stephen Yaxley-Lennon. Jak již bylo uvedeno, pseudonym si vybral podle jména pořadatele protiislámské demonstrace v Lutonu. 6 European Counter-Jihad Movement.

4 5

9


Mnoho z organizací, které jsou součástí ECJM, začínají přecházet z působení na internetu více do ulic, a to i přesto, že na rozdíl od EDL vychází z internetového prostředí a nemají předchozí zkušenosti s pouličními akcemi. Z ideologického hlediska lze obecně ECJM považovat za kulturněnacionalistické hnutí, považující islám za vnitřního nepřítele, který se plíživě snaží islamizovat Evropu a implementovat své hodnoty včetně práva Šaría. Problematická je především schopnost inspirovat svojí ideologií citlivé jedince, kteří jsou pak schopni páchat násilné činy (jako např. Anders Breivik). Pod ochrannými křídly tohoto hutí se mohou ukrývat tradiční formy pravicového extremismu, pro které to může znamenat cestu k legitimitě a tedy i vlivu. Nejasné hranice tohoto hnutí mu umožňují mít široký záběr přitahující širší populaci a potenciálně tedy mít poměrně velký potenciál destabilizovat společnost. Mezi hlavní mobilizační témata ECJM patří především halál maso, sexuální obtěžování ze strany muslimů a stavba mešit (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Brun 2013).

4 Czech Defence League (CZDL) CZDL je registrované občanské sdružení, vzniklé 25. srpna 2011. V České republice existuje i občanské sdružení s podobným názvem CzechDefense7League, které vzniklo 31. července 2012, což je důsledek konkurenční rivality mezi dvěma antiislámskými proudy v ČR, které jsou ve vzájemné při. Czech Defense League je založená Valentinem Kusákem, provozovatelem portálu Antimesita.eu. Organizací Valentina Kusáka se však v této práci zabývat nebudeme. Jeho organizace může být relevantní, nicméně na internetu není tak aktivní jako CZDL, která vyvíjí pravidelnou aktivitu na Facebooku i svých webových stránkách. Mimo internet Kusákova Czech Defense League není aktivní vůbec. CZDL vznikla původně okolo Facebookové skupiny Islám v České republice nechceme (IVČRN),

která má dnes přes 62 000 příznivců. Počet příznivců

Téměř totožný název s odlišností ve slově „Defense“, kde je použito písmeno s namísto „c“.

7

10


na Facebooku není indikátor, který bychom měli přeceňovat, ale přesto jistou vypovídající hodnotu má. Pro porovnání oficiální profil Dělnické strany sociální spravedlnosti má necelých 6 000 příznivců. Na druhé straně oficiální profil CZDL má pouze asi 1 000 příznivců, nicméně sama organizace považuje za hlavní komunikační zdroj právě stránku IVCRN (srov. IVCRN FB 2013, CZDL FB 2013, DSSS FB 2013). Kromě Facebooku je organizace aktivní také na dalších sociálních sítích, a to na Twitteru, Youtube a Google+. Tam však nemá zdaleka tolik fanoušků a s významem stránky IVCRN se tedy tato média srovnávat nemohou. Témata, která CZDL akcentuje, jsou srovnatelná s tématy, se kterými pracuje Evropské antidžihádistické hnutí. Velká pozornost je věnována halál masu. Na svých internetových stránkách CZDL informuje o tom, co to halál maso je, jak se vyrábí, kde se prodává a kdo ho vyrábí. Stručně je zde také zmíněna česká a evropská legislativa, která se tohoto produktu týká. CZDL zároveň na Facebooku spravuje stránku STOP HALAL CZ, která se věnuje výhradně tomuto tématu. Je zde patrná snaha využít „šokujících“ zpráv včetně videí a fotek z halál obřadů, kdy je zvíře zabito tak, že je mu bez předchozího omráčení podříznuta krční tepna a zvíře zemře na vykrvácení. To slouží jako prostředek pro ilustraci neslučitelných hodnot islámské kultury a její „zvrácené“ zvyky. Na druhé straně je zde i snaha o jistou konzistentnost, tudíž stránka sporadicky informuje i o srovnatelných praktikách zabíjení zvířat nemuslimy. Na webových stránkách či na Facebooku si zájemci mohou stáhnout letáky pro tisk nebo mohou zakoupit již hotové materiály, aby se mohli individuálně zapojit do této kampaně (Srov. STOP HALAL CZ 2013, Portál CZDL 2013). Dalším významným tématem jsou mešity. Na webových stránkách je seznam mešit a modliteben. CZDL dlouhodobě vystupuje proti budování dalších mešit a informuje o případných „hrozících“ výstavbách mešit. Specificky českým tématem je kampaň CZDL Naqba 2014. Naqba znamená arabsky „katastrofa“, což je ironický název poukazující na možnost, která vznikne 11


muslimské organizaci Ústředí muslimských obcí v září 2014; tedy deset let od její registrace. Registrovaná církev nebo náboženská společnost může podat návrh na přiznání oprávnění k výkonu zvláštních práv ke dni desetileté nepřetržité registrace (Zákon 3/2002 Sb § 11). V této kampani CZDL prezentuje uvedené zákonné právo jako skutečně katastrofickou možnost, která bude mít zásadní negativní dopady. V rámci této kampaně CZDL předvídá možné důsledky této situace jako nezákonné praktiky muslimů při obstarávání podpisů nutných k získání zvláštních práv, zneužívání možnosti náboženské výuky ve školách, možnost financování terorismu z daní občanů, domácí násilí na ženách, krytí teroristických aktivit a vražd duchovními aj. (CZDL nedatováno). Kromě těchto stálých kampaní komentuje CZDL aktuální dění týkající se islámu a muslimů v ČR i v zahraničí. Z poslední doby lze zmínit několik mediálních kauz, které CZDL nějakým způsobem reflektovala. Například výbuch, při kterém zahynul palestinský velvyslanec a následná kauza ohledně zbraní v jeho domě, kauza dvou muslimských dívek, které opustily střední zdravotnickou školu kvůli nemožnosti nosit zde na hlavě šátek (hidžáb), což považovaly za diskriminační, zaměřené proti muslimům a porušující jejich náboženská práva. Další kauzou z posledních dnů byl i nedávný vandalismus na brněnské mešitě. V souvislosti s již uvedeným výbuchem došlo před palestinskou ambasádou k demonstraci proti „palestinským muničním skladům“. Je otázka, zda lze organizaci této demonstrace připisovat přímo CZDL, ale minimálně určitá část účastníků je s organizací CZDL propojená. Reportování o této demonstraci lidskoprávní aktivistkou Ingrid Romancovou vyvolalo velkou nevoli v internetové diskuzi pod jejím článkem o této demonstraci. Tato diskuze však pokračovala i na Facebookové stránce Romancové. Této diskuze se zúčastnil mimo jiné i Martin Konvička, jeden z představitelů CZDL. Vzájemná výměna názorů se neobešla bez osobních útoků. Oba účastníci v průběhu diskuze zjistili, že působí na stejné univerzitě (Konvička jako vyučující, Romancová jako studentka). Celou událost nakonec řešil děkan Přírodovědecké fakulty Jihočeské 12


univerzity a k celé záležitosti se vyjádřil i rektor Jihočeské Univerzity (Demonstrace proti palestinským muničním skladům v Praze 2014, Portál JCU 2014). Celá záležitost byla medializována a stala se předmětem reakcí ze strany zastánců Konvičky i Romancové (viz Týden 2014, viz Lhoťan 2014, viz Cajthamlová 2014). Spor vedený formou internetové diskuze byl do značné míry vyvolán nevolí představitelů a sympatizantů CZDL k označení této organizace za extremistickou. CZDL toto označení odmítá, a naopak argumentuje tím, že islám je formou extremismu. Zároveň deklaruje, že „CZDL prosazuje nenásilný odpor k islámu za využití prostředků vycházejících zejména z práva na svobodu projevu, práva shromažďovacího a dalších legálních prostředků“ (CZDL 2014: on-line text).Naproti tomu však stojí prohlášení některých předních představitelů o tom, že možné řešení problematiky islámu a muslimů v Evropě je jejich šikana, jakožto prostředek k vymýcení islámu z Evropy (Martin Konvička / Petr Pelikán – boj s islamizací v ČR – Debatní klub 2014).

4.1 Srovnání s širším antidžihádistickým hnutím Při porovnání s výše uvedeným ECJM se dá říct, že CZDL se zatím liší tím, že nepřekročila svůj virtuální stín a neprojevuje se mimo internet. Za jistou výjimku lze považovat demonstraci namířenou proti přítomnosti zbraní na palestinské ambasádě a v domě ambasadora. Ideologie, argumentace a mobilizační témata jsou velmi podobná. Oproti ECJM se CZDL zabývá situací, která vychází ze specificky českého právního prostředí, a to je její kampaň Naqba 2014. Sexuální obtěžování ze strany muslimů v ČR není mobilizačním tématem, jelikož tento jev v ČR pravděpodobně neexistuje a tudíž není mediálně reflektován.

13


Naopak CZDL následuje své západní vzory ve svém potenciálu zaujmout širokou škálu skupin. Takže na Facebooku můžeme najít i tzv. divize CZDL, které kromě různých českých měst zastupují i Židy, křesťany, hnutí LGBT8a Romy (CZDL 2014). V porovnání

s EDL

nevychází

CZDL

z prostředí

fotbalových

chuligánů,

což částečně vysvětluje i její neaktivitu na ulicích. Na druhé straně mnoho jiných evropských antidžihádistických subjektů má podobné pozadí vzniku, a přesto se v nedávné době začaly na ulicích projevovat. ČR však oproti mnoha jiným evropským státům prakticky nemá s muslimskou komunitou problémy. Ostatně muslimská komunita je v ČR velice malá. To je také důvodem, proč se krajní pravice na tomto tématu neprofiluje a CZDL se tedy v současné době nemůže stát organizací, která bude krajněpravicové proudy spojovat. Hlavním mobilizačním tématem krajní pravice je romská problematika. Podporovatelé CZDL na Facebooku jsou spíše pasivní a je otázkou, do jaké míry jejich virtuální sympatie (označení „like“) skutečně odráží jejich přesvědčení a do jaké míry se s ideologií CZDL ztotožňují, případně do jaké míry ji vůbec znají. Na druhé straně problematika islámu je poměrně citlivé téma a možnost budoucí mobilizace není rozumné podceňovat, i když v porovnání s jinými evropskými státy je potenciál větší mobilizace v ČR dost malý.

4.2 CZDL a Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky CZDL oprávněně není středem zájmu státních orgánů, které jsou součástí české militantní demokracie. Její existence si všímá pouze Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, a to jen okrajově ve čtvrtletních zprávách o extremismu konkrétně pro 1. čtvrtletí 2013 a 4. čtvrtletí 2012, a pak také ve Zprávě o extremismu a projevech rasismu a xenofobie Hnutí zastupující zájmy leseb, gayů, bisexuálů a transgender osoby.

8

14


na území české republiky v roce 2011, vyhodnocení plnění koncepce boje proti extremismu pro rok 2011 a koncepce boje proti extremismu pro rok 2012. Nejvýznamnější je pozornost ministerstva ve zprávě o extremismu pro 1. čtvrtletí 2013, kde si všímá aktivit CZDL v rámci kauzy učitelky mateřské školky, která konvertovala k islámu a rozhodla se nosit na hlavě šátek (MVČR 2013). Působení MVČR vůči CZDL si však vyžaduje krátký komentář. První zmínka o CZDL je uvedena ve Zprávě o extremismu pro 4. čtvrtletí 2012. V této zprávě byl původně stručný odstavec, kde byla CZDL uvedena v kontextu s EDL. Za jejího předsedu byl však chybně označen Valentin Kusák, který je představitelem konkurenčního projektu. Po reakci CZDL došlo ke změně této zprávy a celý odstavec zmizel. Výše uvedené zprávy MVČR, kde se CZDL objevuje, paralelně zmiňují i Czech Defense League Valentina Kusáka a mezi oběma organizacemi rozlišují, byť organizaci CZDL občas zmiňují pouze v poznámce pod čarou (srov. CZDL 2014, srov. Lhoťan 2014, srov MVČR 2013). Z hlediska pracovní definice MVČR, která je uvedená v první kapitole, je možné označit CZDL za příklad extremistické organizace, minimálně kvůli některým projevům; to se týká například kampaně Naqba 2014, která je otevřeně islamofobní a je spojena s nepodloženými předpoklady a obviněními. Dalším případem extremistických projevů jsou některé výroky čelných představitelů (viz kap. 3). Lze ji tedy označit za extremistickou z hlediska pracovní definice MVČR, ale také za islamofobní na základě Čejkova pojetí a nepřátelskou vůči náboženství dle pojetí Backese.

5 Závěr Tato práce se věnovala organizaci CZDL, která je zajímavým subjektem v rámci českého politického prostředí. CZDL byla zkoumána z hlediska obecných konceptů extremismu a také z hlediska konkrétního pojetí extremismu, které využívá MVČR jako

15


aktér české militantní demokracie. Dále byl zachycen mezinárodní kontext a zahraniční organizace, které jsou pro CZDL a její působení vzorem. CZDL je možné považovat za představitele specifického krajněpravicového extremismu, který v posledních letech nabírá na popularitě (především v Evropě) a který je zaměřený proti islámu a muslimům. Česká republika je státem s velmi malou muslimskou komunitou, přesto je CZDL velice aktivní organizací, i když pouze na internetu. I mnohé zahraniční organizace začínaly pouze na internetu, ale pak svou činnost přesunuly do ulic. V českém prostředí je však mobilizační potenciál CZDL omezený, protože zde prakticky nelze zaznamenat problémy s muslimskou komunitou, které existují například v západní Evropě nebo Skandinávii. Přesto se dá očekávat, že CZDL bude stále aktivním subjektem, i když její činnost zůstane pravděpodobně velmi omezená.

16


6 Zdroje Allen, C. 2010. Islamophobia. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate. Allen, C. 2011. Opposing Islamification or promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the English Defence League.Patterns Of Prejudice: č. 45, s. 279–294. Backes, U. 2007. Meaning and Forms of Political Extremism. Středoevropské politické studie: č. 9, s. 242–262. Cajhamlová, T. Islám zatemňuje rozum. Především nemuslimům. [on-line] Dostupné

z:

http://cajthamlova.blog.respekt.ihned.cz/c1-61606600-islam-zatemnuje-

rozum-predevsim-nemuslimum, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Copsey, N. 2010. The English Defence League: Challenging our Country and our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness and Equality. Faith Matters. [on-line] Dostupný z WWW:

http://faith-matters.org/images/stories/fm-reports/english-defense-league-

report.pdf, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Czech Defence League (CzDL FB). 2013. In: Facebook. [on-line] Dostupné z: https://www.facebook.com/CzechDefenceLeague, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Czech Defence League (CZDL). CZDL a „extremismus“. [on-line] Dostupné z: http://www.czdl.cz/czdl-a-extremismus/, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Czech Defence League. (nedatováno). Naqba 2014. [on-line] Dostupné z: http://www.czdl.cz/kampane/naqba-2014/, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Čejka, M.Islamofobie, antisemitismus, antiarabismus – pokus o definici a jak spolu tyto

tři

pojmy

souvisejí.[on-line]

Dostupné

z:

http://blizky-

vychod.blogspot.cz/2010/12/islamofobie-antisemitismus.html, ověřeno ke dni 26.2.2014

17


Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti (DSSS FB). In: Facebook. [on-line] Dostupné

z:

https://www.facebook.com/pages/Dělnická-strana-sociální-

spravedlnosti/197466333678437, ověřeno ke dni 9. 1. 2014 Demonstrace proti palestinským muničním skladům v Praze. In: Facebook. [online]

Dostupné

z:

https://www.facebook.com/events/469786359798654/?source=1,

ověřeno ke dni 9. 1. 2014 Garland, J. - Treadwell, J. 2012. The New Politics of Hate? An Assessment of the Appeal of the English Defence League Amongst Disadvantaged White Working- Class Communities in England. Journal Of Hate Studies: č. 10, s. 123–141. Islám v České republice nechceme (IVCRN FB). (2013). In: Facebook . [on-line] Dostupné z: https://www.facebook.com/ivcrn?ref=hl, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Konvička M. - Pelikán, P.: Boj s islamizací v ČR - Debatní klub. In. Youtube. [online] Dostupné z: http://youtu.be/fRjbri5d1cg, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Lhoťan, L. Ministerstvo vnitra ČR:Kritika islámu je projevem extremismu. [on-line] Dostupné z: http://eurabia.parlamentnilisty.cz/Articles/8608-ministerstvo-vnitra-cr-kritikaislamu-je-projevem-extremismu-.aspx, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Lhoťan, L. Skandál na univerzitě: učitel vyhrožoval studentce, anebo naopak? [online] Dostupné z: http://lukaslhotan.blog.idnes.cz/c/392873/Skandal-na-univerzite-ucitelvyhrozoval-studentce-anebo-naopak.html, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Listina základních práv a svobod Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. – Brun, H. A Neo-Nationalist Network: Defence League and

The English

Europe’s Counter-Jihad Movement. [on-line] Dostupné z:

http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ICSR-ECJM-Report_Online.pdf, ověřeno ke dni 9. 1. 2014

18


Portál English Defence League.Memorandum of Understanding.[on-line] Dostupné z: http://www.englishdefenceleague.org/european-defence-leagues/, ověřeno ke dni 9. 1. 2014 Portál Jihočeské Univerzity (JCU). Stanovisko univerzity k výrokům docenta Martina Konvičky. Dostupné z: http://www.jcu.cz/news/stanovisko-jihoceske-univerzity-kvyrokum-docenta-martina-konvicky, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Portál

Ministerstva

vnitra

České

republiky.

[on-line]

Dostupné

z:

http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/bezpecnostni-hrozby337414.aspx?q=Y2hudW09NA%3d%3d, ověřeno ke dni 9. 1. 2014 Portál Ministerstva vnitra České republiky. Co je extremismus. [on-line] Dostupné z: http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/co-je-extremismus.aspx, ověřeno ke dni 9. 1. 2014 Siddique, H. – Quinn, B.EDL: Tommy Robinson and deputy Kevin Carroll quit far right

group.

[on-line]

Dostupné

z:

http://www.theguardian.com/uk-

news/2013/oct/08/tommy-robinson-english-defence-league, ověřeno ke dni 9. 1. 2014 STOP

HALAL

CZ.

In:

Facebook.

[on-line]

Dostupné

z: https://www.facebook.com/StopHalalcz, ověřeno ke dni 9. 1. 2014 Týden. Škola se distancuje od docenta. Píše proti islámu. [on-line] Dostupné z: http://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/skola-se-distancuje-od-docenta-pise-protiislamu_295215.html#.UwubW8EeqCk, ověřeno ke dni 26. 2. 2014 Zákon 3/2002 Sb.

19


Is Israeli-Palestinian Conflict a Clash of Civilization? Samuel P. Huntington’s Theory Challenged.

Eva Taterová, Samuel Antwi Darkwah Email: [email protected], [email protected]

Abstract Soon after being published, the theory of the clash of civilizations presented by established American professor Samuel P. Huntington aroused the unprecedented discussion. Despite all, more or less legitimate objections that can stand against Huntington's theory, its impact on politics is at least in some cases indisputable. This article aims to analyze a statement whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be classified as a clash of civilization, or more precisely a fault line war, working with a definition that American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington introduced in his famous book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). The authors of the article use the example of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and examine the individual criteria of the fault line wars designed by Huntington. Those criteria are following: the geographic proximity of two different civilizations, different religions and cultures, separate social structures and the historical memories of both societies. Finally, based on the analysis of these criteria the authors introduce their conclusions. They deny Huntington’s statement claiming that Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of a fault line war, and thus they propose some revisions of clash of civilizations theory.

20


Abstrakt Brzy po svém zveřejnění renomovaným americkým profesorem Samuelem P. Huntington vyvolala teorie o střetu civilizací do té doby nevídanou diskuzi. Navzdory všem více či méně podloženým výhradám vůči Huntingtonově teorii je možné konstatovat, že její vliv na politiku je minimálně v některých případech nezpochybnitelný. Cílem tohoto článku je prověřit tvrzení, zda je izraelsko-palestinský konflikt možné klasifikovat jako střet civilizací – respektive konflikt na zlomové linii – tak jej ve své známé knize Střet civilizací: Boj kultur a proměna světového řádu (1996) definuje autor knihy americký politolog Samuel P. Huntington. Autoři článku využívají příklad izraelsko-palestinského konfliktu pro prověření jednotlivých kritérií válek na zlomové linii, tak jak je definuje Huntington. Tato kritéria jsou následující: geografická blízkost dvou odlišných civilizací, rozdílná náboženství a kultury, oddělená společenská uspořádání a historická paměť obou společností. Na základě analýzy těchto faktorů autoři prezentují dosažené závěry, které odmítají klasifikaci izraelsko-palestinského konfliktu jako války na zlomové linii, a navrhují revizi vybraných bodů Huntingtonovy teorie.

Keywords Samuel P. Huntington, clash of civilizations, fault line conflict, Israel, Palestine, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Middle East.

Klíčová slova Samuel P. Huntington, střet civilizací, konflikt na zlomové linii, Izrael, Palestina, křesťanství, islám, judaismus, Blízký východ.

21


1 Introduction Soon after being published1, the theory of the clash of civilizations presented by established American professor Samuel P. Huntington aroused the unprecedented discussion. In the context of the renaissance of idealism in the first years after the end of the Cold War and the proclaimed visions of better tomorrows2, the theory predicting the escalation of conflicts in the world seemed to be too apocalyptic. Huntington’s critics often mention his intentional misinterpretation of certain phenomena and excessive emphasis on the qualitative superiority of West over the other civilizations. This is closely linked to the accusations of racism, particularly in the context of author’s other publications such as Who are we? – The Challenges to America National Identity (Huntington 2004) and Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World (Berge, Huntington 2002) where he presents his preference of Western civilization based on Christian-Jewish cultural tradition. Concerning the inner American debate he calls for maintaining the traditions of WASP3 (Fuentes 2004: 77-81). Simultaneously, despite all, more or less legitimate objections that can stand against Huntington's theory, its impact on politics is at least in some cases indisputable. The attitude of American neo-conservatives towards the issues such as immigration or conflicts in some regions of the world can serve as very concrete evidence. These trends influenced quite significantly the administrative of former American president George W. Bush who cooperated closely with people such as Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld who are well-known for their neo-conservative or conservative attitudes (Halter, Clarke 2004). 1

At first it was published as an article in Foreign Affairs in 1993, later in 1996 the author extended the core ideas into a book. 2 A good example of such a worldview is a famous book of Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama 1992). 3 WASP = White Anglo-Saxon Protestants.

22


Therefore there is no doubt that the book that former US Secretary of the State Henry A. Kissinger described as one of the most important publications after the end of the Cold War has its place in the contemporary theories of international relations. Due to its impact on the decision-making processes in some places of this world, this theory is certainly worth further analysis. The aim of this study, however, is to challenge only one of its sub-theses, on which Huntington's theory is based and to revise the author’s view on regional affairs in the Middle East. The prior attention will be paid to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which Huntington has declared as one of the current examples of so called fault line wars(Huntington 1996: 254-255). This study aims to examine that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be classified as a fault line war as defined by Samuel P. Huntington. The attempts to challenge Samuel P. Huntington’s theory have appeared since the publication of the first article about the clash of civilizations. Many authors have tried to apply Huntington’s theory to the reality of Middle East. Jonathan Cook made a research resulting in a book Israel and the Clash of Civilizations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan To Remake the Middle East (Cook 2008). Mohammed Ayoob has been one of the most prominent critics of Samuel P. Huntington’s since the early 1990s. He summarized his objections against clash of civilizations theory in the article Was Huntington Right? Revisiting the Clash of Civilizations (Ayoob 2012). Sara Silvestri denied the main thesis of Huntington’s theory in her article Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations? (Silvestri 2006). All of these authors focused on selected topics of Huntington’s theory, however, none of them has been analyzing the issue of fault line war in terms of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The aim of this article is to focus on this particular issue, and thus, to provide new original conclusions regarding clash of civilizations theory.

23


Methodologically the research is anchored on the basis of empirical-analytic approach, based mainly on analysis of primary and secondary sources. The method of falsification will be applied – in other words if at least one of the criteria that Huntington uses for his thesis about the fault line wars will not be fulfilled in case of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this conflict cannot be qualified as a clash of civilizations. In terms of methodology, this article shall be seen as a preliminary study and survey. Thus, descriptions of the discussed issues shall be the main method that is used. The available primary and secondary sources of literature will be studied and analyzed. The historical research methods will be used. If possible, the examples of specific events will be demonstrated in order to explain the specific features of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of Huntington’s theory.

2 Clash of Civilizations Theory 2.1 Definitions of Civilizations and Their Clashes The core idea of Samuel P. Huntington’s theory is a division of the contemporary world to eight or nine civilizations, each of which has a unique understanding of its own identity. The crucial role in establishing any civilization is given, at least at the beginning of the whole process, to religion. Huntington defines civilization as the broadest cultural entity or using his own words it is "[...] the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people […]“(Huntington 1996: 43). At the same time the author acknowledges that the boundaries between civilizations are often unclear. These boundaries are changing with time, which is a clear indicator of the various development stages, each of which a civilization must necessarily go through during its existence. These development stages can be 24


described as following: firstly the birth of a new civilization, then its rise which is usually followed by the effort to establish the universal state and to promote its own values as universal. Finally, the accumulation of problems will bring the civilization to its demise (Huntington 1996: 43-44). Taking in mind the features of contemporary world, Huntington, despite all the uncertainties, tends to agree with the division of the world into nine major civilizations. These civilizations are as follows: African, Buddhist, Sinic, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Latin American, Orthodox and Western. For the purpose of this study further attention will be given to Islamic civilization (as the membership of Palestinians in this civilization is undeniable), and Western civilization in which the modern State of Israel is included within a broader understanding of Christian-Jewish cultural tradition.4 The core of Huntington's theory is the forecast of the future global conflict when non-Western civilizations shall fight against the Western alliance. This author assumes that the Western civilization has already reached its zenith andinevitably it is going to decline. This process of decline can take several centuries but the probable future scenario is quite obvious. The future war of civilizations will be fought between the two dominant alliance blocks. In general, Huntington expects that Latin American and Orthodox civilization which cultural traditions are based on Christianity would join Western alliance.5 The most probable rival of this alliance is supposed to be Sino-Islamic alliance. Of course, it is questionable whether the balance of power in any eventual 4

This is an interesting paradox as most part of the history, the Jews were supposed to have a fairly different culture which did not fit into the Christian world. Nowadays, some researchers prefer to speak about the independent Jewish civilization where of course, Israel is the central state (Schnell 2005: 560-573). 5 At the same time many authors deny this assumption as they see especially the position of Russia as very ambivalent. Looking at the issue from geopolitical point of view, the history shows that for most of its history Russia has been divided into two different approaches. One of them is pro-western while the other prefers the Euro-Asian membership of the country (Trenin 2002).

25


inter-civilization war could exactly be like that, but the opposition between Islamic civilization and West is considered as a long-term trend (Huntington 1996: 55).

2.2 Islamic Civilization The existence of Islamic civilization is accepted by majority of authors dealing with this issue. At the same time, most of them admit that in comparison to other civilizations there are certain features that need to be examined carefully. Historical development and geographical expansion of this civilization are well documented. The roots of Islam are closely associated with the personality of Prophet Muhammad dated back to the turn of the sixth and seventh century AD. During the following centuries, Islam was spread more or less worldwide. Currently the key religions of Islam are North Africa, Middle East and Central Asia. After several "dark centuries" when Muslims could only watch the rise of Western civilization and its political, economic, technological and military superiority, the 20th century brought about a wave of Islamic revival. According to Huntington, the apparent appearance of this Islamic renaissance is based on anti-Western distinction: "[...] the components of this process are: the adoption of modernity, rejection of Western culture and an inclination to Islam as a guide for life in the modern world [...]"(Huntington 1996: 174). The core problem of Islamic civilization is the lack of a central state or religious authority, which would manage the decision-making process effectively. That is why there is no central authority in the Islamic world that could formulate a clear view of all Muslims. Unlike the other civilizations, the primary role does not belong to the nation states, but rather to family structures, tribe and kinship on the first level and civilization and religion on secondary level (Huntington 1996: 211). It is assumed that even the modern Arab states are a product of the colonial age and in fact, they are not very coherent in terms of inner stability and cohesion. When such a problem is apparent 26


at the level of the individual states, it is possible to admit the existence of the Islamic civilization is questionable? The other issue is the inconsistency of Islam as there are several major denominations6 that have great rivalry against each other. Muslim states have tried to overcome this problem by creating the transnational organizations such as the Islamic Conference,

the

World

Muslim

Congress

and

the

Muslim

World

League.

The effectiveness of those organizations is rather questionable. The problem is that they are not recognized by all Muslim states as there is an enduring suspicion that these organizations shall only serve as a tool in getting regional hegemony for some of the member states and therefore their attempts to unite all Muslims of the world have not succeeded so far (Huntington 1996: 209-211). In principle, all authors agree that Palestinians are rightful members of the Islamic civilization even though some controversial issues still exists, e.g. the existence of the significant Christian community among Palestinians. There is also the issue of Palestinian Diaspora as a significant number of Palestinians lives outside the borders of Islamic civilization. In some cases, their assimilation to the new cultural environment was so successful that even though, those people might still feel as a part of Palestinian nation, internally they do not feel as part of Islamic civilization anymore. Palestinian nation was established due to the common experience of suffering that resulted in their departure from the home country (Kimmerling 1993).Generally speaking, if we accept the definition of Samuel P. Huntington, there are no major objections why Palestinians should not be included into Islamic civilization.

6

The main distinction is of course between the Sunni and Shias but there are also the other groups such as Wahhabists or Druses.

27


2.3 Western Civilization The Western civilization is even more difficult to define than the Islamic civilization. Huntington admits this problem and puts an emphasis on the importance of religion. Despite all the internal incoherence of so called countries of the West he claims the tradition of Western Christianity to be a determining factor (Huntington 1996: 43). On a wider scale, this tradition can be more extended into Christian-Jewish cultural stream that would include the State of Israel7. Obviously the concept of Western civilization is not geographically, historically and culturally entirely accurate. Generally, it is used for description of cultural entities in Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and in a lesser extent other regions of the world formally colonized by European powers. Historically, the birth of Western civilization dates back to 7thand 8thcentury AD. During the following centuries, the Western civilization stayed qualitatively behind the other contemporary civilizations. It was the era of Renaissance that initiated the trends such as the development of science resulting into a rapid technology progress. The new attitude to life in general and the new inventions in particular, enabled the so called “Age of Discovery” later resulting in colonialism (Korecki et al 2010). According to Huntington, Western civilization reached its peak in the first half of 20 th century when the Western powers controlled more than 80% of Earth's surface. It should be emphasized that, the Western powers were able to dominate their colonies thanks to violence, power and technology but not the superiority of western philosophy, values or religion (Huntington 1996: 4648). The key features of Western civilization according to Huntington are the following: the Classical legacy, Western Christianity both Catholicism and Protestantism, the separation of spiritual and temporal authority, rule of law and representative 7

The problems of this qualification are explained above.

28


democracy, a use of wide variety of European languages, social pluralism and individualism. These features can certainly be more or less the same characteristics for other civilizations as well, but this concrete combination is typical for Western civilization only (Huntington 1996: 69-71). The question is whether these criteria can be applied to the contemporary State of Israel. Obviously Israel’s main religion is not Western Christianity but Judaism. The official language is Hebrew which doesn’t belong to Indo-European group of languages but it is of Semitic origin. Nevertheless Israel fulfills the other conditions quite well. It is generally agreed that in 1948 the State of Israel was established on the ideas of secular Zionism. Some compromises had to be done to get the support of religious Jews such as Shabbat, dietary laws and especially the issue of social status like marriage, divorce and burial which are till today more or less under the rule of religious authorities. Despite these specifics, the political regime in Israel is still supposed to be quite close to the model of Western democracies.8 The secular nature of Israel is sometimes questioned because of the influence of Judaism on Israeli politics. Obviously the religious parties such as Shas or United Torah Judaism have a considerable influence in Israeli Parliament (Knesset) and their voices are often decisive for forming the coalitions. At the same time, it is necessary to point out that the largest parliamentary parties such as Likud, Kadima, Yisrael Beiteinu and the Labor Party are of secular nature (Katz 2008: 43-63; Kopelowitz 2010: 166-190). Looking closely at the history of Israeli political system, the tradition of pluralism and representative democracy is of no doubts. The membership of Israel to Western civilization is sometimes supposed to be due to the political, social and cultural 8

According to Democracy Index 2010 made by the Economist Intelligence Unit Israel obtained the 37th position out of 167 states which is the best position in Middle East.The research was focused on Israeli citinzens only – Palestinians were in a special cathegory.(Economist Intelligence Unit 2010).

29


heritage of Ashkenazy Jews9 who had a decisive influence on structure in the first decades of the new established state.

3 Fault Line Wars Huntington assumes that the most important indicators of the future clash of civilizations are so called faultline wars which are possible to observe in certain regions of the world today. They are regional wars that begin as an internal problem within a state or region. However the participants of the conflict aim to present the problem as a major issue of the whole civilization. In most cases, both sides of the conflict tend to rely on the help from their own civilization members. This effort results in so called syndrome of allied countries which at first instance seem to be insignificant regional crises

but

eventually

attract

more

global

attention

and

serve

as effective tools for strengthening the civilization identities (Huntington 1996: 291-292). The features of fault line wars conflicts are as follows: the proximity of two different civilizations, religions and different cultures, separate social structures and historical memories of both sides (Huntington 1996: 291). Based on these criteria of fault line wars it is now possible to examine Huntington’s theory in the light of Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

3.1 The Geographic Proximity of Two Different Civilizations The geographic proximity of these two civilizations, as defined by Huntington, is undeniable. The State of Israel has a long-term dispute with Palestinians over the territory which began more than 60 years ago. These quarrels about the division of the country have caused a strong hostility between these two nations (Morris 2001). 9

The Jews who came to Israel from the countries of the West.

30


However, a detailed analysis of the conflict since 1948 shows that there are some factors that do not fit to Huntington's theory very well. First of all, it is clear that the conflict between the State of Israel and Palestinians is based primarily on the principles of nationalism. It seems to be quite obvious that Palestinian would fight against anyone who comes to settle in their territory. At the same time the determination of Jews to establish their own state had a strong reason to fight hard to achieve their goals (Herzl 1946). Therefore it is quite predictable that even if the location of modern Israel was not in Palestine but for example in Argentina or Uganda10 and they were opposed by the local inhabitants the same situation would have happened. Both nations seek to have their own state, but in principle they do not refuse the existence of the ethnic minorities of both sides. Even though the vision of the united state where Jews and Arabs would live and rule together seems more or less like Utopia right now, but if the Arab-Israeli conflict should be solved one day, the two sides will need to come to a compromise in their demands.To confirm what is already mentioned, there is an example of

significant Arab community living within Israeli territories.

Instead of being regarded as “beta-Israelis” they rather obtained Israeli citizenship. Even though there is the obvious social inequality, legally they have full citizenship rights. At the same time any proposed plan of the future Palestinian state must take into account that, there would be a Jewish minority living in Palestinian territories (Chapman 2002: 77). The proposals to deal with such situations are various. In general, all Arab leaders try to avoid the accusation of anti-Semitism. Even the most radical Palestinian leaders prefer to explain their hostility to the Jews on the basis of territorial dispute rather than the intolerance to different ethnic groups described by Huntington as civilization. 10

Originally, these options were discussed by the Zionist movement as well.

31


The core of the dispute is the problem of dividing the territory of historic Palestine between the Jews and the Arabs. If the two-state solution prevails in the end, there is no empirical evidence forecasting that the war between these two states would continue since they belong to different civilizations. Israel's relations with Egypt and Jordan also had their ups and down in the second half of the 20th century but after the peace agreements were reached, there seems to be enduring peace between these countries. These prevailing relations can sometimes be characterized as relatively cold, but certainly not very hostile. Thisis not the only historical example in this world as France and Germany experienced the same situation in the period from the late 19 th century to the first half of 20th century. The situation improved after the Second World War when both countries became members of the European Economic Community presently the European Union. In this sense, there is a hope that a similar process could also work for Israel and the Palestinians.

3.2 Different Religions and Cultures Judaism and Islam are obviously two different religions, but at the same time it must be remembered that they share many similar principles. Islam recognizes Judaism as well as Christianity as its predecessor. They are all sometimes called religions of the book which refers to the fact that many Bible characters are recognized by all these religions. Simultaneously, both Judaism and Islam put extra emphasis on similar dietary habits and lifestyle. In the background of Israeli-Palestinian conflict it seems that religion does not play the most important role, with a significant exception of the ultra-radical groups on both sides whose impact on high level political decision-making is nevertheless limited.11 As history has shown repeatedly, Jews and Muslims are able to 11

Even the movements such as Hamas that are often called islamic often make a very pragmatic decision (Mishal, Sela 2006).

32


live next to each other in peace and to respect each other. There is no reason to presuppose that they could not prove it again despite all the potential obstacles including religious differences. From the religious point of view the most problematic issue of the conflict is probably the status of holy places in general and of Jerusalem in particular. The original UN Partition Plan from 1947 proposed Jerusalem to be corpus separatum under international administration (The Avalon Project 1947). After this proposal had failed, Jerusalem was divided between Israel and Jordan. This status quo was changed when Israel launched a Six Day War in 1967 in anticipation to defend itself of the presupposed attack by Arabs and the result led to Israel conquering Jerusalem, the Western Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. This situation has not changed to present day despite many negotiation attempts (Hagee 2006). At present, the status of Jerusalem is one of the major obstacles to the peace process. The religious authorities of both sides strictly reject to any compromise concerning the status of local holy places. The point is that the status of Jerusalem and other Muslim holy sites in Israel/Palestine are not supposed to be a purely Palestinian matter. On contrary, this issue is discussed passionately around the entire Muslim world, thus according to Huntington all around Islamic civilization (Dumper 2002). However, this issue is too complex to be explained by the civilizations theory level only. The fact that Islam has no single religious authority results in such ambivalent situation. If such a leader existed – similarly to the position of Pope as a leader of Catholic Church – the status of holy places would be most probably under the authority of such a leader. Therefore the interest of the Muslim world about the holy places in Israel/Palestine should not be confused with being a member of particular civilization.

33


Religion clearly plays a certain role in the conflict, but most probably not the primary role. Both Israeli and Palestinian leadership is characterized by its secular nature, although in some aspects this secularism cannot be understood absolutely. We would assume that politics prevail over religion in this case.

3.3 Separate Social Structures Generally speaking, the differences in the social structure of Western and Islamic societies are indisputable. Nevertheless it is quite disputable whether these differences are so obvious in the specific cases of Israeli and Palestinian societies. Speaking about the realities of Muslim world, Palestinian society is considered as one of the most liberal. The historical development of Palestinian society has been heavily affected by the extreme conditions and history of repeated clashes. Therefore some of the traditions and common understanding of social roles had to be changed. The other thing is that the Palestinian nation is not formed by Muslims alone, but there is a significant minority of Palestinian Christians. The influence of Western civilization over the Palestinian society is also important phenomenon to be examined (Kimmerling 1993: 20), for example the European Union aims to promote values such as democracy and human rights which by a way is a precondition to its official development assistance. The social structure of Israel in many ways mirrors the Western democratic tradition and, with a relatively small group of Jewish ultra-Orthodox (Haredim) community as an exception, it can be characterized as secular, pluralistic and liberal social system. Of course, it is necessary to bear in mind that the state has been in war continuously for more than sixty years and this of course has certain impact on the structure of both society and politics and this is the samefor the Palestinians. 34


Speaking about everyday life, it is often emphasized that the behavior of individuals especially Sephardic Jews in comparison to Arabs – is in some aspects very similar and influenced by similar customs and traditions (Shanhav 2008: 257-273). The assumptions about the different social structures in terms of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are rather contradictory. On one hand, an in-depth analysis will undoubtedly find some differences, but these differences can be also found among the single states of one civilization as defined by Huntington and on the other hand, there are many similarities as well. To make a final decision whether this point should be accepted or rejected, it would be necessary to have a precise definition of what is meant by the difference in social structure, and how they can be measured. Unfortunately, Huntington does not offer such a qualification in his book and rather leaves this point undecided.

3.4 The Historical Memories of Both Societies The historical memories of both Israeli and Palestinian societies obviously play a vital role in the conflict.Based on the knowledge of their history and identity which is closely connected to the territory of the Holy Land, Jews were able to survive nearly two thousand years in exile, the Diaspora. During this long period some differences among various Jewish communities were created. The main distinction is between Ashkenazim, the so-called Western Jews who returned to Israel from Europe and the USA, and the Sephardim, the so-called Oriental Jews who spent Diaspora in Muslim countries (Palmer 2002). The historical experience of oppression and suffering, which culminated in Holocaust when more than six million Jews were murdered, led to the growth of Jewish nationalism (Zionism). Zionists had declared their intention to create a Jewish state in late 19th century but it took few more decades until the modern State of Israel was established in 1948 (Morris 2007: 45).

35


In modern Jewish history, especially in reference to the historical past of the nation it is very clear that the feeling of constant existential threat prevails. This feeling is noticeably reflected in Israeli politics in general and the attitude to the Palestinian issue in particular. There is a premise that only the independent Jewish state can guarantee a full existence of Jewish nation, and therefore it is necessary to defend it no matter at what cost (Aronson 2009: 65-93). Historical

experience

plays

a

crucial

role

for

Palestinians

as

well.

While Palestinians recognize that Jews lived in the Holy Land much earlier than the first Arabs ever appeared in the region, they consider Jewish claims over the territory based on this early settlement irrelevant and absurd. One of the arguments is that this principle has never been applied before and it has no precedent in international law. Arab tribes came to Palestine in 7th century AD and have continuously lived there till present day therefore claiming their rights to the disputed territory and stick to the argument that their land was stolen by Jews (Morris 2007: 43). The other strong historical experience reflects the harms and injustices that were committed against Palestinians by Jews prior to and after the declaration of Israeli state. They often remember the massacres of civilians such the liquidation of Palestinian village Deir Yassin in April 1948 which resulted into mass exodus of Palestinians from the country. This event is closely related to the fate of Palestinian refugees, many of whom still live in refugee camps. This historical experience of oppression and violence played a vital role in shaping Palestinians into a nation. Before Israel was established, the local Arab population had not considered themselves to be Palestinians but just Arabs (Kramer 1993: 171-206). In conclusion, these indicators prove that the historical memories of both nations are very strong. They are based on the historical experience of suffering and oppression and both nations often refer to these historical events making this factor an integral part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 36


4 Conclusion Based on the criteria for a fault line war as defined by Samuel P. Huntington we tried to examine the hypothesis thatthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be classified as a fault line war as defined by Samuel P. Huntington. This study analyzed only a limited piece of Huntington’s theory but some problems and inaccuracies appeared which after careful examination might doubt the whole theory. One of these problems is a good and concise definition of civilization. This problem arises particularly in the case of Western civilization but in certain extents appear also in cases of Islamic civilization, African civilization and others. The question now arises whether states belonging to certain civilizations actually fulfill all the criteria of Huntington’s definition. The next question arising from his definition to be dealt with is the possible criteria for determining which group belongs to a particular civilization. A similar question can be raised when it comes to the classification factors for the fault line war which according to Huntington are as follows: theproximityof twodifferentcivilizations,

religionsand

separate

cultures,

differentsocialstructures

andhistoricalmemoriesof bothsides. As we have tried to show up above, the application of these criteria to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict demonstrates that these factors are quite vague, lack further explanation, and thus leaves a relatively large space for interpretations of the individual authors. Despite all these problems, however we have tried to prove that the IsraeliPalestinian conflict according to criteria listed for civilization wars on the fault line does not fit to this category. Undeniably, there is the geographical proximity between both warring sides, however as discussed above it is not clear whether this is the inevitable cause of the conflict. It seems that a more significant role is played by factors such as nationalism and the dissatisfaction of Palestinians with current status quo rather than mere geography. A good example of such a statement may be the fact that there are 37


two Muslim states (namely Egypt and Jordan), which have direct borders with Israel and despite the history of mutual hostility and conflicts they have been living in peace for several decades. Different religions and culture can play certain role in the conflict, but not as absolute as it might seem. Most of the issues are not of religious but political nature and therefore making the potential of this factor as least questionable as possible. Simultaneously, there are examples from the past when despite religious and cultural differences both Muslims and Jews managed to live side by side in peaceful coexistence. Thus there is no clear evidence that the differences between Jews and Muslim must necessarily lead to war. The other impressive fact is that Judaism and Islam are in comparison to other religions quite close to each other and have more in common than frictions and the same is true when it comes to culture. The above statement is closely related to the question of separate social structures where again the main problem is the vague classification illustrated by Huntington. As a result we could not decide whether these two societies are so fundamentally different or not. It is obvious that some differences exist, but there are many similarities at the same time making it very difficult to make a definite conclusion. On the contrary, it is relatively easy to examine the factor regarding the historical past of both nations which have clearly played a vital role in the causes and the eventual evolution of the conflict. The examples discussed above speak more than clearly in favor of this argument. Based on these facts it can be assumed that the hypothesis was confirmed and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not meet the criteria of civilization fault line war as defined by Samuel P. Huntington. Using the method of falsification we were able to find at least one example that doubts Huntington’s theory of clash of civilization in this concrete case. 38


5 List of References Ayoob, M. 2012. Was Huntington Right? Revisiting the Clash of Civilizations. Insight Turkey 14, 1-11. Aronson, S. 2009. Israel's Security and the Holocaust: Lessons Learned, but Existential Fears Continue. Israel Studies 14: 65-93. Berger, P. L., Huntington, S. P. 2002. Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapman, C. 2002. Whose Promised Land? The Continuing Crisis over Israel and Palestine. Grand Rapids MI: Baker Books. Cook, J. 2008. Israel and the Clash of Civilizations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan To Remake the Middle East. London: Pluto Press. Dumper, M. 2002. The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict. Boulder Colo.: L. Rienner. Economist Intelligence Unit. 2010. Democracy Index 2010. Available from: http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf, accessed May 24, 2013. Fukuyama, F. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin Books. Fuentes, C. 2004. Huntington and the Mask of Racism. New Perspectives Quarterly 21: 77-81. Hagee, J. 2006. Jerusalem Countdown. Lake Mary Fla.: FrontLine. Halter, S. A., Clarke, J. 2004. America alone: The neo-conservatives and the global order. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. Herzl, T. 1946. The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question. New York: American Zionist Emergency Concil. 39


Huntington, S. P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Huntington, S. P. 2004. Who Are We? - The Challenges to America's National Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster. Katz, G. 2008. Secularism and the Imaginary Polemic of Israeli Intellectuals. Israel Studies 13, 43-63. Kimmerling, B. 1993. Palestinians: The Making of a People. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kopelowitz, E. 2010. Religious Politics and Israel’s Ethnic Democracy. Israel Studies 6: 166-190. Korecki, Z. et al. 2010. Military Logistics during Operations on African Territory under the EU Flag. Ústí nad Labem: Private Autonomy, o.s. Kramer, M. 1993. Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity. Deadalus 112: 171-206. Mishal,

S.,

Sela,

A.

2006.

The

Palestinian

Hamas:

Vision,

Violence,

and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press. Morris, B. 2007.Making Israel. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Morris, B. 2001. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 18812001. New York: Vintage Books. Palmer, E. H. 2002. History of the Jewish Nation: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day Piscataway NJ USA: Gorgias Press. Schnell, I. 2005. Israeli Geographers in Search of a National Identity. The Professional Geographer 6: 560-573. Shanhav,

Y.

2008. “History

Begins

at

Home.

Postzionism:

In Silberstein, L. J. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 40

A

Reader”.


Silvestri,

S.

2006.

Euro-Mediterranean

Relations:

Beyond

the Clash of Civilizations? Conference Papers - International Studies Association. 2006 Annual Meeting, 1. The Avalon Project.1947.UN General Assembly Resolution 181. Available from: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm, accessed May 24, 2013. Trenin, D. 2002. The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and

Globalization.

Washington:

Carnegie

41

Endowment

for

Intern.

Peace.


Enemies

among

us:

The

anti-elitist

and

xenophobic

discourses in the Czech Republic and Slovakia20

Alena Kluknavská Email: [email protected]

Abstract The extreme right parties offer a clear identification between “us” and “them”, translating the dichotomy into friend-enemy distinction. These parties share a core of anti-elitist and xenophobic attitudes, that are in the case of the extreme right in Central and Eastern Europe usually directed at the ruling establishment and the Roma minority. The aim of this exploratory paper is to analyse the frames employed by extreme right parties that serve to construct meanings about their main perceived enemies, the political elites and the Roma,in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The paper builds upon the assumption that meanings are not naturally attached to objects and events, but are constructed through interpretive processes producing specific frames. Applying the frame analysis, the paper examines the discourses of the People’s Party Our Slovakia and the Worker’s Party of Social Justice in regard to their enemies in the period of 2010-2013. The results indicate that the strategy employed by the parties is similar to new master frame combining xenophobia and anti-political-establishment populism. The paper makes an empirical contribution to the research on the extreme right and the ideological processes of extreme right parties in Central and Eastern Europe. 20

This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract No. APVV-0413-11.

42


Keywords Right-wing extremism, extreme right, frame analysis, political parties, anti-elitism, xenophobia

1 Introduction Extreme right parties throughout Europe share animosities towards several out-groups and in their discourses offer a strong distinction between “us” and “them”, which in their worldview translates into more extreme form of friend-enemy dichotomy. Various actions of the extreme right in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, such as antiRoma demonstrations and rallies mixed with anti-establishment stances, contribute to concerns regarding the relationship between the majority and various minorities. Even though the enemy stands in the centre of the extreme right’s attention, the literature usually focuses on immigration issue (e.g. Rydgren 2008), deals with the ideology (e.g. Betz, Johnson 2004) or discourse (Wodak et al. 2013) in general or concentrate on the processes of the extreme right’s identity politics (e.g. Caiani et al. 2012). Although there exist some theoretical contributions to different types of enemies of the extreme right (e.g. Mudde 2007), less work has been done on the ways through which meanings about these enemies are built in the discourse of the extreme right. The extreme right groups began to form in the region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after 1989. In Western Europe, the contemporary extreme right parties, which are a part of the “new right” (Ignazi 1992), are linked to xenophobic and populist attitudes. The new master frame of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-political establishment populism (Rydgren 2005) is supposed to be communicated and diffused between related parties in different countries. Although extreme right parties in Central and Eastern Europe experienced a different development than their counterparts in Western Europe, we can hypothesize that this new strategy, shifting the attention away from the “old right” and referencesto Italian Fascism or German Nazism, also to 43


a certain extent affects the extreme right in the post-communist countries. Within this master frame, these parties attract voters mainly through populist appeals pointing to corrupted nature of political elites and xenophobic attitudes aimed usually, but not exclusively at immigrants in Western Europe and national or ethnic minorities (mostly Roma) in Central and Eastern Europe. The important questions therefore ask, 1) how salient are the political elites and the Roma communities in the discourse of extreme right parties, and 2) how are the political elites and the Roma minority framed by extreme right parties? This paper investigates the forms of issue-specific frames in the discourses of the extreme right in relation to the political elites and the Roma communities in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Applying the frame analysis, the paper examines the framing processes of the People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) and the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS) in the period of 2010-2013. Both parties currently stand in an extraparliamentary spectrum, however, the leader of the ĽSNS Marian Kotleba has been elected as a governor of the Banská Bystrica region in the 2013 elections. The aim of the paper is to identify the extent to which the extreme right parties refer to political elites and the Roma communities and to analyse the extreme right’s active construction of meanings associated with these perceived enemies. The paper is structured into four parts. It presents the dichotomous vision of the extreme right of the world divided into good and bad, and proposes a potential of the framing perspective in the research on extreme right parties. The methodological part introduces the case and data selection, as well as the method for analysis used in the paper. It follows with the results of the analysis, where it focuses on demonstrating the central position of the political elites and Roma among the extreme right’s perceived enemies, by presenting the quantifiable measures and qualitative data. It concludes with the summary and the discussion of the findings.

44


2 Enemy in the spotlight: Anti-elitist and xenophobic attitudes of the extreme right The extreme right parties of the current wave begun to form in Western Europe during 1980s and 1990s and in Central and Eastern Europe have emerged in the course of the regime change after 1989. During the last two-three decades many countries in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe saw an increasing intensity of achievements of extreme right parties, which have been successful not only in electoral arena, but also in developing frames and putting issues on the agenda, mostly on the topics such as immigration, minorities issues or themes related to the nation and state, with potential to influence the public discourse, mainstream political parties and their policies. The extreme right parties share a coherent programmatic position combining two important factors of anti-political-establishment and xenophobic attitudes. According to Betz (2003), the combination of differentialist nativism and comprehensive protectionism seeks to exploit the anxieties and feelings of insecurity provoked by the socio-economic factors associated with globalization and the socio-cultural transformation of societies caused by the presence of a growing foreign population. The extreme right’s mobilization of resentment against political elites is designed to appeal to latent sentiments of political disenchantment, frustration and cynicism of the part of voters (Betz 2003). The nationalistic, authoritarian and populist strategy (Rydgren 2005; Mudde 2007) enables parties of the extreme right to mobilise xenophobic attitudes without being stigmatised as racists and to pose serious critique on contemporary democratic systems without being stigmatised as antidemocrats (Rydgren 2005).Although the extreme right in Central and Eastern Europe had a different development due to political regime change, 25 years after the fall of communism, we can expect the extreme right parties to be adopting some parts of the strategy employed by the extreme right parties in Western Europe. 45


In context of high public discontent with politics, some political actors find it advantageous to build upon this attitude for political purposes through an antiestablishment discourse (Barr 2009). Although the literature use various naming of the concept (such as anti-political-establishment politics, anti-party politics), it describes the claim that the ruling elites are unable or unwilling to represent the ordinary citizens. Usingthis rhetoric, actors try to appeal to public through “us” versus “them” dichotomy and offer a solution based on replacing the ruling elites and on improving the political system that would more accurately represent the interests of ordinary citizens (Barr 2009). Even though a variety of actors use anti-establishment rhetoric, including non-radical-right populists, the extreme right parties go further in their appeals, turning “them” into excluding category of “enemies”. This is seen not only in the language they use in relation to establishment, but also in their xenophobic appeals regarding other perceived enemies. The contemporary extreme right parties developed a comprehensive ideology, which core is based on the principles of exclusionary, xenophobic and intolerant discourse. In Western Europe, the main elements appear to be a strident Islamophobia and hostility toward globalization (Betz 2003), with focus on immigrants from outside of Europe. The extreme right parties in Central and Eastern Europe focus mostly on the national or ethnic minorities.In regard to the ethnic minorities, the negative attitudes vis-à-vis the Roma communities can be traced not only in the political discourses, but also in the public debate, both in the media (Kluknavská, Zagibová 2013) and among majority population (SASD 2008; CVVM 2013). The anti-Roma sentiments are particularly present in countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where the Roma minority is relatively numerous, such are the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Some 200,000250,000 Roma people are estimated to live in the Czech Republic, while the number

46


of Roma in Slovakia has been estimated at 400,000-500,00021. Stereotyping of the Roma in public discourse and putting the minority into a certain ethnic scheme affect the attitudes towards the Roma minority and can create favourable ground for extreme right parties, leading to their electoral successes. The extreme right seeks to position itself as an oppositional movement defending a conception of national identity that it considers as fundamentally threatened (Betz 2003).This strategy is based on the in-group–out-group differentiation, which is very common when people create their own identities. The populists, building upon such behaviour, divide the world into “us” and “them”. However, while in the populist vision the world is separated between the “pure people” and “corrupted elites”, the extreme right interprets the world through “black and white” categories. This conception leads to division of the world separated between friends, who support extreme right’s causes and enemies, who oppose them (Caiani, Parenti 2013). The friend is presented as a strong actor protecting the defenceless people or the society itself, and the enemy as an outsider, that ranges from holders of power to various minorities. While the friends suffer from unfair treatment and deprivation, the enemies are expected to benefit from such an injustice. Within this strategy, the party, as part of the in-group, constructs an image of itself in opposition to political elites, however, positioning itself between “normal” opposition and an anti-democratic one (Rydgren 2004). Having said that, it is the enemy who presents the common feature ofthe extreme right and who stands in the centre of its discourse. 21

According to the Roma Integration Concept for 2010-2013, the number of Roma living in the Czech Republic is estimated at 150,000-200,000. The Council for Europe (2012) estimates the number of Roma at 150,000-250,000 people. According to the Atlas of Roma communities 2004, approximately 320,000 Roma people live in Slovakia, while the Atlas of Roma communities 2013 states that number of the Roma people in the country is around 400,000. The Council of Europe estimates the number of Roma in Slovakia at 380,000-600,000, with the average of 490,000 people.

47


3 The framing perspective Although much of the literature on the extreme right deals with their electoral successes and orients on the structural conditions or the individual motivations, the appeal and influence of extreme right parties based purely on the election results may be misleading (Minkenberg 2013). The research thus suggests the need to turn the focus to the role of extreme right parties as a strategic actors attempting to best respond to their political environment (e. g. Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer, Carter 2006) and to orient on the level of the analysis that links macro and micro conditions. Framing perspective is in this regard flexible enough to link ideas, actions and events, and could shed some light on understanding how the movements present the reality and actors involved in it (Caiani et al. 2012). Framing perspective is a quickly developing concept in the social sciences. Although the framing perspective was developed in social psychology and elaborated mostly in social movements studies, it has soon transposed to media studies (e.g. Pan, Kosicki 1993; Scheufele 1999; Semetko, Valkenburg 2000), policy studies (e.g. Rein, Schön 1996) or political research (e.g. Lakoff 2004), including the study of extreme right (e.g. Rydgren 2005; Bosman, d'Haenens 2008; Caiani, della Porta 2011). It builds upon the assumption that meanings are not naturally attached to objects or events, but are produced through interpretive processes by actors assigning meanings to events and conditions in order to motivate constituents or mobilize potential adherents to action (Snow, Benford 1988). Produced meanings, mediated by various contextual factors (Snow 2006b), are packaged into frames, which serve as the interpretative structures that the members of a party or a movement use to address the symbolic construction of the external reality.

48


Following Snow and Benford (1992: 137), we see a frame as an “interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment”. Frames, that are subject to change over time rather than static cultural and/or interactional entities (Snow 2006a), attribute blame for perceived social problems by identifying the individuals or groups that are supposed to have caused the problem (a diagnosis) and by suggesting the course of action in solving the problem (a prognosis). While attributing blame to concrete actors, extreme right parties through strategically built frames usually punctuate the seriousness and injustice of social conditions, specify the action needed to generate change and offer a rationale to engage in an action (Snow, Benford 1992).

4 The methodology of the analysis Case Selection. We focus on two extreme right parties in Central and Eastern Europe – the Worker’s Party of Social Justice in the Czech Republic and the People’s Party Our Slovakia in Slovakia. The extreme right political parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia began to form in the region of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. We focus on extra-parliamentary parties, which share a similar path in the development. Both parties were founded after 2000 and formed from previous extreme right movements, but had been dissolved (the current ĽSNS in 2006, and the current DSSS in 2010) and re-emerged with the same leadership. Both parties never entered national parliament, but run for the office and their electoral gains have been rising. The parties were to some extent successful at the regional and local level. In Slovakia, the leader of the ĽSNS M. Kotleba became a governor of the Banská Bystrica region in the 2013 elections.

49


Data Source and Sample Selection. The data are derived from 478 articles that appeared in electoral programs, party manifestos and the party press (party journal). The article is a unit of the analysis and presents each press item or each section in the party programs (separated by the sub-headline). We analysed 250 articles in the DSSS sample and 228 in the ĽSNS sample. First, we analysed 2010 and 2011 electoral programs for the DSSS and 2010 and 2012 electoral programs for the ĽSNS. Second, we analysed the on-line journal Our Slovakia (Naše Slovensko, circulated irregularly, 121 articles), and Workers’ Post (Dělnické listy, circulated 4-times a year, 216 articles). For the ĽSNS we supplemented the data with statements (97 units) published on www.naseslovensko.net (2010-2013) and www.pospolitost.wordpress.com (2010-2011). The first is the official Internet page of the party and the latter is the official page of political movement Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitosť), with which the ĽSNS has had close ideological and personal connections and common activities22. Frame analysis. The paper is based on a qualitative frame analysis, with providing quantifiable measures. Although theoretically the concept is well established, there are not shared criteria as how to perform the frame analysis methodologically. To analyse the framing process qualitatively, most studies use techniques borrowed from discourse analyses and sociolinguistics, as frames can be reconstructed through the analysis of the discourse of the social movements (Johnston 1995). The discursive techniques may prove themselves helpful in analysing deeper structures of the qualitative data. The quantifiable measures present descriptive statistical data about the enemies and associated frames. For purposes of the analysis, we build upon Snow and Benford’s (1988) core framing tasks and Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) catchphrases, through which Until 2012 the movement’s webpage was used as a platform for presenting ideas of (thenemerging) political party. We selected only those articles that were signed as written by the ĽSNS’ members. 22

50


wearrive at a structure of issue-specific frame. For each article, we code various diagnostic and prognostic framing. These claims represent a sentence or paragraph, where there can be identified at least one of pre-defined frames. The presence of a framing element is indicated when one of the sources makes a statement that addresses the character of the frame. The diagnostic framing refers to 1) the problem identification and interpretation of perceived reality (What is the problem?), and 2) identification of the source of problem responsibility – the attribution of blame (Who is responsible for the problem?), 3) identification of the actors affected by a problem – problem holders. In this part of the process, the delineation between the perpetrators (enemies who are to blame) and victims (friends who are affected) takes place. Prognostic framing refers to 4) the articulation of a possible solution to the identified problem (How should the problem be solved?). It also carries 5) the actor responsible for carrying out this strategy (Who is responsible for action?). Based on catchphrases, we determine the nature of the connections between the different actors, usually between those who are seen as a cause and who are seen as affected by a certain problem. For each framing element, we code for stereotypes, dichotomies, metaphors, and/or historical references. When present, we also code for labelling, naming or adjectives used to describe respective actors. In order to identify the issue specific frames, we conducted a qualitative pre-study on the sample of articles across years and both parties, and developed a codebook used

for

further

analysis.

For

each

article,

we

coded

multiple

diagnostic

and/or prognostic framing elements respectively that relate to either Political elites or Roma enemies. Under political elites, we include the general references to the system, the establishment, the government, the politicians, the political parties, the parliamentarians, or more specific references to particular politicians or political positions. Under the Roma we include the general references to Roma communities, the Roma minority or to Roma individuals or groups. For each framing element (a claim), 51


a source is coded. A source could be the party, the party leader or (other) party member. In total, we coded 660 sources. Table 1. Diagnostic frames employed by the extreme right parties and their characteristics (in alphabetical order), in relation to Political elites and Roma enemies.

Frame

Characteristics

Abuse of political power

The government and established politicians abuse their political and economic power, all for their own benefit.

Discrimination of people

Authorities discriminative against majority population. Failure of the authorities to secure safety of people.

Loss of independence

Loss of national sovereignty, federalization of Europe, control over member states by supranational organizations.

Persecution of opponents

Interventions, criminalization and persecution political opponents, suppression of free discussion.

Positive discrimination of Roma

Unfair protection, support and favouritism of the Roma minority by authorities, who ignore their violations of laws.

Roma menace

Roma criminality and Roma parasitism. Roma are criminals and inherently lazy exploiters, live at the expense of society, do not respect basic civilization and moral norms, do not follow rules.

of

Source: the author.

For coding of diagnostic framing elements, we differentiate between six diagnostic frames in relation to Political elite and Roma enemies (Table 1). A total of 660 diagnostic elements were coded: 292 for the DSSS (249 for Political elites, 43 for Roma) and 368 for the ĽSNS (232 in relation to Political elites, 136 to Roma). In addition to diagnosis, when mentioned by a source, we coded for the attribution of responsibility and the problem holder. We coded identical numbers of the problem attributions as the diagnostic frames, and 396 problem holders (171 in relation to Political elites, 52


and 31 in relation to Roma in the discourse of the DSSS; 115 in relation to Political elites, and 79 to Roma in the discourse of the ĽSNS). Table 2. Prognostic frames employed by extreme right parties and their characteristics (in alphabetical order), in relation to Political elites and Roma enemies.

Frame

Characteristics

Antiestablishment actions

Stopping political elite in the elections, establishing a real democracy, organizing anti-establishment demonstrations.

Empowerment

The people or the extreme right should help themselves, mobilize and use their potential, resources, organizational skills, etc.

Law and order

Various policy reforms and law changes. The law should apply to all equally. Stricter enforcement of rules and law.

Restitution of independence

Withdrawal from the EU, Eurozone and/or NATO. Stricter foreign policy. Restoration of food, economic and energy self-sufficiency.

Voting for opposition

Vote for real political or ideological opposition, usually the extreme right itself.

Source: the author.

For coding of prognostic framing elements, we identified five major frames (Table 2). A total of 254 prognostic elements were coded (137 for the DSSS and 117 forthe ĽSNS). In addition to prognosis, we coded for responsibility for carrying out the solution; a total of 122 responsible actors were coded (54 for the DSSS and 68 for the ĽSNS).

5 The Enemies in the discourse of extreme right parties The extreme right parties show negative attitudes towards various subjects, or events. Such a designation is usually accompanied by identification of a perpetrator responsible for the problem that is depicted as an enemy and often linked to actors 53


supposedly affected by the problem who are presented as victims. This friend-enemy differentiation is clearly present in the discourse of both extreme right parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The victims, presented as actors affected by certain problems, are part of the in-group, which is comprised of the people, including extreme right parties. The enemies present a more diverse group than friends,and both parties point to the same groups of actors whom they consider as causing significant problemsin society (Figure 1). Throughout the years, the most emphasized enemies in the discourse of both parties are the political elites and the Roma. The Czech DSSS blames the responsibility on the political elite in two thirds of its framing activity and the ĽSNS in more than half of the cases. The political elites are usually presented as the government, the state, the system or established political parties and politicians. The Roma are to blame in one tenth of the cases of the DSSS and in one third of the ĽSNS’ framing activity. Figure 1. Enemies in the discourse of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left) and the People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2013 (in %). Homosex uals

Homosex uals

Economi c elite

Economic elite Political elite

Foreigner s

Foreigne rs

Cultural elite

Cultural elite

Roma

Roma

Source: the author.

54

Political elite


The friends, presented as victims by both parties, are part of the in-group, or “us”. They consist of “the People” (the society, the majority) and the members of the extreme right parties (Figure 2). Although the people are the most affected actors in the discourses of both parties, the DSSS in more cases (27.2 per cent) than the ĽSNS (7.7 per cent) points to its own misdeeds, presenting the party itself as a victim. The people are in the discourse of the DSSS usually referred to as “the decent citizens” and in the discourse of the ĽSNS as “decent people”. Figure 2.Friends (victims)in the discourse of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice and the People’s Party Our Slovakia, 2010-2013 (in %) in relation to Political elite and Roma enemy. 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

People

Extreme right

2010

2011

2012

2013

2010

DSSS

2011

2012

2013

ĽSNS

Source: the author.

Both parties construct several different diagnostic frames in relation to Political elites and Roma, and throughout the years mostly emphasized the Roma menace and Abuse of power frames. However, while the ĽSNS focused mostly on the notion the Roma communities threaten the majority population and parasite on the society (Figure 3), the DSSS mostly stressed thenotion of corrupted elites, who stand behind the “destruction” of the nation (Figure 4). For the ĽSNS, the Abuse of power frame was the second most visible frame. For the DSSS, the idea of Roma as a threat to well-being of the majority played less significant role, though by 2013 the salience of the frame considerably increased. 55


The DSSS also highly emphasize Persecution of political opponents frame, while the idea of oppression of the extreme right members caused by the political elites was the least visible in the discourse of the ĽSNS. Instead, the Slovak party highlighted the failure of authorities to secure safety and decent life for people, as well as the discriminatory policies and actions aimed at the majority population. The salience of this frame in the discourse of the DSSS was decreasing over time. The ĽSNS also more than the DSSS emphasized the notions that the government unfairly favours the Roma communities against the majority population, and that the ruling establishment is responsible for losing the national sovereignty and for causing that the state is controlled by supranational organizations. In overall, though the framing activities of the DSSS were rather balancedin 2010, the salience of the Abuse of power increased over time and in 2013 tookone third of the party’s framing. The diagnostic strategy of the ĽSNS persistently highlighted the threat coming from the Roma communities and the government, either in the form of “dangerous” Roma, or from the government’s influence on the ordinary people’s lives.

56


Figure 3.Diagnostic framing of the People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) in relation to the Political elite and the Roma communities, 2010-2013. 50% Roma menace

45%

Roma menace

40%

Abuse of power

35% Discrimination of people

30% Abuse of power

25%


20%


15%


10% Persecution of political opponents

5% 0% 2010

2011

2012

2013

Source: the author.

Figure 4.Diagnostic framing of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS) in relation to Political elite and Roma, 2010-2013. 50%

Abuse of power

45% 40%

Abuse of power

Roma menace

35% 30%


Persecution of political opponents

25%

Roma menace

Persecution of political opponents

20% 15%


10% 5%


0% 2010

2011

2012

2013

Source: the author.

57


Since both parties mostly emphasize the Roma menace and Abuse of power frames, we shall have a look, what deeper meanings parties createin relation to these frames. Both the DSSS and the ĽSNS create the meanings about the political elite in a similar way (Table 3), however, the meanings about the Roma communities are constructed very differently (Table 4). The political elites are in discourse of both parties depicted in a dismissive way as “treacherous politicians” (the ĽSNS) and “corrupted establishment” (the DSSS). The Roma are presentedin a very negative, even hostile way, however, the DSSS engage in more subtle, abstract and ambiguous form than the ĽSNS. The DSSS addresses the Roma as “Gypsies”, “unadaptable community”, “members of Gypsy minority”, or “unadaptable individuals”, while the ĽSNS uses more severe, concrete and direct way of naming the Roma, who are addressed as “drunken asocial Gypsy parasites”, “asocial parasites”, “Gypsy extremists”, or “asocial Gypsies”. Table 3. Adjectives and catchphrases used to address “enemies” and “friends” in the discourse of the ĽSNS and the DSSS in relation to Abuse of power frame, 2010-2013 (selected cases). Party

Date

Enemy

Catchphrase

Friend

Frauds and thefts by our politicians 17.02.2010

Politicians

regardless their party affiliation. They are usually all thieves, liars and crooks.

ĽSNS Treacherous 01.11.2011

Slovak politicians

They have plundered the state’s assets after 1989.

58

People


Us (we), 01.01.2012

Government

The government endlessly wastes

decent

our money.

working people

Government, 01.01.2013

establishment after 1989

They devastated, destroyed

People,

Slovakia and stole everything.

Slovakia

The government wastes our 01.10.2013

Government

money with impunity and its members live luxurious life.

US (our money)

It is impossible what the current 19.03.2010

Ruling

ruling establishment performs. It

Ordinary

establishment

is corrupted, materialistic and

citizens

totalitarian regime. Political parties during past 20 25.06.2010

Political

years have been asset stripping

parties

our land and leading it to

Our land

permanent debt. DSSS 15.04.2011

Corrupted establishment

The establishment is paralyzed by corruption and involved in mafia structures. They have ruined and stole our

18.01.2012

Government

nation assets, but the

Nation,

consequences delegated on

citizens

citizens. 05.07.2013

Government

The government have made a good business out of politics.

Source: the author.

59


According to the ĽSNS, politicians are all “thieves, liars and crooks”, who “have plundered the state’s assets”, “devastated, destroyed Slovakia”, “endlessly waste our money”, and “live luxurious life”. Similarly, the DSSS denotes that politicians “have been asset stripping our land and leading it to permanent debt”, the government is “paralyzed by corruption and involved in mafia structures”, and “corrupted, materialistic and totalitarian regime”, which “lost last remnants of its legitimacy”. Both parties identically state that the politicians “have made a business out of politics”(Table 3). Table 4. Adjectives and catchphrases used to address “enemies” and “friends” in the discourse of the ĽSNS and the DSSS in relation to Roma menace frame, 2010-2013 (selected cases). Party

Date

Enemy

Catchphrase

Friend

Young Gypsies showed a hunt in a Drunken, 25.10.2010

asocial Gypsy parasites

pack; The last month there were a

White

couple of attacks on white residents

residents;

who have such a misfortune that they

A young

live close to the community of asocial

couple

Gypsy parasites.

ĽSNS

01.09.2011

07.07.2012

Asocial

Asocial families live at the expense of

families

us all, and spend our money.

A group of

A group of Gypsies with axes in hands

A white

Gypsies

threatened a white citizen.

citizen

Us (our)

Gypsy terror; Raging Gypsy extremists 01.01.2013

Gypsy

terrorize the whole village. They steal,

Decent

extremists

beat and kill decent people on a daily

People

basis.

60


Gypsy 01.10.2013

extremists; Gypsy asocials

30.10.2011

30.10.2011

DSSS

14.10.2012

05.07.2013

Gypsy extremists destroy our land and people, who have a right to live

People;

here. White children are afraid to go

White

to school, because Gypsy kids

children

beat,torture andbully them.

Members of

They cause problems; The attacks on

Gypsy

decent people by members of Gypsy

minority

minority are growing.

Gypsy

The attacks of Gypsy community on

The

community

the Czechs.

Czechs

Gypsies

Gypsies do not want to comply with the law and order.

Decent people

Citizens

Unadaptable

Aggressiveness of unadaptable

Decent

individuals

individuals towards decent citizens.

citizens

The thefts, noise, destruction of 16.10.2013

Gypsies

municipal and private properties are on the rise.

Source: the author.

As the ĽSNS is more severe in naming the Roma minority, the more extreme form in framing is seen also in overall phrasing and the way of connecting the enemies with the victims. The DSSS rather distantly puts forward claims such as “The attacks of Gypsy community on the Czechs” and “Aggressiveness of unadaptable individuals towards decent citizens”, and formally states that “Gypsies are favoured against majority population” or “The thefts, noise, destruction of municipal and private properties are on the rise”. The ĽSNS uses more emotional, expressive and dramatic presentation and points to “Gypsy terror”, “Brutal attacks by Gypsy extremists”, who “terrorize the whole village”, and presents claims that “Asocial families live at the expense of us 61


all” or “the Raging Gypsy extremists… steal, beat and kill decent people on a daily basis”(Table 4). The most salient prognosis persistently throughout the years in the discourse of both the DSSS and the ĽSNS is the Law and order (Figure 4). The greater emphasis on the frame can be traced in the discourse of the ĽSNS (60.8 per cent) in comparison to the DSSS (45.3 per cent). The frame generally refers to notions of equal application and stricter enforcement of law. The parties ask for demands such as “so that law will finally apply to everyone equally – to the Whites, as well as to the Gypsies” (ĽSNS), or “the corruption and stealing our common assets must be punished severely” (DSSS), and that the party will “eliminate unfair favouring of not only Gypsy parasites” (ĽSNS). It also includes more concrete actions, when the parties want “to adopt orders to protect decent people” (DSSS), or to “lower the criminal responsibility to ten years of age. We will change the criminal law policy so each politician and parasite will think twice, whether he will honestly work or steal, rape and kill” (ĽSNS). Figure 4. Variations in prognostic framing of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left) and the People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2013. 70%

60% 50%

DSSS

40%

30% 20%

ĽSNS

10%

0%

Source: the author.

62


The salience of other frames in the discourses of two parties is similar, with the exception of the Anti-establishment actions frame, which is more salient in the discourse of the DSSS (21.9 per cent) than in the ĽSNS (7.7 per cent). The DSSS calls for “immediate purification of political scene” (17. 4. 2012, Worker’s Post) and to “head to streets and show them that our goal is only to have peaceful and criminalabuse-free life” (30.10. 2011, Worker’s Post). The ĽSNS also wants to “head to the streets and try to change this system” (5. 5. 2011, Our Slovakia), and calls for radical measures, because “the nation needs real political change” (13. 4. 2012, Our Slovakia). However, it also emphasizes the need of withdrawal from supranational organizations such as the EU and NATO, and the restoration of food, economy and energy self-sufficiency.

6 Conclusion and discussion The paper aimed at answering the questions how salient are the political elites and the Roma communities in the discourses of the two extreme right parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and how have these parties constructed meanings about them in the period of 2010-2013. The Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS) and the People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) clearly engage in the populist differentiation between “us” and “them”, turning the dichotomy into more extreme form of “enemies” and “friends”. Moreover, the results indicate that the extreme right presents this friendenemy distinction within the category of victims-perpetrators. The group of victims, which is affected by certain problems caused by the perpetrators, comprised of “the People” and the members of the extreme right. The group of enemies is more diverse than the group of friends, but the results showed that the political elites and the Roma communities are in fact the most salient perceived enemies in the discourses of the DSSS and the ĽSNS. 63


Both parties construct several diagnostic and prognostic frames in relation to political elites and the Roma communities, but throughout the years mostly emphasized the perceived threat of the Roma for the people and the corrupted nature of political elites. However, while the ĽSNS focused mostly on the notion the Roma communities threaten and parasite on the society, the DSSS mostly stressed the notion of corrupted elites causing deprivation of the people. Nevertheless, the Abuse of power was the second most visible frame in the discourse of the ĽSNS and the salience of the idea of

Roma

as

a

threat

to

well-being

of

the

majority

in

the

discourse

of the DSSSconsiderably increasedby 2013. Both parties to some extent changed their framing strategiesduring the course of the years. While in 2010 the framing strategies of the DSSS were more balanced, by 2013 the visibility of the idea of political elites abusing their power became very salient in the discourse of the party. The ĽSNS persistently

highlighted

the

perceived

threat

posited

by

the

Roma

minority

and the government, and their combined blame over the misdeeds of the ordinary people, and by 2013 the framing strategy became more balanced. It is also important to mention that while the framing strategy of the DSSS is rather subtle and abstract, the ĽSNS uses, especially in relation to the Roma communities, severe and dramatic rhetoric. The results indicate that the framing strategy employed by the parties is in line with the new master frame combining the xenophobia and anti-establishment populism, according to which the extreme right parties mobilise xenophobic attitudes and pose a critique on contemporary democratic systems. Although the literature points to different characteristics of the extreme right organizations in Central and Eastern Europe due to different historical development and political and cultural conditions in which it has been evolving, we can see the adopting and the adaptation of the similar strategy that is used by the extreme right parties in Western Europe. Even though it is true that differences do exist (e.g. the more extreme references to “white people” in contrast to 64


“Gypsies” in the discourse of the ĽSNS) in regard to their ideologies, especially when looking into deeper structures, they do not overtly emphasise the relation to the historical continuity of fascism or Nazism and the overall frame indicates that the extreme right parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia mobilise the voters against both the established structures of power and the latent xenophobic views in the society. The parties build upon the public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment, the appeal to the common people, and the anti-minorities sentiments. Although extreme right parties are not the only political actors targeting Roma or the political elites, they are usually the most extreme (Mudde 2007). However, the negative attitudes in regard to the Roma communitiestend to surface also in

the

mainstream

political

and

public

discourse.Categorization

of

Roma

and stereotypingof the whole minority can in turn create discursive opportunities, i.e. favourable breeding ground, for extreme right parties, leading to their electoral successes. The popularity of the Czech extreme right party, Worker’s Party of Social Justice, has in recent years increased mainly in those regions, where the public was more inclined to accept the racial explanations offered by the party. The Slovak People's Party Our Slovakia adopted a similar strategy and in parliamentary elections 2010 and 2012 was on the local level successful in the regions with perceived problematic relations between the majority and Roma minority (Kluknavská 2013). The research indicates that the extreme right parties’ strategies tend to be resonant with the public in regions with perceived problematic relations between majority and minority population. This paper analysed the form of the frames that parties construct in their discourses. Acknowledging that such discourses do not exist in a societal and political vacuum, more elaboration is needed in regard to the overall context accompanying the presence of the parties in public and political arena. Furthermore, this analysis also presents the first step in explaining why the parties chose certain strategies and avoided 65


others, and why certain frames better resonate with the public. The further research should thus aim at explaining how these frames help or hinder the electoral success of extreme right partiesin the electoral arena, or to orient on explaining why do actors choose and modify the frames they do and neglect others. Although the theoretical and empirical literature on the framing perspective is extensive, we still do not know enough about the determinants of selection of particular framing strategies. The literature suggests that extreme right frames are mainly determined by factors on the demand side, e.g. socio-demographic factors, as well as on the supply side, mainly

opportunity

structures,

organizational

resources,

the

party

leadership

and the ideology. The future research can therefore elaborate more on both the area of the extreme right organizations as well as the framing perspective.

66


7 Literature Arzheimer, K., Carter, E. (2006). Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success.European Journal of Political Research, 45 (3), pp. 419–44. Barr, R. R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. Party Politics, 15 (1), pp. 29-48. Benford, R. D., Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An overview and Assessments.Annual Review of Sociology, 26, pp. 611–39. Betz, H.-G. (2003). Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe. In Panitch, L., Leys, C. (Eds.). Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno- Nationalism. London: Merlin, pp. 193–210. Betz, H.-G., Johnson, C. (2004).Against the current—stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right.Journal of Political Ideologies, 9 (3), pp. 311-327. Bosman, J., d'Haenens, L. (2008).News reporting on Pim Fortuyn: framing in two Dutch newspapers. Media Culture Society, 30 (5): pp. 735 – 748. Caiani, M., della Porta, D. (2011). The elitist populism of the extreme right: A frame analysis of extreme right-wing discourses in Italy and Germany. Acta Politica, 46, pp. 180–202. Caiani, M., della Porta, D., Wagemann, C. (2012). Mobilizing on the Extreme Right: Germany, Italy, and the United States.Oxford University Press. Caiani, M., Parenti, L. (2013).European and American Extreme Right Groups and the Internet. Ashgate Publishing Company.

67


Council of Europe (2012). Estimates on Roma population in European Countries (http://hub.coe.int/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3f6c4a82-0ca7-4b80-93c1fef14f56fdf8&groupId=10227). CVVM, Public opinion research center, (2013).Romové a soužití s nimi očima české verejnosti – duben 2013 [Roma and co-existence with them through eyes of the public,2013] (http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c1/a7017/f3/ov130521.pdf) . Dělnické listy [Workers’ Post].The party press, vol. 8, no. 25 (January-March 2010) – vol. 11, no. 41 (October-December 2013). Electoral program of the DSSS (2010).Programová listina [The programmatic list] (http://www.dsss.cz/programova-listina). Electoral program of the ĽSNS (2010).14 krokov pre budúcnosť Slovenska a našich

detí

[14

steps

for

the

future

of

Slovakia

and

our

children]

(http://www.naseslovensko.net/dokumenty/14bodov.pdf). Electoral program of the ĽSNS 2012.Desatoro Ľudovej strany Naše Slovensko na odstránenie následkov zločinov spáchaných politikmi po novembri 1989 a nastolenie sociálnej spravodlivosti [Ten Commandments of People’s Party Our Slovakia to eliminate the consequences of the crimes committed by politicians afterNovember 1989 and

the

establishment

of

social

justice](http://www.naseslovensko.net/dokumenty/desatoro_lsns_2012.pdf). Gamson, W. A., Modigliani, A. (1989). Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. American Journal of Sociology, 95 (1), pp. 1-37.

68


Ignazi, P. (1992). The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe. European Journal of Political Research 22, pp. 3-34. Johnston, H. (1995). A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata. In Johnston, H., Klandermans, B. (Eds.). Social Movements, Protests, and Contention. Volume 4, pp. 217-246. Kluknavská, A. (2013). Od Štúra k parazitom: Tematická adaptácia krajnej pravice v parlamentných voľbách na Slovensku. Politologický časopis 20 (3), 258-281. Kluknavská, A., Zagibová, L. (2013). Neprispôsobiví Rómovia a slušná väčšina? Spravodajský diskurz po násilných udalostiach na severe Českej republiky 2011 [Unadaptable Roma and decent majority? News discourse after violent incidents in the north part of the Czech Republic in 2011]. Central European Political Studies Review, 15 (4), pp. 300-323 (http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=608). Lakoff, G. (2004). Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate--The Essential Guide for Progressives. Chelsea Green Publishing. Naše Slovensko [Our Slovakia]. The party press, September 2011 – December 2013. Minkenberg, M. (2013).The European Radical Right and Xenophobia in West and East:

Trends,

Patterns

and Challenges.

In

Melzer,

R.,

Serafin,

S.,

Eds.

Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies, pp. 934. Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pan, Z., Kosicki, G. M. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse.Political Communication, 10 (1), pp. 55-75. 69


Party manifest of the DSSS 2011.Manifest Dělnickej strany Sociální spravedlnosti (http://www.dsss.cz/program-dsss-2011). Plenipotentiary of the Government for Roma Communities (2004).Atlas of Roma Communities 2004 (http://www.minv.sk/?regiony_atlas). Plenipotentiary of the Government for Roma Communities (2013).Atlas of Roma Communities 2013 (http://www.minv.sk/?atlas_2013). Polletta, F., Kai Ho, M. (2006).Frames and their consequences. In Goodin, R. E., Tilly, Ch. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, pp. 189 – 209. Rein, M., and Schön, D. (1996). Frame-Critical Policy Analysis and Frame Reflective Policy Practice. Knowledge and Policy, 9 (1), pp. 88-90. Rydgren, J. (2004). Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark, West European Politics, 27(3), pp. 474-502. Rydgren, J. (2005). Is Extreme Right-wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the Emergence of a new Party Family.European Journal of Political Research, 44, pp. 41337. Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical rightwing voting in six West European countries. European Journal of Political Research 47, pp. 737–765. Slovak archive of Social Data, SASD (2008).Rovnosť a menšiny na Slovensku 2008

[Equality

and

minorities

in

Slovakia

2008]

(http://sasd.sav.sk/sk/data_katalog_abs.php?id=sasd_2008005). Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., Tillie, J. N. (2005). Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate electoral support. Comparative Political Studies, 38 (5), pp. 537-573.

70


Semetko, H. A., Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news.Journal of Communication,50 (2), pp. 93-109. Scheufele, D. A. (1999).Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.Journal of Communication,49 (4), pp.103-22. Snow, D. A. (2006a). Frame. In Ritzer, G. (Ed.).Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol. IV, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 1178-1780. Snow, D. A. (2006b). Framing and Social Movements. In Ritzer, G. (Ed.).Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol. IV, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 1780-1784. Snow, D. A., Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization.International Social Movement Research, 1 (1), pp. 197-217. Snow, D. A., Benford, R. D. (1992). Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In Morris, A., Müller, C. (Eds.). Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 133-55. Webpage Naše Slovensko. Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko [People’s Party Our Slovakia] (www.naseslovensko.net). Webpage Slovenská pospolitosť.Slovenská pospolitosť[Slovak Togetherness] (www.pospolitost.wordpress.com). Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M., Mral, B. (2013).Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse.Bloomsbury Academic.

71


Economic recources of Kadyrov´s regime

Autor: Tomáš Šmíd Email: [email protected]

Abstract The regime of Ramzan Kadyrov, leader of the Russian Federation’s Chechen Republic, has become a frequent subject of social science research in recent years. The author of this text has engaged issues related to Chechnya for a number of years, and this article aims to introduce the Kadyrov regime’s key economic sources enabling him to remain in power, or, more precisely, strenghten his power and influence. The author examines the issue via the concept of criminalization of the state. Data collection was conducted via field research in the region in the form of over a dozen informal, unstructured interviews with the local population, 16 semi-structured interviews with experts as well as representatives from the non-profit sector and state administration, all of which, given the nature of the topic and the regime, demanded anonymity. Media and journalistic resources as well as relevant expert literature, particularly related to the topics of criminalization, (organized) crime, and armed non-state actors, were also used.

72


Conceptual Basis Criminalisation The term “criminalisation” does not have a fixed conceptual basis, and it can be used diversely and with different accents or shifts in meaning in various contexts. The term itself however does have its basiswhich we can safely use – crime, or crime rate/criminal activity. On the other hand, crime rate itself can also be viewed differently in different scientific paradigms. A strictly codified view of crime rate is provided by legal science, especially its subdiscipline, criminal law, while social sciences offer another, wider view. And it is also very important in what cultural, legal, and historical traditions and areas the term is used. The term “crime rate” is not universal in the sense that it would automatically mean the same thing in all parts of our planet, which logically also applies to the term “criminalisation”. The author of this text does not use the terms criminal activity, crime rate or crime in general in a strictly legal and state-centred way, in which the term is viewed mainly in the form of a criminal act, i.e. an act that is punishable in accordance with clear, state-framed and defined criminal law, but in a wider concept that also includes violation of moral rules based on the charter of fundamental rights and freedoms which logically emphasize mainly Judeo-Christian value traditions. This approach is of course methodologically questionable, since these values are changeable and differently rooted in various cultures and societies, but it is difficult to achieve value-free social science, especially in matters with ethical and moral dimensions. On the other hand, being anchored in values does not a priori mean giving up on objectivity (Fay 1996; cf. Schneider – Schneider 2008). The term criminalisation itself involves a process which followsthe development of certain human or social behaviour into “antisocial”behaviour which becomes a crime, and committing crimes becomes criminal activity. This process is influenced by states, 73


media, civic society, and other actors who in the endinfluence what behaviour is considered criminal, both in legal and in wider social scientific or philosophical view (cf. Schneider – Schneider 2008). However, especially in the framework of legal paradigm, the process and consequently the actual concept of criminalisation may often not correspond to general moral principles of the given society, let alone to the JudeoChristian value framework. The process of criminalisation often becomes a political powertool that can be strongly manipulated, and the acts of individuals or entire social groups can be labelled criminal even though they do not at all contradict Judeo-Christian morality or local ethical and moral codes (Islam, common law, etc.). There are many examples of such deformations in modern history in the form of various dictatorships and totalitarian systems. Nevertheless, the view of criminalisation is more or less socioanthropological,andit will not be used for the purposes of this analysis that focuses mainly on politics and security. It was however important to introduce it as the basic wider view of the term. What is more important for the following analysis is the view of the term criminalisation which emphasises changes in behaviour and motivation of actors within the research field of security. In this case, criminalisation means the process in which a certain actor (from an individual to the state) gradually changes into a criminal actor, mostly in both the criminal law and ethical and moral paradigms. If the actors within the research field of security are mostly group actors, the process of criminalisation of originally in most cases a political actor involves ahigher type of criminal activity which is organized and becomes organized crime, presenting a challenge and threat to the whole social system or societyin certain defined time and space. The actor who is getting criminalised increasingly accentuates mainly economic profit and its maximization, for a long period of time (Finckenauer 2005, Hagan 2006, Abadinsky 1994, Cressey 1972). Economic profit is achieved mostly in an illegal way, or in a legal way but using illegal means. Such actors do not necessarily need to be 74


apolitical, and often even cannot be apolitical, but politics stops playing a role for them in the sense of ideology and doctrines. It becomes again only a tool to maximize profits, to protect them and to make the impression of legality. But the basis of their motivation is accumulation of profit without any moral or legal restrictions, and gaining power in order to protect their profit. All activity is profit-oriented. Criminalization is therefore theprocessof more or less gradual change of the actor’s motivations and goals towards economic profit which is aggregated by criminal activity. The actor’s original motivation or status however often remains as a guise, and the actor’s criminalisation may not be evident when looked at superficially. And it is this very process that is happening according to the author’s assumptions to the sub-state actor – Ramzan Kadyrov’sregime in the ChechenRepublic – a federal entity within Russian Federation. The aim of the following analysis is to show how Kadyrov’s regime collects economic resources and to what extent is this part of the regime’s operation criminal.

The problematic issue of oil There is not even basic data about the current Chechen economic facts, but the general characteristics are evident. Kadyrov’s clan has a monopoly in most of the lucrative industries (transportation, construction, mining). They are impossible to penetrate even for those willing to pay tribute. The most important is oil tradewhich is connected with theRussian state company Rosneft, but its real functioning is shrouded in mystery. Many sources (Aliyev 2008,Pylńova 2009; some confidential) claim that much more oil is extracted than officially reported, and the unreported oilis sold in illegal markets; the profits are shared among Kadyrov’sclan, Rosneft management and its political patronsin Moscow. There is no official data, and we can only get to unofficial and unverifiabledata, especially when distribution of profits is concerned. 75


The issue of Chechen oil is however the biggest bone of contentionin the relation between Putin’s centre and Kadyrov’s periphery. Kadyrov has long been trying to get Chechen oil extraction and transportation as well as transportation of Azerbaijani oil over Chechen territory under his control. Chechen oil used to make 7% of total Rosneft oil extraction, via Grozneftegaz, which is not a decisive share but neither can we say that it is a negligible amount (Reuters 4.4.2012). In the long term, however, the amount of oil extraction is decreasing. According to Pylńova (2009), 15.6 million barrels of oil were produced in 2007, while in 2008 it was 13.9 million according to data from Grozneftegaz, 11.4 million in 2009, and 7.4 million barrels of crude oil in 2010. Oil extraction was further decreased to 5.9 million barrels in 2011 and to 4.7 million barrels in 2012 (Rosneft 2013). Most oil is exported from Chechnya, both by pipelines and by trains. A lot of trade with exported oil is donevia offshore companies which also keep part of the profits. The owners are virtually untraceable. Another part of the profits is supposed to stay on a special account of the Department of Energy, but exact data is a state secret. While 49% of Grozneftegaz is owned by Kadyrov’s regime, the controlling interest of 51% belongs to the federal Rosneft. The second important company is Chechenneftekhimprom, which is the successor company of the Soviet company Grozneft which used to own 100% of Chechen oil industry. The company however exists only on paper, and the licence belongs to Rosneft. The question of licences is constantly being opened by Grozny because the lease contracts should be temporary, and this makes the Chechen representatives question the claims of the federal centre (Rosneft) to controlling the most strategic and most lucrative branch of Chechen industry.Already during Putin’s first presidency, the current Chechen president’s father Akhmad Kadyrov wanted to control the oil industry. However, he died in a bomb attack at the Grozny football stadium on 9 th May 2003 before the scheduled meeting with Putin regarding these questions. Alu Alkhanov was not so active in this matter, but Akhmad’s son and real successor Ramzan, after 76


consolidating his power, was very active in the matter of oil industry, and this issue has always belonged to the most problematic points in his relations with the federal centre. In 2012, Kadyrov junior tried to reach an agreement with Azerbaijanabout deepening their cooperation andinvolving Azerbaijani companies in Chechen oil industry. The then Minister of Finance of Chechnya, Eli Isayev even declared in Baku that Rosneft’slicence to Chechen oil extraction had expired (Radio Free Europe 2012, Grozny Inform 2012). Kadyrov had resorted to this step before Vladimir Putin’s presidential inauguration after his re-election in 2012. Moscow’s reaction to this step was however very disapproving, and Kadyrov was unusually strongly warned that a 49% share was not even imagined by other Chechen leaders, and that he would not be able to control the oil sector because that would virtually be the last step towards actual independence. According to internal sources, there was a clear threat that if he would not stop negotiating with Azerbaijanhe could lose Putin's support very fast, and instead he could face Moscow’s attempts to dethrone him. Oil business represents the most lucrative and strategic industry in Chechnya. Although oil extraction in Chechnya is technologically relatively difficult and oil infrastructure is obsolete, the high quality of Chechen oil and the country’s strategic location are very valuable. So valuable that Moscow had refused and continues to refuse to give Kadyrov a free hand in this matter.

Siphoning money from federal budgets A classic manifestation of the sultanistic character of R. Kadyrov’sregime is the use of money from budgets intended for post-war reconstruction of infrastructure and housing devastated by military conflicts. According to local sources wishing to remain anonymous, much of it ends up on private accountsof Kadyrov and his closest associates (Shaa Turlayev, Delimkhanov brothers and others). When Kadyrov does invest a part of the budget in the reconstruction of Chechnya, it always involves projects 77


that bring profit to his allied businessmen. Long-term investments in education, healthcare or industry cannot be demonstrated. For a population that has spent a decade either in ruins or in makeshift refugee camps andhas been facing absolute lack of employment opportunities outside the

limited

environment

of

state

services,

even

superficial

and

hastily

and poorlydonereconstruction is psychologically important. It strengthens the illusion of a normal life. This is one of the reasons the common citizen considers his or her dependence on a clientelist system of services and reciprocal services or on the black market to be meaningful and functional. In this respect we can see in Chechnya some sort of forgiving tolerance of stealing, or misappropriation of state funds. Besides, the situation in neighbouring North Caucasian republics is not different. In general, the tradition of using office as a way to private enrichment is simply deeply rooted in the given region as well as in the wider context of Russian politics, and there is no reason to limit it only to Chechnya (Pipes 1992). We should also mention the opinion of a number of Chechen people that Russia is actually morally obligated to “pour” money into the region because it is the most to blame for destroying the country. While Kadyrov managed to relatively successfully create the illusion of stability and development in Chechnya, when looking closer, a number of the financed projects are useless, excessive, and often showing typical characteristics of Potemkin villages. A whole range of hotels, a football stadium, or a high-quality road from Grozny to Gudermes have been built, while many basic elements of social infrastructure such as kindergartens, schools and good health-care facilities are still missing. Neither are transportation and industrial infrastructure being developed as expected, and the audit by Schetnaya Palata points this out when it mentions the shortcomings such as insufficient fulfilment of the Strategy of Development of the North Caucasian Federal District by 2025, failure to accept a solution to renew the railway connection between 78


Grozny and Nazran, and to build an oil refinery in Grozny. A whole range of projects in education, culture, and health-care have not been completed either, which is however also connected with the reduction of funds for the federal target programme of SocialEconomic Development of Chechen Republicby 12 billion roubles. Kadyrov has failed to build an industrial basis that would bring profits. The construction boom is slowly coming to an end, and it was not significantly contributing to improving the unemployment data anyway because ordinary Chechens were rarely employed by foreign construction companies. Chechen representatives therefore suggest that money for Chechnya should also be earmarked for the construction of industrial and manufacturing facilities, again from the federal budget. Chechnya, or rather the whole North Caucasian Federal District is Russia’s leading region when it comes to the corruption index and money laundering. The problem is largely due to the fact that the banking system in the region is not enough developed, and many operations go through shadow economy. For that matter, this applies to the whole financial system, and it can be seen as one of the causes why budgets are so successfully misappropriated, or at best inefficiently used. We should also mention that Chechnya is not a unique case in Russian context. Although it belonged to the first twenty subsidised regions in 2012 both in terms of absolute volumes and in the volumes of subsidies per capita, for example the neighbouring Ingushetia or Dagestan are more subsidised regions than Chechnya in terms of funds per capita. The fact is also that while Chechnya receives federal subsidies, it does not have revenues from its raw material resources which mainly consist of high quality oil. On the other hand, it is virtually impossible to obtain data about how much Chechnya uses from non-public budget funds which include various politically and security-sensitive expenses, and many local sources claim that Kadyrov’sregime receives considerable funds from this budget section, especially in 2013 when it was on lower positions in official data. However, official data are 79


confusing and unclear. Kadyrov himself uses various data in his appearances, sometimes talking about 50 billion roubles in the absolute volume, and other times about 80 billion. The official figure that can be found for 2013 is 17.9 billion, which makes Chechnya the fourth most subsidised republic in absolute volume.23The real support is probably even higher. Kadyrov’s administration even calculated on federal budget funds to such extent that according to some Chechen observers they had not hesitated to take out credit from banks, guaranteed by the expected budget funds which would be sent only by the end of the calendar year to prevent their misappropriation. In short, only what had been really done and built was paid. But this way Kadyrov’s administration de facto managed to bypass federal control. If this fact is true, it shows very clearly the form of relations and degree of trust between both parties. It is therefore evident that the views of the Chechen administration and the federal centre diverge, and the degree of the federal centre’s distrust is growing. Even the head of the North Caucasian Federal District, Alexander Khloponin, shows his discontent. He said several times that the federal district under his control is leading among Russian regions when it comes to money laundering, which often happens through investment projects in Chechnya. He also pointed out that not even after 10 years have the boeviks been cut off from financial support, which can be seen as a clear allusion to Ramzan Kadyrov who is supported by Moscow mainly because he is supposed to play the role of guarantor of stability in Chechnya and fighter against illegal armed formations. 23

The first is the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) with 51.4 billion roubles, the second is Dagestan with 43.2 billion, the third is Kamchatka Kraiwith 31.7 billion. Note that Sakha Republicand Kamchatka Krai are sparsely populated areas, so they are subsidised far more per capita than Dagestan or Chechnya. See Federalnyi zakon ot 03.12.2012 N 2016-FZ “O federalnom byudzhete na 2013 god i na planovyj period 2013 a 2014 god”.

80


Considering the fact that Chechen political regime is strongly vertical with significant power in the hands of the head of the republic Ramzan Kadyrov, it is necessary to say that it is he and his closest associates who are fully responsible for managing the budget funds. This distinguishes Chechnya from neighbouring subsidised republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia where the structure of power is much more fragmented, and where many more participants are fighting for budget funds.

Racketeering Many witnesses indicatethat Kadyrov’s militants accumulate capital in the classic old mafia/gangster way –byracketeering. The reasons for collecting money from various actors are numerous: money for Ramzan’s birthday celebration, for a statue of his father, simple protection money, etc. Kadyrov’s followers also establishunofficial customs houses, allegedly serving as checkpoints to prevent movement of terrorists. In fact, however, they serve to collect money for passage, in the “brasher” version even from Russian soldiers. All this makes some observers compare Kadyrov’s regime to a quasi-feudal structure. The elites simply see Chechnya as a feud from the centre; for occasionally showing loyalty to Moscow and paying a part of the tribute to some of its representative, they are basically allowed to do anything on its territory. Another parallel to organized crime is the Akhmad Kadyrov Fund (officially Regional Public Fund of the Hero of the RF A. Kadyrov) serving as the common bank (known asoбщак). It was founded in 2004, and the head of the fund is A. Kadyrov’s widow and mother of the current president, Aimani Kadyrova. The fund officially serves as a foundation financing social and development projects in Chechnya. The money for the fund and other Ramzan’s charitable activities supposedly comes from businessmen of Chechen origin Umar Dzhabrailov24 or Ruslan Baysarov.25The fund was used 24

Dzhabrailov belongs to the most distinctive figures of Chechen origin in Russian social life. He graduated from MGIMO in 1980s. He was a member of the Federation Council in 2004-

81


to finance even projects beneficial to the whole society, but absolutely unsystematically. At the same time, Kadyrov is notorious for randomly (but as the personality cult requires, always in front of TV cameras) giving expensive presents to common people as well as to guests from among the stars of show business and sports whose concerts and performances are always generously financed by the fund (Novaya gazeta 2008). In this respect, Ramzan’s position really resembles the gloryof oriental satraps. This approach moreover hinders the development of medium and small businesses, and meaningful long-term foreign investments (or investments from other subjects of Russian federation outside Chechnya). Kadyrov has recently felt the desire to develop tourist industry in the country, but he is not willing or able to realize many consequences. Or he is, but in that case the whole project is only a cover-up for stashingaway financial resources obtained in various ways. The first problem Kadyrov would have to solve is building a good transportation infrastructure. He would also have to give up his monopoly on air traffic which he controls via Grozny Avia. Air traffic to Groznyis the most expensive of all comparable destinations (Makhachkala, Nazran, Vladikavkaz, Nalchik).Tourist industry also requires a whole range of accompanying 2009, and is currently adviser in presidential administration, also active in diplomacy, working as an unofficial adviser and emissary e.g. in Russian-Bangladeshi, Russian-Sudanese, or Russian-Jordanian relations, i.e. in connection with Muslim countries. He got rich in hotel industry and oil trade, his business style was close to the Komsomol elites of 1980s; he is currently a patron of the arts (Marciniak 2001). Typologically he is rather an oligarch than a criminal authority or warlord. 25

Baysarov became famous by marrying Kristina, daughter of the Soviet/Russian popular music legend Alla Pugacheva. They were later scandalised due to their relationship problems, with Baysarov supposedly even kidnapping their son. He got rich in show business, owned casinos and hotels. Later he penetrated the oil and gas industry. It was through him that R. Kadyrov allegedly entered into business with Y. Luzhkov (mayor of Moscow until 2010), or more precisely with his wife Yelena Baturina, in the area of hotel services and real estate and oil trade. He is viewed as the leader of Chechen criminal structures, and survived several assassination attempts (Shleynov 2011).

82


services, often at the level of small businesses. But the omnipresent corruption and racketeering by local authorities in effect don’t allow any free economic activity, which has been lately the main cause why Chechens, especially younger generations, have been leaving their country and moving to Russian centres or to Europe. And in many cases it is also the key motivation to join anti-Kadyrov opposition which however in fact currently consists only of Islamists. Low social mobility in the country which has been smotheredby power domination of the Kadyrov clan is an often ignored factor of radicalisation of a part of the society and non-existence of any real economic development of the country. Acquiring even a small farmor shop is faced with so many bureaucratic obstacles and often direct racketeering by Kadyrov’s militants that people outside Kadyrov’s clan can simply by no means do business that would pay off. Any resistance often ends very tragically – by arson attacks against the business and property, torturing, and sometimes even elimination of the disobedient individual. When a profitable business is started away from the attention of Kadyrov’s people, at the moment when such business is "discovered" by them, the situation is even more dangerous for the businessmen than if it had been nipped in the bud. In such case, a powerful Kadyrov's follower appears, opening a rival business, starting to compete unfairly, offering dumping prices, and gradually taking over the original business of the businessman whose successful business activity had found a niche in the market. This is followed by monopolisation, raising the price of the commodity or services, and decline in their quality. The author of this text for example got acquainted with the situation in brick making industry which corresponds to this model, and which has gradually been taken under the control of Ramzan Kadyrov’s close associates and confidants, the Delimkhanov brothers and Magomed Daudov,alias the Lord. When the country finds itself in the current atmosphere of fear and tension, it can never get the reputation of a tourist destination where people come to relax. To build 83


on local Chechen tourism is an absolutely unprofitable decision because Chechen clientele is economically very weak. Other nations in the RF including the Russian majority are already used to western or Mediterranean standards, and they are moreover burdened by anti-Chechen stereotypes. The foreign tourists coming to the region are only adventurers, and not conventional tourists – the core of mass tourism.

Conclusion Kadyrov’s regime has more economic resources and methods of collecting finances, for example customs machinations at Grozny airport (Marten 2012). Nevertheless, the above mentioned methods and industries are the most typical way how Kadyrov’s followers gain economic sources of their power. The most significant are federal budget funds,the most strategic is oil industry, which they however don’t fully control, and the most typical and destructive in the long term is robbing their own population and economically active people, which encourages the younger generation either to emigration or to joining the rebel structures. Or the situation turns them into passive unproductive individuals, only surviving in fear of their ruler. The crucial problem is that the criminal and despotic way of economic activity is deeply rooted in Kadyrov’s regime andmade possible by support from the federal centre. And let’s leave aside the fact that in this respect the whole Russian Federation is a problematic state where proprietary rights are not sufficiently guaranteed, and the state has criminalization tendencies even in other regions of this vast country. Chechnya is really an extreme example.

84


Literature: ABADINSKY, H. (1994). Organized Crime. Chicago. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ALIYEV, T. (2008).Komu prinadlezhit chechenskaya neft. Agentstvo politicheskikh novostey. [on-line]Available at: http://www.apn.ru/publications/article19552.htm. BAKER, P. a GLASSER, S. (2005).Kremlin Rising. Vladimir Putin´s Russia and the End of Revolution. New York – London – Toronto – Sydney: A Lisa Drew Book. CRESSEY, D. R. (1972). Criminal Organization: Its Elementary Forms. London. Harper & Row. FINCKENAUER, J. (2005).Problems of Definition: What is Organized Crime? Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 63-83. HAGAN, F. A. (2006).Organized Crime and „organized crime“: Indeterminante Problems of Definition. Trends in Organized Crime, Vol.9, No.4.,p.127-137. MARCINIAK, W. (2001).Rograbione imperium. Krakow: ARCANA. MARTEN, K. (2012). Warlords. Strong-arm brokers in weak states. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. PYNLŃOVA, D. (2009).Voina ze chechenskuyu neft. Novaya gazeta 29.01.2009. [on-line] Available at:http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/46335.html. SCHNEIDER, J. a SCHNEIDER, P. (2008).The anthropology of crime and criminalization. Annual review of anthropology, No. 37,p. 351-373. SNYDER, R. (1998).Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes:Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives.In Chehabi, H. E. & Linz, J. J. (eds.).Sultanistic Regimes. London – Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

85


SHLEYNOV, M. (2011).Kak ustroen biznes Ruslana Baysarova.Vedomosti,No. 12 December

2011.

[on-line]Available

at:

http://www.vedomosti.ru/library/news/1450005/esli_budet_ploho_obraschus_i_k_kadyrovu.

Media sources: GROZNYINFORM (05.04.2012).Эли Исаев опроверг сообщения некоторых СМИ.[on-line] Available at:http://www.grozny-inform.ru/main.mhtml?Part=9&PubID=32984 NOVAYAGAZETA (03.07.2008).Дары Рамзана: Как стать народным и одновременно

богатым.

[on-line]

Available

at:http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/39605.html. RADIO FREE EUROPE (17.04.2012).Russia's Chechnya Invites Azerbaijan To Explore

Oil

Fields.[on-line]

Available

at:http://www.rferl.org/content/chechnya_invites_azerbaijan_to_explore_oil_fields/24540282.ht ml. Coalson, R. (2012): Russia´s Chechnya Invites Azerbaijan to Explore Oil Fields. Available at:http://www.rferl.org/content/chechnya_invites_azerbaijan_to_explore_oil_fields/24540 282.html.

86


Mareš, M., Výborný, J.: Militantní demokracie ve střední Evropě

Autor: Michal Ševčík

Více jak dvousetstránková kniha autorů Mareše a Výborného se zabývá problematikou militantní nebo také bojující demokracie ve střední Evropě. Fenomén tzv. militantní demokracie se v době akcentace lidských a občanských práv jeví přinejmenším jako problematická část státní politiky ve vztahu k těmto právům. Monografie se skládá z devíti kapitol, z nichž osm z nich je věnováno deskripci militantní demokracie v zemích střední Evropy (Německo, Rakousko, Česká republika, Slovensko, Polsko a Maďarsko). Pouze jedna kapitola je věnována tzv. konceptualizaci militantní demokracie, jejíž součástí je i podkapitola zmiňující kritiku této státněpolitické doktríny ze strany odborné veřejnosti, ale i politických aktivistů. Monografie byla mnohými odborníky očekávána (jako první publikace věnující se tématu militantní demokracie v ČR) spíše jako dílo, ve kterém bude rozvedena politická filozofie a teoretická východiska konceptu militantní demokracie, autoři se však věnují deskripci doktríny militantní demokracie ve jmenovaných zemích střední Evropy a toto schéma aplikují i na ty země, kde se o militantní demokracii, tak jak je chápána a stanovována zejména vzorovým modelem v SRN, nejedná (především je možné významně pochybovat o Maďarsku a Polsku). Lze tedy tvrdit, že monografie nepodala ucelený pohled na významný nástroj některých evropských liberálních demokracií k potírání tzv. antidemokratické opozice, ať už domnělé či skutečné, ve smyslu širší analýzy politické filozofie této preventivně-represivní doktríny.

87


Z politologického i právního hlediska je militantní demokracie pouze jistou formou demokracie, avšak jen v určitém politickém rozměru–díky parciální funkčnosti a dosahu na marginální část společností středoevropských států, neboť je nástrojem ke kontrole, regulaci a eliminaci ideologií a aktivistů, kteří buď částečně, anebo zcela zavrhují systém liberálního parlamentarismu. Zvláštností militantní demokracie je rovněž podezření, že se soustředí pouze na regulaci pravicového extremismu a levicový extremismus má mnohem více veřejného prostoru a možností působení a z dosahu prevence a represe militantní demokracie je vyňat (existence komunistických stran a jejich zastoupení v zastupitelských sborech na národní i evropské úrovni ve jmenovaných zemích). Tato „zvláštnost“ může mít za následek oprávněné obavy o jednostrannou ochranu demokracie pouze před pravicovými extremisty (různé podoby neonacismu, neofašismu, nacionalismu a autoritativních systémů vládnutí). Selektivní přístup může rovněž naznačovat zapojení extremistické levice do tvorby realizace militantní demokracie. Jedná se o domněnky s oporou v sociální realitě, které však nebyly doposud konceptualizovány. V kapitole, kde autoři skromně popisují ontologické zdroje militantní demokracie, najdeme zmínky o kořenech militantní demokracie již v antickém Řecku, dále klasiky politické filozofie 18.–20. století, od kdy můžeme datovat nástup kapitalismu, úzce související se současnou podobou liberálního parlamentarismu jako takového. Za důležité považuji uvedení myslitelů Carla Schmitta a Karla Loewensteina. Oba vycházejí ze zcela odlišných metapolitických axiomů, avšak instrumentalizace jejich myšlenek může působit podobně, ne-li stejně. Schmittův etatismus a z něho vyplývající decizionismus,s kořeny v římsko-katolické ekleziologii, který je nadřazen politickým ideologiím (nikoli ideám) u Loewensteina samozřejmě nenalezneme. Právě tyto dva autory a jejich díla by bylo vhodné rozvést pro lepší pochopení existence militantní demokracie, bohužel toto v monografii Mareše a Výborného absentuje. Již tradičně jsou v rámci brněnské politologické školy uváděni němečtí autoři Backes a Jesse, kteří se 88


soustředí na vymezování pojmu a působnosti militantní demokracie. Jejich modely militantní demokracie jsou často v modifikované podobě transponovány i na české podmínky (na základě podobnosti sociální reality ČR a SRN?). V teoretické části se rigidně vychází z premisy, že liberální parlamentarismus je roven velmi problematickému a v poslední době také více konfliktnímu pojmu svoboda (tedy méně konsenzuálnímu ve smyslu původnosti, rozsahu a smyslu). Tento předpoklad vytváří dojem axiomu, což zrovna demokraticky nepůsobí. Příčiny existence liberálního parlamentarismu a snahy jeho institucí o maximální konzervaci a ochranu lze nalézt u osvícenského myšlení, moderního protestantismu a ateismu či vzniku kapitalistických (buržoazních) společností, které byly záměrně nivelizovány pro lepší mobilitu pracovních sil a komodifikaci veřejného života. Je tedy militantní demokracie strážkyní svobody nebo strážkyní partikulárních hospodářských zájmů? Odtud směřuje výtka ke stručnosti konceptualizace pojmu militantní demokracie ve druhé kapitole. Třetí kapitola pojednává o militantní demokracii (ochraně demokracie vůbec) v Německu. Popisuje doktrinální souvztažnosti, východiska a aktéry. Principiálně vychází z nutnosti ochrany demokracie před režimy, jako byl národní socialismus (12leté období Zeit des Nationalsozialismus). Německo je klasickým případem selektivního přístupu (který je úhelným kamenem militantní demokracie v celé střední Evropě) k aplikaci metod militantní demokracie; na jedné straně potírání veškeré propagace národního socialismu a na straně druhé tolerování propagace režimu, který existoval v Německé demokratické republice (komunistický

režim

vlády

jedné

strany).

Existence

„neonacistické“

Národnědemokratické strany Německa (která je nejspíš infiltrována agenty německé kontrarozvědky Bundesamt für Vervassungsschutz) a její participace na politickém životě

Německa

je

podmíněna

distancováním 89

se

od

národního

socialismu.


V případě nástupkyně východoněmecké Sozialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Die Linke, je sentiment k režimu v NDR (verbální přihlášení se k vymoženostem socialismu) nesankcionován. Mareš s Výborným se tomuto přístupu na obecné rovině ani jeho bližšímu vysvětlení příliš nevěnují. Ve čtvrté kapitole je probírána militantní demokracie v Rakousku, jejíž struktura a teleologie má stejný záměr jako v Německu – ochrana před restaurováním reziduí národního socialismu (selektivní přístup). Rovněž zde najdeme instrumenty a aktéry, stejně jako problematiku existence pravicově-populistických stran FPÖ a přidruženou FPK v Korutanech, které mají stabilně poměrně dobré volební výsledky. Strany však nekritizují liberální parlamentarismus, ale pouze konkurenční politické ideologie v rámci samotného diskurzu. Pátá kapitola je věnována tradicím a základním hodnotám ochrany demokracie v České republice. Kapitola má stejné náležitosti jako další kapitoly věnující se popisům militantní demokracie v jednotlivých zemích. Tradice militantní demokracie v ČR je odvozována

od

politiky

ochrany

ústavy

ČSR

v letech

1918–1938

a

potom

na denacifikačním a antiněmeckém úsilí poválečné vlády a následných 40 let diktatury proletariátu. Akademická schémata i praktické postupy či přístupy jsou velmi často přijímány od německého modelu streitbare Demokratie. V šesté kapitole najdeme deskripci stavu militantní demokracie na Slovensku, která se v mnohém podobá České republice a Německu, jak autoři správně uvádějí. Jednak z důvodu existence společného státu Čechů a Slováků a rovněž dominantnímu teoreticko-metodologickému vlivu SRN v této oblasti. Sedmá kapitola (o Polsku) hovoří o specifické historické zkušenosti polských občanů s nacismem a komunismem a silným vlasteneckým cítěním, které v určitých aspektech může naplňovat rysy nacionalistického extremismu, vůči kterému je ze strany

90


veřejnosti i státu jistá tolerance, neboť z kvantitativního hlediska se nejedná o marginální politické skupiny. Osmá kapitola, věnující se Maďarsku, naznačuje, že tolerance společnosti a státního aparátu vůči tamním extremistickým skupinám (v našem případě pouze pravicověextremistickým) je v určité blízkosti spíš s identifikací. Současná politika Maďarska je pravicově vyhraněná a politické ovzduší ovlivňuje i krajní pravice zastoupená v parlamentu na národní i evropské úrovni (Jobbik). Jsou diskutovány i změny ústavy a posuny od liberálního parlamentarismu k blíže nespecifikované formě demokracie (k jedné změně ústavy již v Maďarsku došlo). Maďarsko má silnou antiliberální tradici projevující se i v současnosti a v případě této země postrádá smysl aplikovat schéma militantní demokracie. Celkově lze říci, že publikace Militantní demokracie ve střední Evropě neměla ambici být politickofilozofickým příspěvkem k veřejné diskuzi o tomto pojmu, který kvůli svojí koncepci působí často jako protimluv, ale je spíše deskripcí současného stavu profylaktických

a

represivních

postupů

vůči

razantním

kritikům

liberálního

parlamentarismu. Na počin zabývající se hlubším zamyšlením si v naší vlasti ještě počkáme.

91


Kraus, J. Íránský státní terorismus. Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, Brno, 2014.

Autor: Martin Doleček E-mail: [email protected]

Představovaná publikace si klade za úkol několik cílů. Kromě zodpovězení hlavní výzkumné otázky zde figurují také další úkoly, jdoucí s tím hlavním ruku v ruce. Výzkumnou otázku autor formuloval takto: Jak intenzivní hrozbu terorismus íránské provenience, resp. Íránem podporovaný, představuje? Naším úkolem je tedy odpovědět, jak se s ní autor vypořádal. Hned na úvod je pak vhodné uvést, že vzhledem k povaze práce s otevřenými zdroji a také kvůli značně problematickému vymezení samotného fenoménu terorismu a konceptualizaci pojmů si autor vytyčil poměrně náročný úkol. Nicméně formulace hlavní výzkumné otázky stejně jako fakt, že autor při vymezení pojmů a následné konceptualizaci postupuje logicky a smysluplně, tyto obtíže umenšuje a kniha tak už od počátečních pasáží dává čtenáři tušit, že Krausova práce je promyšleným a poučeným počinem. Celá zkoumaná problematika je zařazena do přehledného rámce, a to nejen po stránce konceptualizace a následné operacionalizace užívaných pojmů, ale také s ohledem na vymezené časové období, které odpovídá z výzkumného hlediska relevantním mezníkům íránských teroristických aktivit. Nyní krátce ke struktuře knihy – ta je rozdělena do desíti kapitol (nepočítaje v to závěr), na nichž nás autor postupně seznamuje s cíli práce a použitou metodologií, hovoří také o problematických aspektech takto laděného výzkumu či teorii státního terorismu. Po tomto teoretickém výkladu postupujeme k historickému pozadí moderního 92


Íránu a popisu jeho politického systému včetně jeho vývoje. Po něm se čtenář nachází zhruba v polovině hlavní části knihy. Zde se dostáváme k jednotlivým oblastem, které jsou nám představovány s ohledem na působení íránského státního terorismu. Prostor je tak věnován Perskému zálivu, Levantě, Afghánistánu, Kavkazskému regionu a íránské podpoře terorismu ve zbývajících částech světa. Ke konci se Kraus věnuje také ještě terorismu směrem dovnitř, kde rozlišuje domácí patronaci a asistenci. Při vymezování teorie Kraus zcela správně zmiňuje i kritické hlasy, jež se negativně vyhrazují vůči řazení zkoumaných státních aktivit mezi terorismus jako takový. Autor zde čtenáři nezapomíná přiblížit ani hlavní linie diskuze, jež je kolem tohoto tématu vedena – nicméně by textu jistě prospělo, a ocenili by to především čtenáři méně důvěrně obeznámení s problematikou konceptualizace státního terorismu, kdyby na tomto místě autor uvedl i informace ohledně toho, jak výrazné zastoupení tyto zamítavé názory mají v rámci hlavního proudu. Na druhou stranu je poctivé přiznat, že s nastolenými protiargumenty se Kraus vypořádává naprosto adekvátně a jeho pojetí tématu obstává bez trhlin. Vyskytují-li se v knize problematické momenty (například ve vztahu k validitě zdrojů atp.), Kraus je vždy uvádí na pravou míru a poskytuje potřebné vysvětlení jak s ohledem na konkrétní příklady, tak i v otázce teoretických informací. Je nasnadě, že problematika íránského státního terorismu je komplikovaná nejen možnostmi, jak získat potřebné údaje, ale také povahou popisovaných skutečností, které spadají do přece jen poněkud odlišného kulturního prostoru, než na jaký je obyvatel střední Evropy zvyklý. Každá z oblastí, jimiž se Kraus ve své knize zabývá, je proto představena natolik, aby čtenáři co nejvíce přiblížila kontext nezbytný k pochopení daného problému. Podávaný přehled informací není vyčerpávající, naopak spíše jen nezbytně nutný, a to lze rozhodně přičíst textu k duhu. Autor píše zhutněle, jde k věci a slovy neplýtvá – ani tato deviza bohužel však neusnadňuje orientaci v textu nabitém 93


exoticky znějícími názvy reálií a osob; aspekt jistě očekávatelný, i přesto je však dobré na něj čtenáře upozornit. Postrádá-li recenzent v knize něco po stránce jejího zpracování, pak lze dodat, že u některých rozvětvených definic (např. dle Stohla na straně 26) by jistě nebylo na škodu zpracovat daný problém pomocí nějaké efektní schematizace – zde kupříkladu názornou tabulkou či zpřehledňující ilustrací. Podobnou námitku je možné směřovat i na absenci mapového doprovodu. Oblast, jež je předmětem Krausova zájmu, je natolik specifická, že by vizuální znázornění probíraných oblastí bylo významným přínosem. Vezmeme-li však tuto výtku do důsledku, mapové podklady si lze dohledat – to by ale nešlo říci o vlastních fotografiích autora, kterými knihu vhodně doplňuje. A nadto lze zmínit daleko více kladů hodnocené publikace. Touto prací autor pomáhá vyjasňovat některé podstatné nejasnosti či nejednoznačnosti, které prostupují kupříkladu mediálním prostorem; viz např. Krausovo vysvětlení skutečného rozdělení moci v Íránu a reálné, médii nadceňované, prezidentovy moci (s. 71–72). Zajímavým přínosem publikace je také pojednání o významu íránských náboženských nadací a jejich

vztahu

k ekonomickému

fungování

země

a

dalším,

o

poznání

méně

očekávatelným oblastem působnosti. A je na místě doplnit, že podobných momentů, které vnášejí světlo do problematik, které se mohou našinci jevit jako nejasné, obsahuje tato monografie celou řadu. U témat, která jsou z hlediska konceptualizace či operacionalizace problematická, Kraus ve své knize nenechává prázdná místa, ale poskytuje dostatečné široký vhled, díky kterému si čtenář zvládá utvářet celistvý kontext. Kniha obsahuje mnoho konkrétních příkladů, zpětné odkazování na dříve zmíněné skutečnosti apod., čímž je autenticky dokládán jeden velice podstatný fakt, na nějž ostatně upozorňuje i sám autor: pro celou oblast platí, že současné hranice moderních státních jednotek mnohdy nemusejí odpovídat skutečnému geografickému ohraničení 94


lokálních konfliktů či problémů (případ Levanty; s. 103) nebo etnického rozložení (případ Tádžiků; s. 131). Jak je už na samém počátku knihy uvedeno, odpovědět na výzkumné otázky pomocí kvantitativních metod nelze, a to ze zcela pochopitelných důvodů. Kvalitativní přístup může z jistého pohledu budit dojem méně věrohodné metody. Kraus nicméně postupuje systematicky a jeho způsob výkladu a použité argumentace je přesvědčivý a vede k věrohodným závěrům. Ocenit lze mj. i přístup autora k zařazení kapitoly o Kavkaze. Tato oblast je z hlediska vztahu k íránskému státnímu terorismu poměrně problematická a pro některé autory také kontroverzní. Na problematické aspekty je ovšem čtenář upozorněn a kapitola tak slouží daleko spíše k rozšíření přehledu o zkoumaném fenoménu než k jeho zmatení. Bylo-li v úvodu nadneseno, že text by rád přispěl do debaty o konceptualizaci státního terorismu a případně pomohl zpřehlednit uchopení dané problematiky, je možné říci, že k tomu nedošlo nijak násilně. Závěrem své monografie Kraus uvádí, že jeho cílem nebylo nastolit autoritativní řešení a přinést jednoduché odpovědi, v čemž s ním lze bezproblémově souhlasit. Jak jinak by totiž měl autor vstoupit do diskuze než poctivým vědeckým vkladem? A za ten je knihu podloženou smysluplnou teorií, hlubokým vhledem a četným vlastním terénním výzkumem jistě možné považovat. Ostatně i jeho odpověď na hlavní výzkumnou otázku není banální. Byť ji představuje poměrně skromná tabulka míry ohrožení daných oblastí, již autor zařadil v závěru, za jejím zpracováním stojí kus promyšlené práce. Závěrem lze už jen doplnit, že tuto publikaci mohou ocenit především odborníci či studenti z oblasti bezpečnostních a strategických studií či mezinárodních vztahů anebo i politologie. Doporučit ji lze rozhodně také novinářům či komukoli se zájmem o tuto

95


problematiku; nepochybně tedy i expertům z řad odpovídajících státních bezpečnostních složek.

96

Rexter – časopis pro výzkum radikalismu, extremismu a terorismu je vydáván Centrem pro bezpečnostní a strategická studia, o.s. ve spolupráci s Katedrou politologie Fakulty sociálních studií Masarykovy univerzity v Brně. ▪ Vydáváno dvakrát ročně. ▪ Výkonný redaktor: PhDr. Josef Smolík, Ph.D. ▪ Redakční rada: PhDr. Josef Smolík, Ph.D., doc. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D., Mgr. Tomáš Šmíd, Ph.D., Mgr. Richard Stojar, Doc. Ing. Dr. Štefan Danics, Ph.D., Mgr. Martin Hrabálek, Ph.D., prof. PhDr. Pavel Mühlpachr, Ph.D. a Mgr. Alena Kajanová, Ph.D. ▪ Jazyková korektura/proofreading: Bc. Martin Doleček ▪ www.rexter.cz ▪ www.cbss.cz ▪ Časopis je registrován Ministerstvem kultury České republiky pod číslem MK ČR E 21205. ▪ ISSN: 1214-7737

2014

Recommend Documents