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De!ontmoetingen!van!de!BELGIAN!FINANCE!CLUB!! !
2015:!Confrontatie!van!de!opinies!van!5!grote!economisten! ! !
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Maandag!15!december!2014!om!18u15!in!de!kantoren!van!! TreeTop!Asset!Management,!79,!Frankenstraat,!Brussel!
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• • • • •
Evolutie!van!de!rentevoeten!en!wisselkoersen!:!! ! Peter!Vanden!Houte,!Chief!Economist!ING! Vooruitzichten!van!de!Belgische!economie!:!! ! ! Edwin!De!Boeck,!Chief!Economist!KBC!Group! Problematiek!van!de!overheidsschulden!:!! ! ! Prof.!Dr.!Bruno!Colmant,!partner!Roland!Berger! Europa:!gebrek!aan!concurrentievermogen?!:!! ! ! Georges!Ugeux,!CEO!Galileo!Global!Advisors! Structurele!hervormingen,!tewerkstelling!en!ongelijkheden:!! Philippe!Defeyt,!Voorzitter!OCMW!van!Namur! !
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Les!rencontres!du!BELGIAN!FINANCE!CLUB!! !
2015:!Confrontation!des!avis!de!5!grands!économistes! ! !
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Lundi!15!décembre!2014!à!18h15!dans!les!bureaux!de!! TreeTop!Asset!Management,!79,!rue!des!Francs!à!Bruxelles!
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• Evolution!des!taux!d’intérêt!et!des!cours!de!change!:!! • Perspectives!de!l’économie!belge!:!!
! ! • Problématique!des!dettes!souveraines!:!! ! • L’Europe!en!perte!de!compétitivité?!:!! ! ! • Réformes!structurelles,!emploi!et!inégalités!:!!
! ! ! !
Peter!Vanden!Houte,!Chief!Economist!ING! Edwin!De!Boeck,!Chief!Economist!KBC!Group! Prof.!Dr.!Bruno!Colmant,!partner!Roland!Berger! Georges!Ugeux,!CEO!Galileo!Global!Advisors! Philippe!Defeyt,!Président!du!CPAS!de!Namur!
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Programma/Programme
1) Problema,ek van de overheidsschulden /Probléma,que des de9es souveraines : Prof. Dr. Bruno Colmant, partner Roland Berger 2) Evolu,e van rentevoeten en wisselkoersen / Evolu,on des taux d’intérêt et cours de change : Peter Vanden Houte, Chief Economist ING 3) Europa: gebrek aan concurren,evermogen? / L’Europe en perte de compé,,vité? Georges Ugeux, CEO & Chairman Galileo Global Advisors 4) Vooruitzichten van de Belgische economie / Perspec,ves de l’économie belge : Edwin De Boeck, Chief Economist KBC Group 5) Structurele hervormingen, tewerkstelling en ongelijkheden : Réformes structurelles, emploi et inégalités : Philippe Defeyt, Président du CPAS de Namur
QUATRE SLIDES BFC.pptx
3
Bruno Colmant
The problem of the sovereign debt
50% 90%
45%
80%
40% 35%
70%
30% 60%
25% 20%
50%
15%
40%
10% 30%
5%
0% 20% 1826 1836 1846 1856 1866 1876 1886 1896 1906 1916 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006
% of countries with annual inflation over 20%
% of countries in default or restructuring
Total public debt/GDP (world average) QUATRE SLIDES BFC.pptx
4
The euro ?
A political decision with insufficient economic ground : monetary federalism BUT budgetary confederalism Windfall effect (monetary expansion, German rating, low rates) Monetary mobility but increased government pressure
The euro is genetically recessionary QUATRE SLIDES BFC.pptx
5
Welcome to euro austerity : a suicide
Unemployment rate : 12,1 % Austerity fuels recession…that requires more austerity The same mistake as in the Thirties (Hoover, Brüning, Laval, …) Risk of a global nationalization… Self-destructive
QUATRE SLIDES BFC.pptx
6
QUATRE SLIDES BFC.pptx
7
Interest rate and exchange rate perspectives Peter Vanden Houte Chief Economist ING Belgium
8
The disappointing recovery GDP since start of the crisis (Q1 2008 = 100)
UK
Japan
Eurozone
9
Secular stagnation arguments (Japanese scenario) • • • •
Overcapacity High private & public debt Population ageing Slow productivity growth (lack of structural reform)
Natural level of interest rates has come down
10
Which central bank will hike monetary policy first?
Unemployment rate (%)
Inflation (%)
11
A new US credit boom?
12
First Fed rate hike in 2015 (though strong $ will slow tightening)
…which may soon start rising
Fed funds rate closely tracks wage growth… 11 10
9 8
5.5
35
5.0
30
4.5
7
4.0
6 5
5.5 5.0 4.5
25
4.0
20
3.5
15
3.0
3.5
4
3.0
3 2
2.5
1
2.0
0 -1
1.5 90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
2.5
10
2.0 5
1.5
0
1.0 90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
NFIB survey: % firms planning to raise worker compensation, 6M lead
Fed Funds target rate
Hourly earnings, y/y%, rhs
Hourly earnings, y/y%
Dec-‐14
Nov-‐14
Oct-‐14
Sep-‐14
Aug-‐14
Jul-‐14
Jun-‐14
May-‐14
Apr-‐14
Mar-‐14
Feb-‐14
Jan-‐14
Number of mentions of “QE” during press conference
# mentions of "QE"
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
14
Some market interest rates pushed into negative territory
15
Sovereign QE based on ECB capital key What if the ECB were to allocate €250bn worth of bond purchases based on ECB capital keys? Amount of central government bond purchases as % of current outstanding >100%
Estonia Latvia
26.8%
Luxembourg
12.0%
Greece
10.9%
Slovakia
8.5%
Cyprus
8.5%
Slovenia
6.9%
Portugal
5.8%
Finland
5.7%
Germany
5.5%
Malta
4.7%
Netherlands
4.4%
Spain
4.3%
France
3.8%
Ireland
3.7%
Austria
3.6%
Belgium
2.8%
Italy
2.7%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
16
Bond yields typically increased after launch of QE (Though in many cases the increase wasn’t sustained…)
5.0
(%)
Fed QE1
(%)
4.5
4.5
Fed QE2 ECB 3Y LTROs
4.0
5.0
4.0 ECB OMT
3.5
3.5
Fed QE3
3.0
3.0
2.5
2.5 TLTROs
2.0
Boj APP
ECB CBPP3 + ABPP
1.5
2.0 1.5
Boj QQME
1.0
?
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.0
0.0 08
09
10 10Y Bund yield
11
12
13
10Y Treasury Yield
14
15
10Y JGB yield 17
Purchasing Power Parity EUR/USD 10 years
10 years
PPP
EUR/USD
18
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Is Europe Losing Its CompeOOveness? Georges Ugeux
Bruxelles, 15 December 2014
European CompeOOveness Is A Myth
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Euro Area Current Account Balance with the Rest of the World (in Billions of Euros)
EU-‐28 Euro Area ( EA-‐ 18) Euro Area ( EA-‐ 17) Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Ireland Greece Spain France Croatia Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden United Kingdom Iceland Norway Montenegro FYR of Macedonia Turkey Japan United States
2003 (23.1) -‐ 20.7 9.4 (1.0) (5.0) 6.5 40.5 (1.0) 0.0 (11.3) (27.5) 7.0 (1.8) (10.4) (0.3) (0.8) (1.1) 2.1 (5.9) (0.1) 26.4 3.8 (4.9) (9.2) (3.1) (0.2) (1.7) 7.0 19.3 (25.8) (0.5) 24.5 -‐ (0.2) (6.7) 120.3 (459.4)
2004 (33.4) -‐ 60.8 9.3 (1.3) (4.7) 5.9 102.4 (1.1) (0.9) (10.7) (44.2) 9.0 (1.4) (4.6) (0.6) (1.4) (1.4) 3.3 (7.1) (0.3) 37.5 5.1 (10.7) (12.4) (5.1) (0.7) (2.7) 9.4 19.3 (37.3) (1.1) 26.5 -‐ (0.4) (11.4) 138.5 (505.4)
2005 (86.5) -‐ 10.8 6.0 (2.7) (1.0) 9.0 112.6 (1.1) (5.7) (14.7) (66.9) (8.3) (1.9) (12.6) (0.8) (1.6) (1.5) 3.5 (6.6) (0.4) 38.0 5.3 (5.9) (15.9) (6.9) (0.5) (3.3) 5.3 20.2 (47.4) (2.2) 39.7 -‐ (0.1) (17.2) 133.3 (602.2)
2006 (144.0) -‐ (12.6) 5.9 (4.6) (2.4) 6.5 144.7 (2.1) (6.3) (23.8) (88.3) (10.3) (2.6) (22.3) (1.0) (3.6) (2.6) 3.5 (6.6) (0.5) 50.7 7.3 (10.4) (17.2) (10.2) (0.5) (3.5) 6.9 27.6 (66.4) (3.2) 46.2 -‐ 0.0 (25.4) 136.5 (637.1)
2007 (138.2) -‐ 7.4 6.4 (7.8) (5.7) 3.1 180.9 (2.6) (10.1) (32.6) (105.3) (18.9) (3.1) (19.9) (1.9) (4.7) (4.1) 3.8 (7.2) (0.3) 38.4 9.6 (19.3) (17.1) (16.8) (1.4) (2.9) 7.7 31.6 (50.3) (2.3) 40.1 -‐ (0.4) (27.5) 154.9 (519.7)
Source: Eurostat, ECB
20
2008 (271.7) -‐ (141.1) (4.6) (8.2) (3.3) 6.8 153.6 (1.5) (10.2) (34.8) (104.7) (33.7) (4.1) (44.9) (2.7) (3.0) (4.2) 2.0 (7.7) (0.3) 25.5 13.8 (23.8) (21.7) (16.2) (2.0) (4.0) 4.9 30.2 (15.6) (2.8) 54.5 -‐ (0.9) (27.1) 107.0 (460.5)
2009 (84.7) (12.0) (12.4) (2.2) (3.1) (3.4) 7.6 140.7 0.4 (3.8) (25.8) (50.5) (25.1) (2.2) (29.0) (1.8) 1.6 1.0 2.6 (0.2) (0.5) 29.7 7.5 (12.2) (18.4) (4.9) (0.2) (1.6) 3.0 18.2 (19.9) (1.0) 35.8 -‐ (0.5) (8.7) 105.0 (269.2)
2010 (67.1) 10.0 10.3 6.8 (0.5) (5.9) 13.8 159.3 0.4 1.8 (22.5) (47.0) (25.5) (0.4) (52.6) (1.7) 0.5 0.0 3.0 0.2 (0.4) 43.3 9.7 (18.1) (18.3) (5.5) (0.1) (2.5) 2.7 22.2 (51.8) (0.8) 38.7 (0.7) (0.1) (34.2) 153.7 (357.0)
2011 (34.2) 12.1 12.4 (4.1) 0.0 (4.2) 14.3 178.4 0.3 2.0 (20.6) (39.0) (35.2) (0.4) (47.3) (0.6) (0.4) (1.2) 2.8 0.4 (0.1) 54.4 4.9 (18.5) (12.0) (5.9) 0.1 (2.6) (2.8) 23.6 (22.3) (0.6) 47.8 (0.6) (0.2) (53.9) 85.6 (339.8)
2012 68.6 133.1 134.1 (7.3) (0.3) (2.0) 14.7 198.6 (0.3) 7.3 (4.6) (12.4) (44.4) 0.0 (4.1) (1.2) (0.6) (0.1) 2.5 0.8 0.1 57.2 7.3 (14.2) (3.3) (5.9) 1.2 1.6 (2.7) 24.4 (73.8) (0.6) 55.8 (0.6) (0.2) (37.0) -‐ -‐
2013 155.7 227.7 228.9 (6.0) 0.8 (2.2) 18.2 206.0 (0.2) 10.9 1.4 8.0 (27.7) 0.5 15.8 (0.3) (0.2) 0.5 2.4 3.0 0.1 62.6 8.4 (5.0) 0.9 (1.5) 2.2 1.5 (2.1) 26.0 (83.4) 0.4 41.1 (0.5) (0.1) (48.7) -‐ -‐
European CompeOOveness Is A Myth USA , Switzerland, China and Russia
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Goods
Source: Eurostat (2013)
21
Services
European Banks Prefer to Finance Governments Despite the Risks Sovereign Exposure Represents Almost 3 Trillion Euros and 120% of European Banks’ Equity
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
(2)
Source: ECB
22
Is Europe Labor Market CompeOOve?
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
The European Unemployment Rate vs. the US and Japan
Source: Eurostat
23
Priority Focus An Anglo-‐Saxon CompeOOve Economy is not compaOble with a Mediterranean Social Model
Urgently needed: competent and courageous poliOcal leadership Find Non-‐Financial soluOons to reinvigorate European Economies
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
Tell the Truth to European CiOzens Embrace InnovaOon and Entrepreneurship
24
Belgische economie Anno 2015
15 December 2014 Edwin De Boeck KBC Group Chief Economist
België 2008-‐2014
Groei gesteund door rela/ef stevige binnenlandse vraag…. Economische groei
Reële parOculiere consumpOe
(reële bbp, Q1 2008 = 100) 105
100
(Q1 2008 = 100)
België
Duitsland
106
Frankrijk
Italië
Spanje
EMU
104
België Duitsland Frankrijk Eurozone
102 100 98 96
95
Investeringsvraag in België (1q2008 = 100)
100 95 90
90
26
85
Bedrijven
Woningbouw
België 2008-‐2014 …maar onhoudbaar
Overheidsfinanciën
55
Groei van de werkgelegenheid (2007= 100)
50
115 110
(% van BBP)
Primaire uitgaven Totale ontvangsten
45
105 40 100 95 90 85
Lopende rekening van de betalingsbalans 6 Gesubsidieerde jobs Totaal
4
Jobs in de marktsector
2
wv. industrie, bouw, en energie
0 -‐2 -‐4
27
(% van BBP)
België 2015-‐2018
Nog zware begro/ngssanering voor de boeg Structurele begroOngsbesparing (in
Vergelijking met begroOngssaneringen in de jaren 80 en 90
% van BBP)
6.5 6 5.5 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -‐0.5
Gerealiseerd in 2010-‐14 Nog te realiseren tegen 2018
8 6 4 2 0 -‐2 -‐4 -‐6 -‐8 -‐10 -‐12 -‐14 -‐16
Reële BBP-‐groei (in %) BegroOngssaldo totale overheid (% van BBP) Bron:EC, Ameco
28
Structureel primair saldo (% van BBP)
België 2015-‐2018
(Alweer) posi/eve olieprijsschok….? Olieprijs
130
CumulaOef effect op reële BBP na 3 jaar van 10% olieprijsdaling
(in USD, per barrel, Brent)
0.40
120
0.37
0.36
0.34
110 100
0.25
80
0.10 0.07
70 60
29
eurozone
0.20
90
*
0.05
0.05
België 2015-‐2018
….die impact van begro/ngssanering en loonma/ging tempert? België -‐ ConsumpOeprijzen (jaars,jging in %)
6% 5% 4%
Algemeen Gezondheidsindex
2014
2015
2016
Reële bbp-‐groei*
1,0
1,3
1,7
InflaOe*
0,3
0,3
1,2
Werkloosheidsgraad (eop)
8,4
8,3
7,8
*JaarsOjging in %, jaargemiddelde
3% 2% 1% 0% -‐1% -‐2%
30
België 2015-‐2018
….maar allicht te weinig om EU2020 jobdoelstellingen te realiseren RelaOeve arbeidskosten (1996 = 100)
Werkgelegenheidsgraad (in % van 20-‐64 jarigen)
Rel. arbeidskost per prod. eenheid (t.o.v. handelspartners) Rel. loonkost per wn. -‐ private sector (t.o.v. 3 buurlanden)
75
111
EU2020-‐doelstelling Vlaanderen: 76% EU2020-‐doelstelling België: 73.2%
70 107
103
65 60
99
55
95
50
31
België
Vlaanderen
Wallonië
Brussel
Philippe Defeyt: Sortir de l'impasse sociale et économique
Supply-side and demand-side policies are closely related (much more than many believe or want to believe) : > supply-side policies are of course necessary to guarantee sustainable prosperity > but bad (short term) demand-side management restricts (long term) investments For the moment : fiscal policies are of the bad sort, even stupid sort
Sortir de l'impasse sociale et économique
Illustrations : > bad short-term management > bad long-term prospects : loss of confidence, less (public and private) R&D, emigration in some countries, building of an hidden debt (infrastructures), less up to date technologies incorporated... > some demand supporting policies (e.g. housing and energy saving) are good in the short-term (more economic activity) and in the long-term (housing less costly)
Sortir de l'impasse sociale et économique
Focus on inequality (incomes and property) : > Growing consensus among economist : to much inequality is hampering (short term) demand as well as (long term) supply > e.g. investments in education, social costs of growing poverty (opportunity costs), propensity to consume, less social cohesion...
Sortir de l'impasse sociale et économique
Focus on pension policies : > Most policies reduce the short and medium term prospects for the young (and less younger) unemployed (even for the most educated) > Many older workers are less keen and capable to adopt new technologies
Sortir de l'impasse sociale et économique
I fear thus that the (supposed) positive supply-side (longterm) effects of people working longer are wiped off by the short-term (demand-side) and long term (supply-side) costs : loss of confidence, less opportunities, short-term impact on the purchasing power... *
*
*
There won't be enough jobs (of good quality) for everybody whatever is done in the coming years
Sortir de l'impasse sociale et économique
Recommendations : - massive investments : housing, energy saving, infrastructures - tax shifts : taxing more the "bads", taxing more the incomes other than wages, taxing more the goods and less the services - review the pension policies and support a gradual retirement policy - (gradually) implement a basic income (allocation universelle)
